埃兹拉·克莱因与德里克·汤普森:政治、特朗普、AOC、埃隆与 DOGE
Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson: Politics, Trump, AOC, Elon & DOGE
两位评论者讨论美国政治生态与民主党路线之争,兼及科技人物与政府效率部门的角色。
2024年大选结束后,民主党同时丢掉了白宫、参议院和众议院,最高法院里也没有一位由自己任命的大法官。党内还找不到一个能接棒的人。
埃兹拉·克莱因(Ezra Klein)在节目里说了一句很重的话:「在我的有生之年,民主党从来没有像现在这样内部碎裂、虚弱、没有领袖、没有方向。」他是《纽约时报》的专栏作家,也是美国左翼最有影响力的声音之一。
他和《大西洋月刊》的德里克·汤普森(Derek Thompson)合写了一本书,叫《丰裕》(Abundance)。书在名义上是给民主党开的药方,骨子里是一次对自由主义自身的清算。
这期节目聊了三个多小时,从民主党输在哪、特朗普赢在哪、注意力怎么成了新的政治货币,一路聊到加州为什么建不出一条高铁、旧金山为什么花170万美元修一个公共厕所,以及AI可能正在悄悄削弱人的思考能力。下面是我认为最值得细读的部分。
民主党还在用金钱结算政治,对手用的是注意力
哈里斯(Kamala Harris)2024年接棒之后,短时间内筹到大约十亿美元,比特朗普还多。这笔钱几乎全部拿去买了注意力:社交媒体团队、竞选广告、明星站台。
克莱因点出了两边的根本差别。民主党至今认定政治的货币是钱,而政治的货币已经换成了注意力。
在美国右翼,擅长社交媒体意味着你本人在社交媒体上就是一个活人。维韦克·拉马斯瓦米、JD·万斯、特朗普、马斯克,他们自己就是产品。在左翼,擅长社交媒体意味着你的办公室里有一个会做表情包的团队。
两套理解方式完全不同。前者把候选人本人变成注意力机器,后者把候选人当成一个需要被包装和保护的资产。
克莱因说他真正确定拜登不行了,是在2023年。那一年拜登没做超级碗中场采访。他的推断是,竞选团队不信任拜登能做好即兴访谈。一位民调落后于对手的在任总统,还拒绝曝光量最大的免费时段,背后一定有外人看不到的理由。
如果你不能让你的候选人变成产品,如果你不信任你的候选人能成为这场选举的产品,你就完蛋了。(Ezra Klein)
特朗普从2015年坐金色扶梯下来那一刻起,把美国政治议程的设定权攥了将近十年。2015到2020年,议题是特朗普。2020到2024年,议题还是特朗普。拜登在任四年,像一块注意力上的真空。2024年重新出来竞选,第一站去福吉谷,讲的是1月6日,讲的还是特朗普。
这套玩法的逻辑很清楚:议程控制权来自冲突,不来自好感。你去做对方强烈反对的事,对方被迫反击,那个议题就被钉在头条上。特朗普现在是现代总统里同期净支持率最低的之一,达到负值只用了五十多天,拜登当年用了两百多天。他做的事显然不服务于受欢迎程度,也不服务于大胜。
三个数字,能解释2024年的大部分
汤普森的解释相当克制。2024年全球范围内在任者集体落败,美国、欧洲、几乎所有发达国家,程度是五十年未见的。疫情后的通胀对所有建制派力量造成了毁灭性打击。民主党恰好在台上,于是承受了这一切。
第二个因素少有人提。21世纪以来,两党的得票率几乎稳定在48%上下,每一次选举都在争夺那飘忽的1.5%。差距这么窄,任何微小的温差摆动都会翻转结果。
克莱因给了一个更极简的模型。2020年,疫情让特朗普承受了大约2.5个百分点的在任惩罚,于是拜登赢了4.5个百分点的普选票。2024年,通胀让哈里斯承受了大约2.5个百分点的在任惩罚,于是特朗普赢了1.5个百分点。
这场胜利谈不上压倒性。特朗普2024年的普选票优势,是2000年以来最小的总统普选胜利。
真正需要解释的是另一个现象:特朗普从2016年至今,对美国政治注意力的垄断持续了将近十年。他赢得注意力靠的是舞台感,政策只是副产品。汤普森把这归因于通信技术革命带来的能力重组。
罗斯福的时代,广播让一种声音能被全国听见。1960年的电视直播让肯尼迪击败尼克松,因为他在屏幕上太好看了。今天这个屏幕时代,奖励的是一种「现场感真实」(live wire authenticity)。特朗普在这个维度上是奇才。他在任何观众面前都不加修饰,脑子里好像没有那个不断计算「这句话对不同群体该怎么说」的后台程序。
相比之下,民主党政治人物的默认状态是官僚式谨慎。汤普森用这个解释莱克斯·弗里德曼(Lex Fridman)长期遇到的现象:左翼嘉宾不太愿意来录三四个小时的长节目。排期只是表层理由,底下的东西是一种文化,害怕说错话,害怕被剪成短视频病毒式传播。
一百七十万美元的厕所,和一条永远建不完的高铁
《丰裕》最狠的地方,是它对民主党自己开刀。
汤普森讲了他写这本书的起点。2022年,疫情已经两年,他在21度的天气里站在外面排队等新冠检测。他一边冻得发抖一边想,原来整个疫情故事从头到尾都是一部稀缺史。检测盒稀缺,疫苗稀缺,口罩稀缺,呼吸机稀缺。21世纪的经济,被稀缺定义了。
这些稀缺里,很大一部分由人自己制造出来。
加州的例子最典型。加州批准了超过300亿美元修高铁,几乎不存在。芝加哥市长最近还自豪地宣布,花了110亿美元建一万套保障房,平均每套110万美元。旧金山修一个公共厕所花了170万美元。
自由主义在过去五十年变得非常擅长阻止的政治,而不擅长建设的政治。它把「批了多少钱」当成成功,把「建成了什么」忘在了后面。(Derek Thompson)
克莱因补充了一个更让人无语的细节。洛杉矶选民通过了一项大约十亿美元的债券法案,专门建保障房。六年过去,建了几千套,平均成本60到70万美元一套。这个价格比在丹佛买房的市场价还高。
原因在于,一旦动用公共资金,就会叠加一层私营开发商不必遵守的规则。你得雇工会工人,或者支付通行工资。你得满足更高的绿色建筑标准。你得在设计上向规划委员会做各种让步,停车场、安保、外观。你为了多拿几笔拨款,还得承诺优先安置无家可归的退伍军人,于是在开工前得先把这些人找到。你还得做额外的无障碍审查,尽管项目已经满足了《美国残疾人法》,城市自己的审查员仍然会说,你们的门框得再宽三英寸。
克莱因给这套做法起了个名字:百吉饼自由主义(everything bagel liberalism)。百吉饼上撒一点芝麻很好吃,把所有东西一股脑全撒上去,它就成了一个什么都逃不出去的黑洞。
高铁是另一个案例。加州高铁在功能上已经不可能建成。技术本身没有障碍,欧洲建、日本建、中国建。问题出在公共项目被监管到无法完成的地步。克莱因说他跟马斯克有100个分歧,但马斯克那句「在加州建高铁在功能上是违法的」,他同意。
再往下挖还有一层。美国这个文明一直在筛选最适合本国经济体系的技能。中国处在发展主义阶段,当土木工程师、搞半导体、造实体东西,就是最好的选择。美国因为富裕和稳定,变成了一个「谈判」极其重要的国家。一个谈判极重要的国家,会持续筛选出律师、金融从业者、管理咨询师。
Stripe创始人帕特里克·科里森(Patrick Collison)有句话被引用过:在美国当个高铁工程师太难了,去做数字生意会容易得多。于是数字领域成了创业的最后前沿。想造东西的人去了比特和字节,不去原子世界。
克莱因引了密歇根大学法学院教授尼克·巴格利(Nick Bagley)的观察。从蒙代尔到沃尔兹,民主党总统候选人名单上,没有一个人没上过法学院。法律人的视角是:政府的合法性来自遵守程序。巴格利的反驳是,政府的合法性至少有一部分来自结果。你把程序放在结果之上,以为自己合法行事,在选民眼里,真正能让你合法的,是你把承诺的东西建成了,是城市变得可负担了。
你年复一年告诉他们,我们才是懂治理的人,他们看不到任何证据。最后就会有个人跳出来说,我一个人就能搞定,然后他赢了。
住房是经济学问题,也是美国的机会地理学
汤普森引了一篇论文,《万物皆房》(The Housing Theory of Everything)。不管你在意什么公共政策议题,住房大概都和它接壤。你在意创新,创新需要人聚在城市里合作,那是住房密度问题。你在意育儿成本,那是降低建筑成本的问题。你想住在朋友和家人附近,那还是住房问题。
数据也很直接。一个城市如果进步派选票份额增加10%,被批准的住房数量就下降30%。过去五十年,我们给人类天生那个「希望周围别变」的保守本能,配上了武器:分区法、历史保护条例、环境评估、允许邻居起诉叫停开发的条款。
克莱因把这个问题推得更深一层。城市是美国的机会机器。全美前沿AI实验室几乎全部集中在湾区大约50平方英里的范围里。纽约没有,达拉斯没有,芝加哥没有,奥斯汀没有。金融在纽约、科技在旧金山、文化在洛杉矶,每个超级产业都有巨大的溢出效应。在谷歌附近当理发师,比在阿肯色乡下当理发师赚得多得多,这是最古老的阶层流动路径。
20世纪美国的社会流动,大约三分之一来自人们搬到生产率更高的地区。过去二三十年,这个过程在倒转。以前清洁工和律师都该搬到纽约,现在只有律师该搬过去,清洁工搬走,因为你在曼哈顿当清洁工养不起家、住不起房、通勤也不现实。
布隆伯格(Michael Bloomberg)说过一句名言,纽约是奢侈品,奢侈品就得是奢侈的价格。纽约变成奢侈品是真的,这在克莱因看来是糟糕的问题,是对城市本质的颠倒。
他还有一个很妙的观察:读名人回忆录会发现,那些回忆录本质上都是住房故事。Moby的第一本回忆录写的是纽约某个时代,但他当年能和一堆音乐人住在一起,住的是便宜房子。莉齐·古德曼的《相约浴室》讲纽约2000年代摇滚复兴,也是住房故事。湾区那套反文化、同志文化、迷幻文化和国防工业混在一起催生硅谷,同样是便宜住房的故事。
只有一种人付得起那里的房租,城市就会慢慢变成单一文化。这件事的量级早就超出住房本身,它关乎经济创新和机会在地理上的分布。
DOGE:钢人论证站得住,目标却没写出来
节目里有一段非常长的DOGE(政府效率部)讨论,克莱因和汤普森在这里展现了他们和一般民主党评论员的差别。
汤普森先给出「钢人论证」(steelman,把对方观点重构到最强版本)。政府效率部这个名字,如果政府确实低效,听起来就是一个必要机构。他们整本书的一个主题就是政府可以多么低效,想建高铁的时候建不成,想加保障房的时候加不成。克莱因有句话他很喜欢:我们不仅要考虑放松市场管制,还要考虑放松政府自身的管制,把那些阻止政府实现民主目标的规则挪开。放到这个框架里,政府效率部是天赐之物。一个相信政府重要的自由派,更该痴迷于让政府运转良好。
克莱因接着给出了他认为更接近真实的钢人论证。政府是一个利益集团,官僚系统、深层政府、规则、条例,它的存在从来与效率无关。你不会在追求效率时这么干。它是零基预算,是把东西打碎、关掉再打开、大规模裁员。让改变可能发生的唯一方式,是删掉现存的东西。不管它原来是否高效,你不可能真的让它一个个来陈述自己的价值,那只会让一切原地打转。
政府的问题在于没有真正的竞争。教育部不会被「三年前成立的教育局」竞争掉。要激进改变,唯一的方式是把现存的东西推平,然后重建。你裁掉了教育部一半人,接下来就可以招你自己的人,他们真的会做你要他们做的事。你证明了所有规则都可以废掉或者不遵守,接下来就可以开始决定哪些真要遵守。
这套逻辑真正落到的动作是删除。它瞄准的产物,是把整个联邦政府变成特朗普本人的神经末梢。运转细节的微调不在考虑范围内。先摧毁,再按那个样子重建。这才是「钢人」意义上站得住的解释。
紧接着是反方。克莱因说,效率只有挂在一个目标上才有意义。马斯克在特斯拉有目标,造出未来的电动车。在SpaceX有目标,更便宜的上天、可复用火箭。在SolarCity有目标。在推特,至少有一个表达出来的目标,言论自由的回归。
那DOGE的目标是什么?读冻结资金的预算局备忘录,里面明确写着:政府必须反映人民通过选择总统表达出来的意志。读拉斯·沃特(Russ Vought)写的东西,那是单一行政权理论(unitary executive theory)。这一点克莱因本人不认同,但对方表达得极其明确。
麻烦在于,如果这是目标,那封让两百多万联邦雇员回复「你这周做了什么」的邮件就解释不通。他手上没有一个能认真处理并跟进这些回复的团队。DOGE有50个人,不可能真的核实两百万人的工作。
真正的零基预算必须对照明确标准。USAID被关掉了,PEPFAR被关掉了。PEPFAR是乔治·布什时期的项目,被公认为美国政府史上通过对外援助拯救生命效率最高的项目之一,让一代人免于死于艾滋病毒。没有给任何人进来辩护的机会。教育部被砍了一半,而教育部本身是所有机构里人员编制最低、拨款第四高的,管理着超过一万亿美元的高等教育经费,就管理成本而言属于最精简的机构之一。他们没有告诉那些人,一个减半的教育部应该做什么。
克莱因说,这大概率也违法。就在节目录制前一周,一位法官裁定大约26000名被解雇的联邦雇员必须被重新雇用,理由就是解雇行为不合法。这事最后会上到最高法院。他本人支持公务员制度改革,太难雇,太难解雇,太难管理。改革本来可以走国会。而且一开始,罗·康纳(Ro Khanna)和一批民主党人是愿意跟DOGE合作的。民主党人投票支持过《莱肯·莱利法案》这种强硬移民法案,他们准备好了谈交易。对方不想谈,因为这件事对他们来说本质上是政治控制。
马斯克在推特做的事,效果是让它变得可控。它现在也不像一个更好的产品,它成了一个不同的产品。他走进一个他认为人们不同意他的地方,把它打碎,直到他拿到实际运营控制权,直到他们会做他要他们做的事。(Ezra Klein)
他们在联邦政府做的事,是让这个东西变得可控。沃特的原话是需要「创伤化」公务员。马斯克谈USAID时说,「全是虫子,没有苹果,我们要把它喂给碎木机」。考核谁在好好干活的人不会用这种词汇。这套话属于征服者。
还有另一个维度:埃隆在国会山的权力。任何在关键投票上违抗特朗普的共和党众议员或参议员,他会往初选里砸5000万到1亿美元。这笔钱在他那里不算钱,对那些人来说是致命的。这大概就是乔尼·恩斯特投票支持皮特·赫格塞斯的原因。这条线的落点,是把权力集中到特朗普手里。
关税、撤案,和特朗普的权力逻辑
克莱因给了一个非常清晰的框架。把DOGE、关税、司法部对埃里克·亚当斯的案子放在一起看,就明白了。特朗普是一个非常19世纪的政治人物,极其关系化,极其零和,一直在找杠杆。
关税在这里不承担稳定的产业政策功能。如果承担,就该像竞选时说的那样,对所有进口商品征10%到20%,对中国商品征65%,然后企业在这个新的成本结构下做长期投资决策。他做的是一会儿加,一会儿减,一会儿又谈判。克莱因说他有一次正在跟一个关税专家录播客,讨论汽车零部件问题,制片人进来说,他刚刚又推迟了汽车零部件关税。
这套打法的落地机制是:贸易协定需要国会批准,关税属于总统可以单方面使用的行政权力,还有巨大的自由裁量空间。特朗普想要的东西是控制权。这条线贯穿他几乎所有政治行为。
所以你可以用关税来调整产业链,也可以用它来让哥伦比亚把被驱逐者戴上手铐接回去。这两件事他同时在干。他用司法部对埃里克·亚当斯撤案,理由里没有意识形态同盟这条,撤案之后他就能对纽约市有控制权。
克莱因说,你可以觉得这是好是坏,它本身是连贯的。剩下的问题只有一个,你对「特朗普拥有这么多权力」的规范性判断是什么。
AI 正在悄悄削弱人的思考能力
节目最后聊到智力和AI,克莱因讲了一段我觉得最该单独拎出来的话。
他说他对智力的看法有一个转变。过去大家讨论的是怎么变聪明。弗林效应(Flynn effect)说人类智商在几十年间持续上升,原因是社会戴上了「科学眼镜」,教人们抽象阅读、符号逻辑。现在有证据显示这个趋势停了。他前阵子看到《金融时报》一篇文章,标题大概是《我们是否已经过了人类智力的顶点》,讲的是阅读成绩和各种测试分数在下降。
他的判断是:我们花了太多时间讨论如何变聪明,不够时间讨论如何避免变笨。我们以为能让自己变聪明的事,比如手机上一直挂着社交媒体,效果恰好相反。信息质量差只是一层,更麻烦的是注意力的破碎、持续的干扰、专注力的丧失。
他把这个担忧直接指向AI:「我最大的担忧是,我们会把自己弄笨很多,而且自己还没意识到。」因为AI最容易自动化的,恰恰是智力真正发生的地方。让AI帮你总结一段阅读,让AI帮你写第一稿。
没有哪个摘要能替代我亲自去读,坐在那里自己建立联想,花时间泡在书里,然后想它在我心里激起了什么。第一稿是我写的。ChatGPT写不了我书的第一稿。第一稿非常难写,难在它往往是彻底错的,不是细节错。ChatGPT永远不会告诉你,你这件事真正的问题是你在做一件错的事。(Ezra Klein)
他说他读书已经不在屏幕上读了,全部打印出来坐在桌前读。iPad也能读,笔记本也能读,他还是打印,因为注意力不一样。
弗里德曼补充说他自己每天写代码,用AI辅助确实很有效,但他明显感觉到编程能力在退化。那种创造性的第一跳,AI替不了,正在被一点点让渡出去。
反建制时代缺的是「有话说的人」
回到民主党为什么不愿意上长播客。汤普森给了一个「暴动理论」:第一个扔石头的人需要极大勇气,第一百零一个不需要。现在缺的是第一个人。如果韦斯·摩尔(Wes Moore)上来讲得好,五分钟的片段全网传,那么上这个节目就从高风险变成「不上等于浪费钱」。
克莱因的答案更直接。他做节目选人的标准,从来不是民调前七名,他找的是脑子里正在想事情的人。他刚请了马萨诸塞州不太出名的众议员杰克·奥金克洛斯(Jake Auchincloss),因为这个人会在节目里公开思考。他接下来要请的两个人,也不是大名鼎鼎的角色。
「现在不是2028,不是2027,民主党初选还没开始。提前跑初选是愚蠢的。我们甚至不知道那时候世界是什么样,可能第三次世界大战了,可能有AGI了。我现在请人是因为他们有话说,是一个在此刻还活着的大脑,对当下有视角。」
他举了伯尼·桑德斯的例子。桑德斯2015年竞选时,一开始根本没人当回事,左翼大多数人的感觉是「可惜伊丽莎白·沃伦不选」。桑德斯几十年来一直在说同一套话,只是站在荒野里没人听。他一直保留着一种本能:最重要的事是找到一个有人听你说话的地方,而且最好能让你说很久。
汤普森补了一句:真正重要的地方是有东西要说。「我们想来跟你聊,因为我们有话说。我们写了一本300页的书,就是因为有太多话要说。我作为一个写作者、思想者,我希望我的软件跑在尽可能多的硬件上。」
两个乐观主义者
最后弗里德曼问,什么让你们对未来抱有希望。
汤普森说他在性格上就是个深度乐观主义者。他举了几个科学方向:mRNA癌症疫苗、CAR-T细胞疗法、GLP-1药物革命。GLP-1最早是从蜥蜴毒液里合成出来治二型糖尿病的,结果发现它能减少全身炎症,可能对痴呆和阿尔茨海默有作用。人类可能从蜥蜴的舌头上,意外拿到了一部分治疗老年痴呆的药。
他也对AI加速跨领域知识综合抱有期待。爱迪生发明白炽灯,靠的是试了一万种材料,发现一种特别的竹子燃烧时间刚好。一台机器可以把这个「一万种材料」的探索过程加速,可以让CRISPR和癌症研究在某个点上接起来,做出针对胰腺癌某个抑制剂的基因疗法。
克莱因说自己性格上远没有汤普森乐观。他给的答案更精确:
我们处在一个比很长很长时间以来方差都更高的时期。这带来巨大的危险,也带来巨大的可能性。如果AI是对人类的巨大恩惠呢?如果我们真的发明并部署了清洁能源技术,实现了真正的能源丰裕呢?如果实现了大规模海水淡化呢?我在动物痛苦问题上很在意,我吃素。如果我们真的做出了在酿造罐和支架上培养的肉,不用每年杀掉几百亿在难以想象的痛苦中被养大的动物呢?
「不过这算不上希望。那是一个未来。你必须创造未来,你必须召唤一个未来,你必须为它战斗。所以,与其说我对2030年或2040年的美国或世界怀抱希望,不如说我确信有足够多的非凡结果是有可能的。这让当下值得投入,值得做你那一小部分,把时间的弧线弯向你觉得更公正的方向。」
普通人可以带走什么
这期节目表面上在聊美国政治,它给出的思维工具可以迁移到任何一个正在变复杂、变慢、变得不可交付的系统里。以下是几个可操作的点。
- 区分「批了多少钱」和「建成了什么」。评估一个政府项目、一家公司的季度表现,或者你个人的年度计划,先问自己一个问题:我是在为投入鼓掌,还是在为结果鼓掌?只剩前者的时候,你已经掉进了百吉饼自由主义的陷阱。
- 项目卡住时,先分清是结果监管还是过程监管在挡路。结果监管规定底线,比如空气里PM2.5不得超过多少。过程监管规定路径,比如必须经过几轮审查、几场听证、几份表格。前者保护你,后者最容易被工具化,变成任何人叫停任何事的武器。在你自己的组织里定期清点一遍:有多少流程本来是防止最坏情况,实际效果是阻止了最好的情况?
- 把「注意力是货币」这句话用在自己身上。你花最多注意力的事,构成了你的政治。你信息流里被推送最多的话题,构成了你大脑的议程设置。某个议题持续占据你的注意力却不给你任何行动空间,那不是你在关注它,是它在收割你。定期做一次注意力审计。
- 警惕那些帮你变笨的效率工具。判断标准很简单:这个工具替你省掉的,是重复劳动,还是那第一跳的创造性劳动?摘要、提纲、第一稿看起来省时间,它们省掉的恰恰是智力的发生现场。可以让AI做检索、格式、校对,第一稿一定要自己写,哪怕写得很烂。写烂的第一稿是你跟自己思想打架的过程,AI替不了这一架。
- 做内容或做传播的人,别再优化「不出现负面注意力」。克莱因那句话值得贴在墙上:议程控制来自冲突,好感的积累换不来议程。想让人听见一件事,就得准备好有人不同意。追求零负面评价的传播策略,等价于追求零传播。
- 找那些有话说的人,而不是位置高的人。招募、合作、关注,都可以换这条标准:这个人此刻有没有一个非说不可的想法?位置高的人保护位置,有想法的人想被听见。前者给你安全感,后者给你新东西。
- 如果你在一个正在变慢的系统里工作,先别急着推倒。DOGE演示了推倒的诱惑和代价。它证明美国政府的可动空间比所有人以为的都要大,也证明在目标没写清楚的情况下砸碎一个系统,你将得到的产物是控制权,效率不在其中,而且控制权往往还落不到你手上。有效的改革顺序是:先说清要什么结果,再找出瓶颈在哪,然后拆掉挡路的规则,同时加上加速的规则。跳过第一步的改革,最后都会变成权力重组。
克莱因那句「未来算不上希望,是要打出来的」的话,大概是整期节目里最有分量的一句。丰裕是持续选择的总
丰裕是持续选择的总和:选择建造而不是阻止,选择结果而不是流程,选择在有风险的时候把话说出来。
这场对话里藏着一个更深的裂缝
把整期节目串起来看,克莱因和汤普森真正在指出的,是两种政治气质的错位。
右翼的问题在克莱因嘴里是一句很干脆的话:它是威权式的。左翼的问题是官僚式的。这两种气质都指向同一个终点,就是政府不管承诺了什么,最后都没法把东西交到人手上。一个用砸碎的办法回避交付,一个用流程的办法拖延交付。选民用脚投票,搬去更便宜的地方,或者在投票箱前换一个愿意砸的人上来。
这本书的赌注,是在这两种气质之间劈出第三条路。它要求自由派接受一个不太舒服的前提:你对政府的爱,必须体现在你愿意改造它,而不只体现在你愿意为它辩护。一个只会说「制度很好、我们是制度的捍卫者」的政党,在一个反建制的年代,等于把自己锁进了一个必输的位置。因为选民看得见那些失败,他们每天都在经历那些失败,他们搬离蓝州就是因为那些失败。
汤普森有一句话点得很准。民主党的沟通困境,根源在于它失去了谈论政府失败的能力。党内所有能批评政府的声音都被推到边缘,剩下的主流话语只能一味捍卫。于是当有人指着加州高铁说「这玩意儿根本没建成」,民主党没有词汇去回应,只能沉默或者转移话题。而那个指着说话的人,赢得了整个注意力市场。
重新拿回谈论失败的能力,是这本书最政治性的部分。它要的不是更多拨款,是承认拨款不等于交付,然后从承认里长出一套新的治理语言。
为什么「丰裕」这个词选得这么准
书名值得多想一层。稀缺和丰裕在经济学里是一对老词,但这两位作者把它从资源分配问题,挪到了制度生产能力问题上。
传统左派的直觉是:好东西稀缺,所以要重新分配。这套直觉在收入层面成立,在实物层面会翻车。你把租房券发给一个住房供给被锁死的城市,钱最后流进了房东口袋,房租被推得更高,你名义上帮助了穷人,实际效果是给一个受限市场做了补贴。克莱因管这个叫「成本病式社会主义」(cost disease socialism),名字很拗口,机制很直白:在供给被掐住的地方增加需求,只会把价格顶上天。
所以丰裕派的主张是,重新分配之前先问一句:这个东西本身够不够多?不够多,就先把它造出来。造出来之后,再谈怎么分。这两步的顺序一颠倒,善意就会变成通胀。
这套逻辑听起来像右派的市场原教旨,其实落点完全不同。它要的不是政府退场,是政府有能力把事办成。丰裕派想要的政府,是一个承诺修高铁就真能修出高铁的政府,一个承诺建保障房就真能让人住进去的政府。一个能做到这些的政府,自然更有底气去谈 redistribution,因为选民看得见钱去了哪里。
汤普森那个 Equinox 健身房的比喻在这里就成立了。你交270美元一个月的会员费,器械永远空着、更衣室永远干净、洗完澡有契尔氏的乳液擦脸,你心甘情愿掏这个钱,因为你看见钱变成了什么。北欧人交的税比美国人高得多,他们满意度也高得多,原因一样,他们看得见税变成了什么。问题从来不在税率高低,问题在交完税走出家门,看见的是塌掉的基础设施、涨上天的房租、和一群只会告诉你「程序没问题」的官员。
社会契约一旦在这个层面断裂,人就会去找那个说「我一个人能搞定」的人。克莱因那句「Kool-Aid man 撞墙进来」的比喻,说的就是这个时刻。
回到那个被反复问到的问题:AOC 会不会来
节目里有一段轻松的插曲,弗里德曼反复追问怎么才能请到 AOC 上三小时长节目。克莱因的回答绕了几圈,最后落在一个特别具体的点上:问题不在排期,在排期文化。
政治人物的时间是被人安排出来的。助手、幕僚、竞选团队习惯了「没人能占用老板三四个小时」这个默认设定。记者不行,捐款人不行,政策幕僚也不行。所以当有人提出要三四个小时,系统给出的默认答案就是不行,原因不是他们真的抽不出时间,是这件事在他们的文化里没有先例。要让这件事发生,得 AOC 本人对团队说一句:不,这个时间我们留出来。
这段插曲表面上在聊播客,实际在聊一个更普遍的机制。阻碍改变的往往不是能力或资源,是一套没有人质疑过的默认惯例。你想在组织里推动一件新事,撞到的多半不是「做不到」,是「我们从来不这么干」。而要打破它,需要一个位置足够高的人愿意说一句「这次例外」。
汤普森那个「暴动理论」补上了另一半。第一个人需要极大勇气,第一百零一个人不需要。改变的发生往往卡在第一块石头上。一旦有人证明这件事值得做、做了有回报,剩下的门槛会自己塌掉。所以任何领域的破局,重点常常落在找到那个愿意当第一的人,而不在说服所有人。
最后说回那个把话说出来的勇气
整期节目聊到最后,克莱因反复回到同一个词:willing to upset people。
特朗普改造共和党,靠的是他敢跟共和党人打。他竞选时对着布什、对着杰布·布什、对着罗姆尼、对着那些被当成神圣不可侵犯的贸易协定开火。他是在罗姆尼和麦凯恩之后立刻出来竞选的,一边竞选一边攻击这两个人。这种打法在常规政治里近乎自杀,但它改造了一个党。
克莱因说民主党也需要这种勇气。奥巴马联盟已经耗尽,它撑不起下一个时代。要换一种形态,就得有人站出来说,我们过去在某些事上错了,我们得改一些看法,我们得换个说法、换个做法。这句话说出口会得罪人,会招来负面注意力,会被剪成短视频。但不说,党就停在原地。
这大概就是这期节目最想留下的东西。一个组织的活力,一个人思想的活力,来自同一个地方:敢在没人鼓掌的时候把话说出来,敢在会得罪人的时候承认自己错了。注意力会来,因为你说了别人不敢说的话。方向会清晰,因为你终于肯面对那些一直回避的失败。
丰裕不是一种已经实现的状态,是每一代人反复做出的一串选择。选择建造,选择交付,选择在程序挡住了结果的时候站出来改程序。这些话放在美国政治里成立,放在任何一个想让事情真正发生的人身上,同样成立。
Democrats still think the currency of politics is money and the currency of politics is attention.
民主党人仍然认为政治的货币是金钱,政治的货币是注意力。
00:00 And that’s a huge difference between the two sides right now.
现在双方之间存在巨大差异。
I think the steel man is very easy to make here.
我觉得钢铁侠在这里很容易制作。
00:07 Department of government efficiency.
政府效率部。
That sounds like an organization that’s needed if government is inefficient.
这听起来像是政府效率低下时所需要的组织。
And one of the themes of our book is just how inefficient government can be, not only at building houses, building energy, often at achieving its own ends.
我们这本书的主题之一是政府的效率是多么低下,不仅在建造房屋、建设能源方面,而且常常在实现自己的目标方面。
Building high-speed rail when it wants to build high-speed rail.
想建高铁就建高铁。
Adding affordable housing units when it wants to add affordable housing units.
当想要增加经济适用住房单位时,就增加经济适用住房单位。
I love Ezra’s line that we don’t just need to think about deregulating the market.
我喜欢以斯拉的观点,即我们不仅需要考虑放松市场管制。
We need to think about deregulating government itself, getting the rules out of the way that keep government from achieving the democratic outcomes that it’s trying to achieve.
我们需要考虑放松对政府本身的管制,消除那些阻碍政府实现其想要实现的民主成果的规则。
This is a world in which a department of government efficiency is a godsend.
在这个世界上,政府效率部门是天赐之物。
We should be absolutely obsessed with making government work well, especially if we’re going to be the kind of liberals who believe that government is important in the first place.
我们应该绝对致力于让政府运转良好,特别是如果我们要成为那种认为政府首先重要的自由主义者。
In my lifetime, the Democratic Party has never been as internally fragmented and weak, leaderless, rudderless as it is right now.
在我的一生中,民主党从来没有像现在这样内部分裂、软弱、群龙无首、群龙无首。
01:02 Now, it won’t stay that way.
现在,情况不会再这样了。
You cannot change American politics.
你无法改变美国政治。
You can’t change the Democratic Party if you’re not willing to upset people.
如果你不愿意让人们不高兴,你就无法改变民主党。
Donald Trump reformed the Republican Party by willing able to fight Republicans.
唐纳德·特朗普通过愿意与共和党人对抗来改革了共和党。
He ran against George W.
他与乔治·W·布什竞选。
Bush, against Jeb Bush, against Mitt Romney, against the trade deals, against a bunch of things that were understood to be sacred cows.
布什,反对杰布·布什,反对米特·罗姆尼,反对贸易协议,反对一堆被认为是神圣的事物。
Somehow this guy ran right after Mitt Romney and John McCain, while attacking Mitt Romney and John McCain.
不知何故,这个家伙紧追着米特·罗姆尼和约翰·麦凯恩,同时攻击米特·罗姆尼和约翰·麦凯恩。
The Democratic Party does need to change.
民主党确实需要改变。
It needs to attain a different form because the Obama Coalition is exhausted.
它需要采取不同的形式,因为奥巴马联盟已经筋疲力尽。
It’s done.
完成了。
It’s not going to be able to do that.
它无法做到这一点。
If doesn’t have standard bears who are willing to say, “We were wrong about some things.
如果没有标准熊愿意说:“我们在某些事情上错了。
We have to change our views on some things.
我们必须改变对某些事情的看法。
We have to act differently and speak differently.”
我们必须以不同的方式行事,以不同的方式说话。”
When Elon takes over Tesla, when Elon is at SpaceX, when Elon’s at X, I would imagine, and you know this better than me because you know him, and maybe most importantly for the purposes of this part of the conversation, you know the people who work for him.
当埃隆接管特斯拉时,当埃隆在 SpaceX 时,当埃隆在 X 时,我想,你比我更了解这一点,因为你了解他,也许最重要的是,就这部分对话而言,你了解为他工作的人。
01:58 I’ll bet if you ask the people who work under Elon at X, Tesla, SpaceX, they say, “I know exactly what Elon wants.
我敢打赌,如果你问埃隆在 X、特斯拉、SpaceX 手下工作的人,他们会说:“我确切地知道埃隆想要什么。
This is his goal for the super heavy rocket.
这是他对超重型火箭的目标。
This is his goal in terms of humanoid robots.
这就是他在人形机器人方面的目标。
This is his goal in terms of profitability of Twitter, and the growth of our subscription business and how we’re going to integrate new features.” There’s probably a really clear mind meld.
这是他的目标,包括 Twitter 的盈利能力、订阅业务的增长以及我们将如何整合新功能。”可能有一个非常清晰的头脑融合。
02:32 Right now, I have no sense that there’s a mind meld.
现在,我感觉不到有心灵融合。
And in fact I have the exact opposite sense, that rather than an example of creative destruction, which would be a mitzvah of entrepreneurship, we have an act of destruction, destruction.
事实上,我有完全相反的感觉,我们不是创造性破坏的例子,这将是企业家精神的成人礼,而是破坏行为,破坏。
We have destruction for the sake of destruction.
我们为了破坏而破坏。
It’s much cleaner to me from an interpretive standpoint, to describe ,Doge as an ideological purge of progressivism, performing the job of efficiency rather than a department of actual efficiency itself.
从解释的角度来看,将 Doge 描述为对进步主义的意识形态清洗,执行效率工作而不是实际效率部门本身,对我来说要干净得多。
The following is a conversation with Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson.
以下是与 Ezra Klein 和 Derek Thompson 的对话。
03:08 Ezra is one of the most influential voices representing the left wing of American politics.
以斯拉是代表美国政治左翼最有影响力的声音之一。
He is a columnist for The New York Times, author of Why We’re Polarized and host of the Ezra Klein Show.
他是《纽约时报》的专栏作家、《我们为何两极分化》一书的作者以及《埃兹拉·克莱因秀》的主持人。
Derek is a writer at the Atlantic, author of Hit Makers and On Work, and host of the Plain English Podcast.
德里克是《大西洋月刊》的作家、《Hit Makers》和《On Work》的作者,也是《Plain English Podcast》的主持人。
Together, they’ve written a new book simply titled Abundance, that lays out a kind of manifesto for the left.
他们一起写了一本新书,简单地命名为《丰富》,为左派提出了一份宣言。
It is already a controversial, widely debated book, but I think it puts forward a powerful vision for what the Democratic Party could stand for in the coming election.
这已经是一本有争议、广泛争论的书,但我认为它为民主党在即将到来的选举中可以代表什么提出了一个强有力的愿景。
03:55 If I may, let me comment on the fact that sometimes on this podcast, I delve into the dark realm of politics.
如果可以的话,让我评论一下这样一个事实:有时在这个播客上,我会深入研究政治的黑暗领域。
Indeed, politics often devises and frankly, brings out the worst in some very smart people.
事实上,政治常常会设计并坦率地揭露一些非常聪明的人最糟糕的一面。
Plus to me, it is frustrating how much of the political discourse is drama, and how little of it is rigorous, empathetic discussion of policy.
另外,令我沮丧的是,政治话语中有多少是戏剧性的,而其中很少是严格的、富有同理心的政策讨论。
I hate this.
我讨厌这个。
But I guess I understand why.
但我想我明白为什么。
If the other side is called either Hitler or Stalin online by swarms of chanting mobs, it’s hard to carry out a nuanced discussion about immigration, healthcare, housing, education, foreign policy, and so on.
如果对方在网上被一群群高呼口号的暴民称为希特勒或斯大林,就很难就移民、医疗、住房、教育、外交政策等问题进行细致入微的讨论。
On top of that, anytime I talk about politics, half the audience is pissed off at me.
最重要的是,每当我谈论政治时,一半的观众都会生我的气。
And no, there is no audience capture.
不,没有观众吸引力。
I get on equally by different groups across the political spectrum, depending on the guest.
根据客人的不同,我与不同政治派别的不同群体相处融洽。
Why?
为什么?
I don’t know.
我不知道。
But I’m slowly coming to accept that this is the way of the world.
但我慢慢地接受这就是世界的方式。
I try to maintain my cool, return hate with compassion and learn from the criticism and the general madness of it all.
我努力保持冷静,以同情心回报仇恨,并从批评和普遍的疯狂中吸取教训。
05:07 Still, I think it’s valuable to sometimes talk about politics.
尽管如此,我认为有时谈论政治还是很有价值的。
It’s an important part to the big picture of human civilization, but indeed, it is only still a small part.
它是人类文明大局的重要组成部分,但事实上,它还只是一小部分。
My happy place is talking to scientists, engineers, programmers, video game designers, historians, philosophers, musicians, athletes, filmmakers and so on.
我快乐的地方是与科学家、工程师、程序员、视频游戏设计师、历史学家、哲学家、音乐家、运动员、电影制作人等交谈。
So, I apologize for the occasional detour into politics, especially over the past few months.
因此,我为偶尔绕道政治而道歉,尤其是在过去的几个月里。
I did a few conversations with world leaders and I have a few more coming up.
我与世界领导人进行了几次对话,接下来还会有更多对话。
So, there will be a few more political podcast coming out in part so I can be better prepared to deeply understand the mind, the life and the perspective of each world leader.
因此,将会有更多的政治播客出现,部分原因是这样我可以更好地准备深入了解每位世界领导人的思想、生活和观点。
I hope you come along with me on this journey into the darkness of politics, as I try to shine a light in the complex mess of it all, hoping to understand us humans better, always backed of course by deep rigorous research and by empathy.
我希望你能和我一起踏上这段进入政治黑暗的旅程,因为我试图在这一切复杂的混乱中照亮一盏明灯,希望更好地理解我们人类,当然总是以深入严谨的研究和同理心为后盾。
06:06 Long-term, I hope for political discussions to be only a small percentage of this podcast.
从长远来看,我希望政治讨论只占这个播客的一小部分。
If it’s not your thing, please just skip these episodes.
如果这不是你的事,请跳过这些剧集。
Or maybe come along anyway, since both you and I are reluctant travelers on this road trip.
或者无论如何也可以一起去,因为你和我在这次公路旅行中都是不情愿的旅行者。
But who knows what we’ll learn together about the world and about ourselves.
但谁知道我们会一起学到什么关于世界和我们自己的知识。
This is the Lex Fridman Podcast.
这是莱克斯·弗里德曼播客。
To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description.
为了支持它,请在说明中查看我们的赞助商。
And now, dear friends, here’s Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson.
现在,亲爱的朋友们,这是埃兹拉·克莱因和德里克·汤普森。
06:38 You are both firmly on the left of the US political spectrum.
你们都坚定地属于美国政治光谱的左派。
Ezra, I have been a fan of yours for a long time.
以斯拉,我很长时间以来一直是你的粉丝。
You’re often referred to, at least I think of you as one of the most intellectually rigorous voices on the left.
你经常被提及,至少我认为你是左派中最理性严谨的声音之一。
Can you try to define the ideals and the vision of the American left?
您能尝试定义一下美国左派的理想和愿景吗?
Oh, good.
哦,很好。
06:56 We’re starting small here.
我们从小事做起。
And maybe contrast them with the American right.
或许还可以将他们与美国右翼进行对比。
Sure.
当然。
07:00 So, the thing I should say here is that you can define the left in different ways.
所以,我在这里要说的是,你可以用不同的方式来定义左派。
I think the left has a couple fundamental views.
我认为左派有几个基本观点。
One is that life is unfair.
一是生活是不公平的。
We are born with different talents.
我们生来就具有不同的天赋。
We are born into different nations.
我们出生在不同的国家。
The luck of being born into America is very different than the luck of being born into Venezuela.
出生在美国的运气与出生在委内瑞拉的运气有很大不同。
We are born into different families.
我们出生在不同的家庭。
We have luck operating as an omnipresence across our entire lives.
我们很幸运,在我们的一生中无所不在。
And as such, the people for whom it works out well, we don’t deserve all of that.
因此,对于那些效果良好的人来说,我们不应该得到这一切。
We got lucky.
我们很幸运。
I mean we also worked hard, and we also had talent and we also applied that talent.
我的意思是,我们也努力工作,我们也有天赋,我们也运用了这种天赋。
But at a very fundamental level that we are sitting here is unfair, and that so many other people are in conditions that are much worse, much more precarious, much more exploited is unfair.
但从根本上讲,我们坐在这里是不公平的,而许多其他人的处境更糟糕、更不稳定、更受剥削,这也是不公平的。
And one of the fundamental roles of government should not necessarily be to turn that unfairness into perfect equality, but to rectify that unfairness into a kind of universal dignity so people can have lives of flourishing.
政府的基本作用之一不一定是把这种不公平变成完全平等,而是将这种不公平纠正为一种普遍的尊严,让人们过上繁荣的生活。
So, I’d say that’s one thing.
所以,我想说这是一回事。
08:11 The left is fundamentally more skeptical of capitalism and particularly unchecked forms of capitalism than the right.
从根本上来说,左派比右派更加怀疑资本主义,尤其是不受约束的资本主义形式。
I always think this is hard to talk about because what we call unchecked capitalism is nevertheless very much supported by government.
我一直认为这很难谈论,因为我们所说的不受限制的资本主义仍然得到政府的大力支持。
So, I think in a way, you have both.
所以,我认为在某种程度上,你们两者都有。
Markets are things that are enforced by government.
市场是由政府强制执行的事情。
How you set the rules of them is what ends up differing between the left and the right.
你如何制定规则,最终导致左派和右派之间的差异。
But the left tends to be more worried about the fact that you could get rich building coal-fired power plants, belching pollution into the air, and you could get rich laying down solar panels.
但左派往往更担心这样一个事实:建设燃煤发电厂、向空气中排放污染物可以致富,铺设太阳能电池板也可以致富。
And the market doesn’t know the difference between the two.
而市场并不知道两者之间的区别。
And so, there’s a set of goals about regulating the unchecked potential of capitalism that also relates to exploitation of workers.
因此,有一系列关于规范资本主义不受限制的潜力的目标,这也与对工人的剥削有关。
There’s very fundamental questions about how much people get paid, how much power they have.
关于人们得到多少报酬、他们拥有多少权力等非常基本的问题。
Again, the rectification of economic and other forms of power is very fundamental to the left when you think about what the minimum wage is.
同样,当你考虑最低工资是多少时,经济和其他形式的权力的整顿对于左派来说是非常重要的。
09:11 I am a successful podcast host when I go into a negotiation with the New York Times, I have a certain amount of market power in that negotiation because other firms want to hire me.
当我与《纽约时报》进行谈判时,我是一名成功的播客主持人,我在谈判中拥有一定的市场力量,因为其他公司想雇用我。
When you are a minimum wage worker, the reason we have a minimum wage is in part to rectify a power problem.
当你是最低工资工人时,我们制定最低工资的部分原因是为了纠正电力问题。
A lot of workers do not have market power.
许多工人没有市场力量。
They do not have a bunch of job opportunities.
他们没有很多工作机会。
They’re not working with firms.
他们不与公司合作。
And by the way, without certain kinds of regulation, those firms would cartelize and make it so they can hold down wages anyway.
顺便说一句,如果没有某种监管,这些公司就会结成卡特尔,这样他们就可以压低工资。
So, trying to rectify power imbalances is, I think, another thing folks on the left take more seriously.
因此,我认为,试图纠正权力失衡是左翼人士更重视的另一件事。
That would be a start of things that I think broadly unite the…
我认为这将是广泛团结……的开始。
maybe let’s call it the intuitions.
也许我们可以称之为直觉。
I want to say that’s a podcast answer, not a book.
我想说这是一个播客答案,而不是一本书。
I’m sure I left a million things out here, but I’ll start there.
我确信我在这里留下了一百万件事,但我将从这里开始。
I mean there’s a lot of fascinating things there on the unfairness of life that could be the inter-person unfairness, so one person getting more money than another person, or more skills or more natural abilities and another person.
我的意思是,生活中的不公平有很多令人着迷的事情,可能是人与人之间的不公平,所以一个人比另一个人得到更多的钱,或者比另一个人拥有更多的技能或更多的天赋。
09:57 And then there’s just the general unfairness of the environment, the luck of the draw, the things that happen.
然后还有环境的普遍不公平、抽签的运气以及发生的事情。
All of a sudden you cross a street, and the car runs a red light, and runs you over and you’re in the hospital.
突然你过马路,汽车闯红灯,把你撞倒,然后你就进了医院。
So, that unfairness of life.
所以,生活的不公平。
And in general, I guess the left sees there’s some role or a lot of role for government to help you when that unfairness strikes.
总的来说,我想左派认为,当不公平现象发生时,政府可以发挥一定的作用或很多作用来帮助你。
And then maybe there’s also a general notion of the size of government.
也许还有政府规模的一般概念。
I think the left is more comfortable with larger government as long as it’s effective and efficient, at least in its idea.
我认为左派更愿意接受更大的政府,只要它有效且高效,至少在它的理念上是这样。
That’s certainly true in the last 200 years.
过去 200 年来确实如此。
10:42 It was new deal liberals who enlarged the government in the 1930s.
20世纪30年代,新政自由派扩大了政府规模。
It was Republicans who acquiesced to that larger government in the 1950s.
20世纪50年代,共和党人默许了这个更大的政府。
And then starting the 1970s, 1980s, it’s typically been conservatives who’ve tried to constrict governments.
然后从 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代开始,通常是保守派试图限制政府。
Sometimes they failed while liberals have typically tried to expand, certainly taxing and spending.
有时他们会失败,而自由派通常会试图扩张,当然是征税和支出。
But one thing that I was thinking as Ezra was talking, and I was just writing this down because I thought Ezra’s answer was really lovely, but at a really high level, I thought…
但当以斯拉说话时,我在想一件事,我只是把它写下来,因为我认为以斯拉的回答真的很可爱,但在一个非常高的水平上,我想……
maybe you disagree with this.
也许你不同意这一点。
I thought about distinguishing between liberals and conservatives based on three factors, what each side fears, what each side values and what each side tolerates.
我考虑过根据三个因素来区分自由派和保守派:双方恐惧什么、双方价值观以及双方容忍什么。
I think liberals fear injustice, and conservatives often fear cultural radicalism or the destruction of society.
我认为自由主义者害怕不公正,而保守派常常担心文化激进主义或社会的破坏。
And as a result they value different things.
因此,他们重视不同的事物。
11:37 Liberals I think tend to value change.
我认为自由主义者倾向于重视变革。
And at the level of government that can mean change in terms of creating new programs that don’t previously exist.
在政府层面,这可能意味着创建以前不存在的新计划方面的变化。
It’s typically been liberals, for example, who’ve been trying to expand health coverage, while conservatives have tried to cut it back.
例如,通常是自由派试图扩大医疗保险覆盖范围,而保守派则试图削减医疗保险覆盖范围。
Just in the last few years, it was Biden who tried to add a bunch of programs, whether it was infrastructure, the Chips and Science Act, the IRA, and then Trump comes into office and is unwinding it.
就在过去几年,拜登试图增加一堆项目,无论是基础设施、芯片和科学法案、爱尔兰共和军,然后特朗普上台后又取消了这些项目。
12:02 And then I also think they tolerate different things.
然后我也认为他们容忍不同的事情。
I think liberals are more likely to tolerate a little bit of overreach, a little bit of radicalism in terms of trying to push society into a world where it hasn’t been.
我认为自由主义者更有可能容忍一点点过度扩张和一点点激进主义,试图将社会推向一个从未有过的世界。
Well, I conservatives are more likely to tolerate injustice.
好吧,保守派更可能容忍不公正。
They’re more likely to say there’s a kind of natural inequality in the nature of the world and we’re not going to try to overcorrect forward with our policies.
他们更有可能说,世界本质上存在着一种天然的不平等,我们不会试图用我们的政策来过度纠正。
And so, I think that even at a layer above what Ezra was articulating with the policy differences between liberals and conservatives, there’s almost like an archetypal difference between what they fear, and value and tolerate.
因此,我认为,即使在埃兹拉所阐述的自由派和保守派之间的政策差异之上,他们的恐惧、重视和容忍之间也几乎存在典型的差异。
Liberals fearing injustice, seeking change, tolerating sometimes a bit of what people might think of as overreach, while conservatives fear that overreach, value tradition and often tolerate injustice.
自由主义者担心不公正,寻求变革,有时会容忍人们认为的过度扩张,而保守派则担心过度扩张,重视传统并经常容忍不公正。
The only thing I would say is that I do think this sort of the left likes big government, the right like small government oversimplifies.
我唯一想说的是,我确实认为这种左派喜欢大政府,而右派则喜欢过于简单化的小政府。
12:54 The left is pretty comfortable with an expansive government that is trying to correct for some of the imbalances of power and injustices and imbalances of luck I talked about earlier.
左派对一个庞大的政府感到相当满意,该政府正在试图纠正我之前谈到的一些权力失衡、不公正和运气失衡。
The right is very comfortable with a very powerful police and surveillance in national security state.
右翼对国家安全状态下强大的警察和监视感到非常满意。
13:18 I always think about the sort of George W.
我总是想起乔治·W·布什 (George W.
Bush era, although right now with ice agents hassling all kinds of green card holders, you can think about this moment, too.
布什时代,虽然现在冰毒特工正在骚扰各种绿卡持有者,但你也可以想想这个时刻。
But the right’s view that on the one hand the government is incompetent.
但右翼认为,一方面政府无能。
And on the other hand we could send our army across oceans, invade Afghanistan and Iraq, and then rebuild these societies we don’t understand into fully functioning liberal democracies that will be our allies, was an extraordinary level of trust in a very big government.
另一方面,我们可以派遣我们的军队跨越海洋,入侵阿富汗和伊拉克,然后将这些我们不理解的社会重建为功能齐全的自由民主国家,这将成为我们的盟友,这是对一个非常大的政府的非凡信任。
I mean that was expensive.
我的意思是那很贵。
That took manpower.
那需要人力。
Compared to we’re going to set up the Affordable Care Act in America, that took a lot more faith in the US government being able to do something that was extraordinarily difficult.
与我们将在美国制定《平价医疗法案》相比,这需要我们更加相信美国政府能够做一些极其困难的事情。
But the left is more confidence in the government of the check and the right has more confidence in the government of the gun.
但左派对支票政府更有信心,而右派则对枪支政府更有信心。
You’re right, there’s some degree to which what the right, when the right speaks about the size of government, it’s a little bit rhetoric and not actual policy because they seem to always grow the size of government anyway.
你是对的,在某种程度上,当右派谈论政府规模时,这只是一种说辞,而不是实际政策,因为他们似乎总是在扩大政府规模。
14:06 They just say small government, but they don’t…
他们只是说小政府,但他们不……
it’s in the surveillance state, in the foreign policy in terms of military involvement abroad, and really in every program, they’re not very good at cutting either.
在监视状态下,在对外军事参与方面的外交政策中,实际上在每个项目中,他们也不太擅长削减。
They just kind of like to say it.
他们只是喜欢这么说而已。
Cutting is really hard.
切割确实很难。
14:38 Government spends trillions of dollars and if you cut billions of dollars, someone is going to feel that pain and they’re going to scream.
政府花费了数万亿美元,如果你削减数十亿美元,有人会感受到这种痛苦,他们会尖叫。
And so, you look at defense spending under Reagan, you look at overall under Reagan.
因此,你看看里根领导下的国防开支,看看里根领导下的总体国防开支。
Reagan might be one of the most archetypally conservative presidents of the last 40, 50 years.
里根可能是过去 40、50 年来最典型的保守派总统之一。
He utterly failed in his attempt to shrink government.
他缩小政府规模的企图彻底失败了。
Government grew under Reagan.
里根领导下的政府不断壮大。
Defense grew, all sorts of programs grew.
国防不断发展,各种项目不断发展。
So, I think that one thing we’re sort of scrambling around in our answers is that at a really high level, there are differences between liberalism and conservatism in American history.
所以,我认为我们在回答中争论的一件事是,在非常高的层面上,美国历史上的自由主义和保守主义之间存在差异。
But often at the level of implementation, it can be a little bit messy.
但通常在实施层面,可能会有点混乱。
Even Bush’s foreign policy that Ezra was describing from a big sense of American history, is very like Wilsonian, this sense of it’s America’s duty to go out and change the world.
甚至埃兹拉从美国历史的大意义上描述的布什外交政策也非常像威尔逊主义,这种感觉是美国有责任走出去改变世界。
Or to use a current example, McKinleyan.
或者使用当前的例子,麦金莱恩。
Or McKinleyan.
或者麦金莱恩。
15:32 Right.
正确的。
And a lot of people compare Donald Trump’s foreign policy to Andrew Jackson.
很多人将唐纳德·特朗普的外交政策与安德鲁·杰克逊进行比较。
This sense of we need to pull back from the world.
这种我们需要从世界中抽身出来的感觉。
America first.
美国第一。
We need to care about what’s inside of our borders and care much less about what’s outside of our borders.
我们需要关心我们境内的事情,而不是关心境外的事情。
Sometimes the differences between Republican and Democrat administrations don’t fall cleanly into the lines of liberal versus conservative because those definitions can be mushy.
有时,共和党和民主党政府之间的差异并不完全属于自由派与保守派的界限,因为这些定义可能很模糊。
All right.
好的。
15:59 So, to descend down from the platonic ideals of the left and the right, well, who’s actually running the show on the right and the left?
那么,从左翼和右翼的柏拉图式理想来看,到底是谁在左右左右呢?
Who are the dominant forces?
谁是主导力量?
Maybe you could describe and you mentioned democratic socialists, the progressives, maybe liberals, maybe more sort of mainstream left, and the same on the right with Trump and Trumpism.
也许你可以描述并提到民主社会主义者、进步主义者,也许是自由主义者,也许是更多的主流左派,右翼也有特朗普和特朗普主义。
So, on the right, it’s pretty straightforward at the moment.
所以,在右边,目前非常简单。
16:24 And the right is composed differently than it was 10 years ago.
右派的构成与十年前不同。
But the right is run by Donald Trump and the people who have been given the nod of power by Donald Trump.
但右翼是由唐纳德·特朗普和那些被唐纳德·特朗普授予权力的人掌控的。
So, that is right now Elon Musk, but Elon Musk’s power is coming from Donald Trump.
所以,现在是埃隆·马斯克,但埃隆·马斯克的权力来自唐纳德·特朗普。
That is maybe in some degrees JD Vance, maybe in some degrees, Russ Vought, maybe sometimes Homan’s over at DHS.
也许在某种程度上是 JD Vance,也许在某种程度上是 Russ Vought,有时也许是 DHS 的 Homan。
The right beneath that, the Republicans in Congress are extraordinarily disempowered compared to in other administrations.
在此之下,与其他政府相比,国会中的共和党人的权力被严重削弱。
They are sort of being told what to do and they are doing what they are told.
他们被告知要做什么,而他们正在做他们被告知的事情。
Republicans in Congress, Senate Republicans, they didn’t want Pete Hegseth.
国会的共和党人,参议院的共和党人,他们不想要皮特·赫格斯。
They didn’t want Kash Patel.
他们不想要卡什·帕特尔。
They didn’t want Tulsi Gabbard.
他们不想要图尔西·加巴德。
They didn’t want RFK Jr. Nobody got elected to be a Republican in the Senate hoping that they would confirm Robert F.
他们不希望小罗伯特·肯尼迪成为共和党人。没有人希望他们确认罗伯特·F·肯尼迪在参议院的地位。
Kennedy Jr, a member of the Kennedys, a Democrat who is pro-choice and running as a Democrat two years ago for HHS.
小肯尼迪(Kennedy Jr),肯尼迪家族成员,支持堕胎的民主党人,两年前以民主党人身份竞选美国卫生与公众服务部(HHS)。
But Donald Trump told him to do it and they did.
但唐纳德·特朗普告诉他这样做,他们就这么做了。
17:23 So, the right has developed a very, very top-down structure.
因此,右翼已经形成了一种非常非常自上而下的结构。
And one of Trump’s talents, one of the things that makes him a disruptive force in politics is his ability to upend the sort of coalitional structure, the interest group structure that used to prevail.
特朗普的才能之一,使他成为政治颠覆力量的因素之一,就是他颠覆过去盛行的联盟结构、利益集团结构的能力。
The Koch brothers were the big enemy of the left 10, 15 years ago.
科赫兄弟是10、15年前左派的大敌。
The view was in many ways they set the agenda of the right.
人们认为他们在很多方面设定了右翼的议程。
The Koch brother network is much less powerful Donald Trump because he just disagrees with them and has disempowered them.
科赫兄弟的网络远不如唐纳德·特朗普强大,因为他只是不同意他们的观点并剥夺了他们的权力。
Not to say none of their people or none of their groups are meaningful at all.
并不是说他们的人民或他们的团体都没有任何意义。
They are, but you wouldn’t put them at the forefront in the way that you might’ve had another time.
是的,但你不会像以前那样把它们放在最前面。
Right this second, we’re using the left, but Democrats are in fundamental disarray.
就在此刻,我们正在使用左翼,但民主党陷入了根本性的混乱。
There is no leader.
没有领导者。
Democrats, Senate Democrats decided to vote for the containing resolution, avoiding a shutdown or a critical mass of them.
民主党、参议院民主党人决定投票支持包含该决议的决议,避免政府关门或出现临界人数。
Then Hakeem Jeffries is the leader of the House Democrats and Chuck Schumer, the leader of Senate Democrats are in bitter disagreement over whether or not they should have done that.
众议院民主党领袖哈基姆·杰弗里斯和参议院民主党领袖查克·舒默在是否应该这样做的问题上存在严重分歧。
Democratic leadership isn’t even united on the single biggest point of leverage they might’ve had.
民主党领导层甚至在他们可能拥有的最大影响力上也没有团结一致。
They disagree over whether or not it was even a point of leverage.
他们对于这是否是一个杠杆点存在分歧。
Outside of them, the party has no leader, which is fairly normal after a pretty crushing defeat.
除了他们之外,该党没有领导人,这在惨败之后是很正常的。
But there isn’t the next in line.
但没有下一个。
18:40 So, you go back and it was pretty clear that after Barack Obama, it was going to be Hillary Clinton.
所以,你回头看看,很明显,继巴拉克·奥巴马之后,希拉里·克林顿将是希拉里·克林顿。
After Hillary Clinton, it was either going to be Joe Biden or Bernie Sanders.
在希拉里·克林顿之后,要么是乔·拜登,要么是伯尼·桑德斯。
Bernie Sanders had come in second in the primary.
伯尼·桑德斯在初选中名列第二。
Joe Biden had been the vice president.
乔·拜登曾担任副总统。
You often have a presumptive next nominee who the party can look to for kind of leadership.
通常会有一个假定的下一位提名人,政党可以指望他来担任领导职务。
Even after 2000, Al Gore was still giving big speeches.
即使在2000年之后,阿尔·戈尔仍在发表重要演讲。
There was a question about Al Gore running again.
有人质疑阿尔·戈尔再次参选。
There is no presumptive in the Democratic Party right now.
目前民主党内尚无推定。
You can’t turn around and say, “Oh, it’s going to be Pete Buttigieg.
你不能转身说:“哦,这将是皮特·布蒂吉格。
It’s going to be Josh Shapiro.
这将是乔什·夏皮罗。
It’s going to be Gretchen Whitmer.” Parties are given force, modern parties, which are quite weak by historical standards.
这将是格雷琴·惠特默。”现代政党被赋予了力量,但以历史标准来看,它们相当弱。
Modern parties tend to be given force by a centralizing personality.
现代政党往往受到集权人格的影响。
Donald Trump being a very strong example of that on the right, but Barack Obama was the person who held together the Democratic Party for a long time.
唐纳德·特朗普是右翼势力的一个非常有力的例子,但巴拉克·奥巴马则是长期团结民主党的人。
19:33 In my lifetime, the Democratic Party has never been as internally fragmented and weak, leaderless, rudderless as it is right now.
在我的一生中,民主党从来没有像现在这样内部分裂、软弱、群龙无首、群龙无首。
Now, it won’t stay that way.
现在,情况不会再这样了。
There’s a rhythm to these things.
这些事情都有节奏。
There’ll be a midterm, they’re probably going to pick up a bunch of seats in the midterm.
将会有一个中期选举,他们可能会在中期选举中获得很多席位。
If that means Hakeem Jeffries becomes speaker after the midterm, he’s going to have a much louder voice because he’s going to have power.
如果这意味着哈基姆·杰弗里斯在中期选举后成为议长,他的声音将会更大,因为他将拥有权力。
It’s going to be a harder road for Schumer to get back to the majority because of the Senate map, and then we’ll start having a primary on the left.
由于参议院地图的原因,舒默重返多数席位的道路将更加艰难,然后我们将开始进行左翼初选。
And you’ll begin to see voices emerge out of that.
你会开始看到声音从中出现。
20:09 But right now, the Democratic Party, it doesn’t have points of power.
但现在民主党没有权力点。
There’s simply outside of at the national level, there is no Democrat who wields control over a branch of government.
在国家层面之外,没有民主党人能够控制政府部门。
They don’t have the Supreme Court, they don’t have the House, they don’t have the Senate, they don’t have the presidency and they don’t have a next in line.
他们没有最高法院,没有众议院,没有参议院,没有总统职位,也没有下一任总统。
So, you’re looking at an organization without any of the people in the position to structure it, and the head of the DNC, the new head, Ken Martin, doesn’t have power in that way.
所以,你看到的是一个没有任何人能够构建它的组织,而民主党全国委员会的主席、新任主席肯·马丁(Ken Martin)没有这样的权力。
So, they’re pretty fractured.
所以,他们非常破碎。
You got a lot of criticism for this, but you were one of the people that early on said that Biden should step down.
你因此受到了很多批评,但你是早期表示拜登应该下台的人之一。
20:41 Why is the Democratic Party at this stage in its history, so bad at generating the truly inspiring person?
为什么民主党在其历史的这个阶段如此不善于培养真正鼓舞人心的人?
To me personally, AOC is an example of a person that might be that person.
对我个人来说,AOC 就是一个可能就是这样的人的例子。
You should have her on the show.
你应该让她上节目。
21:06 I would watch that.
我会看的。
Definitely.
确实。
21:07 I really try to, and we’ll talk about this, I try to do two, three hours and there’s a hesitancy on the left, especially to do these kinds of long programs.
我真的很努力,我们会讨论这个,我尝试做两三个小时,但左边有些犹豫,尤其是做这些长节目。
I think it’s a trust issue.
我认为这是一个信任问题。
I’m not exactly sure what it is.
我不太确定那是什么。
80% of the people on this show are left wing.
这个节目中80%的人都是左翼。
I’m pretty good faith and I try to bring out the best in people.
我很诚实,我努力让人们发挥出最好的一面。
Have you invited her?
你邀请她了吗?
21:29 Is that what you’re saying?
你是这么说的吗?
Yeah, yeah.
是啊是啊。
We’ll see what happens when people get closer to 2028.
我们将看看当 2028 年临近时会发生什么。
Sure.
当然。
Maybe people begin taking that kind of risk.
也许人们开始冒这种风险。
I hope so.
我希望如此。
21:36 Bernie’s up there in age so he can’t do it anymore.
伯尼的年龄已经很大了,所以他不能再这样做了。
Why is the Democratic Party so bad at generating this kind of power?
为什么民主党在产生这种权力方面如此糟糕?
I don’t think it’s so bad at generating them.
我不认为生成它们有那么糟糕。
21:45 I think that it turned out to be bad at generating them this year.
我认为今年它们的生成结果很糟糕。
Look, as you mentioned back in February, 2023, I was somebody who came out and said, Biden can’t run again.
听着,正如你在 2023 年 2 月提到的那样,我是一个站出来说“拜登不能再次参选”的人。
This isn’t going to work.
这是行不通的。
And my view, and that was really what that set of pieces was about, was about the argument that even though Biden was clearly going to win the primary, that there was still time for Democrats to do something the parties had done in the past and have an open convention.
我的观点,这也是这组文章的真正内容,是关于这样的论点:尽管拜登显然将赢得初选,但民主党仍然有时间做各党过去做过的事情并召开公开大会。
And you could structure the lead up to an open convention in a number of different ways.
您可以通过多种不同的方式构建开放大会的准备工作。
You could have something like a mini primary.
你可以举办小型初选之类的活动。
But basically you’d have Democrats out in the media out giving speeches.
但基本上你会让民主党人在媒体上发表演讲。
And their ultimate audience would be the delegates at the Democratic National Convention.
他们的最终观众将是民主党全国代表大会的代表。
And my hope was through that you would find the person for this moment.
我希望你能找到此时此刻的那个人。
22:29 The thing for Kamala Harris, it was really difficult was she was for another moment.
对于卡玛拉·哈里斯来说,这真的很困难,因为她又经历了一个时刻。
She’s picked by Joe Biden in 2020 amidst just a very different political equilibrium, a sense that you had a transitionary moment between two versions of the Democratic Party.
她在 2020 年被乔·拜登选中,当时的政治平衡截然不同,感觉民主党正处于两个版本之间的过渡时刻。
Maybe Joe Biden reaching a little bit back to the past to these sort of lunch pail, blue collar Democrats.
也许乔·拜登对这些午餐桶、蓝领民主党人有点回到过去。
Joe from Scranton was a big part of the Joe Biden appeal.
来自斯克兰顿的乔是乔·拜登呼吁的重要组成部分。
But also Biden never has a chance if he’s not Barack Obama’s vice president.
但如果拜登不是巴拉克·奥巴马的副总统,他也永远没有机会。
And so, you have this sort of weird set of historical factors operating at the same time.
因此,一系列奇怪的历史因素同时发生。
There’s a desire for stability and experience amidst the chaos of Donald Trump in the pandemic.
在唐纳德·特朗普在大流行病中的混乱中,人们渴望稳定和体验。
There is Biden as Obama’s vice president who nevertheless did not run in the election after Obama.
拜登作为奥巴马的副总统,但在奥巴马之后没有参加选举。
23:17 I think a lot of people look back at 2016 and think, you know what?
我想很多人回顾 2016 年都会想,你知道吗?
If Biden had been the candidate, he would’ve beaten Trump and we would live in a different reality.
如果拜登是候选人,他就会击败特朗普,我们就会生活在不同的现实中。
And then Biden chose Harris as an effort to shore up his own, at least assumed weaknesses.
然后拜登选择哈里斯是为了弥补自己的弱点,至少是假设的弱点。
He’s a white man in the Democratic Party at a time when the Democratic Party is diversifying.
在民主党多元化的时期,他是民主党的白人。
And when the view of how you win elections is you put back together the Obama Coalition.
当你如何赢得选举的观点是你重新组建奥巴马联盟时。
And the Obama Coalition is young people, it’s voters of color and it’s enough working class white voters and then college educated white voters.
奥巴马联盟是年轻人、有色人种选民、工人阶级白人选民以及受过大学教育的白人选民。
That’s the Obama coalition.
这就是奥巴马联盟。
And so, Biden picks Harris for different reasons.
因此,拜登出于不同的原因选择了哈里斯。
My view at that time was I was sort of a Tammy Duckworth person and thought he should have picked Tammy Duckworth.
我当时的观点是,我有点像塔米·达克沃斯那样的人,认为他应该选择塔米·达克沃斯。
But there were different people out there.
但那里有不同的人。
24:05 And then the kind of moment that Harris was running in just sort of dissipates.
然后哈里斯正在跑步的那种时刻就消失了。
First, she has a particular background from California where she’s tough on crime.
首先,她有加州的特殊背景,在那里她对犯罪采取严厉的态度。
Her book is called Smart on Crime Prosecutor.
她的书叫《聪明的犯罪检察官》。
But she runs in the Democratic Party at time when it’s turned on that kind of politics.
但她在民主党竞选时,正值民主党掀起这种政治浪潮。
People want a lot from her personally, but they don’t want a sort of prosecutorial character.
人们对她个人有很多要求,但他们不想要一种检察官的性格。
So, she sort of abandons that and never I think really finds another political identity, certainly before she begins running in 2024.
所以,她有点放弃了这一点,我认为她从未真正找到过另一个政治身份,尤其是在她 2024 年开始竞选之前。
That works.
那行得通。
But she’s a talented debater.
但她是一位才华横溢的辩手。
She’s a very talented performer on the stump, but she doesn’t really have a theory of politics and policy that she’s identified with.
她是一位非常有才华的树桩表演者,但她并没有真正认同的政治和政策理论。
But she’s a way for Biden to signal that he understands that him being in 2020, a 78-year-old white guy, he understands the future is not him, or at least not just him.
但她是拜登的一种方式,表明他明白自己在 2020 年,作为一个 78 岁的白人,他明白未来不是他,或者至少不是他一个人。
And he’s sort of trying to make a coalitional pick that speaks to his own potential weaknesses.
他在某种程度上试图做出一个能够体现他自己潜在弱点的联盟选择。
25:02 I think by 2024, you have two problems.
我认为到 2024 年,你会遇到两个问题。
He only steps down, what is it, June?
他只是走了下来,什么事,琼?
They’re weeks from the DNC.
他们距离民主党全国委员会还有几周的时间。
They don’t have time anymore for an open convention.
他们不再有时间举行公开会议。
You know how the Biden position is very unpopular for a number of reasons, but particularly inflation and cost of living.
你知道,拜登的立场非常不受欢迎,原因有很多,尤其是通货膨胀和生活成本。
So, now you have Kamala Harris running with a sort of anvil of being associated.
所以,现在卡玛拉·哈里斯(Kamala Harris)带着某种关联的铁砧奔跑。
It’s a Biden-Harris administration.
这是拜登-哈里斯政府。
She doesn’t really have a lane on cost of living.
她在生活成本方面确实没有办法。
It’s not something she’s known for working on in the Senate.
这并不是她因在参议院工作而闻名的事情。
It’s not something she has a bunch of great ideas about.
她对此并没有很多好主意。
It’s not something she could write a talking about.
这不是她可以写一篇谈论的事情。
It’s probably not the candidate you would pick for a cost of living election.
它可能不是你在生活成本选举中会选择的候选人。
25:40 And she’s had no time to build that out.
她没有时间去构建它。
Maybe if she had been running in a primary for a year and a half, having to fend off Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders, and Pete Buttigieg and whomever else, she either would’ve figured out how to do it.
也许如果她参加初选一年半,不得不抵御伊丽莎白·沃伦、伯尼·桑德斯、皮特·布蒂吉格和其他人,她就会想出如何做到这一点。
Primaries or periods of education and learning for the candidates too, or they would’ve found somebody else who could do it.
候选人也需要初选或教育和学习阶段,否则他们会找到其他人可以做到这一点。
But she doesn’t get any of that.
但她什么也没得到。
She’s thrown into the game with three months to go.
距离比赛还有三个月,她就投入了比赛。
So, they picked the candidate in 2020 who won.
因此,他们选出了 2020 年获胜的候选人。
Whether you think Biden’s inspiring or not, he was a reasonable pick for that moment.
无论你认为拜登是否鼓舞人心,他都是当时的合理选择。
He should have never run for a second term, and he sort of implied to a lot of people that he wouldn’t.
他不应该竞选连任,他也向很多人暗示他不会。
And then the handover to Harris was a very difficult handover to a candidate who didn’t go through any kind of selection process for the moment in which he was running.
然后,向哈里斯的移交是一次非常困难的移交,因为他在竞选期间没有经过任何形式的选拔程序。
We’ll see what they do in 2028, but the consequences of what they did in 2024 have been severe.
我们将看看他们在 2028 年会做什么,但他们在 2024 年所做的事情的后果是严重的。
There’s two really big questions on the table that I think click together in an interesting way.
我认为有两个非常重要的问题以一种有趣的方式结合在一起。
26:29 You asked one, why did Trump win?
你问一个人,特朗普为什么赢了?
And two, why do Democrats have this certain communication style that might make them less interested in coming onto an unstructured three-hour conversation with you?
第二,为什么民主党人有这种特定的沟通方式,可能会让他们不太愿意与你进行三小时的非结构化对话?
Let me try to tell a story that connects them.
让我试着讲一个将他们联系起来的故事。
I think Trump’s victory in 2024 was over determined if there are a lot of factors here.
我认为如果有很多因素的话,特朗普在2024年的胜利已经是板上钉钉了。
Number one, if you look internationally, incumbents lost all over the world.
第一,如果你放眼国际,就会发现世界各地的现任者都在流失。
They lost in the US, they lost in Europe, they lost in pretty much every developed country at rates that we really haven’t seen in 50 years.
他们在美国失败了,在欧洲失败了,在几乎每个发达国家都失败了,其速度是我们 50 年来从未见过的。
And that’s largely because the inflation crisis that came after COVID created an absolute disaster for incumbent establishment power.
这主要是因为新冠疫情之后爆发的通胀危机给现任建制派带来了一场绝对的灾难。
People couldn’t bring prices down.
人们无法降低价格。
Voters were furious and they were destroying establishment orders all over the world.
选民们非常愤怒,他们正在破坏世界各地的建制秩序。
Democrats happened to be in power, and as a result, they got the brunt of it.
民主党恰好掌权,结果他们首当其冲。
That’s number one.
这是第一。
27:21 Number two, if you look at elections over the 21st century, two things are true.
第二,如果你看看 21 世纪的选举,就会发现有两件事是正确的。
One, almost every election is unbelievably close.
第一,几乎每次选举都令人难以置信地接近。
For reasons that I’m not sure I entirely understand, the parties have gotten really good, historically, bizarrely good at getting each group to come to the polls with about 48% such that every election is a battle over the next 1.5%.
出于我不确定我完全理解的原因,从历史上看,各党派都非常擅长让每个群体以大约 48% 的得票率参加投票,这样每次选举都是一场争夺接下来 1.5% 的战斗。
And in a world like that, little thermostatic swings are very important.
在这样的世界里,微小的恒温波动非常重要。
And what we’ve seen over the last few years, and there’s this theory about thermostatic public opinion in American politics, that says that what often happens in politics is one party has a very compelling message of change, they become the establishment and then they become the victims of exactly the weapon that they marshaled.
我们在过去几年中看到,有一种关于美国政治中舆论恒温的理论,该理论认为,政治中经常发生的情况是,一个政党发出了非常引人注目的变革信息,他们成为建制派,然后成为他们所使用的武器的受害者。
That then the next out-group party says, “We have a theory of change and we’re going to throw out the bums.” And the next party comes in and they overreach and then they lose.
然后下一个团体外的一方会说:“我们有一个变革理论,我们要赶走流浪汉。”下一个政党进来了,他们做得太过分了,然后他们就输了。
28:13 In a world where you have thermostatic change and every election is very close, you tend to have elections swinging back and forth.
在一个恒温变化且每次选举都非常接近的世界中,选举往往会来回摇摆。
So, I think that also explains why Democrats and Republicans have struggled to hold onto power for six-year, eight-year, 12-year terms the same way they did say in the 1930s or 1960s.
所以,我认为这也解释了为什么民主党和共和党一直在努力保住六年、八年、十二年的权力,就像他们在 1930 年代或 1960 年代所说的那样。
But finally, you have to look at what kind of character Donald Trump is and what kind of a media figure he is.
但最后,你必须看看唐纳德·特朗普是一个什么样的人物,他是一个什么样的媒体人物。
We were just talking off camera about how every age of communications technology revolution clicks into focus a new skill that is suddenly in critical demand for the electorate.
我们刚刚在镜头外谈论了每一个时代的通信技术革命如何聚焦选民突然急需的一项新技能。
The world of radio technology is a world in which Franklin Delano Roosevelt can be powerful in a way that he can’t be in the 1890s.
在无线电技术的世界里,富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福 (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) 可以以他在 1890 年代无法做到的方式拥有强大的力量。
And then you have the 1950s.
然后是 20 世纪 50 年代。
Dwight Eisenhower, 1956, I believe is the first televised national convention.
德怀特·艾森豪威尔 (Dwight Eisenhower),1956 年,我相信这是第一次电视转播的全国代表大会。
Famously the 1960 presidential debates between JFK and Richard Nixon take an election that is leaning toward Nixon and make it an election that’s leaning toward JFK because he’s so damn handsome and also just electrically compelling on a screen.
众所周知,1960 年肯尼迪和理查德·尼克松之间的总统辩论将一场倾向于尼克松的选举变成了一场倾向于肯尼迪的选举,因为他非常英俊,而且在屏幕上也非常引人注目。
29:21 We have a new screened technology right now, which is not just television on steroids.
我们现在拥有一种新的屏幕技术,这不仅仅是类固醇电视。
It’s a different species entirely.
这是一个完全不同的物种。
And it seems to favor, it seems to provide value for individuals, influencers, and even celebrities and politicians who are good at something like live wire authenticity.
它似乎有利于,它似乎为个人、有影响力的人,甚至擅长诸如现场电线真实性之类的名人和政客提供价值。
They’re good at performing authenticity, as paradoxical as that sounds.
他们擅长表现真实性,尽管这听起来很矛盾。
Trump is an absolute marvel at performing authenticity even when the audience somehow acknowledges that he might be bullshitting.
特朗普在表现真实性方面绝对是一个奇迹,即使观众以某种方式承认他可能在胡说八道。
He’s just an amazing performer for this age.
他是这个年龄段的一位出色的表演者。
And it speaks to the fact that he seems to be, to borrow Ezra’s term, remarkably disinhibited in front of every single audience.
借用以斯拉的话来说,这说明了这样一个事实:他在每一位观众面前似乎都表现得非常不拘束。
There doesn’t seem to be this sort of background algorithm in his head calculating exactly how to craft these message to different audiences.
他的头脑中似乎没有这种后台算法来准确计算如何向不同的受众传达这些信息。
He just seems to be like a live wire animal in front of every audience.
在每个观众面前,他就像一只活生生的钢丝动物。
And I think that compares very distinctly to the democratic character of bureaucratic caution in our age.
我认为这与我们这个时代官僚谨慎的民主特征非常明显。
30:26 And there is a really important distinction between this vibe of the Trumpian ruler and the vibe of the rule follower.
特朗普统治者的氛围和规则追随者的氛围之间存在着非常重要的区别。
And the vibe of the bureaucratic rule follower is a little bit afraid of unstructured conversation, is always performing the background algorithm of how do I communicate in a way that balances all of the coalitions on my side?
官僚规则追随者的氛围有点害怕非结构化对话,总是执行后台算法,即我如何以平衡我这边所有联盟的方式进行沟通?
Because if you look at the Democratic Party right now compared to the Republican Party, I mean in 2015, I think there were four political parties in America.
因为如果你现在将民主党与共和党进行比较,我的意思是在 2015 年,我认为美国有四个政党。
There was MAGA, there was the Center Right, there was the Bernie Wing, and there was the Biden Clinton Obama wing.
有MAGA,有中右翼,有伯尼翼,还有拜登·克林顿·奥巴马翼。
And what happened is that Trump killed and skinned the Center Right and is now wearing it as a hat.
事实是,特朗普杀死了中右翼人士并剥了皮,现在把它当作帽子戴了。
31:10 The entire Republican Party is Donald Trump wearing the skins of the old center, the Romney wing, and the Democratic Party is still a fight.
整个共和党都是唐纳德·特朗普披着老中间派、罗姆尼派的皮,民主党还在打架。
It’s exactly what Ezra described.
这正是以斯拉所描述的。
It’s a jungle.
这是一片丛林。
And maybe there’s something about that jungle nature of the Democratic Party that is making some of its leaders perform this sort of coalitional calculation when they’re communicating, such that it makes them less interested in appearing in settings that might cost them, that might not benefit them in exactly the sort of pre-calculated way they have to get their message across.
也许民主党的丛林本质使得一些领导人在沟通时进行这种联盟算计,这使得他们不太愿意出现在可能会让他们付出代价的环境中,这可能不会以他们必须以预先计算的方式传达信息的方式对他们有利。
And so, there’s not necessarily a whole lot of empirics to that theory.
因此,该理论不一定有大量经验。
I’m a little bit going on vibes here, and maybe Ezra see some flaws to theory.
我在这里有点共鸣,也许埃兹拉看到了理论的一些缺陷。
It’s an age of the vibe.
这是一个充满活力的时代。
It’s the age of the vibe.
这是一个充满氛围的时代。
31:52 Yeah, exactly.
是的,完全正确。
I’m trying to perform the live wire authenticity that I’m describing, but I do think that might begin to explain why you, Lex, might be picking up on a difference between the political vibes.
我试图表现出我所描述的真实性,但我确实认为这可能会开始解释为什么你,莱克斯,可能会注意到政治氛围之间的差异。
An eagerness and a willingness and the one hand to have kind of unstructured and even chaotic conversations, and a care on the other side about not letting conversations become too unstructured or too careless.
一方面渴望和愿意进行某种无组织甚至混乱的对话,另一方面关心不要让对话变得太无组织或太粗心。
Can I build on that?
我可以以此为基础吗?
32:16 I know we’re supposed to talk about abundance, but I want to talk about this.
我知道我们应该谈论丰富,但我想谈谈这个。
There’s an abundance of time.
有充裕的时间。
An abundance of time.
时间充裕。
32:24 We’re on the Lex Fridman Show.
我们在莱克斯·弗里德曼秀上。
So, two or three things.
所以,有两三件事。
One is Democrats still think the currency of politics is money and the currency of politics is attention.
一是民主党人仍然认为政治的货币是金钱,政治的货币是注意力。
And that’s a huge difference between the two sides right now.
现在双方之间存在巨大差异。
So, what did Kamala Harris come in and do?
那么,卡玛拉·哈里斯进来做什么呢?
She came in and raised a shit ton of money, like a billion dollars in record time, basically.
她进来筹集了一大笔钱,基本上是在创纪录的时间内筹集了十亿美元。
She had more money than Donald Trump did, and used it to try to buy attention.
她比唐纳德·特朗普有更多的钱,并用它来吸引注意力。
What it meant for Democrats to be good at social media, is to have a good social media team.
对于民主党来说,擅长社交媒体意味着拥有一支优秀的社交媒体团队。
People in your office somewhere in your campaign headquarters who put out cool things on social media, good memes, and good advertisements-
在你的竞选总部办公室里的人,他们在社交媒体上发布了很酷的东西、好的表情包和好的广告——
33:00 Put out cool things on social media, good memes, and good advertisements and so on.
在社交媒体上发布很酷的东西、好的表情包、好的广告等等。
What it means on the right to be good at social media is to be you personally good at social media, your Vivek Ramaswamy, you’re JD Vance, your Donald Trump, your Elon Musk, and what you understand is you are the product.
对右翼来说,擅长社交媒体意味着你个人擅长社交媒体,你是你的维韦克·拉马斯瓦米,你是 JD·万斯,你的唐纳德·特朗普,你的埃隆·马斯克,你所理解的是你就是产品。
What it means to be good at attention is you are good at attention.
善于集中注意力意味着你善于集中注意力。
Now, Harris, I think was actually better at some dimensions of this.
现在,哈里斯,我认为实际上在某些方面做得更好。
They were just slightly older dimensions and people always gave her credit for, hell of a performer on the stump.
它们只是尺寸稍大一些,人们总是称赞她是树桩上的出色表演者。
She was way better on the stump than people realized she would be, and a good debater, she’d always been a good debater.
她在树桩上的表现比人们想象的要好得多,而且她是一名优秀的辩手,她一直都是一名优秀的辩手。
She trashed Donald Trump in that debate, but she does not do social media herself at any level because she’s not going to take risks Democrats.
她在那场辩论中抨击了唐纳德·特朗普,但她自己并没有在任何层面上使用社交媒体,因为她不会冒民主党的风险。
33:41 Most Democrats still live in a world where the thing that they’re optimizing for and attention is to not get negative attention.
大多数民主党人仍然生活在一个他们正在优化的事情和注意力是不受到负面关注的世界。
And what the Trumpist wing of the Republican Party understands, and this is truer for them than it probably would be for Democrats because for them the media is the enemy, or at least the mainstream media is etcetera, but is that attention.
共和党的特朗普派所理解的,这对他们来说比对民主党人来说可能更真实,因为对他们来说媒体是敌人,或者至少主流媒体是等等,但这就是关注。
A volume of attention is itself good and you can only get a critical mass of it if you’re willing to accept negative attention.
一定程度的关注本身就是好事,只有当你愿意接受负面关注时,你才能获得足够的关注。
Agenda control doesn’t come from positive attention.
议程控制并非来自积极的关注。
It comes from conflict.
它来自冲突。
You get agenda control by doing things the other side disagrees with, so they enter into functioning agreement with you to keep the thing you’re doing at the front.
你通过做对方不同意的事情来获得议程控制权,因此他们与你达成有效协议,将你正在做的事情放在首位。
34:23 Now, that doesn’t make you highly popular.
现在,这并不会让你很受欢迎。
Donald Trump is the most unpopular modern president at this stage of his presidency except for Donald Trump’s first term.
唐纳德·特朗普是除第一个任期外现阶段最不受欢迎的现代总统。
It took, I think Nate Silver said it was 221 days for Joe Biden’s net favorability to go negative.
我记得内特·西尔弗说过,乔·拜登的净好感度在 221 天后才变为负值。
It’s taken something like 55 days for Donald Trump to do the same.
唐纳德·特朗普花了大约 55 天的时间才做到了这一点。
So what Donald Trump is doing does not optimize for favorability.
因此,唐纳德·特朗普所做的事情并没有优化好感度。
It does not optimize, by the way, for big wins.
顺便说一句,它并没有针对重大胜利进行优化。
Democrats feel like they got trashed in 2024, and in a way they did.
民主党人感觉他们在 2024 年被彻底摧毁了,而且在某种程度上他们确实如此。
But Trump’s popular vote victory was the smallest popular vote victory since 2000 when Al Gore beat George W.
但特朗普的普选胜利是自2000年戈尔击败乔治·W·布什以来最小的普选胜利。
Bush by 17 dogs and three old men or whatever it was.
布什由 17 条狗和三个老人或其他什么东西组成。
And so, attention works really differently.
因此,注意力的作用确实不同。
35:06 And while I think some of the Rogan of the left discourse has been frankly overstated, because honestly, the most parsimonious model of 2024 and 2020 is in 2020, you have a 4848 nation, something like that.
虽然我认为左派的一些罗根言论坦率地被夸大了,因为老实说,2024 年和 2020 年最节俭的模型是在 2020 年,你有一个 4848 个国家,类似的东西。
Or maybe you have something that’s more like a 49 Democrat, 47 Republican nation.
或者也许你的国家更像是一个 49 个民主党人、47 个共和党人的国家。
And in 2020, because of the pandemic, Donald Trump suffered a, let’s call it a 2.
2020 年,由于大流行,唐纳德·特朗普遭受了,我们称之为 2。
5-point incumbent penalty.
现有处罚5分。
People are mad about the pandemic, they’re mad about things being chaotic, so he loses 2.5 points that given the natural split of the electorate, Joe Biden, a 4.5-point popular vote victory.
人们对这种流行病感到愤怒,他们对混乱的事情感到愤怒,因此考虑到选民的自然分裂,乔·拜登以 4.5 个百分点的普选胜利,他失去了 2.5 个百分点。
In 2024, people are mad about inflation.
2024年,人们对通货膨胀感到愤怒。
They’re somewhat mad about the border.
他们对边境有点生气。
You have a 2.5-point penalty applied to the incumbent administration.
现任政府将处以 2.5 分的处罚。
Now it’s Harris, and you get a 1.5-point popular vote victory for Donald Trump.
现在轮到哈里斯了,唐纳德·特朗普以 1.5 个百分点的普选优势获胜。
I genuinely don’t think, and this held internationally too, right?
我真的不这么认为,这在国际上也是如此,对吧?
I generally don’t think you need a lot more to explain the election right now than that, but you do need something more than that to explain.
我一般认为你现在不需要更多的东西来解释选举,但你确实需要更多的东西来解释。
36:06 Donald Trump’s now since 2016, almost decade long dominance of all attention in American politics.
自 2016 年以来,唐纳德·特朗普在美国政坛占据了近十年的主导地位。
Starting when he came down the golden escalator in 2015, American politics from 2015 to 2020 when Joe Biden won was about Donald Trump.
从2015年他走下金色自动扶梯开始,从2015年到2020年乔·拜登获胜的美国政治都是关于唐纳德·特朗普的。
And then from 2020 to 2024, when Joe Biden was president, it was about Donald Trump.
然后从 2020 年到 2024 年,当乔·拜登担任总统时,一切都是关于唐纳德·特朗普的。
And then from 2024 on, it was about Donald Trump.
从 2024 年开始,一切都与唐纳德·特朗普有关。
Joe Biden was an attentional void, be it his age, be it their strategy.
乔·拜登是一个注意力空白的人,无论是他的年龄,还是他们的策略。
They agreed that the topic of the nation should be Donald Trump, right?
他们一致认为国家的话题应该是唐纳德·特朗普,对吧?
When he went back to begin his campaign in 2024, he goes to Valley Forge and gives a speech about January 6th and Donald Trump, right?
当他 2024 年回去开始竞选时,他会去福吉谷发表关于 1 月 6 日和唐纳德·特朗普的演讲,对吧?
It wasn’t about his own achievements, it was about Donald Trump.
这与他自己的成就无关,而是与唐纳德·特朗普有关。
Joe Biden didn’t do the Super Bowl interview in 2023.
乔·拜登没有接受 2023 年超级碗的采访。
That’s when I did my thing about this is not going to work.
那时我所做的事情是行不通的。
Probably because at that point, he was not capable of good extemporaneous interviews.
可能是因为那时他还没有能力进行良好的即兴采访。
37:02 I mean, I think that was my view of them, that the revealed thing here was that they didn’t trust him to do interviews.
我的意思是,我认为这就是我对他们的看法,这里暴露的事情是他们不信任他进行采访。
I didn’t have some inside information about anything, I just looked at what they were doing, what they weren’t doing.
我没有任何内幕消息,我只是看看他们在做什么,没有做什么。
They’re behind in the polls.
他们在民调中落后。
They weren’t doing things like the Super Bowl interview.
他们没有做超级碗采访之类的事情。
If you can’t turn your candidate into the product, if you don’t trust your candidate to be the product in an election, you’re fucked, right?
如果你不能把你的候选人变成产品,如果你不相信你的候选人会成为选举中的产品,那你就完蛋了,对吧?
And so that was to me, the tell, but attention is the coin of the realm.
对我来说,这就是告诉,但注意力是这个领域的硬币。
Now, there are better and worse ways of doing it.
现在,有更好和更坏的方法。
I don’t think Donald Trump is doing himself huge favors right now.
我认为唐纳德·特朗普现在并没有给自己带来巨大的好处。
I think they had, there was a path they could have walked to be a majority party.
我认为他们有,他们可以走一条成为多数党的道路。
37:37 I think that if he was more restrained, more inhibited, if he was able to not do a bunch of things that are mobilizing opposition to him, you could talk about what they would or wouldn’t achieve that way, but I think they could be in a much stronger political position that would make them stronger for the midterms.
我认为,如果他更加克制,更加克制,如果他能够不做一堆煽动反对他的事情,你可以谈论他们会或不会以这种方式实现什么,但我认为他们可能处于一个更强大的政治地位,这将使他们在中期选举中变得更强大。
It would eventually make JD Vance stronger as a successor.
它最终将使 JD Vance 作为继任者变得更加强大。
I think they’re running a very high-risk strategy that has a very reasonable chance of if they don’t make what I would call an autocratic breakthrough, they might completely blow up their own movement.
我认为他们正在实施一种非常高风险的策略,如果他们没有取得我所说的独裁突破,他们很有可能会彻底摧毁自己的运动。
It’s all very high risk.
这都是非常高风险的。
So, for them, for everybody, for everything, what makes them good at politics is also what makes them bad at politics.
因此,对于他们、对于每个人、对于一切事物,使他们擅长政治的因素也使他们不擅长政治。
38:14 But for Democrats, the caution, the bureaucratic culture, the fear of saying anything that will make anybody mad, it is optimized for a different attentional era.
但对于民主党人来说,谨慎、官僚文化、害怕说出任何会让任何人生气的话,这些都针对不同的注意力时代进行了优化。
One of the things I’m watching when you’re saying about leaders, one of the things I’m watching in the people coming up, the ones who want to run in 2028 is who seems like they have adapted to this era not in the way Trump did or Vance did or Musk did.
当你谈论领导人时,我关注的一件事是,我在那些即将上任的人、那些想要在 2028 年参选的人中关注的一件事是,他们似乎已经适应了这个时代,而不是像特朗普、万斯或马斯克那样。
I think they’re going to need something different.
我认为他们需要一些不同的东西。
They fully represent the Twitter era of politics.
他们充分代表了Twitter时代的政治。
I mean Musk bought Twitter.
我的意思是马斯克买了推特。
I think sort of all in on what politics right now, what online politics feels like.
我认为现在的政治、网络政治是什么样的。
I think the thing that will come next is someone who’s able to synthesize both the lessons of it, feeling that we all have that it’s kind of sick and poisoned, right?
我认为接下来会发生的事情是有人能够综合它的教训,感觉我们都有这种病态和中毒,对吧?
That Twitter’s not a good place, X is not a good place.
Twitter 不是一个好地方,X 也不是一个好地方。
TikTok politics is not a good place that we’re all being turned on each other somehow.
TikTok 政治不是一个好地方,我们都会以某种方式互相攻击。
39:08 You need to be authentic and authentically angry at what we’ve all become in the way that Obama ran as a political reformer who hated the red and blue cut of America, who hated what political consultants and pollsters were doing to us.
你需要对我们所有人的现状感到真诚和真正的愤怒,奥巴马作为一名政治改革者,讨厌美国的红蓝划分,讨厌政治顾问和民意调查专家对我们所做的事情。
You’re not going to have somebody who just echoes.
你不会遇到只会附和的人。
There’s not going to be, there’ll be no Joe Rogan of the left.
不会有,不会有左翼的乔·罗根。
There will be no Donald Trump of the left because the left is different than the right, but it’ll have to be something authentically of this era, but also authentic to the backlash to it, which I think as we enter into this period where the president and everybody around him fully embraces this attentional economy, I think people are going to want something different from this attentional economy in four years.
不会有左派的唐纳德·特朗普,因为左派与右派不同,但它必须是真正属于这个时代的东西,但也必须是真实的对它的强烈反对,我认为当我们进入总统和他周围的每个人完全拥抱这种注意力经济的时期时,我认为人们会在四年内想要与这种注意力经济不同的东西。
And be okay with a negative attention that comes with being authentic.
并接受因真实而带来的负面关注。
You’re going to have to have some of it, right?
你必须有一些,对吧?
39:49 You cannot change American politics.
你无法改变美国政治。
You can’t change the Democratic Party if you’re not willing to upset people.
如果你不愿意让人们不高兴,你就无法改变民主党。
Donald Trump reformed the Republican Party by willing able to fight Republicans.
唐纳德·特朗普通过愿意与共和党人对抗来改革了共和党。
He ran against George W.
他与乔治·W·布什竞选。
Bush, against Jeb Bush, against Mitt Romney, against the trade deals, against a bunch of things that were understood to be sacred cows.
布什,反对杰布·布什,反对米特·罗姆尼,反对贸易协议,反对一堆被认为是神圣的事物。
Somehow this guy ran right after Mitt Romney and John McCain while attacking Mitt Romney and John McCain, right?
不知何故,这个家伙一边追赶米特·罗姆尼和约翰·麦凯恩,一边攻击米特·罗姆尼和约翰·麦凯恩,对吗?
If you are not, the Democratic Party does need to change.
如果不是,民主党确实需要改变。
It needs to attain a different form because the Obama Coalition is exhausted.
它需要采取不同的形式,因为奥巴马联盟已经筋疲力尽。
It’s done.
完成了。
It’s not going to be able to do that if it doesn’t have standard-bearers who are willing to say we were wrong about some things.
如果没有愿意说我们在某些事情上错了的旗手,它就无法做到这一点。
We have to change our views on some things.
我们必须改变对某些事情的看法。
We have to act differently and speak differently.
我们必须以不同的方式行事,以不同的方式说话。
Is there a degree to which the left uniquely attacks its own more intensely than maybe other parts of the political spectrum?
左派是否在某种程度上比政治领域的其他部分更强烈地攻击自己?
It’s possible.
这是可能的。
40:47 You go back to the model that I gave you of 2015 where there used to be these four large parties, MAGA, center right, center left, and left.
你回到我在 2015 年给你的模型,那里曾经有四个大型政党,MAGA、中右翼、中左翼和左翼。
Right now, the Republican Party is all MAGA, so there is no coalitional fight to be had.
现在,共和党都是MAGA,所以没有什么可以进行的联合斗争。
It’s all Donald Trump.
这都是唐纳德·特朗普。
And if Donald Trump wants to name a former left-wing environmentalist to be the HHS secretary, everyone says, “Okay, that sounds like a fantastic idea.
如果唐纳德·特朗普想任命一位前左翼环保人士担任美国卫生与公众服务部部长,每个人都会说:“好吧,这听起来是个好主意。
That’s exactly who we were going to nominate too.
这也正是我们要提名的人选。
Thank you, Donald.
谢谢你,唐纳德。
That’s wonderful.
太棒了。
It’s at the tip of my tongue.”
它就在我的舌尖上。”
41:16 On the Democratic side, there is a fight and it’s happening right now and our book is trying to win a certain intra-left coalitional fight about defining the future of liberalism in the Democratic Party.
在民主党方面,有一场斗争正在发生,我们的书正试图赢得一场关于定义民主党自由主义未来的左翼内部联盟斗争。
So, I’m not of the left.
所以,我不是左派。
I’m certainly not of the far left.
我当然不是极左派。
I have center left politics and maybe even a center left personality style if we can even call it that, but I do not begrudge the left for fighting because there’s a fight to be had.
我有中间偏左的政治倾向,甚至可能有中间偏左的人格风格,如果我们可以这样称呼它的话,但我并不嫉妒左派的斗争,因为还有斗争要做。
In many ways, I think sometimes they see, I’m not endorsing this, I’m describing it.
在很多方面,我认为有时他们会看到,我不是在赞同这一点,而是在描述它。
I think they see their near-term opposition as not always the Republican Party, but as the forces, the Democratic Party that are in the way for them controlling one of the two major parties in this country.
我认为他们认为近期的反对派并不总是共和党,而是阻碍他们控制这个国家两个主要政党之一的势力,即民主党。
42:10 And so, they do have an oppositional style and maybe that’s personality based.
所以,他们确实有一种对立的风格,也许这是基于个性的。
They are fighting the center left.
他们正在与中左翼作战。
They are criticizing the center left consistently, but I want to be good faith about this even though I don’t share their politics and say that they’re doing it because they’re trying to win power on the left of center, and so that’s why they’re criticizing the way they are.
他们一直在批评中左翼,但我想对此保持真诚,尽管我不同意他们的政治观点,并说他们这样做是因为他们试图赢得中左翼的权力,所以这就是为什么他们批评他们的方式。
Now, our book and much of my writing is an attempt to do a little bit of a very specific dance as we touched on this I think really beautifully.
现在,我们的书和我的大部分写作都是尝试做一些非常具体的舞蹈,因为我们触及了这一点,我认为非常漂亮。
We’re in an era right now of anti-institution politics, anti-establishment politics, and Democrats are at risk right now as being seen as the party that always defends institutions, the party that always defends the establishment status quo, and that is an absolute death knell, I think for this century’s angry anti-establishment politics.
我们现在正处于一个反制度政治、反建制政治的时代,民主党现在正面临着被视为始终捍卫制度的政党、始终捍卫建制现状的政党的风险,我认为这对于本世纪愤怒的反建制政治来说绝对是丧钟。
43:05 So, what we’re trying to do is essentially say, here’s a way to channel the anger that people have at the establishment, but toward our own ends, right?
所以,我们想做的本质上是说,这是一种缓解人们对当权派的愤怒的方法,但也是为了我们自己的目的,对吗?
We believe that we have answers on housing and energy and high-quality governance and science and technology, really good answers that are fiercely critical of the status quo in Democrat-led cities and Democrat-led states.
我们相信,我们在住房和能源以及高质量治理和科学技术方面有答案,这些答案非常好,对民主党领导的城市和民主党领导的州的现状提出了强烈批评。
We’re trying to be oppositional in a way that’s constructive rather than just destructive.
我们试图以一种建设性而非破坏性的方式来反对。
Just to put a nice pretty bow tie in the whole thing, let me ask for advice.
只是为了在整个事情中打上漂亮的领结,让我征求建议。
43:34 What do I need to do for AOC to do a three-hour interview with me?
我需要做什么才能让 AOC 对我进行三个小时的采访?
Ezra, from your throne of wisdom.
以斯拉,来自你的智慧宝座。
I don’t think I know how you get AOC herself to do it.
我想我不知道你是如何让 AOC 自己去做这件事的。
43:49 I would not pretend to know her offices or her particular views on this.
我不会假装了解她的办公室或她对此的具体看法。
I do think though that you can see different Democrats taking on different kinds of risks.
我确实认为,你可以看到不同的民主党人承担不同类型的风险。
Right now, we’re sort of in the age of Gavin Newsom.
现在,我们正处于加文·纽瑟姆的时代。
I mean, Gavin Newsom is the Governor of California and he’s spending some percentage of his time doing a podcast with Charlie Cook and Michael Savage and Steve Bannon.
我的意思是,加文·纽瑟姆是加利福尼亚州州长,他花了一定比例的时间与查理·库克、迈克尔·萨维奇和史蒂夫·班农一起制作播客。
Gavin Newsom realizes that one lane for a Democrat is to be high risk and talking to virtually everybody.
加文·纽瑟姆 (Gavin Newsom) 意识到,民主党人的一条路就是冒着高风险,与几乎所有人交谈。
I think Pete Buttigieg in a different way, somebody who wants to take media risks.
我认为皮特·布蒂吉格有不同的方式,他是一个愿意承担媒体风险的人。
Now I think he’s going to, my gut on him is he’s going to hold his powder a little bit, so he’ll probably want to do the Lex Fridman podcast assuming he runs in 2028, in 2027.
现在我认为他会这么做,我的直觉是他会稍微保守一下自己的立场,所以假设他在 2028 年、2027 年参选,他可能会想做 Lex Fridman 播客。
Buttigieg?
布蒂吉格?
Buttigieg, right.
布蒂吉格,对。
44:40 I think a lot of them are trying to figure out what is the lane for right now, and there’s a lane for the next two years and there’s a lane for the two years after that, and you’re going to see a lot of people begin to blanket media in the two years after that.
我认为他们中的很多人都在试图弄清楚现在的车道是什么,未来两年有一条车道,之后两年也有一条车道,你会看到很多人在那之后的两年里开始覆盖媒体。
Now, it’d be interesting, I would be curious to know, would Hakeem Jeffries come on your show right now?
现在,这很有趣,我很想知道,哈基姆·杰弗里斯现在会来参加你的节目吗?
That’d be interesting.
那会很有趣。
I mean, would he do it for four hours?
我的意思是,他会做四个小时吗?
I don’t know.
我不知道。
The four-hour ask, the three to four-hour ask as somebody who also books politicians is hard.
对于同时预订政客的人来说,四个小时的询问,三到四个小时的询问是很困难的。
I have trouble, I like to book people for 90 minutes to two hours, and I tend to get negotiated down to, I try not to go under 75 or 65.
我遇到了麻烦,我喜欢为人们预订 90 分钟到两个小时,而且我倾向于协商下来,我尽量不要低于 75 或 65。
But even as somebody I think well regarded in that world, it’s very, very, very hard for me to get politicians to sit for two hours.
但即使作为一个我认为在这个世界上很受尊敬的人,我也很难让政客们坐上两个小时。
I don’t have the sense that the three-hour ask is a big ask because of scheduling.
由于日程安排,我不认为三个小时的要求是一个很大的要求。
45:23 I think it still is grounded in the fear of saying the wrong thing.
我认为这仍然是基于害怕说错话。
I just think they’re used to something else, right?
我只是觉得他们已经习惯了别的东西,对吧?
Used to, yeah.
曾经,是的。
I think that when you talk, I mean they are scheduled by schedulers.
我认为当你谈论时,我的意思是它们是由调度程序调度的。
45:34 If you talk to them yourself, if you end up having a personal relationship with Wes Moore of Maryland and he wants to do your show, he will tell his scheduler, “I want three to four hours to do the show.” But the scheduler is used to a world.
如果你自己和他们交谈,如果你最终与马里兰州的韦斯·摩尔建立了私人关系,并且他想做你的节目,他会告诉他的调度员,“我想要三到四个小时来做这个节目。”但调度程序已经习惯了这个世界。
The staff is used to a world where nobody gets three to four hours for the boss.
员工们已经习惯了没有人能为老板工作三到四个小时的世界。
Reporters don’t, donors don’t, policy staffers don’t.
记者不这样做,捐助者不这样做,政策工作人员不这样做。
So then, when some interview comes in and they say, “Hey, I want three to four hours.” The answer is no, because culturally it’s not done.
因此,当接受采访时,他们会说:“嘿,我想要三到四个小时。”答案是否定的,因为从文化角度来看,这还没有完成。
You need Donald Trump himself, Pete Buttigieg himself, AOC herself to say to their staff, “No, no, no, we’re making time for this.”
你需要唐纳德·特朗普本人、皮特·布蒂吉格本人、AOC本人对他们的员工说:“不,不,不,我们正在为此腾出时间。”
Right.
正确的。
Because it’s not how they make time for things normally.
因为这不是他们通常为事情腾出时间的方式。
46:15 I don’t know how much it is fear.
我不知道有多少是恐惧。
I do think they’re unused to it, but I suspect a lot of it is simply booking culture.
我确实认为他们不习惯,但我怀疑其中很多只是预订文化。
I run into it too.
我也遇到了。
They’re not used to saying yes to three to four hours for anything.
他们不习惯答应三到四个小时做任何事情。
It’s not that they don’t have it.
并不是说他们没有。
They have three to four hours if their kid is having a graduation.
如果他们的孩子要毕业,他们有三到四个小时的时间。
I mean, they’re human beings, they can make time, but it would have to come in a way from them.
我的意思是,他们是人,他们可以创造时间,但必须以某种方式来自他们。
My sense is part of the Rogan, it’s very unclear because they’re very differing stories on what happened in the Rogan-Harris negotiations, but it does seem that time was one of the sticking points.
我的感觉是罗根的一部分,这非常不清楚,因为他们对罗根-哈里斯谈判中发生的事情有非常不同的故事,但时间似乎确实是症结之一。
It’s also possible that you’re going to find as you try to interview democratic politicians, that the exact same thing that happened with tech CEOs is going to happen among democratic politicians.
当你试图采访民主政客时,你也可能会发现,发生在科技首席执行官身上的同样的事情也将发生在民主政客身上。
46:48 You interviewed some tech CEOs and then they did a great job and their friends were like, “You were fantastic on a Lex Fridman podcast.
你采访了一些科技公司的首席执行官,然后他们做得很好,他们的朋友说,“你在莱克斯·弗里德曼的播客上表现得非常棒。
That was such a great thing that you said in minute 97.” And then there becomes a bit of a meme that you can create really high value moments for yourself if you appear on Lex’s podcast and then it becomes less risky for the next marginal CEO to say yes.
你在第 97 分钟说的这句话真是太棒了。”然后就形成了一种模因:如果你出现在莱克斯的播客上,你就可以为自己创造真正高价值的时刻,然后下一位边缘首席执行官答应的风险就变得较小。
And I think right now what we’re talking about fundamentally is not physics, it’s culture, it’s just norms.
我认为现在我们谈论的根本不是物理,而是文化,只是规范。
I think there’s a fear of low expected value.
我认为人们担心预期价值低。
47:28 If you’re a high-ranking democratic politician and maybe you do a podcast like this, what if I say the wrong thing and it goes viral and my bookers and my agenda, people and myself just feel terrible for the next few weeks because all we see on Bluesky and X is just people hating.
如果你是一位高级民主政治家,也许你会做一个这样的播客,如果我说错了话并且它像病毒一样传播开来,我的预订者和我的议程、人们和我自己在接下来的几周都会感觉很糟糕,因为我们在 Bluesky 和 X 上看到的只是人们讨厌的东西。
But if you get one interview that goes well, if you talk to Wes Moore, let’s say, and there’s a five-minute segment where he articulates vision of liberalism in the 2020s that everyone says, “My gosh, that is the best possible articulation of what the Democratic Party can stand for the next four years that I’ve ever heard.” Suddenly what’s happened is that appearing on the show becomes massively de-risk.
但如果你得到了一次进展顺利的采访,比如说,如果你与韦斯·摩尔交谈,其中有一个五分钟的片段,他阐述了 2020 年代自由主义的愿景,每个人都会说,“我的天哪,这是我听过的关于民主党未来四年的立场的最佳阐述。”突然间,出现在节目中的风险大大降低了。
And in fact, the risk valence entirely switches.
事实上,风险价完全改变了。
We are leaving dollars on the floor by not appearing on this guy’s podcast, AOC.
如果我们不出现在这个家伙的播客 AOC 上,我们就等于白白浪费钱了。
I’m a sensational communicator.
我是一个出色的沟通者。
If Wes Moore can do it, I can do it even better.
如果韦斯摩尔能做到,我就能做得更好。
48:19 And so, I think to a certain extent, there’s a little bit of a riot theory phenomenon here.
所以,我认为在某种程度上,这里存在一点暴乱理论现象。
The person who throws the first stone in a riot has to be very courageous.
在骚乱中扔第一块石头的人必须非常勇敢。
The person who throws the 101st stone in a riot doesn’t need to be courageous at all, and there might be a little bit of that going on that people need to see proof of high expected value before it breaks what we’re acknowledging to be a bit of a communications norm on the left.
在骚乱中投掷第 101 块石头的人根本不需要有勇气,而且可能会有一些事情发生,人们需要看到高期望值的证据,然后它才会打破我们所承认的左派沟通规范。
That’s a really convincing and powerful theory.
这是一个非常令人信服且有力的理论。
48:43 I think I want to push back on it.
我想我想反击它。
So, what’s going to happen, for example, this very conversation, you’re both going to come off brilliant.
所以,接下来会发生什么,例如,这次谈话,你们都会表现得很出色。
Well, we’re barely like 50 minutes into a four-hour.
好吧,四个小时里我们只用了 50 分钟。
Yeah, it’s going to be…
是的,这将会是……
48:59 Let’s see what happens.
让我们看看会发生什么。
I have no more material.
我没有更多的材料了。
49:00 Lex, it’s all straight downhill…
Lex,一切都在走下坡路……
But people will get tired, they’ll listen to this…
但人们会感到疲倦,他们会听这个……
It’s sloppy.
这很马虎。
And they’re like, “Well, that’s Ezra.
他们就像,“嗯,那是以斯拉。
49:06 He’s brilliant.” They’re going to be worried about their own candidate.
他很聪明。”他们会担心自己的候选人。
If AOC comes off brilliant, they’re not going to be thinking, “Oh, this is a place to be brilliant.” They’re going to be like, “Well, because AOC is brilliant, but my candidate is not.” It’s still boils down to the caution.
如果 AOC 表现出色,他们不会想,“哦,这是一个表现出色的地方。”他们会说,“好吧,因为 AOC 很出色,但我的候选人却不是。”归根结底还是要谨慎。
I’ve had a lot of Republican, high profile Republican people reach out to me, they don’t give a shit.
有很多共和党高调的共和党人士向我伸出援手,但他们根本不在乎。
They’re just like, “Whatever, I’ll come.” People on the left, I’ve had two people who I respect deeply and admire, expressed caution about the previous people I’ve interviewed and not wanting to come on.
他们就像,“无论如何,我会来。”左边的人,我有两个我深深尊敬和钦佩的人,他们对我之前采访过的人表示谨慎,不想上场。
Well, that’s the thing the left has to get over.
好吧,这是左派必须克服的事情。
49:45 Yeah, that’s a very important cultural.
是的,这是一个非常重要的文化。
They began to do a thing where spaces were verboten because it had platformed so-and-so, and I think that culture is changing.
他们开始做一件禁止空间的事情,因为它已经成为了某某的平台,我认为文化正在发生变化。
I think they realized, I mean, that they abandoned huge, vast swaths of significant culture because they wouldn’t go places.
我认为他们意识到,我的意思是,他们放弃了大片大片的重要文化,因为他们不会去别的地方。
It’s crazy.
太疯狂了。
The idea that you only go where people agree with you is genuine lunacy.
你只去人们同意你的地方的想法是真正的疯狂。
I don’t want to act as your booker here and 2020 candidates are what they are and they each have their own press strategy.
我不想在这里充当你们的预订员,2020 年的候选人就是这样,他们每个人都有自己的新闻策略。
But I would say I’m doing this myself on my show.
但我会说我自己在节目中这样做。
I don’t think the best people to get right now in the Democratic Party are the seven people who lead the polls.
我认为民主党目前最合适的人选并不是民意调查中领先的七个人。
I’m looking for people who will think out loud.
我正在寻找能够大声思考的人。
50:35 I just had Jake Auchincloss on.
我刚刚戴上了杰克·奥金克罗斯。
He’s not that well-known house member from Massachusetts.
他并不是马萨诸塞州著名的众议院议员。
I just think he’s a guy who thinks out loud.
我只是认为他是一个敢于大声思考的人。
I am booking someone else right now two more people like that frankly, who are neither of them.
坦白说,我现在正在预订另外两个这样的人,但他们都不是。
They’re like [inaudible 00:50:51].
他们就像[听不清00:50:51]。
I could get a bigger name.
我可以得到一个更大的名字。
I’m more interested in people who are thinking.
我对那些有思想的人更感兴趣。
One reason I think Bernie Sanders always did everything is to him, the thing he was really doing was he had something to say.
我认为伯尼·桑德斯总是做一切事情的原因之一是为了他,他真正做的事情是他有话要说。
The point of almost everything for Bernie Sanders is to be in a place where people can hear the thing he has to say, and a lot of politicians don’t have that, right?
对于伯尼·桑德斯来说,几乎所有事情的目的都是要让人们能够听到他所说的话,而很多政客都没有这一点,对吗?
The point of anything is what it does for them in the polls, what it does for them with the donors, how it repositions them.
任何事情的重点在于它在民意调查中对他们有什么好处,对捐助者有什么好处,以及如何重新定位他们。
51:18 I’m interested right now at this moment because it’s not 2028, it’s not 2027, there’s no democratic primary happening right now.
我现在很感兴趣,因为现在不是 2028 年,也不是 2027 年,现在没有民主初选。
The idea that you’re going to pre-run the Democratic Party primary is stupid.
你要提前进行民主党初选的想法是愚蠢的。
We don’t even know what the, we might be in World War Three.
我们甚至不知道我们可能会陷入第三次世界大战。
We have no idea what, we might have AGI, the things that the 2027 primary might be about, the kinds of scandals that might’ve erupted by them are totally different.
我们不知道,我们可能会有 AGI,2027 年初选可能涉及的事情,可能爆发的丑闻类型是完全不同的。
Whereas, the reason I have people on is because they are saying something.
然而,我之所以有人在,是因为他们在说些什么。
They’re a live mind in the moment that has a perspective on this that you want to hear.
他们是一个活跃的头脑,对这个问题有你想听到的观点。
And so, I would look for that.
所以,我会寻找那个。
51:56 And I think a lot of people who are not there are people who are trying to protect something, protect a standing in the polls, protect a sort of coalitional set of allies they currently have, and then there are people who are trying to just be heard.
我认为很多不在那里的人试图保护某些东西,保护在民意调查中的地位,保护他们目前拥有的一组盟友,然后还有一些人试图只是被听到。
Again, a lot of Bernie Sanders’ culture, the way he does media is now Bernie Sanders is Bernie Sanders.
再说一次,伯尼·桑德斯的很多文化,他做媒体的方式现在都是伯尼·桑德斯,伯尼·桑德斯就是伯尼·桑德斯。
He didn’t used to be.
他以前不是这样的。
He wasn’t in 2015 even.
他甚至不在2015年。
When Bernie Sanders ran for president in 2015, it wasn’t initially a big deal.
当伯尼·桑德斯 (Bernie Sanders) 2015 年竞选总统时,一开始这并不是什么大事。
It was like, “Oh, bummer.” Elizabeth Warren didn’t run for president was a feeling of most people on the left.
就像是,“哦,真糟糕。”伊丽莎白·沃伦没有竞选总统是大多数左翼人士的感觉。
And so, Bernie Sanders was the guy who’s been saying the same thing for decades, but in the wilderness and nobody was listening.
因此,伯尼·桑德斯几十年来一直在说同样的话,但在荒野中却没有人在听。
52:37 And now, he still has the instincts of somebody who understood that the most important thing was to find a place where people were listening, where they would let you talk and even better let you talk for a while.
现在,他仍然有一个人的直觉,他明白最重要的是找到一个人们倾听的地方,让你说话,甚至更好地让你说一会儿。
I think the candidate who’s going to do well in 2028 is going to have an instinct like that, but even right now, I think the question is, one of my big questions is I’m booking for my show is just I want someone who has a perspective on this moment, who feels like they have had a thought that is about right now and who we are right now and what the story of America is right now.
我认为在 2028 年表现出色的候选人都会有这样的直觉,但即使是现在,我认为问题是,我预订的节目的一个大问题是我想要一个对这个时刻有看法的人,他觉得他们已经有了关于现在、我们现在是谁以及美国现在的故事是什么的想法。
I think what’s really important is what Ezra said, it’s about having something to say.
我认为真正重要的是以斯拉所说的话,就是有话要说。
53:11 We wanted to talk to you and talk together about how much we wanted to talk to you because we got something to say.
我们想和你谈谈,并一起讨论我们是多么想和你谈谈,因为我们有话要说。
We wrote a 300-page book about how much we have to say.
我们写了一本 300 页的书,讲述了我们有多少话要说。
We love going on podcasts and television shows and radio and then doing live events to tell people what we have to say.
我们喜欢上播客、电视节目和广播,然后举办现场活动来告诉人们我们要说的话。
We think this idea of abundance isn’t just important for redefining what the American left means.
我们认为,这种丰富的观念不仅对于重新定义美国左派的含义很重要。
We think that the outcome of thinking abundantly about housing and energy and science and technology is what politics is all about.
我们认为,对住房、能源和科学技术进行充分思考的结果就是政治的全部内容。
It’s about people, the good life, and we think this is the path toward it.
这是关于人、关于美好生活的,我们认为这是实现这一目标的道路。
53:49 So certainly, one thing that’s profoundly motivated us is having something very concrete that we just want to get out there in the world.
当然,深深激励我们的一件事就是拥有一些非常具体的东西,我们只想将其传播到世界各地。
My sense as a writer, as a thinker is I want my software running on as many pieces of hardware as possible.
作为一名作家和思想家,我的感觉是我希望我的软件在尽可能多的硬件上运行。
I want to get my ideas out there as much as possible and who gets credit for them and where the idea goes, and that’s all secondary.
我想尽可能多地表达我的想法,谁会获得这些想法以及想法的去向,这些都是次要的。
I believe on ideas because they’re important.
我相信想法,因为它们很重要。
And so, I want to talk to people who have large platforms about those ideas because how else is the idea getting into the mainstream except through those large platforms?
因此,我想与拥有大型平台的人讨论这些想法,因为除了通过这些大型平台之外,这些想法如何进入主流?
That’s how broadcast technology works in the first place.
这就是广播技术的工作原理。
So maybe one thing that you’re touching on is a little bit of ideological ambiguity.
所以也许你所触及的一件事是意识形态上的一点模糊性。
Maybe a part of this is this sense that people don’t know exactly what it is they have to say for three hours.
也许部分原因是人们在三个小时内不知道自己到底要说什么。
All I can say for sure is that we know.
我只能肯定地说,我们都知道。
There’s also a reality, and I mean the book is trying to enter into this reality.
还有一个现实,我的意思是这本书试图进入这个现实。
54:42 I think one thing you’re saying is that people have coded you.
我认为你所说的一件事是人们已经对你进行了编码。
And so, Donald Trump is really excited to do it and maybe left with politicians are not.
因此,唐纳德·特朗普对此感到非常兴奋,而政客们可能并不兴奋。
One thing that we think is that we’re in a period of realignment.
我们认为的一件事是我们正处于一个重新调整的时期。
The last chapter of the book, we talk about an idea that is picked up from a historian named Gary Gerstle, which is an idea of political orders.
本书的最后一章,我们讨论了一个来自历史学家加里·格斯特尔(Gary Gerstle)的观点,即政治秩序的观点。
And political orders are periods that have a sort of structure of consensus and a structure of a zone of conflict, but it’s more or less agreed on by the two sides, even if only tacitly.
政治秩序是具有某种共识结构和冲突地区结构的时期,但双方或多或少都同意,即使只是心照不宣。
So, you have a new deal order, new deal order is founded by FDR.
所以,你有一个新的交易订单,新的交易订单是由 FDR 创建的。
It is entrenched when Dwight Eisenhower accepts the New Deal as part of the US proving that it can treat workers better than the Soviet Union.
当德怀特·艾森豪威尔接受新政作为美国的一部分,证明美国可以比苏联更好地对待工人时,这种观念就根深蒂固了。
So those are sort of right there.
所以这些就在那里。
The three ingredients typically have an order.
这三种成分通常有一个顺序。
55:40 You have a party that starts it, opposition party that accepts key premises.
有一个政党发起它,有一个反对党接受关键前提。
Dwight Eisenhower doesn’t come in and say, “We’re going to roll back the whole New Deal,” and it’s often held in place by an external antagonist.
德怀特·艾森豪威尔不会进来说:“我们要推翻整个新政”,而且它往往是由外部对手维持的。
In that case, the Soviet Union.
在这种情况下,就是苏联。
You then you have in the 70s stagflation, the Vietnam War, series of problems that the New Deal order no longer seems able to handle.
然后你会遇到 70 年代的滞胀、越南战争以及新政秩序似乎不再能够解决的一系列问题。
So, you have the rise of what he calls the neoliberal order.
因此,他所说的新自由主义秩序正在兴起。
And the neoliberal order is if you’re going to choose a founder, it’s going to be Reagan on that one.
新自由主义的秩序是,如果你要选择一位创始人,那就是里根。
It’s much more about markets.
这更多地与市场有关。
It’s very concerned with things like inflation, and it really is entrenched by Bill Clinton, the era of the government is over.
它非常关心通货膨胀等问题,而且它确实被比尔·克林顿所根深蒂固,政府的时代已经结束了。
And partially, it’s entrenched also by the fall of the Soviet Union.
在一定程度上,它也因为苏联的解体而变得根深蒂固。
56:20 The fall of the Soviet Union is like this proof point that the capitalists are right, that markets are the way of the future, government does not know what it’s doing, and that becomes the governing set of assumptions.
苏联的垮台就像一个证据,证明资本家是正确的,市场是未来的出路,政府不知道自己在做什么,而这成为了一套主导假设。
And so, there are arguments about what the markets should be doing.
因此,关于市场应该做什么存在争议。
Obamacare is about creating markets and health insurance.
奥巴马医改旨在创造市场和健康保险。
You can use markets very progressive ends.
您可以利用市场非常进步的目的。
We want to use markets for lots of progressive ends, but the neoliberal order basically collapses amidst a financial crisis and climate change and China.
我们希望利用市场来实现许多进步的目标,但新自由主义秩序在金融危机、气候变化和中国的影响下基本上崩溃了。
And those are the three things that grow a little, but also separately we think kill it, which is the neoliberal order does not have an answer to the financial crisis, and it botches in many ways.
这就是增长了一点的三件事,但我们也认为它们会分别杀死它,即新自由主义秩序没有解决金融危机的办法,而且在很多方面都搞砸了。
57:01 The answer to the financial crisis puts too little demand into the economy, lets a recession linger and a very slow recovery linger for too long, it doesn’t know what to say really about climate change.
金融危机的解决方案对经济的需求太少,让经济衰退和非常缓慢的复苏持续太久,不知道如何看待气候变化。
Markets have made a lot of people rich by doing a lot of things that are very, very damaging for the environment, very damaging for the future of the human race potentially.
市场通过做很多对环境、对人类未来潜在危害极大的事情,让很多人变得富有。
And you have the rise of China and the neoliberal order said you integrate China into the global economy.
中国的崛起和新自由主义秩序说,中国融入了全球经济。
You bring them into the WTO, you trade with them, you help them build their industrial base, you help them pull their people out of poverty, which that part is good, and they’ll become more like the West.
你让他们加入世贸组织,与他们进行贸易,帮助他们建立工业基础,帮助他们让人民摆脱贫困,这一部分是好的,他们会变得更像西方。
They will liberalize.
他们将实行自由化。
They’ll have a free press.
他们将享有新闻自由。
The richer we make China, the more China’s going to become like us, and that proves totally wrong.
我们让中国越富裕,中国就越会变得像我们一样,事实证明这是完全错误的。
57:46 China becomes more authoritarian over time, but it also develops an industrial base.
随着时间的推移,中国变得更加专制,但它也发展了工业基础。
It becomes as it does not become more like us, becomes dangerous, at least in our view.
它变得不像我们一样,变得危险,至少在我们看来。
You don’t want to ever have a conflict with another country who you’ve outsourced your key industrial base to.
你不想与你将关键工业基地外包给的另一个国家发生冲突。
And so, you have the sort of fall of that order.
所以,这个顺序有点下降。
And then again here, things that would’ve been ridiculous at one point in American politics then become possible.
然而,在美国政治中一度荒谬的事情却再次成为可能。
Bernie Sanders is one of them, right?
伯尼·桑德斯就是其中之一,对吧?
The idea that you’d have somebody, a self-described socialist running for president and coming anywhere near the Democratic nomination, that was unthinkable in 2004.
让一个自称为社会主义者的人竞选总统并接近民主党提名的想法在 2004 年是不可想象的。
And by 2016, it almost happened.
到了 2016 年,这几乎成为现实。
58:24 And Donald Trump is another thing.
唐纳德·特朗普则是另一回事。
Donald Trump runs like headlong into the failures of neoliberalism in the Republican Party.
唐纳德·特朗普一头扎进了共和党新自由主义的失败之中。
He runs against trade.
他反对贸易。
He runs against a sort of Paul Ryan more open immigration.
他与保罗·瑞安(Paul Ryan)那种更为开放的移民政策进行竞争。
George W.
乔治·W.
Bush and John McCain were both very big on liberalizing immigration policy.
布什和约翰·麦凯恩都非常热衷于自由化移民政策。
He runs against the Iraq war and foreign adventurism, and there’s an isolationist instinct that coexist very awkwardly now within a territorial expansionist instinct, but at least to 2016, it was more isolationist.
他反对伊拉克战争和外国冒险主义,孤立主义本能现在与领土扩张主义本能非常尴尬地共存,但至少到2016年,它更加孤立主义。
And so, Donald Trump and his sort of reimagining of the Republican Party as a right-wing populist, more like sort of some Christian democratic parties in other countries up in that quadrant of socially conservative, economically populist, that becomes something that’s possible.
因此,唐纳德·特朗普和他将共和党重新想象为右翼民粹主义者,更像是其他国家的一些基督教民主党,处于社会保守、经济民粹主义的象限,这成为可能。
59:13 But nothing has found an equilibrium, right?
但没有什么能找到平衡,对吗?
Nobody’s agreed to the other side’s premises.
没有人同意对方的前提。
There are certain ones that people are agreeing on, both the Republican and Democratic parties a very different view on China now.
人们在某些方面达成了共识,但共和党和民主党现在对中国的看法截然不同。
Biden kept a lot of Trump’s policies on China and actually strengthen them, and now Trump is building on that aggressively again.
拜登保留了特朗普的很多对华政策,并且实际上加强了这些政策,现在特朗普再次积极地在此基础上发展。
But in terms of the other things, there isn’t agreement about what the next period in American politics should look like, and that’s one reason I think it’s very dangerous, both as a question of media strategy, but also is a question of politics to code people, places, platforms too tightly.
但就其他事情而言,对于美国政治的下一个时期应该是什么样子,人们并没有达成一致,这就是我认为这是非常危险的原因之一,这既是一个媒体策略问题,也是一个对人、地方、平台过于严格编码的政治问题。
Republicans and Democrats aren’t going to get along in Congress.
共和党和民主党在国会里不会和睦相处。
That has to do with, I think the incentives of Congress.
我认为这与国会的激励措施有关。
59:54 My first book is called Why We’re Polarized.
我的第一本书叫做《为什么我们两极分化》。
It’s about those almost hydraulic incentives for partisanship.
这是关于党派之争的近乎液压的激励措施。
But in terms of what is the meaning of my podcast, of Derek’s, of yours, of Joe Rogan, of Theo Vaughn, of Call Her Daddy, of a million different places that are not well coded, that’s I think are very up for grabs.
但就我的播客、德里克的播客、你的播客、乔·罗根的播客、西奥·沃恩的播客、呼唤她爸爸的播客、一百万个编码不佳的不同地点的意义而言,我认为这些都非常有待争夺。
I mean, Elon Musk was an Obama-era liberal in 2012.
我的意思是,埃隆·马斯克 (Elon Musk) 在 2012 年是奥巴马时代的自由主义者。
I mean, I think his personal process of radicalization is not going to unwind itself, but a lot of the people who Democrats are like, “All these billionaires are right-wing now.” No, people are just uncertain.
我的意思是,我认为他个人的激进化过程不会自行缓解,但很多民主党人都会说,“现在所有这些亿万富翁都是右翼分子。”不,人们只是不确定。
I mean, some of them are a little bit afraid, but people are uncertain.
我的意思是,他们中的一些人有点害怕,但人们不确定。
They’re moving back and forth.
他们来回移动。
The sort of texture of it is unsettled and it’s going to take time, these transitionary periods.
它的结构是不稳定的,这需要时间,这些过渡时期。
1:00:41 I mean, they can go very badly too, but they take time and I think people who are clinging to old certainties about what tells you which side folks are on, my sense is a lot of people who are very open to MAGA in 2025 are going to feel very differently about it in 2028 depending on how they do, right?
我的意思是,它们也可能会变得非常糟糕,但它们需要时间,我认为那些坚持旧的确定性的人,知道什么可以告诉你人们站在哪一边,我的感觉是,很多对 2025 年 MAGA 持开放态度的人到 2028 年会对它有非常不同的感觉,这取决于他们的表现,对吗?
If they do great, then they’re going to entrench.
如果他们做得很好,那么他们就会巩固地位。
But if they don’t, then a lot of people became MAGA curious are not going to be MAGA curious anymore, but they’re not going to want the last Democratic Party either.
但如果他们不这样做,那么很多对 MAGA 感到好奇的人就不会再对 MAGA 感到好奇,但他们也不会想要最后一个民主党。
1:01:11 I was making this point to someone the other day about why the Democratic Party’s embrace of the Liz Cheney style independent didn’t work.
前几天,我向某人提出了这一点,解释为什么民主党对利兹·切尼风格的独立人士的拥抱不起作用。
Liz Cheney, of course, being Dick Cheney’s daughter, a Republican.
当然,莉兹·切尼是迪克·切尼的女儿,共和党人。
But what Liz Cheney, the Never Trumpers were a way of reaching out to who the Democratic Party thought the independents were.
但利兹·切尼的“永不特朗普派”是一种接触民主党认为的独立人士的方式。
But the key thing about an independent to a political party is not that they don’t like the other party, it’s that they’re an independent because they also don’t like your party.
但对于一个政党来说,独立人士的关键不是他们不喜欢对方,而是他们是独立人士,因为他们也不喜欢你的政党。
And so, finding a bunch of people who are meant to be messengers to them about why they shouldn’t like the other party, it’s fine, but what you need to do is explain why they should like your party.
因此,找到一群本应成为他们的信使的人,告诉他们为什么他们不应该喜欢对方,这很好,但你需要做的是解释为什么他们应该喜欢你的政党。
You need to have some message.
你需要有一些消息。
You need to accept some fault.
你需要接受一些错误。
You need to think about what it was about you that drove them away.
你需要想想是什么让你离开了他们。
1:01:58 One of our deep views about politics right now and not politics policy, the texture of the economy of the country is that the last period in American politics, in the economy was about demand.
我们对当前政治而非政治政策、国家经济结构的深刻看法之一是,美国政治和经济的最后一个时期是关于需求的。
The fundamental problem coming out of the financial crisis was demand.
金融危机带来的根本问题是需求。
We had too little demand in the economy.
我们的经济需求太少了。
Behind that too little demand in the economy was this other thing that was building up, which was a cost-of-living crisis.
在经济需求过少的背后,还有另一件事正在加剧,那就是生活成本危机。
Housing was getting super expensive, healthcare in certain ways, energy.
住房变得非常昂贵,医疗保健(某些方面)以及能源都变得非常昂贵。
But energy is more complicated in ways we can talk about elder care, child care, higher education, right?
但能源更复杂,我们可以谈论老年人护理、儿童护理、高等教育,对吧?
This is a point, my wife is a journalist at the Atlantic, Annie Lowrey with Derek, and she wrote this piece on in early 2020.
这是一点,我的妻子是《大西洋月刊》的记者 Annie Lowrey 和 Derek,她在 2020 年初写了这篇文章。
The pandemic that went very viral called the Affordability Crisis.
这场病毒式传播的流行病被称为“负担能力危机”。
1:02:44 And it sticks in my head because she’s writing at a time when people were saying, “The economy’s great.
这句话一直萦绕在我的脑海里,因为她写作的时候,人们都在说:“经济形势很好。
Everything’s great.” You looked at measures of consumer confidence in 2020, February of 2020, terrific.
一切都很棒。”您查看了 2020 年 2020 年 2 月的消费者信心指标,非常棒。
She’s like, “So, how come if the economy’s so great?
她说:“那么,如果经济这么好,那怎么办呢?
Everybody I talked to is so upset.” And she’s like, “Look, people are making more money than ever, but it’s getting eaten up and eaten up and eaten up by these things they really need.” They keep getting more expensive, even as consumer goods get cheaper, then the pandemic hits, the problem becomes COVID, but then you have inflation and inflation moves the problem of the economy, the fundamental problem everybody’s paying attention to.
和我交谈过的每个人都很沮丧。”她说,“看,人们赚的钱比以往任何时候都多,但钱却被他们真正需要的东西吞噬了。”它们变得越来越贵,即使消费品变得更便宜,然后大流行来袭,问题变成了新冠病毒,但随后出现了通货膨胀,通货膨胀推动了经济问题,这是每个人都在关注的根本问题。
1:03:20 From the demand side, how do we get more people at work?
从需求方面来说,如何让更多的人就业?
How do we get them to spend more money to the supply side?
如何让他们把更多的钱花到供给侧?
We don’t have enough.
我们还不够。
We have a constriction of semiconductors, of used cars, and then eventually everything, everything is getting more expensive.
我们对半导体和二手车进行了限制,最终一切都变得更加昂贵。
We’ll see what happens with tariffs.
我们将看看关税会发生什么。
We do get, by 2024, the rate of inflation under control, but prices are still much higher and now people are paying real attention to prices.
到 2024 年,通货膨胀率确实得到了控制,但价格仍然要高得多,现在人们正在真正关注价格。
And the affordability crisis, which again is a cost-of-living crisis, which had been growing for a very long time, is now at crisis levels and it becomes the substance of politics.
而负担能力危机,又是一场生活成本危机,已经持续了很长一段时间,现在已经达到危机水平,并成为政治的实质。
You had all these Democrats saying, I don’t know what the problem is.
所有这些民主党人都说,我不知道问题是什么。
Inflation has come down to whatever it was, 3 to 4% in 2024, and they’re right about that.
到 2024 年,通货膨胀率已经下降到 3% 到 4%,他们的看法是正确的。
But one, the price level of everything remained high.
但其一,所有商品的价格水平仍然居高不下。
Two, people were now like, “The housing so expensive.
第二,人们现在会说,“住房太贵了。
I’m never going to be able to afford a home.” My parents went to public university, debt free.
我永远买不起房子。”我的父母上了公立大学,没有负债。
I could never do that.
我永远做不到。
And what we’ve done is fail.
而我们所做的一切都是失败的。
1:04:19 I mean, Democrats in this case, Republicans haven’t done that great on it either.
我的意思是,在这件事上民主党人,共和党人在这方面也没有做得那么好。
But in blue states, Democrats have failed on cost of living.
但在蓝色州,民主党在生活成本方面却失败了。
The reason California, Illinois, New York are losing hundreds of thousands of people to Florida, Texas, Arizona, Colorado, is that they failed on cost of living.
加利福尼亚州、伊利诺伊州、纽约州有数十万人流向佛罗里达州、得克萨斯州、亚利桑那州、科罗拉多州,原因是他们的生活成本不高。
It is too expensive to live there, and the reason they failed at cost of living is supply.
那里的生活成本太高,他们在生活成本上失败的原因是供应。
They did not make enough.
他们赚得还不够。
They actually made it too hard in many cases to make enough of the things people needed.
事实上,在很多情况下,他们很难生产足够的人们需要的东西。
Some of those are straightforward.
其中一些很简单。
We didn’t let people build enough homes.
我们没有让人们建造足够的房屋。
Some of them are more like we’ve made it too expensive to build public infrastructure like high-speed rail or the Second Avenue subway.
其中一些更像是我们让高铁或第二大道地铁等公共基础设施的建设成本变得过高。
Some of it has to do, I think, in the long run with innovation and the relationship between Democrats and technology.
我认为,从长远来看,其中一些与创新以及民主党与技术之间的关系有关。
1:04:58 But one of our views is that there are other things in politics that will matter too, but we are in a period where the cost-of-living supply affordability is the fundamental economic question.
但我们的一个观点是,政治中还有其他事情也很重要,但我们正处于一个生活成本供应负担能力成为根本经济问题的时期。
Donald Trump himself has said he won because of the price of groceries.
唐纳德·特朗普本人表示,他之所以获胜是因为食品杂货的价格。
He’s got this very funny quote where he is like, nobody said, I don’t have a Donald Trump impression, but he’s like, “Nobody ever used the word groceries in politics before I did.” Well, it’d be good if he then wasn’t making it more expensive, but Democrats believe his weakness is cost of living.
他有一句非常有趣的话,他说,没有人说,我没有唐纳德·特朗普的印象,但他说,“在我之前,没有人在政治中使用过杂货这个词。”好吧,如果他不让房价变得更贵就好了,但民主党人认为他的弱点是生活成本。
They’re probably right, but they don’t have a strength on it.
他们可能是对的,但他们没有实力。
The key question our book is trying to refocus politics on is how do we make more of what we need?
我们的书试图重新关注政治的关键问题是我们如何生产更多我们需要的东西?
How does the government either organize itself or organize markets to create more of what we need, and how do we admit as liberals times when we’ve made it so the government makes it too hard to make more of what we need?
政府如何组织自身或组织市场来创造更多我们需要的东西?当我们已经做到了政府让我们很难制造更多我们需要的东西时,我们如何承认作为自由主义者的时代?
1:05:47 I’ll say one last thing and this is a pretty long answer.
我要说最后一件事,这是一个很长的答案。
I thought one of the most important things that has come out recently is a piece in Foreign Affairs by Brian Deese, who’s a former head of Joe Biden’s National Economics Council, and Deese helped negotiate every major Bill Biden passed.
我认为最近出现的最重要的事情之一是布莱恩·迪斯(Brian Deese)在《外交事务》上发表的一篇文章,他是乔·拜登国家经济委员会的前任主席,迪斯帮助谈判了拜登通过的每一项重大法案。
It’s a very-
这是一个非常-
1:06:00 He’s helped negotiate every major bill Biden passed.
他帮助谈判了拜登通过的每一项重大法案。
It’s a very straightforward piece about what it is Democrats have not done to make it possible to build at the level of their goals.
这是一篇非常直截了当的文章,讲述了民主党在实现其目标水平方面尚未采取的行动。
And he says things like, “We should just remove federal funding from cities that have highly restrictive home zoning codes.” He says, “We should have a goal for how much nuclear we build in the next 10 years.
他说,“我们应该从那些拥有严格限制性住宅区划法规的城市中取消联邦资金。”他说:“我们应该为未来 10 年建造多少核电制定一个目标。
We should be trying to reach a goal of new nuclear capacity.” It’s a very, very important piece because Deese is right at the center of Democratic policy.
我们应该努力实现新核能力的目标。”这是一个非常非常重要的部分,因为迪斯是民主党政策的核心。
Instead of retrenching, he’s like, “Okay, we didn’t get there.
他没有缩减开支,而是说:“好吧,我们没有做到这一点。
What do we do now to make it possible to get to the place we promised you we can go?”
我们现在要做什么才能到达我们向你承诺过的地方?”
And we should say that the book you’ve mentioned, which I’ve gotten a chance to read, and I think it’s incredible, highly recommend, it’s called Abundance.
我们应该说你提到的那本书,我有机会读过,我认为它令人难以置信,强烈推荐,它叫《丰富》。
1:06:37 I think of it as a kind of manifesto for what the left would represent in the coming years.
我认为这是左翼在未来几年所代表的一种宣言。
So I think people should read it from that angle.
所以我认为人们应该从这个角度来阅读它。
And both of you have been writing about this topic from different angles for a while.
一段时间以来,你们俩一直在从不同的角度讨论这个话题。
I think in ’22, Derek, you wrote an article on this topic of abundance titled A Simple Plan to Solve All of America’s Problems.
我想德里克,你在 22 年写了一篇关于这个丰富主题的文章,题为《解决美国所有问题的简单计划》。
And Ezra, you wrote an article in ’21, a supply side progressivism titled The Economic Mistake the Left is Finally Confronting.
以斯拉(Ezra),你在 21 年写了一篇文章,一篇供给侧进步主义,题为《左派最终面临的经济错误》。
And you’ve just described, laid out this more progressive perspective on supply side economics that you’re presenting in Abundance.
您刚刚描述了您在《丰富》中提出的关于供应方经济学的更进步的观点。
I was wondering if you could give the broad, high-level explanation of this idea of supply side progressivism?
我想知道您能否对供给侧进步主义的这一理念给出广泛、高层次的解释?
Well, my piece about the abundance agenda, which I wrote in 2022, started with me standing outside, waiting for a COVID test.
嗯,我在 2022 年写的关于丰富议程的文章是从我站在外面等待新冠病毒测试开始的。
1:07:44 And this was a period where two years after the pandemic started, COVID tests were still being rationed and it was like 21 degrees outside.
那是在大流行开始两年后的一段时期,新冠病毒检测仍然是定量的,而且外面的温度大约是 21 度。
And I was getting very, very frustrated about the fact that still, we seem to have a scarcity of COVID tests.
我对我们似乎仍然缺乏新冠病毒检测感到非常非常沮丧。
And as I’m sitting outside, just freezing my ass off and just getting really mad, I’m thinking, “It’s not just COVID tests we’ve had scarcity of.
当我坐在外面,冻得屁股都冻僵了,我真的很生气时,我在想,“我们所缺乏的不仅仅是新冠病毒检测。
We also had a scarcity of COVID vaccines early on in the rollout, which created this really discombobulated scheme for distributing the early COVID vaccines.”
我们在推出初期也遇到了新冠疫苗的短缺,这导致了早期新冠疫苗分发计划的混乱。”
1:08:20 And then also, you go earlier into March and May of 2020, and we had a shortage of PPE equipment for our doctors to remain safe as they were taking care of a pandemic.
而且,早在 2020 年 3 月和 5 月,我们就缺乏个人防护装备,无法让我们的医生在应对大流行病时保持安全。
And I thought it’s interesting that this entire experience of the pandemic has essentially been defined by this concept of scarcity.
我认为有趣的是,整个大流行的经历本质上都是由稀缺概念定义的。
And as I zoomed out a little bit, I thought it’s not just the pandemic.
当我把视野缩小一点时,我认为这不仅仅是大流行病。
It’s really so much the 21st century economy that’s been defined by scarcity.
21 世纪的经济确实是由稀缺性定义的。
Ezra beautifully described the degree to which housing unaffordability has become the economic problem of our time.
以斯拉精彩地描述了住房负担不起已成为我们这个时代的经济问题的程度。
1:08:54 In the history of political orders, each political order is in part defined by the internal crisis, the Great Depression springs neoliberalism, stagflation springs neoliberalism.
在政治秩序的历史上,每一种政治秩序都部分由内部危机决定,大萧条催生新自由主义,滞胀催生新自由主义。
Now we’re in this molten moment where we’re waiting for the new political order to emerge and it’s going to emerge because of the lever, because of the power of housing affordability.
现在我们正处于这个熔炉时刻,我们正在等待新的政治秩序的出现,而它的出现是因为杠杆,因为住房负担能力的力量。
You have to solve that problem if you want to solve the problem of American anger about prices, and part of this is just pure arithmetic.
如果你想解决美国人对价格的愤怒问题,你就必须解决这个问题,而其中一部分只是纯粹的算术。
If you look at any family’s budget, the biggest part of their budget in any given year is the part that goes to rent or mortgage.
如果你看一下任何家庭的预算,就会发现他们在任何一年的预算中最大的一部分是用于租金或抵押贷款的部分。
It’s housing, housing, housing, and housing connects to everything else.
它是住房、住房、住房,住房与其他一切相连。
It connects to innovation.
它与创新相关。
You want cities to agglomerate, to bring smart people together.
你希望城市聚集,将聪明人聚集在一起。
Housing relates to all sorts of other affordability.
住房与各种其他负担能力有关。
Like if you care about the cost of eldercare, you want to make it cheaper to house institutions, buildings that can care for children, which means you want to bring those rents down.
就像如果你关心老年人护理的成本,你希望降低安置机构和可以照顾儿童的建筑物的价格,这意味着你希望降低这些租金。
1:09:55 And so I thought as I’m zooming out on this concept of scarcity in the 21st century, we have chosen to make housing scarce.
因此,我认为,当我缩小 21 世纪的稀缺概念时,我们选择了让住房变得稀缺。
In some of the most productive cities and states, often run by Democrats, we have rules, zoning rules, historic preservation rules, permitting processes, environmental reviews, laws that we created that have gotten in the way of making abundant the most important material good there is, which is housing.
在一些生产力最高的城市和州,通常由民主党人管理,我们制定了规则、分区规则、历史保护规则、许可程序、环境审查和我们制定的法律,这些规则阻碍了最重要的物质财富的丰富,那就是住房。
And as I kept working myself into a lather and getting mad about the world, I thought it’s actually not just housing.
当我不断地让自己起泡沫并对这个世界感到愤怒时,我认为这实际上不仅仅是住房。
It’s clean energy too.
这也是清洁能源。
There’s lots of environmentalists who are on my side and believing very fervently in climate change who’ve made it very difficult to site solar panels or site solar farms or to raise wind turbines or to advance geothermal or to accept nuclear power.
有很多环保主义者站在我这边,对气候变化深信不疑,他们让安装太阳能电池板、太阳能发电厂、风力涡轮机、推进地热能或接受核电变得非常困难。
We have chosen to make clean energy scarce as well.
我们也选择让清洁能源变得稀缺。
1:10:51 And then finally, the ultimate boss of scarcity was the pandemic itself, which constricted the supply of all sorts of goods around the world, setting the price of everything to the moon.
最后,稀缺的最终根源是大流行本身,它限制了世界各地各种商品的供应,将所有东西的价格推向月球。
And that’s why inflation wasn’t just an American phenomenon, not just a North American phenomenon.
这就是为什么通货膨胀不仅仅是美国现象,不仅仅是北美现象。
It was a global phenomenon.
这是一个全球现象。
And I thought what we need to solve for this crisis of penumbral scarcity is an abundance agenda, an approach towards solving America’s problems that puts abundance first.
我认为,我们需要解决这场半影稀缺危机的是一个丰富的议程,一种将富裕放在首位的解决美国问题的方法。
And Ezra and I have a very focused definition of abundance.
以斯拉和我对丰富有一个非常集中的定义。
We believe, we say in the first page of the book, America needs to build and invent more of the things it needs.
我们相信,我们在书的第一页说,美国需要建造和发明更多它需要的东西。
We believe that housing is critical.
我们认为住房至关重要。
We believe energy is critical.
我们相信能源至关重要。
We talk a lot about science and technology, but we really put government effectiveness at the heart of this because one really deep vein of our book is a criticism of where liberalism has gone wrong in the last 50 years, where liberalism has gone from in the New Deal era, a politics of building things.
我们谈论了很多关于科学和技术的话题,但我们确实把政府效率放在了核心位置,因为我们这本书的一个真正深刻的脉络是对自由主义在过去 50 年里出了问题的批评,自由主义在新政时代已经偏离了一种建设事物的政治。
1:11:55 FDR and the progressives transformed the physical world, not just with infrastructure projects, but with building roads, the highway system under Dwight Eisenhower, we changed the physical world during the decades of 1930s to the 1950s.
罗斯福和进步人士不仅通过基础设施项目,而且通过修建道路和德怀特·艾森豪威尔领导下的高速公路系统,改变了物质世界,我们在 1930 年代到 1950 年代的几十年里改变了物质世界。
But in the last half century, liberalism has become very good at the politics of blocking rather than the politics of building.
但在过去的半个世纪里,自由主义变得非常擅长封锁政治而不是建设政治。
And if you look at the way that liberals define success in the last few decades, it’s often about success defined by how much money you can spend rather than how many things you can actually build.
如果你看看过去几十年来自由主义者定义成功的方式,你会发现成功通常是由你能花多少钱来定义的,而不是你能实际建造多少东西。
1:12:31 You look at the fact that, for example, in the book, we have so many examples, California authorizes more than $30 billion to build a high-speed rail system, which basically doesn’t exist.
你看一个事实,比如书里我们有那么多例子,加州授权超过300亿美元建设高铁系统,这基本上是不存在的。
Just last week, the Mayor of Chicago bragged that they spent $11 billion building 10,000 affordable housing units.
就在上周,芝加哥市长吹嘘说他们斥资 110 亿美元建造了 10,000 套经济适用房。
That’s $1.1 million per affordable housing unit.
每套经济适用房的价格为 110 万美元。
That’s absolutely pathetic.
这绝对是可悲的。
We have a story in the book about a $1.7 million public toilet built in San Francisco, $1.7 million for a toilet because of all of the rules that get in the way and raise the price of building public infrastructure like public bathrooms in San Francisco and California.
我们在书中讲述了一个故事,内容是在旧金山建造一座耗资 170 万美元的公共厕所,一个厕所的成本为 170 万美元,因为所有规则都阻碍了旧金山和加利福尼亚州公共浴室等公共基础设施的建设,并提高了建设成本。
1:13:10 So liberalism, I’m worried over the last 50 years has become so good at the politics of blocking and the politics of associating the money authorized as success rather than what you build in the physical world that we’ve lost sense of material abundance, of how important outcomes are and not just processes.
因此,我担心自由主义在过去 50 年里已经变得如此擅长封锁政治,以及将金钱与成功联系起来的政治,而不是你在物质世界中建造的东西,以至于我们失去了物质丰富的感觉,失去了结果的重要性,而不仅仅是过程。
And so this is a book that’s trying to nudge the Democratic Party back to what we think are in a way, historically its roots.
因此,这本书试图在某种程度上推动民主党回到我们所认为的历史根源。
Thinking about what Americans need and making it easier for government to act efficiently to provide them, and that really does, I think, begin with housing and energy.
思考美国人的需求,让政府更容易有效地采取行动来提供这些需求,我认为,这确实要从住房和能源开始。
Is there a tension between the left, the progressive wealth redistribution kind of ideas with the idea of building that’s primarily getting out of the way and letting the market get the job done?
左翼渐进式财富再分配理念与主要是让路并让市场完成工作的建设理念之间是否存在紧张关系?
Let’s say two things on that.
对此我们说两件事。
1:14:09 So one, we think there’s a real tension between equality, redistribution and constricting the supply of specifically housing.
因此,我们认为平等、再分配和限制特定住房供应之间确实存在紧张关系。
So housing by the way, I would love to understand is that’s the big problem of-
顺便说一下,住房问题,我很想了解这是一个大问题——
Housing and energy, I think are the two most significant that we focus on in the book.
我认为住房和能源是我们在书中关注的两个最重要的问题。
1:14:24 Right?
正确的?
Housing and clean energy.
住房和清洁能源。
We don’t have housing, we don’t have enough clean energy.
我们没有住房,我们没有足够的清洁能源。
I would add things to that, public infrastructure.
我想补充一点,公共基础设施。
We don’t really focus that much on education, but we could and we could talk about that.
我们并不太关注教育,但我们可以而且可以谈论这个问题。
Immigration is probably there for me too, and we talk about that a little bit in the book and we do talk a lot about how to pull innovation forward from the future.
移民可能也适合我,我们在书中对此进行了一些讨论,并且我们确实谈论了很多关于如何推动未来创新的问题。
But when you ask about redistribution, I really think this is an important point because there’s a great new paper by David Schleicher, and I’m so sorry because I’m forgetting his co-author.
但是当你问起重新分配时,我真的认为这是很重要的一点,因为大卫·施莱彻(David Schleicher)有一篇很棒的新论文,我很抱歉,因为我忘记了他的合著者。
They’re law professors though, and they talk about the victory of gentry law.
但他们是法学教授,他们谈论士绅法的胜利。
We used to have a law that was very dynamic when it came to property and land.
我们曾经有一部在财产和土地方面非常活跃的法律。
It was very different than how things were in Britain.
这与英国的情况非常不同。
And over time, back half of the 20th century, we moved American law to be much more for what they call the gentry.
随着时间的推移,早在 20 世纪上半叶,我们就将美国法律变得更加适合他们所谓的绅士。
We moved it much more towards protecting those who currently have things.
我们将其更多地转向保护那些目前拥有物品的人。
Right?
正确的?
1:15:15 And we do that through 1,000,000 things, covenants and HOAs and all these contracts we make people enter into so they can’t even build on their own land.
我们通过 1,000,000 件事情、契约和 HOA 以及我们让人们签订的所有这些合同来做到这一点,这样他们甚至无法在自己的土地上建造。
But one of the things that just happens when you constrict the supply of housing is that people who got in when the getting was good, it’s a classic story, in New York and LA and in SF, you bought a place in 1977 for $220,000, and now it’s worth $2.7 million, and maybe you’ll pass it on to your kids or you’ll sell it, but the working class families can’t afford to live there anymore.
但当你限制住房供应时,就会发生一件事,那就是人们在条件好的时候就进来了,这是一个经典的故事,在纽约、洛杉矶和旧金山,你在 1977 年以 22 万美元买了一个地方,现在它价值 270 万美元,也许你会把它传给你的孩子,或者你会卖掉它,但工薪阶层家庭再也负担不起住在那里了。
Right?
正确的?
So that’s not even a question of redistribution.
所以这甚至不是重新分配的问题。
Sometimes what you need in order to create the possibilities for opportunity and mobility is enough supply of the thing.
有时,为了创造机会和流动性的可能性,你需要的是足够的供应。
1:15:56 At the same time, we don’t think that redistribution is the problem here.
与此同时,我们认为重新分配不是这里的问题。
I’m pro redistribution, I’m pro more redistribution than we currently do, but to give one example the way these can be great tastes that go together, Derek tells in the book at some great length the story of Operation Warp Speed.
我支持重新分配,我支持比现在更多的重新分配,但为了举一个例子,说明这些可以是伟大的品味结合在一起的方式,德里克在书中详细讲述了曲速行动的故事。
And here you have in the mRNA vaccines, technology that was critically funded by public money, specifically DARPA at different points, then hastened after COVID.
这里有 mRNA 疫苗,这项技术主要由公共资金资助,特别是 DARPA 在不同时期的资助,然后在新冠疫情之后加速发展。
Government through Operation Warp Speed under Donald Trump really tried to clear out regulatory cruft, move these things really fast, but the demand on the side of the public for having funded so much of this, for having made so much possible was that when these vaccines hit, they were going to be free.
唐纳德·特朗普领导下的政府通过“曲速行动”确实试图清除监管障碍,真正快速地推动这些事情,但公众对为此提供大量资金、创造如此多可能的要求是,当这些疫苗上市时,它们将是免费的。
Maybe the most important medical advance of that entire era, and it wasn’t going to be like Ozempic say, where it’s $15,000 for a year of doses.
也许是整个时代最重要的医学进步,而且它不会像 Ozempic 所说的那样,一年的剂量为 15,000 美元。
Right?
正确的?
It wasn’t going to be only available to the richest people at the beginning.
它一开始并不是只有最富有的人才能享受到的。
We were going to try to give it to everybody, sorted by need to the best that we could and it would be free.
我们将尽力将其提供给每个人,并按需求分类,尽我们所能,而且是免费的。
1:16:58 Now, you’re not going to do that with everything, right?
现在,你不会对所有事情都这样做,对吗?
There are places for the price signal to actually function and where it can function to then bring on more supply later.
价格信号在某些地方可以实际发挥作用,并且可以在以后发挥作用以带来更多供应。
And there’s all the econ 101 stuff that we all know, but there are a lot of places where redistribution and supply increases go hand in hand.
我们都知道经济 101 的所有内容,但在很多地方,再分配和供应增加是齐头并进的。
Another good example, I’ve done over the course of my career, a huge amount of work on health insurance reform and universal healthcare.
另一个很好的例子,在我的职业生涯中,我在医疗保险改革和全民医疗保健方面做了大量工作。
And let’s say you got Bernie Sanders had become president in 2016 and had swept in a huge Democratic majority and they passed Bernie’s single-payer-for-all plan, which was by the way, much more expansive than any existing single payer plan in the world.
假设伯尼·桑德斯 (Bernie Sanders) 于 2016 年成为总统,并赢得了民主党的绝大多数席位,他们通过了伯尼的单一付款人计划,顺便说一句,该计划比世界上任何现有的单一付款人计划都要广泛得多。
It covered much more than Canada’s or the UK’s or anybody else.
它涵盖的范围比加拿大、英国或其他任何国家都要多。
If you had done that, what you would have needed immediately was a huge supply increase in healthcare because you would have had a huge demand increase.
如果你这样做了,你将立即需要的是医疗保健供应的大幅增加,因为你的需求将会大幅增加。
1:17:44 What happens if you make healthcare free?
如果免费医疗会发生什么?
People are going to use more of it.
人们将会使用更多它。
If you make insurance much more widespread, people are going to go to the doctor more often.
如果保险更加普及,人们就会更频繁地去看医生。
Well, if you don’t have enough doctors, you don’t have enough nurses, you don’t have enough surgeons, you need more.
好吧,如果你没有足够的医生,你没有足够的护士,你没有足够的外科医生,你需要更多。
We constrict the supply of all those things using residency rules, using nursing rules, immigration rules, who can practice as a nurse practitioner?
我们使用居住规则、护理规则、移民规则来限制所有这些东西的供应,谁可以作为执业护士执业?
What can a nurse practitioner actually do?
执业护士实际上可以做什么?
You have to be attentive to the supply side even if what you’re doing is aggressive redistribution.
即使你正在做的是积极的再分配,你也必须关注供给侧。
Now, there are places where these things don’t conflict, like I’d like to see a much expanded child tax credit, and I don’t think that has a big supply side implication one way or the other.
现在,有些地方这些事情并不冲突,比如我希望看到大幅扩大儿童税收抵免,而且我认为这不会对供给侧产生重大影响。
But on a lot of the things we’re talking about, even if what you want to do, and it is often what we want to do, to do more redistribution, if you’re redistributing some kind of thing that gives you access to a good or a service, you need to expand the good or the service.
但在我们谈论的很多事情上,即使你想做的,而且通常也是我们想做的,做更多的再分配,如果你要重新分配某种能让你获得商品或服务的东西,你就需要扩展商品或服务。
1:18:32 We do rental vouchers, giving people rental vouchers in the San Francisco housing market, unless you build more housing, just creates something that our friends at the Niskanen Center call cost disease socialism, where you are increasing demand for good at which you’ve constricted supply.
我们提供租赁券,为旧金山房地产市场的人们提供租赁券,除非你建造更多的住房,否则只会创造出我们尼斯卡宁中心的朋友所说的“成本病社会主义”,即你在限制供应的情况下增加对商品的需求。
If you do that, you’re just going to drive the price up.
如果你这样做,你只会推高价格。
To some degree, that’s at least part of the story of higher education.
在某种程度上,这至少是高等教育故事的一部分。
We give people Pell Grants, we give people all kinds of subsidies for higher ed, but we have not done nearly enough to increase supply or regulate the way in which colleges just then pocket part of that money.
我们为人们提供佩尔助学金,我们为人们提供各种高等教育补贴,但我们在增加供应或规范大学将部分资金收入囊中的方式方面做得还远远不够。
And so they’re building these fancy gyms and they’re competing with each other, but they’re not actually increasing the supply of slots.
因此,他们正在建造这些豪华的体育馆并相互竞争,但实际上他们并没有增加老虎机的供应。
It’s certainly not the level we want them to.
这当然不是我们希望他们达到的水平。
1:19:12 So there’s a lot here where I think it scrambles traditional categories.
所以我认为这里有很多地方扰乱了传统类别。
You cannot do effective redistribution in ways that we would like to see them done, and many people on the left would like to see them done if you’re not taking supply of the thing that you’re subsidizing seriously.
你无法以我们希望看到的方式进行有效的再分配,如果你不认真提供你正在补贴的东西,许多左翼人士希望看到它们完成。
If you think about it from a first principle standpoint, what if what you wanted to do was to bring American poverty as close to 0.0% as you possibly could?
如果你从首要原则的角度考虑,如果你想做的是尽可能让美国的贫困率接近 0.0%,该怎么办?
1:19:26 You got a bunch of smart people into a room.
你让一群聪明人进入一个房间。
You said, “What can we possibly do?” In my opinion, the answer would include a lot of what are sometimes called demand-side policies, a lot of redistribution of income.
你说:“我们能做什么?”在我看来,答案将包括很多有时被称为需求方政策的内容,以及大量的收入再分配。
The child tax credit, I think would be essential.
我认为儿童税收抵免至关重要。
Expanding the earned income tax credit would be essential.
扩大所得税抵免至关重要。
Expanding cash welfare might be essential.
扩大现金福利可能至关重要。
Certainly, redistributing income from the rich to the poor would be essential.
当然,将富人的收入重新分配给穷人是至关重要的。
These are demand-side policies, they’re tax and spending policies.
这些是需求方政策、税收和支出政策。
But if you only approach this subject through the demand side, you will utterly and categorically fail.
但如果你只从需求方来处理这个问题,你将彻底失败。
Because like we said, housing is the biggest part of a typical family’s budget.
因为就像我们说的,住房是典型家庭预算的最大部分。
And if your only policy on housing is to increase housing vouchers without increasing the supply of housing, macroeconomically speaking, there’s only one direction for housing prices to go, and it’s straight up to the moon.
而如果你对住房的唯一政策是增加住房券而不增加住房供应,那么从宏观经济上来说,房价的走向只有一个方向,那就是直奔月球。
You’re not actually bringing housing prices down.
你实际上并没有降低房价。
You’re just subsidizing a constricted market, and therefore creating enormous inflation.
你只是在补贴一个收缩的市场,从而造成巨大的通货膨胀。
1:20:41 You have to solve some of these problems on the supply side.And one of the conceptual scoops that Ezra and I are trying to work out for the left, for liberals in America is to get people to ask the question, “How do we solve this problem with supply?
你必须在供应方面解决其中一些问题。以斯拉和我试图为美国的左派和自由主义者制定的概念独家新闻之一就是让人们提出这样的问题:“我们如何通过供应来解决这个问题?
Housing is a crisis.
住房是一场危机。
How do we solve it with supply?
供应方面如何解决?
Energy is a crisis.
能源是一场危机。
How do we solve it with supply?
供应方面如何解决?
Medical innovation, scientific discovery is a massively interesting phenomenon.
医学创新、科学发现是一个非常有趣的现象。
We don’t even understand how it exists, really.
我们甚至不明白它是如何存在的,真的。
How do great discoveries actually happen?
伟大的发现实际上是如何发生的?
Is there a supply-side policy for that as well?” That’s the question we’re asking over and over in the book.
是否也有相应的供给侧政策?”这就是我们在书中反复提出的问题。
1:21:19 So at the end of the day, demand-side progressivism and what Ezra calls supply-side progressivism really are peanut butter and chocolate.
因此,归根结底,需求方进步主义和以斯拉所说的供给方进步主义实际上都是花生酱和巧克力。
They are two flavors that go beautifully well together, but here’s the problem that I think your question was putting your finger on.
它们是两种完美搭配的口味,但我认为你的问题正是针对了这个问题。
I think a lot of Americans don’t believe that these things work together because what they see is a liberalism that just taxes and spends and Americans don’t see the benefits of that spending.
我认为很多美国人不相信这些事情可以一起发挥作用,因为他们看到的是一种只税收和支出的自由主义,而美国人看不到这种支出的好处。
The Biden administration authorized $42 billion to build rural broadband in America.
拜登政府授权拨款420亿美元在美国建设农村宽带。
Practically, none of it was built.
实际上,这些都没有建成。
Authorized $7.5 billion to build EV charger stations in America.
授权 75 亿美元在美国建设电动汽车充电站。
Practically, none of it was built.
实际上,这些都没有建成。
How many tens of billions of dollars have been authorized to build high-speed rail in California?
加州已授权多少百亿美元建设高铁?
Practically, none of it exists.
实际上,这些都不存在。
You can’t ride it.
你不能骑它。
1:22:05 So the problem is when the reputation of a tax and spend liberal makes contact with the fact that people don’t see the results in the physical world, like where’s my money going?
所以问题是,当税收和支出自由主义者的声誉与人们看不到现实世界的结果(比如我的钱去了哪里)这一事实联系在一起时?
I have in my head something like this idea of what I call Equinox liberalism, which is to say there’s some forms of liberalism where it’s very expensive, but you see what you’re getting.
我脑子里有一种类似我所说的春分自由主义的想法,也就是说,有些形式的自由主义非常昂贵,但你会看到你得到了什么。
Like when you spend $270 to go to Equinox for the month, right?
就像你花 270 美元去 Equinox 玩一个月一样,对吧?
It’s a really expensive gym bill, but people who go there seem to love it.
这是一笔非常昂贵的健身费用,但去那里的人似乎很喜欢它。
They’re like, “The equipment is always free, everything is clean.
他们说,“设备总是免费的,一切都很干净。
I go into the locker room, there’s a bunch of Kiehl’s lotions to put on my face after I shower.
我走进更衣室,那里有一堆科颜氏乳液,可以在我淋浴后涂在脸上。
I am getting exactly what I’m paying for.
我得到的正是我所付出的。
Yes, I’ll pay out the nose for a gym because I love seeing that money going to work.” And in places like Sweden, Denmark, citizens seem very happy.
是的,我会花钱去健身房,因为我喜欢看到这些钱能发挥作用。”在瑞典、丹麦等地,公民似乎非常高兴。
They’re paying much higher taxes than people are in America, but they’re seeing where the money’s going to work.
他们缴纳的税款比美国人高得多,但他们正在考虑这些钱的用途。
1:22:57 The problem with the liberalism that blocks rather than builds is that people don’t see the money going to work.
阻碍而不是建设的自由主义的问题在于,人们看不到钱能发挥作用。
All they see are the dollar signs being spent by government, and then they walk out of their house and they see collapsing infrastructure and they see crime and they see housing prices going to the moon.
他们所看到的只是政府花掉的美元符号,然后他们走出家门,看到基础设施崩溃,看到犯罪,看到房价飞涨。
And so they think, “Wait, this social contract is broken down.
所以他们想,“等等,这个社会契约被打破了。
You’re asking for Equinox prices, but you’re giving me a shit-ass gym and that’s unfair.”
你问的是春分价格,但你却给了我一个糟糕的健身房,这是不公平的。”
1:23:25 And so what we’re trying to say is…
所以我们想说的是……
In a very serious way because I’m not trying to be flippant about gyms.
以一种非常严肃的方式,因为我不想对健身房轻率。
In a very serious way, what we’re trying to say is a part of this problem is that you Democrats have looked so hard at the demand side of the ledger that you’ve forgotten how powerful the levers are on the supply side.
以一种非常严肃的方式,我们想说的是这个问题的一部分是,你们民主党人太仔细地关注了账本的需求方,以至于你们忘记了供应方的杠杆有多么强大。
And if we can just pull those levers on housing in particular, we can bring down the cost of living and people might even support the tax and spend model more because they’ll feel like they’re participating in Equinox liberalism and not its opposite.
如果我们能够特别在住房方面发挥这些杠杆作用,我们就可以降低生活成本,人们甚至可能会更多地支持税收和支出模式,因为他们会觉得自己正在参与春分自由主义,而不是相反的自由主义。
Can we zoom in on the housing problem?
我们能不能把目光聚焦到住房问题上?
1:23:55 Can you explain the housing problem and what’s the importance of housing in the quality of life, in the flourishing of the nation of the United States in general, and what is broken about it?
您能否解释一下住房问题,以及住房对于生活质量、美国国家繁荣的重要性,以及它的不足之处是什么?
Let’s take the second part of the question first.
我们先来看问题的第二部分。
1:24:12 What’s so important about housing?
住房有什么重要的?
We’re talking about life, and even at a higher level, we’re talking about freedom, like the freedom to live where you want to live, the freedom to feel like the good and achievable life is actually good and achievable.
我们谈论的是生活,甚至在更高的层面上,我们谈论的是自由,比如生活在你想生活的地方的自由,感觉美好和可实现的生活实际上是美好和可实现的自由。
This is profoundly a question of housing.
这本质上是一个住房问题。
There’s this great paper that was written several years ago called The Housing Theory of Everything by Bowman, Southwood, and I forget the other guy’s name, but they made this really beautiful point that no matter what you care about in terms of public policy or politics, housing probably makes contact with it.
几年前,鲍曼、索斯伍德写了一篇很棒的论文,名为《一切的住房理论》,我忘记了另一个人的名字,但他们提出了一个非常美丽的观点,即无论你关心公共政策或政治方面的什么,住房都可能与之相关。
If you care about innovation, innovation, as I said, it’s about getting people together in a city where they can work together.
如果你关心创新,正如我所说,创新就是让人们聚集在一个可以一起工作的城市。
That’s about housing density.
这与住房密度有关。
If you care about childcare costs, that’s about bringing down the cost of buildings.
如果您关心儿童保育费用,那就是降低建筑物的成本。
That’s also about housing.
这也与住房有关。
If you care about being able to live near your friends and family, this is also profoundly a question of housing.
如果您关心能够住在朋友和家人附近,这也是一个深刻的住房问题。
1:25:05 So when we talk about housing over and over, we’re not just talking about the four walls and roof and floor, we’re talking about what housing means to people because housing is life.
因此,当我们一遍又一遍地谈论住房时,我们不仅仅是在谈论四堵墙、屋顶和地板,我们正在谈论住房对人们意味着什么,因为住房就是生活。
And right now, what we very clearly see in the data is that Americans are leaving expensive cities and states that tend to be run by Democrats and they’re moving to areas that are sunnier, that are cheaper and are often more likely to be run by Republicans.
现在,我们在数据中非常清楚地看到,美国人正在离开往往由民主党管理的昂贵城市和州,而转向阳光更充足、成本更低且通常更有可能由共和党管理的地区。
And this is, I think because starting in the 1960s, 1970s, you had this era of blockage points in housing.
我认为这是因为从 20 世纪 60 年代、1970 年代开始,出现了住房堵塞的时代。
We started seeing zoning regulations, we started seeing historic preservation rules.
我们开始看到分区法规,我们开始看到历史保护规则。
We started seeing laws that made it easier for citizens to sue to stop a new development from going up.
我们开始看到一些法律使公民更容易起诉以阻止新开发项目的建设。
Essentially, new tools were invented to empower people’s natural conservatism.
从本质上讲,新工具的发明是为了增强人们天生的保守主义。
1:25:57 For hundreds of years, people might’ve always felt like, “I want my neighborhood to stay the same.” That might’ve been something that the Neanderthals were feeling, but only in the last 50 years have we really outfitted human beings with a weapon to go along with their biological preference for the familiar such that they can utilize it to stop the change of the physical world around them.
数百年来,人们可能一直觉得,“我希望我的社区保持不变。”这可能是尼安德特人的感受,但直到最近 50 年,我们才真正为人类配备了一种武器,以符合他们对熟悉事物的生物偏好,以便他们能够利用它来阻止周围物质世界的变化。
And so we’ve seen the rise of what is commonly called NIMBYism, Not In My Backyard, the rise of a movement to stop the development of new housing around where they live.
因此,我们看到了所谓的邻避主义(NIMBYism)的兴起,即阻止在他们居住的地方开发新住房的运动的兴起。
And so what you see in the data is according to one study that was reported on by Yoni Applebaum, my colleague at The Atlantic, if there’s a city with a 10% increase in the progressive vote share, there’s a 30% decline in the number of houses that are permitted.
所以你在数据中看到的是,根据我在《大西洋月刊》的同事 Yoni Applebaum 报道的一项研究,如果一个城市的进步派投票比例增加 10%,那么允许建造的房屋数量就会减少 30%。
For some reason, it does tend to be these areas that are more populated by progressives that have more of these choke points.
出于某种原因,确实往往是这些进步派人口较多的地区有更多的阻塞点。
1:26:50 Some of this is just historical quirk, but some of it is, I think maybe the character of a certain kind of liberal, maybe often an older liberal, who believes that preserving the physical environment is the good, that the best thing you can do for the planet is to stop things from changing around you, stop things from being built.
其中一些只是历史怪癖,但其中一些是,我认为也许是某种自由主义者的性格,也许通常是年长的自由主义者,他们相信保护自然环境是好事,你能为地球做的最好的事情就是阻止你周围的事物发生变化,阻止事物被建造。
And that’s an old-fashioned version of environmentalism that we’re trying to turn the liberals against because really, we see the challenge with climate change is not how do we get everybody to stop using electricity?
这是一种老式的环保主义,我们试图让自由主义者反对它,因为实际上,我们看到气候变化的挑战不是我们如何让每个人停止使用电力?
How do we get people to stop using any power or electrons that come from natural gas and oil?
我们如何让人们停止使用来自天然气和石油的任何电力或电子?
We want people to recognize that if the people want to lead modern lives and they’re going to continue to demand modern lives, and so we have to use clean energy technology to allow them to live those lives.
我们希望人们认识到,如果人们想要过上现代生活,他们就会继续要求现代生活,所以我们必须使用清洁能源技术让他们过上这些生活。
That means you have to build an absolute shit ton of new clean energy, solar and wind and geothermal and nuclear, and maybe in the near future, even fusion.
这意味着你必须建造大量新的清洁能源,太阳能、风能、地热能和核能,也许在不久的将来,甚至是核聚变。
1:27:52 It requires an attitude of being excited about building new things, rather than a liberalism that seeks always to block changes to the physical environment around them.
它需要一种对创造新事物感到兴奋的态度,而不是一种总是试图阻止周围物理环境发生变化的自由主义。
So I think that what we’re trying to do is to allow people in a way to meet processes and outcomes.
所以我认为我们正在努力做的是让人们以某种方式满足流程和结果。
I think liberals want housing abundance in some part of their brains, in some part of their hearts.
我认为自由主义者希望他们大脑的某些部分、心灵的某些部分拥有丰富的住房。
I think they want the price of housing to go down, but there hasn’t quite been a really clean articulation of a mindset or paradigm-shifting argument that gets them to see how the processes that we’ve created go so dramatically against the outcomes that liberals want.
我认为他们希望房价下降,但还没有一个真正清晰的思维方式或范式转变论点让他们看到我们创建的过程如何与自由主义者想要的结果如此戏剧性地背道而驰。
And we’re trying to say, “Here’s a new process.
我们想说的是,“这是一个新流程。
Here’s a new question you can ask yourself.
您可以问自己一个新问题。
How can we solve the housing problem on the supply side?”
供给侧如何解决住房问题?
And also, solving the housing problem is one of the mechanisms to lift people out of poverty.
而且,解决住房问题也是人们脱贫的机制之一。
1:28:41 So there’s a lot of goals that align well with the liberals.
因此,有很多目标与自由主义者非常一致。
You write about cities, “Cities are where wealth is created, not just where it is displayed.
您在谈到城市时写道:“城市是创造财富的地方,而不仅仅是展示财富的地方。
They are meant to be escalators into the middle class, not penthouses for the upper class.” So the housing problem we’re talking about specifically, or most importantly is in urban areas.
它们应该成为通往中产阶级的自动扶梯,而不是上层阶级的顶层公寓。”所以我们具体讨论的住房问题,或者说最重要的是城市地区的住房问题。
Yeah.
是的。
1:29:06 This is something that we spend a lot of time thinking about for the book.
这是我们为这本书花费了大量时间思考的事情。
There’s a lot of land in the United States, and sometimes you’ll hear people say something like, I’ve heard this a lot, “Well, not everybody can live in San Francisco or Venice and Los Angeles or Manhattan or Brooklyn or whatever.” And fine, right?
美国有很多土地,有时你会听到人们这样说,我听过很多次这样的话,“好吧,不是每个人都能住在旧金山、威尼斯、洛杉矶、曼哈顿、布鲁克林或其他地方。”很好,对吧?
Not everybody can.
不是每个人都可以。
That’s true.
这是真的。
The problem is that cities are engines of opportunity and economic dynamism.
问题在于城市是机会和经济活力的引擎。
As you know better than we do, the frontier AI labs in the US, basically all of them outside of China exist in 50 square miles in the Bay Area.
大家比我们更清楚,美国的前沿人工智能实验室,基本上都是中国以外的,都位于湾区50平方英里的范围内。
There’s not one in New York, there’s not one in Dallas, there’s not one in Chicago, there’s not one in Austin.
纽约没有,达拉斯没有,芝加哥没有,奥斯汀也没有。
There’s not one anywhere but in the Bay Area, but the key thing is that there is huge spillover from these hyper-dynamic industries, be it finance in New York, be it tech in San Francisco, be it culture in Los Angeles.
除了湾区之外,其他地方都没有,但关键是这些充满活力的行业产生了巨大的溢出效应,无论是纽约的金融业,还是旧金山的科技业,还是洛杉矶的文化业。
1:30:14 You make a lot more money being a barber near Google than you do being a barber in rural Arkansas, and this is the ancient pathway to mobility.
在谷歌附近当理发师赚的钱比在阿肯色州乡村当理发师赚的钱多得多,这是古老的流动途径。
People who are poor and work in the service sector, they move to richer areas where the productivity is higher, and thus the money spreads around.
那些在服务业工作的穷人,他们会搬到生产力更高的富裕地区,因此金钱会四处传播。
And if you look at American mobility and opportunity over the 20th century, about a third, roughly on some calculation, just comes from this people moving to richer areas.
如果你看看 20 世纪美国的流动性和机会,粗略地计算一下,大约三分之一来自人们迁移到更富裕的地区。
And if you look in the last 20-ish years, 30-ish years, you see this extremely steady process of income convergence as people move towards richer areas begin to throw itself into reverse because it used to make sense for the janitor and the lawyer to move to New York City, but now it only makes sense for the lawyer to and the janitor leaves because you can’t support yourself and your family and live in a home and have a reasonable commute being a janitor working in Manhattan.
如果你回顾一下过去20多年、30多年,你会发现,随着人们向富裕地区迁移,这种极其稳定的收入趋同过程开始陷入逆转,因为过去对门卫和律师来说搬到纽约市是有意义的,但现在只有律师和门卫离开才有意义,因为你无法养活自己和你的家人,住在家里,作为在曼哈顿工作的门卫有合理的通勤时间。
Now, obviously some people do it and it’s often very tough and they live very far.
现在,显然有些人这样做了,而且通常非常艰难,而且他们住得很远。
It’s very hard in San Francisco.
在旧金山很难。
1:31:27 You can’t look at cities as, “Well, that’s just where the rich people are,” and that’s a problem that many Democrats now have.
你不能以“嗯,这就是富人所在的地方”来看待城市,而这正是许多民主党人现在面临的问题。
Michael Bloomberg famously described New York City as a luxury good and luxury goods cost luxury prices, and that’s true in the sense that New York became a luxury good, but that’s a problem.
迈克尔·布隆伯格 (Michael Bloomberg) 有句名言将纽约市描述为奢侈品,而奢侈品的价格是奢侈品,从纽约成为奢侈品的意义上来说,这是事实,但这是一个问题。
That is a terrible problem and an inversion of what the city is.
这是一个可怕的问题,也是城市本质的倒置。
There’s this famous advice, possibly Apocryphally from Horace Greeley who’s a early American newspaper publisher and political candidate, but he says, “Go west, young man, go west.” Right?
有一个著名的建议,可能是美国早期报纸出版商和政治候选人霍勒斯·格里利 (Horace Greeley) 的杜撰,但他说:“向西走,年轻人,向西走。”正确的?
The opportunity is out in the west where the lands are open.
机会就在西部开放的土地上。
It’s never been true, including for him.
这从来都不是真的,包括他自己。
That guy moved from a rural area to New York City, and that’s how he became famous, and he ran a newspaper and he ran against Ulysses S Grant in a presidential election.
那家伙从农村搬到了纽约市,这就是他成名的原因,他经营一家报纸,并在总统选举中与尤利西斯·S·格兰特竞争。
1:32:16 The cities are the frontier.
城市是边境。
The cities have always been the frontier, not of the land, but of the economy because the frontier of the economy is where ideas are produced and ideas, even now, even the age of remote work are produced in the big cities where people live together and they compete with each other and they cooperate with each other.
城市一直不是土地的前沿,而是经济的前沿,因为经济的前沿是思想产生的地方,即使是现在,即使是远程工作的时代,也是在大城市中产生的,人们在一起生活,互相竞争,互相合作。
And so if you gate the cities, if you make it impossible for someone making 50,000 bucks with two kids to live in the city, then what you’ve done is you’ve actually closed the American frontier.
因此,如果你封锁城市,如果你让一个年收入 5 万美元、带着两个孩子的人无法在城市生活,那么你所做的实际上就是关闭了美国边境。
You have forced them into lower productivity places.
你迫使他们进入生产力较低的地方。
Their children are less likely to grow up around the inventors in the cities.
他们的孩子不太可能在城市的发明家身边长大。
1:32:50 There’s really amazing research from Raj Chetty and others, basically showing that kids, no matter what income class they’re in, they’re likelier to grow up innovating and patenting in the innovations of the place around them, right?
Raj Chetty 和其他人的研究确实令人惊叹,基本上表明,孩子们,无论他们处于哪个收入阶层,他们都更有可能在周围的创新中进行创新并获得专利,对吗?
Smart kids don’t just grow up and innovate in anything.
聪明的孩子不仅仅会在任何事情上成长和创新。
If they grew up in the Bay Area, they innovate in technology as Steve Jobs did, and Wozniak did, right?
如果他们在湾区长大,他们就会像史蒂夫·乔布斯和沃兹尼亚克那样进行技术创新,对吧?
Because they just lived around those people.
因为他们就生活在那些人周围。
And that is true in many, many, many different things.
在很多很多不同的事情上都是如此。
1:33:16 And so when you gate the cities, housing is almost too small of a thing for what we’re talking about.
因此,当你把城市封闭起来时,住房对于我们正在谈论的东西来说几乎是太小了。
We’re talking about if you can live next to economic opportunity.
我们正在讨论的是您是否可以生活在经济机会旁边。
We are talking also about if you can put the people together who will create the next era of economic opportunity.
我们还在讨论是否能够将人们聚集在一起,创造下一个经济机遇时代。
Right now, the Bay Area is still in some ways drafting off the back when it was cheap.
目前,湾区在某些方面仍处于廉价时期。
A lot of the people we’re talking about who have made amazing things, they started in the Bay Area when you could afford to live there.
我们谈论的很多人都做出了令人惊叹的事情,他们是从湾区开始的,当时你有能力住在那里。
It wasn’t always like this, and it wasn’t that long ago that it wasn’t like this.
并不总是这样,不久前也不是这样。
And now, fine, you can go there if you have money or you have a great job offer from Google or Apple or whomever, but over time, you need the ferment.
现在,好吧,如果你有钱或者你有谷歌、苹果或其他公司提供的很好的工作机会,你可以去那里,但随着时间的推移,你需要发酵。
I have a personal interest in reading memoirs and noticing that the memoir is really a housing story.
我个人有兴趣阅读回忆录并注意到回忆录实际上是一个住房故事。
One of the ones I like about this, Moby, the electronic musician, his first memoir, which is great, it’s a memoir of a certain era in New York, it’s a housing story.
我最喜欢的一个是莫比,电子音乐家,他的第一本回忆录,非常棒,这是纽约某个时代的回忆录,是一个住房故事。
He was just living next to a bunch of other musicians in cheap-ass housing.
他只是和一群其他音乐家一起住在廉价的住房里。
I just read Meet Me In The Bathroom by Lizzy Goodman, a sort of oral history of the Aughts Rock Revival in New York City, a housing story.
我刚刚读了丽兹·古德曼(Lizzy Goodman)的《在浴室里遇见我》(Meet Me In The Bathroom),这是纽约市奥格茨摇滚复兴的口述历史,也是一个住房故事。
They could afford to live here.
他们有能力住在这里。
Right?
正确的?
I’ve read a bunch of these in San Francisco too, where people just like, they’re actually squatting, right?
我在旧金山也读过很多这样的文章,那里的人们喜欢,他们实际上是蹲着的,对吧?
The San Francisco ferment, its queerness, its openness and tolerance of new ideas, its home of the psychedelic counterculture that intermixed with the defense culture that created Silicon Valley, right?
旧金山的骚动,它的酷儿,它对新思想的开放和宽容,它是迷幻反主流文化的发源地,它与创建硅谷的国防文化混合在一起,对吗?
You’ve read probably…
您可能已经读过……
Is it Frederick Turner’s From Counterculture to Cyberculture?
是弗雷德里克·特纳的《从反主流文化到网络文化》吗?
That was a story of cheap housing.
这是一个廉价住房的故事。
You need to allow people to be around each other, to mix each other.
你需要让人们彼此相处,彼此混合。
If only one type of person can afford to be there, it becomes a monocultural over time.
如果只有一种类型的人能够负担得起那里的费用,那么随着时间的推移,它就会变成单一文化。
And so it’s not just housing.
所以这不仅仅是住房。
This is about the geography of economic innovation and opportunity.
这是关于经济创新和机遇的地理。
That’s why it’s so fucking important.
这就是为什么它如此重要。
Yeah, that’s so brilliantly put that the economic dynamism and the intellectual dynamism that makes America, I think the greatest nation on Earth is at the core, a housing story.
是的,这句话说得太精辟了,我认为美国这个地球上最伟大的国家的经济活力和知识活力的核心是住房故事。
1:35:07 It’s like you have to live near the place where there is turmoil and turbulence intellectually and economically speaking.
就好像你必须生活在思想上和经济上都存在动荡和动荡的地方附近。
And so you want to be able to move there and be part of that culture, part of that economy and part of that, how you raise your kids and culturally what you want them to study, what you want them to do.
所以你希望能够搬到那里,成为那种文化的一部分,那种经济的一部分,你如何养育你的孩子,在文化上你希望他们学习什么,你希望他们做什么。
Yeah, that’s fascinating.
是的,这很有趣。
So how do we solve the housing problem?
那么我们如何解决住房问题呢?
Is it just remove as much regulation as possible, like get out of the way?
是否只是尽可能取消监管,比如让路?
There’s certainly a lot of regulation that you want to get out of the way.
当然有很多监管是你想要摆脱的。
1:35:51 You look at California, for example.
例如,你看看加利福尼亚州。
You were just giving a beautiful summary of just how important it is for people to be able to move next to economic opportunity.
您刚刚对人们能够抓住经济机会的重要性做了一个精彩的总结。
If you look at the number of houses that have been permitted in the State of California, over the last 40 years, it’s basically just a squiggle line down.
如果你看看过去 40 年来加利福尼亚州批准建造的房屋数量,你会发现基本上只是一条曲线。
The tragedy here, just to put a really fine point on it, is that the city wasn’t gated by geography or by destiny.
这里的悲剧,只是说得更清楚一点,是这座城市并没有受到地理或命运的限制。
Or by technology.
或者通过技术。
1:36:18 We know how to build apartment buildings.
我们知道如何建造公寓楼。
Yeah.
是的。
1:36:19 Yeah.
是的。
Elisha Otis invented the elevator in like the 1850s.
Elisha Otis 在 1850 年代发明了电梯。
This is not exactly a breaking technology.
这不完全是一项突破性技术。
We chose to do this.
我们选择这样做。
We wrote these laws.
我们制定了这些法律。
We people are filing these lawsuits.
我们人民正在提起这些诉讼。
We judges are accepting these lawsuits and determining that this building can’t be built.
我们的法官正在接受这些诉讼并确定这座建筑无法建造。
This is entirely self-inflicted.
这完全是自作自受。
And it’s why over and over again in this book, we call it a manufactured scarcity, which is like a little bit of a funny term.
这就是为什么在这本书中,我们一次又一次地将其称为“人为的稀缺”,这就像一个有点有趣的术语。
How do you manufacture the absence of something?
你如何制造某种东西的缺失?
No, a manufactured scarcity means you didn’t have to do this.
不,人为制造的稀缺意味着你不必这样做。
This is a human-made rule whose purposeful goal was to make it harder to add to the supply of something.
这是一条人为规则,其目的是让增加某种东西的供应变得更加困难。
And in this case, especially since the 1960s, we have made it purposefully difficult to add housing supply, and the outcome just follow the process.
在这种情况下,特别是20世纪60年代以来,我们故意让增加住房供应变得困难,而结果就是遵循过程。
You see housing supply decline often in the richest cities and these states that are governed too often by progressives.
你会看到最富裕的城市和这些经常由进步人士统治的州的住房供应经常下降。
How do we undo it?
我们如何撤消它?
Yes.
是的。
A huge part of it exists at the layer of law.
其中很大一部分存在于法律层面。
Right?
正确的?
California is already trying to change its laws, right?
加州已经在尝试修改法律了,对吧?
1:37:22 And single-family zoning, make it easier to add accessory dwelling units called ADUs.
而单户住宅分区可以更轻松地添加称为 ADU 的附属住宅单元。
We’re changing this at the level of law, but one thing I’m very fixated on is making sure that we also communicate to people that it has to be changed at the level of mindset, and even at the level of political courage because here’s like a model of what often happens.
我们正在法律层面上改变这一点,但我非常关注的一件事是确保我们也向人们传达这一点,即必须在心态层面上改变,甚至在政治勇气层面上改变,因为这就像经常发生的事情的一个模型。
You’re the Mayor of some city and you want to add a housing development of let’s say 500 units.
您是某个城市的市长,您想要增加一个住房开发项目,比如说 500 套住房。
Right?
正确的?
500 apartment unit building is going to be set up by some developer, and there’s a City Council meeting to determine whether or not this apartment building is going to be built.
某开发商将要建造一座拥有500套公寓的大楼,市议会将召开会议来决定是否建造这座公寓楼。
1:38:02 Because of loss aversion and because the people who tend to go to City Council meetings are older and richer and homeowners, guess what the overwhelming volume of reaction is in those City Council meetings?
由于厌恶损失,并且由于倾向于参加市议会会议的人年龄更大、更富有并且是房主,猜猜市议会会议上的压倒性反应是什么?
It’s a lot of people who feel like they have something to lose, saying, “You cannot put up this building, you cannot add these apartments.
很多人觉得自己失去了一些东西,他们说:“你不能建造这座大楼,你不能增加这些公寓。
It’s going to ruin the character of the neighborhood.
这会破坏社区的特色。
It’s going to create traffic.
它将创造流量。
It’s going to be like an eyesore because I don’t like buildings that are that tall.” Any number of excuses can come out of like the Pez dispenser of excuses.
这会很碍眼,因为我不喜欢那么高的建筑物。”就像佩兹借口分配器一样,可以出现任何数量的借口。
You take care of one, there’s going to be another that comes to the surface.
你照顾了一个,另一个就会浮出水面。
1:38:37 And so what often happens is that these Mayors or these people sitting in the City Council will look out into this room of 50 people saying, “No, no, no.” And they’ll say, “I’m going to represent the feedback that I see and I’m going to vote no on the addition of these housing units, the addition of this apartment building.” Where political courage comes into play is the ability to say, “You know what?
因此,经常发生的情况是,这些市长或市议会的这些人会看着这个有 50 人的房间说:“不,不,不。”他们会说,“我将代表我看到的反馈,我将投票反对增加这些住房单元,增加这栋公寓楼。”政治勇气发挥作用的地方在于能够说:“你知道吗?
I want everyone here to know that I hear you.
我希望这里的每个人都知道我听到了你的声音。
I’m listening to you and…”
我正在听你说话,而且……”
1:39:00 I want everyone here to know that I hear you.
我希望这里的每个人都知道我听到了你的声音。
I’m listening to you and I represent you.
我正在听你的讲话,我代表你。
And so, I’m grateful that you showed up to the city council meeting.
因此,我很感激您出席市议会会议。
But for every one person here who says they see a benefit to adding a new apartment building, I know that there are 10,000 people in the city that didn’t have the wealth or the knowledge to be here at this meeting.
但对于每一个说他们看到增加一栋新公寓楼的好处的人来说,我知道这座城市有一万人没有财富或知识来参加这次会议。
And they’re going to benefit from more housing because that’s going to bring down their housing costs, and I represent them as well.
他们将从更多的住房中受益,因为这将降低他们的住房成本,我也代表他们。
1:39:28 I don’t just represent, you could say the circle of care that I can see right now.
我不只是代表,你可以说我现在能看到的关怀圈。
I also represent the circle of voters that we can’t see right now, who are in the city or who are in the state or might even want to move to the state, but currently can’t because housing prices are too high on account of housing supply being restricted.
我也代表了我们现在看不到的选民圈子,他们在城市或在州,甚至可能想搬到州,但目前不能,因为住房供应受到限制,房价太高。
1:39:48 And so, one thing we’re trying to get liberals to have is a sense of political courage to stand up against this very visible NIMBYism and say, “We represent interests that aren’t necessarily visible at this city council meeting.
因此,我们试图让自由主义者拥有的一件事就是有政治勇气,站起来反对这种非常明显的邻避主义,并说:“我们代表的利益在这次市议会会议上不一定是可见的。
We represent the larger interest of housing abundance.” So, we’re going to always default to saying yes rather than default to saying no, just because the people who happen to come to these meetings are NIMBYs.
我们代表了住房丰富性的更大利益。”因此,我们总是会默认说“是”,而不是默认说“不”,只是因为碰巧参加这些会议的人是邻避者。
I want to add a wrinkle on regulation and deregulation.
我想补充一下监管和放松监管的问题。
1:40:14 So, we were talking about coding earlier, who gets coded as right wing?
那么,我们之前讨论过编码,谁被编码为右翼?
Who gets coded as left wing?
谁被标记为左翼?
Deregulation is a word that is highly coded as right wing.
放松管制这个词被高度视为右翼。
The right wing wants it to deregulate, right?
右翼希望放松管制,对吗?
They want the government to stop regulating the market.
他们希望政府停止监管市场。
It’s fine.
没关系。
In many cases, the government should deregulate parts of the market.
在许多情况下,政府应该放松部分市场的管制。
In many cases, it should regulate parts of the market more.
在许多情况下,它应该对部分市场进行更多监管。
What we don’t talk about enough is how much the government regulates the government and how badly it needs to deregulate the government.
我们谈论得不够多的是,政府对政府的监管有多大,以及政府多么需要放松对政府的监管。
So, I have many more left friends and they’ll come to me or they’ll critique me and they’ll say, “This all is fine, but what we really need in this country is public housing,” or it’s been rebranded social housing.
所以,我还有更多离开的朋友,他们会来找我,或者批评我,他们会说,“这一切都很好,但我们这个国家真正需要的是公共住房,”或者它已被重新命名为社会住房。
It’s fine, Singapore, huge amount of social housing, right?
没关系,新加坡有大量的社会住房,对吧?
They do a great job with it.
他们在这方面做得很好。
1:40:59 One of the things we go into, and this book is a manifesto on some level, but something we really try to do is take you into the gritty, grimy, frustrating details of how policy plays out on the ground, what actually happens after a bill passes, and why we get the outcomes we do.
我们所讨论的事情之一,这本书在某种程度上是一份宣言,但我们真正想做的事情是带你了解政策如何在实地发挥作用、法案通过后实际发生的情况以及为什么我们会得到这样的结果等坚韧、肮脏、令人沮丧的细节。
Because often, it’s like a bunch of decisions made after everybody stopped paying attention.
因为通常情况下,这就像在每个人都停止关注后做出的一系列决定。
1:41:21 So, one of the things we pay some real attention to is the kind of housing that people on the left all agree on is affordable housing through government grants, right?
因此,我们真正关注的事情之一是左翼人士都同意的那种住房是通过政府拨款购买经济适用房,对吗?
The government says, “Oh, we’re not just going to have market rate developers coming in, building more luxury condos for the children of the upper class.
政府说:“哦,我们不只是让市场价格的开发商进来,为上层阶级的孩子建造更多的豪华公寓。
We’re going to build affordable housing for people who should be in this city, but otherwise couldn’t pay enough to be here.”
我们将为那些本应居住在这座城市、但却无力支付足够费用来到这里的人建造经济适用房。”
1:41:47 California.
加利福尼亚州。
I can give you two different examples, but let’s look at Los Angeles.
我可以举两个不同的例子,但让我们看看洛杉矶。
I’m from outside LA and they have something…
我来自洛杉矶以外的地方,他们有一些东西……
I always forget if it’s Measure H or Measure HHH.
我总是忘记是 Measure H 还是 Measure HHH。
But California, LA voters pass a bond measure about a billion dollars a little bit more, I think it was to build affordable housing.
但加州、洛杉矶的选民通过了一项大约十亿美元的债券措施,我认为是为了建造经济适用房。
Six years later when I’m writing about this, they have built a couple of thousand units at an average cost of $600,000 to $700,000 a unit.
六年后,当我写这篇文章时,他们已经建造了几千个单位,每个单位的平均成本为 600,000 至 700,000 美元。
1:42:13 So, it’s costing more to build housing under this affordable housing bond measure, which they have agreed to pay for than it is to buy a home market rate in Denver.
因此,根据他们同意支付的经济适用住房债券措施建造住房的成本比在丹佛购买房屋市场的成本更高。
Denver is a nice place to live.
丹佛是一个宜居的地方。
So, why?
那么,为什么呢?
What had happened?
发生了什么事?
Well, it turns out that when you trigger the public money in various cities, these are city ordinances often, but not always.
事实证明,当你在各个城市触发公共资金时,这些通常是城市法令,但并非总是如此。
1:42:35 And you use these public grants and you cobble together the different grants you need to build an affordable housing complex.
你使用这些公共拨款,并拼凑出建造经济适用住房所需的不同拨款。
What you’ve done is layer onto yourself a huge number of rules that the market rate developers don’t have to follow.
你所做的就是为自己制定大量规则,而市场利率开发者不必遵守这些规则。
You’re either using union labor or paying prevailing wage.
您要么使用工会劳工,要么支付现行工资。
You’re building to higher green building codes.
您正在按照更高的绿色建筑规范进行建设。
1:42:52 Oftentimes, by the way, to get through the kind of planning board meetings that Derek is talking about, you’ve made a bunch of concessions on the design.
顺便说一句,为了完成德里克所说的那种规划委员会会议,你常常在设计上做出很多让步。
Is there going to be parking in it, security?
里面有停车场吗,保安?
Things like that.
诸如此类的事情。
You have to often agree to who’s going to be in the home.
您必须经常就谁将留在家里达成一致。
So, you’re getting…
所以,你得到了……
There’s a thing in the Measure H stuff where, well, they wanted it to not just be the taxpayer money.
H 措施中有一件事是,他们希望它不仅仅是纳税人的钱。
They also wanted nonprofit grants so the money would go further.
他们还希望获得非营利性赠款,以便这笔钱能够进一步发挥作用。
1:43:14 So, you’re trying to get these other grants, but these grants are to house homeless veterans.
因此,您正在尝试获得其他补助金,但这些补助金是为了安置无家可归的退伍军人。
So, now to open the thing, you need to find these homeless veterans.
所以,现在要打开这件事,你需要找到这些无家可归的退伍军人。
You need to go through extra disability accessibility reviews.
您需要接受额外的残障人士无障碍审查。
And, of course, we all want these things to be accessible, but they already had to comply with the American Disability Act.
当然,我们都希望这些东西可供使用,但它们已经必须遵守《美国残疾人法案》。
But now, you’re doing another disability act review in the city, and they come in and they say, “Well, your doors are a little bit not as wide as we think.
但现在,你正在这座城市进行另一项残疾人法案审查,他们进来说:“好吧,你们的门有点没有我们想象的那么宽。
So, you got to make all your doors 3 inches wider before you can open up,” and that adds time and that adds cost.
因此,您必须将所有门加宽 3 英寸才能打开,”这会增加时间并增加成本。
1:43:39 You have these subcontractor rules, right?
你们有这些分包商规则,对吗?
This is, now I’m using an example from San Francisco.
这是,现在我正在使用旧金山的一个例子。
But you had a preference initially for minority-based subcontractors that became illegal.
但您最初偏爱少数族裔分包商,但后来变成了非法。
It became small businesses, but that meant it had a preference against the bigger contractors who were more efficient at building housing.
它变成了小企业,但这意味着它更倾向于建造住房效率更高的大型承包商。
1:43:54 In order to use public money, and then very much in order to build public housing directly, it ends up being more expensive and slower than market rate, and that is a choice.
为了使用公共资金,然后直接建造公共住房,最终会比市场价格更贵且更慢,这是一个选择。
We do not have to try to solve every problem in society through an individual housing project.
我们不必试图通过个人住房项目来解决社会上的所有问题。
Building affordable housing is hard enough.
建造经济适用房已经够难的了。
It’s not impossible, but it’s difficult to do.
这并非不可能,但很难做到。
You do have to talk with the neighbors, right?
你必须和邻居谈谈,对吧?
It’s never going to be trivial to build a 500-unit apartment building.
建造一栋 500 套公寓楼绝非易事。
1:44:23 But instead, we layer on all these external and additional agenda items.
但相反,我们对所有这些外部和附加议程项目进行分层。
I call this everything bagel liberalism because you sprinkle just enough on the bagel and it’s great, but if you saw everything everywhere all at once, you put everything on the everything bagel, and it becomes a black hole from which nothing can escape.
我把这称为一切百吉饼自由主义,因为你在百吉饼上洒了足够多的东西,这很棒,但如果你一下子看到到处都是一切,你把所有东西都放在百吉饼上,它就变成了一个黑洞,任何东西都无法逃脱。
1:44:39 And so, the need to deregulate government, right?
因此,需要放松对政府的管制,对吧?
Why?
为什么?
I saw some of Elon Musk’s marathon appearance on your show, and he talks about high-speed rail in California.
我在你们的节目中看到了埃隆·马斯克的一些马拉松表演,他谈到了加州的高铁。
And the thing he says there that it’s functionally illegal to build high-speed rail in California.
他在那里说,在加州建设高铁实际上是非法的。
I got 100 disagreements with Elon Musk right now.
我现在和埃隆·马斯克有 100 个不同意见。
That’s not one of them.
那不是其中之一。
It’s functionally illegal to build high-speed rail in California.
在加州修建高铁实际上是非法的。
1:45:01 Like I went out, I toured the high-speed rail.
就像我出门一样,我游览了高铁。
I’ve done a lot of reporting on that.
我对此做了很多报道。
You can’t build it affordably.
你无法负担得起建造它的费用。
You just can’t on time.
你只是不能准时。
They have no way to get the money to build the rest of it.
他们无法获得资金来建造其余部分。
It’s not going to happen and it’s not going to happen, not because you can’t build high-speed rail.
这不会发生,也不会发生,不是因为你不能建造高铁。
Europe builds high-speed rail.
欧洲修建高铁。
Japan builds high-speed rail.
日本修建高铁。
China builds high-speed rail.
中国修建高铁。
And it’s not because of the private market, like we’ll only build luxury high-speed rail.
这并不是因为私人市场,就像我们只建造豪华高铁一样。
It’s because we have so heavily regulated a public project that you can’t finish it, and you definitely can’t bring it in on time and affordably.
因为我们对一个公共项目的监管太严格了,你无法完成它,你肯定无法按时、经济地把它引入。
1:45:31 And so, I really would like to de like, uncode, deregulation because yeah, there’s places where I would like to regulate more.
所以,我真的很想取消、取消编码、放松管制,因为是的,有些地方我想进行更多监管。
I don’t want you to be able to build a coal-fired power plant in America.
我不希望你能够在美国建造一座燃煤发电厂。
I just don’t want it to be possible.
我只是不希望它成为可能。
I think it’s bad.
我认为这很糟糕。
But I do want it to be possible to build high-speed rail and affordable housing, including through the public market.
但我确实希望能够建设高铁和经济适用房,包括通过公共市场。
1:45:49 And one thing, my friends on the left, I think really underrate is how hard they’ve made it for the government to act.
一件事,我的左派朋友们,我认为真正被低估的是他们让政府采取行动的难度有多大。
They believe in government, but if you believe in government, then you have to make it possible for government to complete projects.
他们相信政府,但是如果你相信政府,那么你就必须让政府能够完成项目。
You have to make it possible for the people who work for government to apply their own genius and initiative.
你必须让为政府工作的人们能够发挥自己的天才和主动性。
They have to have agency.
他们必须有代理权。
1:46:09 I always say that like we’re sort of trapped right now between a party that wants government to fail and a party that won’t make government work.
我总是说,就像我们现在陷入了一个希望政府失败的政党和一个不会让政府发挥作用的政党之间。
And like, we are trying to push this idea that the thing we want is a capable government, a strong government, a government that when it promises it will do something, it actually does it and gets it done.
就像,我们正在努力推动这样的想法,即我们想要的是一个有能力的政府,一个强大的政府,一个当它承诺会做某事时,它实际上会做到并完成它的政府。
And that requires not just deregulation of the private sector, though sometimes it does require that.
这不仅需要放松对私营部门的管制,尽管有时确实需要这样做。
It requires deregulation of the government itself.
它需要政府本身放松管制。
I love this question of deregulation.
我喜欢这个放松管制的问题。
1:46:34 But I also sometimes find it very frustrating, because sometimes I find that people’s sense of regulation is so specifically coded.
但有时我也觉得很沮丧,因为有时我发现人们的监管意识是如此具体地编码。
Regulation is just rules.
监管只是规则。
If you change the word from regulation to rules, I think it’d be easier for people to see.
如果把“监管”这个词改成“规则”,我想人们会更容易看到。
1:46:51 Some rules are good and some rules are stupid.
有些规则是好的,有些规则是愚蠢的。
We all understand that in life.
生活中我们都明白这一点。
That’s what regulations are.
这就是法规。
They’re just rules.
它们只是规则。
And sometimes, they give us exactly the outcomes we want.
有时,它们给我们的正是我们想要的结果。
And sometimes, they give us the outcomes we would never hope for.
有时,它们会给我们带来我们永远不会希望的结果。
And here’s a good example.
这是一个很好的例子。
You go back to the 1940s and 1950s, America was fucking disgusting.
你回到 20 世纪 40 年代和 1950 年代,美国真是太恶心了。
The air and the water was horrifying.
空气和水都令人恐惧。
1:47:15 In 1943, residents of Los Angeles woke up to a smog that was so black.
1943年,洛杉矶的居民在一片漆黑的烟雾中醒来。
They thought the Japanese had launched a chemical attack against America.
他们认为日本对美国发动了化学袭击。
In New Hampshire, in the rivers next to textile mills.
在新罕布什尔州,纺织厂旁边的河流中。
Sometimes, the rivers themselves would run green and purple and red depending on what textile colors were being dumped into the river.
有时,河流本身会呈现绿色、紫色和红色,具体取决于倒入河中的纺织品颜色。
You had the Ohio River on fire in the 1960s, 1970s.
20 世纪 60 年代、1970 年代,俄亥俄河着火了。
The world of mid 1900s America was truly sickening, and it made people sick.
1900 年代中期的美国世界确实令人作呕,它让人生病。
1:47:45 And so, we passed a raft of environmental rules, and some of them achieved exactly what we wanted.
因此,我们通过了一系列环境规则,其中一些规则完全达到了我们的要求。
The air we breathe and the water we drink is cleaner because of the Clean Air and Water Acts.
由于《清洁空气和水法案》,我们呼吸的空气和饮用的水变得更清洁。
We did extraordinary things with this era of regulation.
我们在这个监管时代做了非凡的事情。
Some of these regulations were about outcomes that the Clean Air and Water Act regulates specific pollution levels in the air and the water or the emissions coming out of tailpipes.
其中一些法规是关于《清洁空气和水法》规定空气和水的特定污染水平或尾气排放的结果。
1:48:08 Some of the regulations though, were about process.
不过,有些规定是关于流程的。
NEPA is the National Environmental Protection Act, and it among many other things, empowered individuals and citizens to sue the government and organizations, businesses, to stop construction or fill out environmental reviews to prove that their construction would meet muster wouldn’t degrade the environment too severely.
NEPA 是《国家环境保护法》,除其他外,它还授权个人和公民起诉政府、组织、企业,停止建设或填写环境审查,以证明他们的建设符合要求,不会严重破坏环境。
1:48:33 This opened the door to an infinitude of lawsuits to wrap up any effort to build anything in red tape forever.
这为无限的诉讼打开了大门,以永远结束任何在繁文缛节中建造任何东西的努力。
So, fast forward to 2021 the year, or sorry, the month after Newsom’s signs, Gavin Newsom, Governor of California signs the law to end single-family zoning in California.
因此,快进到 2021 年,或者抱歉,在纽瑟姆签署法案后的一个月,加州州长加文·纽瑟姆签署了结束加州单户住宅区划的法律。
It seems like a massive win for the pro-housing YIMBYs of California.
对于加州住房支持者 YIMBY 来说,这似乎是一次巨大的胜利。
1:48:58 The month after that law was passed, the board of supervisors in San Francisco decided to rule against an apartment building that would have added 500 total units and 100 below market rent units.
该法律通过后的一个月,旧金山监事会决定否决一栋公寓楼的建设,该公寓楼将增加 500 套公寓,其中 100 套低于市场租金。
So, something like public or social housing that was going to be built on a Nordstrom parking lot, just about the best possible place you could add housing in the world, a Nordstrom parking lot because the builders, the developers, didn’t file the appropriate paperwork under environmental review.
因此,像公共或社会住房这样的东西将建在诺德斯特龙停车场上,这几乎是世界上可以添加住房的最佳地点,诺德斯特龙停车场,因为建筑商、开发商没有在环境审查下提交适当的文件。
Right.
正确的。
So, this is a world in which the most housing starved city in America is being starved even more of housing because of the expression of, or the power of the instrumentalization of a rule past the 1970s that has allowed people to sue to stop the physical world from being changed.
因此,在这个世界上,美国住房最匮乏的城市正面临着更多的住房匮乏,因为 20 世纪 70 年代以后的一项规则的表达或工具化的力量,该规则允许人们起诉以阻止物质世界的改变。
1:49:29 And I think it goes back to this idea that like sometimes the solutions of one era can become the problems of the next generation, right?
我认为这可以追溯到这样一个想法,有时一个时代的解决方案可能会成为下一代的问题,对吗?
1:49:54 It was really good to pass the set of environmental bills that we did in the 1960s and 1970s because it addressed the extremely real problem of air and water and land being degraded by industry.
通过我们在 20 世纪 60 年代和 1970 年代制定的一系列环境法案确实很好,因为它解决了因工业而导致空气、水和土地退化的极其现实的问题。
But we’re in a new world, and the problem environmentalism today is in part a problem of global warming.
但我们正处于一个新世界,当今的环保主义问题部分是全球变暖问题。
And we have to build not only dense housing, but also clean energy.
我们不仅要建造密集的住房,还要建造清洁能源。
And the same rules that were designed to help the environment in the 1960s and 1970s are sometimes ironically used in a way that hurt the environment in the 2020s.
讽刺的是,在 2020 年代,那些旨在帮助 20 世纪 60 年代和 1970 年代保护环境的规则有时却以损害环境的方式被使用。
And that’s one reason why, we, as liberals need a paradigm shift.
这就是为什么我们作为自由主义者需要范式转变的原因之一。
Okay.
好的。
1:50:32 You said a lot of really interesting insights there.
你在那里说了很多非常有趣的见解。
So, one, if I understood correctly that regulation of outcomes is more a good idea than regulation of process, because regulation of process is where you can breed a lot of, basically the lawyers show up.
所以,第一,如果我正确地理解,对结果的监管比对过程的监管更好,因为对过程的监管是你可以滋生很多东西的地方,基本上律师都会出现。
And the other insight is, if we get rid of 99% of lawyers, the world would be a better place.
另一个见解是,如果我们摆脱 99% 的律师,世界将变得更加美好。
There’s a lot of jokes around that.
围绕这有很多笑话。
I don’t know if you agree, but that…
我不知道你是否同意,但是……
I definitely wouldn’t say 99%.
我绝对不会说99%。
98…
98…
Yeah, yeah, 82.3% to be absolute.
是的,是的,绝对是82.3%。
In the 80s, okay.
80年代,好吧。
No.
不。
Majority of them, no, they’re simply there to take advantage of the rules.
他们中的大多数人,不,他们只是为了利用规则。
We talk a lot about a book.
我们就一本书谈论了很多。
1:51:10 I don’t know if you’ve run into this one.
不知道你有没有遇到过这种情况。
But it’s by Mancur Olson, who’s sort of a founder of public interest economics, and it’s called The Rise and Decline of Nations.
但这是曼瑟·奥尔森(Mancur Olson)写的,他可以说是公共利益经济学的创始人,书名是《国家的兴衰》。
This is a very famous book.
这是一本非常有名的书。
Libertarians love this book, and I love this book.
自由主义者喜欢这本书,我也喜欢这本书。
It’s not right about everything, but its fundamental question is, how come after World War II did the completely destroyed, bombed out countries of Germany and Japan?
这并不完全正确,但它的根本问题是,二战后,德国和日本这两个国家是如何被彻底摧毁、炸毁的?
You would have thought they would be just screwed.
你可能会认为他们会被搞砸。
1:51:38 Instead, they both become growth miracles.
相反,他们都成为了增长奇迹。
They both do much better than the UK, which was on the winning side of the war.
他们的表现都比战争获胜方的英国好得多。
Why?
为什么?
And Olson’s argument is that affluent, stable societies over long periods of time, develop something that is very difficult to develop and very important to develop, which is bargaining organizations, right?
奥尔森的论点是,长期富裕、稳定的社会会发展一些非常难以发展但又非常重要的东西,这就是谈判组织,对吗?
1:51:56 Collective action is hard.
集体行动很难。
It is hard to form an organization.
组织很难成立。
It is hard to make that organization persist.
要让这个组织持续下去是很困难的。
But if you can do that in an atmosphere of stability, then over time, that organization will tend to entrench its power, right?
但如果你能在稳定的氛围中做到这一点,那么随着时间的推移,该组织将倾向于巩固其权力,对吗?
Think about AARP or the Chamber of Commerce or certain unions or the National Manufacturing Council, et cetera, the business roundtable.
想想美国退休人员协会或商会或某些工会或国家制造委员会等等,商业圆桌会议。
They’re not that powerful when they start, but over long periods of time, they become really powerful, and they start to pass laws and make themselves more powerful and so on.
他们一开始并没有那么强大,但经过很长一段时间,他们变得非常强大,他们开始通过法律,让自己变得更强大等等。
1:52:26 There’s a lot you can say about this insight, but my favorite part of Olson’s book, and one that I don’t think people emphasize enough, is this insight he has, which is that over time, countries will begin.
关于这一见解,你可以说很多,但奥尔森书中我最喜欢的部分,也是我认为人们强调得不够的部分,就是他的这一见解,即随着时间的推移,国家将会开始。
Every country has a kind of form of natural selection within it, and that form of natural selection will select for people with the skills to navigate, best navigate the kind of economy that country has.
每个国家都有一种自然选择形式,这种自然选择形式会选择那些有能力驾驭、最好地驾驭该国经济类型的人。
1:52:48 So, if you’re in China right now and China’s in its developmentalism phase, you really want to be in civil infrastructure, right?
所以,如果你现在在中国,而且中国正处于发展主义阶段,你真的想涉足民用基础设施领域,对吗?
It is great to be a civil engineer in China, great to be working on semiconductors in China, great to be doing all this stuff in the physical world.
在中国成为一名土木工程师真是太好了,在中国从事半导体工作真是太好了,在现实世界中做所有这些事情真是太好了。
But America as a kind of price of our affluence and our success, we’ve become a country, and this happens to a lot of countries where negotiation is really important.
但美国作为我们富裕和成功的一种代价,我们已经成为一个国家,这种情况发生在许多谈判非常重要的国家。
And a country in which negotiation is really important is going to, over time, start developing a preference for lots of lawyers, people in finance, management consultants, because it is a society that requires continuous, what he calls complex bargaining.
随着时间的推移,一个真正重视谈判的国家将会开始偏爱大量律师、金融界人士、管理顾问,因为这是一个需要持续不断的、他所说的复杂谈判的社会。
1:53:27 And I think this actually explains a lot.
我认为这实际上解释了很多。
Patrick Collison, we quote him in the…
帕特里克·科里森,我们在……中引用了他的话
Who’s the founder, CEO of Stripe, brilliant tech guy.
谁是 Stripe 的创始人、首席执行官,杰出的技术人员。
Here’s his point that he made in an interview with Noah Smith, who’s a blogger and economist where they were talking about high-speed rail, and sort of Patrick makes this point.
这是他在接受博主兼经济学家诺亚·史密斯采访时提出的观点,他们在采访中谈论了高铁,帕特里克也表达了这一点。
He’s like, “It’s just tough to be a high-speed rail engineer in America.
他说:“在美国成为一名高铁工程师很难。
You’re going to have a much easier time working in the digital space.” And so, the digital space becomes a kind of frontier of last resort.
你在数字空间中的工作将会变得更加轻松。”因此,数字空间成为最后的手段。
1:53:54 And so, people want to build things, go into bits and bytes, not into atoms, right?
所以,人们想要建造东西,进入比特和字节,而不是原子,对吗?
To use the old kind of Peter Thiel cut.
使用旧式的 Peter Thiel 切割。
And I think there’s something to that.
我认为这是有道理的。
It’s not that lawyers are bad.
并不是说律师不好。
Some of the people I love and most in this world are lawyers.
我所爱的一些人和这个世界上最爱的人是律师。
And many lawyers do amazing, amazing work.
许多律师的工作非常出色。
But one reason we’ve selected for so many lawyers and America has a lot of lawyers, is we became a society that needs a lot of lawyers because we are a society that is stable, affluent, and we’ve become very into bargaining.
但我们选择这么多律师并且美国有很多律师的原因之一是我们成为一个需要大量律师的社会,因为我们是一个稳定、富裕的社会,而且我们非常喜欢讨价还价。
1:54:21 Donald Trump is a real estate developer.
唐纳德·特朗普是一名房地产开发商。
That’s a relational business.
这是一个关系型业务。
The way real estate development works in this country, the reason you don’t have all that many huge firms building housing in many, many states simultaneously is it requires a lot of relationships in the individual city you’re in.
在这个国家,房地产开发的运作方式,之所以没有那么多大公司同时在许多州建造住房,是因为它需要在您所在的各个城市建立大量的关系。
1:54:35 And so, if you read, say, Maggie Haberman’s, great biography of Donald Trump, Confidence Man, which focuses a lot on his time as a real estate magnate in New York.
因此,如果你读过玛吉·哈伯曼 (Maggie Haberman) 所著的唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump) 的伟大传记《自信者》(Confidence Man),该书重点介绍了他作为纽约房地产巨头的经历。
You see Donald Trump doesn’t build a ton of stuff in other states.
你看唐纳德·特朗普并没有在其他州建造大量东西。
He actually builds in other countries sometimes or more to the point he puts his name on things built in other countries.
事实上,他有时甚至在其他国家建造房屋,甚至更多地在其他国家建造的东西上署上自己的名字。
But really, what he did was build here and he built here through his relationships with the New York political system.
但实际上,他所做的是在这里建设,他通过与纽约政治体系的关系在这里建设。
1:54:57 And so, over time, societies that make building and construction and creation something that is the output of negotiations rather than very clear standards and rules where if you’ve done it, you can just do it.
因此,随着时间的推移,社会将建设和创造变成了谈判的结果,而不是非常明确的标准和规则,如果你做到了,你就可以做。
You get a lot of lawyers, you get a lot of management consultants, you get a lot of finance people because that’s what society is selecting for.
你会得到很多律师,你会得到很多管理顾问,你会得到很多财务人员,因为这就是社会所选择的。
That’s what you’ve made it possible to have agency and freedom in.
这就是你让拥有代理权和自由成为可能的原因。
That’s what you need to do, to do big things.
这就是你需要做的,要做大事。
1:55:23 This is coming from Nick Bagley, who’s a University of Michigan law professor.
这是密歇根大学法学教授尼克·巴格利 (Nick Bagley) 的发言。
But between Walter Mondale and Tim Walz, there’s not a single person on a Democratic presidential ticket who didn’t go to law school, not one, like the Democratic Party in particular is a party of lawyers.
但在沃尔特·蒙代尔(Walter Mondale)和蒂姆·沃尔兹(Tim Walz)之间,民主党总统候选人中没有一个人没有上过法学院,没有一个,就像民主党是一个律师政党一样。
And lawyers look at things through the legal perspective.
律师从法律的角度看待事情。
And the legal perspective is that government is legitimate by following process.
And the legal perspective is that government is legitimate by following process.
1:55:46 And Bagley’s point is that government attains legitimacy, at least in part through outcomes.
And Bagley’s point is that government attains legitimacy, at least in part through outcomes.
And when you prize process so high over outcomes, you think you’re acting legitimately, but actually it what would have made you legitimate in the view of the people is that you built the thing you told them you were going to build, you made it possible to live affordably in the city.
当你把过程看得比结果更重要时,你会认为自己的行为是合法的,但实际上,在人们看来,让你合法的原因是你建造了你告诉他们你要建造的东西,你让在城市里过上负担得起的生活成为可能。
And so, you have this sort of movement then over time to populist strong men who say, I alone can fix it, because they’ve kind of given up on this procedural liberalism like they didn’t deliver for them.
因此,随着时间的推移,民粹主义强人会发起这种运动,他们说,我一个人就能解决这个问题,因为他们已经放弃了这种程序自由主义,就像他们没有为他们提供帮助一样。
1:56:12 So, you keep telling them, we’re the ones who know how to run government and they don’t see it.
所以,你不断地告诉他们,我们是知道如何管理政府的人,但他们却看不到。
And eventually, somebody else comes and says, “I’m going to bust through the walls of this thing like the Kool-Aid man,” and they win.
最终,其他人走过来说,“我要像酷爱饮料人一样冲破这件事的墙壁”,然后他们就赢了。
So, speaking of the Kool-Aid man…
所以,说到酷爱饮料人……
I can see what you’re about to do.
我可以看到你要做什么。
Yeah, I’m so transparent.
是啊,我就是这么透明。
1:56:30 It makes me think I’m a robot built in a lab somewhere.
这让我觉得我是一个在某个实验室建造的机器人。
Sam Altman once said to me, he said, “Well, aren’t you just a reinforcement learning system with energy running through it?”
Sam Altman 有一次对我说,“好吧,你不就是一个能量贯穿其中的强化学习系统吗?”
Yeah.
是的。
It’s like, I’d like to think not, but maybe.
就像,我想不是,但也许是。
So, on the Kool-Aid man, I was wondering if you could maybe steelman the case for and against Elon Musk and DOGE, because you mentioned all of these regulations, all of these complexities that get in the way of building, it seems like a bold human like Elon is required to break through the regulation, put that on one side and the other side.
所以,关于酷爱人,我想知道你是否可以为埃隆·马斯克和 DOGE 提供支持和反对的理由,因为你提到了所有这些法规,所有这些阻碍建设的复杂性,似乎需要像埃隆这样大胆的人来突破法规,把它放在一边和另一边。
1:56:48 I read somewhere that abundance is kind of the anti-DOGE, which to me, it seems like there is conflicting ideas, but there’s also alignment.
I read somewhere that abundance is kind of the anti-DOGE, which to me, it seems like there is conflicting ideas, but there’s also alignment.
So, maybe can we break all that?
那么,也许我们可以打破这一切吗?
I think the steelman is very easy to make here.
我认为钢铁侠在这里很容易制作。
1:57:31 Department of Government Efficiency.
政府效率部。
That sounds like an organization that’s needed if government is inefficient.
这听起来像是政府效率低下时所需要的组织。
And one of the themes of our book is just how inefficient government can be, not only at building houses, building energy, often at achieving its own ends, building high-speed rail when it wants to build high-speed rail, adding affordable housing units when it wants to add affordable housing units.
我们这本书的主题之一就是政府的效率是多么低下,不仅在建造房屋、建设能源方面,而且往往是为了达到自己的目的,想建高铁就建高铁,想增加经济适用房就增加经济适用房。
1:57:57 I love Ezra’s line that we don’t just need to think about deregulating the market.
我喜欢以斯拉的观点,即我们不仅需要考虑放松市场管制。
We need to think about deregulating government itself, getting the rules out of the way that keep government from achieving the democratic outcomes that it’s trying to achieve.
我们需要考虑放松对政府本身的管制,消除那些阻碍政府实现其想要实现的民主成果的规则。
This is a world in which a Department of Government Efficiency is a godsend.
This is a world in which a Department of Government Efficiency is a godsend.
1:58:17 We should be absolutely obsessed with making government work well, especially if we’re going to be the kind of liberals who believe that government is important in the first place.
我们应该绝对致力于让政府运转良好,特别是如果我们要成为那种认为政府首先重要的自由主义者。
So, that to me is the sort of pillbox version of a steel case for a Department of Government Efficiency.
So, that to me is the sort of pillbox version of a steel case for a Department of Government Efficiency.
Wait, before you do the anti-case, can I offer a different steelman?
等等,在你做反案之前,我可以提供一个不同的钢铁侠吗?
Please?
请?
I think the steelman case for what DOGE is, right, rather than what it pretended to be, is that the government is an interest, the bureaucracy, the deep state, the rules, the regulations, and it’s not about efficiency, never was.
我认为,关于 DOGE 是什么的钢铁人理由是,政府是利益、官僚机构、深层政府、规则、法规,而不是它假装的样子,这与效率无关,从来都不是。
1:58:35 You wouldn’t do this if it was about efficiency, that it’s zero-based budgeting, that you’re breaking the thing.
如果是为了效率、零基预算、或者你正在破坏事情,你就不会这样做。
You’re turning it on and off.
你正在打开和关闭它。
You’re firing massive parts of it.
你正在发射它的大部分。
1:59:04 Because the only way to make change within it possible is to delete what currently exists, whether it was efficient or not.
因为要在其中进行更改,唯一的方法就是删除当前存在的内容,无论它是否有效。
You would never actually know that if you had it all come and present its case for efficiency or something, you’d know you’d get turned around, whatever.
你永远不会真正知道,如果你让一切都来并提出效率或其他什么的理由,你就会知道你会得到扭转,无论如何。
The only way like, the problem with the government is there is no actual competition.
The only way like, the problem with the government is there is no actual competition.
1:59:25 The Department of Education doesn’t get outcompeted by the agency of education, which has started up three years ago or something.
教育部并没有被三年前成立的教育机构打败。
And because of that, the only way to make possible radical change is to bulldoze the thing that currently exists.
And because of that, the only way to make possible radical change is to bulldoze the thing that currently exists.
And then, once that is done, you can begin to rebuild.
然后,一旦完成,您就可以开始重建。
If you’ve fired half of the Department of Education, then you can start rehiring your people and they will actually do what you want.
If you’ve fired half of the Department of Education, then you can start rehiring your people and they will actually do what you want.
If you have shown that you can delete every regulation or just not follow it, then you can begin deciding which ones to actually follow.
如果您已经表明您可以删除所有规定或只是不遵守它,那么您可以开始决定实际遵循哪些规定。
If there is no department of USAID and you’ve moved back under state, then you can tell state what really to fund in terms of foreign aid, right?
如果没有美国国际开发署的部门,而你已经搬回州政府,那么你可以告诉州政府在对外援助方面真正需要资助什么,对吗?
2:00:05 There’s a theory here, I think that was never about efficiency.
There’s a theory here, I think that was never about efficiency.
It was about deletion.
这是关于删除的。
He’s not trying to make things run a little bit better.
He’s not trying to make things run a little bit better.
He’s not trying to lower the overhead cost of government.
He’s not trying to lower the overhead cost of government.
That the theory is that in the first term, the bureaucracy impeded Donald Trump.
该理论认为,在第一任期内,官僚机构阻碍了唐纳德·特朗普。
It didn’t listen to him.
它不听他的话。
Bureaucracy is supposed to be limbs of the President.
Bureaucracy is supposed to be limbs of the President.
The only way to make the federal government a neural link of Donald Trump himself, is to destroy the federal government.
让联邦政府成为唐纳德·特朗普本人的神经纽带的唯一方法就是摧毁联邦政府。
And then, rebuild it as that thing.
然后,将其重建为那个东西。
I think if you talk to people at DOGE or talk to people who are authors of Project 2025 who are at Heritage, who are chiefs of staff, and the people working for Heritage, if you have a truth serum conversation with these folks and you say, “Defend what’s happening?”
我认为,如果你与 DOGE 的人交谈,或者与 Heritage 的 2025 项目作者、参谋长以及为 Heritage 工作的人交谈,如果你与这些人进行真相血清对话,你会说:“捍卫正在发生的事情?”
Oh, that’s not up.
哦,那还不行。
2:00:52 They’re excited to tell you.
他们很高兴告诉你。
This is what they’re saying.
这就是他们所说的。
They’re saying, something metastatic has grown inside of government, not just over the last few years under Joe Biden, but over the last few decades, maybe going all the way back to FDR and even Woodrow Wilson.
他们说,政府内部已经出现了某种转移性的东西,不仅是在乔·拜登领导下的过去几年,而且在过去几十年里,也许可以一直追溯到罗斯福,甚至伍德罗·威尔逊。
We have allowed an administrative state to accumulate like barnacles on a ship around the executive branch.
我们允许行政国家像行政部门周围的船上的藤壶一样堆积。
And it’s keeping the executive branch from being able to translate.
这使得行政部门无法进行翻译。
The Democratic will into policy because there’s never any president who’s purely elected by the people.
民主党将意志纳入政策,因为从来没有任何一位总统是纯粹由人民选举产生的。
2:01:21 They’re elected into an office that is already pre-contaminated by the bureaucracy itself.
他们被选入一个已经被官僚机构本身污染的办公室。
And we’re trying to take all of that away.
我们正在努力消除这一切。
We’re trying to, I mean, this is very just explicitly the case they’re going to make, trying to make government more democratic, not less, by allowing the democratic, the elected president guide or lead in a pure way.
我的意思是,我们正在努力,这正是他们将要提出的情况,试图通过允许民主人士、民选总统以纯粹的方式进行指导或领导,从而使政府更加民主,而不是更少。
Okay.
好的。
2:01:44 So, as you said, two things.
所以,正如你所说,有两件事。
One is the steelman, and then at the end there, there was a non-steelman.
一个是钢铁人,最后还有一个非钢铁人。
So, the first part is cutting, removing as much as possible to see what’s actually needed.
所以,第一部分是切割,尽可能多地去除,看看真正需要什么。
That seems like one of the ways to figure out what’s actually needed is by removing it.
这似乎是找出实际需要什么的方法之一就是删除它。
And then, there’s the second thing is that you mentioned so that you can install the people that follow your policy, whatever.
然后,第二件事是你提到的,这样你就可以安装遵循你的政策的人,无论如何。
Oh, I disagree here that that wasn’t the steelman.
哦,我不同意那不是钢铁侠。
2:02:12 I mean, I think you have to listen to them to do the steelman, right?
我的意思是,我认为你必须听他们的才能做钢铁侠,对吗?
I don’t think the steelman is imaginary.
我不认为钢铁侠是虚构的。
If you read the OMB regulation that froze funding, it said explicitly that the government has to reflect the will of the people as expressed through their choice of president.
如果你读过 OMB 冻结资金的规定,它明确表示政府必须反映人民通过选择总统所表达的意愿。
If you read anything, Russ Vought has ever said, they have the unitary executive theory.
拉斯·沃特曾经说过,如果你读过任何东西,他们有统一执行理论。
2:02:37 I’m not saying it’s right or wrong.
我并不是说这是对还是错。
If you asked me to do the non-steelman, which I would love to do too.
如果你让我做非钢人,我也很乐意做。
It is not my view that the steelman case of this is to make the federal government fully responsive to Donald Trump.
我不认为钢铁侠事件是为了让联邦政府充分回应唐纳德·特朗普。
But the steelman case for what they are doing as expressed by them.
但正如他们所表达的那样,钢铁侠为他们正在做的事情辩护。
And I think a steelman reflects, I mean, I have talked to these people, right?
我认为钢铁侠反映,我的意思是,我已经和这些人谈过了,对吗?
I’m telling you what they tell me on some level.
我正在告诉你他们在某种程度上告诉我的事情。
The steelman cases, they believe, like as Derek said a minute ago, this has become non-democratically responsive, and the way it becomes democratically responsive is deeply responsive to the president.
他们认为,就像德里克一分钟前所说的那样,钢铁人案件已经变得非民主回应,而它变得民主回应的方式是对总统的深刻回应。
The president represents a different politics than Joe Biden’s politics.
总统代表的政治与乔·拜登的政治不同。
And so, if you have a state filled with liberal civil servants who don’t want to do what he says, that is a violation of small democratic principles of how the government should be run.
因此,如果一个国家充满了自由派公务员,而他们不愿意按照他所说的去做,那就违反了政府运作的小民主原则。
2:03:25 I think if you don’t like it, that’s fine.
我想如果你不喜欢它,那也没关系。
But I do want to say, I actually think that is the steelman.
但我确实想说,我其实认为那是钢铁侠。
They’re not doing this for no reason.
他们这样做并不是无缘无故的。
They have an intention here, and I think whether you like it or not, so it depends on whether or not you like their view.
他们在这里是有意图的,我想你喜欢不喜欢,所以这取决于你喜欢不喜欢他们的观点。
Okay.
好的。
2:03:40 Well, I don’t like it because it cuts my ear in a certain way that one of the criticisms I have for Donald Trump and the Trump administration is, there’s a natural circles of sycophancy that forms, and every president has their personality and psychological quirks, and I think he is one of the people where favoritism is more likely to develop.
嗯,我不喜欢它,因为它在某种程度上割伤了我的耳朵,我对唐纳德·特朗普和特朗普政府的批评之一是,形成了一个自然的阿谀奉承圈子,每一位总统都有自己的个性和心理怪癖,我认为他是最容易产生偏袒的人之一。
2:04:02 So, when you choose who to install as the head of whatever organization, so if you fire everybody and rehire, the rehiring process is more likely to have people that just said nice things about Donald Trump in the past versus a meritocracy-based system that these people are really good.
因此,当你选择任命谁为任何组织的负责人时,如果你解雇所有人并重新雇用,那么重新雇用过程中更有可能有人在过去对唐纳德·特朗普说了好话,而不是基于精英制度的人,这些人真的很优秀。
Lex, AOC should definitely come on the show.
Lex、AOC 绝对应该出现在节目中。
Well, she has her own.
嗯,她有自己的。
2:04:23 But the ideal, the steelman to me about not maybe what Elon is doing is, in order to have the best people in the world doing a great job at every part of government, you have to figure out, I mean, his first email of like, “What have you done this week?”
但对我来说,钢铁侠的理想也许不是埃隆正在做的事情,而是,为了让世界上最优秀的人在政府的各个部门做好出色的工作,你必须弄清楚,我的意思是,他的第一封电子邮件,比如“你这周做了什么?”
2:04:47 If we just steelman everything he’s been doing, which is like, let’s find the productive people that show up to work that love what they’re doing that are actually sort of amazing at what they’re doing.
如果我们只是钢铁侠他所做的一切,就像,让我们找到那些在工作中热爱他们正在做的事情的富有成效的人,他们实际上对他们正在做的事情感到惊讶。
I mean, how would you solve that problem from his experience in business?
我的意思是,根据他的商业经验,你会如何解决这个问题?
It’s painful, but effective to just fire almost everybody.
解雇几乎所有人虽然很痛苦,但很有效。
And then, rebuild from there and continuously do that.
然后,从那里重建并持续这样做。
2:05:09 And as the result, as long as everybody is aligned in a mission is you’re simplifying over and over the system.
结果,只要每个人都在一个任务上保持一致,你就可以一遍又一遍地简化系统。
So, it’s more and more and more effective.
所以,它越来越有效。
Now, how else would you approach…
现在,您还会如何处理...
We could start now criticizing, how would you make government more efficient, if not by the way that they’re doing it?
我们现在可以开始批评,如果不按照他们的做法,如何提高政府效率?
Yeah, can I steelman to the other side now?
是啊,我现在可以到另一边去钢铁侠吗?
Sure.
当然。
Okay.
好的。
2:05:37 You wouldn’t do this.
你不会这样做。
You wouldn’t do this.
你不会这样做。
Yeah.
是的。
So, let me say a couple of things.
那么,让我说几件事。
2:05:43 One is that efficiency only makes sense when yoked to a goal.
一是效率只有在与目标挂钩时才有意义。
So, when…
所以,当……
If Elon Musk came in and did this at Tesla, Musk had a goal for Tesla.
如果埃隆·马斯克加入特斯拉并做到这一点,那么马斯克就为特斯拉设定了一个目标。
It was to build the electric vehicle of the future.
这是为了制造未来的电动汽车。
SpaceX, he had a goal for SpaceX.
SpaceX,他对SpaceX有一个目标。
We know what the goal for SpaceX is in some long-term way, go to Mars, but in some short-term way, cheaper orbital travel, cheaper orbital shipping, reusable rockets, et cetera.
我们知道 SpaceX 的长期目标是什么,即前往火星,但短期目标是更便宜的轨道旅行、更便宜的轨道运输、可重复使用的火箭等等。
We know what the goal for SolarCity was.
我们知道 SolarCity 的目标是什么。
2:06:16 In a way, and I do think sort of the purchase of Twitter is late Elon, which becomes a much more political set of goals.
在某种程度上,我确实认为埃隆收购 Twitter 已经晚了,这成为了一套更具政治性的目标。
But nevertheless, in a way, at least there’s an expressed idea at Twitter, which is the return of free expression.
但无论如何,在某种程度上,Twitter 至少表达了一个想法,那就是言论自由的回归。
I think it’s really important if you are steelmanning or any kind of manning is really asking and listening to what people are saying their goal is, because efficiency does not exist in a vacuum, right?
我认为如果你是钢铁人员或任何类型的人员真正询问并倾听人们所说的他们的目标是什么,这一点非常重要,因为效率并不存在于真空中,对吧?
2:06:41 A state that is efficient at building dirty energy and a state that is efficient at burning clean energy, they can be opposite versions of each other, right?
一个能够高效建设肮脏能源的国家和一个能够高效燃烧清洁能源的国家,它们可能是彼此相反的版本,对吧?
You have to be optimizing towards something.
你必须针对某些事情进行优化。
You’re an AI guy.
你是一个人工智能人。
You have to optimize towards something.
你必须针对某些事情进行优化。
And the goal…
而目标……
I find myself really consistently frustrated by conversations about DOGE that treat efficiency as some free-floating thing.
我发现自己一直对 DOGE 的对话感到沮丧,因为这些对话将效率视为某种自由浮动的东西。
Or I sometimes will hear people say to me, very smart people have said to me, “Oh, what DOGE is really doing is stripping the government down to studs, so it can put AI into it, because Elon believes in AGI is coming soon, and you need to make a government capable of using AGI.
或者我有时会听到人们对我说,非常聪明的人对我说,“哦,DOGE 真正做的是将政府精简为螺柱,这样它就可以将人工智能放入其中,因为埃隆相信通用人工智能即将到来,你需要让政府有能力使用通用人工智能。
2:07:18 And I always say to them, “Okay, AI towards what?
我总是对他们说:“好吧,人工智能的目标是什么?
Towards what value function?
朝向什么价值函数?
Towards what prompt are you inserting at the base level?” Sorry about that.
您在底层插入什么提示?对此感到抱歉。
And I think a few things become very clear.
我认为有些事情变得非常清楚。
One is that it is towards Donald Trump.
一是针对唐纳德·特朗普。
It is his movement.
这是他的动作。
Elon Musk serves at his pleasure.
埃隆·马斯克随心所欲地服务。
Elon Musk has said that he would like to himself chisel Donald Trump’s face into Mount Rushmore.
埃隆·马斯克曾表示,他想亲自将唐纳德·特朗普的脸凿进拉什莫尔山。
He said he loves Donald Trump as much as a man can love any other man.
他说他爱唐纳德·特朗普,就像一个人爱其他男人一样。
He believes in Trump, right?
他相信特朗普,对吗?
2:07:48 I think you have to take him at his word, or maybe you think he’s very cynical and he’s saying all that to curry favor in a sycophantic way with Trump.
我认为你必须相信他的话,或者也许你认为他非常愤世嫉俗,他说这些都是为了以阿谀奉承的方式讨好特朗普。
But at some point, Elon Musk does not serve with any kind of independence.
但在某些时候,埃隆·马斯克并没有以任何形式的独立性任职。
If Trump says, “Your power is gone,” his power is gone.
如果特朗普说:“你的权力消失了”,那么他的权力就消失了。
He’s functionally an outside advisor to the government.
他实际上是政府的外部顾问。
2:08:02 So, then you really do, I think, have to listen to what Donald Trump has said, what Russ Vought has said, and they believe that Trump represents something fundamental.
所以,我认为,你真的必须听听唐纳德·特朗普和拉斯·沃特所说的话,他们相信特朗普代表了一些根本性的东西。
His movement represents something fundamental that has been suppressed in American life, okay.
他的运动代表了美国生活中被压制的一些基本东西,好吧。
I think if you were doing something…
我想如果你在做某事......
The best cases I’ve seen for Elon are a zero-based budgeting case.
我见过的埃隆最好的案例是零基预算案例。
2:08:19 You’re trying to break everything down to studs, and then it needs to rejustify itself.
你试图将一切分解为螺柱,然后它需要重新证明自己。
If he did this at Twitter, the engineers had to come in and justify to his people what they were actually doing.
如果他在 Twitter 这样做,工程师就必须进来并向他的员工证明他们实际所做的事情是合理的。
But that wasn’t how those emails worked.
但这些电子邮件并不是这样运作的。
We all know this, right?
我们都知道这一点,对吧?
He doesn’t have a staff capable of seriously working through, and then following up on emails from 2 some million government employees about what they did that week, and then really checking, well, did they do it well?
他没有一支员工能够认真完成工作,然后跟进两百万政府雇员发来的关于他们那周做了什么的电子邮件,然后真正检查,嗯,他们做得好吗?
Was the thing accomplished, right?
事情已经完成了吧?
That’s not how you do that like what?
那不是你这样做的方式吗?
He’s got 50 people at DOGE?
他在 DOGE 有 50 名员工?
It’s nothing.
没什么。
2:08:53 If you want to do zero-based budgeting, it has to be against a criteria.
如果你想做零基预算,就必须符合一个标准。
So, coming in and gutting USAID, some of the things USAID does are just extraordinary, right?
所以,美国国际开发署进来并摧毁了美国国际开发署,它所做的一些事情非常了不起,对吗?
PEPFAR, nobody anywhere thought PEPFAR was not an efficient program.
总统紧急救援计划(PEPFAR),没有人认为总统紧急救援计划(PEPFAR)不是一个有效的计划。
PEPFAR is maybe the highest value thing that we have ever done in the US government to save human life through foreign aid.
“总统紧急救援计划”可能是美国政府通过对外援助拯救生命所做的最有价值的事情。
I mean, just bluntly, it’s a George W.
我的意思是,坦白地说,这是乔治·W·布什 (George W.
Bush program.
布什计划。
It saved a generation of people from dying of HIV AIDS.
它使一代人免于死于艾滋病毒。
2:09:19 They just turned it off, and they didn’t have somebody come in and justify the PEPFAR funding.
他们只是把它关掉了,没有人进来证明总统紧急救援计划(PEPFAR)资金的合理性。
They just turned it off as they turned all these different things off and have never given people a serious effort to come back in and say, ” This is what we do.” They just fired half of the people at DOE.
他们只是把它关掉,就像他们关掉所有这些不同的东西一样,从来没有认真地努力让人们回来说:“这就是我们所做的。”他们刚刚解雇了能源部一半的员工。
DOE is, if you look at it, DOE has the lowest staffing level of any agency, but the fourth highest appropriation, and it administers the more than $1 trillion higher ed.
DOE 是,如果你看一下,DOE 的人员配备水平是所有机构中最低的,但拨款却排名第四,并且管理着超过 1 万亿美元的高等教育。
It is in overhead terms, one of the leanest of all the agencies alongside Social Security Agency.
从管理费用来看,它是继社会保障局之后最精简的机构之一。
2:09:51 They didn’t tell those people what they wanted out of a DOE of half the size.
他们没有告诉那些人他们想要从一半大小的能源部得到什么。
They didn’t let those people come in and argue for their jobs.
他们不让那些人进来为他们的工作争论。
They’re just cutting things, and they’re not explaining at any point, at any level what they want to do with them.
他们只是在削减东西,并且在任何时候、任何层面上都没有解释他们想用它们做什么。
And then, I will also say what they’re doing is probably illegal, right?
然后我也会说他们这样做可能是违法的吧?
Just this week or last week, a judge said that about 26,000 people need to be rehired by the federal government because their firings were illegal.
就在本周或上周,一名法官表示,联邦政府需要重新雇用约 26,000 人,因为他们的解雇是非法的。
2:10:17 And now, that’s going to go up to the Supreme Court and we’ll see what John Roberts and Amy Coney Barrett say, right?
现在,这件事将提交至最高法院,我们将看看约翰·罗伯茨和艾米·科尼·巴雷特会怎么说,对吧?
That game is not done yet, but they have Congress.
这场比赛还没有结束,但他们已经有了国会。
I am a person who believes we needed civil service reform.
我认为我们需要进行公务员制度改革。
Too hard to hire, too hard to fire, too hard to manage.
招聘太难,解雇太难,管理太难。
And they could have gone to Congress.
他们本来可以去国会。
2:10:37 And frankly, at the beginning, Ro Khanna and a bunch of Democrats that they wanted to work with DOGE, Democrats were defeated.
坦白说,一开始,罗·卡纳和一帮民主党人想与 DOGE 合作,但民主党被击败了。
If you had wanted to build some amount of like political bipartisanship, it was there to do, right?
如果你想建立某种程度的政治两党合作,那就可以做,对吧?
Like the Democrats voted for the Laken Riley Bill, the hardcore immigration bill.
就像民主党投票支持了核心移民法案《拉肯莱利法案》一样。
They were ready to deal, but they didn’t want to do that because it is fundamentally for them about political control.
他们已经准备好进行交易,但他们不想这样做,因为这对他们来说根本上是政治控制。
And this is my steelman case for the action.
这是我的钢铁侠行动案例。
This is a case, I believe.
我相信这是一个案例。
2:11:02 What Elon did at Twitter was not make Twitter more efficient.
埃隆在 Twitter 所做的并不是让 Twitter 变得更有效率。
It’s not like a better product now.
现在它不像是更好的产品了。
It’s a different product.
这是一个不同的产品。
What he did was he made it controllable.
他所做的就是让它变得可控。
What he did at Twitter was he went into something where he thought the people disagreed with him, and he broke it until he had actual operational control of the thing, and they would do what he wanted them to do, and then he can move it in his direction.
他在推特所做的就是,他参与了一些他认为人们不同意他的事情,然后他打破了它,直到他对这件事有了实际的操作控制权,他们会做他想让他们做的事情,然后他就可以把它朝着他的方向发展。
2:11:20 What they’re doing in the federal government, and this is what Chris Rufo wanted to do, it’s what Russ Vought wanted to do, is make the thing controllable.
他们在联邦政府所做的就是让事情变得可控,这就是克里斯·鲁福(Chris Rufo)想要做的,也是拉斯·沃特(Russ Vought)想要做的。
And what they want to do with that control, I don’t even think they fully know, but their view is that the federal government is like a…
他们想用这种控制做什么,我什至认为他们完全不知道,但他们的观点是联邦政府就像……
It is the capital city that they have conquered.
这是他们征服的首都。
2:11:37 And now, they need to turn it into something that they can actually use.
现在,他们需要将其变成他们可以实际使用的东西。
And in order to do that, I mean, Russ Vought has said, “You need to traumatize the civil servants,” right?
为了做到这一点,我的意思是,拉斯·沃特说过,“你需要让公务员受到创伤”,对吗?
That was his word, traumatize the civil servants.
这是他的话,让公务员受到创伤。
When Elon Musk talked about USAID, he said, “It’s all worms.
当埃隆·马斯克谈到美国国际开发署时,他说:“都是蠕虫。
No apple.
没有苹果。
We’re going to feed it to the wood shipper.” This isn’t the language of, let’s see who’s really doing a good job here and who’s not.
我们将把它喂给木材运输商。”这不是这样的语言,让我们看看谁在这里做得很好,谁做得不好。
This is the language of conquering.
这是征服的语言。
This is the language of destruction, and they have not-
这是毁灭性的语言,而他们没有——
2:12:00 This is the language of destruction and they have not articulated new better goals for it and nor are they starting with the parts of the government where I think you would start with.
这是破坏性的语言,他们没有为此阐明新的更好的目标,也没有从我认为你会从政府部分开始。
What do they want the education department to do?
他们希望教育部门做什么?
I’m a professional political journalist.
我是一名专业政治记者。
I talk to people in the Trump administration.
我与特朗普政府的人交谈。
I can’t tell you what they want out of it, aside from the fact that they don’t like it and they think it’s like a hotbed of other people’s power.
我无法告诉你他们想从中得到什么,除了他们不喜欢它并且他们认为这就像其他人权力的温床这一事实之外。
2:12:22 I can tell you what some conservatives have written about it, but the administration itself has not articulated goals.
我可以告诉你一些保守派对此有何评论,但政府本身并没有明确的目标。
So what I think their view is right now is they’re breaking the thing and trying to make the people who would be oppositional either leave or go into hiding and then they’re going to figure out what they want to do with it.
所以我认为他们现在的观点是,他们正在破坏这个事情,并试图让那些反对的人离开或躲藏起来,然后他们会弄清楚他们想用它做什么。
2:12:38 But right now they’re in the period where you have to sack and then later on you can build yourself your monuments and turn the civil service to your own ends.
但现在他们正处于你必须解雇的时期,然后你可以为自己建造纪念碑,并让公务员队伍为自己服务。
I don’t think it’s still…
我认为现在还不是……
I just…
我只是……
That is what I think is going on.
我认为这就是正在发生的事情。
I think that’s, from a certain perspective, accurate and insightful description.
我认为,从某种角度来看,这是准确而富有洞察力的描述。
2:12:52 If we just look at Twitter, you said that he didn’t make it more efficient, he made it more controllable.
如果我们只看Twitter,你说他没有让它变得更有效率,他让它变得更加可控。
Let me just describe, just because I know the engineers inside Twitter well, which we could argue that the government is very different than a company.
我简单描述一下,因为我很了解 Twitter 内部的工程师,我们可以说政府与公司有很大不同。
That’s an important argument there.
这是一个重要的论点。
With Twitter, the culture that’s there now, people are really excited to work there and to be productive there, engineers.
有了 Twitter,现在的文化,工程师们,人们真的很高兴能在那里工作并提高工作效率。
Elon is really good at finding people that are there, extremely good at what they do and are there to give everything.
埃隆真的很擅长找到在那里的人,非常擅长他们所做的事情,并且愿意付出一切。
2:13:37 And the resulting thing this machine that is created, all barriers removed, you create beautiful stuff.
这台机器创造出来的结果是,所有障碍都被消除,你创造了美丽的东西。
It’s not like move fast and break things.
这不像是快速行动并打破事物。
It’s very cynical perspective on it.
这是非常愤世嫉俗的观点。
No, everybody loves what they do, are good at it and are really rapidly figuring out all the multitude of problems that arise in that.
不,每个人都热爱自己所做的事情,都很擅长,并且很快就能解决其中出现的众多问题。
It’s a different culture, a culture of productivity, and it’s not like some negative boys club or there’s all kinds of negative perspectives you can take on those things.
这是一种不同的文化,一种生产力文化,它不像一些消极的男孩俱乐部,或者你可以对这些事情采取各种消极的观点。
No, it’s a positive culture of productivity.
不,这是一种积极的生产力文化。
2:14:15 Controllable side, also really important to understand and that could be taken advantage of in a really negative way, especially in government.
可控的一面,理解起来也非常重要,并且可能会以一种非常消极的方式被利用,特别是在政府中。
But you should say on some of the most successful software projects, there is a level of control required like open source projects, Linus Torvalds, that heads up the Linux kernel.
但你应该说,在一些最成功的软件项目中,需要一定程度的控制,例如领导 Linux 内核的开源项目 Linus Torvalds。
There has to be what’s often called the benevolent dictator for life.
必须有一个所谓的终身仁慈的独裁者。
There has to be a controllability to the machine of this extremely productive, efficient team to work together.
这个生产力极高、高效的团队必须对机器具有可控性才能一起工作。
2:14:50 Now, those are engineering projects and the problem with government is you get elected new benevolent dictators for life that come.
现在,这些都是工程项目,政府的问题是你会在未来的生活中选出新的仁慈的独裁者。
They’re often not benevolent.
他们往往并不仁慈。
And they’re often not benevolent and they all convince themselves they’re benevolent.
他们往往并不仁慈,但他们都说服自己自己是仁慈的。
2:15:01 I’m sure Hitler thought he’s doing the right thing, the good thing, the benevolent thing in his worldview.
我确信希特勒认为他在做正确的事、好事、仁慈的事。
Every single dictator does that, yes.
是的,每个独裁者都会这样做。
So that’s the problem, but in order to be efficient, there has to be some level of controllability and there has to be, I think, to go back to the steelman, you have to have a culture of productivity that I’m not sure I’ve had quite a bit of experience with DOD and DARPA from the academic side.
这就是问题所在,但为了提高效率,必须有一定程度的可控性,而且我认为,回到钢铁侠,你必须拥有一种生产力文化,我不确定我是否在学术方面对国防部和国防高级研究计划局有相当多的经验。
2:15:36 Just everything is so bureaucratic and slow.
只是一切都是如此官僚和缓慢。
That’s a different culture.
那是一种不同的文化。
So part of the destruction is in reestablishing culture and yes, make it more controllable so you can be efficient.
因此,破坏的一部分在于重建文化,是的,使其更加可控,这样你就可以提高效率。
We still need to define what the outcome is.
我们仍然需要定义结果是什么。
Yes, that’s a-
是的,那是一个——
Productivity and service of what?
生产力和服务是什么?
In service of what?
为了什么服务?
Efficiency in service of what?
服务效率是什么?
2:15:56 And I think the juxtaposition of the private and public sectors is really useful here.
我认为私营部门和公共部门的并置在这里非常有用。
Private companies, publicly traded companies have the benefit of tight and quantifiable feedback loops.
私营公司、上市公司受益于紧密且可量化的反馈循环。
Are you making more money this quarter than you were last quarter or less?
您本季度赚的钱比上季度多还是少?
How’s consumer feedback?
消费者反馈如何?
Do people say they like the product more?
人们是否说他们更喜欢该产品?
Are you getting 4.8 on your reviews or 4.6?
您的评论是 4.8 还是 4.6?
The feedback loops are very quantifiable and they’re also very, very quick.
反馈循环是非常可量化的,而且速度也非常非常快。
2:16:22 You know exactly when you’re doing a good and bad job.
你清楚地知道自己什么时候做得好,什么时候做得不好。
And so the KPIs are so cleanly drawn that people are aligned in their sense of we are moving forward and moving back.
因此,KPI 的绘制非常清晰,人们对于我们前进和后退的感觉是一致的。
I don’t think government has done this at all under DOGE.
我认为政府在总督领导下根本没有这样做过。
In fact, I think in some ways goals that you could clearly identify as being good are being torn down.
事实上,我认为在某些方面,你可以清楚地认为是好的目标正在被推翻。
And this is why again, it’s so useful to be able to articulate goals in politics because without an articulation of goals, you don’t know whether the job to be done is to take something away or to add something.
这就是为什么能够阐明政治目标是如此有用,因为如果没有明确的目标,你就不知道要做的工作是删除一些东西还是添加一些东西。
2:16:53 And right now the answer from DOGE is to take away, take away, subtract everything, break down to studs as Cesar said.
现在 DOGE 的答案是拿走,拿走,减去一切,分解成螺柱,正如塞萨尔所说。
But let’s take a really, really concrete example here.
但让我们举一个非常非常具体的例子。
The FDA, right?
FDA,对吗?
DOGE just laid off dozens of probationary employees.
DOGE 刚刚解雇了数十名试用期员工。
So upwardly mobile, recently hired, often very young, nicely credentialed employees at the FDA as a part of its slashing of the federal workforce.
FDA 的员工晋升空间很大,最近聘用了很多非常年轻且资历良好的员工,这是 FDA 削减联邦劳动力的一部分。
2:17:16 One of the big problems of the FDA is slow approval of phase three clinical trial drugs.
FDA的一大问题是三期临床试验药物审批缓慢。
Everyone in this country who believes in science and technology wants the most lifesaving drugs to be brought into the public marketplace as soon as possible and competed against with other drugs, the price comes down and helps to extend people’s lives and health spans.
这个国家每一个相信科学技术的人都希望最能救命的药物尽快进入公共市场,与其他药物竞争,价格下降,有助于延长人们的生命和健康寿命。
I think everyone agrees that is an outcome worth fighting for.
我想每个人都同意这是值得为之奋斗的结果。
And if they don’t, certainly, as you and I willing to say that’s an outcome that we want.
如果他们不这样做,当然,正如你和我愿意说的那样,这就是我们想要的结果。
That’s what we want from our science policy.
这就是我们对科学政策的期望。
2:17:44 What happens if you cut probationary employees at the FDA?
如果 FDA 裁减试用期员工,会发生什么?
The FDA doesn’t become more efficient.
FDA 并没有变得更有效率。
It becomes less efficient because the same amount of work spread over fewer people means longer delays in terms of approving phase three clinical trial drugs and deciding whether or not to approve them for public consumption.
它变得效率较低,因为相同数量的工作分散在更少的人身上,意味着在批准第三阶段临床试验药物以及决定是否批准它们供公众消费方面需要更长的延迟。
So in this really, really clear and very specific example, I think we can see the problem with not having articulated goals.
因此,在这个非常非常清晰且非常具体的示例中,我认为我们可以看到没有明确目标的问题。
You don’t know whether the job to be done is to take away employees or to add them.
你不知道要做的工作是减少员工还是增加员工。
I think if instead what DOGE had done is come in and say, “You know what, Elon Musk and a bunch of other people from Silicon Valley, one thing we take very seriously is the importance of scientific and technological progress.”
我认为,如果 DOGE 所做的只是进来说:“你知道吗,埃隆·马斯克和其他一群来自硅谷的人,我们非常重视的一件事是科学技术进步的重要性。”
2:18:28 Because if you look back over decades and centuries, what distinguishes our generation from every other generation in terms of its health and its power is science and technology.
因为如果你回顾几十年和几个世纪,我们这一代人在健康和力量方面与其他每一代人的区别在于科学和技术。
And we want to infuse government with a sense of science and technological progress.
我们希望给政府注入科技进步的意识。
And to that end, one thing we want to do is to have a smarter and more efficient FDA so that people can experience life-saving medicines.
为此,我们想做的一件事就是拥有一个更智能、更高效的 FDA,以便人们能够体验到救命药物。
2:18:49 I think what you would do is research the bottlenecks that exist to American science and pharmaceutical policy and say, “We should hire more people at the FDA to accelerate drug approval, decide which drugs are to be rejected and which drugs are to get the FDA label.” That is the opposite of the DOGE approach, and this really, I think puts a fine point to the problem of a DOGE without goals.
我认为你会做的是研究美国科学和制药政策中存在的瓶颈,然后说:“我们应该在 FDA 雇佣更多的人来加速药物审批,决定哪些药物将被拒绝以及哪些药物将获得 FDA 标签。”这与 DOGE 方法相反,我认为这确实很好地解决了没有目标的 DOGE 问题。
2:19:16 When Elon takes over Tesla, when Elon is at SpaceX, when Elon is at X, I would imagine, and you know this better than me because you know him, and maybe most importantly for the purposes of this part of the conversation, the people who work for him.
当埃隆接管特斯拉时,当埃隆在 SpaceX 时,当埃隆在 X 时,我想,你比我更了解这一点,因为你了解他,也许最重要的是,就这部分对话而言,了解为他工作的人。
I’ll bet if you ask the people who work under Elon at X, Tesla, SpaceX, they say, “I know exactly what Elon wants.
我敢打赌,如果你问埃隆在 X、特斯拉、SpaceX 手下工作的人,他们会说:“我确切地知道埃隆想要什么。
This is his goal for the super heavy rocket.
这是他对超重型火箭的目标。
This is his goal in terms of humanoid robots.
这就是他在人形机器人方面的目标。
This is his goal in terms of profitability of Twitter and the growth of our subscription business and how we’re going to integrate new features.”
这是他的目标,包括 Twitter 的盈利能力、订阅业务的增长以及我们将如何整合新功能。”
2:19:48 There’s probably a really clear mind meld.
可能有一个非常清晰的头脑融合。
Right now I have no sense that there’s a mind meld and in fact I have the exact opposite sense that rather than an example of creative destruction, which would be a mitzvah of entrepreneurship, we have an act of destruction, destruction.
现在我没有感觉到有一种思想融合,事实上我有完全相反的感觉,而不是创造性破坏的例子,这将是企业家精神的成人礼,我们有一种破坏行为,破坏。
We have destruction for the sake of destruction.
我们为了破坏而破坏。
It’s much cleaner to me from an interpretive standpoint to describe DOGE as an ideological purge of progressivism performing an act or performing the job of efficiency rather than a department of actual efficiency itself.
对我来说,从解释的角度来看,将 DOGE 描述为对进步主义的意识形态清洗,执行一项行动或执行效率工作,而不是一个实际效率部门本身。
I want to say because I really want to emphasize that it has goals.
我之所以这么说,是因为我真的想强调它是有目标的。
2:20:24 The goals are clear on some level and they have to do with centralizing power.
这些目标在某种程度上是明确的,并且与集中权力有关。
So let me take out something that’s not DOGE because this is, I think an important place where you see what the effort is.
所以让我拿出一些不是 DOGE 的东西,因为我认为这是一个重要的地方,你可以看到其中的努力是什么。
What is Congress for?
国会是为了什么?
Not just Democrats in Congress who are in theory right now the opposition party, but Republicans in Congress.
不仅国会中理论上现在是反对党的民主党人,还有国会中的共和党人。
Congress is this aggregation of information from different places in the country who have chosen representatives to represent them in Washington.
国会是来自全国各地的信息的集合,这些地方选出代表在华盛顿代表他们。
That’s how the system works.
这就是系统的工作原理。
2:20:56 One of the things that has really cowed congressional Republicans, it is a huge sun-like gravitational force now on Capitol Hill, is that Elon has made it known that any house or Senate Republican who defies Trump on a key vote, cabinet nominees or the CR, that kind of thing, he will dump 50 to a hundred million dollars into a primary.
真正让国会共和党人感到畏惧的一件事是,现在国会山上有一股巨大的太阳般的引力,埃隆已经让大家知道,任何众议院或参议院共和党人如果在关键投票、内阁提名人或民权代表之类的问题上违抗特朗普,他将在初选中投入 50 到 1 亿美元。
2:21:20 It’s no money at all for him.
这对他来说根本就不是钱。
It’s lethal for them.
这对他们来说是致命的。
This is well known.
这是众所周知的。
He has said this personally to some of them.
他曾亲自对其中一些人说过这样的话。
It’s been well reported.
已经有很好的报道了。
This is probably why Joni Ernst voted for Pete Hegseth.
这可能就是乔尼·恩斯特投票给皮特·赫格斯的原因。
Well, what’s achieved by this?
那么,这样做达到了什么目的呢?
I think it’s an interesting question because Republicans in theory are allied to Donald Trump, right?
我认为这是一个有趣的问题,因为理论上共和党人与唐纳德·特朗普结盟,对吧?
He’s the nominee of their party and they don’t all have literally the same view of him.
他是他们政党的提名人,但他们对他的看法并不完全相同。
But I think you might say from one perspective there is a value in the system and there being checks and balances.
但我想你可能会说,从一个角度来看,这个系统是有价值的,并且存在制衡。
2:21:47 There’s a value in the system, in this system having to absorb other kinds of information.
这个系统是有价值的,这个系统必须吸收其他类型的信息。
Now, we already don’t know the checks and balances we once had or thought we would have in this country because we have nationalized political parties instead of branches of government that compete with ambition, checking ambition, and I’ve done whole shows on this and we can talk about that if we want.
现在,我们已经不知道我们曾经拥有或认为我们在这个国家会拥有的制衡,因为我们已经国有化了政党,而不是与野心竞争、制止野心的政府部门,我已经就此做了完整的表演,如果我们愿意,我们可以谈论这个。
But we do have political parties and political parties are themselves institutions that aggregate different kinds of information.
但我们确实有政党,而政党本身就是汇集不同类型信息的机构。
In order to try to come to some outcome that is a better outcome because more information is surfaced.
为了尝试得出更好的结果,因为更多的信息浮出水面。
2:22:19 I think Donald Trump would be in a stronger position for him if Senate Republicans could have done what they actually wanted to do and not confirm RFK Jr., not confirm Tulsi Gabbard, not confirm Pete Hegseth, not confirm Kash Patel and Dan Bongino, right?
我认为,如果参议院共和党人能够做他们真正想做的事情,不确认小罗伯特·肯尼迪、不确认图尔西·加巴德、不确认皮特·赫格斯、不确认卡什·帕特尔和丹·邦吉诺,那么唐纳德·特朗普对他来说会处于更有利的地位,对吗?
That’s actually a huge amount of risk the Trump administration has taken on.
这实际上是特朗普政府承担的巨大风险。
If they had named a sort of normal figure to HHS and then there’s a measles outbreak.
如果他们向卫生与公众服务部指定了一个正常数字,那么麻疹就会爆发。
Well, measles outbreaks are tough.
嗯,麻疹疫情很严重。
That’s a hard thing.
这是一件很难的事情。
If you name RFK Jr. And there’s a huge measles outbreak, you’re really going to get blamed for that because people are ready to blame you.
如果你提到小罗伯特·肯尼迪(RFK Jr.),并且麻疹爆发了,你真的会因此受到指责,因为人们已经准备好责怪你了。
2:22:52 If there is a domestic terror attack after you’ve put Kash Patel who’s quite unqualified in charge of the FBI and they’ve launched a war internally against the FBI which they see as a hotbed of anti-Trump sentiment and the FBI in the internal chaos misses some things and you have deaths on American soil, that’s a huge amount of risk you’ve taken on.
如果你让卡什·帕特尔(Kash Patel)负责联邦调查局(FBI),而卡什·帕特尔(Kash Patel)完全不合格,他们对联邦调查局(FBI)发起了一场内部战争,他们认为联邦调查局是反特朗普情绪的温床,而联邦调查局(FBI)在内部混乱中错过了一些事情,而美国领土上出现了人员死亡,那么如果发生国内恐怖袭击,那么你就承担了巨大的风险。
I mean, the guy they fired, Chris Wray, he was Trump’s appointee.
我的意思是,他们解雇的克里斯·雷是特朗普任命的人。
It wasn’t some Democrat.
这不是什么民主党人。
Trump named him in his first term.
特朗普在第一个任期内任命了他。
2:23:18 But Elon, what he did here was he created a death star of primary money, and he has said that, “If you cross Trump in Congress even as a Republican, you’re done.
但是埃隆,他在这里所做的是他创造了一个主要货币的死星,他说过,“如果你在国会里与特朗普作对,即使你是一名共和党人,你就完蛋了。
Between Trump’s control of attention and loyalty and my ability to outspend you, you’re toast.” I think what that reveals is that what he wants is for power to be centralized under Trump.
特朗普对注意力和忠诚度的控制,以及我比你花钱的能力,你完蛋了。”我认为这表明他想要的是权力集中在特朗普的领导下。
We’ve been talking about the bureaucracy, but he also wants it to be true in Congress.
我们一直在谈论官僚主义,但他也希望国会也能如此。
I’m not a Donald Trump fan, but obviously other people are Donald Trump fans.
我不是唐纳德·特朗普的粉丝,但显然其他人都是唐纳德·特朗普的粉丝。
Obviously, I think at this point Elon Musk is a Donald Trump fan, but much of the country thinks this guy is great and I think we should take what they’re doing at word and deed.
显然,我认为埃隆·马斯克在这一点上是唐纳德·特朗普的粉丝,但全国大部分人都认为这个人很棒,我认为我们应该接受他们所做的言行。
2:23:58 The point of Donald Trump is that Donald Trump is right about things.
唐纳德·特朗普的观点是,唐纳德·特朗普的观点是正确的。
We should give him power and he should use that power.
我们应该给他权力,他应该使用这种权力。
My sense is you have some mixed feelings about him, but not everybody does, and this very consistent application of authority across the people…
我的感觉是你对他有一些复杂的感觉,但不是每个人都这样,而且这种在人们之间非常一致地运用权威......
JD Vance.
JD万斯.
The difference between Mike Pence and JD Vance is JD Vance said explicitly in the whole run up to the vice presidential sweepstakes that his view of what went wrong in the first administration is between the bureaucracy and the staff.
迈克·彭斯和JD·万斯之间的区别在于,J·D·万斯在副总统抽奖的整个过程中明确表示,他对第一届政府的问题的看法是在官僚机构和工作人员之间。
2:24:25 Too many people are trying to inhibit Donald Trump and that what he would do is tell Trump that he’s got to get rid of these generals and he’s got to get people who will do what Trump actually said.
太多人试图阻止唐纳德·特朗普,而他要做的就是告诉特朗普,他必须摆脱这些将军,他必须找到那些会按照特朗普实际所说的去做的人。
The view of Trump’s fans, the view of his allies is that the first term didn’t go well enough because they had too much opposition from Republicans in Congress who talked Trump into things they shouldn’t have talked him into and too much opposition from the civil service and even from Trump’s own staff.
特朗普的粉丝和盟友认为,第一任期进展得不够顺利,因为他们遭到了国会共和党人的太多反对,他们说服特朗普做了他们不应该做的事情,也遭到了公务员部门甚至特朗普自己的工作人员的太多反对。
2:24:51 I think a very simple heuristic of why these terms are so different is that the most important member of the Trump family, Trump aside in the first term was Jared Kushner and maybe Ivanka, and the most important member of the family in the second is Donald Trump Jr. right?
我认为,为什么这些术语如此不同,一个非常简单的启发是,特朗普家族中最重要的成员(第一任期的特朗普除外)是贾里德·库什纳(Jared Kushner),也许还有伊万卡(Ivanka),第二个任期中最重要的家族成员是小唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump Jr.),对吗?
Kushner brought in a bunch of inhibitors.
库什纳带来了一堆抑制剂。
He brought in mainstream figures like Gary Cohn and Kushner represented other parts of society that were mixed on Trump and they wanted him to do certain things and not others, and there was maybe a productive tension.
他引进了像加里·科恩和库什纳这样的主流人物,他们代表了社会上对特朗普意见不一的其他部分,他们希望他做某些事情而不是其他事情,这可能会产生一种富有成效的紧张关系。
2:25:19 McConnell was majority leader.
麦康奈尔是多数党领袖。
He was more powerful than Thune is.
他比图恩还要强大。
Paul Ryan was speaker.
保罗·瑞安(Paul Ryan)是演讲者。
He’s more powerful than Mike Johnson is.
他比迈克·约翰逊更强大。
In the second term, you have Donald Trump Jr. who brings in much more right-wing figures.
在第二个任期中,小唐纳德·特朗普带来了更多的右翼人物。
They’re accelerators, not inhibitors.
它们是加速器,而不是抑制剂。
Accelerationists in many cases explicitly.
在许多情况下,加速主义者都是明确的。
You have Elon Musk who believes the likeliest problem is Trump doesn’t go far enough, fast enough.
埃隆·马斯克认为最有可能的问题是特朗普走得不够远、不够快。
And you have a weak Republican Congress that is further cowed by Musk’s money.
而且共和党国会实力薄弱,马斯克的金钱进一步吓倒了它。
2:25:45 It could be good or it could be bad, but the Curtis Yarvin take that we need a more monarch-like figure is clearly being tested out.
这可能是好事,也可能是坏事,但柯蒂斯·雅文认为我们需要一个更像君主的人物的观点显然正在接受检验。
The view, just as you said about software engineering things is that you often need a benevolent dictator.
正如您所说的关于软件工程的观点一样,您通常需要一个仁慈的独裁者。
Now, I don’t think Trump is benevolent, other people do, but the view that what is being attempted here is something much more centralized in its power, I think is actually a shared view of what’s going on.
现在,我不认为特朗普是仁慈的,其他人是仁慈的,但认为这里正在尝试的事情是其权力更加集中的观点,我认为实际上是对正在发生的事情的共同看法。
It’s like a consensus reality we have, not like an argument over reality we’re having.
这就像我们所拥有的共识现实,而不是我们对现实的争论。
Do you think there’s some degree to where if you trust in the system of democracy, which I do, and there’s some people, and we’ll talk about that.
你认为如果你相信民主制度的话,在某种程度上,我相信,而且有一些人,我们会讨论这个问题。
2:26:12 One of the main criticisms or concerns of Donald Trump is he’s going to break democracy.
唐纳德·特朗普的主要批评或担忧之一是他将破坏民主。
But if you trust that democracy holds, isn’t this an interesting experiment of how when everybody’s aligned, aggressive cutting of regulation and the number of people is an experiment of like, “Okay, let’s see what this does to a really over bloated bureaucracy that’s become extremely inefficient.”
但如果你相信民主是成立的,这难道不是一个有趣的实验吗?当每个人都一致时,积极削减监管和人数是一个类似的实验,“好吧,让我们看看这对一个非常臃肿、效率极低的官僚机构会产生什么影响。”
2:26:48 And by the way, so I have an optimism about it that matches the division of abundance in the book, that once you do the creative destruction, then you start to really be able to step in and have a clear vision of like, “Okay, housing.
顺便说一句,我对此持乐观态度,这与书中对丰富性的划分相匹配,一旦你进行了创造性破坏,你就开始真正能够介入并有一个清晰的愿景,比如“好吧,住房。
What are the policies to solve housing?” But I do think the first step that’s needed is the destruction.
有哪些政策解决住房问题?但我确实认为需要采取的第一步是破坏。
As Ezra said, we’re sort of speed running a particular experiment here of what does executive power look like if we do away as much as possible with checks and balances.
正如以斯拉所说,我们正在快速进行一项特定的实验,看看如果我们尽可能取消制衡,行政权力会是什么样子。
2:27:15 And I would submit that we’re already starting to get some feedback loops from the market.
我想说的是,我们已经开始从市场获得一些反馈循环。
The stock market is not the economy, but it is a very clear voting mechanism.
股市不是经济,但它是一个非常明确的投票机制。
And what’s clear is that many institutional and retail investors think that the current economic regime is pushing us toward a recession that we don’t have to have, right?
显而易见的是,许多机构和散户投资者认为当前的经济体制正在将我们推向一场我们不必经历的衰退,对吗?
2:27:49 Donald Trump has insulated himself from any feedback loop or any sense of criticism that his tariff policy might not be the best course of strategy for American industry or global relations.
唐纳德·特朗普使自己免受任何反馈循环或任何批评的影响,认为他的关税政策可能不是美国工业或全球关系的最佳战略方针。
And as a result, what we have is I think fairly described as a purposeful chaos.
结果,我认为我们所面临的情况被描述为一种有目的的混乱。
I mean, what other term can you use if a tariff is being announced at 9:00 AM and then taken away at 3:30 PM, and then 10 days later announced at 9:37 and then renegotiated at 2:45?
我的意思是,如果关税在上午 9:00 宣布,然后在下午 3:30 取消,然后 10 天后在 9:37 宣布,然后在 2:45 重新谈判,您还可以使用什么其他术语?
This is not a principled theory of the perfect tariff level on international trade.
这不是国际贸易完美关税水平的原则理论。
2:28:27 This is, I think, much more parsimoniously explained by just an expression of Donald Trump’s personality.
我认为,这可以通过唐纳德·特朗普的个性表达来简单地解释。
This is a New York real estate guy.
这是一位纽约房地产人士。
He loves making big awesome pronouncements and then using those big awesome pronouncements in order to negotiate little one-on-one dealings where he can rest for himself a personal sense of power or money, or pride, right?
他喜欢发表令人敬畏的重大声明,然后使用这些令人敬畏的重大声明来谈判一对一的小交易,这样他就可以为自己带来个人的权力感、金钱感或自豪感,对吗?
Announcing these tariffs in a chaotic way, forces world leaders to get on the phone with him and say, “Donald, what can I give you to bring down the tariff?”
以混乱的方式宣布这些关税,迫使世界领导人打电话给他说:“唐纳德,我能给你什么来降低关税?”
2:28:59 This is personality standing in for politics in a way that’s totally unmolested by anybody else’s sense of, “Hey, that’ll maybe chill it on the tariff policy.
这是代表政治的个性,完全不受其他任何人的感觉的干扰,“嘿,这可能会让关税政策冷静下来。
Hey, let’s maybe slow down on the deportations.
嘿,让我们放慢驱逐速度吧。
I’m not so sure about this particular move over here.” Instead, you have an executive branch that’s just a full manifestation of Donald Trump’s mind.
我对这里的这个特殊举动不太确定。”相反,你拥有的行政部门完全体现了唐纳德·特朗普的思想。
And I do think at the early returns, if you look at consumer sentiment, if you look at the stock market, if you look at the 10-year yield, you have a range of let’s called them aggregated economic information telling us that the economy, consumers, employers, investors, do not like what’s happening now, which is going to be a really interesting test case.
我确实认为,在早期回报方面,如果你看看消费者情绪,如果你看看股市,如果你看看10年期收益率,你会得到一系列我们称之为汇总经济信息的信息,告诉我们经济、消费者、雇主、投资者不喜欢现在发生的事情,这将是一个非常有趣的测试案例。
2:29:40 Donald Trump’s first four years in office, love him or hate him, were four rather successful years of economic growth.
唐纳德·特朗普上任的头四年,无论爱他还是恨他,都是经济增长相当成功的四年。
Low unemployment, steady growth, low inflation, pretty much every economic indicator in the green.
低失业率、稳定增长、低通胀,几乎所有经济指标都是绿色的。
We’re already in the red in many of the economic indicators that never even blinked yellow under his first administration.
我们的许多经济指标已经处于亏损状态,而在他的第一届政府执政期间,这些指标甚至从未出现过黄色闪烁。
And I personally don’t think it’s a coincidence that you’re getting these red indicators at a time when Donald Trump is having an entirely different experience of being president where there is no Mnuchin to tell him, “Hey, maybe let’s cool it off in the tariffs.”
我个人认为,当唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump)担任总统的经历完全不同时,你得到这些红色指标并不是巧合,因为没有姆努钦告诉他,“嘿,也许让我们在关税中冷静下来。”
2:30:13 The one more thing I would add here is you said maybe Trump’s presidency is a kind of right-wing abundance, right?
我在这里还要补充的一件事是,你说也许特朗普的总统任期是一种右翼的丰富,对吗?
And I think that it’s a worthy question, right?
我认为这是一个值得提出的问题,对吧?
Is Donald Trump just doing his own version of abundance and we should…
唐纳德·特朗普只是在做他自己版本的丰富吗,我们应该……
even if we disagree with his process, ideologically root for the outcomes that are likely under it?
即使我们不同意他的过程,从意识形态上支持它可能产生的结果?
Here’s why I don’t think so.
这就是为什么我不这么认为。
Let’s say that you or just someone as a conservative shares our view that they want housing to be abundant.
假设您或某个保守派人士同意我们的观点,即他们希望住房充足。
2:30:45 I think what they should really root for is to reduce the tax for building and make it easier to add housing units cheaply.
我认为他们真正应该支持的是减少建筑税,并使廉价增加住房单元变得更容易。
Well, houses are made out of materials.
嗯,房子是用材料建造的。
Two of the most important materials in home building are soft lumber and drywall.
住宅建筑中最重要的两种材料是软木材和干墙。
Soft lumber, we import from Canada.
软木材,我们从加拿大进口。
Drywall, one of the key ingredients we import from Mexico.
干墙,我们从墨西哥进口的关键成分之一。
One of the first things that’s going to happen if you raise 25% tariff on lumber from Canada and drywall from Mexico is that the cost of housing is going to go straight up.
如果对加拿大木材和墨西哥干墙提高 25% 的关税,首先发生的事情之一就是住房成本将直线上升。
2:31:15 And this isn’t my personal opinion, this was a March 7th memo sent by the National Association of Home Builders essentially in a controlled panic saying, “Please don’t do a tariff policy like this.
这不是我个人的观点,这是美国房屋建筑商协会 3 月 7 日发出的一份备忘录,本质上是在一种受控的恐慌中,“请不要采取这样的关税政策。
You’re going to screw over home builders even though ironically, you Donald Trump were elected by Biden to Trump voters who were mad about the price of housing.” So I am not in the moment optimistic that his centralizing style is going to be economically useful for Americans, whatever their interests.
你会搞砸房屋建筑商,尽管讽刺的是,你唐纳德·特朗普是被拜登选给那些对房价感到愤怒的特朗普选民的。”因此,我目前并不乐观地认为,无论美国人的利益如何,他的集权风格将在经济上对美国人有利。
2:31:45 My sense of the early feedback and of the early returns is that he in fact does not have a very clear and beneficial economic agenda.
我对早期反馈和早期回报的感觉是,他实际上没有一个非常明确和有益的经济议程。
He has a personal agenda.
他有个人议程。
He likes taking phone calls from international leaders and working out little deals with them.
他喜欢接国际领导人的电话并与他们达成小交易。
I don’t think that’s in the larger interest of economic growth, and certainly I don’t think it’s in the specific interest of reducing housing prices.
我不认为这符合经济增长的更大利益,当然我也不认为这符合降低房价的具体利益。
Okay.
好的。
2:32:09 There’s a lot to say there.
有很多话要说。
So first of all, can we separate the abundance and those efforts from tariffs?
首先,我们能否将丰富性和这些努力与关税分开?
Because I don’t know who agrees with the tariffs.
因为我不知道谁同意关税。
Tariffs don’t make sense to me economically.
关税对我来说在经济上没有意义。
Maybe you can explain who agrees or likes the tariffs on the right or the left or anybody.
也许你可以解释谁同意或喜欢右翼、左翼或任何人的关税。
But do you see my point that-
但你明白我的观点吗——
Well, that point also to comment on it, I mean, one of the mechanisms by which bureaucracy forms is a kind of polite civility and a structure and a process.
嗯,这一点也评论一下吧,我的意思是,官僚主义形成的机制之一是一种礼貌的文明,一种结构和一个过程。
2:32:31 There is a argument to be made, and I’m not saying Donald Trump is that person, but there’s some qualities there of picking up the phone and calling Putin.
这是有争议的,我并不是说唐纳德·特朗普就是那个人,但拿起电话给普京打电话有一些品质。
That goes against all the process.
这违背了所有的过程。
Some of the most successful peace negotiations throughout history broke process.
历史上一些最成功的和平谈判打破了进程。
I just spoke with Narendra Modi.
我刚刚与纳伦德拉·莫迪交谈过。
There’s a process you’re not supposed to meet with Pakistan or whatever for India.
有一个过程你不应该与巴基斯坦或印度的任何人会面。
You just screw it.
你就搞砸吧。
“I’m going to go to a wedding, a Pakistan wedding of a high up official.
“我要去参加一场婚礼,一场巴基斯坦高级官员的婚礼。
I’m going to do these things that are very Trumpian, break the rules.”
我要做这些非常特朗普式的事情,违反规则。”
2:33:17 Now, in a perfect world, some of that is good matched with principled policy that’s surrounded by a large number of experts that actually understand that policy.
现在,在一个完美的世界中,其中一些与原则性政策很好地匹配,周围有大量真正理解该政策的专家。
I can criticize Trump all day, but I’m just saying that there is some degree to the picking up the phone and talking to leaders and playing in the morning, say one thing in the evening another and that could be part of a principled chaos.
我可以整天批评特朗普,但我只是说,在某种程度上,早上拿起电话与领导人交谈、玩游戏,晚上说一套,这可能是原则性混乱的一部分。
I think the important part of madman theory is that you’re not actually a madman.
我认为疯子理论的重要部分是你实际上并不是一个疯子。
2:33:43 You just got to convince people you are.
你只需要让人们相信你就是这样的人。
Yes, yes.
是的,是的。
Look, I don’t think…
你看,我不认为……
2:33:49 I’m in agreement that we should talk to everybody.
我同意我们应该与每个人交谈。
I don’t know how many people followed the 2008 election closely who are watching this.
我不知道有多少关注2008年大选的人在关注这一点。
There’s a big fight in that election between Clinton and Obama about should you negotiate with your enemies?
在那次选举中,克林顿和奥巴马就是否应该与敌人进行谈判展开了一场激烈的争论。
And Obama’s view is, “We should.
奥巴马的观点是:“我们应该这样做。
We should talk to anybody.” And Clinton’s view was more nuanced than that, right?
我们应该和任何人谈谈。”克林顿的观点比这更微妙,对吗?
Certainly, we shouldn’t at this juncture.
当然,我们不应该在这个时候这样做。
And during his presidency, Obama did a deal with Iran on the nuclear question.
奥巴马在担任总统期间与伊朗就核问题达成协议。
He negotiated with Cuba.
他与古巴进行谈判。
He had very direct negotiations with Russia.
他与俄罗斯进行了非常直接的谈判。
2:34:23 He did it importantly unlike Donald Trump without alienating all of our traditional allies.
与唐纳德·特朗普不同的是,他的做法很重要,但没有疏远我们所有的传统盟友。
One of the things that I think is important to say about Trump is that the difference between Trump and, say, Biden or Trump and Obama is not that Trump will negotiate with Putin and Obama wouldn’t.
我认为关于特朗普重要的一件事是,特朗普与拜登或特朗普与奥巴马之间的区别并不在于特朗普会与普京谈判而奥巴马不会。
It’s that Trump is realigning our alliances.
特朗普正在重新调整我们的联盟。
2:34:45 He doesn’t really seem to want to negotiate with the Europeans, or at least he wants to do it from a more hostile position.
他似乎并不想与欧洲人谈判,或者至少他想以更加敌对的立场进行谈判。
He wants to make Canada the 51st state, not treated as a longtime ally.
他想让加拿大成为第 51 个国家,而不是被视为长期盟友。
The thing here is not that Trump is negotiating with our perceived enemies.
这里的问题并不是特朗普正在与我们认为的敌人进行谈判。
These are his perceived allies and he’s turning our traditional allies into perceived enemies.
这些是他所认为的盟友,而他正在将我们的传统盟友变成他所认为的敌人。
So with him, I think it’s important.
所以对于他来说,我认为这很重要。
I am very much on the view of you talk to everybody.
我非常同意你与每个人交谈的观点。
And it was my view going back for some years that it was clear that the Biden administration needed to be pushing for negotiations over Ukraine.
几年前我的观点是,拜登政府显然需要推动乌克兰问题的谈判。
2:35:18 There was not going to be some end game here where Ukraine got all of its territory back.
这里不会出现乌克兰收回全部领土的结局。
But, but, but, but I don’t think it is reasonable to look at what he is doing and say that is the norm that he has broken.
但是,但是,但是,但是我认为看看他所做的事情并说这是他打破的规范是不合理的。
The idea that we should have negotiations.
我们应该进行谈判的想法。
I mean, many different presidents have done many surprising things and he’s rolled back a bunch of those things.
我的意思是,许多不同的总统做了许多令人惊讶的事情,而他推翻了其中的一些事情。
Republicans have been very unfriendly to the opening that began with Cuba, right?
共和党人对从古巴开始的开放非常不友好,对吗?
And that was a big deal in American foreign policy.
这对美国外交政策来说是一件大事。
Something Obama did against very heavy criticism, something that cost him and cost Democrats in Florida and among Cuban voters in the following election.
奥巴马在面对严厉批评时所做的事情,让他以及佛罗里达州的民主党人和随后的选举中的古巴选民都付出了代价。
2:35:56 So I just don’t think that that’s that an unusual thing with Trump.
所以我认为这对特朗普来说并不是什么不寻常的事情。
I also just want to say with the tariffs, he wanted to cut the tariffs off from DOGE and cut the tariffs off from this broader agenda.
我还想说,在关税方面,他希望取消对 DOGE 的关税,并从更广泛的议程中取消关税。
And one reason I don’t is that I think the way to understand tariffs…
我不这样做的原因之一是我认为理解关税的方式......
Look, you can be accomplishing many different things with tariffs.
看,你可以通过关税完成许多不同的事情。
One thing, which was a theory that you heard from some people around Trump and fit what he said on the campaign trail, which was Trump’s position on the campaign trail, was that he was going to lay down 10 to 20% tariffs on all imported goods and 65% tariffs on imported goods from China.
有一点是你从特朗普周围的一些人那里听到的一个理论,符合他在竞选过程中所说的话,也就是特朗普在竞选过程中的立场,那就是他将对所有进口商品征收 10% 至 20% 的关税,并对来自中国的进口商品征收 65% 的关税。
So I think that’s a bad idea for a bunch of different reasons, but what that is, is a stable change in the cost structure for all corporations and all trade.
因此,出于多种不同的原因,我认为这是一个坏主意,但那是所有公司和所有贸易的成本结构的稳定变化。
And then different players can make different investment decisions in the long term based on this new cost structure.
然后不同的参与者可以根据这种新的成本结构做出不同的长期投资决策。
What he’s doing, as Derek said, and I’ve had these funny experiences where I’m literally doing a podcast with a tariffs expert and I’ll be talking about the auto parts problem, and then my producer will be like, “He just delayed the tariff on the auto parts.” What he’s doing with these tariffs that you move on and you move off and you negotiate over endlessly, and I’ve been told this again by people around him is their view is that America had leverage it wasn’t using.
正如德里克所说,他在做什么,我有过这些有趣的经历,我实际上是在与关税专家一起做播客,我将讨论汽车零部件问题,然后我的制片人会说,“他只是推迟了汽车零部件的关税。”他对这些关税的做法是,你继续前进,你继续前进,你无休止地谈判,他周围的人再次告诉我,他们的观点是,美国拥有它没有使用的杠杆。
And tariffs in particular are a form of executive control.
关税尤其是行政控制的一种形式。
Trade deals need to be negotiated and ratified with Congress.
贸易协议需要与国会谈判并获得批准。
Trade deals are something you have to do with the rest of the system, but tariffs are something Trump can do unilaterally.
贸易协议是你必须与体系其他部分达成的事情,但关税是特朗普可以单方面做的事情。
And one thing Trump wants is control.
特朗普想要的一件事就是控制。
That is the through line of virtually everything in his politics.
这几乎是他政治中所有事情的主线。
Tariffs are a leverage based form of foreign policy.
关税是一种基于杠杆的外交政策形式。
They are America has the biggest economy in the world that anybody who’s going to get into a trade war with us is going to suffer worse than we will.
美国拥有世界上最大的经济体,任何与我们发生贸易战的人都会遭受比我们更严重的损失。
And there’s something where the president can use the tariffs because of authority granted by Congress some time ago for other purposes.
由于国会不久前授予的权力,总统可以将关税用于其他目的。
He can use them with a huge amount of discretion.
他可以非常谨慎地使用它们。
So you can use them on the one hand to say, “Well, I think that we’ve lost too much manufacturing and the dollar is undervalued in other places, or overvalued rather.
因此,你一方面可以用它们说:“嗯,我认为我们失去了太多的制造业,而美元在其他地方被低估,或者说被高估了。
And so we want to use tariffs to make the cost structure differently so that people have to locate more of the supply chains and the intermediate manufacturing in the United States.”
因此,我们希望利用关税来改变成本结构,以便人们必须将更多的供应链和中间制造放在美国。”
2:38:06 But you can also use a tariff to say, Columbia has to take the people we’re deporting and they have to take them in chains.
但你也可以用关税说,哥伦比亚必须带走我们要驱逐的人,他们必须用锁链锁住他们。
And Donald Trump is doing both things.
唐纳德·特朗普正在做这两件事。
And the reason I think it’s important to keep those in mind is that what Donald Trump wants, what connects a lot of different things is that he wants leverage over things.
我认为记住这些很重要的原因是,唐纳德·特朗普想要的,将许多不同事物联系起来的,是他想要对事物施加影响力。
I think it connects to Eric Adams and you were sitting here talking to New York City.
我认为这与埃里克·亚当斯有关,而你坐在这里与纽约市交谈。
Eric Adams is a Democratic mayor.
埃里克·亚当斯是民主党市长。
Donald Trump has no truck with Eric Adams, right?
唐纳德·特朗普和埃里克·亚当斯没有关系,对吧?
He did not support Eric Adams.
他不支持埃里克·亚当斯。
Eric Adams is not his natural ally, but what he had over Eric Adams, he realized was a leverage that he could get the cases off of Eric Adams and then get Eric Adams in his pocket.
埃里克·亚当斯并不是他天然的盟友,但他意识到,他对埃里克·亚当斯的优势在于,他可以从埃里克·亚当斯手中夺走案件,然后将埃里克·亚当斯收入囊中。
2:38:43 So Donald Trump stepped in to save like the corrupt Democratic mayor of New York City.
因此,唐纳德·特朗普像纽约市腐败的民主党市长一样介入拯救。
Not because they have a deep ideological alliance, but because then Donald Trump would’ve power over New York City and its policy that he wouldn’t otherwise have.
不是因为他们有深厚的意识形态联盟,而是因为唐纳德·特朗普届时将拥有控制纽约市及其政策的权力,而这是他原本不会拥有的。
The thing that connects Trump, Trump is a very old school politician.
与特朗普联系在一起的是,特朗普是一位非常老派的政客。
He’s very relational.
他很有关系。
He’s very 19th century.
他很有19世纪的风格。
He’s looking for the angle.
他正在寻找角度。
He’s very zero sum.
他是一个非常零和的人。
He’s looking for things to empower.
他正在寻找能够赋予力量的东西。
2:39:08 DOGE is a way of getting power over the bureaucracy.
DOGE 是获得凌驾官僚机构权力的一种方式。
Tariffs are a way of getting power over the international financial system and foreign policy and breaking traditional alliances.
关税是获得国际金融体系和外交政策权力以及打破传统联盟的一种方式。
Maybe in his mind, even getting Canada to become the 51st state, maybe getting Mexico to change its immigration policy, trying to weaponize the Justice Department against Eric Adams as a way of getting power over Democratic mayor.
也许在他看来,甚至可以让加拿大成为第 51 个州,也许可以让墨西哥改变其移民政策,试图用司法部武器来对抗埃里克·亚当斯,以此作为获得对民主党市长权力的一种方式。
Some of what they’re doing with grants and money is a way of getting power over other institutions in American life.
他们利用赠款和资金所做的一些事情是获得对美国生活中其他机构的权力的一种方式。
2:39:34 Again, you could think it’s bad or you could think it’s good, but it is coherent.
同样,你可以认为它是坏的,也可以认为它是好的,但它是连贯的。
I think it’s bad, but it is coherent, and the people who think it’s good think it’s good for Trump to have power.
我认为这很糟糕,但它是连贯的,认为这是好的人认为特朗普掌权是件好事。
Again, with the Eric Adams thing, they were very explicit about this, right?
再说一次,对于埃里克·亚当斯的事情,他们对此非常明确,对吗?
They said that it is worthwhile for the president to negotiate over his policy objectives and to trade things to get his policy objectives more fully carried out.
他们表示,总统值得就他的政策目标进行谈判,并通过一些东西让他的政策目标得到更充分的实现。
And so Eric Adams went from saying New York City would be a sanctuary city.
因此,埃里克·亚当斯不再说纽约市将成为一座庇护城市。
They’d aggressively carry out deportations.
他们会积极进行驱逐。
2:40:02 You can think that kind of transactionalism is fine.
你可以认为这种交易主义很好。
I think in this case, given that it’s about corruption, it wasn’t.
我认为在这个案例中,考虑到它与腐败有关,事实并非如此。
But the idea, Trump’s idea that the problem is that the president doesn’t wield enough power here the way he does in Russia, the way he might in India, the way he might in China.
但特朗普的想法是,问题在于总统在这里没有像在俄罗斯、印度和中国那样行使足够的权力。
Trump has spoken very openly of envying some of the powers these other people have.
特朗普非常公开地表示羡慕这些其他人拥有的一些权力。
I think it’s a consistent governing philosophy that needs to be taken as that.
我认为这是一个需要被视为一贯的治理理念。
Right?
正确的?
2:40:28 I think sometimes you describe…
我想有时你会描述……
One of the difficulties Trump poses is sometimes if you just describe what he’s doing, I think quite neutrally, people say, “Oh, you’re criticizing him, you’re anti-Trump.” But I’m just describing what he’s doing.
特朗普提出的困难之一是,有时如果你只是描述他在做什么,我认为相当中立,人们会说,“哦,你在批评他,你是反特朗普的。”但我只是描述他在做什么。
You can think it’s good or it’s bad, but the fact that he wants to arrogate power and find points of leverage and tariffs are one.
你可以认为这是好事,也可以认为是坏事,但他想要攫取权力、寻找杠杆点和关税的事实就是其中之一。
What he’s doing through DOGE is another.
他通过 DOGE 所做的事情是另一回事。
What he did with the DOJ is another.
他对司法部所做的事情是另一回事。
It’s all very consistent.
一切都非常一致。
The question is really then just what your normative view is on Trump having that much power.
问题实际上在于,你对特朗普拥有如此大权力的规范看法是什么。
Yeah.
是的。
2:41:01 I have a question about DOGE, but before that, I’ll just say that I don’t think Donald Trump should have that much power because I think to this day, my biggest criticism and concern is that he is a person that denied the results of the election.
我有一个关于DOGE的问题,但在此之前,我只想说,我认为唐纳德·特朗普不应该拥有那么大的权力,因为我认为直到今天,我最大的批评和担忧是他是一个否认选举结果的人。
And so I’m unwilling.
所以我不愿意。
I like George Washington.
我喜欢乔治·华盛顿。
I like people that have the skill, the ability, the track record to walk away from power.
我喜欢那些有技巧、有能力、有摆脱权力的记录的人。
And a person who’s unwilling to accept reality and is willing to bend reality to maintain a grip on power, even if what they’re trying to do is really good, maybe making a government more efficient makes me very concerned.
而一个不愿意接受现实并愿意扭曲现实以维持对权力的控制的人,即使他们试图做的事情确实很好,也许让政府变得更有效率让我非常担心。
2:41:49 But on the topic of DOGE is more on the Elon side.
但关于 DOGE 的话题更多是埃隆这边的。
If we can combine DOGE and abundance as a topic, if DOGE succeeds the effort, let’s just forget DOGE, but the effort of making government more efficient, what does that look like before the next election and after the next election?
如果我们可以将DOGE和富足结合起来作为一个主题,如果DOGE成功了,我们就忘记DOGE吧,但是让政府更有效率的努力,在下一次选举之前和下一次选举之后会是什么样子?
If we can just look at success.
如果我们能只看成功的话。
I know I’m jumping again, but I’ll do something quick and then pass to you.
我知道我又要跳了,但我会快速做一些事情,然后传给你。
2:42:12 I’m not a huge fan of the experiment framing because amidst this experiment, people are…
我不太喜欢这个实验框架,因为在这个实验中,人们……
Through USAID, as my colleague Nick Kristof has documented and potentially further and otherwise will die, lose homes, be scammed by things.
正如我的同事尼克·克里斯托夫(Nick Kristof)所记录的那样,通过美国国际开发署,可能会进一步死亡,失去家园,被事物欺骗。
So I feel like experimenting with the government at that level is very dangerous, but if assuming democracy survives, Democrats, they’re going to make the government work again, are going to have to become less rule-bound than they were.
因此,我觉得在这个级别上对政府进行试验是非常危险的,但如果假设民主得以幸存,民主党人将不得不让政府再次运转起来,他们将不得不变得比以前更少受规则约束。
2:42:47 I have outlined that the problem with a personality type of the right is it’s autocratic now, and the problem with a personality type of the left is it’s bureaucratic.
我已经概述过,右翼人格类型的问题是现在的独裁,而左翼人格类型的问题是官僚主义。
And I don’t want to see things going either to where DOGE is in terms of, I think, there’s a fundamental lawlessness to it, but I also don’t like the aims of it.
我也不希望事情发展到 DOGE 那样的地步,因为我认为它存在根本性的违法行为,但我也不喜欢它的目标。
But I don’t want to see things where Democrats were, which is such respect for process, that they will put the process ahead of getting their own things done.
但我不想看到民主党所做的事情,这是对流程的尊重,他们会把流程放在完成自己的事情之前。
2:43:14 They will listen to any lawyer with any super intense interpretation of any law, and that’ll turn them all the way back.
他们会听取任何对任何法律有超强解释的律师的意见,这会让他们完全回头。
What DOGE has demonstrated is that the room for movement inside the American government, inside the state, as much wider than anybody gave it credit for both Republican and Democratic administrations.
DOGE 所证明的是,美国政府内部、州内的活动空间比共和党和民主党政府所认为的要广泛得多。
It may not be as wide, it probably isn’t legally as wide as what DOGE is trying to do, and that’s why they’re losing all these court cases.
它可能没有那么广泛,在法律上可能没有 DOGE 试图做的那么广泛,这就是他们输掉所有这些法庭案件的原因。
But it is wide.
但它很宽。
And you could also use Congress.
你也可以利用国会。
You could pass statute to make it wider, and you should.
你可以通过法规来扩大范围,你也应该这样做。
2:43:45 There is no abundance agenda that works if the Democratic Party is as rule-bound and as process obsessed as it was in the last 10 years.
如果民主党像过去十年那样受规则束缚、痴迷于程序,那么再多的议程也行不通。
It doesn’t work flatly.
它的工作并不顺利。
That is why so many of the stories we tell in the book are about process gone.
这就是为什么我们在书中讲述的许多故事都是关于流程消失的。
It’s not process gone wrong because it’s doing exactly what it was intended to do, but it is process that has become antagonistic to the promised outcomes.
这并不是流程出了问题,因为它完全按照预期做的事情,而是流程与承诺的结果背道而驰。
2:44:10 And so I do hope there’s a kind of thesis, right?
所以我确实希望有一篇论文,对吗?
All the institutions are great.
所有机构都很棒。
Democrats are the defenders of government.
民主党人是政府的捍卫者。
Antithesis, the government is a corrupt cesspool.
相反,政府是一个腐败的污水坑。
It’s a ball of worms, and it has to be destroyed and taken over by a benevolent or non-benevolent dictator.
它是一个蠕虫球,必须被仁慈或非仁慈的独裁者摧毁和接管。
And synthesis, which is that the government’s process has made it not a functional state.
综合而言,政府的程序使其不再是一个功能性国家。
It’s non-responsive in many important ways, and it needs to be reformed at a quite fundamental level, but in a way that is lawful, in a way that is thoughtful, in a way that is running experiments that gathers information, and then can make adjustments, in a way that is respectful of the human lives, that it touches and affects, in a way that is not hostile to the goals of good government, but is more committed to them than it is committed to the process…
它在许多重要方面都没有反应,需要从根本上进行改革,但要以一种合法的方式,以一种深思熟虑的方式,以一种进行收集信息的实验的方式,然后可以进行调整,以一种尊重人类生命的方式,它触及和影响,以一种不敌视好政府的目标,但更致力于这些目标而不是致力于这个过程的方式......
2:45:00 …but is more committed to them than it is committed to the process the government has erected and evolved over time.
......但更致力于它们,而不是致力于政府随着时间的推移建立和发展的流程。
As you articulated the principle beautifully, and just to put some meat on the bones, abundance is about being incredibly concrete about what you want to accomplish in the world.
当你完美地阐述了这个原则,并且只是在骨头上添加一些肉时,丰富就是对你想要在世界上实现的目标非常具体。
2:45:07 Then it’s about understanding how to accomplish that.
然后就是了解如何实现这一目标。
A stage of the process that I think Doge has entirely skipped.
我认为 Doge 完全跳过了这个过程的一个阶段。
I don’t think we’ve reached the stage of understanding.
我认为我们还没有达到理解的阶段。
We’ve destroyed and then maybe it’s sometimes promised to understand the thing that we’ve destroyed after the fact.
我们已经摧毁了,然后也许有时会承诺在事后了解我们所摧毁的东西。
You want to set goals, you want to understand how to meet those goals and then you want to meet them.
你想要设定目标,你想要了解如何实现这些目标,然后你想要实现它们。
And the problem with liberalism over the last few years, in the last few decades is that we’ve become disconnected from outcomes.
过去几年、过去几十年自由主义的问题是我们已经与结果脱节了。
Really, really crystal clear example.
真的,非常清晰的例子。
So Joe Biden in 2021 signs the bipartisan infrastructure law.
因此,乔·拜登将在 2021 年签署两党基础设施法。
And he and Pete Buttigieg call it truthfully, one of the most important infrastructure bills passed in the last few decades.
他和皮特·布蒂吉格如实称其为过去几十年来通过的最重要的基础设施法案之一。
$1.2 trillion to do exactly what Ezra and I want to do, to build in the world.
1.2 万亿美元用于做以斯拉和我想做的事情,建设世界。
2:46:04 There’s a piece of that law that’s a $42 billion program called BEAD stands for broadband, equity, access and deployment, I think.
我认为,该法律中有一项是价值 420 亿美元的 BEAD 计划,代表宽带、公平、接入和部署。
$42 billion to build rural broadband.
420亿美元用于建设农村宽带。
Fast-forward to 2024, practically none of it is built.
快进到 2024 年,几乎没有一个项目建成。
We’re now four calendar years after it was passed and the program is at this point, it seems like it’s going to die and they’re just going to transfer the whole thing to Starlink.
现在已经是该计划通过四年后的事了,而该计划此时似乎即将消亡,而他们只是打算将整个计划转移到星链上。
So why?
那么为什么呢?
We want to understand why does government fail to achieve its outcomes?
我们想了解为什么政府未能实现其成果?
And how can we learn from those failures to allow government to succeed at its outcomes?
我们如何从这些失败中吸取教训,让政府取得成功?
Well, you look into it and it turns out that in order to take these $42 billion and send it to the states, the states had to go through a 14 stage process in order to get the money.
好吧,你调查一下就会发现,为了把这 420 亿美元送到各州,各州必须经过 14 个阶段才能拿到钱。
2:46:47 First, the FCC had to draw a map of the places where America needed more rural broadband.
首先,联邦通信委员会必须绘制一张美国需要更多农村宽带的地方的地图。
And then there was a challenge period where people could question the map, and the FCC would remake the map and then the challengers would sue them to change the map again.
然后有一个挑战期,人们可以质疑地图,FCC 会重新制作地图,然后挑战者会起诉他们再次更改地图。
Then the states had to file a letter of intent and a five-year action plan and a funding program, all of which could be subject to their own challenge periods.
然后,各州必须提交一份意向书、一份五年行动计划和一项资助计划,所有这些都可能受到各自挑战期的影响。
And in each of these challenge periods, the commerce department is going back to the states and saying, “We really like your five-year plan, but your workforce development program didn’t pass this matrix of equity.
在每一个挑战时期,商务部都会回到各州并说:“我们真的很喜欢你们的五年计划,但你们的劳动力发展计划没有通过这个公平矩阵。
And you didn’t reach out to the right bidders over here.
而且您没有联系到这里合适的投标人。
And if you try harder to reach out to more people who just aren’t white men to be your employees, that would be fantastic if you could put that into the new edit that you submit to us.”
如果你更加努力地接触更多非白人的人来成为你的员工,如果你能将其纳入你提交给我们的新编辑中,那就太棒了。”
2:47:29 And of course there are delays because every state has to do its own programs.
当然,也会有一些延迟,因为每个州都必须执行自己的计划。
The commerce department is backed up, yada, yada, yada.
商务部有后援,呀呀呀呀呀。
You get to a point where out of 56 states and jurisdictions that have applied to begin the 14 stage process, by the time the Democrats lose the election in November 2024, three out of the 56 have passed all 14 stages.
当民主党在 2024 年 11 月的选举中失败时,在 56 个已申请开始 14 个阶段流程的州和司法管辖区中,56 个州和司法管辖区中的 3 个已经通过了所有 14 个阶段。
And very little of the money has actually been spent because of all the problems that Ezra and I discussed about how hard it is to build in the physical world.
由于以斯拉和我讨论了在物理世界中建造有多么困难,因此实际上花掉的钱很少。
$42 billion therefore dies upon contact with planet Earth.
因此,有 420 亿美元因与地球接触而死亡。
That’s not government achieving its goals.
这并不是政府实现其目标。
And a Doge that we were sort of duumvirate of in this parallel universe, is one that would try very clearly to A, articulate a goal.
在这个平行宇宙中,我们有点像二人组的总督,他会非常清楚地尝试阐明一个目标。
What are we trying to do here?
我们在这里想做什么?
We’re trying to build rural broadband.
我们正在努力建设农村宽带。
Why?
为什么?
Because we think connectivity is incredibly important to the economy of the future.
因为我们认为互联互通对于未来的经济极其重要。
It helps people’s health, it helps the economy of rural areas.
它有助于人们的健康,有助于农村地区的经济。
Let’s build rural broadband.
建设农村宽带。
2:48:28 Two, what are the roadblocks?
二、障碍是什么?
What are the bottlenecks?
瓶颈是什么?
What’s hard about taking a pot of money that exists in Washington and actually creating broadband networks in rural Kentucky?
拿华盛顿的一大笔钱在肯塔基州的农村地区建设宽带网络有什么困难呢?
Let’s understand what those roadblocks are so that we can do two things.
让我们了解这些障碍是什么,以便我们可以做两件事。
We can take away the things that need to be taken away to accelerate the program.
我们可以拿走那些需要拿走的东西来加速程序。
And maybe we can add new policies that will accelerate the spending because bottom line, we want to make a difference in the world.
也许我们可以增加新的政策来加速支出,因为最重要的是,我们希望改变世界。
That’s a world where government is, to borrow Ezra’s language, deregulated itself.
借用以斯拉的话说,在这个世界里,政府放松了自身管制。
It’s easier for the government to achieve its goals.
政府更容易实现其目标。
I think that it’s really important at the level of a principle here that liberals fall out of love with this procedural fetish that has dominated the left of the last half century and fall back in love with outcomes.
我认为,在原则层面上,自由主义者不再热爱这种在过去半个世纪里主导左派的程序迷恋,而重新爱上结果,这一点非常重要。
To be ruthlessly obsessed with how liberalism has failed and how these kinds of failures aren’t just technocratic stories to tell in a podcast.
无情地痴迷于自由主义如何失败,以及这些失败如何不仅仅是播客中讲述的技术官僚故事。
2:49:26 I think this is fundamental to why Democrats are losing the communications war in an era of anti-establishment and anti-institutional.
我认为这是民主党在反建制和反制度时代输掉沟通战的根本原因。
We find ourselves in a reflexive position of having all the cranks, so to speak, having left the Democratic Party and we’re the ones who defend all institutions.
我们发现自己处于一个反射性的位置,可以说,我们已经离开了民主党,而我们是捍卫所有机构的人。
We’re the ones who defend the establishments.
我们是捍卫机构的人。
We’re the ones saying government can only do good.
我们说政府只能做好事。
But as a result, we lose the ability to talk to people about how government fails and how they can see that failure.
但结果是,我们失去了与人们谈论政府如何失败以及他们如何看待这种失败的能力。
And how sometimes they’re literally leaving cities and states run by Democrats because that failure is so effing obvious to them.
有时他们真的会离开民主党管理的城市和州,因为这种失败对他们来说是如此明显。
So this isn’t just about the BEAD program, it’s not just about 14-step programs, it’s not just about rural broadband.
因此,这不仅仅是 BEAD 计划,不仅仅是 14 步计划,也不仅仅是农村宽带。
It really is about a higher level principle of political communication.
这确实是关于更高层次的政治沟通原则。
How do you develop a liberalism that in an age of anti-establishment anger both reflects that anger and channels it for proactive purposes by not just doing destruction destruction but creative destruction.
如何发展一种自由主义,在反建制愤怒的时代,既反映愤怒,又通过不仅进行破坏性破坏,而且进行创造性破坏,将其引导到积极主动的目的。
So first of all, beautifully put and second is of the big thing that Doge did is make this a sexy topic to discuss.
因此,首先,措辞优美,其次,Doge 所做的一件大事就是让这个话题成为一个值得讨论的性感话题。
2:50:25 And then you can tear down Doge with the way they’re doing it, say it’s wrong, criticize.
然后你可以用 Doge 的做法来拆毁他们,说这是错误的,批评他们。
But then people are all of a sudden more and more caring about the efficiency of government and educating themselves, learning about it, and it’s creating a culture of transparency to the whole thing.
但随后人们突然越来越关心政府的效率并进行自我教育和了解,这正在创造一种整个事情透明的文化。
So now you can swoop in with a book like Abundance and describe here’s actually how to have a clear mission and metrics, how to solve these problems.
所以现在你可以读一本像《丰富》这样的书,在这里描述实际上如何拥有明确的使命和指标,如何解决这些问题。
But that allows as opposed to have this culture of process, me personally, one of the things that really frustrates me about this world is that, the bureaucracy of that kind of process.
但这允许而不是拥有这种流程文化,就我个人而言,这个世界真正让我沮丧的事情之一就是这种流程的官僚主义。
Especially because everybody, at least in the United States is just all so fucking polite everywhere about the whole thing.
尤其是因为每个人,至少在美国,对整个事情到处都是那么他妈的有礼貌。
They’re all so nice to you as they’re doing the process.
他们在做这个过程时都对你很好。
About every single thing they’re just like, this is…
关于他们喜欢的每件事,这是……
And then you have to call from nine to five.
然后你必须从九点到五点打电话。
2:51:28 There’s hours and let’s schedule a meeting in three weeks from now to discuss this document so we can have another document.
现在还有几个小时,让我们在三周后安排一次会议来讨论这份文件,以便我们可以制定另一份文件。
And all of a sudden the big dreams and the visions, the hopes that people have invested in building a project that’s an incredible project dies.
突然之间,人们投资建设一个令人难以置信的项目的伟大梦想、愿景和希望都破灭了。
It’s not just a waste of money, it’s the possibility of a beautiful thing that could have been built, never gets built.
这不仅仅是浪费金钱,而是有可能建造出本来可以建造的美丽事物,但却永远无法建造。
You’re retracing Ezra’s lovely line about how the character of the right these days is autocratic, and the character of the left can be overly bureaucratic.
你正在回顾以斯拉的可爱台词,即如今右翼的性格是独裁的,而左翼的性格可能过于官僚。
2:51:49 I hope there’s a middle synthesis lane here where there’s a political identity that believes in efficient bureaucracies.
我希望这里有一条中间综合路线,那里有一种相信高效官僚机构的政治身份。
Sometimes it actually does take a lot of people to get certain things done.
有时确实需要很多人才能完成某些事情。
But you really, I think need to have an eye toward institutional reform.
但我认为你确实需要关注制度改革。
This is a theme of our book that we haven’t talked about as much yet, but I think it’s so important for abundance to believe that each generation adopts, is passed down institutions that were created for different eras, different decades to solve different problems.
这是我们这本书的一个主题,我们还没有讨论太多,但我认为对于丰富来说,相信每一代人都采用、传承下来的制度是非常重要的,这些制度是为不同时代、不同几十年创建的,旨在解决不同的问题。
That’s how you get an environmental revolution in the 1960s that solves the problem of dirty air and dirty water.
这就是 20 世纪 60 年代发生的环境革命,解决了空气污染和水污染问题。
But leaves us with a set of norms like NEPA that make it impossible to add clean energy in our generation, just a tragedy of unintended outcomes.
但这给我们留下了一套像 NEPA 这样的规范,使得我们这一代人不可能增加清洁能源,这只是一场意想不到的悲剧。
2:52:43 And to narrow this down to a world that I know you care a lot about, there’s a chapter in our book about science policy and the history of the NIH.
为了将范围缩小到我知道你们非常关心的世界,我们书中有一章是关于科学政策和国家卫生研究院的历史的。
And the NIH really comes into its own after World War II.
美国国立卫生研究院 (NIH) 真正发挥作用是在二战之后。
And it is immediately this beautifully funded crown jewel of biomedical research, just the federal government irrigating university researchers studying cancer and heart disease and brain science and everything else.
这就是生物医学研究皇冠上的明珠,资金雄厚,联邦政府资助大学研究人员研究癌症、心脏病、脑科学和其他一切。
Practically every single scientific breakthrough in the US in the last 70 years at least bears the fingerprints of NIH.
实际上,过去 70 年来美国的每一项科学突破都至少带有 NIH 的痕迹。
But the NIH is also a bureaucracy.
但国立卫生研究院也是一个官僚机构。
And like every bureaucracy, it has accumulated a set of processes and habits that it’s the people most affected by it.
和每个官僚机构一样,它积累了一套流程和习惯,而人民受其影响最大。
Scientists in America told us and will tell anybody else who’s listening, has flaws.
美国的科学家告诉我们,并将告诉其他任何正在倾听的人,这种说法存在缺陷。
2:53:31 According to some surveys, 40% of the time that scientists are working today in America, they are filling out grants and doing paperwork, not doing science.
一些调查显示,当今美国科学家 40% 的工作时间是在填写资助金和做文书工作,而不是从事科学研究。
That is astonishing.
这太令人惊讶了。
As we say in the book, imagine if we discovered that one year there was a virus that broke out in the American academic scene, such that our scientists suffered from chronic fatigue disorder between January and June every single year.
正如我们在书中所说,想象一下,如果有一天我们发现美国学术界爆发了一种病毒,导致我们的科学家每年一月到六月都患有慢性疲劳症。
They just couldn’t work.
他们就是无法工作。
We’d be like, “This is an absolute shanda, we have to fix this problem.” This problem exists.
我们会说,“这绝对是盛大,我们必须解决这个问题。”这个问题是存在的。
It’s our own bureaucratic rules.
这是我们自己的官僚规则。
It’s the rules that we wrote that’s slowing down science.
正是我们制定的规则拖慢了科学的发展。
So what should we do?
那么我们应该做什么呢?
I don’t think we should tear down the NIH.
我认为我们不应该废除国立卫生研究院。
I don’t think we should slash and burn grants as we’re currently doing in the administration.
我认为我们不应该像政府目前所做的那样大幅削减和烧毁拨款。
2:54:17 I think we should understand what’s broken and be clear about our desired outcomes.
我认为我们应该了解哪里出了问题,并明确我们想要的结果。
My desired outcome for science is that we produce and pursue high risk, high reward science under the theory that almost no important breakthrough is going to be obvious before you discovered it.
我对科学的期望结果是,我们在这样的理论下生产和追求高风险、高回报的科学,即在你发现它之前,几乎没有任何重要的突破是显而易见的。
If it’s obvious, you probably already knew it.
如果很明显,您可能已经知道了。
So why is it some new science?
那么为什么它是一些新科学呢?
You should want to incentivize scientists to ask their biggest, most curious questions in a high risk, high reward environment.
您应该激励科学家在高风险、高回报的环境中提出最大、最好奇的问题。
And right now the NIH doesn’t do that.
目前美国国立卫生研究院并没有这样做。
The NIH for a variety of reasons, whether it’s aspects of the peer review process or just assumptions that scientists have of the system, is too incrementalist.
出于多种原因,无论是同行评审过程的各个方面,还是科学家对该系统的假设,美国国立卫生研究院都过于渐进主义。
It funds older researchers and it wastes a lot of scientists time with bureaucratic paperwork and kludge.
它为年长的研究人员提供资金,并在官僚文书工作和杂乱上浪费了许多科学家的时间。
We’d love to reform it.
我们很乐意对其进行改革。
We have ideas for reforming it.
我们有改革的想法。
But if liberals don’t use the language of and act on institutional reform, we will allow institutions to grow old and sclerotic and piss off Americans.
但如果自由主义者不使用制度改革的语言并采取行动,我们将允许制度变得陈旧和僵化,并激怒美国人。
2:55:16 And they’ll vote for people who come in with a wrecking ball to tear it down.
他们会投票给那些带着破坏球来拆除它的人。
So that’s why I think it’s so important for abundance liberals like us to be very clear about our goals, our outcomes, and exactly what we want to accomplish because I think that’s the only way to really see how and why institutions that are all around us truly do need reform.
因此,我认为对于像我们这样的富裕自由主义者来说,非常清楚我们的目标、结果以及我们想要实现的目标非常重要,因为我认为这是真正了解我们周围的机构如何以及为何真正需要改革的唯一方法。
Listen, I hope your book becomes the manifesto of the Democratic Party.
听着,我希望你的书成为民主党的宣言。
2:55:37 It’s a beautiful vision.
这是一个美丽的愿景。
I’m a little bit skeptical because of the momentum of bureaucratic thought, but nevertheless remain hopeful.
由于官僚思想的势头,我有点怀疑,但仍然充满希望。
I have to ask as I’m a fan of both of you in the interest of time, Ezra, you had an intense debate many years ago with Sam Harris.
我不得不问,因为我是你们俩的粉丝,为了时间的利益,埃兹拉,很多年前你和山姆·哈里斯进行了一场激烈的辩论。
Okay, so you’re, I would say, like I said, I’m a fan of both of you.
好吧,所以我想说,就像我说的,我是你们俩的粉丝。
You’re both intellectually rigorous people.
你们都是思想严谨的人。
So the debate, the contentiousness of it was both sad to me.
所以这场辩论,其中的争议让我感到悲伤。
But also as just a fan of you and since I admire your intellects, it’s just fun to watch, what is it Godzilla and King Kong fight.
但作为你的粉丝,我钦佩你的智慧,所以观看哥斯拉和金刚的战斗很有趣。
I wish there was more of it.
我希望有更多。
I wish you would do this podcast again and debate it more on some other topic and argue.
我希望你能再次做这个播客,并就其他话题进行更多辩论和争论。
It’s just great.
太棒了。
Anyway, some time has passed and-
无论如何,已经过去了一段时间了——
Yeah, was this eight years ago now?
是啊,这是八年前的事了吗?
Yeah,
是的,
2018-ish, something there.
2018 年左右,有一些东西。
Yeah, the battles you have fought over the years, that’s just-
是的,这些年来你所经历的战斗,那就是——
That’s a lot of chapters.
这是很多章。
Yeah, this is like several chapters ago.
是的,这就像几章前的内容。
2:56:49 But in the interest of camaraderie, what do you admire most about Sam Harris?
但出于友情的考虑,你最欣赏萨姆·哈里斯的什么?
Oh, that’s not a hard question.
哦,这不是一个很难的问题。
2:57:00 If you go back, if you listen to that debate on my show at Vox, I intro that debate by saying, “Look, I disagree with Harris on like this specific conversation he had with Charles Murray about race and IQ.
如果你回去听我在 Vox 节目中的辩论,我会这样介绍这场辩论:“听着,我不同意哈里斯的观点,就像他与查尔斯·默里关于种族和智商的具体对话一样。
But he’s good on meditation, he’s good on psychedelics, he’s good on consciousness, he’s good…” I don’t know if I said AI back then though, but I think he’s good on AI.
但他很擅长冥想,他很擅长迷幻药,他很擅长意识,他很擅长……”我不知道我当时是否说的是人工智能,但我认为他在人工智能方面很擅长。
I always felt in that without going into the way back machine, that Sam really thought like he really somehow got where I was wrong.
我总觉得,在没有进入回头路的情况下,萨姆真的认为他真的以某种方式理解了我的错误。
And I thought I offered like a lot of like tries for deescalation and he did me weirdly the favor of publishing our whole email correspondence.
我以为我提出了很多类似的降级尝试,而他奇怪地帮了我的忙,公布了我们的整个电子邮件通信。
And I think if you read that you can see that I was not angling for a fight here.
我想,如果你读到这篇文章,你就会发现我并不是想在这里打架。
2:57:42 What I admired about him since, I think the thing that he’s been good on is he’s been very independent.
从那时起我就很钦佩他,我认为他的优点是他非常独立。
So Sam at that time, there was sort of the emergence around then of this thing that people then called the intellectual dark web.
所以萨姆当时就出现了一种人们称之为知识暗网的东西。
And it was like Sam and the Weinstein brothers and Ben Shapiro, and I forget who was part of it.
就像萨姆、韦恩斯坦兄弟和本·夏皮罗一样,我忘记了谁是其中的一部分。
And as a bunch of those people I think, it kind of split up over time, but Harris has done a good job not falling into conspiracy as the Weinstein brothers did.
我认为,作为一群这样的人,随着时间的推移,他们会分裂,但哈里斯做得很好,没有像韦恩斯坦兄弟那样陷入阴谋。
Not letting his anger at the left blind him to the failures of the right.
不要让对左派的愤怒蒙蔽了他的双眼,让他看不到右派的失败。
He’s a guy, I guess both for better and for worse as we all are.
我想他是一个男人,无论好坏,就像我们所有人一样。
But he is perfectly willing to stand alone in a crowd.
但他完全愿意站在人群中。
Like I haven’t listened to that much of his stuff lately, but my sense is he’s been like quite clear-eyed from my perspective on Donald Trump.
就像我最近没有听过他那么多的东西一样,但我的感觉是,从我对唐纳德·特朗普的角度来看,他的眼光非常清晰。
So my view is not that Sam Harris is in general a bad actor, it just isn’t.
所以我的观点并不是说山姆·哈里斯总体上是一个糟糕的演员,事实并非如此。
Yeah, he’s been like difficult to categorize and fearless about it, meaning like he deliberately resists audience capture.
是的,他很难归类,而且对此无所畏惧,这意味着他故意抵制观众的吸引。
Yeah, which is a hard thing to do.
是的,这是一件很难做到的事情。
It’s quite difficult.
这是相当困难的。
I think I saw a clip of him on this show sort of like going after Trump and it became like a big whole thing.
我想我在这个节目中看到了他的一个片段,有点像追随特朗普,这就像一个大事件。
Yeah, he’s been very consistent on that.
是的,他在这一点上一直非常一致。
2:58:55 Let’s try to find the interesting thing here.
让我们尝试在这里找到有趣的事情。
I actually had a while back, a podcast with Richard Haier.
事实上,我不久前和理查德·海尔一起做过播客。
He studies intelligence.
他研究智力。
And it was a very detailed non-policy discussion about IQ tests and all that kind of stuff.
这是关于智商测试和所有此类内容的非常详细的非政策讨论。
And there I tried extremely hard to be very nuanced because that felt like an uncomfortable topic back then.
在那里,我非常努力地做到非常细致,因为当时感觉这是一个令人不舒服的话题。
It doesn’t feel so uncomfortable now.
现在感觉没那么不舒服了。
Do you think the Overton Window has expanded?
您认为奥弗顿之窗已经扩大了吗?
Do you think the kind of things we’re willing to talk about now…
你认为我们现在愿意谈论的事情......
And this has to do with the Trump moment also.
这也与特朗普时刻有关。
I think the place where the topic seems to me to have changed in my ambient awareness of it is two things.
我认为,在我看来,这个话题在我周围的意识中发生了变化,有两件事。
2:59:35 One is the sense of the Flynn effect, which is yeah, it’s hard to individually change your IQ, but there is a very well-documented effect.
一是弗林效应,是的,很难单独改变你的智商,但有一个有据可查的效应。
And I talked to James Flynn before I talked to Sam.
在与萨姆交谈之前,我先与詹姆斯·弗林交谈。
There is a very well-documented effect where IQs have been rising over time.
随着时间的推移,智商不断上升,这是有据可查的效应。
There’s good evidence now that that has stopped.
现在有充分的证据表明这种情况已经停止。
Again, this is ambiently my sense, I’ve read some things like in passing, I did not come to this podcast preparing to talk about IQ or I would have prepared very carefully.
再说一次,这是我的感觉,我顺便读过一些东西,我来这个播客并不是为了准备谈论智商,否则我会非常仔细地准备。
And then there was an interesting FT article just the other day that was like, Have We Passed Peak Human Intelligence?
前几天英国《金融时报》发表了一篇有趣的文章,内容是“我们已经过了人类智力的巅峰了吗?”
And my sense is that that wasn’t about IQ, although again, I don’t remember exactly what was in it.
我的感觉是,这与智商无关,尽管我同样不记得里面到底写了什么。
I kind of glanced at it and put it aside to read more later.
我大致看了一眼,然后把它放在一边,以便稍后再阅读。
3:00:24 But the literacy scores are going down and a number of test scores are going down.
但识字成绩正在下降,许多考试成绩也在下降。
And the sort of sense of the piece was that we are making ourselves stupider by endlessly staring at screens and social media, which I think is probably right.
这篇文章的意义在于,我们无休止地盯着屏幕和社交媒体,让自己变得更愚蠢,我认为这可能是对的。
I’ve had this sort of line since becoming aware of that piece in my head that, we spend a lot of time talking about how to get smarter and not enough time talking about how to avoid getting dumber.
自从意识到我脑子里有这样一句话,我们花了很多时间谈论如何变得更聪明,却没有足够的时间谈论如何避免变得更愚蠢。
But we do a lot of things that we think make us smarter, like I would say having social media on our phones because like, oh, you’re getting all this information all the time that in fact make us dumber because it’s not just that the information is bad.
但我们做了很多我们认为能让我们变得更聪明的事情,就像我会说在我们的手机上拥有社交媒体一样,因为就像,哦,你一直在获取所有这些信息,这实际上让我们变得更愚蠢,因为这不仅仅是因为这些信息是坏的。
But the lack of concentration, the constant distraction, the sort of lack of focus.
但注意力不集中,经常分心,注意力不集中。
3:01:05 And so my sense is that there is a different kind of conversation here.
所以我的感觉是这里有一种不同类型的对话。
I’m not sure it’s really an IQ conversation, but that there is a sense that we are inflicting a possibly global, certainly societal cognitive wound on ourselves.
我不确定这真的是一场智商对话,但有一种感觉,我们正在给自己造成可能是全球性的、当然是社会性的认知创伤。
That’s what John Height’s book is a little bit about, that’s sort of more coming at it from a behavioral standpoint.
这就是约翰·海特(John Height)的书的一些内容,更多的是从行为的角度来看。
But we have the Flynn effect reflects…
但我们有弗林效应反映......
This is how James Flynn would describe it.
詹姆斯·弗林是这样描述它的。
The Flynn effect reflects society’s putting on, he, I think put it the scientific spectacles.
弗林效应反映了社会的表现,我认为他说的是科学奇观。
You create societies where we prize things like reading abstract intelligence, symbolic logic.
你创建了一个我们珍视阅读抽象智慧、符号逻辑等东西的社会。
You teach people on them a lot and we get better and better and better at doing it.
你教了人们很多这方面的知识,我们做得越来越好。
And reading changes the brain, it changes the physical structure of the brain.
阅读改变大脑,它改变大脑的物理结构。
You’re hijacking parts of the mind and meant for other purposes to do this kind of interpretive work.
你劫持了大脑的一部分,并为了其他目的而进行这种解释工作。
3:01:59 But it’s of course possible just as we became societally connected and then made more and more widespread technologies like literacy, that changed our brains and led to the increase in this thing we call G intelligence.
但这当然是可能的,就像我们与社会建立了联系,然后创造了越来越广泛的技术(例如识字)一样,它改变了我们的大脑并导致我们称之为 G 智能的增加。
And decreases in other things, like I’m really shitty at knowing which direction I’m going into.
其他事情也有所减少,比如我真的不知道自己要走向哪个方向。
That sort of part of my brain that does navigation is terribly atrophied compared to somebody in a society that did not have Google Maps.
与没有谷歌地图的社会中的人相比,我大脑中负责导航的部分严重萎缩。
It’s entirely possible to go too far in that.
完全有可能走得太远。
It’s entirely possible to move on to technology to begin to weaken that.
完全有可能转向技术来开始削弱这一点。
I have this concern very profoundly about AI, by the way, which obviously you have a lot of your roots in.
顺便说一句,我对人工智能有着非常深刻的担忧,显然你有很多根源。
And there are parts of AI I’m very optimistic about, but my biggest concern about AI is we’re going to make ourselves much stupider without realizing it.
我对人工智能的某些部分非常乐观,但我对人工智能最大的担忧是我们会让自己变得更加愚蠢而没有意识到。
Because the things that are easy to automate in AI, which is like getting the AI to summarize the reading of something or getting AI to write the first draft of something, that’s where all the intelligence happens in my view.
因为在人工智能中很容易实现自动化的事情,就像让人工智能总结某件事的阅读或让人工智能写某件事的初稿,在我看来,这就是所有智能发生的地方。
3:02:59 I think one advantage I have over a lot of other podcast hosts who superficially do what I do, probably this is true for you, I’m sure this is true for you, I know, is that I really do do the reading.
我认为与许多其他播客主持人相比,我有一个优势,他们表面上做我所做的事情,可能这对你来说是正确的,我相信这对你来说是正确的,我知道,是我真的在做阅读。
No summary is equivalent to me doing the reading and sitting there and making the associations myself and spending the time in the book.
没有总结就相当于我阅读并坐在那儿自己进行联想并花时间在书中。
And then sort of thinking about what it brought up in me.
然后思考它给我带来了什么。
I write the first draft.
我写初稿。
ChatGPT cannot write the first draft of my book.
ChatGPT 无法撰写我的书的初稿。
The first draft is fucking hard to write.
第一稿太难写了
And it’s often hard because it’s completely wrong, but not because it’s narrowly wrong.
这通常很困难,因为它是完全错误的,而不是因为它是微不足道的错误。
ChatGPT will never tell you that the problem with what you’re trying to do is that you’re just trying to do the wrong thing.
ChatGPT 永远不会告诉您您正在尝试做的事情的问题在于您只是想做错误的事情。
It’ll never tell you if you tell it to write a first draft, that’s the wrong direction for this draft.
如果你让它写初稿,它永远不会告诉你,那是这个草稿的错误方向。
Some part of you has to know it.
你的某些部分必须知道这一点。
And often the problem is you just haven’t done enough reporting, haven’t done enough research and ChatGPT can’t tell you that either.
通常,问题在于您没有做足够的报告、没有做足够的研究,而 ChatGPT 也无法告诉您这一点。
3:03:47 And my worry for my kids, my worry for society is creating technologies that make it incredibly alluring to automate the part of creation that is most difficult, most laborious, and most likely to lead to genuine insight and the sort of sharpening of your own mental acuity.
我对我的孩子的担忧,我对社会的担忧是创造技术,这些技术使得自动化最困难、最费力、最有可能带来真正的洞察力和提高你自己的思维敏锐度的创造部分变得极其诱人。
We better hope the AI can autonomously make innovations because I really worry we’re going to stop being able to.
我们最好希望人工智能能够自主创新,因为我真的担心我们将无法做到这一点。
Yeah, and all of that is brilliantly put, I definitely think that social media is making me dumber.
是的,所有这些都说得很精彩,我绝对认为社交媒体让我变得更笨。
3:04:14 Like if I spend a week checking social media versus reading books, I’m just distinctly the quality of my thoughts-
就像如果我花一周时间查看社交媒体而不是读书,我的想法就明显不同了——
Even the same content.
即使内容相同。
3:04:31 I don’t read things anymore as much as I can on like a screen, I print everything out and I sit at a table and I read it.
我不再像在屏幕上那样多地阅读内容,而是将所有内容打印出来,然后坐在桌子旁阅读。
I can read it on my iPad, I can read it on my laptop.
我可以在 iPad 上阅读,也可以在笔记本电脑上阅读。
I print it all out because my attention is different.
我把它全部打印出来,因为我的注意力不一样。
And the same goes for AI, whether we’re talking about this kind of research, it’s more distinct and rigorous.
人工智能也是如此,无论我们谈论的是这种研究,它都更加独特和严谨。
3:04:44 And the other space that I do every single day is programming.
我每天做的另一个事情是编程。
I’m definitely becoming a worse programmer by using AI offloading because it actually works really well there.
通过使用人工智能卸载,我肯定会成为一个更糟糕的程序员,因为它实际上在那里工作得很好。
I’m becoming worse at creative thinking at what you’re saying, writing the first draft, which require that skill, that first little leap, that little mini leap into the creative genius that we all do every single day.
我在创造性思维方面越来越差,按照你所说的,写初稿,这需要这种技能,第一个小飞跃,那个我们每天都在做的创造性天才的小飞跃。
AI is not able to do that, and it’s definitely doling that.
人工智能无法做到这一点,但它确实正在做到这一点。
All right, we covered a lot of ground today.
好吧,我们今天讨论了很多内容。
But on the note of optimism, what gives you hope about the future of this great nation of ours, the future of America?
但从乐观的角度来看,是什么让您对我们这个伟大国家的未来、美国的未来充满希望?
Looking out in the next few years and the next few decades, centuries, when we colonize the solar system and beyond or we could just stick to the next couple of decades.
展望未来几年、几十年、几个世纪,当我们殖民太阳系及更远的地方时,或者我们可以坚持接下来的几十年。
Sure.
当然。
3:05:49 Despite the fact that our book is a deep diagnosis of modern liberalism with a ton of criticism of the last half decade in politics, I am at root a profound optimist about everything just at a general personality sense.
尽管我们的书是对现代自由主义的深刻诊断,并对过去五年的政治进行了大量批评,但从根本上来说,我对一切事物都抱有深刻的乐观主义者的态度。
To a certain extent, a question like this is attempting to elicit a little bit of what can be considered analysis of the world.
在某种程度上,这样的问题试图引出一些可以被认为是对世界的分析。
But you’re also eliciting what is fundamentally like personality, like what makes you optimistic?
但你也引出了本质上类似于个性的东西,比如是什么让你乐观?
I’ve just always been a real optimist.
我一直都是一个真正的乐观主义者。
I’m optimistic about science and technology, especially in the realm of biomedical science in a big way.
我对科学技术持乐观态度,尤其是在生物医学领域。
I think if you look at what’s happening right now in mRNA cancer vaccines, in CAR T-cell therapy for redesigning T-cells to attack cancers.
我认为,如果你看看 mRNA 癌症疫苗、重新设计 T 细胞来攻击癌症的 CAR T 细胞疗法中正在发生的事情。
If you look at the GLP-1 drug revolution and some of these studies that have been done on the fact that GLP-1 drugs, while they were initially synthesized from lizard venom to help people with type two diabetes turned out to have these effects that seem to reduce body-wide inflammation.
如果你看一下 GLP-1 药物革命以及一些基于以下事实进行的研究:GLP-1 药物最初是从蜥蜴毒液中合成的,旨在帮助患有二型糖尿病的人,结果却具有这些效果,似乎可以减少全身炎症。
That not only rewires our minds and makes it easier for people’s desired sense of moderation to be actualized.
这不仅重塑了我们的思维,也让人们更容易实现所期望的节制感。
3:07:04 So people who want to eat more fruits and vegetables seem to find it easier to eat more fruits and vegetables when they’re on GLP-1 drugs.
因此,想要多吃水果和蔬菜的人似乎发现在服用 GLP-1 药物时更容易多吃水果和蔬菜。
But also because there’s probably a lot of neurological issues that are fundamentally issues of inflammation, including maybe dementia and Alzheimer’s.
但也因为可能有很多神经系统问题从根本上来说是炎症问题,包括痴呆症和阿尔茨海默氏症。
We might have accidentally from the tongue of a lizard, a partial medicine for Alzheimer’s disease.
我们可能无意中从蜥蜴的舌头中得到了一种治疗阿尔茨海默病的部分药物。
The ability of science to connect these dots in the cosmos just absolutely thrills and fascinates me.
科学将宇宙中的这些点连接起来的能力绝对让我兴奋和着迷。
And I hope that we get better at making those connections.
我希望我们能够更好地建立这些联系。
3:07:39 And while I have a lot of fears about AI, many of them shared by Ezra, I am really interested in the possibility of AI being useful for synthesizing large bodies of knowledge to allow people to make cross-domain comparisons.
虽然我对人工智能有很多恐惧,其中许多是 Ezra 所共有的,但我真的很感兴趣人工智能是否有可能有助于综合大量知识,使人们能够进行跨领域比较。
I think a lot of inventions in tech history are essentially ingenious recombinations of ideas.
我认为科技史上的许多发明本质上都是思想的巧妙重组。
Like to a certain extent, you look at something as fundamental or archetypal as Thomas Edison inventing the incandescent light bulb.
在某种程度上,你会看到像托马斯·爱迪生发明白炽灯泡这样的基本或原型的东西。
What did he do?
他做了什么?
He just tested 10,000 different materials and figured out that actually it was like a very special kind of bamboo that burned for the right amount of time and said, “Boom, I did it.
他刚刚测试了 10,000 种不同的材料,发现实际上它就像一种非常特殊的竹子,燃烧了适当的时间,然后说:“繁荣,我做到了。
I made the incandescent light bulb.”
我制作了白炽灯泡。”
3:08:18 The ability to have a machine accelerate the degree to which we understand what those 10,000 materials can do, or synthesize knowledge so people can combine it and say, we’re going to take a little bit of CRISPR over here and a little bit of cancer science over here to develop a gene therapy that targets a particular inhibitor that allows the immune system to attack a protein that is explicitly related to pancreatic cancer.
拥有机器的能力可以加速我们理解这 10,000 种材料的作用,或者合成知识,这样人们就可以将它们结合起来并说,我们将在这里运用一点 CRISPR 和一点癌症科学来开发一种基因疗法,该疗法针对特定的抑制剂,使免疫系统能够攻击与胰腺癌明确相关的蛋白质。
I do absolutely believe that we might be on the doorstep of those kinds of breakthroughs.
我绝对相信我们可能正处于这些突破的门口。
And that makes me incredibly optimistic because I think at base it’s like, what’s life about?
这让我非常乐观,因为我认为从根本上来说,生活是什么?
What’s abundance about?
丰富是什么?
Why housing and energy?
为什么是住房和能源?
Well, because we think they’re fundamental to living a good life.
嗯,因为我们认为它们是美好生活的基础。
You need a place to live, and people deserve the freedom to live where they want to live.
你需要一个居住的地方,人们应该有居住在他们想要居住的地方的自由。
3:09:06 Energy is what powers the entire economy.
能源是整个经济的动力。
And more energy would power technologies that we can’t even imagine or are just beginning to, whether it’s supersonic flight powered by clean fuel or fusion technology that basically gives us infinite solar energy, the sun’s actual energy in a particular location.
更多的能源将为我们无法想象或刚刚开始的技术提供动力,无论是由清洁燃料驱动的超音速飞行,还是基本上为我们提供无限太阳能的聚变技术,即太阳在特定位置的实际能量。
These are beautiful things that can happen.
这些都是可能发生的美好事情。
But also I think the good life is about health.
但我也认为美好的生活取决于健康。
It’s about health and it’s about the wealth that comes, and the freedom that comes from finding health in your own life.
这关乎健康,关乎随之而来的财富,以及在自己的生活中寻找健康所带来的自由。
And I am incredibly optimistic that we might be at the cusp of a real golden age in taking all these little ingredients that we’ve spent decades on, whether it’s genomics and proteomics and a little bit of AI.
我非常乐观地认为,我们可能正处于一个真正的黄金时代的风口浪尖,利用我们花了几十年的时间研究的所有这些小成分,无论是基因组学、蛋白质组学还是一点点人工智能。
We’re at a moment right now, I hope, where we can have this explosion of combinatorial intelligence.
我希望,我们现在正处于一个可以实现组合智能爆炸的时刻。
And that hopefully in an optimistic way, AI could be useful in accelerating us toward that future.
希望以乐观的方式,人工智能可以帮助我们加速迈向那个未来。
But I also think to the point of this book, we have to get institutions right too.
但我也认为就本书的要点而言,我们也必须建立正确的制度。
3:10:11 These are discoveries that are going to happen inside of institutions.
这些发现将在机构内部发生。
And how those institutions work and how they’re funded and the incentives that are created by law or by technology, really matter in terms of the world that we build.
这些机构如何运作、如何筹集资金以及通过法律或技术创造的激励措施,对于我们构建的世界来说确实很重要。
And so that’s why I think it’s really important to not only be obsessed with what the technology can do, but how it’s instantiated in the institutions that we have because it ultimately is institutions and individuals that build the world, not technology acting on its own.
因此,我认为不仅要关注技术的用途,还要关注技术如何在我们拥有的机构中实例化,因为最终是机构和个人构建了世界,而不是技术本身发挥作用,这一点非常重要。
Yeah.
是的。
3:10:36 And I should say that you make a really great case for investing in weird science, meaning stuff that doesn’t on the surface make sense.
我应该说,你为投资奇怪的科学提供了一个非常好的案例,这意味着那些表面上没有意义的东西。
You said lizard venom.
你说的是蜥蜴毒液。
There’s all this popular criticism of scientific projects that sound like a waste of money when in reality, at least in the scientific realm, projects that seem like they don’t have any positive effect might actually end up being the ones that transform human civilization as we know it because of the unintended discoveries that happen and all the eureka moments.
所有这些对科学项目的流行批评听起来像是浪费金钱,但实际上,至少在科学领域,看起来没有任何积极影响的项目实际上可能最终成为改变我们所知的人类文明的项目,因为发生了意想不到的发现和所有的灵光一现的时刻。
All the special discoveries happen truly, when you’re just passionately pursuing a cool thing in science, that’s how scientific minds work.
当你热情地追求科学中一件很酷的事情时,所有特殊的发现都会真实发生,这就是科学思维的运作方式。
And so it makes sense to invest in exploring weird shit, the weird mysteries of the universe.
因此,投资探索奇怪的事物、宇宙的奇怪奥秘是有意义的。
Anyway, Ezra, what gives you hope?
无论如何,以斯拉,是什么给了你希望?
I’m a less temperamentally optimistic person than Derek by a lot actually.
事实上,我的性格比德里克要乐观得多。
3:11:30 And I would usually give a pretty similar answer to this question that Derek gave, which is technological advancement.
对于德里克提出的这个问题,我通常会给出一个非常相似的答案,那就是技术进步。
We live in an age of marvels.
我们生活在一个充满奇迹的时代。
I guess I’ll say from the realist perspective, that we live in a more liquid moment than many.
我想我会从现实主义的角度说,我们生活在一个比许多人更加流动的时刻。
That if one of the advantages of the ’90s of much of the life that I have grown up in, is that much of the structure of technology, of global governance was fairly stable.
如果说我成长的90年代的优势之一就是,全球治理的大部分技术结构都相当稳定。
We could sort of like look at it and there were certain, not certainties but fairly reliable guardrails of what was and what wasn’t going to happen.
我们可以有点像看看它,有一些确定的,不是确定的,但相当可靠的护栏,告诉我们什么会发生,什么不会发生。
And there were disruptions like 9/11 and the financial crisis.
还有 9/11 和金融危机等破坏。
They weren’t small and slowly they broke that entire system.
他们的规模并不小,而且慢慢地他们破坏了整个系统。
But I think one of the things people sort of miss, sort of feel about the way history’s accelerated is that things have just all gotten faster and less predictable.
但我认为人们对历史加速的方式有点怀念、感觉的一件事是,事情变得更快、更难以预测。
And they really have, I think gotten faster and less predictable.
我认为他们确实变得更快、更难以预测。
3:12:28 We’re in an age it seems to be more like the early 20th century, late 19th century than like the 1990s.
我们所处的时代似乎更像是 20 世纪初、19 世纪末,而不是 20 世纪 90 年代。
And that means the possibilities range very widely.
这意味着可能性范围非常广泛。
When you think about AI, when you think about biotech advances, when you think about energetic advances, when you think about the sort of shifting nature of global alliances, of the technological and political systems, we are in the most high variance period that I think has happened in a very, very, very long time.
当你想到人工智能,当你想到生物技术的进步,当你想到能源的进步,当你想到全球联盟、技术和政治体系的性质转变时,我们正处于我认为在非常、非常、非常长的时间里发生的最高方差时期。
And that carries tremendous peril.
这会带来巨大的危险。
Things could go terribly, and it carries tremendous possibility.
事情可能会变得很糟糕,而且蕴藏着巨大的可能性。
What if AI is an incredible boon for humanity?
如果人工智能为人类带来难以置信的福祉怎么办?
What if we do invent and deploy the clean energy technologies that deliver energy abundance.
如果我们发明并部署清洁能源技术来提供丰富的能源,结果会怎样?
Not just a kind of answer to the worst of climate change, but genuine energy` abundance.
这不仅是对最严重的气候变化的一种解决方案,而且是真正丰富的能源。
3:13:20 Unlocking new things like mass desalination.
解锁大规模海水淡化等新事物。
And what if we do…
如果我们这样做怎么办……
Like I’m an animal suffering person.
就像我是一个受动物痛苦的人一样。
I’m a vegetarian.
我是素食主义者。
I care a lot about animal suffering.
我非常关心动物的痛苦。
What if we did figure out cultivated meat that we grow in breweries and on scaffolds, and we don’t have to kill tens of billions of animals that we’ve raised in unimaginable suffering every single year?
如果我们确实找到了在啤酒厂和脚手架上种植的人造肉,并且我们不必每年杀死我们在难以想象的痛苦中饲养的数百亿动物,会怎么样?
What if we do figure out how to make government better and more responsive?
如果我们确实找到了如何让政府变得更好、反应更快怎么办?
What if that thesis, antithesis, synthesis thing does work out?
如果这个论题、对立论、综合论确实成功了怎么办?
But it’s not hope, it’s like that’s a future.
但这不是希望,而是未来。
You have to create a future.
你必须创造未来。
You have to call into being a future you’ll have to fight for.
你必须召唤一个你必须为之奋斗的未来。
So it isn’t so much that I find myself hopeful about what America or the world would be like in 2030 or 2040.
因此,我发现自己对 2030 年或 2040 年的美国或世界会是什么样子并没有太大希望。
But I find that I believe in the possibility of enough remarkable outcomes, that it makes the present really worth being engaged in.
但我发现我相信有可能取得足够显着的成果,这使得现在确实值得参与。
And really worth trying to do your small part, to bend the arc of the time in the direction that you find more just.
确实值得尝试做你的小部分,将时间的弧线弯曲到你发现更公正的方向。
Well, thank you to both of you for fighting for abundance and writing this manifesto for abundance, and for all the writing and the work you do in the podcasts and just being incredible minds in this world that I’m a fan of.
好吧,感谢你们俩为富裕而奋斗,为富裕而写下这份宣言,感谢你们在播客中所做的所有写作和工作,感谢你们在这个我所喜欢的世界上的不可思议的头脑。
3:14:25 So thank you for talking today.
谢谢你今天的发言。
Thanks very much, Lex.
非常感谢,莱克斯。
Thanks so much.
非常感谢。
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson.
感谢您收听 Ezra Klein 和 Derek Thompson 的对话。
3:14:47 To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description.
为了支持这个播客,请在说明中查看我们的赞助商。
And now let me leave you with some words from Napoleon Bonaparte, ” In politics, stupidity is not a handicap.” Thank you for listening.
现在让我向你们传达拿破仑·波拿巴的话:“在政治上,愚蠢不是障碍。”感谢您的聆听。
I hope to see you next time.
我希望下次能见到你。
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