杰弗里·瓦瑟斯特罗姆：中国、习近平、贸易战、台湾、香港与毛泽东

The following is a conversation with Jeffrey Wasserstrom, a historian of modern China.

以下是与现代中国历史学家杰弗里·沃瑟斯特罗姆的对话。

00:00 This is the Lex Fridman Podcast.

这是莱克斯·弗里德曼播客。

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And now, dear friends, here’s Jeffrey Wasserstrom.

现在，亲爱的朋友们，这是杰弗里·沃瑟斯特罗姆 (Jeffrey Wasserstrom)。

00:17 You’ve compared Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong in the past.

您过去曾比较过习近平和毛泽东。

What are the parallels between the two leaders, and where do they differ?

两位领导人有何相似之处，有何不同？

Xi Jinping, of course, is the current leader of China for the past 12 years, and Mao Zedong was the communist leader of China from 1949 to 1976.

当然，习近平是过去12年的中国现任领导人，毛泽东是1949年至1976年的中国共产党领导人。

So what are the commonalities, what are the differences?

那么有什么共同点，有什么区别呢？

So the biggest commonality of them is that they’re both the subject of personality cults, and that Mao was the center of a very intensely felt one from 1949 to 1976.

因此，他们最大的共同点是，他们都是个人崇拜的对象，而毛泽东是 1949 年至 1976 年个人崇拜的中心人物。

00:38 And when he died, there was tremendous outpouring of grief, even among people who had objectively suffered enormously because of his policies.

当他去世时，人们表达了巨大的悲痛，即使是在客观上因他的政策而遭受巨大痛苦的人们中也是如此。

Xi Jinping is the first leader in China since him who has had a sustained personality cult of the kind where if you walk into a bookstore in China, the first thing you see are books by him, collections of his speeches.

习近平是继他之后中国第一位有着持续个人崇拜的领导人，如果你走进中国的一家书店，你首先看到的是他的书、他的演讲集。

And when Mao was alive, you might’ve thought that’s sort of what happened with Communist Party leaders in China.

当毛泽东在世时，你可能会认为这就是中国共产党领导人身上发生的事情。

But after Mao’s death, there was such an effort to not have that kind of personality cult that there was a tendency to not publish the speeches of a leader until they were done being in power.

但毛泽东去世后，人们为了消除这种个人崇拜而做出了如此大的努力，以至于出现了一种倾向，即在领导人不再掌权之前不发表其讲话。

01:32 I was first in China in 1986, and you could go for days without being intensely aware of who was in charge of the party.

1986年我第一次来到中国，你可能会在那里呆上好几天，但并没有强烈地意识到谁是党的负责人。

You would know, but his face wasn’t everywhere, the newspaper wasn’t dominated with stories about him, and quotations from his words and things like that.

你会知道，但他的脸并不到处都是，报纸上也没有充斥着关于他的故事，以及他的话的引文之类的内容。

So with Xi Jinping, you’ve had a throwback to that period in Communist Party rule, which seemed as though it might be a part of the past.

因此，对于习近平来说，你会感觉回到了共产党统治的那个时期，这似乎已经成为过去的一部分了。

01:59 So that’s a key commonality, and a key difference is that Mao really reveled in chaos, in turning things upside down in a sense that he talked about class struggle, which came out of Marxism, but he also really, his favorite work of Chinese popular fiction was the Monkey King about this legendary figure who is this Monkey King who could turn the heavens upside down.

所以这是一个关键的共同点，而一个关键的区别是，毛泽东确实热衷于混乱，热衷于把事情搞得天翻地覆，从某种意义上说，他谈论的是阶级斗争，这源于马克思主义，但他也确实，他最喜欢的中国通俗小说作品是《孙悟空》，讲述了这个传奇人物，这个孙悟空可以把天颠倒。

So he reveled in disorder and thought disorder was a way to improve things.

所以他沉迷于无序，并认为无序是改善事物的一种方式。

02:32 Xi Jinping is very orderly, is very concerned with kind of stability and predictability.

习近平非常有秩序，非常注重稳定性和可预测性。

So you can see them as very, very different that way.

所以你可以看到它们非常非常不同。

And Mao also liked to stir things up like that, people on the streets clamoring.

毛泽东也喜欢这样闹事，街上人们叫嚷。

So Xi Jinping, even though he has a personality cult, it’s not manifesting itself.

所以说习近平虽然有个人崇拜，但是并没有表现出来。

He doesn’t like the idea of people on the streets in anything that can’t be controlled.

他不喜欢人们在街上做任何无法控制的事情。

So there are a lot of ways that they’re similar, a lot of ways they’re different.

因此，它们有很多相似之处，也有很多不同之处。

03:02 They’re also different, and this fits with this orderliness that Xi Jinping talks positively about Confucius and Confucian traditions in China.

它们也是不同的，这也符合习近平积极谈论孔子和中国儒家传统的秩序。

And Confucian traditions are based on kind of stable hierarchies for the most part, and sort of clear categories of superior and inferior, whereas Mao like things to be turned upside down.

儒家传统在很大程度上是基于某种稳定的等级制度和某种明确的上下级界限，而毛泽东则喜欢把事情颠倒过来。

He thought of Confucianism as a feudal way of thought that it held China back.

他认为儒家思想是一种阻碍中国发展的封建思想。

So you can come up with things that they’re similar and you can come up with things where they’re really opposites.

所以你可以想出它们相似的东西，也可以想出它们真正相反的东西。

But they both clearly did want to see China under rule by the Communist Party, and that’s been a continuity, and that connects them to the leaders in between them too as well.

但他们显然都希望看到中国受到共产党的统治，这是一种连续性，这也将他们与他们之间的领导人联系起来。

So there’s some degree, as you said, that Xi Jinping espouses the ideas of Communism and the ideas of Confucianism.

所以，正如你所说，习近平在某种程度上拥护共产主义思想和儒家思想。

03:45 So let’s go all the way back.

那么让我们一路回去吧。

You wrote that in order to understand the China of today, we have to study its past.

您写道，为了了解今天的中国，我们必须研究它的过去。

So the China of today celebrates ideas of Confucius, a Chinese philosopher who lived 2,500 years ago.

因此，今天的中国崇尚 2500 年前的中国哲学家孔子的思想。

Can you tell me about the ideas of Confucius?

您能介绍一下孔子的思想吗？

First of all, we don’t know that much about the historic Confucius.

首先，我们对历史上的孔子了解不多。

04:11 He’s around the same time as figures like Socrates.

他与苏格拉底等人物大约处于同一时代。

And like with Socrates, we get a lot of what we know about him or think we know about him from what his followers said and things that were attributed to him and dialogues that were written afterwards.

就像苏格拉底一样，我们从他的追随者所说的以及归因于他的事情以及后来写的对话中获得了很多我们对他的了解或认为我们对他的了解。

So you can have a lot of fun with these sort of Axial Age thinkers and what they had in common.

因此，你可以从这些轴心时代的思想家以及他们的共同点中获得很多乐趣。

04:39 Another thing that connects these Axial Age thinkers is they were trying to kind of make a case for why they should be able to educate the next generation, the elite, and sort of had a way of promising that they had philosophical ideas that helped decide how you should run a polity.

连接这些轴心时代思想家的另一件事是，他们试图证明为什么他们应该能够教育下一代、精英，并以某种方式承诺他们拥有有助于决定如何管理一个政体的哲学思想。

Confucius lived in a time when there were these warring kingdoms in a territory that later became China.

孔子生活的时代，在后来成为中国的领土上存在这些战国。

But what he said was that there had been this period of great order in the past that the lines between inferior and superior were clear, and there was a kind of synergy between superior and inferior that kept everything ticking along really nicely.

但他说的是，过去有过一段秩序井然的时期，上下之间界限分明，上下之间有一种协同作用，一切都进展得很好。

He thought that hierarchical relationships were a good thing, and that the trick was that both sides in a hierarchical relationship owed something to the other.

他认为等级关系是一件好事，而诀窍在于等级关系中的双方都欠对方一些东西。

So the father and son relationship was a key one.

所以父子关系是关键。

The father deserved respect from the son, but owed the son care and benevolence, and things would be fine as long as both sides in a relationship held up their end.

父亲值得儿子尊重，但也欠儿子关怀和仁慈，只要感情双方都坚持到底就可以了。

05:49 And he had a whole series of these relationships.

他拥有一系列这样的关系。

The husband to the wife was, again, an unequal one of the husband being superior to the wife, but him owing the wife care and her owing him deference.

丈夫对妻子来说，又是一种不平等的关系，丈夫高于妻子，但他欠妻子照顾，妻子欠他尊重。

And he had the same notion that then the emperor to the ministers were…

而他也有同样的想法，当时的皇帝对大臣来说是……

These were all parallels, and there were no egalitarian relationships in Confucianism.

这些都是相似的，儒家思想中不存在平等关系。

06:14 Even something that in the West we often think of as a kind of quintessentially egalitarian relationship between brothers.

甚至在西方我们常常认为这是一种典型的兄弟之间的平等关系。

In the Chinese tradition of Confucianism, there was only older brother and younger brother.

在中国的儒家传统中，只有哥哥和弟弟。

Brotherhood was not an egalitarian relationship.

兄弟情谊并不是一种平等的关系。

It was one where the older brother took care of the younger brother and the younger brother showed respect for the older brother.

这是哥哥照顾弟弟，弟弟尊重哥哥的表现。

So stable hierarchy was at the core of everything in society.

因此，稳定的等级制度是社会一切事物的核心。

06:40 It permeated everything including politics.

它渗透到一切事物中，包括政治。

Yeah.

是的。

06:46 And there was even a sense that it connected the natural world to the supernatural world.

甚至有一种感觉，它将自然世界与超自然世界联系起来。

So the emperor was to heaven this kind of non-personified deity like the emperor was to the minister.

所以皇帝之于天，就像皇帝之于大臣一样，是一种非人格化的神灵。

So all of this had these relationships.

所以所有这一切都有这些关系。

So the emperor was the son of heaven.

所以说皇帝是天子。

07:08 And for Confucius, he said, so we should study the texts, we should study how the sages of old behaved, that society was becoming corrupted and was going away from that sort of purity of the sages when the relationships were all in order.

他说，对于孔子来说，我们应该研究文本，我们应该研究古代圣人的行为方式，社会正在变得腐败，并且正在远离圣人在人际关系良好时的那种纯洁。

So Confucianism was a kind of conservative or even backward looking.

所以说儒家思想是一种保守甚至是落后的思想。

It wasn’t arguing for progress, it was arguing for reclaiming a pure golden age in the past.

它不是在主张进步，而是在主张夺回过去的纯粹黄金时代。

So it was also a kind of conservative.

所以这也是一种保守。

So in all kinds of ways, it’s irreconcilable to many things about Marxism and communism, which is all about struggle and all about actually a progressive view of history moving from one stage to the next.

因此，从各个方面来说，它与马克思主义和共产主义的许多事情都是不可调和的，马克思主义和共产主义都是关于斗争的，实际上都是关于从一个阶段到下一个阶段的进步的历史观。

So that’s the interesting thing about Xi Jinping and the China of today is there is that tension of Confucianism and communism where communism, Marxism is supposed to let go of history.

因此，习近平和当今中国的有趣之处在于，儒家思想和共产主义之间存在紧张关系，而共产主义、马克思主义应该放弃历史。

07:55 And Confucianism, there’s a real veneration of history that’s happening in China of today.

而儒家思想，在今天的中国正在发生着对历史的真正的崇敬。

So they’re able to wear both hats and balance it.

所以他们能够同时兼任并保持平衡。

Yeah.

是的。

08:15 You could say that in many points in the 20th century, there was a kind of struggle between different competing political groups over which part of the Chinese past to connect with.

可以说，在 20 世纪的很多时候，不同政治团体之间存在着某种斗争，争论着应该与中国过去的哪一部分联系起来。

Was it to the Confucian tradition or to the kind of rebellious Monkey King tradition, which was what Mao connected to.

毛泽东所联系的是儒家传统还是孙悟空的反叛传统。

08:38 Xi Jinping and before him to some extent, Hu Jintao, we saw this a little bit, the Olympics, it was more of this kind of mix it all together view.

习近平和他之前的胡锦涛，我们看到了一点，奥运会，更多的是这种混合在一起的观点。

Anything that suggested greatness in the past could be something that could be fused together.

任何暗示过去伟大的东西都可以融合在一起。

So Xi Jinping says that Mao is one of his heroes or one of the people he looks to as a model, but so is Confucius.

所以习近平说，毛泽东是他的英雄之一，或者说是他崇拜的榜样之一，但孔子也是。

And there’s really…

而且还真的有……

they had so little in common, but they both, in his mind and the minds of others, suggest a kind of power and greatness of the Chinese past.

他们的共同点很少，但在他和其他人的心目中，他们都暗示着中国过去的一种力量和伟大。

Yeah.

是的。

09:15 So this platonic notion of greatness, and that you could say that’s a thread that connects for Xi Jinping the great history, multi-thousand year history of China.

所以，这种柏拉图式的伟大观念，你可以说，这是一条连接习近平伟大历史、中国几千年历史的线索。

Yeah.

是的。

09:30 And it involves smoothing out all kinds of internal contradictions.

这涉及到消除各种内部矛盾。

You had the first emperor of China jumping forward a bit in 221 BC.

公元前 221 年，中国第一位皇帝向前迈进了一点。

He is anti-scholars, he burns books, and he doesn’t venerate these kind of rituals and things.

他是反学者的，他烧书的，他不崇尚这种仪式和东西。

So he was very much against the things that Confucius stood for.

所以他非常反对孔子所主张的东西。

And Mao in a sense of having to choose between Confucius and the first emperor, he said, “Well, maybe the first emperor had the right idea.

毛泽东不得不在孔子和秦始皇之间做出选择，他说：“好吧，也许秦始皇的想法是对的。

Scholars can be a pain.” So he said, “If you have to choose between Confucianism and that.”

学者可能会很痛苦。”所以他说：“如果你必须在儒家思想和儒家思想之间做出选择。”

10:09 But Xi Jinping I think continually is kind of not choosing.

但我认为习近平始终是一种不选择。

And if he wants to say, “Well, look at the Great Wall, look at this wonderful…

如果他想说，“好吧，看看长城，看看这个美妙的......

In fact that was a symbol of kind of strength and domination related to the first emperor.” Who by the way, didn’t build anything like the Great Wall you see today.

事实上，那是与始皇有关的一种力量和统治的象征。”顺便说一句，谁没有建造像你今天看到的长城这样的东西。

He built walls, and they were fine, they were good, but the Great Wall itself didn’t come into being until many centuries later.

他建造了城墙，它们很好，很好，但长城本身直到许多世纪后才出现。

But still, this idea of anything that suggests a kind of greatness is something that as a, in many ways, a nationalist above all else, Xi Jinping is a supporter of the party and single-party rule.

但尽管如此，这种任何暗示某种伟大的想法都表明，从很多方面来说，作为一名民族主义者，习近平是共产党和一党专政的支持者。

That’s something he clearly believes in, and he’s a nationalist, he wants to see China be great and acknowledge this great on the world stage.

这是他明确相信的事情，他是一名民族主义者，他希望看到中国伟大并在世界舞台上承认这一伟大。

Boy, so many contradictions always with Stalin, he was a communist but also a nationalist, right?

男孩，总是和斯大林有很多矛盾，他是一个共产主义者，但也是一个民族主义者，对吗？

11:00 That contradiction, it also permeates through Mao and all the way to Xi Jinping.

这种矛盾，也渗透到毛泽东，一直到习近平。

But if you can linger on Confucius for a little bit, you write that one of the most famous statements of Confucianism is the belief that, quote, “People are pretty much alike at birth, but become differentiated via learning.” So this sets the tradition that China places a high value on education and on meritocracy.

但如果你能稍微停留在孔子身上，你会写到，儒家最著名的言论之一就是相信“人生而相似，而通过学习而有所不同”。这奠定了中国高度重视教育和精英管理的传统。

Can you speak to this Confucius’s idea of education, and how much does it permeate to the China of today?

您能否谈谈孔子的教育理念，它对当今中国的影响有多大？

Sure.

当然。

11:44 So there’s an optimism to this, there’s an optimism in the sense of a ability that people can be good.

所以对此有一种乐观的态度，这是一种人们可以向善的能力意义上的乐观态度。

And when exposed to exemplary figures from the past, they’ll want to be like those exemplary figures.

当接触到过去的模范人物时，他们会想成为那些模范人物。

So it was a form of education through kind of emulation of models and study of past figures and past texts that were exemplary.

因此，这是一种通过模仿模型和研究过去的人物和过去的典范文本来进行的教育形式。

And it did have this idea, a relatively positive view of human nature and the sort of changeability of humans through education.

它确实有这样的想法，对人性的相对积极的看法以及人类通过教育的可变性。

12:21 And I think that shows through in all kinds of things, even the fact that while there were lots of killings by the Chinese Communist Party and other groups, there was often an idea that people could be remolded potentially.

我认为这体现在各种各样的事情上，甚至是尽管中国共产党和其他团体进行了大量杀戮，但人们常常有一种想法，认为人们有可能被改造。

And China was one of the few places where they didn’t kill the last emperor.

而中国是少数几个没有杀死末代皇帝的地方之一。

The last emperor, the idea was that he could become…

末代皇帝，他的想法是他可以成为……

anybody could be kind of turned into a citizen of this or a subject of this, a good member of this polity through the kind of education, often it was a very kind of forceful form of education, but I think that’s a carryover from the Confucian times.

任何人都可以通过这种教育成为这个国家的公民或这个国家的臣民，这个政体的好成员，通常这是一种非常有力的教育形式，但我认为这是儒家时代的遗留物。

13:09 And over time, this Confucian idea led to the creation of one of the early great civil service exams, an idea that bureaucracy should be run, not by people who were born into the right families, but ones who had shown their ability to master these fairly intensive kind of exams.

随着时间的推移，这种儒家思想催生了早期伟大的公务员考试之一，即官僚机构不应由出身名门的人来管理，而应由那些表现出掌握这些相当密集的考试的能力的人来管理。

And the exams were things that could make or break your career, a bit like at some points in the American past, passing a bar exam, a really intensive thing could set you on the road to a good career.

考试可能会成就或毁掉你的职业生涯，有点像美国过去的某些时候，通过律师资格考试，一件真正强度大的事情可以让你走上通往良好职业生涯的道路。

In China, you had the civil service exam tradition.

在中国，有公务员考试的传统。

13:46 So I think this kind of emphasis on education and on valuing of scholarly pursuits, but then Chinese leaders throughout history, including up to Mao and Xi Jinping, have also found scholars to be tremendously difficult to control.

所以我认为这种对教育和学术追求的重视，但历史上的中国领导人，包括毛泽东和习近平，也发现学者非常难以控制。

So there’s an ambivalence to it or a contradiction again there.

所以这里面又存在矛盾或者矛盾。

But to which degree, this idea of meritocracy that’s inherent to the notion that we all start at the same line, there’s a meritocratic view of human nature there?

但是，这种精英主义的观念是我们都从同一条线上开始的观念所固有的，在多大程度上存在对人性的精英主义观点？

14:10 Or if you work hard and you learn things, you will succeed.

或者，如果你努力工作并学习东西，你就会成功。

And so the reverse, if you haven’t succeeded, that means you didn’t work hard, and therefore do not deserve the spoils of the success.

反之，如果你没有成功，那就意味着你没有努力工作，因此不值得获得成功的战利品。

Does that carry over to the China of today?

这会延续到今天的中国吗？

There’s such a challenge in all these forms of meritocracy because you had the civil service exams, but the question was if you had a really good tutor, if you could afford a really good tutor, you had a better chance of passing the exams.

所有这些形式的精英管理都面临着巨大的挑战，因为你要参加公务员考试，但问题是，如果你有一个非常好的导师，如果你能负担得起一个非常好的导师，你通过考试的机会就更大。

14:56 One thing that happened there was families would pull together resources to try to help the brightest in their group to be able to become part of the officialdom.

那里发生的一件事是，家庭会聚集资源，试图帮助他们群体中最聪明的人能够成为官场的一部分。

And this kind of pooling together resources to help as a family was an important part of that structure.

这种汇集资源作为一个家庭提供帮助的方式是该结构的重要组成部分。

But there was always a tension of that, so what if you don’t succeed?

但总是有一种紧张感，如果你不成功怎么办？

15:25 Some of the leaders of rebellions against emperors were failed examination candidates.

一些反抗皇帝的领导人未能通过考试。

You had this issue, and then it became something, well, the system was out of whack, and it needed a new leader.

你遇到了这个问题，然后它就变成了，嗯，系统出了问题，需要一个新的领导者。

15:42 And also there was something built in that was not so much Confucius himself, but one of his main interpreters, early interpreters, Mencius, had this idea, which can be seen as a crude justification for a rebellion or for a kind of democracy to say that even though the emperor rules at the will of heaven, if he doesn’t act like a true emperor, if he’s not morally upstanding, then heaven will remove its mandate to him.

而且其中蕴藏着某种东西，与其说是孔子本人，不如说是他的主要解释者之一、早期的解释者孟子有这样的想法，这可以被视为叛乱或某种民主的粗略辩护，即即使皇帝按照天意统治，但如果他的行为不像一个真正的皇帝，如果他道德不正直，那么天就会取消对他的委托。

And then there’s no obligation to show deference for a ruler who’s not behaving like a true ruler.

然后，没有义务对行为不像真正统治者的统治者表示尊重。

And there it sort of justifies rebellion.

这在某种程度上为叛逆提供了正当理由。

And the idea is that if the rebellion isn’t justified, then heaven will stop the ruler from being killed.

这个想法是，如果叛乱没有正当理由，那么上天就会阻止统治者被杀。

But if heaven has removed his support, then the rebellion will succeed, and then a new ruler will be justified in taking power.

但如果上天没有了他的支持，那么叛乱就会成功，新的统治者就有理由夺取政权。

So it’s an interesting sense that the universe in this Confucian view has a kind of moral dimension to it, but it also, it’s when things actually happen that you see where the side of morality is.

因此，在儒家观点中，宇宙具有某种道德维度，这是一个有趣的感觉，但同时，只有当事情实际发生时，你才能看到道德的一面在哪里。

Okay, so it’s meritocracy with an asterisk.

好吧，这就是带有星号的精英管理。

17:03 It does seem to be the case, maybe you can speak to that, that in the Chinese education system, there seems to be a high value for excellence.

情况似乎确实如此，也许你可以这么说，在中国的教育体系中，似乎非常重视卓越。

Hopefully I’m not generalizing too much, but from the things I’ve seen, there are certain cultures, certain peoples that it’s just part of the value system of the culture that you need to be a really good student.

希望我没有概括太多，但从我所看到的情况来看，在某些文化、某些民族中，这只是该文化价值体系的一部分，你需要成为一名真正的好学生。

Is that the case with the China of today?

今天的中国也是如此吗？

There’s been a lot of emphasis on education and sort of working really hard and excelling at some subjects and having…

人们非常重视教育，并且非常努力地工作并在某些科目上表现出色，并且……

17:32 There isn’t the civil service exam, but there is the Gaokao, an exam that really can determine where you get what kind of institution you get into.

没有公务员考试，但是有高考，高考确实可以决定你进入什么样的院校。

17:53 And I think getting back to this idea of meritocracy, which is strong in a lot of tradition.

我想回到精英管理的理念上来，这种理念在很多传统中都很牢固。

It also a kind of…

它也是一种…

what it opens you up to is when there is a sense of unfairness on who’s getting ahead and how the spoils are being divided, this leads to a kind of outrage.

当你对谁领先以及如何分配战利品感到不公平时，这会导致一种愤怒。

And some of the biggest protests in China have been about this sense of nepotism, which really seems to subvert this whole idea of kind of meritocracy.

中国最大的一些抗议就是与这种裙带关系有关，这似乎确实颠覆了精英统治的整个理念。

18:31 And the 1989 protests of Tiananmen, even though kind of in the Western press particularly was discussed as a movement for democracy, but a lot of the first posters that went up that got students really angry were criticisms of corruption within the Communist Party and nepotism, and the sense that people, despite all the talk…

1989 年的天安门抗议活动，尽管在西方媒体中特别被讨论为一场民主运动，但许多第一批让学生真正愤怒的海报都是对共产党内部腐败和裙带关系的批评，以及人们的感觉，尽管有这么多的谈论……

I mean, despite the fact that most people seem to be having to study really hard to pass these exams to get good positions in universities, that some of them were being handed out via the kind of back door.

我的意思是，尽管事实上大多数人似乎必须非常努力地学习才能通过这些考试才能在大学获得好职位，但其中一些人是通过后门发放的。

And that led to a kind of outrage.

这引发了一种愤怒。

I mean, that’s true in many places, but I think it gives a special anger against nepotism because of that, the way in which so much emphasis is put on kind of the standard exam way of getting ahead.

我的意思是，在很多地方都是如此，但我认为这引起了人们对裙带关系的特别愤怒，因为这种方式如此强调通过标准考试取得成功的方式。

I hope it’s okay if we jump around through history a bit and find the threads that connect everything.

我希望我们稍微浏览一下历史并找到连接一切的线索就可以了。

19:21 Since you mentioned Tiananmen Square, you have studied a lot of student protests throughout Chinese history, throughout history in general, what happened in Tiananmen Square?

既然你提到了天安门广场，你研究了中国历史上的很多学生抗议活动，整个历史，天安门广场发生了什么？

So in 1989, this massive movement took place, the story of it’s largely suppressed within China and largely misunderstood in other places in part because it happened around the same time that communism was unraveling and ending in the former Soviet Bloc.

因此，1989 年，发生了这场大规模的运动，它的故事在中国境内很大程度上受到压制，而在其他地方很大程度上被误解，部分原因是它发生在前苏联集团共产主义解体和结束的同一时间。

19:38 So I think it’s often conflated with what was going on there.

所以我认为它经常与那里发生的事情混为一谈。

And so I think one of the key things to know about the protests in 1989 was that they were an effort to get the Communist Party in China to do a better job of living up to its own stated ideals, and to try to support the trend within the party toward a kind of liberalizing and opening up form that had taken shape after Mao’s death.

因此，我认为，关于 1989 年的抗议活动，我们需要了解的一个关键事情是，这些抗议活动是为了让中国共产党更好地实现自己既定的理想，并试图支持党内走向毛泽东去世后形成的自由化和开放形式的趋势。

And in a sense, the student generation of ’89, and I was there in ’86 when there were some sort of warm-up protests, there was a kind of frustration with what they felt was a half-assed version of what they were talking about, that the government was saying, the party was saying, we believe in reforming and opening up, we need to liberalize, we need to give people more control of their fate.

从某种意义上说，89年的学生一代，我是86年的学生，当时有某种热身抗议，他们感到一种沮丧，因为他们认为他们所说的内容是半途而废的版本，政府说，党说，我们相信改革开放，我们需要自由化，我们需要让人们更多地掌控自己的命运。

And the students felt that this was being done more effectively in the economic realm than in the political realm, and that there were a lot of sort of partial gestures that suggested the party needed to be pressed to really, really move in that direction.

学生们认为，这在经济领域比在政治领域做得更有效，而且有很多片面的姿态表明，需要向该党施压，使其真正、真正朝这个方向前进。

21:17 And it’ll seem like a very trivial thing, but I found it fascinating in ’86 when I was there in Shanghai in late ’86, and students protested, and this was the first time that students had been really on the streets in significant numbers since the Culture Revolution or at least since ’76.

这看起来是一件非常微不足道的事情，但我在86年发现这很有趣，当时我在86年末在上海，学生们抗议，这是自文化大革命或至少自76年以来第一次真正大量的学生走上街头。

21:37 And the students were inspired by calls for democracy and discussion of democracy by this physicist, Fang Lizhi, who was a kind of often thought a Chinese Sakharov.

而学生们也受到了物理学家方励之对民主的呼吁和对民主的讨论的启发，方励之通常被认为是中国的萨哈罗夫。

He was a liberalizing intellectual.

他是一位自由主义知识分子。

21:53 But one of the things that students in Shanghai, where some of the most intense protests that year took place, were frustrated about was a rock concert of all things that Jan and Dean, the American surf rock band, which was kind of like the Beach Boys, only not as big, and they were touring China.

但上海的学生们感到沮丧的一件事是，美国冲浪摇滚乐队简和迪恩（Jan and Dean）举办了一场摇滚音乐会，这支乐队有点像海滩男孩，只是没有那么大，而且他们正在中国巡演。上海是当年最激烈的抗议活动的发生地。

It was the first time in Shanghai that there’d been a rock concert.

这是上海第一次举办摇滚音乐会。

And the students were really excited about this because this fit in with what they thought the Communist Party was moving toward, was letting them be more part of the world.

学生们对此感到非常兴奋，因为这符合他们认为共产党正在走向的方向，让他们更多地融入世界。

And for them, that meant being more in step with pop culture around the world.

对他们来说，这意味着与世界各地的流行文化更加同步。

And at the concert, some students got up to dance because that’s what they knew you were supposed to do at a rock concert, and the security guards made them sit down.

在音乐会上，一些学生起身跳舞，因为他们知道摇滚音乐会上应该跳舞，保安让他们坐下。

And for the students in Shanghai, this would’ve symbolized what was a feint toward openness that really didn’t have follow-through; we’re going to give you rock concerts, but not let you dance.

对于上海的学生来说，这象征着一种假装开放，但实际上并没有什么后续行动。我们将为你们举办摇滚音乐会，但不会让你们跳舞。

22:49 And so the protests went on for a little while in ’86, and posters went up.

因此，86 年的抗议活动持续了一段时间，海报也贴了起来。

The officials at universities said, “Now this is out of hand.

大学官员表示：“现在情况已经失控了。

We had chaos on the streets during the Culture Revolution.

文化大革命期间，我们的街头一片混乱。

We can’t go back to that.” And nobody wanted to go back to that.

我们不能再回到那个时候了。”没有人愿意回到过去。

So there were posters I saw that said, this is new Red Guardism.

所以我看到一些海报说，这是新的红卫兵主义。

And the students didn’t want to be associated with that.

学生们不想与此扯上关系。

So it wound down pretty quickly, and they thought, we’re not like the Red Guards.

所以很快就结束了，他们想，我们不像红卫兵。

We don’t want to make chaos.

我们不想制造混乱。

We also are not fervent loyalists of anybody in power.

我们也不是任何当权者的狂热忠诚者。

The Red Guards had been passionate about Mao.

红卫兵们对毛泽东充满热情。

The analogy partly sort of scared them, and also it meant that the government was really serious about dealing with them.

这个类比在一定程度上让他们感到害怕，同时也意味着政府在对待他们方面是非常认真的。

23:36 So then in 1989, the protest restart, and there are a variety of reasons why they can restart.

那么到了1989年，抗议活动重新启动，并且有各种各样的原因可以重新启动。

The space for them…

他们的空间……

Students are thinking about doing something in 1989.

1989年，学生们正在考虑做点什么。

It’s a very resonant year, 200th anniversary of the French Revolution.

今年是法国大革命 200 周年，这是非常值得引起共鸣的一年。

People are thinking about that.

人们正在思考这个问题。

But more importantly, it’s the 70th anniversary of the biggest student movement in Chinese history, the May Fourth Movement of 1919.

但更重要的是，今天是中国历史上最大的学生运动——1919年五四运动——的70周年。

24:04 And the May Fourth Movement had helped lay the groundwork for the Chinese Communist Party.

五四运动为中国共产党奠定了基础。

Some member leading founders of it had been student activists then, it was an anti-imperialist movement, but it was also a movement against bad government.

它的一些成员主要创始人当时是学生活动家，这是一场反帝国主义运动，但也是一场反对坏政府的运动。

And so the students thought the anniversary of that movement was always marked, commemorated in China, and people took the history seriously.

因此，学生们认为，在中国，这场运动的周年纪念日总是被标记和纪念的，人们也认真对待这段历史。

People were reminded of what students did in the past, and so there were a lot of reasons why people were itching to do something.

人们会想起学生过去做过的事情，因此人们渴望做某事的原因有很多。

24:39 And then a leader, Hu Yaobang, who was associated with the more kind of reformist, more liberalizing group within the Chinese Communist Party, he had been stripped of a very high office, demoted after partly taking a fairly light stance toward the ’86, ’87 protests.

当时的领导人胡耀邦与中国共产党内更偏向改革、更自由化的团体有联系，他被剥夺了很高的职位，并在对 86 年和 87 年的抗议活动采取了相当温和的立场后被降职。

And so he was still a member of the government, but he was not as high up in power.

所以他仍然是政府成员，但权力没有那么高。

He had been very high up.

他的地位很高。

He had been sort of Deng Xiaoping’s potential successor, and he dies unexpectedly.

他曾是邓小平的潜在接班人，但他却意外去世。

And there has to be a funeral for him because he dies still as an official.

而且必须为他举行葬礼，因为他死时仍然是一名官员。

And the students take advantage of the opening of there having to be commemorations of his death.

学生们利用开幕式来纪念他的去世。

And they put up posters that basically say the wrong people are dying.

他们张贴的海报基本上表明错误的人正在死去。

Hu Yaobang was younger than some of the more conservative members.

胡耀邦比一些较为保守的成员更年轻。

They said, “So some people are dying too young, some people don’t seem like they’re ever going to die.”

他们说，“所以有些人死得太早，有些人似乎永远不会死。”

25:40 So they begin these sorts of protests.

所以他们开始了这类抗议。

This is in April of ’89.

这是89年4月的事。

And the government tries to sort of get the protest to stop quickly, and they use the sort of same technique of they issue an editorial in People’s Daily that says, “This is creating chaos,” which is a code term for take us back to the Culture Revolution.

政府试图让抗议活动迅速停止，他们使用了与《人民日报》发表社论相同的技巧，社论说，“这是制造混乱”，这是一个将我们带回到文化大革命的代名词。

And this time the students say, “No, we’re just trying to show our patriotism.

这次学生们说：“不，我们只是想表达我们的爱国主义。

We believe that there’s too much corruption and nepotism.

我们认为腐败和裙带关系太多。

There’s not enough support for the more liberalizing wing within the party.” And so they keep up the protests.

党内更加自由化的派别没有得到足够的支持。”所以他们继续抗议。

26:18 And there’s a lot of frustration at this point.

此时有很多挫败感。

There are also economic frustrations at this point.

目前还存在经济方面的挫折。

The economy is improving because of the reforms, but it seems that people with good government connections are getting rich too easily.

由于改革，经济正在改善，但与政府有良好关系的人似乎太容易致富了。

And so there’s sort of a sense of unfairness.

所以有一种不公平的感觉。

The students are also really frustrated by the kind of macro-managing of their private lives on campuses.

学生们对校园私生活的宏观管理也感到非常沮丧。

26:42 So the protests at Tiananmen Square and in plazas all around the country and other cities as well become this mix of things.

因此，天安门广场、全国各地和其他城市的广场上的抗议活动也变成了这种混合形式。

It’s an anti-corruption movement, it’s a call for more democracy movement, it’s a call for more freedom of speech movement, but it’s also a kind of…

这是一场反腐败运动，这是一场呼吁更多民主运动，这是一场呼吁更多言论自由的运动，但它也是一种……

has some counterculture elements that are like, there are rock concerts on the square, the most popular rock musician, Cui Jian, comes to the square and is celebrated when he’s there.

有一些反文化的元素，比如，广场上有摇滚音乐会，最受欢迎的摇滚音乐家崔健来到广场，当他在那里时受到庆祝。

There’s a sense of kind of a variety of things rolled into one.

有一种多种事物融为一体的感觉。

27:17 And I brought up how it sort of gets conflated with the movements to overthrow communism in the Eastern Bloc.

我提到了它是如何与东欧集团推翻共产主义的运动混为一谈的。

It was actually, in many ways, I think more like something that happened in the Eastern Bloc 20 years earlier.

实际上，在很多方面，我认为这更像是 20 年前发生在东方集团的事情。

It was more like Prague Spring and other 1968 protests in the Communist Bloc, which was about moving toward socialism with a human face, more like trying to get the parties empowered to reform rather than necessarily doing away with them.

这更像是布拉格之春和1968年共产主义集团的其他抗议活动，其目的是走向人性化的社会主义，更像是试图让政党有权进行改革，而不是必然废除它们。

27:46 So there was a kind of disjuncture, happened at the same time as moves to end communism.

因此，在结束共产主义的运动同时发生了一种分裂。

But of course, so there was a possibility when all the protesters were on the square.

但当然，当所有抗议者都在广场上时，就有可能发生。

It seemed that for a time that this might be seen as an acceptable kind of movement to just have a kind of course correction.

有一段时间，这似乎被视为一种可以接受的运动，只是进行一种路线修正。

But then there’s also an internal struggle within the Communist Party leadership.

但共产党领导层内部也存在斗争。

And clearly the people who are more political conservatives, even if they believe in economic reform, are clearly getting the upper hand.

显然，政治保守派人士即使相信经济改革，也显然占据了上风。

And this is not going to be tolerated.

这是不能容忍的。

And the students stay on the square when signals are given to try to get them out.

当发出信号试图让学生离开时，学生们留在广场上。

Students from around the country are pouring in to Beijing to join this movement.

全国各地的学生纷纷涌入北京加入这场运动。

They don’t want to end the movement when they’ve just arrived.

他们不想在刚到达时就结束运动。

So it’s actually one thing that keeps it going is new participants are coming from the provinces.

因此，实际上让它继续下去的一件事是来自各省的新参与者。

And even if some moderates want to leave the square, people want to stay.

即使一些温和派想要离开广场，人们也想留下来。

28:47 And then workers start joining in the movement as well and form a independent labor union.

然后工人们也开始加入运动并组建独立的工会。

And that really, the Chinese Communist Party, to a certain extent, they might put up with student protesters, but they know from past experience that sometimes student protests lead to members of other social classes joining them because they look up to students as sort of potential intellectual leaders of the country.

事实上，中国共产党在某种程度上可能会容忍学生抗议者，但他们从过去的经验中知道，有时学生抗议会导致其他社会阶层的成员加入他们，因为他们将学生视为国家潜在的知识领袖。

And admiration for scholars is part of this that people turn out when students protest, something very different from the American case where there’s a kind of often suspicious of student activists being necessarily on the same side as everybody else.

当学生抗议时，人们会表现出对学者的钦佩，这与美国的情况非常不同，在美国，人们经常怀疑学生活动人士一定与其他人站在同一边。

29:31 But in China, there had been, from the history of the 20th century, a sense of students as potentially a vanguard.

但在中国，从20世纪的历史来看，学生一直被视为潜在的先锋队。

So once there are labor activists joining the movement, then troops are called in.

因此，一旦有劳工积极分子加入运动，就会召集军队介入。

And there’s a massacre near Tiananmen Square on the middle of the night of June 3rd and early on June 4th.

6月3日半夜和6月4日凌晨，天安门广场附近发生了一场屠杀。

And the army just moves in and begins behaving very much like an army of occupation, which is something that People’s Liberation Army is supposed to be the one that saves China from foreign aggression, and they’re acting like an invading force.

军队刚刚进驻并开始表现得非常像一支占领军，人民解放军应该是拯救中国免遭外国侵略的军队，但他们的表现就像一支侵略军。

So this is where famously the tanks roll in.

这就是著名的坦克滚滚的地方。

The tanks roll in, and I think also you have that famous image of the man standing in front of the tank.

坦克滚滚而来，我想你也看到了那个站在坦克前面的人的著名形象。

30:14 That’s a banned image within China.

这是中国境内禁止的图片。

And I really think the reason why it’s so considered so toxic by the regime is because it just shows the People’s Liberation Army looking like an invading force, not like a stabilizing force.

我真的认为它被政权认为如此有毒的原因是因为它只是表明人民解放军看起来像一支入侵力量，而不是一支稳定力量。

Can we talk about that, who’s now called the Tank Man, the man that stood in front of the row of tanks?

我们能谈谈那个现在被称为“坦克人”的人吗？站在那排坦克前面的那个人？

30:36 This was on June 5th in Tiananmen Square.

这是6月5日的天安门广场。

What do we know about him?

我们对他了解多少？

What do you think about him, the symbolism?

你对他的象征意义有何看法？

It’s an amazing symbol.

这是一个了不起的象征。

30:51 He’s on this boulevard near the square with this long line of tanks, and it’s unquestionably this act of incredible bravery.

他站在广场附近的大道上，坦克排成一长队，毫无疑问，这是令人难以置信的勇敢行为。

And there’s some interesting things about…

还有一些有趣的事情……

31:00 …

……

act of incredible bravery.

令人难以置信的勇敢行为。

And there’s some interesting things about it, some that are forgotten.

其中有一些有趣的事情，有些被遗忘了。

One is that in the end he climbs up on the tank and the tank swerves.

一是最后他爬上了坦克，坦克突然转向。

It doesn’t run him over.

它不会压倒他。

And the Chinese Communist Party initially showed video of this and said, “Look, the Western press is talking about how vicious we were, but look at the restraint.

中国共产党最初展示了这段视频并说：“看，西方媒体正在谈论我们有多么恶毒，但看看我们的克制。

Look at this.

看看这个。

He wasn’t mowed down.” And they tried this whole story with Tiananmen initially of saying, “Look, the students were out of control.

他没有被砍倒。”他们最初对天安门事件尝试了整个故事，说：“看，学生们失控了。

Everybody should remember what happened during the Cultural Revolution, and the army showed restraint.” And there were a small number of soldiers who were actually burned alive in their tanks during…

大家应该记住文革期间发生的事情，军队表现出了克制。”还有少数士兵实际上在坦克中被活活烧死……

Once the massacre began, people got outraged and they attacked the soldiers.

屠杀一开始，人们就愤怒了，他们袭击了士兵。

But by selective use of footage, the Communist Party could say, “Look.

但通过选择性地使用镜头，共产党可以说：“看。

Actually look at this.

其实看看这个。

The heroes, the martyrs, were these soldiers.”

英雄、烈士就是这些士兵。”

31:58 And they try, for the first months after it, to try to get this narrative to stick.

在事件发生后的头几个月里，他们试图让这种说法继续下去。

They talk about Tiananmen a lot.

他们经常谈论天安门事件。

They talk about these things.

他们谈论这些事情。

They show images of the tank man.

他们展示了坦克人的图像。

The problem with it is that lots and lots of people around Beijing had seen what happened and knew that in fact, there’d first been the firing on unarmed civilians with automatic weapons.

问题在于，北京周围很多很多人都看到了发生的事情，并且知道事实上，首先是用自动武器向手无寸铁的平民开枪。

And there had been many, many people, some students, but a lot of ordinary Beijing residents and workers, who were just mowed down.

还有很多很多人，有学生，但也有很多普通的北京居民和工人，他们刚刚被砍倒。

So lots of people knew somebody who had been killed.

所以很多人都认识被杀的人。

So that story just didn’t work.

所以这个故事根本行不通。

32:35 And then I think the claim had to be made to try to suppress discussion of the event and particularly to repress that visual imagery that was that image of the man in front of the line of tanks.

然后我认为必须提出这一主张，以试图抑制对这一事件的讨论，特别是抑制视觉图像，即坦克前的那个人的图像。

Whatever the tanks did to him or not, the main takeaway from it would be this idea that there were lines of tanks in a city.

无论坦克对他做了什么，主要的收获就是城市里有一排坦克。

The image was of the government as having lost the mandate to rule, and they really didn’t want to have that image out there in the world.

政府的形象是失去了统治权，他们真的不想让这个形象出现在世界上。

Yeah.

是的。

33:14 We’re watching the video now.

我们现在正在看视频。

He’s got, what, grocery bags in his hands?

他手里拿着什么购物袋？

It’s such a symbolic, “I’ve had enough,” that kind of statement.

这是一种象征性的说法，“我已经受够了”。

Yeah, and it’s probably not a student.

是的，而且可能不是学生。

33:28 It’s often described as a student, but he probably was a worker.

人们通常将其描述为学生，但他可能是一名工人。

And it is a powerful, powerful image of bravery.

这是一个强大、有力的勇敢形象。

And I brought up the 1968 parallel for Eastern and Central Europe.

我提出了 1968 年东欧和中欧的情况。

There was actually a very powerful photograph of a man baring his chest in front of a tank in Bratislava during what we think of as Prague Spring.

事实上，在我们所说的“布拉格之春”期间，有一张非常有力的照片，照片中一名男子在布拉迪斯拉发的一辆​​坦克前袒露胸膛。

That was a famous image of bravery against tanks.

那是勇敢对抗坦克的著名形象。

And in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, then still Czechoslovakia, the tanks that rolled in were Soviet tanks sent down there.

1968年，在捷克斯洛伐克，当时还是捷克斯洛伐克，开进来的坦克是苏联派来的坦克。

But that was an image…

但那是一个图像……

What was so powerful in that was saying, “We’re not going to put up with this invasion.”

这句话的威力在于：“我们不会容忍这次入侵。”

34:18 Again, I think you have the People’s Liberation Army looking like an invading force, and that’s what the Chinese Communist Party in a sense can’t deal with now.

再说一次，我认为中国人民解放军看起来就像一支入侵力量，从某种意义上说，这是中国共产党现在无法应对的。

Even though sometimes they could tell a story about 1989, and they do tell a version of this, and some people believe this, I think, is that in 1989, China went one route of not having the Communist Party dramatically change or relinquish control, and the Soviet Union and the former Soviet states went another.

尽管有时他们可以讲述一个关于1989年的故事，而且他们确实讲述了这个故事的一个版本，而且有些人相信，我认为，在1989年，中国走了一条没有让共产党发生戏剧性改变或放弃控制的路线，而苏联和前苏联国家则走了另一条路线。

And you could say, “Well, look.” And after 1989, the Chinese economy boomed.

你可以说，“好吧，看。” 1989年后，中国经济蓬勃发展。

Life got better for people in China.

中国人民的生活变得更好了。

Life got really terrible for a lot of people in the former Soviet blocs.

对于前苏联集团的许多人来说，生活变得非常糟糕。

“Actually, maybe this was the right way to go.” And you can make that kind of argument, but if you show the tanks and the man in front of the tanks, you just have a different kind of image of heroism.

“事实上，也许这才是正确的做法。”你可以提出这样的论点，但如果你展示坦克和坦克前面的人，你就会看到一种不同的英雄主义形象。

It’s one of my favorite photographs or snapshots ever taken, videos ever taken, so I apologize if we linger on it.

这是我最喜欢的照片或快照、视频之一，所以如果我们在它上面徘徊，我深表歉意。

35:17 Sometimes you don’t understand the symbolic power of an image until afterwards, and perhaps that’s what the Chinese government didn’t quite understand.

有时你直到事后才理解图像的象征力量，也许这就是中国政府不太理解的地方。

They lost information more than [inaudible 00:35:39].

他们丢失的信息超过 [听不清 00:35:39]。

So I have to ask, what do you think was going through that man’s head?

所以我不得不问，你认为那个人脑子里在想什么？

Was it a heroic statement?

这是一个英雄的宣言吗？

Was it a purely primal guttural, “I’ve had enough”?

这是纯粹的原始喉音，“我受够了”吗？

It’s so interesting to just speculate, and we just don’t know, because he was never able to be interviewed afterwards.

猜测是很有趣的，但我们只是不知道，因为事后他再也无法接受采访。

35:50 But I think your emphasis on patriotism is really important, because one of the students’ main demands was, then I think it might have been the thing that would have gotten them to leave the square, would’ve been to say, “We want this to be acknowledged as a patriotic, that our goals are patriotic.” We’re not here to take China back into the Cultural Revolution.

但我认为你对爱国主义的强调非常重要，因为学生的主要要求之一是，那么我认为这可能是让他们离开广场的原因，就是说，“我们希望这被认为是爱国的，我们的目标是爱国的。”我们来这里不是为了让中国重新陷入文化大革命。

We’re here to express our love for the country if it goes in the right way.

如果这个国家进展顺利，我们来这里是为了表达我们对这个国家的热爱。

So will you admit that?”

那么你愿意承认吗？”

36:23 And you mentioned about the power of the image, and I do think the Chinese Communist Party learned something, has taken to heart the power of the image after that, because we saw this when there were protests in Hong Kong.

你提到了形象的力量，我确实认为中国共产党在那之后学到了一些东西，并牢记了形象的力量，因为我们在香港发生抗议活动时看到了这一点。

The government on the mainland really wanted to tell a story there of crowds out of control.

大陆政府确实想讲述一个人群失控的故事。

And initially in 2014, and again initially in 2019, there were very orderly crowds, and it had trouble with that story.

最初是在 2014 年，后来又是在 2019 年，人群非常秩序井然，这个故事在讲述时遇到了麻烦。

So they tried very hard to ban images of peaceful protests until there were some incidents, as there almost always are, of violence by crowds, and then they would show those images over and over again.

因此，他们非常努力地禁止和平抗议的图像，直到出现一些人群暴力事件（几乎总是如此），然后他们会一遍又一遍地展示这些图像。

37:09 They also worked very hard, when Hong Kong protests began in the 2010s, to try very hard to avoid any use of soldiers to repress them.

当2010年代香港抗议活动开始时，他们也非常努力地避免使用士兵镇压他们。

It was all the police.

都是警察。

And they tried very hard and managed to success because the Western press was often saying, “Will this be another Tiananmen?

他们非常努力并取得了成功，因为西方媒体经常说：“这会是另一个天安门吗？

Will there be a massacre, or will there be soldiers on the streets?” The movements in Hong Kong were suppressed without the use of shooting to kill on the streets.

会发生屠杀，还是街上会有士兵？”香港的运动被镇压，没有使用街头枪杀。

They were shooting to wound.

他们向受伤者开枪。

There was bean-bag shot.

有豆袋射击。

There were rubber bullets.

有橡皮子弹。

There was enormous amounts of tear gas.

现场释放了大量催泪瓦斯。

There was even tear gas let fly inside subway stations in 2019.

2019年，地铁站内甚至还曾发射过催泪瓦斯。

37:54 And all these things are really brutalizing, but they don’t make the kind of images that sear in the mind the way something like the Tiananmen tank man image or the image of a Vietnamese woman being burned by napalm, a young woman, that became another of the iconic images during Vietnam War.

所有这些事情确实很残酷，但它们并没有像天安门坦克人的形象或被凝固汽油弹烧伤的越南妇女的形象那样让人印象深刻，而后者成为越南战争期间的另一个标志性形象。

Those images really can have an extraordinary power, and I think the Chinese Communist Party is now aware of that.

这些图像确实可以具有非凡的力量，我认为中国共产党现在已经意识到了这一点。

There are very few photographs allowed of the Xinjiang extra-legal detention camps.

新疆法外拘留营很少被允许拍照。

There is an awareness of how much power a photograph of a certain type can have.

人们意识到某种类型的照片可以拥有多大的力量。

So nobody knows what happened to the tank man?

那么没人知道坦克人怎么了？

No.

不。

What do you think happened to the tank man?

你认为坦克人发生了什么？

I assume he was killed.

我认为他被杀了。

Killed.

被杀了。

I assume he was just disappeared.

我猜想他只是失踪了。

38:50 It’s interesting because very often, figures are made an example of in one way or another.

这很有趣，因为很多时候，数字都会以这样或那样的方式作为例子。

I mean, Liu Xiaobo was imprisoned and not allowed to get enough medical care, so you can talk about him having died earlier than he should have.

我的意思是，刘晓波被关进监狱，得不到足够的医疗护理，所以你可以说他死得早了。

But there’s been relatively few for political crimes recently, sentencing to death and things like that.

但最近政治犯罪、判处死刑之类的比较少。

It’s much more just remove them, imprison them.

更重要的是除去他们，监禁他们。

But the tank man, there was never a trial, even a trial that was one that you knew what the result would be, which there was for Liu Xiaobo and others.

但坦克人，从来没有审判，即使是一场你知道结果会是什么的审判，就像刘晓波和其他人的审判一样。

Not even a hidden trial, but simply disappeared.

连隐藏试炼都算不上，只是消失了。

39:40 And there’s been somebody who’s like another figure like this who’s disappeared.

还有一个像这样的人一样失踪了。

A couple of years ago in Beijing, there was a lone man who put up a banner on a bridge, Sitong bridge in Beijing.

几年前，在北京，有一个人孤身一人在北京四通桥上挂了一条横幅。

And it was extraordinary.

这是非凡的。

It had denunciations of the direction Xi Jinping was taking the country.

它谴责了习近平带领国家走向的方向。

It was denunciation of Covid policies, but also a dictatorial rule.

这是对新冠政策的谴责，也是独裁统治。

And the banner, somehow he managed to have it up and get it long enough to be filmed and to draw attention and the film to circulate.

还有横幅，不知何故，他设法把它举起来，并保持足够长的时间来拍摄，引起人们的注意，并使电影得以传播。

Again, another image of the power of images.

再次，图像力量的另一个形象。

And he’s disappeared, and there hasn’t been a show trial or even a secret trial, and again, we don’t know if he’s still alive, but these are cases where I think the Chinese Communist Party really doesn’t want a competing story out there.

他失踪了，没有进行公开审判，甚至没有进行秘密审判，而且，我们不知道他是否还活着，但我认为在这些案件中，中国共产党真的不希望出现一个相互竞争的故事。

They don’t want somebody to be able to answer what he was thinking.

他们不希望有人能够回答他的想法。

How much censorship is there in modern-day China by the Chinese government?

中国政府在当今中国有多少审查制度？

There’s a lot of censorship.

有很多审查制度。

40:43 One of my favorite books about Chinese censorship, Margaret Roberts, where she talks about there are three different ways that the government can control the stories.

我最喜欢的关于中国审查制度的书之一是《玛格丽特·罗伯茨》，她在书中谈到政府可以通过三种不同的方式控制故事。

And she says there’s fear, which is this direct censorship thing, like banning things.

她说存在恐惧，这是直接的审查制度，就像禁止某些东西一样。

But there’s also friction.

但也存在摩擦。

She has three Fs, fear, friction, and flooding, and she says they’re all important, and I think this is true not just of China, but in other settings too.

她有三个F，恐惧、摩擦和洪水，她说它们都很重要，我认为这不仅适用于中国，也适用于其他环境。

41:12 So what friction means is you just make it harder for people to get answers or get information that you don’t want them to get.

因此，摩擦意味着你只会让人们更难获得答案或获得你不希望他们获得的信息。

Even though you know that some people will get it, you just make it that the easiest way, the first answer you’ll get through a search.

即使您知道有些人会得到它，您也只是以最简单的方式，通过搜索得到的第一个答案。

So a lot of tech-savvy or globally minded, tapped-in Chinese people will use a VPN to jump over the firewall.

因此，许多精通技术或具有全球视野的中国人会使用 VPN 来跳过防火墙。

But it’s work.

但这是工作。

The internet moves slower.

互联网移动速度较慢。

You have to keep updating your VPN.

您必须不断更新您的 VPN。

So you just create friction so that, okay, some people will find this out.

所以你只是制造摩擦，这样，好吧，有些人就会发现这一点。

And then flooding.

然后洪水泛滥。

You just fill the airwaves and the media with versions of the stories that you want the people to believe.

你只需在广播和媒体上传播你希望人们相信的故事版本即可。

So all those exist and in operation, and I think the fear is the easiest side to say what’s blocked.

所以所有这些都存在并在运作，我认为恐惧是最容易说出什么被阻止的一面。

42:06 So I’m always interested in things that you would expect to be censored that aren’t censored.

所以我总是对那些你认为会被审查但没有被审查的事情感兴趣。

You can read all sorts of things in China about totalitarianism.

在中国你可以读到各种各样关于极权主义的东西。

You can read Hannah Arendt’s book on totalitarianism.

你可以阅读汉娜·阿伦特关于极权主义的书。

You’re not supposed to be able to read that in a somewhat totalitarian state or a dictatorial state of anything, but it’s not specifically about China.

你不应该在一个有点极权主义国家或任何独裁国家里读到这篇文章，但这并不是专门针对中国的。

And so censorship is most restrictive when it’s things that are actually about China.

因此，当审查实际上与中国有关时，审查制度的限制最为严格。

Things about leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, there’s intense kind of censorship of that, and certain events in that way.

关于中国共产党领导人的事情，以及某些事件都受到严格的审查。

But something through allegory, something through imagining a place that looks a lot like a Communist Party-ruled state so that people are going to read it…

但通过寓言的方式，通过想象一个看起来很像共产党统治的国家的地方，这样人们就会读到它……

43:06 There were things that were banned up until the very last period of Gorbachev’s rule, things banned in the Soviet Union, that are available in Chinese bookstores.

有些东西直到戈尔巴乔夫统治的最后时期才被禁止，在苏联被禁止的东西，在中国书店里可以买到。

You can buy 1984 in a Chinese bookstore.

你可以在中国书店买到《1984》。

You’ve been able to since 1985.

自 1985 年以来您就能够做到这一点。

Again, it’s not about China.

再说一次，这与中国无关。

And actually, for some people within China in the mid-1980s, where they focused on the part of 1984 that’s the two minutes of hate, these rituals of denunciation of people, for some people in China, it seemed like it was about their past, not about their present.

事实上，对于 20 世纪 80 年代中期中国的一些人来说，他们关注的是 1984 年那两分钟的仇恨，这些谴责人们的仪式，对于一些中国人来说，这似乎是关于他们的过去，而不是关于他们的现在。

43:41 And then by the ’90s, 1984 is a very bleak culture of scarcity, a place where people just aren’t having fun.

然后到了 90 年代，1984 年是一个非常惨淡的稀缺文化，一个人们没有乐趣的地方。

Some people would read 1984 and say, “Look, this is the world we’re living in.

有些人读到《1984》后会说：“看，这就是我们生活的世界。

It’s a Big Brother state.” But others said, “Well, that has some similarities to us, but he wasn’t talking about a country like ours.

这是一个老大哥国家。”但其他人说：“嗯，这与我们有一些相似之处，但他说的不是像我们这样的国家。

Look, we’ve got supermarkets.

看，我们有超市。

We’ve got McDonald’s.

我们有麦当劳。

We’ve got fast trains.

我们有快速列车。

We’re living so much better in some ways than our grandparents did, and this isn’t like that bleak world he was imagining.”

在某些方面，我们的生活比我们的祖父母要好得多，这并不像他想象的那个荒凉的世界。”

Yeah.

是的。

44:17 You’ve actually spoken about and described China’s more akin to the dystopian world of Brave New World than 1984, which is really interesting to think about.

你实际上谈到并描述了中国比1984年更类似于《美丽新世界》中的反乌托邦世界，这真的很有趣。

I think about that a lot.

我想了很多。

I’ve recently, over the past couple of years, reread Brave New World a couple of times, and also 1984.

最近几年，我重读了好几遍《美丽新世界》，还有《1984》。

It does seem that the 21st Century might be more defined to the degree it is dystopian, any of the nations are, by Brave New World than by 1984.

与 1984 年相比，《美丽新世界》对 21 世纪的定义似乎确实更加反乌托邦，任何国家都是如此。

There are mixed elements.

有混合的元素。

44:48 I think there are moments when it can seem more one than the other, and there can be parts of the same country that seem more one than the other, I think.

我认为，有些时候，它可能看起来比另一个更独特，而且同一个国家的某些部分也可能看起来比另一个更独特。

And if we just think about control through distraction and playing to your sense of pleasure…

如果我们只是考虑通过分散注意力和发挥你的愉悦感来进行控制……

One thing that people forget sometimes, or don’t know, is that Aldous Huxley, who wrote Brave New World, taught Eric Blair, who became George Orwell, when he was a student at Eden.

人们有时会忘记或不知道的一件事是，《美丽新世界》的作者奥尔德斯·赫胥黎在伊甸园就读时，曾教过埃里克·布莱尔（后来的乔治·奥威尔）。

And they were rivals.

他们是竞争对手。

45:21 And in fact, in 1949, Orwell sent his former teacher a copy in 1984 and said, “Look, I’ve written this.” Basically, it’s almost a little Oedipal.

事实上，1949 年，奥威尔在 1984 年给他以前的老师寄了一份副本，并说：“看，我写了这个。”基本上，这几乎有点恋母情结。

“I’ve written this book that displaces yours.” He didn’t say that.

“我写的这本书可以取代你的书。”他没有这么说。

He just said, “I want you to have this.” But he had criticized Brave New World in reviews, having imagined a world of capitalism run wild like before, realizing the totalitarian threats of the middle of the 20th century.

他只是说：“我想要你拥有这个。”但他在评论中批评了《美丽新世界》，想象了一个像以前一样疯狂的资本主义世界，意识到了20世纪中叶的极权主义威胁。

But Huxley wrote Orwell a letter in October of 1949, same month the Communist Party took control in China, not that he mentions China, and he just said, “It’s a great book and everything, but I think the dictators of the future will find less arduous ways to keep control over the population,” basically saying, “More like what was in my book than in yours.”

但赫胥黎在 1949 年 10 月给奥威尔写了一封信，同月共产党控制了中国，他没有提到中国，他只是说，“这是一本伟大的书，什么都有，但我认为未来的独裁者会找到不那么艰难的方法来控制人民，”基本上是说，“更像是我书中的内容，而不是你的书。”

I have to say, I think Huxley might be really on to something there.

我不得不说，我认为赫胥黎可能真的说到了点子上。

46:17 Truly a visionary.

真是一个有远见的人。

Although to give points to Orwell, I do think as far as just a philosophical work of fiction, 1984 is a better book, because Brave New World does not quite construct the philosophical message thoroughly because 1984 contains many very clearly, very poetically defined elements of a totalitarian regime.

虽然为了给奥威尔点分，但我确实认为，就一部哲学小说而言，《1984》是一本更好的书，因为《美丽新世界》并没有完全彻底地构建哲学信息，因为《1984》包含了许多非常清晰、非常诗意地定义了极权主义政权的元素。

Oh, and the dissection of language is so amazing.

哦，对语言的剖析是如此惊人。

Language.

语言。

No, I think you’ve got a point there, and I went back and reread Brave New World, and it’s fascinating but it’s very messy.

不，我认为你说得有道理，我回去重读了《美丽新世界》，它很有趣，但很混乱。

Yeah.

是的。

I think there’s a clarity to Orwell’s 1984.

我认为奥威尔的《1984》很清晰。

47:00 There’s a clarity to Margaret Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale, similarly, the construction of the elements, and she was a big fan of both 1984 and Brave New World, so there’s a way they go forward.

玛格丽特·阿特伍德的《使女的故事》的元素结构也很清晰，而且她是《1984》和《美丽新世界》的忠实粉丝，所以他们有一个前进的方向。

It’s not exactly a sequel, but Huxley did write something called Brave New World Revisited in the ’50s.

这并不完全是续集，但赫胥黎确实在 50 年代写过《重访美丽新世界》。

Yes, he did.

是的，他做到了。

47:27 Right.

对。

That’s in

那是在

And he mentions China there.

他在那里提到了中国。

47:31 He says that in Mao’s China, they’re combining the two things of this.

他说，在毛泽东时代的中国，他们正在将这两件事结合起来。

And I’m really fascinated by that, because they published in China, on the Chinese mainland.

我对此非常着迷，因为它们是在中国、中国大陆出版的。

It was published in Taiwan and Hong Kong too.

台湾、香港也有出版。

It’s called the Dystopian Trilogy, and it’s a box set where you have Zamyatin’s We, who then inspired both Orwell and Huxley to some extent.

它被称为“反乌托邦三部曲”，这是一个套装，里面有扎米亚京的《我们》，他在某种程度上启发了奥威尔和赫胥黎。

That’s one book.

那是一本书。

And then there’s Animal Farm and 1984 is the second book.

然后是《动物农场》，《1984》是第二本书。

And then the third volume is Huxley’s Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited.

第三卷是赫胥黎的《美丽新世界》和《重访美丽新世界》。

And it was published in complex characters.

而且是用复杂的汉字出版的。

You can buy it in Hong Kong.

你可以在香港买。

But I compared it to the book you can buy on the mainland, and it’s all the same except the parts in Brave New World Revisited that refer to China are scalpeled out.

但我把它和大陆上能买到的书比起来，除了《美丽新世界重游》中涉及中国的部分被砍掉之外，其他都一样。

48:28 And this, I think, shows the subtlety of the censorship system.

我认为，这显示了审查制度的微妙之处。

You can buy these books and you can read about them, but the parts that really show you how to connect the dots, that gets taken out.

你可以购买这些书，也可以阅读有关它们的内容，但真正向你展示如何将各个点联系起来的部分，却被删除了。

I think with China I was feeling it was definitely moving more toward Brave New World, except Tibet and Xinjiang being more the crude boot-on-the-face, 1984 style of control.

我认为，对于中国，我感觉它肯定更加向美丽新世界迈进，除了西藏和新疆更像是1984年风格的粗暴控制。

But then during the Covid lockdowns, when people were being so intensely monitored and controlled, even places like Shanghai that had seemed much more the Brave New World style had their Orwellian moment.

但在新冠疫情封锁期间，当人们受到如此严格的监视和控制时，即使是像上海这样看起来更像美丽新世界风格的地方也出现了奥威尔式的时刻。

So now, I think there are more 1984, more Brave New World parts of the country, and there are also more Brave New World, more 1984 moments.

所以现在，我认为这个国家有更多1984年、更多美丽新世界的部分，也有更多美丽新世界、更多1984年的时刻。

I see why it could give a sense, after you’ve thoroughly internalized the fear, that you have complete freedom of speech, just don’t mention the government.

我明白为什么在你彻底内化了恐惧之后，它会给人一种感觉，你有完全的言论自由，只是不要提及政府。

49:23 So you can talk about totalitarianism.

所以你可以谈论极权主义。

You can talk about the darkest aspects of human nature.

你可以谈论人性最黑暗的方面。

You can even talk about the government in a metaphorical, poetic way that’s not directly linkable, but the moment you mention the government, it’s like a dumb keyword search.

你甚至可以用一种隐喻的、诗意的方式来谈论政府，这种方式是不可直接链接的，但当你提到政府的那一刻，它就像一个愚蠢的关键词搜索。

Yeah.

是的。

49:56 And I think it’s one of these really good examples of how China’s distinctive, but it’s not unique.

我认为这是中国的独特之处的很好的例子之一，但它并不是独一无二的。

You have other settings where you have these no-go zones that you learn, and one example is in Singapore.

在其他环境中，您也可以学到这些禁区，新加坡就是一个例子。

So the National University of Singapore has a world-class history department, but no Singapore historian in it, nobody who focuses on the history of Singapore.

所以新加坡国立大学有一个世界一流的历史系，但是里面没有新加坡历史学家，没有人关注新加坡的历史。

Because it’s incredibly wide-ranging what you can do, analyze, but when you’re actually talking about the family that’s been most powerful in Singapore, then it gets to be touchy.

因为你可以做、分析的范围非常广泛，但当你真正谈论新加坡最有权势的家族时，事情就会变得敏感。

50:36 In Thailand, which I’ve been working on recently, you have this lèse-majesté laws that make it very, very dangerous to say certain kinds of things about the King.

在我最近一直在研究的泰国，有一项冒犯君主的法律，使得谈论国王的某些事情变得非常非常危险。

And so in all of these settings, you have to figure out ways to work around.

因此，在所有这些设置中，您必须找出解决方法。

And there’s a way in which you can say at the foreign correspondence clubs in different parts of Asia…

在亚洲不同地区的外国函授俱乐部里，你可以这样说……

You can have an event that’s about the country one over that you can say basically anything you want, but when it gets to the things in the place where you are, it’s touchy.

你可以举办一场与国家有关的活动，基本上你可以说任何你想说的话，但当涉及到你所在地方的事情时，那就很敏感了。

51:17 I should give credit for that insight.

我应该赞扬这种洞察力。

Shibani Mahtani co-wrote a very good book on Hong Kong Among The Braves.

希巴尼·马塔尼 (Shibani Mahtani) 与人合着了一本关于香港勇士队的好书。

She was talking about that, that in Singapore at the Foreign Correspondence Club, you could have an event on Hong Kong that could say all kinds of things that you couldn’t say at the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondence Club.

她说的是，在新加坡的外国通讯俱乐部，你可以在香港举办一个活动，可以说各种你在香港外国通讯俱乐部不能说的事情。

But at the same time, when I saw her in Singapore, she said there was a Singapore political refugee in Hong Kong who was giving a talk at the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondence Club saying kinds of things that he couldn’t say in Singapore.

但同时，当我在新加坡见到她时，她说香港有一个新加坡政治难民在香港外国通讯社演讲，说了一些他在新加坡不能说的话。

51:51 And in Thailand, I gave a talk at the Foreign Correspondence Club, and then I went to hear a talk there because I was just curious about the culture in this foreign correspondence club, and there was somebody talking about human rights abuses in different parts of Southeast Asia saying things very directly and then said, “And there are things going on in Thailand that we’re not going to talk about.” Self-censorship can be a very powerful thing.

在泰国，我在外国函授俱乐部做了一次演讲，然后我去那里听了一场演讲，因为我只是对这个外国函授俱乐部的文化感到好奇，有人在谈论东南亚不同地区的侵犯人权行为，非常直接地说，然后说，“泰国正在发生一些事情，我们不会谈论。”自我审查可能是一件非常强大的事情。

One of the things I learned about all of this, which is interesting, I want to learn more, is about the human psychology, the ability of the individual mind, to compartmentalize things.

我从这一切中学到的一件事很有趣，我想了解更多，那就是关于人类心理学，即个体思维划分事物的能力。

52:19 It does seem like you could not live in a state of fear as long as you don’t mention a particular topic.

看起来，只要你不提及某个特定话题，你就无法生活在恐惧之中。

My intuition would be about the human mind.

我的直觉是关于人类思想的。

If there’s anything you’re afraid of talking about, that fear will permeate through everything else.

如果有什么事情是你害怕谈论的，那么这种恐惧就会渗透到其他一切事情中。

You would not be able to do great science, great exploration, great technology.

你将无法进行伟大的科学、伟大的探索、伟大的技术。

52:51 And that idea, I think, underpins the whole idea of freedom of speech in the United States.

我认为，这个想法支撑了美国言论自由的整个理念。

You don’t want to censor any, even dangerous, speech, because that will permeate everything else.

你不想审查任何甚至危险的言论，因为这会渗透到其他一切。

You won’t be able to have great scientists.

你将不可能拥有伟大的科学家。

You won’t be able to have great journalists.

你将不可能拥有优秀的记者。

You won’t be able to have…

你将无法拥有……

I don’t know.

我不知道。

I’m obviously biased towards America, and I think you do need to have that full-on freedom of speech.

我显然对美国有偏见，我认为你确实需要拥有充分的言论自由。

But this is an interesting case study, and that’s actually something that you speak about, that Mao, if he were alive today and visited China, would be quite surprised.

但这是一个有趣的案例研究，这实际上是你所说的，如果毛泽东今天还活着并访问中国，他会感到非常惊讶。

And you give the Nanjing bookstores an example.

你举了南京书店的例子。

Can you just speak to this?

你能简单谈谈这个吗？

If Mao visited China, let’s go with that thought experiment, what would he recognize?

如果毛泽东访问中国，我们来做一个思想实验，他会认识到什么？

What would he be surprised by?

他会惊讶什么？

So I wrote about imagining a revivified Mao going [inaudible 00:53:44] pondering this really cool Nanjing bookstore in the early 2000s and just being amazed at what you could read there and what books were for sale.

所以我写了一篇关于想象一个复活的毛泽东去[听不清 00:53:44] 思考 2000 年代初这家非常酷的南京书店的文章，你会惊讶于那里可以读什么书以及出售什么书。

53:38 And I thought about how he’d be like, “What’s going on?

我想到他会是什么样子，“发生了什么事？

Is the Communist Party not in control?” He talked about how art and politics needed to in some ways go together, and you’ve got all these kind of things.

共产党不受控制吗？”他谈到艺术和政治需要如何在某些方面结合在一起，你已经拥有了所有这些东西。

He also would have been shocked by all…

他也会被所有人震惊……

There were all these books about how to start your own cafe and bar and celebrating entrepreneurship, how to get into Harvard.

有很多关于如何创办自己的咖啡馆和酒吧、庆祝创业精神、如何进入哈佛的书籍。

All of these things just wouldn’t compute from his time.

所有这些事情都无法从他的时代计算出来。

54:23 Although I said, it would actually maybe make him nostalgia for the time of his youth in the 1910s.

虽然我这么说，但实际上也许会让他怀念1910年代的青春时光。

He was a participant in the May 4th movement, which was a time of reading all over the world, looking for the best ideas circulating.

他是“五四”运动的参与者，这是一个在世界各地读书、寻找流传的最佳思想的时代。

So he might say, “Well, the teenage me would have really, really loved this.” So some of the coolest bookstores, the things that I just was amazed could exist in the early 2000s…

所以他可能会说，“好吧，十几岁的我会非常非常喜欢这个。”所以一些最酷的书店，那些让我惊讶的东西可能存在于 2000 年代初期......

So you can still buy copies in 1984 and you can still get some of these other things, but that was a time when more and more of those things were being translated fresh.

所以你在 1984 年仍然可以买到副本，你仍然可以得到一些其他的东西，但那时越来越多的这些东西被翻译成新鲜的。

I’m not sure you’d get permission to translate some of those things now.

我不确定你现在是否会获得翻译其中一些内容的许可。

There’s more of a sense of caution.

更多的是一种谨慎的感觉。

55:06 And when some of those bookstores would also then hold events that would talk about the kinds of ideas that then take them to the next level and talk about the applicability to the situation in China, some of those bookstores have closed or have had to become really shadows of what they were.

当其中一些书店也会举办一些活动来讨论将它们提升到一个新水平的想法，并讨论这些想法对中国情况的适用性时，其中一些书店已经关门了，或者不得不成为它们原来的影子。

And one of the best ones…

最好的之一......

Not the one I wrote about in Nanjing, but a similar one, a Shanghai one, which was literally an underground bookstore.

不是我写的南京的那家，而是类似的一家，上海的那家，实际上是一家地下书店。

It was in a metro station and it had really freewheeling discussions of liberal ideas in the early 2000s and early 2010s.

那是在一个地铁站，对 2000 年代初和 2010 年代初的自由主义思想进行了非常随意的讨论。

But then it just got less and less space to operate under Xi Jinping when things started narrowing, and it then had to close in Shanghai.

但后来，在习近平的领导下，当事情开始缩小时，它的运作空间越来越小，最后不得不关闭在上海。

55:56 And it’s just been reopened in DC as JF Books, and it’s become in this really interesting cultural hub.

它刚刚在华盛顿以 JF Books 的名义重新开业，并成为了这个非常有趣的文化中心。

And I’m really delighted; it’s where I’m going to hold the launch for my next book when it comes out in June, this book on the Milk Tea Alliance about struggles for change across East and Southeast Asia, including in places that are worried about the kind of rising influence of Beijing.

我真的很高兴；我将在这里举办我的下一本书的发布会，该书将于六月出版，这本书是关于奶茶联盟的，讲述东亚和东南亚地区为变革而奋斗的故事，包括那些担心北京影响力上升的地方。

And it seems just perfect to be holding it in the kind of place that can’t exist in Shanghai.

把它放在上海不可能存在的地方似乎是完美的。

So places like that, they stop being able to exist on the mainland, then they could still exist in Hong Kong, but now in Hong Kong, one of the coolest bookstores has had to close up.

所以像这样的地方，他们在大陆就不能存在了，那么他们在香港还可以存在，但是现在在香港，最酷的书店之一不得不关门了。

It just didn’t feel like it could continue operating and tightening control there, and it’s reopened in upstate New York.

它只是觉得它无法继续在那里运营并加强控制，所以它在纽约州北部重新开放。

Wow.

哇。

So you have this phenomenon of bookstores.

所以就有了书店这种现象。

56:47 There’s also a few bookstores called the Nowhere Bookstores that opened in Chiang Mai and Taipei and The Hague, and I heard one maybe is going to open in or is open in Japan too.

还有几家名为 Nowhere Bookstores 的书店在清迈、台北和海牙开业，我听说也有一家即将在日本开业。

My sometime collaborator, Amy Hawkins, who covers China for The Guardian, wrote a great piece late last year about this overseas bookstore phenomenon, carrying on the conversations that people thought they might be able to have in China and then couldn’t, and imagine someday being able to hold in China but maybe can’t.

我以前的合作者艾米·霍金斯（Amy Hawkins）为《卫报》报道中国，她去年年底写了一篇关于海外书店现象的精彩文章，继续进行人们认为在中国可以进行但后来却不能进行的对话，并想象有一天能够在中国进行但也许不能。

So first of all, boy, do I love America.

首先，孩子，我爱美国吗？

57:26 And second of all, it makes me really sad, because there’s a very large number of incredible people in China, incredible minds, and maybe I’m romantic about this, but books is a catalyst for brilliant minds to flourish, and without that…

其次，这让我真的很难过，因为中国有很多令人难以置信的人，令人难以置信的思想，也许我对此很浪漫，但书籍是才华横溢的思想蓬勃发展的催化剂，如果没有这些......

So I guess maybe this is a good time to mention something that I do think about, and sometimes people will think because of censorship and that, there’s an idea of brainwashing within China, population control.

所以我想也许现在是时候提一下我确实想到的事情了，有时人们会因为审查制度而想到，中国境内存在洗脑、人口控制的想法。

57:48 And I periodically will get students from the mainland, and I have a lot of students from the mainland in my classes.

而且我会定期招收大陆的学生，我的班里有很多大陆的学生。

I teach Chinese history, and I feel like, okay, now I’m contradicting the version of the past that’s been drumbeat into them.

我教中国历史，我觉得，好吧，现在我正在与他们灌输的过去版本相矛盾。

But I’ll still get students who are incredible free thinkers who have come through that system and it just doesn’t hold or there are limits to it.

但我仍然会招收一些令人难以置信的自由思想家的学生，他们经历过这个系统，但它不成立或者有限制。

Some of them are people who just got curious by something.

他们中的一些人只是对某些事物感到好奇。

58:33 And it is a porous system.

它是一个多孔系统。

It’s more porous than in North Korea, things like that.

它比朝鲜的漏洞更多，诸如此类。

So even if there’s that fear, friction and flooding which Roberts talks about that ends up keeping lots of people on the same page as the government, there’s still people who take the time to go over the firewall or get intrigued, or they see an image sent by a friend of theirs on social media, will share them something on WeChat that it doesn’t get picked up by the sensors, but they look at it carefully and they say, “Oh, well, wait a minute.

因此，即使罗伯茨所说的恐惧、摩擦和洪水最终让很多人与政府保持一致，仍然有人花时间越过防火墙或感到好奇，或者他们在社交媒体上看到朋友发送的图像，会在微信上分享一些传感器没有捕捉到的内容，但他们仔细查看后会说：“哦，好吧，等一下。

That contradicts what the government’s official line is.” So there’s still ways in which that creativity and freedom of thinking persists.

这与政府的官方路线相矛盾。”因此，创造力和思维自由仍然有多种方式可以持续存在。

That’s really beautiful to hear.

听到这真是太好了。

59:31 I mean, fundamentally, the human spirit is curious and wants to understand, and in some, especially the young people, as we mentioned, are suspicious of authority in the best kind of way, and so they’re always asking kinds of questions, but we always have the child, the young person inside us, always asking, “Maybe I’m being lied to in all these kinds of ways.” But still, it’s sad, because if you’re not deliberately doing that or if there’s not a spark of possibility that comes before you as just a regular citizen of China, you might never really ask, “Maybe there’s a whole different perspective on world history.”

我的意思是，从根本上说，人类精神是好奇的，想要理解，而在某些人中，尤其是年轻人，正如我们提到的，以最好的方式对权威表示怀疑，所以他们总是问各种各样的问题，但我们内心总是有孩子，年轻人，总是问，“也许我被以各种方式欺骗了。”但这仍然令人悲伤，因为如果你不是故意这样做，或者如果你作为一名普通中国公民没有出现任何可能性的火花，你可能永远不会真正问：“也许对世界历史有一种完全不同的视角。”

1:00:15 To be fair, I think the United States is often guilty of this very United States-centric view of history.

公平地说，我认为美国常常对这种以美国为中心的历史观感到内疚。

Similar with Europe.

与欧洲类似。

Europe has a very Europe sense of history.

欧洲有非常欧洲的历史感。

I often enjoy talking to people from different backgrounds, from different parts of the world, talking to them about World War II, because it’s clear that you’ve read certain of the story a lot of times and not the other chapters of the story.

我经常喜欢与来自世界不同地区、不同背景的人交谈，与他们谈论第二次世界大战，因为很明显，你已经多次阅读了这个故事的某些章节，而不是故事的其他章节。

The Western front in Europe and the Eastern front in Europe and then Japan and China’s role in World War II, and the history around that before and after World War II of China, is not often talked about in the United States.

欧洲的西线和东线，以及日本和中国在二战中的角色，以及中国二战前后的历史，在美国并不常被谈论。

And I’m sure, if I could venture a guess, that the opposite is true in China.

我确信，如果我可以大胆猜测的话，中国的情况恰恰相反。

I certainly know the opposite was true in the Soviet Union and even in Europe that directly experienced, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy.

我当然知道，在苏联，甚至在直接经历过的欧洲，法国、英国、德国、意大利，情况恰恰相反。

They all have very different ways of speaking and thinking and reading about World War II.

他们对第二次世界大战的谈论、思考和阅读方式都有很大不同。

And the same goes across all of history and all of culture.

这同样适用于所有历史和所有文化。

1:01:24 So yes, it’s always good to question the mainstream narrative in your country, and looking outside is just harder to do in China based on all the reasons you’ve mentioned.

所以，是的，质疑你所在国家的主流叙事总是好的，而基于你提到的所有原因，在中国向外看就更难了。

And if I can, I just want to give a shout-out.

如果可以的话，我只想大声喊叫。

Thank you.

谢谢。

I’ll look at her work.

我会看看她的作品。

Margaret Roberts, the fear, the friction, and the flooding.

玛格丽特·罗伯茨，恐惧、摩擦和洪水。

Her ideas.

她的想法。

I can already tell there’s a lot of brilliance here.

我已经可以看出这里有很多才华。

Fear: this is the most traditional form involving overt threats and punishments for accessing and sharing such sensitive information.

恐惧：这是最传统的形式，涉及对访问和共享此类敏感信息的公开威胁和惩罚。

However, Roberts finds that fear-based censorship is used selectively, mainly targeting high-profile individuals such as-

然而，罗伯茨发现，基于恐惧的审查制度是有选择性地使用的，主要针对知名人士，例如：

1:02:00 …

……

ship was used selectively mainly targeting high profile individuals such as journalists or activists.

船只有选择性地主要针对记者或活动人士等知名人士。

For the average citizen, the risk of punishment is relatively low, and fear alone is not the main deterrent.

对于普通公民来说，受到惩罚的风险相对较低，恐惧本身并不是主要的威慑因素。

She goes on to describe the friction and the flooding.

她接着描述了摩擦和洪水。

The friction is a tax on information access, and flooding is less visible than fear of friction, but is a powerful tool for shaping the information environment.

摩擦是对信息获取的征税，而洪水不像对摩擦的恐惧那么明显，但却是塑造信息环境的有力工具。

Flooding one scares me, more and more flooding one is the brave new world.

洪水泛滥让我害怕，越来越多的洪水泛滥就是美丽新世界。

Yeah, it is.

是的，确实如此。

1:02:32 And I think it’s a whole kind of, the world of short attention spans and social media, and how this all works.

我认为这是一个整体，注意力持续时间短和社交媒体的世界，以及这一切是如何运作的。

And Chinese Communist Party leaders…

还有中国共产党领导人……

I brought up Singapore and Deng Xiaoping and some leaders were looking at that and they’re looking at…

我提到了新加坡和邓小平，一些领导人正在关注这个问题，他们正在关注……

There are all kinds of things that it both…

有各种各样的事情，它都......

Going to Singapore can sometimes make you feel like you’re in this futuristic setting, in terms of a lot of things that eventually came to other parts of the world would be tried out there.

去新加坡有时会让你感觉自己置身于这个未来主义的环境中，因为很多最终来到世界其他地方的东西都会在那里得到尝试。

And I think the seductiveness is that, some of these things are really…

我认为诱人之处在于，其中一些东西真的......

They both add to convenience at the same time they strip away.

它们既增加了便利性，同时又剥夺了便利性。

They’re collecting information about you, which can be also something that can make your life easier, at the same times it’s stripping you away of…

他们正在收集有关您的信息，这也可以让您的生活变得更轻松，同时它也会剥夺您的……

We talk about the siloing of information and targeting of ads and targeting of news.

我们谈论信息孤岛、广告定位和新闻定位。

1:03:36 So two things come to mind to mention.

所以有两件事值得提及。

One is Christina Larson, a very bright journalist, friend of mine who’s now working on other things but was working in China, and she wrote about this in MIT technology review.

其中一位是克里斯蒂娜·拉尔森（Christina Larson），她是一位非常聪明的记者，也是我的朋友，她现在正在从事其他事情，但在中国工作，她在《麻省理工学院技术评论》中写到了这一点。

She said, you need to think about China as having the best, as well as the worst internet experience in the world.

她说，你需要考虑中国拥有世界上最好的和最差的互联网体验。

And you think about it with…

你想一想……

You think of the worst is easy.

你很容易想到最坏的情况。

The great firewall, you try to search for what happened, you search for him with the tank man, you won’t get it.

伟大的防火墙，你试图寻找发生了什么，你和坦克人一起寻找他，你不会得到它。

You search for information about Dalai Lama and you get all these lies about him, search for things about Xinjiang, and it makes it seem like it’s a place where people are happy rather than massive extra legal detention camps and where your life can be ruined by things you have no control over.

你搜索有关达赖喇嘛的信息，你会得到关于他的所有这些谎言，搜索有关新疆的事情，这会让你觉得这是一个人们幸福的地方，而不是大规模的额外合法拘留营，在那里你的生活可能会被你无法控制的事情毁掉。

1:04:23 But she said, on other ways when it comes to consumer playing to your pleasures and things, it was really advanced.

但她表示，从其他方面来说，当谈到消费者享受快乐和事物时，它确实很先进。

A lot of things that then come out of the place are tried out there and in massive numbers.

许多从这个地方出来的东西都在那里进行了大量的尝试。

And I remember around the time that I had read that I was in Shanghai, and somebody was explaining it to me.

我记得当时我读到我在上海，有人向我解释。

They were talking about going out to eat.

他们正谈论着出去吃饭。

I said, oh, we’ve got such and such.

我说，哦，我们有这样那样的。

And I said, oh, that’s like Yelp.

我说，哦，那就像 Yelp。

He said, well, yeah, but Yelp just tells you the overall rating for a restaurant over time.

他说，嗯，是的，但 Yelp 只是告诉你一段时间内餐厅的总体评分。

We’ve got one that can tell you which part of the restaurant you want to sit in, because there’s a waiter that’s in a really bad mood and people have posted enough information to do this.

我们有一个可以告诉你你想坐在餐厅的哪个部分，因为有一个服务员心情非常不好，而且人们已经发布了足够的信息来做到这一点。

Or what the best dish there is in the last week.

或者上周最好吃的菜是什么。

Forget about these sort of sloth.

忘掉这些懒惰吧。

1:05:11 And you had a lot of things that were like, smart city and control, you can learn things about ease of movement.

你有很多东西，比如智慧城市和控制，你可以了解有关移动便利性的知识。

And Singapore had some of these things tested too.

新加坡也测试了其中一些东西。

You had way before you…

你之前已经有路了……

You go into an underground parking lot now in the US, and you find out whether there are any empty spaces on a floor.

现在在美国，你走进一个地下停车场，你会发现地板上是否有空位。

That was something that was years before in Singapore.

那是多年前在新加坡发生的事情。

And you used money less often there because you had a transponder that would automatically pay for your parking and things.

而且你在那里用钱的次数较少，因为你有一个应答器，可以自动支付你的停车费和其他费用。

And it was something that can be very seductive.

这是非常诱人的东西。

So the other line besides best and worst internet that I always like is, William Gibson who wrote one of the other important dystopian novels of the present, Neuromancer.

因此，除了我一直喜欢的最好和最差的互联网之外，另一条线是威廉·吉布森，他写了当今另一部重要的反乌托邦小说《神经漫游者》。

He wrote a rare, for him, non-fiction piece about Singapore, where he referred to it as Disneyland with the death penalty.

他为自己写了一篇罕见的关于新加坡的非小说类文章，其中他将新加坡称为带有死刑的迪士尼乐园。

And there are times when-

有时——

I shouldn’t laugh.

我不应该笑。

But it is.

但确实如此。

1:06:14 It’s a powerful…

这是一个强大的…

He’s not welcomed in Singapore, let’s just say.

可以这么说，他在新加坡不受欢迎。

But he talked about how when he wanted to try to…

但他谈到了当他想尝试时......

He went to Japan a lot in the 1980s at a time when Japan was a place where you got a sense of what the future might hold.

他在 20 世纪 80 年代经常去日本，当时日本是一个可以预知未来的地方。

So the dark side of this, the surveillance state at its worst, which we see in Xinjiang in places.

所以这有阴暗面，监控状态最差，我们在新疆的一些地方看到了这一点。

And there, again, it may seem like I’m just obsessed with science fiction.

再说一遍，我似乎只是沉迷于科幻小说。

And there it really is minority report.

这确实是少数派报告。

It’s this kind of like you do certain kinds of behaviors, and we’re seeing this other places too.

就像你做出某些行为一样，我们在其他地方也看到了这种情况。

We’re seeing versions of it in the US as well.

我们在美国也看到了它的版本。

Where it’s like, oh, we can tell from a pattern that you are the kind of person who might do X, so in Xinjiang when they were starting to round people up…

就像，哦，我们可以从一种模式中看出你是那种可能会做某事的人，所以在新疆，当他们开始围捕人们时……

1:07:07 There’s this great book by a Uyghur poet.

有一本维吾尔诗人写的好书。

He talks about how people were just starting to disappear off the streets and they were being accused of being radicalized and being potential terrorists.

他谈到人们如何刚刚开始从街头消失，他们被指责为激进分子并成为潜在的恐怖分子。

And the cues could be something like, somebody giving up smoking, or not drinking alcohol.

暗示可能是某人戒烟或不喝酒。

Because that was seen as something that sometimes went along with becoming more devoted to Islam, and more devoted to something, a particular version of it.

因为这有时被视为伴随着更加忠诚于伊斯兰教、更加忠诚于某种事物、某种特定版本的事物而发生的。

So he talked about how a group of the poets, or writers, when they get together, they would…

所以他谈到一群诗人或作家，当他们聚在一起时，他们会……

Whether or not any of them drank, they would make sure there was a bottle of alcohol on their table, because it was simply a way of trying to stay ahead of this system of looking for these kind of clues.

无论他们是否喝酒，他们都会确保自己的桌子上有一瓶酒，因为这只是试图在这个寻找此类线索的系统中保持领先的一种方式。

So you really have this dark side of, Xinjiang is this example.

所以你确实有黑暗的一面，新疆就是这个例子。

And Tibet also with incredible tight control.

西藏也有着令人难以置信的严格控制。

There’s more of that kind of push on personal life in other parts of China as well.

在中国其他地区，这种对个人生活的推动也更多。

1:08:14 But I think the question of whether we give up too much, and who can abuse what we do give up, is something that is being asked in the United States now, about big tech companies, as well.

但我认为，我们是否放弃了太多，以及谁可以滥用我们所放弃的东西，这是美国现在正在问的问题，也是关于大型科技公司的问题。

It’s asked about governments, but it’s also asked about big tech, and what you have as a trade- off.

它被问及有关政府的问题，但也被问到有关大型科技的问题，以及作为权衡的代价。

But I hadn’t thought about it till this conversation, which I can tell is why people find it stimulating to have these extended conversations.

但直到这次谈话我才想到这一点，我可以看出为什么人们觉得进行这些长时间的谈话很刺激。

Because you have set lines, but then the conversation goes and you think in a different way.

因为你已经设定了界限，但随后谈话开始，你就会以不同的方式思考。

So what I used to always say about China after 1989 was, the Chinese Communist Party wanted to stay in power, and they realized that the Soviet Union, Soviet Bloc was falling apart.

所以我在 1989 年之后谈到中国时总是说，中国共产党想要继续掌权，他们意识到苏联、苏联集团正在分崩离析。

They knew that one reason why people, and this is the simple way of…

他们知道人们的原因之一，这是……的简单方法。

One way I think you have to understand why communism fell in Eastern Europe, was partly about ideals and thirst for freedom and that, but also people knew that people…

我认为你必须理解为什么共产主义在东欧垮台，部分原因在于理想和对自由的渴望，但人们也知道人们……

East Germans knew that West Germans were having more fun and getting better stuff.

东德人知道西德人有更多的乐趣并获得更好的东西。

1:09:23 And when some East Berliners got over the wall, one of the first places they went to was this department store, to see if the images of better food and more choices were available there.

当一些东柏林人翻过柏林墙时，他们首先去的地方之一就是这家百货商店，看看那里是否有更好的食物和更多的选择。

And it was true.

这是真的。

And I think this is as human as the desire for more freedom.

我认为这就像人类对更多自由的渴望一样。

So one of the things that the Chinese Communist Party, they never articulated it this way, but how can we try to get to a stage where we don’t have things like Tiananmen, again?

因此，中国共产党从未以这种方式阐明过其中一件事，但我们如何才能再次达到没有天安门这样的事情的阶段呢？

Well, what if we try to make a deal with people?

好吧，如果我们尝试与人们达成协议怎么办？

We’ll give them more choices in their daily life.

我们将为他们的日常生活提供更多选择。

We’ll give them better stuff, we’ll give them more choices at the store, we’ll give them more choices about what to read too, we’ll give them more choices in consumer goods and intellectuals, consumer goods they want or to watch the movies and read the books that other people like them around the world are reading.

我们会给他们更好的东西，我们会给他们在商店更多的选择，我们也会给他们更多读什么的选择，我们会给他们更多消费品和知识分子的选择，他们想要的消费品或者看电影和阅读世界各地像他们一样的人正在阅读的书籍。

1:10:11 So we’ll give them more choices.

所以我们会给他们更多的选择。

We won’t open the floodgates completely, but we’ll give them more choices, but not give them more choices at the ballot box or in politics.

我们不会完全打开闸门，但我们会给他们更多选择，但不会在投票箱或政治上给他们更多选择。

And this was the new social compact.

这就是新的社会契约。

Allow us to keep ruling, and we’ll make sure that you’re living better than the last generation in terms of choices, and in terms of material goods.

让我们继续统治，我们将确保您在选择和物质产品方面比上一代人生活得更好。

Now, one of the things that’s happening now is the Chinese Communist Party, the economy isn’t booming the way it was before.

现在，现在发生的事情之一就是中国共产党，经济不再像以前那样繁荣。

The sense of clearly, we’re living better materially than the generation before, it’s not as easy an argument to make when you have growth rates and things like that.

显然，我们的物质生活比上一代人更好，当你有增长率和类似的事情时，这并不是那么容易提出的论点。

But the Communist Party makes different kinds of arguments now about the rest of the world is in chaos and we’re stable.

但共产党现在提出了不同的论点，认为世界其他地方处于混乱状态，而我们是稳定的。

But the thing that I now am going to think about differently is, the argument was we’ll give you more choices, and you’ll have more of a private life, more of this.

但我现在要以不同的方式思考的事情是，我们会给你更多的选择，你会拥有更多的私人生活，更多这样的生活。

But now in the period we are globally, now there’s a new kind of suspicion about the degree of any kind of private choices.

但现在，在我们全球化的时期，人们对任何私人选择的程度产生了一种新的怀疑。

1:11:27 There was an idea that the post Tiananmen generation was promised to have a little bit more space away from the prying eyes of the state.

有一种想法认为，天安门事件后的一代人被承诺拥有更多的空间，远离国家的窥视。

And now globally we worry about the prying eyes of whether it’s the state, or whether it’s tech companies.

现在，在全球范围内，我们担心是否会受到国家或科技公司的窥探。

It’s a different moment.

这是一个不同的时刻。

What does it mean to say you have more choices?

说你有更多选择是什么意思？

It’s almost like you have two knobs.

就像你有两个旋钮一样。

1:11:49 One is 1984 and one is a brave new world.

一部是《1984》，一部是《美丽新世界》。

At first they turn up the brave new world more choices, and now they’re turning up the 1984…

起初，他们为美丽新世界提供了更多选择，现在他们为 1984 年提供了……

Keeping the choices, but turning up the 1984 with more surveillance.

保留选择，但以更多监视方式呈现 1984 年。

So the choices you make have to be more public.

所以你做出的选择必须更加公开。

Do you have a sense that the thing we’ve been talking about, the increase in censorship, does that predate Xi Jinping?

您是否感觉到我们一直在谈论的事情，即审查制度的加强，是在习近平之前出现的？

Is Xi Jinping a part of that increase in censorship?

习近平是否参与了审查力度的加强？

What is that dynamic?

那动态是什么？

What role does Xi Jinping play in what China has gone through over the past, let’s say a decade and a half?

习近平在中国过去十五年所经历的事情中扮演什么角色？

That’s a really great question.

这是一个非常好的问题。

1:12:28 I was actually just writing a review of two books.

其实我只是在写两本书的书评。

One is called, The Xi Jinping Effect, which was just a bunch of scholars and academic volume looking at, take this topic and that topic.

一个叫做“习近平效应”，这只是一群学者和学术著作在研究这个话题和那个话题。

How much as Xi Jinping as a person really affected it?

习近平个人对它的影响到底有多大？

And they come up with all kinds of answers.

他们想出了各种各样的答案。

But there’s a book I really like.

但有一本书我真的很喜欢。

Emily Fang of NPR has a new book out called, Let Only Red Flowers Bloom.

NPR 的 Emily Fang 出版了一本新书，名为《只让红花盛开》。

1:12:59 And what she talks about the changes in China as she was covering it from the mid-2010s on was…

她在报道 2010 年代中期以来中国的变化时谈到的是……

And I think this really is Xi Jinping’s, one of his [inaudible 01:13:11] on the country, is there’s a narrowing of spaces available for variations of ways of being Chinese within the country.

我认为这确实是习近平的观点之一，他的[听不清 01:13:11] 在这个国家，中国人在国内的各种生活方式的空间正在缩小。

And this goes against the grain of a pattern in the post Tiananmen period of allowing more space for civil society, but also allowing way Muslims felt that they didn’t have to choose between being their Muslim identity and their Chinese identity.

这与天安门事件后时期的模式背道而驰，即为公民社会提供更多空间，但也让穆斯林觉得他们不必在穆斯林身份和中国身份之间做出选择。

But there’s more and more of a kind of…

但有越来越多的一种……

We see this in Xi Jinping becoming impatient with Hong Kong where there was a way of which, okay, this is a city that’s part of the PRC, but it really operates very differently.

我们看到习近平对香港变得不耐烦，虽然香港是中华人民共和国的一部分，但它的运作方式确实非常不同。

He seems to be uncomfortable with difference, I guess.

我猜他似乎对差异感到不舒服。

He’s not alone and strongmaned this way, of wanting to impose a singular vision of what Chinese identity means, what loyalty to the status quo means.

他并不是唯一一个如此强硬的人，他想要对中国身份的含义以及对现状的忠诚意味着一个独特的愿景。

So there’s been a tightening of over all the borders.

因此，所有边界都收紧了。

1:14:18 And even one thing Xi reported on was, inner Mongolia.

甚至习近平汇报的一件事就是内蒙古。

It’s been seen as an unproblematic frontier area, and who cares if there was some revival of Mongolian language.

它被视为一个没有问题的边境地区，谁在乎蒙古语言是否会复兴。

But under Xi, there’s been a less patience with those kinds of difference.

但在习近平的领导下，人们对这种差异缺乏耐心。

There’s been more of a resurgence of the patriarchy.

父权制更多地卷土重来。

All kinds of things have happened under him.

在他手下发生过各种各样的事情。

But, how much is it just him?

但是，只有他一个人有多少？

Or how much is it also a mood or group within the party?

或者说，这在多大程度上也是党内的一种情绪或群体？

Some of these trends I think began before he took power in late 2012.

我认为其中一些趋势在他 2012 年底上台之前就已经开始了。

I think really my own feeling going to China fairly often from the mid 1990s till about 2018 was that until 2008, the year of the Olympics, each trip it would feel like, oh, there’s just more space.

我认为，从 90 年代中期到 2018 年左右，我经常去中国的感觉是，直到 2008 年奥运会那年，每次旅行都会感觉，哦，空间更大了。

There’s more breathing room for…

还有更多的喘息空间……

It’s not becoming a liberal democracy.

它并没有成为自由民主国家。

But I would notice things that felt like, I’m surprised that that happens.

但我会注意到一些事情，感觉就像是，我很惊讶这种情况发生了。

That there just felt…

那里只是感觉……

People felt less worried about what they were saying, and what they were doing.

人们不再那么担心自己所说的话和所做的事情。

That trend line up until about 2008.

这一趋势一直持续到 2008 年左右。

1:15:40 But from the Olympics and then the financial crisis after that, the Chinese Communist Party felt I guess more…

但从奥运会以及之后的金融危机来看，中国共产党的感觉我猜更多的是……

It’s still insecure, but it felt cockier in some ways.

它仍然不安全，但在某些方面感觉更自大。

And you had like, okay, maybe we can start asserting more control over things.

你可能会想，好吧，也许我们可以开始对事物进行更多的控制。

So I think that’s been stronger under Xi Jinping’s time and power.

所以我认为，在习近平的时代和权力下，这一点变得更加强大。

And Xi was already the designated successor.

而习近平已经是指定的接班人了。

By 2008, he was in charge of security for the Olympics.

2008年，他负责奥运会的安保工作。

And the Olympics was supposed to be a moment, possibly of more opening up, because when Seoul hosted the Olympics, South Korea became a less tightly controlled right wing dictatorship and moved toward democracy.

奥运会本来应该是一个可能更加开放的时刻，因为当首尔主办奥运会时，韩国成为一个控制不那么严格的右翼独裁国家，并走向民主。

And some people were hoping the Olympics might move China that way, and it went quite the opposite.

有些人希望奥运会能够让中国朝这个方向发展，但事实恰恰相反。

You mentioned that we don’t know the degree to which this change has to do with Xi Jinping, or the party apparatus.

你提到我们不知道这种变化与习近平或党的机构有多大关系。

1:16:33 And that question going back to Confucius of hierarchy and how does the power within this very strict one state work, what can we say, what do we know about the structure of this Communist party apparatus?

这个问题可以追溯到孔子的等级制度，以及这个非常严格的国家内的权力如何运作，我们能说什么，我们对这个共产党机构的结构了解多少？

How much internal power struggle is there?

内部权力斗争有多少？

How much power does Xi Jinping actually have?

习近平到底有多少权力？

Is there any insight we have into the system?

我们对这个系统有什么了解吗？

James Palmer, who worked in Beijing as a journalist, and now is an editor at Foreign Policy, wrote an important piece a few years ago about just, we should really be straight about what a black box of the Chinese elite politics are.

詹姆斯·帕尔默（James Palmer）曾在北京担任记者，现在是《外交政策》杂志的编辑，他几年前写了一篇重要文章，内容是“我们真的应该直面中国精英政治的黑匣子是什么”。

1:17:08 And really not try to pretend we know more than we do.

真的不要假装我们知道的比我们实际知道的多。

We did used to have more of a sense of these ideological factions, but also partly about different views of how much tinkering there should be with the economy, and things like that.

我们过去确实对这些意识形态派别有更多的了解，但也对应该对经济进行多大程度的修改等问题有不同的看法。

And they were also basic, partly based on personalities and personal ties, but we did have a sense you could map out these kinds of rival power bases and things.

它们也是基本的，部分基于个性和个人关系，但我们确实有一种感觉，你可以规划出这些类型的竞争对手的权力基础和事物。

And we just have much less of a sense of that under Xi Jinping.

而在习近平的领导下，我们对此的认识要少得多。

It’s very hard to know other than this small group around him, how it works.

除了他周围的这一小群人之外，很难知道它是如何运作的。

We don’t have a major defector who says, yeah, this is how Xi Jinping…

我们没有一个主要的叛逃者说，是的，习近平就是这样……

We have Xi Jinping self-presentation, and a lot of things that are then said about him.

我们有习近平的自我介绍，还有很多关于他的言论。

1:18:13 There were some false expectations about him that some people thought, he’s going to be a reformer, because his father was a liberalizing figure.

有些人对他抱有一些错误的期望，认为他将成为一名改革者，因为他的父亲是一个自由主义人物。

That doesn’t work that way.

那是行不通的。

And he does seem to care about orderliness.

而且他似乎确实很关心秩序。

He does seem to care about certain things.

他似乎确实关心某些事情。

He wants to present himself as a kind of scholarly figure in touch with China’s deep past.

他想把自己塑造成一位接触中国悠久历史的学者人物。

We know he’s a strong nationalist and a cultural nationalist as well as political nationalists.

我们知道他是一位坚定的民族主义者、文化民族主义者以及政治民族主义者。

But beyond that, we don’t have that much of a sense of what makes him tick.

但除此之外，我们对他的动机并没有太多了解。

We get little hints.

我们得到的提示很少。

There was a secret speech, that leaked out, that he talked about how the Soviet Union had collapsed, because the leadership didn’t pay enough attention to ideology.

有一个秘密演讲被泄露了，他谈到苏联是如何解体的，因为领导层对意识形态没有给予足够的重视。

And he also said that none of them were manly enough to keep control.

他还说，他们中没有一个人有足够的男子气概来保持控制。

So I imagine if he and Putin never have a heart-to-heart conversation, one thing they’d find to agree on is this distaste for Gorbachev.

所以我想，如果他和普京从未进行过心与心的对话，他们会发现一致的一件事就是对戈尔巴乔夫的厌恶。

This feeling that Gorbachev was…

戈尔巴乔夫的这种感觉……

That was the wrong way to do things.

那是错误的做事方式。

Not manly enough?

不够男子气概？

Yeah, not strong enough about really keeping control.

是的，对于真正的控制力还不够强。

1:19:22 And for Putin it would be that it led to the Soviet Union, to the loss of an empire.

对于普京来说，这将导致苏联的诞生，导致帝国的消失。

But for Xi Jinping, there is a bit of being haunted by what happened to the Soviet Union.

但对于习近平来说，苏联的遭遇却让他有些心神不宁。

And I’m not going to be the leader who sees the diminishment of this landmass that was, in a sense, rebuilt over time for Mao.

我不会成为一个看到这片土地逐渐缩小的领导人，从某种意义上说，这片土地是随着时间的推移为毛泽东重建的。

And then Deng Xiaoping.

然后是邓小平。

You have the story, a very powerful story about the Chinese past, that the Chinese Communist party makes a lot out of.

你有这个故事，一个关于中国过去的非常有力的故事，中国共产党从中做了很多。

But the Chiang Kai-shek, the nationalist party was Mao’s great rival, also made a lot out of.

但国民党蒋介石是毛泽东最大的对手，也从中获益良多。

And that has a partial basis, in fact was that from the middle of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century, China, which had been the strong force in the world, got bullied, and nibbled away at by foreign powers.

这是有部分依据的，事实上，从19世纪中叶到20世纪中叶，作为世界强国的中国遭受了列强的欺凌和蚕食。

And it’s important to realize there are elements of that story that are very true.

重要的是要认识到这个故事的某些元素是非常真实的。

1:20:25 And the answer they had is that, under my watch, that’s not going to happen.

他们得到的答案是，在我的监督下，这不会发生。

And the reason why my party deserves to rule is because it can reassert China’s place in the world.

我的政党之所以值得执政，是因为它可以重申中国在世界上的地位。

And both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party predicated themselves on this nationalistic story of being in a position to prevent that from happening again.

国民党和共产党都以这种民族主义故事为基础，认为自己有能力防止这种情况再次发生。

This is a bit of a tricky question, but is it safe for journalists, for folks who write excellent books about the topic to travel to China?

这是一个有点棘手的问题，但对于记者和那些撰写有关该主题的优秀书籍的人来说，前往中国安全吗？

I think there are all kinds of different things about safety or not.

我认为关于安全与否有各种各样不同的事情。

1:21:02 I think until recently, at least the people who were most vulnerable were people of Chinese descent.

我认为直到最近，至少最脆弱的人是华裔。

People originally from China who had gone abroad and coming back, or even people who were Chinese Americans who went there.

来自中国的出国后又回来的人，甚至是出国的华裔美国人。

There was a higher expectation that they should be on board.

人们对他们应该加入有更高的期望。

So you had early cases.

所以你有早期的病例。

My friend Melissa Chan was an early person kicked out when she was working for Al Jazeera, and reporting on Xinjiang.

我的朋友梅丽莎·陈（Melissa Chan）是很早就被开除的人，当时她在半岛电视台工作，报道新疆。

So that’s one kind of person who was vulnerable because of this expectation that they should be somehow more loyal.

因此，这种人很容易受到伤害，因为他们期望自己应该更加忠诚。

1:21:45 Another kind of person who was vulnerable, or this case more likely to be blocked from China.

另一种人是脆弱的，或者说这种情况更有可能被中国封锁。

The Communist party is particularly concerned about people from outside of China who are amplifying the voices of people within China, or exiles from China who the government would like to silence.

共产党特别担心来自中国以外的人放大中国境内人民的声音，或者政府想要压制的中国流亡者。

So the Dalai Lama…

所以达赖喇嘛...

You had scholars who worked on Tibet and had connections to Dalai Lama where early people would have trouble going to the PRC.

你们有研究西藏问题的学者，并与达赖喇嘛有联系，而早期的人们很难去中华人民共和国。

Then scholars who worked on Xinjiang, and were connected to Uyghurs.

然后是研究新疆问题的学者，与维吾尔人有联系。

But there also were people who were personally connected to dissidents, or exiles who would amplify their voices, or translate their work, would promote them.

但也有一些人与持不同政见者或流亡者有私人关系，他们会放大他们的声音，或翻译他们的作品，会提拔他们。

That then it wasn’t about necessarily danger if you got in China, but you were more likely to be denied a visa if you were the kind of person who was doing that.

那么，如果你进入中国，并不一定会有危险，但如果你是那种这样做的人，你更有可能被拒绝签证。

So I wrote critical op-eds about the Chinese Communist Party.

所以我写了一些批评中国共产党的专栏文章。

I published them in some high-profile places.

我在一些引人注目的地方发表了它们。

I’ve written a lot about Tiananmen, wrote about human rights issues, all that.

我写了很多关于天安门事件、人权问题等等的文章。

1:22:56 And I kept getting visas to go to China.

我不断获得去中国的签证。

I testified to a Congressional executive joint committee on China about the Tiananmen protests on the 25th anniversary of it.

我在天安门抗议活动 25 周年之际向国会中国问题执行联合委员会作证。

And some people said, oh, that’s the kind of thing that would lead to you not getting a visa.

有些人说，哦，这种事情会导致你拿不到签证。

I got a visa right after that.

之后我就拿到了签证。

Now I think it might be different.

现在我想情况可能会有所不同。

Now some of these expectations have been changed.

现在，其中一些期望已经改变。

There have been people who’ve been very surprisingly gotten in trouble.

有些人出人意料地陷入了麻烦。

These two Canadians who were clearly, it was a kind of tit for tat, partly because of TechMaven’s relative being held in Canada.

这两名加拿大人显然是一种针锋相对的行为，部分原因是 TechMaven 的亲戚被关押在加拿大。

So it was kind of there.

所以它就在那里。

It was also not picking a fight with Americans, but there were certain kinds of things that you could map out what was the thing to do.

它也不是与美国人打架，但有些事情你可以规划出该做什么。

And so I went in the 2010s having written forcefully about Tiananmen, and I didn’t feel dangerous.

所以我在 2010 年代就写了关于天安门的有力文章，我并不觉得危险。

1:23:48 I felt there was an awareness in some cases of what…

我觉得在某些情况下人们意识到了……

If I was giving a public talk, there was awareness of what it was.

如果我进行公开演讲，人们就会意识到我的演讲内容是什么。

There was sometimes, you didn’t want to get your host who had brought you to a university in trouble by saying something that would get them in trouble.

有时候，你不想因为说了一些会给你带来麻烦的事情而让带你到大学的东道主陷入麻烦。

I think it was often that, you were more vulnerable if you were within China, or you were connected China in different ways.

我认为通常情况下，如果你在中国境内，或者你以不同的方式与中国联系在一起，你会更容易受到伤害。

For me, it’s been confusing these last few years.

对我来说，这几年一直很困惑。

I wrote one piece about this, about I’m not going to any part of the PRC for the time being.

我写了一篇关于这个的文章，关于我暂时不会去中国的任何地方。

But I always thought that Hong Kong was a place that I’d be free to go, even if the things got difficult.

但我一直认为香港是一个我可以自由去的地方，即使事情变得困难。

I didn’t get a visa for the mainland.

我没有拿到大陆签证。

You didn’t need a visa for Hong Kong.

你不需要香港签证。

With the Mainland, I had kept a distance from the dissidents that I was writing about.

对于大陆，我与我所写的异见人士保持着距离。

With Hong Kong, I felt that these rules kind of didn’t apply, and I was more connected to them.

在香港，我觉得这些规则不太适用，而且我与它们的联系更紧密。

More friends with some of them.

与其中一些人成为更多朋友。

1:24:50 And then with this crackdown that’s come on Hong Kong, and there are exiles from Hong Kong who have bounties on their heads.

随着香港的镇压，香港的流亡者也被悬赏悬赏。

And so now I feel that, it’s not necessarily that anything would happen to me if I went to Hong Kong, but I feel I would be very closely watched.

所以现在我觉得，如果我去香港，不一定会发生什么事情，但是我觉得我会受到非常密切的监视。

I wouldn’t want to meet with some of my friends there who aren’t the side profile.

我不想在那里见到一些不是侧面的朋友。

I don’t want to go to a place where I would feel that I was toxic in some way.

我不想去一个让我觉得自己在某种程度上有毒的地方。

Right.

正确的。

1:25:17 One, you’re walking on eggshells, and two, you can get others in trouble.

第一，你如履薄冰，第二，你可能会给别人带来麻烦。

That kind of dynamic is complicated.

这种动态是复杂的。

So it’s fascinating that Hong Kong is now part of that calculus.

令人着迷的是，香港现在成为了这一算计的一部分。

So I’ve gotten a chance to speak to a bunch of world leaders.

所以我有机会与一群世界领导人交谈。

Do you think it’s possible that I would be able to do an interview with Xi Jinping?

你觉得我有可能接受习近平的采访吗？

If you do, I would be very pleased, because I could watch that interview, and get some insights about Xi, which have been very hard to get.

如果你这样做，我会非常高兴，因为我可以观看那次采访，并获得一些关于习近平的见解，这是很难获得的。

1:25:37 It’s been really difficult.

这真的很难。

There’ve been very few discussions.

讨论很少。

He doesn’t give press conferences.

他不举行新闻发布会。

There’s a variety of things.

有各种各样的事情。

And this is different from some of his predecessors.

这与他的一些前任不同。

Jiang Zemin famously was interviewed by Barbara Walters, and asked about Tiananmen, and he tried to make out that it wasn’t a big deal, the variety of things.

江泽民著名地接受了芭芭拉·沃尔特斯的采访，并询问了天安门事件，他试图表明这没什么大不了的，事情多种多样。

But he had relatively spontaneous conversation.

但他的谈话相对自发。

I was going to say he’s the only Chinese leader I’ve met, but I met him before he was a major, major leader.

我想说他是我见过的唯一的中国领导人，但我在他成为一位主要领导人之前就认识了他。

He was the party secretary, or mayor of Shanghai.

他曾任上海市委书记或市长。

It matters because the party secretary is the more important role.

这很重要，因为党委书记是更重要的角色。

But anyway, he just met with a group of foreign scholars who were going over to Shanghai in ’88 for a conference on Shanghai history.

但无论如何，他刚刚在88年会见了一群前往上海参加上海历史会议的外国学者。

1:26:38 And just to show you the limits of anybody who thinks they can predict what’s going on in Chinese politics.

只是为了向你展示那些认为自己可以预测中国政治正在发生的事情的人的局限性。

Predictability is just very hard in general, in the world.

总的来说，在世界上，可预测性是非常困难的。

But I think the consensus among us, and these were some of the most knowledgeable foreign scholars on China.

但我认为这是我们之间的共识，这些都是一些对中国最了解的外国学者。

Was this was somebody who really had probably topped out because he was meeting with us.

这是一个因为与我们会面而真正达到顶峰的人吗？

He must not be heading anywhere up.

他肯定不会去任何地方。

And then after Tiananmen, he becomes the top leader in China.

天安门事件之后，他成为中国的最高领导人。

But he had a kind of, you could pick things out from being in a room.

但他有一种能力，你可以从房间里挑出东西。

He liked to show off his cosmopolitanism.

他喜欢炫耀他的世界主义精神。

Xi Jinping talks, gives these speeches about all the foreign authors he likes and has read, but it’s all very scripted, at least in his own head too.

习近平的讲话、演讲都是关于他喜欢和读过的所有外国作家的，但这一切都是照本宣科的，至少在他自己的脑海里也是如此。

It’s very carefully done to present a certain image of himself.

为了呈现自己的某种形象，他做得非常仔细。

1:27:33 And we really don’t get many senses of what he’s like in unguarded moments, or has them.

我们真的没有太多感觉他在不设防的时刻是什么样子，或者有没有。

And sometimes we get the illusion of them.

有时我们会产生他们的错觉。

Like there was an image of him and Obama in their shirt sleeves at a Sunnylands meeting.

就像在阳光之乡会议上有一张他和奥巴马穿着衬衫袖子的照片。

And the photo would show them walking and talking, but there’s no translator in the image.

照片中可以看到他们走路和说话，但图像中没有翻译。

And so you’re like, how are they talking?

所以你会想，他们聊得怎么样？

What language are they using?

他们使用什么语言？

How is this?

这是怎么样？

Or is it just a kind of…

或者说这只是一种……

Of course there are exchanges with top leaders.

当然还有与高层领导的交流。

And Trump will say they’re friends, or these kinds of things, where there’s a language of…

特朗普会说他们是朋友，或者诸如此类的事情，其中有一种语言......

Xi Jinping can talk about somebody, or some country being friend, but we don’t have a sense of what makes him tick as a person.

习近平可以谈论某人或某个国家是朋友，但我们不知道是什么让他作为一个人感到高兴。

So maybe you should ask him about Ernest Hemingway, and see if he really gets excited about him.

所以也许你应该向他询问有关欧内斯特·海明威的事情，看看他是否真的对他感到兴奋。

Because in generic things, he talks about all these.

因为在一般事物中，他谈论了所有这些。

You can feel him ticking things off about, oh yes, I’m glad to be in England, the country of Shakespeare and this.

你可以感觉到他在抱怨，哦，是的，我很高兴来到英格兰，莎士比亚的国家和这里。

And he goes off these set things.

他打破了这些既定的规则。

1:28:40 But Hemingway, there’s some sense that he had some special feeling, which fits in with some of the macho side that would be…

但是海明威，有一种感觉，他有一些特殊的感觉，这符合一些大男子主义的一面……

Interestingly, he doesn’t mention Orwell as one of his favorite British authors as much.

有趣的是，他并没有过多地提到奥威尔是他最喜欢的英国作家之一。

He says he likes Victor Hugo a lot.

他说他非常喜欢维克多·雨果。

And that became a little tricky, because Do You Hear The People Sing from Les Miserables became one of the protest songs in Hong Kong.

这变得有点棘手，因为《悲惨世界》中的《你听到人民唱歌了吗》成为香港的抗议歌曲之一。

And how do you get in this position where you…

你是如何到达这个位置的，你......

And actually Victor Hugo is a rare Western author who’s had a pretty steadily positive image in China, even under periods of criticism of all Western authors are problematic.

事实上，维克多·雨果是一位罕见的西方作家，他在中国有着相当稳定的正面形象，即使在所有西方作家都受到批评的时期也是如此。

Because Victor Hugo famously wrote a statement denouncing the European destruction of the old summer Palace in Beijing in 1860, at the end of the second Opium war.

因为维克多·雨果在1860年第二次鸦片战争结束时写了一篇著名的声明，谴责欧洲人毁坏北京圆明园。

He said, how can we claim to be civilized when we’ve destroyed one of the great creations of civilization?

他说，当我们摧毁了文明的一项伟大创造时，我们怎么能声称自己是文明的呢？

So that made him a long-term friend to the Chinese nation.

这使他成为中华民族的长期朋友。

1:29:53 Mark Twain has had a pretty good reputation, because he was a critic of American imperialism.

马克·吐温享有相当不错的声誉，因为他是美帝国主义的批评者。

But anyway, I think if you do get to talk to Xi Jinping, talk to him about Ernest Hemingway and Victor Hugo.

但无论如何，我认为如果你确实能与习近平交谈，请与他谈论欧内斯特·海明威和维克多·雨果。

And I’ll be curious to see if those were the ones who really resonated.

我很想知道这些是否真正引起了共鸣。

One of the things, and it’s a strange thing that I’ve become aware of having spoken with world leaders.

其中之一，这是一件奇怪的事情，我意识到与世界领导人交谈过。

1:30:11 I’m distinctly aware that there’s a real possibility that the black box we mentioned, that the Communist party of China will listen to the words I’m saying now.

我清楚地意识到，我们提到的黑匣子，中国共产党很有可能会听我现在说的话。

And so I have to wonder how much that affects my possible tourist-like trip to China.

所以我想知道这对我可能的中国旅游之旅有多大影响。

Because there’s a difference between an influencer that does fun things, plays video games, and goes over to China, and somebody that actually covers China to some degree.

因为做有趣的事情、玩电子游戏、去中国的影响者和在某种程度上真正报道中国的影响者之间是有区别的。

Whether critical or supportive or nuanced or any kind of way, in a full spectrum of ideas you can have about China, including Chinese history.

无论是批评的、支持的、细致入微的还是任何方式，你都可以对中国有各种各样的想法，包括中国历史。

Whether that’s going to be seen carefully, analyzed carefully, and have repercussions when you travel.

是否会在您旅行时仔细观察、仔细分析并产生影响。

And because of the black box nature, and because it’s, for me, personally, just a culture that’s very different than anything I’m familiar with, it makes me a bit nervous.

由于黑匣子的性质，而且对我个人而言，它只是一种与我熟悉的任何事物都非常不同的文化，这让我有点紧张。

It’s certainly gotten harder for journalists to operate in China.

记者在中国开展工作无疑变得更加困难。

1:31:23 There was a way in which now journalists will look back to the early two thousands, and it was really quite extraordinary what they could do.

现在记者们可以通过某种方式回顾过去的两千年，他们能做的事情确实非常了不起。

Well, you have a lot of listeners.

嗯，你有很多听众。

I think there isn’t that tight a watching of what an academic writes about the Chinese Communist Party.

我认为，对于学者对中国共产党的报道并没有那么严格的关注。

But there are certain things that clearly are tightly policed.

但有些事情显然受到严格监管。

And one is, discussions at the private life of Chinese leaders, and their families, and issues of really following money trails for corruption and things like that.

一是讨论中国领导人及其家人的私生活，以及真正追踪腐败资金流向等问题。

So there was the case of the Hong Kong booksellers who were kidnapped.

于是就有了香港书商被绑架的事件。

And one of them is still in a Chinese prison, he would be a good example.

其中一人仍在中国监狱里，他就是一个很好的例子。

1:32:19 There’s Gui Minhai, the kind of person who was vulnerable.

桂敏海就是这样一个脆弱的人。

He was born in China.

他出生在中国。

He is a Swedish citizen and he was spirited out of Thailand into the Mainland.

他是瑞典公民，被偷偷离开泰国来到大陆。

And the reason why he was on the radar of the Communist party was because the publishing house in Hong Kong that he was connected to was publishing works about the top tier of the Chinese Communist Party, and contradicting the vision of them as a certain kind of moral exemplars.

而他之所以受到共产党的关注，是因为他所在的香港出版社正在出版有关中国共产党高层的作品，与他们作为某种道德典范的愿景相矛盾。

And that’s different from writing things about China has a bad human rights record or something like that, in ways like I did.

这与像我那样写有关中国有不良人权记录或类似的事情是不同的。

These were books that were-

这些书是——

1:33:00 …

……

ways like I did.

像我一样。

These were books that were exposes, or some of them kind of gossipy and lightly sourced, some of them much more serious, but they were about something that the Communist party leadership wants to make a no-go zone.

这些书都是揭露性的，有些是八卦性的、来源浅薄的，有些则严肃得多，但它们都是关于共产党领导层想要设立禁区的事情。

And I’ve thought sometimes that Xi Jinping seems to have Lei’s majesty envy, but I don’t think it’s general criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party as a authoritarian structure, or place that doesn’t deserve to rule in very general terms.

有时我觉得习近平似乎对雷的威严感到嫉妒，但我不认为这是对中国共产党作为威权结构或不值得统治的地方的普遍批评。

I don’t think that’s something that they then pick you up at the border and say, “No, we can’t let that person in,” because people are let in.

我不认为他们会在边境接你并说：“不，我们不能让那个人进来”，因为人们是被允许进来的。

And it’s not rational.

这不合理。

It’s not a rational process.

这不是一个理性的过程。

There are people who’ve been denied visas.

有些人的签证被拒绝了。

It seems pretty inexplicable.

看起来非常莫名其妙。

There are things that now I think the rules are changing very quickly, all over the world, for what’s safe to say and do.

现在，我认为世界各地的规则正在迅速改变，以确保说什么和做什么都是安全的。

Well, either way, I do know that the Communist Party and likely Xi Jinping himself, watched my conversation with Prime Minister Modi.

好吧，无论如何，我确实知道共产党，可能还有习近平本人，都观看了我与莫迪总理的谈话。

1:34:06 They responded to it.

他们对此做出了回应。

And I will definitely go to China and I hope to talk to Xi Jinping.

我一定会去中国，希望与习近平交谈。

It’s a fascinating, historic, ancient culture and is the major player on the world stage in the 21st century.

它是一种迷人的、历史悠久的古老文化，是 21 世纪世界舞台上的主要参与者。

And it would be fascinating to understand the mind of the leader of that great superpower.

了解这个超级大国领导人的想法将是一件很有趣的事情。

Speaking of leaders, what do we understand about the relationship between Xi Jinping, and our current President of the United States, Donald Trump?

说到领导人，我们对习近平和现任美国总统唐纳德·特朗普之间的关系有何理解？

Is there really a human connection, something approximating a friendship as they’ve spoken about?

是否真的存在人与人之间的联系，或者像他们所说的近似友谊的东西？

Or is it just purely real politic maneuvering?

或者这纯粹是真正的政治操纵？

World leaders playing a game of chess?

世界领导人下棋？

Or is it a bit of both?

或者两者兼而有之？

There’s a degree to which I think there’s some confusion about a couple of things.

我认为在某种程度上，有几件事存在一些混乱。

1:35:06 One is when there’s a sense that Trump is uniquely tough on the Chinese Communist Party, he has periodically said things about praising Xi Jinping as a leader, even sort of having praising Xi Jinping’s strength and things.

一是当人们感觉特朗普对中共的态度是独一无二的强硬时，他会时不时地说一些赞扬习近平作为领导人的话，甚至有点赞扬习近平的力量和事情。

So I think for some ways, for the personality cult of Xi Jinping, some of this is useful, because the story that the Chinese Communist Party, they need to tell a story about why they deserve to keep ruling.

所以我认为，从某些方面来说，对于习近平的个人崇拜来说，其中一些是有用的，因为中国共产党的故事，他们需要讲述一个关于为什么他们应该继续执政的故事。

And one of their stories is that because the world is a dangerous place, and there’s not enough respect for China.

他们的故事之一是，因为世界是一个危险的地方，而且对中国没有足够的尊重。

So when there’s very tough talk about China coming out of the White House, that’s useful.

因此，当白宫对中国发表强硬言论时，这是有用的。

And then the other part is about Xi Jinping being just the right person to have at the helm.

另一部分是关于习近平是正确的掌舵者。

1:36:06 And when there are discussions, when there’s praise for him and his showing toughness, that also works well.

当有讨论时，当有人赞扬他和他表现出的强硬时，这也很有效。

So I think the argument among, at least some China specialists, is to say the Chinese Communist Party likes predictability, and Xi Jinping seems to like predictability in particular.

因此，我认为，至少在一些中国问题专家中，争论的焦点是中国共产党喜欢可预测性，而习近平似乎尤其喜欢可预测性。

And Donald Trump clearly isn’t a predictable figure.

唐纳德·特朗普显然不是一个可以预测的人物。

So there might be a way in which this is unsettling.

因此，这可能在某种程度上令人不安。

But I think the other part of it is the Chinese Communist Party wants under Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping wants to gain more allies around the world, to be seen with more respect around the world.

但我认为另一部分是中国共产党希望在习近平的领导下，习近平希望在世界各地获得更多盟友，在世界各地受到更多尊重。

And at the moment is in a position where he can present himself as an orderly, thoughtful gradualist figure.

目前，他可以将自己呈现为一个有序、深思熟虑的渐进主义人物。

In some ways, I think as much as there’s tension between the two capitals, there’s a way that things are going in a way that benefits Xi Jinping, and can conceive it.

在某些方面，我认为尽管两国首都之间存在紧张关系，但事情的发展方式有利于习近平，并且可以设想。

That doesn’t explain what their personal relationship is, and how they actually see each other when they’re in the room together.

这并不能解释他们的个人关系是什么，以及当他们一起在房间里时他们实际上是如何看待对方的。

And whether that matters or it’s a part of the calculus at all, because after all, they are leaders of superpowers.

无论这是否重要，或者它根本就是微积分的一部分，因为毕竟，他们是超级大国的领导人。

1:37:25 I think for Trump, it matters.

我认为对特朗普来说，这很重要。

Personal relationships matter, but of course we see a lot.

人际关系很重要，但我们当然看到了很多。

We know a lot about Donald Trump, we know a lot about the White House.

我们非常了解唐纳德·特朗普，我们非常了解白宫。

And actually, let me just say as a tangent for whatever you think about this particular White House, one of the things I really like is that every single member of the cabinet is willing to talk for many hours every single week, talk about what they think, how they see the world, explain Donald Trump’s approach.

事实上，我想说的是，无论你对这个白宫有什么看法，我真正喜欢的一件事是，内阁的每一位成员都愿意每周花很多时间交谈，谈论他们的想法，他们如何看待世界，解释唐纳德·特朗普的做法。

It doesn’t matter if you disagree with what they’re saying.

如果您不同意他们的说法也没关系。

Maybe you say they’re dishonest, maybe they’re misrepresenting, but there’s a lot of information.

也许你说他们不诚实，也许他们在歪曲事实，但其中有很多信息。

That’s something we don’t have with China.

这是我们中国所没有的。

And as a fan of history, for me, and as a fan of deep political analysis of the world, it makes me sad, because it’s a very asymmetrical amount of information.

作为一个历史迷，对我来说，作为一个对世界进行深入政治分析的粉丝，这让我感到悲伤，因为这是一个非常不对称的信息量。

1:38:35 But anyway, let me, if I can lay out this particular complexity we’re in now, this trade war between us and China.

但无论如何，让我来阐述一下我们现在所处的特殊复杂性，即我们和中国之间的贸易战。

Now, you’re not an economist.

现在，你不是经济学家。

In fact, you think deeply about the history of peoples and the history of China.

事实上，你对各国人民的历史和中国的历史进行了深入的思考。

You think about culture, you think about protests and the movements and so on.

你会想到文化、抗议和运动等等。

And there’s some degree to which this trade war is less about the economics.

这场贸易战在某种程度上与经济无关。

Now that layer is also very important and we could discuss it, but there’s also a deeply cultural standoff almost happening here, which would be interesting.

现在这一层也非常重要，我们可以讨论它，但这里也几乎发生了深刻的文化僵局，这很有趣。

So in April, as people know, Trump escalated a trade war with China using tariffs, raising them on Chinese imports to 145%.

因此，正如人们所知，4月份，特朗普利用关税升级了与中国的贸易战，将中国进口产品的关税提高到145%。

Xi Jinping then responded by raising tariffs on US goods to 125%, and suspending exports on certain rare earth minerals and magnets to the US.

习近平随后将美国商品关税提高至125%，并暂停向美国出口某些稀土矿物和磁铁。

The Chinese government also indicated, it would limit the import of Hollywood films, and restricted certain American companies from operating in China.

中国政府还表示，将限制好莱坞电影的进口，并限制某些美国公司在中国经营。

1:39:48 Now after that, Xi Jinping broke silence on April 11th, and again on April 14th, and since, basically saying that China is not backing down and positioned himself in China as the “responsible superpower,” that promotes, as you were saying, the promoter of the reasonable multilateral global trading framework in a stable global supply chain.

此后，习近平在4月11日和4月14日再次打破沉默，基本上表示中国不会退缩，并将自己定位为“负责任的超级大国”，正如你所说，推动全球稳定供应链中合理的多边全球贸易框架的推动者。

He said “For over 70 years, China’s progress has been built on self-reliance and hard work, never on handoffs from others, and it remains unafraid of any unjust oppression.

他说，70多年来，中国的进步是自力更生、艰苦奋斗的结果，从来不是靠别人的授意，也不怕任何不公正的压迫。

Also, he said there are no winners in a trade war and going against the world will only lead to self-isolation.

他还表示，贸易战没有赢家，与世界作对只会导致自我孤立。

This was all set as part of a tour of Southeast Asia, and he was calling on China and the European Union to defend international rules opposing unilateral bullying.

这一切都是东南亚之行的一部分，他呼吁中国和欧盟捍卫反对单边欺凌的国际规则。

At the same time, I saw that China’s escalating internal propaganda, including interestingly, it would be nice to talk to you about it, the use of the Mao Zedong 1953 speech during the Korean War where he says, “We will never yield.” My question is, with this standoff, who do you think will blink first?

与此同时，我看到中国不断升级的内部宣传，包括有趣的是，很高兴与您谈论这一点，使用毛泽东 1953 年朝鲜战争期间的讲话，他说：“我们永远不会屈服。”我的问题是，在这场对峙中，你认为谁会先眨眼？

Where does this go?

这要去哪里？

So I think one persistent, there’s a lot to unpack there, of a historian too.

所以我认为一位历史学家也有很多东西可以解开。

1:41:09 I think that the reference to being bullied by a foreign power is something that comes up periodically, and plays to this notion of a hundred years of national humiliation that’s been talked about by generations now of Chinese leaders, to talk about that period from the 1840s to the 1940s.

我认为，被外国势力欺凌的说法是周期性出现的，并且与现在几代中国领导人所谈论的一百年国耻概念有关，谈论从1840年代到1940年代的那段时期。

There were a group of foreign powers who were involved in bullying China in one way or another, and you can selectively pick one or another.

有一批外国势力以这样或那样的方式参与欺凌中国，你可以选择性地选择其中之一。

So there is a way in which this can be.

所以有一种方法可以做到这一点。

And if Xi Jinping gives that kind of speech in Southeast Asia, he’s speaking to a place where there is knowledge of times of the past when the United States was an aggressive force there.

如果习近平在东南亚发表这样的讲话，那么他是在一个了解美国过去曾是侵略势力的地方发表讲话。

It’s also a part of the world where there have been times when China has been that.

这也是世界上曾经有过这样的情况的一部分。

1:42:11 So there is a way of positioning vis-a-vis other parts of the world, that is crucial part of this, that I think, I guess I’m circling around it, but there’s a tendency in discussions of US-China relations to think about it in terms of a bilateral discussion or dispute.

因此，有一种相对于世界其他地区的定位方式，这是其中的关键部分，我想，我想我正在围绕它，但在讨论美中关系时有一种倾向，从双边讨论或争端的角度来思考它。

Even though time and again, we realize that places other than the United States are key variables in these things.

尽管一次又一次，我们意识到美国以外的地方是这些事情的关键变量。

So the US and China being at odds in the Mao era, what changed things dramatically for that wasn’t so much even a change in…

因此，美国和中国在毛泽东时代存在分歧，使事情发生巨大变化的甚至不是……的变化。

Yes, Nixon was the one who went to China, but what made it possible for Nixon to go to China was that the Sino-Soviet split happened, that actually it was tensions between China and the Soviet Union that altered equations for the United States and China.

是的，尼克松去了中国，但尼克松能够去中国是因为中苏分裂的发生，实际上是中苏之间的紧张关系改变了美中关系。

1:43:14 I happened to be in China in 1999 when NATO bombs hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and three Chinese citizens died.

1999年，我恰巧在中国，当时北约炸弹袭击了中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆，导致三名中国公民死亡。

And there was tremendous discontent about that, anger about that it within China.

中国国内对此存在极大的不满和愤怒。

And there were some rare protests that the government allowed to happen, but students were worked up about it, and there were protests outside the American Embassy and the British Embassy.

还有一些罕见的抗议活动，政府允许发生，但学生们对此很愤怒，美国大使馆和英国大使馆外也发生了抗议活动。

That happened.

那件事发生了。

And then in 2001, there was a spy plane incident that happened.

然后在2001年，发生了一起间谍机事件。

So there was a lot of discussion that the next decade was going to see US-China tensions being the major force in the world.

因此，有很多讨论认为，未来十年美中紧张局势将成为世界的主要力量。

9/11 happened.

9/11 发生了。

It was a dramatic reset for the trajectory that the US and China were on, which these are two totally different things, the Sino-Soviet split and 9/11.

这是美国和中国所处轨迹的戏剧性重置，中苏分裂和9/11是两件完全不同的事情。

But in both cases, no matter how careful you were at parsing what was likely to be the next five years for US-China relations get dramatically changed by something that happened that wasn’t the US and China.

但在这两种情况下，无论你多么仔细地分析未来五年美中关系可能会发生什么，都会因为美国和中国以外发生的事情而发生巨大变化。

And in the current situation, the trade war, I know that it’ll be very important that China can try to increase sales of consumer products to Europe.

在当前的贸易战形势下，我知道中国尝试增加对欧洲的消费品销售非常重要。

1:44:34 This is something that Europe’s view about the United States is changing right now.

这是欧洲对美国的看法现在正在改变的事情。

These are all kinds of variables that are outside of simply Washington and Beijing as being the two actors.

这些都是华盛顿和北京这两个参与者之外的各种变量。

And sometimes, Beijing can’t control what’s happening outside, and sometimes Washington can’t.

有时，北京无法控制外部发生的事情，有时华盛顿也不能。

So I guess this is simply saying that when you’re watching and you’re trying to keep the eye on the ball, it matters a lot what India’s relationship to China and the United States is.

所以我想这只是说，当你在观察并试图密切关注时，印度与中国和美国的关系非常重要。

So all of these are happening there.

所以所有这些都发生在那里。

So I think that’s it, that it’s both tremendously important what’s going on between China and the United States, but it’s important to remember that they’re not the only players in this dynamic.

所以我认为就是这样，中国和美国之间正在发生的事情非常重要，但重要的是要记住，他们并不是这一动态中的唯一参与者。

Also on top of this, how much cultural will is there to not surrender to bullying?

除此之外，有多少文化意愿不会屈服于欺凌行为？

1:45:23 How much of that is there?

其中有多少？

Like you said, the century of humiliation, both for Xi Jinping and the Chinese populace, like willingness to go through some short-term pain to not be humiliated?

就像你说的，百年屈辱，无论对习近平还是中国老百姓来说，愿意经历一些短期的痛苦而不被羞辱吗？

The story that’s been intensively told about the past is something that provides the possibility for this to matter a lot.

被广泛讲述的关于过去的故事为这件事提供了重要的可能性。

1:45:46 That is something that, it’s so much a part of the legitimating story of the Chinese Communist Party.

这在很大程度上是中国共产党合法化故事的一部分。

And then you have to look at, are there things that are happening that aid the Chinese Communist Party’s story?

然后你必须看看，正在发生的事情是否有助于中国共产党的故事？

So the rise of what can seem like, or is anti-Chinese sentiment within the United States, can feed that propaganda story.

因此，美国国内反华情绪的兴起可能会助长这种宣传故事。

So certainly during COVID, there was a way that if you’re the Chinese Communist Party and you’re saying, “We get a disproportionate amount of blame for whatever happens in the world,” then if there were things you could point to in the foreign media or from foreign governments, then that helps you.

因此，在新冠疫情期间，如果你是中国共产党，你会说，“我们对世界上发生的任何事情都受到了不成比例的指责”，那么如果你可以指出外国媒体或外国政府的一些事情，那么这会对你有所帮助。

So I think there is a setup here where, certainly for Xi Jinping, I think the desire to not be seen weak is crucial.

因此，我认为这里有一个设置，对于习近平来说，我认为不被视为软弱的愿望至关重要。

Sometimes I wonder how much of these leaders operate on pure ego, because politically and on a human level, they don’t want to come off as losers in a standoff, versus coming to a economic win-win for both nations.

有时我想知道这些领导人中有多少人纯粹是出于自我意识，因为从政治和人性的角度来看，他们不想在僵局中成为失败者，而不是为两国实现经济双赢。

1:47:01 And I worry that there is a real pride here, that the center of Humiliation has deeply saturated the populace, the Communist Party, this idea where they’re just not going to back down.

我担心这里有一种真正的自豪感，羞辱的中心已经深深地渗透到了民众、共产党之中，他们不会退缩。

And that I think will cause tremendous pain in the short term for the United States, I think for China and the world, because it completely transforms the supply chain of everything.

我认为这将在短期内给美国、中国和世界带来巨大的痛苦，因为它彻底改变了一切的供应链。

There is a global nature, there is a multilateral nature of all the economic partnerships that are formed throughout the 21st century.

21世纪形成的所有经济伙伴关系都具有全球性、多边性。

And this protectionist, nationalistic kind of ideology goes in the face of all of that, and it’s going to create a huge amount of pain for regular Americans.

面对这一切，这种保护主义、民族主义的意识形态将给普通美国人带来巨大的痛苦。

But also, I worry that this increases now decreases the chance of a global war or conflict of different kinds.

但我也担心，这种情况的增加现在会降低发生全球战争或不同类型冲突的可能性。

Do you see a hopeful possibility for resolution, for de-escalation here?

您认为这里有解决问题、缓和局势的希望吗？

It’s a hard time to figure out what you can, to hopeful angles.

现在很难从充满希望的角度弄清楚你能做什么。

1:48:37 I guess what’s hard to even balance these things out, so one of the things that I’ve thought about when you talk about rising chances of war, that often Taiwan comes to mind with China.

我想平衡这些事情是很困难的，所以当你谈到战争可能性上升时，我想到的一件事就是台湾和中国经常浮现在脑海中。

And one of the things that I’ve thought of is that for Xi Jinping, that military action against Taiwan would be increased by a sense of desperation, a sense of losing popularity, or a sense of not having a good story to tell about why he and the party deserves to lead.

我想到的一件事是，对于习近平来说，对台湾的军事行动会因绝望感、失去支持感或没有一个好故事来讲述为什么他和共产党值得领导的感觉而加剧。

1:49:24 So then there’s a way of playing to the nationalist sentiments of some part of the population.

因此，有一种方法可以迎合部分民众的民族主义情绪。

So then in a sense, it’s hopeful that I think in some ways right now, Xi Jinping is not looking desperate in the eyes of the world.

因此，从某种意义上说，我认为在某些方面，习近平现在在世界眼中并没有显得绝望，这是有希望的。

If he can focus on potentially being seen more positively in other parts of the world by seeming like a force for stability, seen as somebody who’s supporting rather than challenging some elements of the global order, that might lessen the chances of a rash action toward Taiwan.

如果他能够集中精力，通过让自己看起来像一股稳定力量，被视为支持而不是挑战全球秩序某些要素，从而在世界其他地区获得更积极的看待，这可能会减少对台湾采取鲁莽行动的可能性。

That would be a kind of desperation move.

这将是一种绝望之举。

The complicated thing here is that if he gives in, he can come off as the responsible person who cares about the world, or he can come off weak.

这里复杂的事情是，如果他屈服了，他可能会被认为是一个关心世界的负责任的人，或者他可能会被认为是软弱的。

1:50:11 If he doesn’t give in and even escalates the tariffs, although I think he said no more escalation on the China front, then he comes off strong, but also the equally unreasonable person who doesn’t care about the world, who only cares about his own ego, and maybe some aspect of the Communist Party maintaining power, because just like with Tiananmen Square and the tank man, you don’t know once you make the decision how the world will read that decision, what kind of things will become viral memes about the telling of that story.

如果他不屈服，甚至升级关税，虽然我认为他说在中国方面不会再升级，那么他表现得很强势，但也是一个同样不讲理的人，不关心世界，只关心自己的自我，也许还关心共产党维持权力的某些方面，因为就像天安门广场和坦克人一样，你不知道一旦你做出决定，世界将如何解读这个决定，什么样的事情会变得病毒式传播关于那个故事的讲述的模因。

And of course, in part, I think Donald Trump’s reach is much wider, because he’s constantly out there.

当然，在某种程度上，我认为唐纳德·特朗普的影响力要广泛得多，因为他一直在外面。

And I think there’s a more reserved, less messaging out of Beijing.

我认为北京发出的信息更加保守、更少。

So it’s a really chaotic environment in which to make strong decisions.

因此，这是一个非常混乱的环境，需要在其中做出强有力的决定。

1:51:23 But since you brought it up, we’ll talk about Hong Kong, but let’s talk about Taiwan and maybe there’s some parallels there.

但既然你提到了，我们就谈谈香港，但我们谈谈台湾，也许那里有一些相似之处。

Given Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and the unification with Taiwan being a crucial part of his vision for China, what do you think are the chances?

鉴于习近平强调中华民族伟大复兴，而台湾统一是其中国愿景的重要组成部分，您认为机会有多大？

And how willing is he to use force to annex, to forcibly gain control over Taiwan in the coming years?

他有多愿意在未来几年使用武力吞并、强行控制台湾？

I’ll frame it in a way that I think does lead into talking about Hong Kong, because I think these are connected issues.

我将以一种我认为确实会引发讨论香港的方式来构建它，因为我认为这些是相互关联的问题。

1:51:55 In 1984, the year, not the book this time, that’s when a deal was struck basically, between London and Beijing over what would happen to Hong Kong.

1984 年，那一年，不是这本书，而是伦敦和北京之间就香港的命运基本上达成了一项协议的时候。

So Hong Kong Island became a British colony at the end of the first Opium war, the 1840s.

因此，香港岛在第一次鸦片战争结束时（1840年代）成为英国殖民地。

And then Kowloon Peninsula near there became a British colony in 1860 after the second Opium war.

1860年第二次鸦片战争后，附近的九龙半岛成为英国殖民地。

But then there was a large amount of territory of what we now think of as Hong Kong, called the New Territories, that became under British control in 1898, but was not a colony.

但后来我们现在所认为的香港有一大片领土，称为新界，于 1898 年受到英国控制，但不是殖民地。

It was a 99-year lease.

这是一份99年的租约。

1:52:44 So 1997 was this kind of expiration date for the lease of this large amount of territory of what we now think of as Hong Kong.

因此，1997 年就是租借我们现在所认为的香港这一大片领土的到期日期。

It’s a large amount of territory that the rest of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, depend on for energy, water, and food.

香港其他地区、港岛和九龙的能源、水和食物都依赖这片广阔的领土。

So it would’ve been very hard to just transfer those parts to the Peoples Republic of China.

因此，将这些零件转移到中华人民共和国是非常困难的。

So a deal needed to be struck of what would happen in 1997.

因此，需要就 1997 年发生的事情达成协议。

And the deal was about transferring sovereignty of all of Hong Kong, all these parts, to the People’s Republic of China.

该协议是关于将整个香港及其所有部分的主权移交给中华人民共和国。

And I carefully say transfer sovereignty, not give it back to the People’s Republic of China, because it never belonged to the People’s Republic of China.

我小心翼翼地说，转移主权，而不是归还给中华人民共和国，因为它从来就不属于中华人民共和国。

It was part of the Qing Empire, which was a different country, a different state that then anyway, but this needed to be transferred.

它是大清帝国的一部分，这是一个不同的国家，一个不同的国家，无论如何，但这需要转移。

1:53:40 And the deal that was struck was that the London side wanted to do something to protect what was going to happen to the people there.

达成的协议是，伦敦方面希望采取一些措施来保护那里的人们将要发生的事情。

And remember, this is not what usually happens to colonies.

请记住，这不是殖民地通常会发生的情况。

Colonies usually go from being part of an empire to being some degree of self-governed.

殖民地通常会从帝国的一部分转变为某种程度的自治。

And because of that, the Chinese representative of the UN insisted that Hong Kong was not a colony, and Macau was not a colony, because then they would have to be decolonized and go to independent.

正因为如此，中国驻联合国代表坚称香港不是殖民地，澳门也不是殖民地，因为那样他们就必须去殖民化并走向独立。

So anyway, there was an understanding that something would have to happen in 1997, and London wanted some protection for the people in Hong Kong, who they knew were living in a very different way than people lived under Communist party rule.

所以无论如何，大家都认为 1997 年一定会发生一些事情，伦敦希望为香港人民提供一些保护，他们知道香港人民的生活方式与共产党统治下的人们的生活方式非常不同。

There was a different kind of rule of law.

有一种不同的法治。

There wasn’t democracy, but there was some degree of input in governance.

没有民主，但在治理方面有一定程度的投入。

1:54:35 The colonial authority and the power most powerful person in Hong Kong was appointed by London.

香港的殖民当局和权力最有权势的人是由伦敦任命的。

After 1997, the most powerful person would probably have to be somebody who could work with Beijing.

1997年之后，最有权力的人可能必须是能够与北京合作的人。

But in this negotiation, something was come up with, called One Country, Two Systems.

但在这次谈判中，出现了一个问题，叫做“一个国家，两种制度”。

And Hong Kong would become part of the People’s Republic of China in diplomatic terms.

香港将在外交上成为中华人民共和国的一部分。

It wouldn’t have its own military, but it would have its own system for 50 years, was the idea, from 1997 until 2047.

它不会拥有自己的军队，但它会拥有自己的系统50年，这是从1997年到2047年的想法。

There was a tension from the beginning over what that other system, what was going to be the part that was going to be separate.

从一开始就存在着关于另一个系统是什么、什么部分将被分离的紧张情绪。

And clearly, everybody agreed it would need to have a different economic system.

显然，每个人都同意需要有一个不同的经济体系。

It had capitalism, so people agreed on that.

它有资本主义，所以人们同意这一点。

But there was tension from the start of, well, what about legal?

但从一开始就存在紧张，那么法律呢？

What about political, cultural and other things?

政治、文化和其他方面呢？

1:55:31 And things were written into this deal, which would be over time, Hong Kong, people would govern Hong Kong, but Beijing thought they would govern Hong Kong, but it would be a Hong Kong person who Beijing played a role in choosing.

这笔交易中写了一些东西，随着时间的推移，香港，人民将治理香港，但北京认为他们将治理香港，但北京在选择中发挥了作用，将是一个香港人。

But the reason why Taiwan is relevant to all this is, in 1984, as they were discussing this, the Chinese Communist Party said, and will come up with this arrangement and people in Taiwan should pay attention to it, because it could provide a model for what could happen with them being absorbed into the people’s Republic of China.

但台湾之所以与这一切相关，是因为1984年，当他们在讨论这个问题时，中国共产党说，将会提出这个安排，台湾人民应该注意它，因为它可以为他们被吸收到中华人民共和国中可能发生的事情提供一个模型。

So the idea was Beijing said, “Hey, people in Taiwan, watch what happens to Hong Kong after 1997, and think about it as a model for what could happen with you,” saying, watch how smoothly it will go.

所以这个想法是北京说的，“嘿，台湾人民，看看1997年后香港会发生什么，并把它作为一个模型来思考你可能会发生什么，”说，看看它会进展得多么顺利。

Over time, people in Hong Kong started saying, well wait, Beijing keeps sort of nibbling away, chipping away at these things that make us separate, and especially after 2008.

随着时间的推移，香港人开始说，等等，北京一直在蚕食、蚕食这些让我们分裂的东西，尤其是在 2008 年之后。

1:56:35 There were reasons why Beijing went especially light on Hong Kong early after 1997.

1997年初之后，北京方面对香港特别淡定是有原因的。

Beijing wanted to WTO, they wanted to host the Olympics.

北京想要加入世贸组织，他们想要举办奥运会。

A big move against Hong Kong then could have endangered those things.

当时针对香港的重大举措可能会危及这些事情。

Also at that point, the PRC was heavily dependent on economics in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong economy.

也是在那时，中华人民共和国严重依赖香港经济。

Also, just something because I’m a university person.

另外，只是因为我是一名大学生。

In 1997 when Hong Kong became part of the People’s Republic of China, then Hong Kong universities were the only universities in the PRC that were considered totally world-class.

1997年，当香港成为中华人民共和国的一部分时，香港大学是中华人民共和国唯一被认为是世界一流的大学。

Hong Kong University and Chinese University of Hong Kong were highly rated institutions.

香港大学和香港中文大学获得高度评价。

And at that point, Peking University, Beijing, Beida and Tsinghua were not yet considered world-class institutions, because they didn’t have the kind of academic freedom and humanities that was at that point needed to be higher ratings.

那时，北大、北京、北大和清华还没有被认为是世界一流的大学，因为它们不具备当时获得更高评级所需的学术自由和人文学科。

1:57:35 Over time, that difference started to go away, because global ratings of universities stopped caring as much about academic freedom and things like that.

随着时间的推移，这种差异开始消失，因为大学的全球评级不再那么关心学术自由之类的事情。

And Beijing universities surpassed Hong Kong ones.

北京大学超过了香港大学。

So by the 2010s, when you started to have these protests in Hong Kong pushing back against what was called mainlandization, and clamping down, Hong Kong protesters in 2014 put up a banner.

因此，到了2010年代，当香港开始出现这些抗议活动，反对所谓的大陆化并进行镇压时，香港抗议者在2014年竖起了横幅。

At the time when Beijing was holding the line against Hong Kong, people wanted to have real elections to choose the chief executive, rather than one where there were elections, but only people who Beijing approved of basically could run.

在北京对香港采取立场的时候，人们希望通过真正的选举来选择行政长官，而不是选举，但基本上只有北京认可的人才能参选。

Hong Kong activists put up a banner saying, “Hey, Taiwan, look at Hong Kong.

香港活动人士打出横幅，上面写着：“嘿，台湾，看看香港。

Taiwan beware.

台湾要小心了

Hong Kong’s today.

今天的香港。

It could be Taiwan’s tomorrow.” So basically spinning the one country, two systems argument, and saying, “Yeah, Taiwan.

这可能是台湾的明天。”所以基本上是在旋转一个国家、两种制度的论点，然后说：“是的，台湾。

You should watch what happens here.”

你应该看看这里发生了什么。”

1:58:36 So one way to think of Chinese leaders since Mao is that Mao and those after him, wanted to make China bigger territorially than it had been, to try to reclaim land.

因此，思考毛泽东以来的中国领导人的一种方式是，毛泽东和他之后的人希望使中国的领土比以前更大，试图收回土地。

Under Mao, Tibet, which had been not part of China, became part of the People’s Republic of China.

在毛泽东的领导下，原本不属于中国的西藏成为了中华人民共和国的一部分。

Mao offered something a little bit like one country, two systems to it.

毛泽东提出了一个有点像一个国家、两种制度的东西。

Isabel Hilton, who writes wonderfully about Tibet, has talked about the parallels with the Hong Kong system.

伊莎贝尔·希尔顿 (Isabel Hilton) 就西藏问题撰写了精彩的文章，她谈到了西藏制度与香港制度的相似之处。

And some Hong Kong activists saw parallels as well.

一些香港活动人士也看到了相似之处。

Tibet was supposed to go its own way as part of the people’s Republic of China in the 1950s.

20世纪50年代，西藏作为中华人民共和国的一部分，本应走自己的路。

And then by 1959, the center got restless, tried to interfere more.

到了 1959 年，中央变得焦躁不安，试图进行更多干预。

Local people pushed back against it.

当地民众对此表示强烈反对。

And a workable, what seemed like it might work out somehow against all odds, explodes.

一个可行的、看起来可能会克服一切困难的东西却爆炸了。

And the Dalai Lama goes into exile.

达赖喇嘛流亡国外。

The Dalai Lama, who before that had thought maybe he and Mao could work together, that didn’t work.

达赖喇嘛此前曾认为他和毛泽东可以一起工作，但这并没有奏效。

1:59:45 Hong Kong, a new version of the experiment happens, and it becomes clear in the 2010s that it’s not really workable, that the center is less patient, needs Hong Kong less.

香港，进行了新版本的实验，到了 2010 年代，很明显它并不真正可行，该中心缺乏耐心，对香港的需求也减少了。

The Hong Kong people feel it’s more of a now or never period to push back.

香港人觉得现在是时候反击了。

You could say that Deng Xiaoping oversaw the deal that got Hong Kong and Macau to become part of the People’s Republic of China.

你可以说，邓小平促成了香港和澳门成为中华人民共和国的一部分。

He could point to that, even though he died during 1997, but he had achieved that kind of deal.

他可以指出这一点，尽管他于 1997 年去世，但他已经达成了这样的协议。

Xi Jinping could argue, you could argue, he finished the deal of making Hong Kong fully a part of the people’s Republic of China, doing away with this degree of difference.

习近平可以说，你也可以说，他完成了让香港完全成为中华人民共和国一部分的协议，消除了这种程度的差异。

And you could say that that then is a stepping stone toward Taiwan.

可以说，这是通往台湾的踏脚石。

Or you could say that in the South China Sea Islands build up, might be enough for him to put his stamp on having been the kind of leader who expanded Beijing’s reach.

或者你可以说，在南海诸岛的建设，可能足以让他打上自己作为扩大北京影响力的领导人的印记。

2:00:51 He probably wants both.

他可能两者都想要。

Probably, to the extent, he would like Taiwan to become part of the People’s Republic of China, which it has never been.

或许，在某种程度上，他希望台湾成为中华人民共和国的一部分，但实际上台湾从未成为中华人民共和国的一部分。

But the hope was, it could happen through a kind of more gradual absorption, and people in Taiwan being willing to think of that.

但希望是，这可以通过一种更渐进的吸收来实现，台湾人民愿意考虑这一点。

And yet in part because of what’s happened to places like Hong Kong, there’s a fiercer, a stronger sense of Taiwan identity now than there was at an earlier point.

然而，部分原因是香港等地发生的事情，现在比以前更强烈、更强烈的台湾认同感。

And less parties that are more willing to try to negotiate some kind of tighter connection with the PRC, are often doing badly in elections there because of this mood.

由于这种情绪，那些更愿意尝试与中华人民共和国进行某种更紧密联系的谈判的政党往往在选举中表现不佳。

2047 is 50 years from the 1997 handover that you were talking about with Hong Kong.

2047年距您与香港谈论的1997年回归已经50年了。

2:01:35 On top of that, 2049 is a hundred years from Mao taking power.

最重要的是，2049 年是毛泽东掌权一百年。

It feels like at that moment, China could take Taiwan, because it does seem that there’s a kind of value for history in China, and they take these days very seriously.

感觉在那一刻，中国可以拿下台湾，因为中国似乎确实有一种历史价值，而且他们非常重视这些日子。

On the other hand, as you have studied, there is some tensions, and displeasure, and protests, some of the biggest in human history in Hong Kong.

另一方面，正如你所研究的，香港存在一些紧张、不满和抗议，其中一些是人类历史上最严重的。

And so put all of that together, and so many possible trajectories of human history could happen here.

所以把所有这些放在一起，人类历史的许多可能的轨迹都可能发生在这里。

Yeah, I’m particularly interested in youth movements.

是的，我对青年运动特别感兴趣。

2:02:17 And one of the things, I think generation is such an important factor.

其中之一，我认为世代是一个非常重要的因素。

And people know that generation’s important, but somehow, sometimes people think that if you divide people up into economic groups, you divide people up into a racial or ethnic class, that groups, that that somehow is more tangible.

人们知道这一代人很重要，但不知何故，有时人们认为，如果你将人们划分为经济群体，你将人们划分为种族或民族阶层，这些群体在某种程度上是更具体的。

But I think with things like the Hong Kong protests, that there was a process of what was seen as mainlandization, of Beijing just moving to make the things that were really distinctive about Hong Kong less distinctive, and minimizing the differences.

但我认为，像香港抗议这样的事情，存在一个被视为大陆化的过程，北京只是采取行动，让香港真正独特的东西变得不那么独特，并将差异最小化。

And this process sped up dramatically after the 2019 protests.

2019 年抗议活动之后，这一进程急剧加快。

And there was just partly with the distraction of COVID and the distraction of the world, there was this imposition of this national security law that basically did away with the differences.

由于新冠疫情和全世界的注意力分散，国家安全法的实施基本上消除了分歧。

2:03:16 And you had some people in the city of an older generation saying, “Why couldn’t they have just been more patient?” “Why did these protests force the hand of the people in power?” But I think that age has a lot to do with it, that if there was this kind of gradual erosion or there was going to be this process of doing away with the things that made Hong Kong really special and that people loved passionately about it, including this freer press, or just freer associational life and things like that.

老一代城市里的一些人会说：“他们为什么不能更有耐心呢？” “为什么这些抗议活动迫使当权者采取行动？”但我认为年龄有很大关系，如果有这种逐渐侵蚀，或者将会有一个过程，废除那些使香港真正特别的东西，人们热情地热爱它，包括更自由的新闻界，或者只是更自由的社团生活等等。

If you were 17 in 2019, and people were saying by 2047 it will all be gone, or maybe it’ll even all be…

如果 2019 年你 17 岁，人们说到 2047 年这一切都会消失，或者甚至可能全部消失……

2:04:00 By 2047, it’ll all be gone, or maybe it’ll even all be gone in 10 years.

到2047年，这一切都会消失，甚至可能在10年内全部消失。

Then you’re talking about living most of your life in a Hong Kong that isn’t the Hong Kong you really love.

那么你说的是你一生的大部分时间都生活在一个不是你真正喜欢的香港的香港。

Whereas if you were 80, you were like, “Why can’t they be patient?” And people in between had all kinds of other things.

而如果你已经 80 岁了，你会想，“为什么他们不能有耐心呢？”介于两者之间的人还有各种各样的其他东西。

This is one thing that leads to, often logically, there’s a rationality toward younger people being more militant about certain kinds of things.

从逻辑上讲，这导致年轻人对某些事情更加激进是有道理的。

I think we see the same thing with climate change, with climate activism.

我认为我们在气候变化和气候行动主义方面也看到了同样的情况。

You’re talking about whatever projection is of when things are going to get worse further down.

你谈论的是当事情会进一步恶化时的任何预测。

The younger you are, the more of your life is going to live in that scenario.

你越年轻，你的生活就越会生活在这种场景中。

And there’s a logic for more of that impatience.

这种不耐烦是有道理的。

2:04:48 There’s also a sense of frustration with an older generation not having done enough to resolve issues.

老一代人在解决问题方面做得不够，也让人感到沮丧。

These are things with Hong Kong, with climate change, with Thailand, the place that I’ve been working on lately.

这些是与香港、气候变化、泰国有关的事情，我最近一直在泰国工作。

One of the slogans in 2020 when there was a push for democracy was let it end with this generation, which, again, expressed this sense of gradual solutions are fine, but we are carrying more of a burden of what we’re going to live with that.

2020 年推动民主的口号之一是让它在这一代人身上结束，这再次表达了这种渐进解决方案很好的感觉，但我们承受着更多的负担。

So with the 2019, also the protests, some of the things that were being chipped away at by Beijing in 2012, there was an effort to impose mainland style patriotic education, saying, well, who cares how civics is taught?

因此，随着 2019 年的发生，还有抗议活动，以及北京在 2012 年取消的一些事情，有人努力推行大陆式的爱国教育，他们说，好吧，谁在乎如何教授公民知识呢？

But actually that has a lot to do with the larger political story.

但实际上这与更大的政治故事有很大关系。

And the protesters that year, young people stood up and actually got the government to blink.

那一年的抗议者，年轻人站起来，实际上让政府眨眼了。

The local authorities backed down on that bringing in mainland style education.

地方当局对引入大陆式教育做出了让步。

2:05:51 2014, the protest was to try to get full voting rights for the chief executive.

2014年，抗议活动是为了争取行政长官的完全投票权。

The government didn’t blink on that.

政府对此并没有视而不见。

That was something where they held the line.

这是他们坚守阵地的地方。

It was a big, colorful, exciting protest, but in the end, it hit a dead end.

这是一场规模宏大、色彩缤纷、激动人心的抗议活动，但最终却走进了死胡同。

2019 there even bigger protests, and at first it seems like surprising what the issue was.

2019 年出现了更大规模的抗议活动，一开始人们似乎对问题所在感到惊讶。

The issue was an extradition law that would have people, potentially, who committed crimes in Hong Kong being tried for them if the mainland wanted them on the mainland.

问题是一项引渡法，如果大陆希望在香港犯罪的人在大陆接受审判，该法可能会让他们受到审判。

Now, the difference, they’re really different court systems.

现在，区别在于，它们的法院系统确实不同。

Hong Kong never had democracy under the British, but it did have a stronger rule of law and more independent courts.

香港在英国统治下从未有过民主，但它确实拥有更强大的法治和更独立的法院。

Courts that sometimes decided things that went the other way than what the government wanted.

法院有时会做出与政府想要的相反的决定。

2:06:45 And the mainland doesn’t have that kind of court system.

而大陆没有这样的法院系统。

98, 99% conviction rate.

98、定罪率99%。

In Hong Kong if you’re arrested, even for before 2020, if you were arrested, even under a politically-related charge, you were out on bail and giving interviews with the press.

在香港，如果你被捕，即使是在 2020 年之前，如果你被捕，即使是受到与政治相关的指控，你也会被保释并接受媒体采访。

On the mainland, that didn’t happen.

在大陆，这种情况并没有发生。

So I think in 2019, even having lost the battle over voting, this idea that, okay, we’ve really got to take a last stand to defend the rule of law and a degree of separation of powers.

所以我认为，在 2019 年，即使输掉了投票之争，我们确实必须采取最后的立场来捍卫法治和一定程度的权力分立。

That doesn’t sound like a clearly obvious thing for slogans, but it is something that I think we’ve realized in this country and in other countries as well, is something that can really be definitive about where things are going politically.

对于口号来说，这听起来并不是一件显而易见的事情，但我认为我们在这个国家和其他国家都已经意识到了这一点，这确实可以明确政治上的发展方向。

Well, I should also say, I mean it’s more dramatic than it sounds with extradition because it gives power to mainland China to imprison political activists and then try them in a very different way.

好吧，我还应该说，我的意思是，引渡比听起来更戏剧化，因为它赋予中国大陆监禁政治活动人士的权力，然后以一种非常不同的方式审判他们。

2:07:37 So it’s not just even a different system.

所以这不仅仅是一个不同的系统。

It gives another lever, and a powerful one, to punish people that speak against China.

它提供了另一个杠杆，而且是一个强有力的杠杆，来惩罚那些发表反对中国言论的人。

And I mentioned the Hong Kong booksellers who were spirited over the border, and one of them was still in prison, for having published things in Hong Kong that it was supposed to be okay to publish in Hong Kong, but not on the mainland.

我还提到了那些在边境上兴致勃勃的香港书商，其中一位还在监狱里，因为他们在香港出版了本来可以在香港出版的东西，但在大陆却不行。

2:08:02 And yet they ended up being charged.

然而他们最终还是被指控了。

So yeah, there was a clear sense that if they didn’t protest, then would they be able to protest later?

所以，是的，有一个明显的感觉，如果他们不抗议，那么他们以后还能抗议吗？

So this was one of maybe the biggest protests in history?

那么这可能是历史上最大的抗议活动之一？

Percentage-wise.

按百分比计算。

Percentage-wise.

按百分比计算。

Because the ways, why I make that claim, because there were a million to 2 million people in the biggest protests.

因为方式，为什么我这么说，因为最大的抗议活动中有100万到200万人。

2:08:33 And this is of 7.5 million people.

这是 750 万人的数据。

Crazy.

疯狂的。

So if you think about what that means, it’s just enormous.

所以如果你想想这意味着什么，那就是巨大的。

2:08:44 I mean, yeah, there were some very daring protests around that period, the Hong Kong ones, and the year after that there were protests in other places.

我的意思是，是的，那段时期发生了一些非常大胆的抗议活动，香港的抗议活动，之后的一年，其他地方也发生了抗议活动。

The protests in Belarus where again, it was taking big risks, but if people have a feeling that it’s a last moment.

白俄罗斯的抗议活动再次冒着巨大的风险，但如果人们有一种感觉，这是最后一刻了。

So yeah, these were giant and the protests kept growing.

所以，是的，这些活动规模很大，而且抗议活动不断增加。

I think they kept growing in part, and this happens, why protests grow, it’s always hard to figure out.

我认为他们在一定程度上一直在增长，而这种情况发生了，为什么抗议活动会增长，总是很难弄清楚。

But in the case of Tiananmen and the case of Hong Kong 2019, if people feel that the protesters have the moral high ground in one way or another, and what tipped it that way in Hong Kong, I think, was really that the police were using really strong arm methods and the government was never apologizing or never saying, “We need to investigate that.” And I think what really kept the protests going was they became a referendum on the right to protest itself.

但就天安门事件和2019年香港事件而言，如果人们觉得抗议者在某种程度上占据了道德制高点，而在香港造成这种情况的原因，我认为实际上是警察使用了非常强硬的武力手段，而政府从未道歉或从未说过“我们需要对此进行调查”。我认为真正让抗议活动持续下去的是它们变成了对抗议权本身的公投。

2:09:54 What I think the government hoped, and what Beijing certainly hoped, was that some of the protesters would start doing militant actions, violent actions that would alienate the populace from the protests.

我认为政府希望的，也是北京当然希望的，是一些抗议者开始采取激进行动，暴力行动，从而疏远民众与抗议活动。

And the protesters did do some of those things, but they tended to attack, the violence was often against property.

抗议者确实做了其中一些事情，但他们倾向于攻击，暴力往往是针对财产的。

And when there were occasionally violence against people, people within the movement would apologize or try to distance themselves from that.

当偶尔发生针对人们的暴力行为时，运动中的人们会道歉或试图与之保持距离。

Meanwhile, the government was never apologizing or distancing itself from the police.

与此同时，政府从未道歉或与警方保持距离。

And that created a dynamic where they had these enormous numbers of people who were previously on the fence about things turning up for these protests and leading to them being giant.

这就创造了一种动态，有大量的人以前对这些抗议活动的出现持观望态度，并导致抗议活动规模庞大。

And this was a city that sometimes had the misunderstood reputation as being one where people didn’t care that much about politics.

这座城市有时被误解为人们不太关心政治。

They just focused on living a good life.

他们只专注于过上美好的生活。

But there was a sense that they wouldn’t have that possibility if you had a police, and the police used to be really highly respected in Hong Kong, but have lost that.

但有一种感觉，如果有警察，他们就没有这种可能性，而警察曾经在香港确实受到高度尊重，但现在已经失去了。

Maybe you can speak to some of the dynamics of this.

也许你可以谈谈其中的一些动态。

2:11:01 First of all, you were there in the early days, as I understand.

首先，据我了解，您很早就在那里了。

How does the protest of this scale …

如此规模的抗议如何...

explode as it did?

像它那样爆炸吗？

It starts with small groups of students, of the youth.

它从一小群学生、年轻人开始。

Maybe you can speak to, in general, from all the studying of youth protests, how does maybe anger, maybe ideological optimism, maybe the desire for revolution and for better times amongst a small group of students, how does that become a movement and how does that become a gigantic protest?

也许你可以从总体上对青年抗议的研究中谈一谈，一小群学生中的愤怒、意识形态上的乐观主义、对革命和美好时光的渴望，如何成为一场运动，如何成为一场巨大的抗议？

So protests, one of the things that some of the most impressive books I’ve been reading about other places have been emphasizing is that protests are often preceded by other protests that may seem like dead ends, but actually provide people with the skills and scripts and repertoires to then carry out things on a larger scale after that.

因此，抗议活动，我读过的一些关于其他地方的最令人印象深刻的书籍一直强调的一件事是，抗议活动之前通常会发生其他抗议活动，这些抗议活动看起来像是死胡同，但实际上为人们提供了技能、剧本和曲目，以便在此之后进行更大规模的活动。

2:11:46 So you often, we get captivated by a moment that seems to come out of nowhere, but it often doesn’t.

所以，我们常常会被某个似乎不知从何而来的时刻所吸引，但事实往往并非如此。

The ground has been laid by, it can be by an earlier generation that passes on the stories about it or it can be just a few years before.

基础已经奠定了，可能是由上一代人传承了有关它的故事，也可能是几年前。

2:12:31 And sometimes a new generation will say, “Look at what they did.

有时新一代会说：“看看他们做了什么。

That was exciting, but we want to put our mark on things by [inaudible 02:12:39] generation.” So there were these 1986 protests that fizzled out that helped lay the groundwork for the 1989 ones.

这很令人兴奋，但我们希望在 [听不清 02:12:39] 一代人身上留下我们的印记。”因此，1986 年的抗议活动最终以失败告终，为 1989 年的抗议活动奠定了基础。

In Hong Kong, there were the 2012 and 2014 ones that laid the groundwork 2019.

在香港，有2012年和2014年的经历，为2019年奠定了基础。

Some of the times, it was the same activists out on the streets again, but sometimes it was a younger generation said, “Yeah, okay, but that failed.

有时，同样的活动人士再次走上街头，但有时是年轻一代说：“是的，好吧，但那失败了。

So what can we do differently?” And we see this in cases in the US and we see it around the world, of the percolating of things that happen, sometimes in conversations that continue, that happen.

那么我们能做些什么不同的事情呢？”我们在美国的案例中看到了这一点，在世界各地也看到了这一点，发生的事情的渗透，有时是在持续发生的对话中。

And sometimes failures can seem like dead ends, but over a long period of time we see them as succeeding.

有时失败看起来像是死胡同，但在很长一段时间内，我们认为它们是成功的。

And it can seem irrational to try to do something after the last three times people have tried to do it have failed.

在人们过去三次尝试做某事都失败后，再尝试做某件事似乎是不合理的。

But then occasionally, history shows that the third time or the fifth time or the 20th time actually does succeed.

但偶尔，历史表明第三次、第五次或第二十次确实成功了。

There’s enough countervailing.

有足够的反补贴。

In Eastern Europe, you would say in 1956, there was a rising, it was crushed.

在东欧，你可能会说1956年发生了一次起义，但后来被镇压了。

In ’68 they were rising, was crushed.

68年，他们崛起，却被压垮。

Poland 1981, martial law imposed.

1981年波兰实行戒严。

In 1989, what were East German protesters thinking when they poured out onto the streets, and then it happened, but this time it wasn’t.

1989年，东德抗议者涌上街头时在想什么，然后这种事就发生了，但这次却没有。

So I think there’s a way in which social movements are fundamentally unpredictable and there are just times when, against all seeming odds, something that seemed like it would be there forever, just no longer is.

因此，我认为社会运动从根本上来说是不可预测的，有时，尽管看似困难重重，但似乎永远存在的东西却不再存在了。

And that’s the case you make for when the odds seem impossible, it’s still worthwhile?

当可能性看起来不可能时，你就会提出这样的情况，但它仍然值得吗？

It doesn’t mean that it will work, but I think history has enough examples of things that you thought.

这并不意味着它会起作用，但我认为历史上有足够多的例子来说明你所想到的事情。

2:14:39 I mean, it explains why certain figures are so inspirational for generations of activists, that people read.

我的意思是，它解释了为什么某些人物对几代活动人士如此鼓舞人心，值得人们阅读。

There’s a reason why people talk about Václav Havel.

人们谈论瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔是有原因的。

Whereas if Václav Havel had died in 1988, people would’ve said, “Oh, maybe he was a great writer,” but his political project, he didn’t live to see come.

然而，如果瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔 (Václav Havel) 于 1988 年去世，人们会说，“哦，也许他是一位伟大的作家”，但他的政治计划却未能在有生之年看到实现。

But then he lives to ’89 and becomes against all expectations.

但后来他活到了 89 年，却变得出乎所有人的意料。

So Rebecca Solnit, she’s got a new book, No Straight Road Takes You There: Essays for Uneven Terrain, and she’s talking about taking a longer view of some struggles that achieve things after the point when people might’ve imagined that they had run into dead ends.

丽贝卡·索尔尼特（Rebecca Solnit）出版了一本新书《没有直路带你去那里：不平坦地形的散文》（No Straight Road Take You There: Essays for Uneven Terrain），她谈到以更长远的眼光看待一些在人们可能想象自己已经陷入死胡同之后取得成就的斗争。

And she’s talking about keeping your eye on the gains that happen, even incrementally, and the ways in which the need to take a longer term perspective on some of these things.

她正在谈论要密切关注所发生的收益，甚至是渐进的收益，以及需要以更长远的眼光看待其中一些事情的方式。

2:15:55 And I think it’s a strange thing because there’s also often an impatience in movements of people wanting immediate results.

我认为这是一件奇怪的事情，因为想要立即得到结果的人们的行动往往不耐烦。

But as a historian, looking at situations, I’ve mentioned Eastern Europe and Central Europe, but Europe, Taiwan was a right-wing dictatorship under a version of martial law for decades.

但作为一名历史学家，从情况来看，我提到了东欧和中欧，但欧洲、台湾几十年来一直是戒严法下的右翼独裁国家。

And at each stage, it would seem that people struggling to change it were on a quixotic, impossible mission, or South Korea was in a similar situation.

在每个阶段，努力改变现状的人们似乎都在执行一项不切实际的、不可能完成的任务，或者韩国也处于类似的境地。

And then in the late 1980s, you start to have those things unravel.

然后到了 20 世纪 80 年代末，这些事情开始瓦解。

And it’s partly because of a steady resistance.

部分原因是稳定的阻力。

It’s partly because something in the world changes, but there’s often a combination of those things.

部分原因是世界上的某些事物发生了变化，但这些变化往往是多种因素的结合。

So I’m interested in that whole, we know that what happened in Hong Kong in the short run didn’t work, and I don’t see a way in which the national security laws reversed or anything like that.

所以我对整个事情很感兴趣，我们知道香港发生的事情在短期内没有发挥作用，而且我不认为国家安全法会发生逆转或类似的事情。

But that doesn’t mean that it was a completely impossible effort, even though we know the result in that case was to have this failure.

但这并不意味着这是一项完全不可能的努力，尽管我们知道这种情况的结果是失败。

So the protests are generally worthwhile.

因此，抗议总体上是值得的。

2:17:18 I mean they do give, as I look at the description of the migratory routes ideas take, they do seed ideas in the minds of people and then they live with those ideas and they share those ideas.

我的意思是，当我查看对思想迁移路线的描述时，他们确实给予了人们思想，他们确实在人们的头脑中播下了思想，然后他们接受了这些思想并分享了这些思想。

They deliberate through those ideas.

他们仔细考虑这些想法。

They might travel to different places of the world and then those ideas return and rise up again and again and again.

他们可能会去世界不同的地方旅行，然后这些想法就会一次又一次地返回并升起。

There’s two parts of the world that I think are fascinating …

我认为世界上有两个地方很迷人……

and unpredictable.

和不可预测的。

So one is Iran, which the trajectory that place takes might have a complete transformative effect on the Middle East.

其中之一就是伊朗，它的发展轨迹可能会对中东产生彻底的变革影响。

Then the other one is China, where the protests, whether it’s in Taiwan or Hong Kong or maybe other influential parts of China, those ideas percolating up and up again might have a completely transformative effect on the world.

另一个是中国，那里的抗议活动，无论是在台湾、香港，还是中国其他有影响力的地区，这些想法不断渗透可能会对世界产生彻底的变革性影响。

So maybe this is another case where, so the Chinese Communist Party, leaders in the Chinese Communist Party, they do know about history and they care about history.

所以也许这是另一个例子，中国共产党，中国共产党的领导人，他们确实了解历史并且关心历史。

2:18:21 And one history they know is the Chinese Communist Party was almost destroyed in 1927.

他们知道的一段历史是，1927年中国共产党几乎被灭亡。

I mean it was if you were taking odds on what are the chances that this ragtag group that’s being pursued by Chiang Kai-shek to try to determine, and yet over time, they somehow managed to ride it out and eventually come to power.

我的意思是，如果你对蒋介石追捕的这个乌合之众的机会有多大，但随着时间的推移，他们以某种方式设法渡过难关并最终掌权。

There’s an awareness of the ways in which the seemingly impossible can happen.

人们意识到看似不可能的事情可能会发生。

It doesn’t mean it will.

这并不意味着它会。

I mean, this is why I think, and one of the really tragic or heartrending things is you can have situations in which movements that seem to be pursuing an impossible end result, they achieve that result.

我的意思是，这就是为什么我认为，真正悲惨或令人心碎的事情之一是，你可能会遇到这样的情况：看似追求不可能的最终结果的运动，却实现了那个结果。

And then after another period, the country goes into another really difficult period or it seems that the successes are being rolled back.

然后又过了一​​段时期，该国进入了另一个非常困难的时期，或者似乎成功正在倒退。

2:19:34 And my new Milk Tea Alliance book that I’ve just written, I dedicate it to two people who’ve lived through a variety of these things.

我刚刚写的新书《奶茶联盟》，谨献给两个经历过这些事情的人。

One is a Burmese activist who was involved in a failed uprising in 1988.

其中一位是缅甸活动人士，曾参与 1988 年失败的起义。

He then was an exile who didn’t know whether he could ever see his brothers who he loves back in Burma.

当时他是一名流亡者，不知道自己是否还能在缅甸见到他所爱的兄弟。

And then something magical changed.

然后神奇的事情发生了变化。

And in the 2010s, it seemed that there was a democratization that turned out to be a false dawn.

2010 年代，似乎出现了一次民主化，但最终证明是虚假的曙光。

He was able to go back and now he’s, again, when there’s been a coup and a crackdown, he’s now again cut off.

他本来可以回去，但现在，当发生政变和镇压时，他又被切断了联系。

And at one point, I was asking him about how he feels about this when he’s still trying to raise awareness globally about what’s happening in Myanmar.

有一次，我问他对此有何感想，因为他仍在努力提高全球对缅甸正在发生的事情的认识。

He said, “I feel helpless but not hopeless.” I think how does somebody maintain hope in that?

他说：“我感到无助，但并不绝望。”我想人们如何对此保持希望呢？

2:20:31 And the other person I dedicated to Miklós Haraszti is a Hungarian friend of mine who was an activist before ’89 and saw this amazing thing happen was communism, a communist party rule ending.

我向 Miklós Haraszti 献上的另一个人是我的一位匈牙利朋友，他在 89 年之前是一名活动家，看到了共产主义这一令人惊奇的事情的发生，共产党统治的终结。

He was part of the process that came and he was friends with Havel, and Havel’s there and Poland’s changing and all of this exhilarating moment, but ends up being a critic of Orbán and following a tightening of controlling, a rolling back of many of the things that were victorious then.

他是这个过程的一部分，他是哈维尔的朋友，哈维尔在那里，波兰正在发生变化，所有这些令人兴奋的时刻，但最终成为欧尔班的批评者，并在加强控制后，许多当时胜利的事情发生了倒退。

But this, the no straight road, that actually there’s something about, it can be disquieting when these unexpected things are blows to where you thought direction history was going.

但这并不笔直，实际上有一些东西，当这些意想不到的事情对你认为历史发展方向的打击时，它可能会令人不安。

But history just shows you that history doesn’t have a direction.

但历史告诉你，历史没有方向。

There isn’t a straight road.

没有直路。

Yeah.

是的。

2:21:31 And there’s the idealism of youth can lead to things like the Russian Revolution.

年轻人的理想主义可以导致像俄罗斯革命这样的事情。

And then you get Stalin with [inaudible 02:21:41] and the purges and all of that entailed.

然后你会看到斯大林[听不清02:21:41]和清洗以及所有随之而来的事情。

So a successful protest and a successful revolution might have unintended consequences that far overshadow whatever ideals and dreams you had fighting for the working class, whatever it was in that particular case, that can cause immeasurable suffering.

因此，一次成功的抗议和一次成功的革命可能会产生意想不到的后果，这些后果远远掩盖了你为工人阶级而奋斗的任何理想和梦想，无论在特定情况下是什么，都可能造成不可估量的痛苦。

So there is no direction to history.

所以历史没有方向。

There’s just some lessons we pick up along the way and we hopefully try to help humanity flourish and we barely know what we’re doing.

我们一路上吸取了一些教训，希望能够帮助人类繁荣发展，但我们几乎不知道自己在做什么。

And now we have nuclear weapons.

现在我们拥有核武器。

And some of it is also, though, sometimes the people who I find really admirable, it’s not about trying to create totalistic change, but they focus on trying to do what they can for the things they believe in within constrained circumstances.

不过，有时我觉得真正令人钦佩的人也有一些，他们并不是试图创造全面的变革，而是专注于在有限的环境下为他们所相信的事情尽力而为。

2:22:20 And in Thailand, they’ve hit a roadblock now, again, over trying to bring about electoral change.

在泰国，他们在试图实现选举变革方面再次遇到了障碍。

A party that did really well was then disqualified.

表现非常好的一方将被取消资格。

And some of the activists I know are focusing on local efforts to improve a neighborhood, to keep a neighborhood from suffering from a unthinking gentrification.

我认识的一些积极分子正在关注当地改善社区的努力，以防止社区遭受不加思考的中产阶级化。

They’re thinking small, they’re thinking sometimes about just what can we do to improve the life of people within certain, how can we build, how can we contribute to the kinds of social groups that might make some incremental improvement to being the world that we want to live in.

他们的想法很小，有时他们会思考我们可以做些什么来改善某些特定范围内人们的生活，我们如何建设，我们如何为各种社会群体做出贡献，这些群体可能会逐步改善我们想要生活的世界。

People do that in all kinds of ways.

人们以各种方式做到这一点。

What parallels can we draw between Taiwan and Hong Kong?

台湾和香港有哪些相似之处？

2:23:28 What do you think are the people of Taiwan are thinking, looking at Hong Kong?

你认为台湾民众看待香港会怎么想？

Well, I think the way that things developed in Hong Kong have undermined the trust in any story coming out of Beijing.

嗯，我认为香港事态的发展方式已经削弱了人们对来自北京的任何故事的信任。

2:23:38 That there’s a place within Xi Jinping’s version, at least the People’s Republic of China, for a place where people live very different kinds of lives.

在习近平的版本中，至少在中华人民共和国，有一个地方，人们过着截然不同的生活。

And I think a lot of people in Taiwan think of them, feel they’re living a very different life than on the mainland.

我想很多台湾人都会想起他们，觉得他们的生活与大陆截然不同。

So in that way, I think Hong Kong was an important …

因此，我认为香港是一个重要的……

example that way.

就是这样的例子。

And there were connections between, there was a Taiwan protest in 2014 before the big protest in Hong Kong by people who were young people who felt the government then was moving too much toward working together with Beijing.

2014年台湾发生了一场抗议活动，之后香港年轻人发起了大规模抗议活动，他们认为当时的政府过于倾向于与北京合作，这之间存在着联系。

So they’ve been interconnected stories, and I think we sometimes miss how people within a region are looking at what other people in the region are doing and are taking clues from it about how to agitate for the things they care about, what the risks are, what the dangers are.

所以它们是相互关联的故事，我认为我们有时会怀念一个地区的人们如何看待该地区其他人在做什么，并从中寻找线索，了解如何鼓动他们关心的事情，风险是什么，危险是什么。

But the autocrats within different parts per region are looking at each other too, as well as globally.

但每个地区不同地区的独裁者也在互相审视，甚至在全球范围内。

In part because there’s a great dependence in the United States on TSMC and in that way on Taiwan for different supply chains, for electronics, for semiconductors, for a lot of our economy, there’s been a lot of nervousness about Taiwan.

部分原因是美国在不同的供应链、电子产品、半导体以及我们经济的许多方面对台积电有很大的依赖，从而对台湾有很大的依赖，所以人们对台湾有很多紧张感。

2:24:59 What are the chances that there is some brewing military conflict over this question of Taiwan in the coming decades and how can we avoid it?

未来几十年在台湾问题上酝酿军事冲突的可能性有多大？我们如何避免？

It’s one of these really worrisome issues that there isn’t an easy, I think experts who tell you they know what X, Y, & Z about this is are deluding themselves probably.

这是真正令人担忧的问题之一，没有一个简单的方法，我认为那些告诉你他们知道 X、Y 和 Z 是什么的专家可能是在自欺欺人。

2:25:27 There’s so many variables.

有很多变数。

Maybe you could just elaborate the possible clues we have.

也许你可以详细说明我们所掌握的可能的线索。

So with talking to people in Taiwan and from Taiwan, there are a couple things that are clear.

因此，通过与台湾人和台湾人交谈，有几件事是明确的。

2:25:50 One is that daily life in Taiwan is not people waking up each morning living their life based on the fact that they’re in such a perilous predicament.

一是台湾的日常生活并不是人们每天早上醒来就处于如此危险的困境中。

That it’s life goes on and a lot of people feel very, very fortunate to be in Taiwan.

生活还在继续，很多人都觉得生活在台湾非常非常幸运。

There are many reasons why it seems like a great place to live, in many ways.

从很多方面来说，它看起来都是一个理想的居住地，原因有很多。

But at the same time there is an awareness of things that increase precariousness.

但与此同时，人们也意识到一些事情会增加不稳定因素。

And there was a lot of concern with the invasion of Ukraine and watching how the response to that was, and there was a sense of it being analogous.

人们对入侵乌克兰有很多担忧，并观察对此的反应，并且有一种类似的感觉。

There was a sense that Xi Jinping would be watching the response to Putin and seeing what he would do then.

有一种感觉，习近平会关注普京的反应，看看他届时会做什么。

2:27:02 And so then there was a sense of relief, I think, when there was as unified a western, NATO, including the United States response.

因此，我认为，当西方、北约（包括美国）做出统一反应时，人们感到如释重负。

And then there’s a concern about the Trump presidency because of Ukraine.

此外，由于乌克兰问题，人们对特朗普总统任期也存在担忧。

At the same time, there’re mixed signals.

与此同时，也存在混合信号。

So I’m sure there are people there who are both saying, “Trump is going to be tough toward the Chinese Communist Party,” and others are going to say, “But if he’s not as supportive of Ukraine, what does that say for the defensive?” So they’re not the same situations, but all people have, in a sense, sometimes with unknowable situations, is to look at things that have any degree of parallel connections in other places.

因此，我确信有人会说，“特朗普将对中国共产党采取强硬态度”，而其他人会说，“但如果他不那么支持乌克兰，那对防守来说意味着什么呢？”所以它们不是相同的情况，但从某种意义上说，所有人有时在不可知的情况下，都会看到在其他地方有任何程度的平行联系的事物。

Do you think Xi Jinping knows what he’s going to do in the next five, 10 years with Taiwan?

您认为习近平知道未来五年、十年对台湾要做什么吗？

2:28:01 Or is it really, there’s a loose historical notion that Taiwan should be part of China.

或者确实如此，有一个松散的历史观念认为台湾应该是中国的一部分。

Would Xi Jinping and the Communist Party believe that?

习近平和共产党会相信吗？

That loose idea was accepted.

这个松散的想法被接受了。

2:28:23 Chiang Kai-shek and Mao both thought that these two places were part of, somehow, destined to be the same.

蒋介石和毛泽东都认为这两个地方在某种程度上是注定相同的。

It was just, under that period, Chiang Kai-shek thought, how long until I take over the mainland and it all becomes the Republic of China?

只是，在那个时期，蒋介石想，我要多久才能接管大陆，全部成为中华民国？

This is not now something that any leader in Taiwan is believing.

现在台湾任何领导人都不相信这一点。

There is a degree to which that remains a sense within the Chinese Communist Party leadership as a eventuality.

在某种程度上，中国共产党领导层仍然认为这是一种偶然。

I don’t think there’s a set plan, in part because I think it is also dependent on what the costs in various realms would be of doing that.

我不认为有一个固定的计划，部分原因是我认为这还取决于各个领域这样做的成本。

I think it still does …

我觉得还是这样……

I think it’s still, one scenario would be possibly a sense of becoming strong enough to not have to worry about consequences.

我认为，一种情况可能是一种感觉变得足够强大，不必担心后果。

I think another, I still think, to some extent more, would be a sense of weakness or precarity of maintaining power domestically and needing to do something to distract.

我认为另一个，我仍然认为，在某种程度上，是一种在维持国内权力方面的软弱感或不稳定感，需要做一些事情来分散注意力。

And another complexity about this is it’s not always so clear, the line between no conflict and conflict.

另一个复杂之处在于，无冲突和冲突之间的界限并不总是那么清晰。

2:29:41 So there’s a lot of gray zone tactics of nonviolent pressure that China could exude.

因此，中国可能会采取很多非暴力施压的灰色地带策略。

So you could do non-military violence, it could then escalate that to nonviolent military intimidation.

因此，你可以采取非军事暴力，然后将其升级为非暴力军事恐吓。

And all of this has consequences for the United States because there’s a messaging thing going on here.

所有这一切都会对美国产生影响，因为这里正在传递信息。

And then of course that could then go to a full-on do-as-you’re-told actions that come at a high risk of a hot military conflict.

当然，这可能会导致全面按照指示行事，而这些行动极有可能引发激烈的军事冲突。

So basically just don’t do military violence, but just full-on pressure, ordering Taiwan to do things.

所以基本上就是不采取军事暴力，而是全面施压，命令台湾做事。

And there, it’s like the only way to respond is with violence.

在那里，唯一的回应方式似乎就是暴力。

You’re completely trapped.

你完全被困住了。

2:30:37 You’re saying no, you have to say no with a military force behind it.

你说不，你必须在军事力量的支持下说不。

Then what do you do?

那你怎么办？

And every step in this, it’s such an unstable, non-linear, dynamical system where anything could just, unintended consequences can happen and it could just escalate in a matter of days, if not hours.

其中的每一步，都是一个不稳定、非线性、动态的系统，任何事情都可能发生意想不到的后果，并且可能在几天甚至几小时内升级。

And so this is where I think it’s really important to find mechanisms and tactics and strategies for de-escalation, which is why this trade war that’s happening, one of the nice things of being so connected by trade is it creates a disincentive for any of this posturing.

因此，我认为找到缓和局势的机制、策略和战略非常重要，这就是为什么这场贸易战正在发生，通过贸易如此紧密联系的好处之一就是它对任何这种姿态都产生了抑制作用。

Because I do agree with you.

因为我确实同意你的观点。

I think it will start, as these things often do, as a military, early steps posturing in order to maintain power internally.

我认为，正如这些事情经常发生的那样，作为一支军队，它会开始采取早期姿态，以维持内部权力。

So China will just create military conflict, conflict of different kinds in order to distract.

因此，中国只会制造军事冲突，各种不同的冲突，以分散注意力。

But then how does that escalate?

但事态如何升级呢？

As if all that wasn’t complicated enough, Taiwan isn’t just one place or one island.

似乎这一切还不够复杂，台湾不仅仅是一个地方或一个岛屿。

2:31:55 There are islands that are closer to mainland Xianmen and degrees of integration and anyway, but your comment about integration of trade and being a check on, there’s a Chinese writer who, fascinating guy, Han Han, who was a race car driver and a filmmaker and a bad boy novelist.

有一些岛屿更接近大陆仙门和一体化程度，无论如何，但你对贸易一体化和被检查的评论，有一位中国作家，一个迷人的家伙，韩寒，他是一名赛车手、电影制片人和坏男孩小说家。

Anyway, in his heyday, he was an interesting blogger who was testing the edges of things.

不管怎样，在他的全盛时期，他是一位有趣的博主，正在测试事物的边缘。

And he had this blog post where he was talking about, this was in the early 2000s.

他在这篇博客文章中谈到了这一点，那是在 2000 年代初期。

He was talking about how China was building the massive Three Gorges Dam project, this [inaudible 02:32:53].

他正在谈论中国如何建设大型三峡大坝项目，这个[听不清 02:32:53]。

And he said, “Some people are saying building these dams, it could be so easy for the Americans to just bomb them and destroy our country, because it would be a massive flood.”

他说，“有些人说修建这些水坝，美国人很容易轰炸它们并摧毁我们的国家，因为这将是一场大规模的洪水。”

2:33:10 And he said, “But that’s really silly.

他说：“但这真的很愚蠢。

That’s a really silly argument because Americans know that down river from there, what would be flooded out was the place where their iPhones are built and they want their iPhones.” So this notion he is making through a humorous point, the way in which interconnectedness can be a check.

这是一个非常愚蠢的论点，因为美国人知道，从那里下游，他们的 iPhone 生产地将会被洪水淹没，而他们也想要 iPhone。”因此，他通过一个幽默的观点提出了这个概念，即互连性可以成为一种检查。

And interconnectedness can be in all kinds of ways.

相互联系可以通过各种方式实现。

The flows of people between places and having people from one place living in another, traveling to another, studying in another, that can actually be something that helps to stabilize the world.

人员在不同地方之间流动，让一个地方的人生活在另一个地方，到另一个地方旅行，在另一个地方学习，这实际上有助于稳定世界。

And I think that’s an important thing to keep in mind.

我认为这是一件需要牢记的重要事情。

Since you mentioned the Long March and the unlikely coming to power with the Communist Party, let’s go back.

既然你提到了长征和共产党不太可能上台，那我们就回去吧。

2:33:55 We began comparing Xi Jinping and Mao.

我们开始比较习近平和毛泽东。

Let’s go back to Mao.

让我们回到毛泽东。

How did Mao come to power?

毛泽东是如何上台的？

The road to Mao coming to power, we need to first say that China was under rule by emperors until 1911, overthrown by an upheaval that was partly by people who wanted to change China into a republic, but also some people who wanted to get rid of the last dynasty was a group of Manchu-ruling families.

毛泽东的上台之路，我们首先要说的是，中国直到1911年都是由皇帝统治的，是被一场动乱推翻的，其中一部分是那些想要把中国变成共和国的人，但也有一部分是那些想要摆脱最后一个王朝的满族统治家族。

2:34:11 So they saw them as ethnic outsiders.

所以他们将他们视为外来人。

So it was a strange combination of ethnic nationalists who wanted China back under the control of Han Chinese.

因此，这是一个奇怪的民族主义者组合，他们希望中国重新回到汉人的控制之下。

Other people who thought the time for rule by emperors was over and wanted to establish a republic.

其他人则认为皇帝统治的时代已经结束，想要建立共和国。

And Sun Yat-sen became a provisional president of this newly formed Republic of China.

孙中山成为这个新成立的中华民国的临时大总统。

But then-

但接下来——

2:35:00 …

……

President of this newly formed Republic of China.

新成立的中华民国总统。

But then he got nudged out of power by a military strongman.

但后来他被一位军事强人逼下台。

And then there was a period where the country was really divided.

然后是一个国家真正分裂的时期。

Republic of China didn’t have a strong government, but there were then two groups.

中华民国没有一个强大的政府，但当时有两个群体。

One rallied around Sun Yat-sen had founded something that became known as The Nationalist Party.

孙中山周围的一个人创立了一个后来被称为国民党的组织。

And then, there was a small group of people who formed a communist party.

然后，有一小群人成立了共产党。

Mao was one of them.

毛泽东就是其中之一。

These were intellectuals who were part of the May 4th movement of 1919.

这些知识分子是 1919 年五四运动的一部分。

They were inspired by Marxist ideas, but they were also just inspired by the Russian Revolution.

他们受到马克思主义思想的启发，但也只是受到俄国革命的启发。

Russia was nearby.

俄罗斯就在附近。

It seemed good to think with.

一起思考似乎很好。

It had a largely rural population, and somehow it seemed to be getting strong in the world.

它的人口主要是农村人口，而且不知怎的，它在世界上似乎正在变得越来越强大。

And there was this interest in how China could do that.

人们对中国如何做到这一点很感兴趣。

And the newly formed Soviet Union did something very important.

新成立的苏联做了一些非常重要的事情。

2:36:03 There were a group of foreign powers, including Tsarist Russia, that had gained big concessions out of China when, in 1900, The Boxer Uprising had taken place and then been crushed by a consortium of foreign powers who had gotten privileges and indemnities out of that.

1900年义和团起义发生时，包括沙皇俄国在内的一批外国列强从中国获得了重大让步，然后被从中获得特权和赔偿的外国列强财团镇压。

And the newly formed Soviet Union renounced those.

新成立的苏联放弃了这些。

Said that was the old order.

说这是旧命令。

That was imperialism.

那就是帝国主义。

And so, Marx’s ideas were attractive to some Chinese thinkers, but Lenin was very attractive because of his combination of anti-imperialism and his notion of a vanguard party leading a country forward.

因此，马克思的思想对一些中国思想家很有吸引力，但列宁的吸引力很大，因为他把反帝主义和先锋党领导国家前进的思想结合起来。

So there was a small communist party, a bigger nationalist party.

所以有一个小的共产党，一个更大的民族主义政党。

They were involved in these protests against warlords and against imperialists.

他们参与了反对军阀和帝国主义的抗议活动。

And while Sun Yat-sen was alive, Sun Yat-sen got the two parties to work together because Sun Yat-sen wasn’t a Marxist.

当孙中山在世时，孙中山让两党合作，因为孙中山不是马克思主义者。

He didn’t believe in class struggle, but he admired Lenin and Leninism.

他不相信阶级斗争，但钦佩列宁和列宁主义。

And so, he said that actually The Communist Party and The Nationalist Party may have had different views of the path forward for China, but they agreed on who the enemies were and the enemies were the warlords who were keeping China weak and too willing to compromise with Japan, and foreign imperialism.

所以他说，实际上共产党和国民党对中国的前进道路可能有不同的看法，但他们一致认为敌人是谁，敌人就是那些让中国变得弱小、太愿意向日本和外国帝国主义妥协的军阀。

So China needed to get rid of the warlords and become a stronger country, and then they could sort it out of what road to take.

所以中国需要摆脱军阀，成为一个强大的国家，然后才能弄清楚该走什么路。

Sun Yat-sen dies in 1925, and his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, is initially keeps the alliance going with the Communist Party, but in 1927, he turns against the communists and tries to carry out a purge against The Communist Party members.

1925年孙中山去世，他的继任者蒋介石最初与共产党保持联盟关系，但在1927年，他转而反对共产党，并试图对共产党员进行清洗。

He’s the head of the nationalists?

他是民族主义者的领袖？

He’s the head of the nationalists.

他是民族主义者的领袖。

2:38:01 And he has some very different …

他有一些非常不同的……

He’s a kind of culturally more conservative figure.

他是一个文化上更加保守的人物。

But what’s important in part about this is there are some members of the Chinese Communist Party who accept the basic ideas of Marxism, of revolution comes from the cities.

但重要的是，中国共产党中有一些成员接受马克思主义的基本思想，即革命来自城市。

But Mao has this idea that actually he loves this idea of peasant rebellions in China’s past is driving history forward.

但毛泽东有一个想法，实际上他喜欢中国过去农民起义推动历史前进的想法。

And he starts writing about how, well, maybe in China’s case actually the peasantry farmers can be a radical force.

他开始写，也许在中国的情况下，农民实际上可以成为一支激进的力量。

And so, The Communist Party’s on the run.

因此，共产党正在逃亡。

It’s being pushed around, but the nationalists are trying to exterminate them.

它被推来推去，但民族主义者却试图消灭他们。

But eventually, and the nationalists and the Communists ally again after Japan invades China in the 1930s.

但最终，民族主义者和共产党在 20 世纪 30 年代日本入侵中国后再次结盟。

They formed what’s called The Second United Front.

他们组成了所谓的第二统一战线。

But during this period, Mao is emerging as taking leadership in the Chinese Communist Party and his idea of a different kind of vision of communist revolution that has the revolutionary vanguard somehow being the peasantry.

但在此期间，毛泽东正在中国共产党中取得领导地位，并提出了一种不同的共产主义革命愿景，其中革命先锋队在某种程度上是农民。

2:39:21 After World War II, after the two parties have brokered a truce and sort of worked together against Japan, there’s a civil war between the nationalists and the communists.

第二次世界大战后，两党斡旋停战并共同对抗日本后，民族主义者和共产党之间爆发了内战。

And against all odds, the Communist party wins.

尽管困难重重，共产党还是取得了胜利。

The Communist Party gets support from the Soviet Union.

共产党得到了苏联的支持。

The Nationalists get support from the United States, even though neither of them are quite doing things the way that their backer would like them to.

国民党得到了美国的支持，尽管他们都没有完全按照其支持者希望的方式行事。

But there also is a way in which, and this is something I think the Communist Party leaders remember, there’s a feeling that the Nationalist Party doesn’t really believe its own rhetoric.

但还有一种方式，我认为共产党领导人还记得这一点，即国民党并不真正相信自己的言论。

That, in fact, all it cares about is having power, and that it’s internally corrupt.

事实上，它所关心的只是拥有权力，而且它内部腐败。

Chiang Kai-shek himself isn’t viewed as sort of personally corrupt, but family members, and there’s an idea that there’s just a small band of people that are benefiting.

蒋介石本人并不被视为个人腐败，而是被视为家庭成员，并且有一种观点认为只有一小部分人受益。

And there’s a kind of disgust with the Nationalists.

人们对民族主义者有一种厌恶。

The Nationalists end up in retreat in Taiwan.

国民党最终在台湾撤退。

That’s why Taiwan then becomes the Republic of China.

这就是为什么台湾后来成为中华民国。

2:40:32 There’s an uprising there that Chiang Kai-shek’s people, the Nationalists, repress.

那里发生了蒋介石人民、国民党镇压的起义。

And there starts being from the late-nineteen forties on this long period of martial law on Taiwan.

台湾从十九世纪四十年代末开始就开始了这段漫长的戒严时期。

And there becomes then this period where the mainland’s under the control of a Leninist party, believes in one party rule, and believes that it was a very bad in Chinese history when China was unable to stand up to imperialists.

于是就出现了这样一个时期，大陆在列宁主义政党的控制下，信奉一党统治，认为中国无力对抗帝国主义是中国历史上非常糟糕的时期。

Taiwan’s controlled by a Leninist party that believes in one-party rule, limits on participation, believes that it was a bad time when China was being bullied by imperialists.

台湾由列宁主义政党控制，信奉一党统治，限制参与，认为中国受帝国主义欺凌的时代很糟糕。

What distinguishes, Chiang Kai-shek has a personality cult, Mao has a personality cult.

有什么区别，蒋介石有个人崇拜，毛泽东有个人崇拜。

They have a lot in common, but one clear thing that makes them different is Chiang Kai-shek says that what’s wrong with the Communist Party is they’ve abandoned Chinese traditional values of Confucianism.

他们有很多共同点，但有一个明显的区别是，蒋介石说，共产党的问题在于他们放弃了中国传统的儒家价值观。

And Mao says that on the nationalists, what’s really bad is they are still wedded to these traditional Chinese values of Confucianism.

毛泽东说，对于民族主义者来说，真正糟糕的是他们仍然固守着中国传统的儒家价值观。

2:41:47 So cycling back to where we began with Mao and Xi, you could actually say Xi Jinping in some ways is living out the dream that Chiang Kai-shek had of one- party rule and also kind of celebrating Confucianism.

因此，回到我们从毛泽东和习近平开始的地方，你实际上可以说习近平在某些方面正在实现蒋介石的一党统治的梦想，同时也在某种程度上颂扬儒家思想。

Yeah.

是的。

2:42:05 There’s elements you’ve spoken about, the elements of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao that Xi Jinping kind of combines.

你谈到了一些元素，习近平将蒋介石和毛泽东的元素结合在一起。

You’ve also mentioned an interesting, if we had a hundred hours to talk about, there’s another interesting side effect, a similarity that you talk about where Xi Jinping’s wife is out there, a known entity, a part of his public image.

你还提到了一个有趣的问题，如果我们有一百个小时的时间来谈论，还有另一个有趣的副作用，与你谈论的习近平妻子在那里的相似之处，一个已知的实体，他的公众形象的一部分。

And same was the case with Chiang Kai-shek.

蒋介石的情况也是如此。

Yes.

是的。

2:42:35 And both of them, they had high-profile wives who were celebrity figures and made a good impression globally and were more like kind of first ladies.

他们俩的妻子都是名人，在全球范围内留下了良好的印象，更像是第一夫人。

But both Chiang Kai-shek and Xi Jinping oversaw a period of emphasizing more traditional patriarchal values in China.

但在蒋介石和习近平的领导下，中国经历了一个强调传统父权价值观的时期。

And one of the things I didn’t mention before, Xi Jinping has been very, in this idea of trying to do away with difference within PRC, he’s been pushing against any kinds of feminist movements.

我之前没有提到的一件事是，习近平一直在努力消除中华人民共和国内部的差异，他一直在反对任何形式的女权运动。

So going back to Confucius.

那么回到孔子。

Yeah, yeah.

是啊是啊。

2:43:18 In some ways.

在某些方面。

There are people who will argue for a less patriarchal Confucius, but it fits with that mode.

有些人会主张孔子的父权制要少一些，但这符合这种模式。

So now, that gets us close to Mao consolidating power.

现在，这让我们接近毛泽东巩固权力的情况。

Then the story after 1949 with Mao is there were divisions within the Communist Party over sort of …

1949 年之后毛泽东的故事是，共产党内部因某种……而存在分歧。

2:43:31 Mao was impatient.

毛泽东不耐烦了。

He wanted to transform the country quickly.

他想迅速改变这个国家。

He had a utopian streak.

他有一种乌托邦的倾向。

He thought just as the peasantry could, you didn’t have to stick to the traditional pattern of moving slowly to socialism and then to communism.

他认为，就像农民一样，你不必坚持缓慢走向社会主义然后走向共产主义的传统模式。

The Great Leap Forward was this disastrous policy of his that imagined China outdoing the West in a kind of quick industrialization move like this.

大跃进是他的一项灾难性政策，他想象中国以这样的快速工业化举措超越西方。

And it just didn’t work.

但它就是行不通。

And all kinds of things were wrong.

所有的事情都是错误的。

We’d need a whole other session to do The Great Leap Forward and the cultural revolution.

我们还需要另外一届会议来讨论大跃进和文化大革命。

But one of the simple ways to think about it is Mao made these disastrous moves and then was partially sidelined and then wanted to get back to power.

但思考这个问题的简单方法之一是，毛泽东做出了这些灾难性的举动，然后部分被边缘化，然后想要重新掌权。

2:44:37 And there was this struggle between people who were more gradualist, more let’s try to work more kind of rationally, and the more utopian side with Mao.

更渐进主义、更理性地工作的人和毛泽东更乌托邦的人之间存在着斗争。

And both The Great Leap Forward and then later the cultural revolution were Mao’s efforts to do things dramatically, even at the risk of chaos, even at the risk of undoing a lot of the slow building of state building going on.

大跃进和后来的文化大革命都是毛泽东戏剧性地做出的努力，甚至冒着混乱的风险，甚至冒着毁掉正在进行的许多缓慢的国家建设的风险。

Then there were other figures who were more concerned with incremental moves.

还有其他一些人更关心增量行动。

And then, after Mao’s death, one of those figures, Deng Xiaoping ends up being the next long-term paramount leader.

然后，在毛泽东去世后，其中一位人物邓小平最终成为下一任长期最高领导人。

He led to decades of economic progress as economic reforms led to record-breaking growth for China and so on.

他领导了数十年的经济进步，经济改革为中国带来了破纪录的增长等等。

2:45:26 But I got to linger on The Great Leap Forward a bit, enough to understand modern-day China.

但我还是在“大跃进”上停留了一下，足以了解现代中国。

So as people know, as I’ll show, I’ll talk about in other episodes, The Great Leap Forward, this agricultural collectivization and rapid attempt to industrialize has killed 30 to 45 million people.

正如人们所知，正如我将在其他剧集中展示的那样，我将在“大跃进”中谈到，这种农业集体化和快速工业化的尝试已经导致 30 至 4500 万人死亡。

It’s one of, if not the greatest, atrocities in human history.

这是人类历史上最严重的暴行之一。

How could Mao be so catastrophically wrong on the policy of collectivization and be so unwilling to see the atrocity and the suffering he’s causing enough to change course?

毛泽东怎么可能在集体化政策上犯下如此灾难性的错误，并且如此不愿意看到他所造成的暴行和痛苦足以改变路线呢？

So with The Great Leap Forward, it has caused this incredible famine, just incredible devastation.

因此，大跃进造成了令人难以置信的饥荒，令人难以置信的破坏。

2:46:19 One of the things that happened was getting very bad information.

发生的事情之一就是获得非常糟糕的信息。

There was a sense that officials were afraid that if they gave bad news, if they admitted that they were failing to meet these giant targets that were being set, that would be seen as a political mistake.

有一种感觉是，官员们担心，如果他们发布坏消息，如果他们承认自己未能实现所设定的这些巨大目标，就会被视为政治错误。

So it got to be a survival mechanism to pass on unrealistic reports on what was going.

因此，传递有关正在发生的事情的不切实际的报告一定是一种生存机制。

So some of it was a culture of fear around a great leader that led to not getting accurate information.

因此，部分原因是围绕一位伟大领导者的恐惧文化导致无法获得准确的信息。

So that was one part of the dynamic.

这就是动态的一部分。

Ego was a big part of it.

自我是其中很大一部分。

There were all kinds of things that were unmoored.

有各种各样的东西没有停泊。

2:47:15 Early in the Chinese Communist Party history and power, there was the connection to the Soviet Union.

在中国共产党的历史和政权早期，就与苏联有联系。

Mao and Stalin had a connection.

毛泽东和斯大林有联系。

After Stalin’s death, Mao was haunted by the move toward de-Stalinization and the moves by Khrushchev, and thus laid the groundwork for the Sino-Soviet split.

斯大林去世后，毛泽东对去斯大林化和赫鲁晓夫的举动耿耿于怀，从而为中苏分裂埋下了伏笔。

But there was also this kind of obsession with doing things differently that Mao had in that case as well.

但毛泽东在这种情况下也有这种对以不同方式做事的痴迷。

And you have factional struggles, you have all kinds of things that are happening simultaneously.

还有派系斗争，各种各样的事情同时发生。

There’s something I learned about called Gray’s Law, which states any sufficiently advanced incompetence is indistinguishable from malice.

我学到了一种叫做格雷定律的东西，它规定任何足够严重的无能都与恶意没有区别。

2:47:53 So I would say when 30 to 45 million people die, it doesn’t really matter what the explanation is.

所以我想说，当 30 到 4500 万人死亡时，解释是什么并不重要。

That’s a longer discussion.

这是一个更长的讨论。

But the interesting discussion that connects to everything we’ve been talking about is how is Mao seen in modern day China?

但与我们一直在谈论的一切相关的有趣讨论是，现代中国如何看待毛泽东？

What has Xi Jinping said about Mao?

习近平对毛泽东说了些什么？

So before Xi Jinping, there was this kind of assessment of Mao as having been, in the early ’80s, of being 70% right, 30% wrong.

因此，在习近平之前，80年代初期对毛泽东的评价是70%正确，30%错误。

I guess Mao’s own analysis of Stalin was that Stalin was 70% right and 30% wrong.

我猜毛泽东自己对斯大林的分析是，斯大林70%是对的，30%是错的。

2:48:41 And so, they apply the same kind of-

所以，他们应用了同样的——

Logic there.

逻辑在那里。

2:48:50 Yeah.

是的。

Mathematical analysis to Mao.

对毛泽东的数学分析。

Yeah.

是的。

2:48:54 But Xi Jinping has had a different way of talking about this, and he’s talked about the first 30 years of the People’s Republic of China and the second 30 years and says that we should not use the successes of one to criticize the other, that we need to see where we are today as benefiting from both those first 30 years and those second 30 years, which implicitly, or he sometimes talks about a new era, It suggests that in many ways he sees China as now in a post-reform era, we can think about a third stage.

但习近平对此有不同的说法，他谈到了中华人民共和国的前30年和后30年，并说我们不应该用一个的成功来批评另一个，我们需要看到我们今天的处境从前30年和后30年中受益，这是含蓄的，或者他有时会谈到一个新时代，这表明他在很多方面认为中国现在处于改革后的阶段时代，我们可以思考第三阶段。

And there are people who write about it in that way.

有些人就是这样写的。

2:49:35 And so, there’s always been a way of trying to separate out the kind of Mao of the periods when things were not going horribly.

因此，总有一种方法可以试图区分出事情进展不那么糟糕时期的毛泽东。

And I think Xi Jinping would think that Mao having managed to fight the Korean War to a standstill, which is how the history of that period is described in the PRC.

我认为习近平会认为毛泽东已经成功地使朝鲜战争陷入停顿，这就是中华人民共和国对那段历史的描述。

He said, “Look, you had so many different forces of the more developed world fighting on one side, and that war did not end in a defeat for North Korea and for the Chinese side.” So yeah, Xi Jinping, I think, wants to be seen as an inheritor of Mao, continuer of one side of the Mao legacy, but clearly circling back to where we began, not the Mao who liked to stir things up, not the Mao who believed in mobilizing youth on the streets, not the Mao who let things get out of control, but the Mao who was responsible for strengthening the nation.

他说，“看，发达国家的许多不同势力并肩作战，而那场战争并没有以朝鲜和中国的失败而告终。”所以，是的，我认为，习近平希望被视为毛泽东的继承者，毛泽东遗产一方面的继承者，但显然又回到了我们开始的地方，不是那个喜欢煽动事情的毛泽东，不是那个相信在街头动员年轻人的毛泽东，不是那个让事态失控的毛泽东，而是那个负责强国的毛泽东。

Can I ask you about the 1953 speech?

我可以问你关于 1953 年演讲的事吗？

2:50:47 Can you just watch it real quick?

你能快速观看吗？

This particular speech is about, in 1953, at the end of the Korean War, saying China will not surrender.

这篇特别的演讲是关于 1953 年朝鲜战争结束时说中国不会投降的。

Well, let’s actually just listen to it.

好吧，我们实际上只是听一下。

[foreign language 02:51:04].

[外语02:51:04]。

The speech reads, “As to how long this war will last.

演讲中写道：“至于这场战争将持续多久。

2:51:03 We’re not the ones who can decide.

我们不是能够决定的人。

It used to depend on President Truman.

它曾经取决于杜鲁门总统。

It will depend on President Eisenhower or whoever will become the next US president.

这将取决于艾森豪威尔总统或谁将成为下一任美国总统。

It’s up to them.

这取决于他们。

But no matter how long this war is going to last, we will never yield.

但无论这场战争要持续多久，我们都不会屈服。

We will fight until we completely triumph.” Yeah.

我们将战斗，直到完全胜利。”是的。

So this is the version of Mao that you’re speaking to that it is still celebrated today.

这就是你所说的毛泽东版本，至今仍在庆祝。

And from the Chinese perspective, I guess they could tell the story about that particular proxy war that they triumphed.

从中国的角度来看，我想他们可以讲述他们取得胜利的那场特定代理人战争的故事。

What do you think about that speech, about these performances?

您对那次演讲和这些表演有何看法？

I don’t know how much you’ve listened to Mao speeches.

我不知道你听了多少毛泽东讲话。

Well, he had a really difficult accent to make sense of, and native speakers of Chinese can have trouble with his speech.

嗯，他的口音真的很难听懂，而以中文为母语的人可能很难听懂他的讲话。

2:52:04 That one was less hard to follow than some of them.

那个人比他们中的一些人更容易理解。

What explains the accent?

口音怎么解释？

Well, he’s just from Hunan and he had a heavy accent.

嗯，他是湖南人，口音很重。

2:52:22 And this is another complicated side of Mao.

这也是毛泽东复杂的另一面。

He was both anti-intellectual and very intellectual.

他既是反知识分子又是非常知识分子。

He liked to write poetry and to fashion himself as that, but he also liked to be seen as incredibly earthy and critical of intellectuals.

他喜欢写诗并塑造自己，但他也喜欢被视为极其朴实且对知识分子持批评态度。

And if he had an animus toward wanting to, even though he was intellectual, he had that anti-intellectualism.

如果他对想要这样做抱有敌意，即使他是知识分子，他也有反智主义。

But no, I think what’s interesting about that speech in part is how, and even the depiction of Korean War as being the war against America and resist America and support Korea.

但不，我认为那次演讲的有趣之处在于如何甚至将朝鲜战争描述为针对美国、抵抗美国和支持韩国的战争。

I think it fit with his idea that it wasn’t just about China.

我认为这符合他的想法，即这不仅仅与中国有关。

It wasn’t about China working in self-interest, but siding with the underdog countries against the hegemonic ones.

这不是中国为了自身利益而行动，而是与弱国站在一边对抗霸权国家。

And that was another part of Mao’s desire to see China as representing the kind of third world and the countries that had felt the brunt of Western imperialism and Japanese imperialism, and trying to find one or another country’s imperialism to focus on.

这也是毛泽东希望将中国视为第三世界和那些遭受西方帝国主义和日本帝国主义冲击的国家的代表，并试图找到一个或另一个国家的帝国主义作为重点的一部分。

And that point, he was focusing on America, which is something that can have particular resonances now.

那时，他关注的是美国，这是现在能引起特别共鸣的事情。

2:54:10 Mao could alternate that certain points he thought there should be an alliance with, or he said that China should be able to work with Japan, because he said it at one point.

毛泽东可以交替表达他认为应该结盟的某些观点，或者他说中国应该能够与日本合作，因为他曾经说过这样的话。

He said, “Well, without Japanese imperialism, the Communist Party wouldn’t have risen because we wouldn’t have had this ability to unite the people.” We have seen in the post-Mao period, some leaders playing on sort of anti-Japanese sentiment because of the history of Japanese aggression.

他说：“没有日本帝国主义，共产党就不会崛起，因为我们就没有这种团结人民的能力。”我们看到，在后毛泽东时代，一些领导人因日本侵略历史而玩弄某种反日情绪。

Or there can be anti-American sentiment because of the history of American roles in imperialism, or it can be played in a different way.

或者，由于美国在帝国主义中扮演的角色的历史，可能会出现反美情绪，或者可能以不同的方式发挥作用。

The United States certainly tried that.

美国确实尝试过这一点。

The United States didn’t have formal colonies in Asia the way that Britain and France did and tried to present itself differently.

美国没有像英国和法国那样在亚洲拥有正式的殖民地，并试图以不同的方式展现自己。

2:55:06 But these things are also kind of in flux.

但这些事情也在不断变化。

And now we’re in this very unusual in flux period.

现在我们正处于这个非常不寻常的变化时期。

At the beginning of the imposition of tariffs.

征收关税之初。

There were leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea all together in photo ops, which was not something that, being on the same side.

中日韩三国领导人都在一起合影，这可不是站在同一边的事。

So I think this is also just a kind of broader lesson to not assume that configurations will always stay.

所以我认为这也是一个更广泛的教训，不要假设配置将永远保留。

If you look out into the 21st century, what are some of the best possible things that could happen in the region and globally with China at the center of the world stage?

如果展望 21 世纪，当中国处于世界舞台的中心时，该地区和全球可能发生的最好的事情是什么？

2:55:37 What are the possible trajectories you could see culturally, economically, politically, in terms of partnerships and all this kind of stuff?

在文化、经济、政治、伙伴关系等方面，你可以看到哪些可能的发展轨迹？

It’s such such a hard moment to be imagining these things.

想象这些事情真是一个艰难的时刻。

2:56:01 I’ve long wanted to see a return of China to this path toward a more …

我长期以来一直希望看到中国回归这条道路，走向更加……

I wasn’t one of the people who imagined that there would be this convergence of China’s emergence into evolution into a liberal capitalist kind of country.

我并不是那些想象中国会逐渐演变成自由资本主义国家的人之一。

But I’d love to see a return to that more kind of tolerance of diversity within China, variations within China, of more space for civil society.

但我希望看到中国回归对多样性、差异性的宽容，为公民社会提供更多空间。

And it’s a hard time to even imagine that, because Hong Kong kind of represented that place that was somehow within.

现在很难想象这一点，因为香港某种程度上代表了那个地方。

It was an amazing thing, I think looking backward, sorry, rather than forward.

这是一件了不起的事情，我认为回顾过去，对不起，而不是向前看。

I think it’s really extraordinary how much leeway was given to Hong Kong for a period there.

我认为在一段时期内给予香港如此大的回旋余地真是非同寻常。

That was really special.

那真的很特别。

No Communist Party-run country had ever had a city within it that had as free a press as Hong Kong had then, as much tolerance for protests.

从来没有一个共产党统治的国家拥有像香港那样拥有如此自由的新闻界和对抗议活动如此宽容的城市。

2:57:17 I hope it can be seen by some, at least within Beijing, as a miscalculation too.

我希望至少在北京内部的一些人也能认为这是一个误判。

The People’s Republic of China wanted soft power, and Hong Kong films were admired around the world, this industry.

中华人民共和国需要软实力，香港电影这个行业受到全世界的钦佩。

There was a way in which creativity flourished.

有一种方式可以让创造力蓬勃发展。

I guess it would be just the hope for more spaces where that kind of creativity and openness where things can flourish.

我想这只是希望有更多的空间，让创造力和开放性得以蓬勃发展。

I’d love to think that there actually are a variety of things in Taiwan that if those could become broader norms, not that Taiwan’s perfect, it has its own internal problems, but there are many really attractive things about it right now.

我很想认为台湾实际上有很多事情，如果这些事情可以成为更广泛的规范，那么台湾并不是完美的，它有自己的内部问题，但现在有很多真正有吸引力的事情。

Different kinds of things that flourish.

各种事物蓬勃发展。

So maybe a setting in which Taiwan and in its post martial law, post-Leninist incarnation would be something that we could think of more.

因此，也许台湾及其后戒严、后列宁主义化身的背景是我们可以考虑更多的。

Yeah, and you’re right, Taiwan and especially Hong Kong, it’s a truly special place, it’s a case study.

是的，你是对的，台湾，尤其是香港，这是一个真正特别的地方，这是一个案例研究。

2:58:28 It doesn’t make sense that that would happen, but it happened.

发生这种事是没有意义的，但它确实发生了。

History is full of wonderful things like this.

历史上充满了这样奇妙的事情。

And I guess can clarify, you think the protests of 2019, the protests in ’20, they’re mostly a failure?

我想可以澄清一下，你认为 2019 年的抗议活动、20 世纪的抗议活动大多都是失败的？

Is there still a possibility that Hong Kong rises and its way of life, its way of being, the democratic ideals, not necessarily full-on democracy or this kind of thing, but would actually in a sense permeate China, not the other way around?

香港是否还有可能崛起，它的生活方式、存在方式、民主理想，不一定是全面的民主或类似的东西，但实际上在某种意义上会渗透到中国，而不是相反？

So that was a hope early on, and there were ways in which some parts of Hong Kong’s style even permeated across the border.

所以这是早期的一个希望，香港风格的某些部分甚至通过某种方式渗透到边境。

2:59:15 I think it’s hard to see it now with how Hong Kong has changed, but I hesitate to, I mean, an awareness of the unpredictability of things.

我认为现在很难看到香港发生的变化，但我犹豫，我的意思是，意识到事情的不可预测性。

There’s no way to know what kind of thing there would be for Hong Kong later.

不知道以后香港会发生什么。

I do think there are things about Hong Kong that even in the failure of the movement have had repercussions that are not all negative.

我确实认为，即使运动失败，香港的一些事情也产生了并不全是负面的影响。

I think the Hong Kong spirit, which is being kept alive in diaspora communities around the world, is really interesting.

我认为在世界各地的侨民社区中保持活力的香港精神非常有趣。

There are things that are spreading.

有些事情正在传播。

I think Hong Kong represented a vision of a different way of being Chinese, a different notion of Chineseness.

我认为香港代表了一种不同的中国人方式、一种不同的中国性概念。

And I think that is something that exists.

我认为这是存在的。

3:00:15 And there have been protesters in a lot of other parts of the world.

世界许多其他地区也出现了抗议者。

I used to say from Minneapolis to Minsk, because in 2020 there were protests in the US and in Belarus where there were activists who were talking about the Hong Kong idea of sort of trying to focus on be water, more flexible protest tactics.

我曾经说过从明尼阿波利斯到明斯克，因为2020年美国和白俄罗斯发生了抗议活动，那里的活动人士正在谈论香港的想法，即试图专注于水、更灵活的抗议策略。

And clearly in Thailand, there were people who looked at things to learn from Hong Kong, even in defeat.

显然，在泰国，有人希望向香港学习，即使失败了。

There’s a New Zealand-based China specialist, Geremie Barmé, who talks about the other China, which can exist within China, physical China, or elsewhere.

新西兰的中国问题专家杰雷米·巴尔梅 (Geremie Barmé) 谈到了另一个中国，这个中国可以存在于中国境内、实体中国或其他地方。

Which is this equally attached to Chinese traditions, but thinking of those traditions as including not just Confucianism but Taoism, not just hierarchy, but also openness to cosmopolitanism.

这同样重视中国传统，但认为这些传统不仅包括儒家思想，还包括道家思想，不仅包括等级制度，还包括对世界主义的开放。

Not just nationalism, but cosmopolitanism.

不仅是民族主义，还有世界主义。

3:01:15 And I think there are some elements of that, that even in failure, the Hong Kong movements, the Hong Kong protests of the 2020s were a last flourishing of that.

我认为其中有一些因素，即使失败了，2020 年代的香港运动、香港抗议活动也是最后一次繁荣。

And we can see some elements of that in, we can think of Taiwan, elements of that is another China as well.

我们可以看到其中的一些元素，我们可以想到台湾，其中的元素也是另一个中国。

I think not allowing the particular version of Chineseness that the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping wants to make people think of as the essence of Chinese.

我认为，不允许习近平领导下的中国共产党想让人们将其视为中国人的本质的特定版本的中国性。

China has multiple cultural strands, multiple traditions that people can tap into.

中国拥有多种文化、多种传统可供人们利用。

And it’s something richer and more admirable, I think, than this narrowed down version.

我认为，它比这个缩小版更丰富、更令人钦佩。

And I hope for a future where both Hong Kong and Beijing have bookstores that carry 1984, Brave New World, and all of your books.

我希望未来香港和北京都有书店，出售《1984》、《美丽新世界》和你们所有的书。

3:02:07 And I can’t wait to visit them and enjoy the intellectual flourishing of incredible people.

我迫不及待地想拜访他们，欣赏这些令人难以置信的人们的智力繁荣。

What a beautiful world to live in.

生活在一个多么美丽的世界啊。

The Chinese people, all the people I’ve met, it’s just so great to interact with a totally different culture.

中国人，我见过的所有人，与完全不同的文化互动真是太棒了。

You can feel the roots run deep through ancient history that are very different.

你可以感受到深深扎根于古代历史中的非常不同的根源。

And it’s amazing.

这太棒了。

It’s amazing that Earth produced Chinese people, Indian people, the Slavic people.

令人惊奇的是，地球产生了中国人、印度人、斯拉夫人。

There’s just all kinds of variants, and we’re all have our own weirdnesses and quirks and so on.

有各种各样的变体，我们都有自己的怪癖和怪癖等等。

Everybody has brilliant people.

每个人都有才华横溢的人。

We all start shit with each other every once in a while.

我们都会时不时地开始互相恶搞。

But I hope now that we have nuclear weapons, and I hope now that we have technology that connects us, we’ll actually collaborate more than we fight each other.

但我希望现在我们拥有核武器，我希望现在我们拥有连接我们的技术，我们实际上能够合作而不是互相争斗。

And thank you for being one of the people that shows off the beauty of this particular peoples, of the entire region, really, of Southeast Asia.

感谢您成为展示这个特定民族、整个地区（实际上是东南亚）之美的人之一。

And it’s an honor to talk to you.

很荣幸与您交谈。

Thank you so much.

太感谢了。

Thanks for having me on.

谢谢你邀请我参加。

Thanks for listening to this conversation with Jeffrey Wasserstrom.

感谢您收听与 Jeffrey Wasserstrom 的对话。

3:03:31 To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description.

为了支持这个播客，请在说明中查看我们的赞助商。

And now let me leave you some words from Confucius.

现在让我给大家讲一下孔子的话。

“When anger rises, think of the consequences.” Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.

“当愤怒上升时，想想后果。”感谢您的收听，希望下次再见。