第 470 期·中文精读

詹姆斯·霍兰德:二战、希特勒、丘吉尔、斯大林与最大战役

James Holland: World War II, Hitler, Churchill, Stalin & Biggest Battles

二战史学家复盘几场决定性大战的走向与代价,评述希特勒、丘吉尔、斯大林各自的判断与抉择。

官方音频00:00 / --:--
中文精读由 AI 基于原始访谈改写,非官方翻译,可能存在偏差或错误;表述以原音频与官方文稿为准。说明

1945 年,一个叫萨姆·布拉德肖(Sam Bradshaw)的英国坦克兵从欧洲战场回到利物浦。他离家四年,在北非负过重伤,在意大利脖子上中过一枪。推开门的那一刻,他发现母亲的头发已经全白了。他离开时 13 岁的小妹妹,现在是个年轻女人。他的母校被德国空军的炸弹夷为平地。他站在自己长大的街道上,认不出这个地方。

然后他又报名参军了,换了一个团,重新回到欧洲大陆。他成了最早进入贝尔森集中营的英军士兵之一。

历史学家詹姆斯·霍兰德(James Holland)在莱克斯·弗里德曼(Lex Fridman)的播客里讲这个故事时,语气很平静。他说自己一直在想萨姆。萨姆是他最早采访的一批二战老兵之一,已经过世了。霍兰德说,萨姆当时的解释是,他和家乡之间那条时间的鸿沟太宽了,四年的经历把他和所有正常生活切断,切断的方式很残忍,他那一刻没法面对。

“他回到家,发现自己完全无法和家乡连接。他觉得自己和一切正常的生活都断了。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

一场在沙漠、丛林、冰原和海滩上同时进行的战争

霍兰德给二战的定义很简单:它是真正全球性的。沙漠里有战事,北极圈里有战事,大洋上有,空中有,丛林里有,山丘上有,海滩上有,俄罗斯草原上有,乌克兰也有。他在《西方战争史》第一卷开头写过一组数字:6000 多万人死亡,涉及 60 多个国家,整座城市被夷平,国界被重画,数百万人流离失所。

他承认,过去几十年里,中东、非洲部分地区、巴尔干、阿富汗乃至美国的人,都有理由觉得自己正在经历的动荡是近代最惨痛的记忆。但放在全球尺度上,二战仍然是人类现代史上最大的一场灾难,在人类戏剧性这个维度上没有对手。

为什么是人的戏剧性?霍兰德说,凡是战争,就有不可思议的人类故事。他自己会想:如果我当年 20 岁,我会怎么应对?我会进陆军、空军,还是上一艘皇家海军驱逐舰?我怎么处理那种分离?

他采访过的很多人,一走就是四年。二战的大部分战斗,是普通人在极端处境里做不普通的事。这句话听起来像陈词滥调,但萨姆的故事把它变成了具体的东西。

一封信可以杀死一个人

霍兰德说,萨姆讲得最清楚的细节,其实和打仗没什么关系,是关于信件的。

战时的邮件没有规律。理论上应该定期送达,实际上不来就是不来。有时候一天之内突然涌进来五封。萨姆所在的中队里有个同袍,妻子会定期写信,写女儿上学的事,写女儿赢了游泳比赛,写邻里间的琐碎。霍兰德的原话是,这些信在他们眼里就是“猫薄荷”,全队人都等着他的信到,好知道那个小女孩最近又干了什么。

“那些日常琐碎生活的细节,在他们看来就是绝对的猫薄荷。他们爱极了。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

然后“亲爱的约翰”信来了。妻子说,对不起,我遇到了别人,结束了。

萨姆看得出那个朋友状态极差,觉得他会做傻事。他过去跟他说,我知道这很糟,我知道你彻底垮了,但你还有弟兄们在这儿,别干蠢事,等战争结束了也许还能修补。他还劝他站在对方角度想一想,两年没见面了,路那么远。

两天后的下一场战斗,那个人阵亡了。萨姆说,他当时就知道会这样。

霍兰德说他一辈子没忘记这个故事。让一个士兵撑住的东西,和爱国主义没多大关系。是家乡生活还在继续的那个感觉。那封信切断的东西,更接近他和正常世界之间的最后一根线。

霍兰德还讲了另一件事:他看二战老兵口述史时经常感到挫败。这些资料通常被放到 YouTube 或者博物馆网站上,长度半小时,运气好一小时,你只能摸到表面。你没法追问,没法像他那样坐在一个人对面,把他真正想问的东西挖出来。很多老兵在复述他们战后从书里读到的东西,而不是他们自己经历的东西。

“数以百万计”:一份用会计口吻写下的死亡计划

话题转到饥饿计划(Hunger Plan)。弗里德曼问,这个计划和生存空间(Lebensraum)在纳粹意识形态和战争机器里占多大分量。

霍兰德的回答是:这是整件事的核心。

他特别强调了一个容易被忽略的细节:制定饥饿计划的部门在国防军内部,党卫队并不参与。是国防军最高统帅部(OKW)的经济部门,是德国总参谋部。格奥尔格·托马斯将军(Georg Thomas)和当时的粮食部长赫尔曼·巴克(Hermann Backe)坐下来开会,讨论的问题很朴素:我们的粮食不够,怎么办?

德国农业效率低,这是前提。他们的结论是,这就是生存空间的意义所在,我们打进去,把粮食拿走。苏联自 1917 年革命以来经历了大规模城市化,城市人口靠商品粮活着。德国人把粮食拿走,这些人就吃不上饭。托马斯用的词是“数以百万计”(umpteen millions)。

霍兰德说,这个计划的语气非常随意。出面制定它的是参谋,通篇都是算账的口气,没有一句种族理论的演讲词。6000 万死亡里,有相当一部分是这样被算出来的。

再往上,是希特勒的世界观。霍兰德描述得很直白:存在一个全球性的犹太布尔什维克阴谋,犹太人和布尔什维克是一伙的,这是纳粹意识形态的基石,虽然这个前提完全站不住。世界观由此分成两边,一边是“我们”,北欧雅利安白色人种,天然的主宰民族;一边是“他们”。1918 年德国在背后被捅了一刀,这笔账要算。这是一场为了未来生存的存在性战争,这个可怕的任务落到了我们这一代人头上,我们必须完成,否则就没有未来。

希特勒是个非黑即白的人。要么是千年帝国,要么是世界末日。没有中间地带,没有灰色区域。

“他只有这两种模式:千年帝国,或者末日浩劫。没有中间地带,没有灰色地带。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

他之所以能崛起,恰恰因为这个信息足够清晰。每次演讲都从阴暗面开始,最后推向一个狂热的、阳光普照的高潮。霍兰德说,现在有 App 可以翻译他的演讲,按今天的标准听,那就是一堆胡言乱语。但你得把自己放回 1922 年、1923 年,或者 1933 年那些听众的位置上。

霍兰德顺带驳斥了一种常见的历史假设:“如果希特勒意识到乌克兰人愿意跟他并肩作战,如果他把那些犹太科学家纳入纳粹体系,德国也许就能赢。”他说这种说法完全没抓住重点。这是一场意识形态战争,那些“如果”在逻辑上就不可能发生。

一台收音机如何让一个国家相信同一件事

弗里德曼问,希特勒是不是一个务实的理性领导人。霍兰德说不是。意识形态把每一个军事决策都框住了,而这个意识形态从实用角度看是有缺陷的,从伦理角度看更是。

真正让霍兰德佩服其“天才”的人是戈培尔,希特勒不在其中。

1939 年的德国,机械化程度落后,但通信网络是全世界最密的,比美国还密。70% 的家庭有收音机,这个比例在当时前所未有,只有美国能勉强比一比。剩下 30% 没有的家庭也没关系,公寓楼的楼梯间、广场、咖啡馆、酒吧,到处都装着喇叭。

纳粹国家控制广播、电影、报纸,所有媒体渠道都归戈培尔的消息与宣传部管。广播里不全是希特勒的咆哮,还有轻娱乐、滑稽节目、瓦格纳、理查·施特劳斯。但潜台词始终一样:我们是最优秀的,我们是老大,犹太布尔什维克阴谋是可怕的存在性威胁,我们必须战胜它,我们军事上天下第一,我们应该为自己感到骄傲,我们会赢,会成为世界历史上最伟大的民族,而希特勒是个天才。

霍兰德还讲了国民收音机(Volksempfänger)的故事。这东西 9 英寸乘 4 英寸乘 4 英寸,胶木外壳,超级便宜。在此之前,收音机是中产阶级的摆设,胡桃木漆面,用来向邻居炫耀。一夜之间所有人都买得起了。所有人能买得起,就意味着所有人接收同一个信息。霍兰德把它比作 iPod 的出现。

然后是希特勒青年团。十六七岁的年轻人最容易受影响,最不厌恶风险,最跃跃欲试,脑子最容易被塑造。你抓住青年,就抓住了一切。加上漂亮的制服,加入党卫队,拿到那把匕首,还有什么可犹豫的。

“如果你一遍一遍又一遍地重复,人们就会相信。今天他们仍然如此。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

霍兰德把这个逻辑延伸到当下。他说历史不会重复,因为时代总在变化,但人类行为的模式会重复。经济危机之后必然跟着政治动荡,总是如此,因为总有一部分人的处境比以前更差,他们会想,现行制度不行,替代方案是什么?2008 年金融危机,再加上新冠,西方的处境就是不安定的,于是进入政治动荡期。特朗普提供的就是完全不同的东西:旧的方式不管用了,我就直说,不搞外交辞令那一套。如果国家已经感觉坏掉了,来了一个 disruptor(搅局者),你就能理解为什么相当一部分人会想“我要一份”。

他把这条线和 1930 年代接了起来。希特勒 1932 年 7 月拿到 37% 的选票,1933 年 1 月出任总理时只有 33%。他之所以能上台,是因为保守派政客自信能操纵他。霍兰德说,那些人的傲慢把一切都搞砸了。1933 年夏天兴登堡去世,总统职位被取消,只剩元首,授权法案通过,其他政党全部解散,一个极权国家就这么建成了。

弗里德曼在这里提了一条教训:不要让一个极端主义者进入政府,然后以为你能控制他。

欧洲汽车最多的国家,指挥部里没有一部电台

1939 年 9 月 1 日德国入侵波兰。弗里德曼追问,法国当时不是可以直接打到柏林去吗?

霍兰德说,完全可以。

法国在萨尔地区搞了一次所谓“攻势”,实际上是武装侦察,越过边境,闲逛几天,然后慢悠悠地回来。霍兰德形容为“令人尴尬”。当时德国主力全在波兰,西线后门大开。

法国为什么不动?霍兰德给了几层解释。

第一层是创伤。一战在法国土地上打,在他们的工业心脏地带打,法国阵亡人数是英国的三倍。英国被创伤了,但程度不一样。法国没有再次承受这种损失的胃口。

第二层是政治。1930 年代的法国政治极度分裂,一届又一届政府,一位又一位总理,多党联合内阁,左右中全都搅在一起,谁都不同意任何事。马奇诺防线能建成已经是奇迹。

第三层是心理上的错误。比利时是中立国,拒绝盟军进入其领土。法国本应说,那好,我们就不来救你。但他们没这么说,因为整整一代人之前在同一个地方打过仗,心理上过不去。结果德军从比利时方向绕了过来,正好打在马奇诺防线结束的那个铰链处。

第四层是指挥系统的老化。法国最高层的指挥官大多是一战老兵,魏刚(Weygand)、甘末林(Gamelin)、乔治将军(Georges),全都在六十岁以上。最年轻的集团军司令乔治将军也 60 岁了。霍兰德说,60 岁当集团军司令太老了,应该是四十多岁快到五十的人。

然后是那个细节。法军总司令甘末林的指挥部所在的万塞讷城堡,连一部电台都没有。消息靠摩托车传令兵送。早上六点派出去,中午没回来,再派一个,晚上九点才带回答案。那时候德军又推进了 15 英里,早上六点发出的命令早就过期了。这套流程在每一级指挥部重复:总司令部、集团军群、集团军、军、师。

而法国是欧洲汽车化程度最高的社会,仅次于美国。每 8 个法国人就有一辆机动车,德国是 47 人,意大利是 106 人。铁路网一流。这个国家有最好的物质条件,却没有相应的组织能力和通信手段。

霍兰德的结论很克制,也很锋利:法国 1940 年的失败,一半是德国人在作战艺术上的卓越,一半是法国的失败和无能。

“他们的通信系统糟糕透顶。他们依赖常规电话线,而俯冲轰炸机把电话线全炸断了。街上塞满了难民,人根本动不了。电话线断了,没有电台,你就只能靠骑小摩托的传令兵。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

该飞莫斯科的人没有飞

1939 年 8 月,苏联主动找到英法,说坐下来谈吧。英法派去的是三流将领,英国代表甚至没有谈判授权。霍兰德的原话是,那是一场闹剧,从头到尾都是笑话,不可能有结果。

苏联提出的核心条件是可以借道波兰,在受到德国威胁时派兵过去。英法嗅到了巨大的陷阱:一旦同意,苏联就会开进波兰,然后说,你们同意的。他们确实会这么干。但那也可能阻止了世界大战。

弗里德曼在这里点出了那个不对称:英法愿意对希特勒让步,却不愿意在这个局面下对斯大林让步。

霍兰德纠正了一下:到那个阶段,他们对谁都不想让步了,底线是波兰,情况已经变了。但根本原因是,英法不愿意和共产主义者谈判,不信任他们,担心波兰的下场。结果是苏联转向了德国,接受了瓜分波兰的方案。

弗里德曼追问,那斯大林相信这个条约吗?霍兰德说不相信,希特勒也不相信。这是一份双方都心知肚明的、暂时的、便利的现实政治交易。苏联想拿回波兰那部分势力范围,还不想马上开战。而希特勒从此不用再担心东线的威胁,可以放手进波兰。他确信英法不会为波兰开战,这一点他判断错了。

弗里德曼提出一个假设:如果张伯伦亲自飞到莫斯科呢?霍兰德说,他真觉得这可能改变历史轨迹,这比慕尼黑的错误更严重。

两个人聊到为什么领导人如此不愿见面。弗里德曼说他常听外交官讲,不行不行,有流程,先得让外交官谈,起草文件。霍兰德说,人是要面对面看三围的,要看语调和表情,要看眼睛里的东西。我们本质上是动物,需要当面打量对方。隔着屏幕,或者透过别人的转述,就容易把对方非人化。社交媒体上骂人容易,因为人不在你面前。战争是这件事的极端版本。

“这是世界的大悲剧:想打仗的只有少数人,绝大多数人只想安安稳稳过日子,和邻居好好相处。历来如此。就是那少数人把所有人的日子搞砸了。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

丘吉尔是不是那个点火的人

弗里德曼提起达里尔·库珀(Darryl Cooper)那个广为流传的说法:丘吉尔是二战的“头号恶人”。他给了一个善意的解读:库珀的意思可能是,丘吉尔迫使希特勒把一场局限于捷克斯洛伐克、奥地利、波兰的区域战争,升级成了全球战争。

霍兰德的回答直接:不成立。首先,关于波兰的决策是张伯伦政府做的,那时丘吉尔不在政府里,根本没参与。

然后他回到 1939 年英国的位置。英国拥有世界历史上最大的帝国,地图上三分之一的面积是粉红色。它有世界最大的海军,也有世界最大的商船队,占全球商船的 33%,还能调用希腊、挪威、加拿大另外 50% 的运力。合计超过 80% 的世界航运能力,这个位置强得不可思议。

而且英国早就在囤货。铝土、铜、钨,大量储备。因为英国有全球触达能力,它可以和任何国家谈独家长约:未来五年你所有的橡胶我都包了,我出高于市价的钱。等到战争来临,它什么都有。

1930 年代末,英镑还挂着金本位,不是美元。英国当时是世界第一强国,这个地位和今天比已经很难相认。

霍兰德说,正是从这个心态出发,张伯伦才去谈判。他会想:我不会为捷克斯洛伐克打仗,谁在乎他们?但我要让希特勒知道我是认真的。而希特勒那边想的是:这个白头发的老头是谁?我根本不在乎他。

所以霍兰德认为,说丘吉尔是二战的头号战争贩子,是荒谬的。他顺手反驳了另一种攻击:有人说德国有大屠杀,盟军不也一样炸死那么多平民吗?霍兰德说,不一样,因为希特勒一停手,轰炸就停;而如果战争以希特勒获胜告终,屠杀会继续,而且会加速。

他也承认盟军做过很多可疑的事。战争进入 1943 年,道德的边界开始模糊。在北非沙漠里打仗相对干净,挡路的只是几个贝都因部落。一旦进入欧洲,或者进入远东人口稠密的国家腹地,破坏的规模就是另一个量级。

但他给了一个现实主义者的辩护:政治领袖的首要职责是保护自己的人民。所以西方盟国的战争方式,是在赢的同时尽可能减少自己年轻人的死亡。方法是投入巨大火力,是“用钢,而不是用我们的血肉”。

他给了一组比例:任何一支盟军里,步兵不超过 14% 到 15%。45% 是勤务部队,开卡车的、做饭的、洗碗的、搬箱子的。这就是“大战争”(big war)的逻辑:一条极长的尾巴,后勤、运筹、医疗、把伤员尽快送回战场,用火力和机械化去干那些最苦的活。

战略轰炸就是这个逻辑的延伸。你炸掉基础设施、工厂、交通网,克虏伯就造不出虎式坦克,德国人调动就困难,那么将来从那艘登陆艇上跳下去的那 14% 的步兵,活下来的机会就大一些。

弗里德曼替库珀做了一次“钢铁化”处理:这种说法的来源,可能是对丘吉尔的过度神化被新保守派和军工复合体拿来当模板,去为后来的军事干预背书。霍兰德同意这个观察。他说,把任何事情过度简化都是错误,过去是有层次的,为某些事骄傲和为某些事恶心可以同时成立。

“生活不是一条直线。盟军在二战中犯了很多错误,但总体上他们做对了判断。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

他举了反例。伊拉克战争,你砍掉一个强势领导人的头,就会出现权力真空。唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德说,我们不搞重建。霍兰德说,你他妈的当然得搞。你既然接了这个挑战,就得做到底。阿富汗也一样,2008 年 1 月他在赫尔曼德省北部,英军刚拿下穆萨卡拉,他和一个阿富汗人聊天,那人的柳树被砍了给直升机停机坪腾地方。霍兰德问他怎么看英军,那人耸耸肩说,他们要是留下就好了,但他们不会。他说塔利班不怎么样,但我可以把钱包放在墙上一个星期,没人动。你们能带来这种秩序吗?你们把我的柳树砍了,谢谢啊。

他对比了 1945 年之后的意大利、日本、西德。那一代人的重建工作做得非常好,破坏和动荡的后果是繁荣的高产民主国家。一战的教训被吸取了,尽管 1945 年的破坏和人口流离规模是空前的。

五百小时对一百五十小时

1939 年的军力格局:海上,英国和美国。法国海军不小,日本海军不小,意大利海军不小,而且是意大利三军里最现代化的一支,但没有航母,没有雷达。有现代化的战列舰和战列巡洋舰,缺了关键的现代技术部件。

空中,德国空军最大。日本海军和日本陆军航空队也极强。原因是日本飞行员的质量极高,因为要进一线中队太难了。日本飞行员进一线中队时,飞行日志上至少有 500 小时。英国皇家空军或德国空军是 150 到 170 小时。日本飞行员要过学术测试和体能测试,是被纪律打磨到极致的精英中的精英。

但他们人不多。

法国空军的组织方式是问题。飞机被分到各个区域,一个区和另一个区不通气。德国进攻时,法国空军被摊在整个法国:马赛一带一批,布列塔尼海岸一批,另一批在别处。他们从来没有把全部力量集中过一次。而德国空军是进攻方,可以选择在哪里、什么时候、集中多少兵力。他们可以一次飞过去压倒性数量的轰炸机和战斗机,把一座法国机场犁一遍。法国没有防空体系,看不见敌机来,唯一的选择是起飞,在天空中游荡,指望撞上德机。这种方式低效到极点,他们是被一小股一小股地消灭的,而不是成建制地被消灭。

英国皇家空军的结构完全不同。不是每个航空队配几架轰炸机、几架战斗机、几架侦察机,而是按职能分成轰炸机司令部、战斗机司令部、训练司令部、海岸司令部。因为英国是岛国,因为英国 1930 年代的重新武装就是围绕防御设计的。

这套体系的核心,是世界上第一个完全协同的防空系统。雷达链、观察哨军团、控制室,再加上一项很聪明的技术:敌我识别装置(IFF),会发出一个小脉冲。

霍兰德描述控制室的样子:里面有海图桌,有托特板,站在上面能看到哪些中队已经升空、处于什么戒备状态、是否已经接敌。有小灯亮起来提示你。还能看到气象图、云底高度,一眼就能看清。人站在高台上,下面是一张巨大的英格兰南部地图,有像赌场发牌员一样的标图员,推着小方块移动。

雷达给你一个粗略的概念:有什么东西正朝你飞过来。遍布英国、覆盖每一寸领空的观察哨,抬头看天,数清有多少架飞机、在什么高度。他们有个叫比例绘图仪(pantograph)的小设备,帮助判断高度。这些信息通过电话汇总,和雷达站的数据一起,进入战斗机司令部总部的一个单一过滤室,然后直接分发回各扇区站。

所以那张图上的标记一直在更新。一开始看起来可能是 30 多架敌方轰炸机,随着信息不断汇入,你会把它改成 20 架、22 架。这套系统真正的价值在于实时修正。光“看见”还不够。

空中的飞行员和地面控制员通着无线电。控制员在控制室里说,好,如果你升高到 18000 英尺,航向 150 度,你随时应该能看到敌人的轰炸编队了。

这意味着什么?意味着敌人来炸你机场的时候,你不在机场上。你在天上。他们炸的是一片草地,而推土机、挖掘机、平地机早就备好了,随时填坑。你不在地面上被逮住,你就还能再起飞。

结果是:1940 年夏天,英国 138 个皇家空军机场里,只有一座被瘫痪超过 48 小时,是肯特海岸尖端的曼斯顿,而且是主动放弃的。

1940 年 8 月 13 日“鹰日”,德国空军发起全面攻势。英国人看得见他们来,知道该期待什么,可以预判。他们没有被堵在地面上。

不列颠之战是产量战

关于不列颠之战,霍兰德有一个和大众叙事对着干的说法。

所有人都说,“那一小撮人”是抵御纳粹洪流的最后一道防线。霍兰德说,这全是胡说。他们是第一道防线。第二道防线是皇家海军,世界最大,德国那支由莱茵河驳船拼凑的入侵舰队,三分之二是非机动的,横渡英吉利海峡毫无可能,就算过来了也会被打回去。

还有一件常被忘掉的事:德国空军每天飞过来炸英国的同时,皇家空军也在飞过去炸德国。

德国人的困境在于,轰炸机需要战斗机护航。战斗机要在离英国尽可能近的地方起飞,才能省油。所以 1940 年 7 月法国沦陷后,大部分德机进驻加来海峡省那些仓促建成的机场。那是海峡最窄的地方,还有诺曼底北部。

英国人 1940 年的轰炸水平确实很糟,还没有战争后期那套导航辅助设备。但那是一个目标极其丰富的环境,在加来上空你几乎不可能炸偏。那里就是一整片战斗机机场的枢纽。结果是,每一个德国中队,编制上只有 12 架飞机,经常还更少,都不得不留下两架保卫自己的机场。

霍兰德提了一个很有意思的史料:被击落的德国空军地勤被关在特伦特公园,英国人窃听了他们的谈话,留下了完整文字记录。他们都在抱怨皇家空军每晚都来,“我们睡不着”,要是他们能消停点别炸我们就好了。这段叙事在不列颠之战的故事里被完全省略了。

产量上的对比更硬。1940 年 7 月,英国生产了 496 架新的飓风和喷火,单引擎战斗机;德国生产了 240 架。这是德国在这一年里能达到的最好比例,也就是英国以二比一的速度在生产。

到 1940 年 10 月底,不列颠之战正式结束时,德国空军的单引擎战斗机力量剩下不到 200 架,而 7 月初还有 750 架左右。英国那边,7 月初是 650 架,现在是 750 架以上。

“到 1940 年 10 月底,德国空军的单引擎战斗机力量不到 200 架。英国那边从 650 架涨到了 750 架以上。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

整个二战,英国生产了 132500 架飞机,美国 315000 架。

那德国空军的传奇是怎么来的?霍兰德说,因为它是闪电战的矛尖,是第三帝国的妖怪。它被指责为一切问题的原因,因为它被彻底滥用了。它是德国国防军里唯一一支从头到尾都在被持续使用的部队。

对比一下美英的轮换制度。到 1943 年底,一个中队 16 架飞机升空,但会有 40 到 45 名飞行员来保障这 16 架,飞机数量也差不多。你不会把这批人用到废。

1943 年底一个加入雷电或野马中队的新飞行员,手上已经有 350 小时连续飞行时间。因为可以在佛罗里达、加州、德州训练,天空晴朗,训练强度大,能过更多的人。

德国那边完全相反。飞行员训练持续被战争打断,被燃料短缺打断,被恶劣天气打断。英国因为全球触达,在罗德西亚(今津巴布韦)、南非、加拿大都有训练基地。

新人到了中队,有 10 天到两周适应期。老手带飞几次,给点提示,吃饭时听简报时请教。第一次任务是去法国上空的“送奶路线”,危险很小,用来积累经验。等真正被

派去柏林、不来梅、鲁尔区执行任务的时候,他早已进入状态了。

德国这边的情况完全相反。新飞行员进一线中队时只有不到 100 小时,90 到 92 小时左右。而且他们的飞机很复杂,基本上没有双座教练型。第一次坐进福克-沃尔夫 190 或者梅塞施密特 109,就是一次可怕的信仰之跃,年轻聪明的飞行员自己知道没准备好。梅塞施密特 109 翼载很高,机动性好,但机翼小,戴姆勒-奔驰 DB 605 发动机扭矩巨大,一直想把飞机掀翻。起落架又窄。不习惯,就会摔。

1944 年前两个月,德国空军在空中损失了大约 2400 架飞机和飞行员,另有 3400 起事故。

霍兰德由此给出一个更大的判断:二战比任何冲突都更是一场数字的战争。将领的决策有差异,个别的英勇和才华有时能拿下那座桥、守住那个阵地。但这些差异最终只意味着一个月、六个月、甚至几年的差别。到某个节点,结果已经不可避免,因为输的一方在数量上无法与赢的一方竞争。

一千三百辆虎式,四万九千辆谢尔曼

弗里德曼问,那二战是不是一场工厂之战。霍兰德说是,关键在效率。

他拿谢尔曼坦克举例。谢尔曼的 75 毫米主炮是中速炮,初速约每秒 2000 英尺。德国著名的 88 毫米炮初速快到每秒 3000 英尺。纸面上,虎式和谢尔曼在街角相遇,应该毫无悬念。虎式 58 吨,看起来很吓人,确实吓人,炮大,装甲厚。谢尔曼装甲没那么厚,炮没那么大。

但 1944 年 6 月 26 日周一下午五点半,一辆谢尔曼在诺曼底一个叫丰特奈勒佩内尔的小村,一条叫 Rue Massue 的路上转过街角,正面遇上了一辆虎式。结果虎式投降了。

怎么做到的?谢尔曼的车长经验丰富,而且炮膛里已经上了一发弹。看到虎式的瞬间他只说了一个词:开火。那发穿甲弹不可能击穿虎式,但它打在了炮盾上,就是炮管进炮塔处那块加强钢。这造成了崩落,也就是细小的熔融金属碎片飞溅,打中了虎式驾驶员头部。驾驶员惨叫,看不清东西。虎式车长在被击中的瞬间缩回了炮塔内部。一缩进去,虽然有潜望镜,但视野和把头伸在外面完全没法比。

紧接着,谢尔曼连续打出高爆弹。前 30 秒内,这辆谢尔曼往虎式上打了 10 发,虎式一发还没打出去。乘员投降了。

“你不需要摧毁虎式,你只需要让它无法运转。没有乘员,它就是一块无法操作的金属。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

霍兰德从这件事里抽出几条:经验值钱,训练值钱,谢尔曼的灵活性也值钱。它的炮架小,更容易人工操作,装填更快。它是第一辆装了火炮稳定陀螺仪的坦克,行进中射击更有效。炮塔下面还有一个超越开关,车长如果余光扫到什么,可以立刻转动炮塔,不用等下面的炮手反应过来。

但最硬的那条事实是数字:虎式一共造了 1347 辆,谢尔曼造了 49000 辆。每一辆虎式对应 36 辆谢尔曼。

霍兰德说虎式的问题很大。它同时出现在他评的“二战五大坦克”和“五大最差坦克”两个名单里。

优点当然有,88 毫米高速炮很凶,心理战的威力极大。但务实的麻烦一堆。最大的是德国没有美国那种规模的大批量生产能力,说实话连英国都不如。原因不在工艺,在于德国在欧洲中部,没有出海口,没有商船队,拿不到原料。苏联那边的战事不顺,原料加工不了。而且 24 小时挨炸,工厂被迫拆分,这本身就极不效率,零件要到处运,燃料又不够。

于是德国人想,既然不能量产,那就造特别好的坦克。但他们搞错了“好”的定义。在他们眼里,好就是大、吓人、大炮、厚甲。二战的实际经验说明这不够。还需要易于维护,需要可靠。而坦克越大,维护设备就越复杂,需要更大的吊车,更大的吊车需要更大的卡车,更大的卡车烧更多油。

虎式大到装不上欧洲铁路的限界。得换一套履带把它开上平板车,从西德运到诺曼底,卸下来,再换回战斗履带,开进战场,然后祈祷它别抛锚。

更根本的问题是人和基础设施。德国开战时每 47 人才有一辆机动车,美国是 3 人,法国是 8 人。这意味着大量德国人不会开车,也意味着没有那么多修车铺、机械师和加油站。你却要造一台极其复杂的机械,而它恰恰应该尽可能简单。

谢尔曼的美妙之处就在这里。美国几乎每个年轻男人都会开手动挡。坐进谢尔曼,有离合,有油门,刹车就是转向机构,离合在你以为该在的位置,手动变速。踩离合,挂二挡,走。会开手动挡车的人就能开谢尔曼。虎式没几个人能开得动。

还有一个德国设计师的小毛病,霍兰德说他一直没找到解释。20 世纪初到 30 年代,孩子都被要求用右手,不许左撇子。所以装填手应该在炮的左侧,从右边取弹,向右转腰送进膛。但豹式、猎豹、虎式的装填手全在炮膛右侧。从人体工程学上看,这完全说不通。

在前线遇上虎式的美国兵不会在意它难不难维护、运到战场有多麻烦。他只在意眼前这个怪物,吱嘎作响,咔嗒咔嗒地开过来,非常吓人,马上就要把他炸成碎片。这种反应完全可以理解。

但在更高层运筹战争的人和后来研究这一切的历史学家,必须在意那些事。霍兰德翻到一份会议记录,1941 年 12 月 4 日或 5 日,也就是红军在莫斯科城外反攻之前,一场关于武器的会议。格奥尔格·托马斯,就是饥饿计划的制定者,说了一句话,霍兰德说是逐字引用:“我们必须停止制造如此完全不具美感的武器。”也就是说,他们一直在造过度设计、在美学上令人愉悦的武器,这件事他们只做到了一半。

1941 年 12 月:从一个敌人变成三个

巴巴罗萨的原定目标是三个月内彻底摧毁红军。这个目标没实现。

霍兰德给了一个判断:可以说,到 1941 年 12 月初,德国已经不可能赢了。

他用一个日期对比说明。1941 年 6 月 15 日,德国只有一个敌人:英国,加上它的自治领和帝国。六个月后,1941 年 12 月 16 日,它有三个敌人:英国及其帝国、苏联、美国。奇迹武器云云都没用了,这场仗已经输了。

但苏联的处境也很糟。它靠美英的物资撑着,通过北极航线和阿拉斯加运进来的量是空前的。苏联把工厂迁到乌拉尔山以东,这个故事很自豪,但 1941 年巴巴罗萨初期有大量工业被完整地丢给了德国,损失极大。粮食没了,煤没了,整座工厂没了。1941 和 1942 年,苏联钢铁产量下降 80%。

即便如此,苏联在 1941 年下半年新建了 80 个师。英国在整个二战中从来没有过 80 个师,一个师按经验值约 15000 人。

1941 年德国是在赢着赢着把自己赢死。基辅包围战抓了将近 70 万红军,但在这个过程中自身也在持续损耗,战场伤亡加上机械损耗,规模太大,撑不住。

随着取胜越来越无望,希特勒对战役的个人干预越来越多。霍兰德说,他没受过军事训练。他可能有惊人的细节记忆力,能记住部队番号和地图上的位置,但一战时他只是个下士,没上过参谋学院。他读过很多腓特烈大帝,我也读过很多历史,这不代表我能当元帅。

他微观管理,看统计数字,不理解前线是什么样。他扼杀的恰恰是让德军有效的那个东西:给前线指挥官足够的自主空间。

然后他决定 1942 年不去打莫斯科,去打油田。霍兰德说这完全疯了。就算到了油田,苏联会让油田完好无损地落到德国手里吗?就算完好,油要炼,炼油厂在哪?怎么把油运到第三帝国的工厂,变成汽油、柴油,给 U 艇、给坦克、给装甲部队?从高加索到柏林那么远,没有管道,仅有的一些管道还是美国资金和美国工程修的,而且是往乌拉尔方向退,不是往前延伸。铁路运力一点余量都没有,油罐车也没有。

霍兰德说,看德国的详细文献,1942 年春夏没有一个人问这个问题。没人说,好吧,我们去高加索拿油,然后呢?

“蓝色方案”执行中,他们先被克里米亚分心,必须先拿下塞瓦斯托波尔。然后往前推,斯大林格勒出现在伏尔加河畔,一座以斯大林命名的工业城市。希特勒说,现在我要分兵,一半南下高加索,一半对付斯大林格勒。指挥官冯·博克说,这太荒唐了,你把任务拆了。希特勒把他撤了。

接着就是斯大林格勒的巷战。霍兰德说,巷战是最糟的作战形式。以色列刚才把加沙炸平,就是因为不这样你就没有射界。在建成区作战极其可怕。主场优势巨大。进攻时是八月到九月初,酷热;然后突然变得极冷。

同时,美国的机械化,加上一部分英国的机械化,主要是美国卡车,让朱可夫能够筹划那次大钳形攻势。

“俄罗斯人会因为我这么说而恨我,我大概还会因此招来一堆机器人水军,但事实是,摧毁第六集团军的并非巷战,是后来的包围。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

德军被吸进斯大林格勒的街头战斗,无法放弃,无法后退,无法撤出,必须摧毁这座城市。而大部分兵力跑去高加索追逐一场空,一滴油都没拿到,离巴库差得远。就在他们背过身的时候,钳形攻势成形了,而这只可能靠美国的机械化实现。

这是真正的转折点。从那一刻起,德军在后退。库尔斯克突出部那样的反击还有,但大局已定。1942 年 11 月,两个方面军会师,第六集团军再无逃脱可能。最终投降是 1943 年 2 月初。

被忽略的另一个战场

就在同一时间,北非正在崩盘,因为希特勒坚持大规模增援地中海战区。霍兰德给了一个刺人的对比:北非损失的装备比斯大林格勒还多。

心理上,突尼斯当然比不上斯大林格勒,差得远。但必须把两件事放在一起看:这是两条战线同时发生的事,而这也是美军第一次在地面上和轴心国交手,输得很惨。

1943 年 5 月 13 日,盟军成为北非海岸的主人。这是灾难性的一败。1942 年 11 月到 1943 年 5 月,德国空军在北非损失了 2700 架飞机。

再看 1943 年 6 月到 10 月,包括 7 月的库尔斯克会战,德国空军在东线损失 702 架飞机,在地中海损失 3704 架。

霍兰德由此提出一条研究二战的方法论警告:不要用地面部队的人数来判定战略重要性。有时候有关系,有时候没有。没人会说瓜达尔卡纳尔不是太平洋战争的转折点,但那里的兵力和东线甚至西线相比微不足道。德军流血的绝大部分在东线,这不意味着东线在战略上比西线更重要,也不意味着反过来。要保持平衡。

斯大林格勒的心理冲击是巨大的,这一点不能贬低。

纳粹高层的反应是加注,他们并没有说“我们完了”。1943 年 2 月第三周,戈培尔在体育馆发表那场臭名昭著的演讲:你们准备好迎接这个了吗?现在是总体战。这是一场生存之战,我们全都在这条船上,每一个德国人都在这条船上。

霍兰德说,听众当时的情绪是低落到极点的。他们意识到,自己种下的东西要自己收。

因为东线在发生什么,德国人知道。战争前期德国人疯狂拍照、拍电影,要记录帝国的伟大和胜利。那些设备像收音机一样便宜,很多人都有,拍完寄回家。人们互相传看,看到犹太人被围捕殴打,看到乌克兰游击队被处决,看到村庄被烧。“他们真的知道吗?”这个问题,答案是:他们知道。程度有深有浅,有些人确实不看新闻,但总体上,东线发生的残酷事情是广泛被知晓的。士兵休假回来,被自己参与和目睹的事情彻底创伤。

弗里德曼提醒,西线和东线在这件事上差别巨大。子弹大屠杀、集中营和灭绝营不在德国,在波兰,在苏联。霍兰德补充:别忘了奥斯维辛本身就属于“新帝国”,是被并入德国的地区。对他们来说那不再叫波兰名字,它叫奥斯维辛,是个德语名字,是德国的一部分,德国人搬进那座“模范城市”,他们全都知道那里在发生什么。

关于大屠杀的细节,霍兰德说最令他无法接受的是效率背后的动机。600 万人里,一半是被从后脑勺开枪打死的。之所以停止这种方式,是因为行刑者自己受不了。希姆莱 1941 年夏天去看过一次处决,他觉得太可怕了,我的部下不必干这个,得找一个更人道的方式。这里说的“人道”,是对行刑者人道,不是对受害者。

齐克隆 B 不是好走法。它会让肺部毛细血管全部爆裂,极度痛苦,无法呼吸,可能持续 20 到 25 分钟,有些人几分钟。

那些赤身裸体站在毒气室里的人,首先在这个流程里被极度羞辱,然后突然意识到这间屋子接的不是水管,他们正在被毒杀,全都要死了。

“在那个过程里你会想什么?就算你是第一个,你也知道,我喘不上气了,我要死了。其他人会看到最前面的几个人死去,然后明白接下来就是自己。你有那么几分钟,有时是很多分钟,要在极度疼痛和恐慌中想这件事。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

霍兰德说,最让他难以调和的是:德国是多么了不起的国家。贝多芬、施特劳斯、歌德,了不起的艺术和文化,人类历史上最伟大的工程师和科学家。然后它如此迅速地翻转成难以言说的非人道。而这一切发生在一个十年前还是民主国家的国度。

诺曼底:这一切的总成果

1941 年 12 月美国参战,几天后阿卡迪亚会议召开,英美参谋长和丘吉尔、罗斯福定下方针:尽快把美军送到欧洲,送到英国,训练,然后尽快渡海,开始解放欧洲。

现实是 1942 年美军根本没准备好。他们从一支极小的军队开始扩张,没有战场经验。英国那边也还在恢复,海权不错,空权越来越好,陆权在失去法国这个盟友后不得不从头补。

对两国来说,真正的零点都是 1940 年 6 月,法国出局,那场战略地震,所有 1939 年的设想都得推翻重来。

1943 年也没准备好。1942 年 5 月苏联外长莫洛托夫到英国,说你们得做点事,在地面上打德国人。英国人说,渡海入侵现在还不行,我们正在搞北非。莫洛托夫去华盛顿,美国人也说 1942 年一定进攻德国。到了夏天,这个承诺做不到。于是丘吉尔出主意:我们在埃及已经有一支军队,为什么不另派一支在西北非登陆?那是维希法国的殖民地,亲轴心。拿下那里,两头对进,把整个北非拿下来。既能让你们获得和轴心国部队作战的经验,测试装备和指挥官,何乐不为?

美国人的想法是直线:画一条直线到柏林,那是最近的路。两种视角不同。罗斯福接受了前者,北非地中海战役就是这么来的。

突尼斯投入巨大:3500 架飞机,庞大的海军,两支盟军。1943 年 5 月中打完,他们想,既然人都在这里了,不如把意大利彻底踢出战争。西西里是显然的选择。而在北非陷落和西西里之间,是华盛顿的三叉戟会议。美国人在那里说,够了,机会主义的打法到此为止,我们懂了,也认了,但不能再拖。1944 年 5 月,一年之后,我们渡海。英国人说,行,那就这样。霸王行动(Operation Overlord)的代号和规划就是从那里开始的。

1944 年初开始认真规划。西西里到诺曼底的一个教训是:不能让指挥官一边打仗一边筹备下一场战役,必须有独立的指挥架构。到这时已经有足够多有战场指挥经验的人,可以拆分开来。进攻意大利有很实在的理由,尤其是拿到福贾机场,能进一步勒紧纳粹德国的绞索。

诺曼底的先决条件是制空权,不只是诺曼底上空,是西北欧一大片空域。为什么?因为你一登陆,牌就亮了,接下来比的是谁先把人和物资堆上去。盟军得从英格兰南部过来,80 到 130 英里,海上慢速航行;德军已经在大陆上。纸面上看,德军肯定更快,所以你必须拖慢德军。

怎么拖?炸掉他们来路的一切。塞纳河上所有桥,卢瓦尔河上所有桥,调车场。维系德国战争机器的胶水是德国铁路网。炸掉铁路,让德军难以增援诺曼底。而要这么干,得靠双引擎的、更快更小的轰炸机低空精确打击。但你低空炸桥的时候,头顶上不能有福克-沃尔夫和梅塞施密特。所以必须先夺取制空权。

问题是,纳粹德国的工业心脏在西部鲁尔区,从林肯郡和东盎格利亚起飞很方便。但飞机工业在帝国纵深,超出了战斗机护航半径。美国白天轰炸机发现自己虽然叫“飞行堡垒”,其实扛不住,正在被屠杀。

1943 年 8 月 17 日,施韦因富特-雷根斯堡空袭,324 架重型轰炸机去炸一个梅塞施密特工厂和一个轴承厂,轴承对飞机制造至关重要。损失 60 架被击落,另有 130 多架严重受损。这个代价美国承受不起。他们必须找到能一路护航到帝国纵深的战斗机。

如果 1944 年 4 月还没有制空权,就完了,渡海入侵做不了。这场竞赛很紧迫。解决方案是 P-51 野马。它最初是 1940 年 5 月英国委托的,从草图到实机 117 天,是天才之作。但一开始配的艾里逊发动机不合适。直到换装罗尔斯-罗伊斯梅林发动机,就是装兰开斯特、蚊式、喷火和飓风的那台,问题解决了。它能挂副油箱,气动设计极好,飞得越高越省油,航程超过 1400 英里,不只够去柏林往返,够去华沙往返。

结果,到 1944 年 4 月,他们清空了空域。到 5 月底,也就是登陆前夕,盟军飞机能看到的最接近的德国飞机,在距滩头 500 英里以外。

“到 1944 年 5 月底,登陆前夕,盟军飞机能看到的最接近的德国飞机,在距滩头 500 英里以外。”(詹姆斯·霍兰德)

与此同时,台风、暴风、改装过的 P-47 雷电这些对地攻击机,沿着海岸线打掉德军的雷达站,摧毁了它们 90% 的效能。情报战也赢了。德国那边情报即权力,希特勒搞分而治之,平行指挥结构,不利于情报汇总。布莱切利破译很重要,但它只是一个齿轮。监听、照相侦察、地面特工、战俘审讯这些齿轮合起来,比各自单独的价值更大。

诺曼底是联盟战争的顶点。多个国家,目标不同,文化不同,态度不同,起点不同,但全部汇聚到一个共同目标上。在达成目标之前,把分歧放到一边。美英指挥官之间的互不待见被大书特书,但和德国对待自己盟友的方式比,这算天堂。

而且严格说不该叫盟友(allies),是联合伙伴(coalition partners),没有正式同盟条约,这个区别很微妙。但他们确实拉在了一起。

D 日的数据:6939 艘船,其中 1213 艘战舰,4127 艘登陆艇,12500 架飞机,24 小时内 155000 人通过海上登陆和空降进入法国。

霍兰德提醒,虽然人们仍把它看成美国主导的行动,三个军种司令都是英国人,三分之二的飞机是英国的,三分之二登陆的兵员是英国和自治领的。加拿大人不该被忘记,他们在二战的各个层面都大大超出自己的体量,大西洋海战、空中力量、D 日、意大利战役。诺曼底的海军为什么是英国主导?因为美国海军主力此时在太平洋打自己的仗。不是偷懒,是在别处为整体盟国事业尽责。

天气很糟,这让很多人偏离航线,奥马哈海滩死的人比原本会死的更多。按比例算,伤亡最重的是加拿大人,比美国人还重,只是总数少。

D 日必须被看作无可置疑的成功。他们没有百分之百达成当天全部目标,但目标本来就是能力的上限,需要完美的条件,而条件并不完美。他们已经考虑得极其周全。连扫雷都是整个战争中最大的一次扫雷行动,诺曼底沿岸有大片雷区,242 艘扫雷舰在五个方向同时作业,在每个海滩正面开出通道,让入侵舰队通过,实际登陆中没有一艘船因水雷损失。这只能靠极高的技能和规划,而这一切发生在没有电脑、没有 GPS 的年代。

只要站稳桥头堡,就结束了。以盟军此时的兵力和物资对比,没有其他可能。何况德国还在三面受敌,南边是意大利战线,东边是那年夏天发动的巴格拉季昂行动,规模巨大。

地堡里的最后几天

弗里德曼把话题带到最后:柏林战役,希特勒在地堡里的自杀,德国投降。他说霍兰德讲过,电影《帝国的毁灭》(Downfall)拍得非常准确。

霍兰德说确实如此,只有一个细节不对:戈培尔是服氰化物死的,不是开枪。

他说关于那段日子有太多记述,希特勒留下的话有数百万字,很多会议记录都有译本,你能相当清晰地进入他的头脑,比进入斯大林或几乎任何其他领导人的头脑都清晰。所以那部电影给人的印象非常强,感觉他们抓准了。

布鲁诺·甘茨(Bruno Ganz)演得极好。

希特勒说过一句话:“我的名声一开始不会好,但我希望几年之后,人们开始意识到我当年想带来的那些好处。”

“我的名声一开始不会好,但我希望几年之后,人们开始意识到我当年想带来的那些好处。”(希特勒,转述自詹姆斯·霍兰德)

弗里德曼接了一句:他们全都一样,都相信自己是在做好事。

他把二战当成一门关于脆弱性的课

最后一个问题:从二战中应该带走什么教训。

霍兰德说,是不允许这类人物掌握巨大的权力和权威、做出那些可怕的决定。如果你允许这种事发生,后果就会来。你必须在麻烦出现的时刻认出它。出现金融危机,你就知道政治动荡会来,你要为此做准备,要能读懂墙上的字。

不能自满。自满是多么脏的一个词。你得保持清醒,不能把一切当作理所当然。西方人享有的自由不是必然永久的。拥有的时候要珍惜,要想清楚如果牛奶变酸会发生什么,后果是什么。

他说他不认为会有二战那种规模的战争,但你只要看看乌克兰战争最初那几天的照片,被击毁的俄罗斯坦克,到处膨胀的尸体。把它调成黑白,那就是 1944 年法莱斯出逃的路,可以是二战中任何一片德军战场。战壕里的相似性,躲在散兵坑里的人,都令人不适地相似。双方都在承受的巨大伤亡,无论俄罗斯人还是乌克兰人。

这让人震动,提醒你事情可以下滑得多快。就像他说的,德国如何从一个艺术、文化、科学、工程都了不起的国家,迅速滑落到大屠杀。生活是脆弱的,和平是脆弱的,把它当成理所当然,后果自负。

弗里德曼补了一句:同理,不能把“再也不会有人使用核武器”当成理所当然。

他最后问,什么给你希望。

霍兰德的回答很朴素:绝大多数人是好人,想平静地、快乐地生活,心里不装仇恨。这世上有许多出色的头脑,人类大脑拿出新方案、应对新问题的能力是无穷的。这是他希望所在。

整场对话里,霍兰德反复回到同一个方法:不要只看战略和战术,要看中间的运筹层。铁路限界差几英寸,每一码铁轨都得往左挪一点;德国坦克的装填手被放在不合人体工程学的一侧;法军总司令的指挥部没有一部电台;谢尔曼车长的炮膛里提前上了一发弹。历史的走向,常常由这些看起来微不足道的细节决定。

他在节目开头谈萨姆时说了一句话,可以作为整场对话的注脚:二战中的大部分战斗,是普通人在极端处境里做不普通的事。而这些人之所以能撑住,往往只是因为一封家信告诉他们,家乡的小女孩赢了游泳比赛。

如果这些内容让你想动手做点什么

  • 读霍兰德的《西方战争史》系列(The War in the West)时,先看每一章的运筹部分,尤其是铁路、油料、港口、卡车产量这些章节。战略可以争论,这些数字争不了。
  • 下一次看到“某某武器改变了战争”这类说法,先查它的产量,再查维修它需要什么设备、烧什么燃料。1347 对 49000,比任何性能参数表都有说服力。
  • 听《We Have Ways of Making You Talk》,以及他新开的 World War II Headquarters 频道,重点看那些走现场的视频。地形比地图更能解释一场仗为什么那样打。
  • 读那本叫《KL》的书,关于集中营系统的整体史。它难读,原因在内容,文笔本身没有问题。读它的时候准备一支笔,不要一次读完。
  • 把“经济危机之后必然跟着政治动荡”这句话记在心里,然后在每一次危机时,观察谁在提供简单、清晰、非黑即白的叙事,以及为什么这种叙事有效。
  • 当一段冲突或争论只在屏幕上进行时,警惕自己正在把对方非人化。有条件的对话,尽量放到面前进行。
  • 遇到任何把历史人物简化成“好人”或“坏人”模板、并用来为当下政策背书的论述,先去查那个人在关键决策时刻是否真的在场。丘吉尔 1939 年 9 月不在政府里。
中英对照:英文为官方 Transcript 原文,中文为逐句机器翻译(Google 神经机器翻译),仅供学习英文参考,请以英文原文为准。
James Holland00:00

And you see that manifest itself on D-Day, where you’ve got 6,939 vessels, of which there are 1,213 warships, 4,127 assault craft, 12,500 aircraft.

你会看到这一点在诺曼底登陆日就体现出来了,那里有 6,939 艘舰艇,其中有 1,213 艘军舰、4,127 艘攻击艇和 12,500 架飞机。

00:00 155,000 men landed, and dropped from the air, in a 24-hour period.

24 小时内有 155,000 名人员从空中着陆和空投。

It is phenomenal.

这是惊人的。

It is absolutely phenomenal.

这绝对是非凡的。

Lex Fridman00:27

The following is a conversation with James Holland, a historian specializing in World War II, who has written a lot of amazing books on the subject, especially covering the Western front, often providing fascinating details at multiple levels of analysis, including strategic, operational, tactical, technological, and of course the human side, the personal accounts from the war.

以下是与詹姆斯·霍兰德(James Holland)的对话,詹姆斯·霍兰德是一位专门研究二战的历史学家,他在这一主题上写了很多令人惊叹的书籍,尤其是有关西方战线的书籍,经常提供多个分析层面的引人入胜的细节,包括战略、作战、战术、技术,当然还有人性方面,以及战争的个人记录。

00:51 He also co-hosts a great podcast on World War II, called We Have Ways of Making You Talk.

他还共同主持了一个关于二战的精彩播客,名为“我们有办法让你说话”。

This is the Lex Fridman podcast.

这是莱克斯·弗里德曼播客。

To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description, or at lex fridman.com/sponsors.

如需支持,请在说明中查看我们的赞助商,或访问 lex fridman.com/sponsors。

And now, dear friends, here’s James Holland.

现在,亲爱的朋友们,这是詹姆斯·霍兰德。

01:13 In Volume One of the War in the West, your book series on World War II, you write, “The Second World War witnessed the deaths of more than 60 million people, from over 60 different countries.

在您关于第二次世界大战的系列丛书《西方战争》第一卷中,您写道:“第二次世界大战见证了来自 60 多个不同国家的超过 6000 万人死亡。

Entire cities were laid waste, national borders were redrawn, and many millions more people found themselves displaced.

整个城市被夷为平地,国界被重新划定,还有数百万人流离失所。

Over the past couple of decades, many of those living in the Middle East, or parts of Africa and the Balkans, Afghanistan, and even the United States, may feel justifiably that these troubled times have already proved the most traumatic in their recent past.

在过去的几十年里,许多生活在中东、非洲部分地区、巴尔干地区、阿富汗,甚至美国的人可能有理由认为,这些动荡的时期已经证明是他们最近一段时期所经历的最痛苦的时期。

Yet globally, the Second World War was and remains the single biggest catastrophe of modern history.

然而,从全球范围来看,第二次世界大战过去是、现在仍然是现代历史上最大的一场灾难。

In terms of human drama, it is unrivaled.

就人性戏剧而言,它是无与伦比的。

No other war has affected so many lives, in such a large number of countries.”

没有哪场战争影响过这么多国家、这么多人的生命。”

02:11 So what to you makes World War II the biggest catastrophe in human drama in modern history, and maybe from a historian perspective, the most fascinating subject to study?

那么,您认为是什么让第二次世界大战成为现代历史上人类戏剧中最大的灾难,也许从历史学家的角度来看,它是最令人着迷的研究课题呢?

James Holland02:22

The thing about World War II is, it really is truly global.

第二次世界大战的问题是,它确实是全球性的。

02:22 It’s fought in deserts, it’s fought in the Arctic, it’s fought across oceans, it’s fought in the air, it’s in jungle, it’s in the hills, it is on the beaches, it’s also on the Russian steppe, and it’s also in Ukraine.

它在沙漠中作战,在北极作战,在大洋彼岸作战,在空中作战,在丛林中作战,在山上作战,在海滩上作战,也在俄罗斯草原上作战,也在乌克兰作战。

So it’s that global nature of it.

这就是它的全球性。

02:44 And I just think, where there’s war, there is always incredible human drama.

我只是认为,哪里有战争,哪里就总会上演令人难以置信的人类戏剧。

And I think for most people, and certainly the true, in my case, you get drawn to the human drama of it.

我认为对于大多数人来说,当然是真实的,就我而言,你会被其中的人性戏剧所吸引。

It’s that thought that, “Gosh, if I’d been 20 years old, how would I have dealt with it?

就是这样的想法,“天哪,如果我是 20 岁,我会如何处理这件事?

Would I have been in the Army?

我会参军吗?

Would I have been in the Air Force?

我会加入空军吗?

Would I have been on a Royal Navy destroyer?

我会登上皇家海军驱逐舰吗?

Or how would I have coped with it?

或者我该如何应对?

And how would I have dealt with that separation?”

我该如何应对这次分离呢?”

03:08 I mean, I’ve interviewed people who were away for four years.

我的意思是,我采访过离开四年的人。

I remember talking to a tank man from Liverpool in England called Sam Bradshaw, and he went away for four years.

我记得和一位来自英国利物浦的坦克手萨姆·布拉德肖(Sam Bradshaw)交谈过,他离开了四年。

And when he came home, he’d been twice wounded, he’d been very badly wounded in North Africa, and then, he was shot in the neck in Italy, eventually got home.

当他回家时,他已经两次受伤,在北非他受了很重的伤,然后,他在意大利颈部中弹,最终回到了家。

03:27 And when he came home, his mother had turned gray.

当他回到家时,他的母亲已经头发花白了。

His little baby sister, who had been 13 when he left, was now a young woman.

他离开时,他的小妹妹才 13 岁,现在已经是一位年轻女子了。

His old school had been destroyed by Luftwaffe bombs.

他原来的学校被德国空军的炸弹摧毁了。

He didn’t recognize the place.

他不认识这个地方。

And do you know what he did?

你知道他做了什么吗?

He joined up again, went back out of Europe, and was one of the first people in Belsen, so …

他再次加入,离开欧洲,成为贝尔森的第一批人之一,所以……

Lex Fridman03:49

What was his justification for that, for joining right back?

他加入右后卫的理由是什么?

James Holland03:52

He just felt completely disconnected to home.

他只是觉得与家完全脱节了。

03:52 He felt that the Gulf of time, his experiences had separated him from all the normalities of life, and he felt that the normalities of the life that he had known, before he’d gone away to war, had just been severed, in a really kind of cruel way, that he didn’t really feel he was able to confront at that particular point.

他觉得时间的深渊,他的经历把他与生活的所有常态分开,他觉得在他去参战之前,他所熟悉的生活的常态刚刚以一种非常残酷的方式被切断,他真的觉得自己在那个特定的时刻无法面对。

04:14 But he decided to rejoin, couldn’t go back to the Third Royal Tank Regiment, so he went back to a different unit.

但他决定重新加入,无法回到皇家坦克第三团,所以他又回到了另一个部队。

It went from, kind of the Italian campaign, to the European theater.

它从意大利战役转移到了欧洲战场。

Didn’t see so much action at the end, but a lot of British troops, if you were in a certain division at a certain time, you know, ended up passing very close to Belsen, and you suddenly realize, “Okay, this was the right thing to do.

最后没有看到那么多行动,但是很多英国军队,如果你在某个时间在某个师,你知道,最终经过贝尔森非常近的地方,你突然意识到,“好吧,这是正确的做法。

We did have to get rid of Nazism.

我们确实必须摆脱纳粹主义。

We did have to do this, because this is the consequence.

我们确实必须这样做,因为这就是结果。

It’s not just the oppression, it’s not just the secret police.

这不仅仅是压迫,不仅仅是秘密警察。

It’s not just the expansionism of Nazism.” It is also the Holocaust, which hadn’t been given its name at that point, but you’re witnessing this kind of untold cruelty.

这不仅仅是纳粹主义的扩张主义。”这也是大屠杀,当时还没有被命名,但你正在目睹这种难以言喻的残酷行为。

04:55 And I’ve always sort of, I think a lot about Sam.

我总是想很多关于萨姆的事。

I mean, he’s no longer with us, but he was one of the first people that I interviewed, and I interviewed him at great length.

我的意思是,他已经不在我们身边了,但他是我最早采访的人之一,而且我对他进行了很长的采访。

And I know you like a long interview, Lex, and I totally, totally get that.

我知道你喜欢长时间的采访,莱克斯,我完全、完全明白。

Because when you have a long interview, you really start getting to the nuts and bolts of it.

因为当你进行长时间的采访时,你才真正开始了解它的具体细节。

05:14 One of the frustrations, for me, when I’m looking at oral histories of Second World War vets is usually, they’re kind of, they’re put on YouTube, or they’re put on a museum website.

对我来说,当我查看二战老兵的口述历史时,令人沮丧的事情之一通常是,它们被放在 YouTube 上,或者被放在博物馆网站上。

They’re 30 minutes, an hour, if you’re lucky, and you’re just scratching the surface.

时间是 30 分钟,如果你幸运的话,你只是触及了表面。

You never really get to know it, and you feel that they’re just repeating kind of stuff they’ve read in books themselves after the war, and stuff.

你永远不会真正了解这一点,你会觉得他们只是在重复他们在战后自己在书中读过的东西等等。

05:36 I always leave, kind of feeling frustrated that I haven’t had a chance to kind of grill them on the kind of stuff that I would grill them on, if I was put in front of them.

我总是离开,感到有点沮丧,因为我没有机会用我会烤的东西来烤它们,如果我放在他们面前的话。

Lex Fridman05:44

So tank man.

所以坦克人。

05:44 What was maybe the most epic, the most intense, or the most interesting story that he told you?

他给你讲过的最史诗般、最激烈或最有趣的故事是什么?

James Holland05:53

Well, I do remember him telling me, funny enough, it’s not really about the conflict.

好吧,我确实记得他告诉我,这很有趣,这并不是真正的冲突。

05:53 I remember him telling me about the importance of letters, and there was this guy who, literally every few weeks, the post would arrive intermittently.

我记得他告诉我信件的重要性,而且有一个人,几乎每隔几周,就会断断续续地收到邮件。

There was no kind of regular post, so it was supposed to be regular, but it didn’t come around regularly.

没有那种定期的帖子,所以它应该是定期的,但它并没有定期出现。

So you might suddenly, suddenly get a flurry of five, all in one day.

所以你可能会突然、突然地在一天之内得到五次。

06:18 But he said there was this guy in his tank, a member of a different tank troop.

但他说他的坦克里有一个人,是另一个坦克部队的成员。

He was a good friend of his in the same squadron.

他是他在同一个中队的好朋友。

You had British half squadrons for their armor, which is,Americans would have a company.

英国有半个中队的装甲部队,也就是说,美国人有一个连。

Lex Fridman06:32

I should say that in your book, one of the wonderful things you do is you use the correct term in the language for the particular army involved, whether it’s the German or the British or the American.

我应该说,在你的书中,你所做的一件美妙的事情就是你在语言中为所涉及的特定军队使用了正确的术语,无论是德国、英国还是美国。

James Holland06:42

Well, that’s not to be pretentious.

好吧,这并不是自命不凡。

06:42 That’s really just because you’re dealing with so many numbers, and different units, and it can go over your head, and you can get sort of consumed by the detail, if you’re not careful.

这实际上只是因为你要处理如此多的数字和不同的单位,如果你不小心的话,它可能会超出你的头脑,你可能会被细节所消耗。

And as a reader, it can be very unsatisfying, because you just can’t keep pace with everything.

作为一名读者,这可能会非常令人不满意,因为你无法跟上一切的步伐。

06:58 So one of the things about writing in the vernacular German, or in the American spelling, or more, rather than our mauer, as we Brits would spell it, is it just immediately tells the reader, “Okay, this is American, yeah, okay, I’ve got that.

因此,用德语或美式拼写或更多的方式写作,而不是像我们英国人那样拼写“mauer”,其特点之一就是它会立即告诉读者:“好吧,这是美式拼写,是的,好吧,我明白了。

Or, this is German, I’ve got that, or Italian, or whatever it might be.”

或者,这是德语,我有那个,或者意大利语,或者无论是什么。”

07:17 But yeah, to go back to Sam, so Sam, there was this guy in his squadron, and he’d get his letters from his girlfriend, his wife, and he said, “It was like a soap opera.” He said, “We all just waited for his letters to come in, so we could find out whether his daughter had got to school or something, won the swimming contest, or whatever it was.” The sort of details of this day to day kind of banal life was just absolute catnip to these guys.

但是,是的,回到萨姆,萨姆,他的中队里有一个人,他会收到他的女朋友、他的妻子的来信,他说,“这就像一部肥皂剧。”他说:“我们都在等他的信,这样我们就可以知道他的女儿是否上学了,是否赢得了游泳比赛,或者其他什么。”这种日复一日的平庸生活的细节对这些人来说绝对是令人着迷的。

They absolutely loved it.

他们非常喜欢它。

07:49 And then, the letter arrived, the Dear John letter saying, “Sorry, I’ve found someone else, and it’s over.” And his friend was just absolutely devastated.

然后,信到达了,亲爱的约翰的信上写着:“抱歉,我已经找到了别人,一切都结束了。”他的朋友彻底崩溃了。

It was the only thing that was keeping him going, this sense of this sort of continuity of home, this sort of foundation of his life back at home.

这是唯一让他继续前进的东西,这种家的连续性的感觉,这种他在家乡生活的基础。

08:12 Sam said he could see he was in a really, really bad way, and he thought, “He’s going to do something stupid.” And he went up to him, and he said, “Look, I know it’s bad, and I know it’s terrible, and I know you’re absolutely devastated, but you’ve got your mates here, just don’t do anything silly.

萨姆说,他可以看到自己的处境非常非常糟糕,他想,“他会做一些愚蠢的事情。”他走到他面前,说道:“听着,我知道这很糟糕,我知道这很可怕,我知道你绝对崩溃了,但你有你的伙伴在这里,只是不要做任何愚蠢的事情。

Maybe when it’s all over, you can patch things up or sort things out.” And he said, “You’ve got to understand it from her point of view.

也许当一切都结束后,你可以修补或解决问题。”他说:“你必须从她的角度来理解。

It’s a long way.

这是一条很长的路。

You haven’t seen you for two years,” this kind of stuff, “so just don’t do anything rash.” And of course, the next engagement, two days later, he was killed.

两年没见了,”这种事,“就别鲁莽行事了。”当然,在两天后的下一次交战中,他被杀了。

And he said it was just a kind of, he just knew that was going to happen.

他说这只是一种,他只是知道这会发生。

So it was a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.

所以这是一种自我实现的预言。

08:49 That’s something I’ve never forgotten, that story, and I just thought, “It’s about human drama, that’s the truth of it,” and how people react to this totally alien situation.

这是我永远不会忘记的事情,那个故事,我只是想,“这是关于人类戏剧,这就是它的真相”,以及人们如何对这种完全陌生的情况做出反应。

For the most part, the Second World War is fought by ordinary everyday people doing extraordinary things.

在很大程度上,第二次世界大战是由普通人做着不平凡的事情而进行的。

09:10 And I think that’s something that’s so fascinating.

我认为这是非常令人着迷的事情。

I think, instinctively, I’m quite slapdash, I think.

我认为,本能地,我觉得我很草率。

So I think I would’ve bought it literally.

所以我想我真的会买它。

I don’t think it would have ended well for me.

我认为这对我来说不会有好的结局。

I’m just a bit careless.

我只是有点粗心而已。

Lex Fridman09:25

Yeah, I think I also have an element in me, where I can believe in the idea of nation, and fight for a nation, especially when the conflict is as grand.

是的,我想我身上也有一种元素,我可以相信国家的理念,并为一个国家而战,尤其是当冲突如此严重时。

James Holland09:38

There are things worse than death.

有比死亡更糟糕的事情。

Lex Fridman09:39

Yes, as the propaganda would explain very clearly, but also in reality, yes.

是的,正如宣传中解释得非常清楚的那样,但实际上,是的。

09:39 So a nation, France, Britain, was maybe facing the prospect of being essentially enslaved.

因此,法国、英国等国家可能面临着本质上被奴役的前景。

The Soviet Union was facing the prospect of being enslaved, literally.

苏联确实面临着被奴役的前景。

09:58 I mean, it was very, very clearly stated what they’re going to do.

我的意思是,它非常非常清楚地说明了他们要做什么。

They’re going to repopulate the land with Germanic people, so …

他们将让日耳曼人重新居住在这片土地上,所以……

James Holland10:06

Well, they’re not just going to do that.

好吧,他们不仅仅会这么做。

10:06 They’re also going to starve lots and lots of Soviet individuals to death by the Hunger Plan, for example, which is planned really very casually, and not by the, this is not SS units or anything like this.

例如,他们还将通过饥饿计划饿死很多很多苏联人,该计划的计划非常随意,而不是通过,这不是党卫军部队或类似的东西。

10:21 This is the Wehrmacht, this is the economic division of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the German combined general staff.

这是国防军,这是德国国防军联合总参谋部的经济部门。

General Georg Thomas comes up, and Hermann Backe, who’s the, kind of Minister for Food.

乔治·托马斯将军出现了,还有赫尔曼·巴克,他是食品部长。

They come up, “What are we going to do?

他们上来,“我们要做什么?

We haven’t got enough food,” largely because German farming is inefficient, and they think, “Well, this is part of Lebensraum.

我们没有足够的食物,”很大程度上是因为德国农业效率低下,他们认为,“好吧,这是生存空间的一部分。

We’ll go in and we’ll take the food.”

我们进去拿食物。”

10:50 And there’s been this colossal urbanization of the Soviet Union since the revolution in 1917.

自 1917 年革命以来,苏联经历了大规模的城市化。

“So they’re just not going to get their food, these people in these cities because we’re going to take it all.

“所以这些城市的人们将无法获得食物,因为我们将把它们全部拿走。

And that’s going to lead to a lot of deaths.” “Umpteen millions” is the phrase that Georg Thomas used.

这将导致大量人员死亡。” “无数百万”是乔治·托马斯使用的短语。

Lex Fridman11:11

So let’s talk about the Hunger Plan.

那么我们来谈谈饥饿计划。

11:11 How important was the Hunger Plan and Lebensraum to Nazi ideology, and to the whole Nazi war machine?

饥饿计划和生存空间对于纳粹意识形态以及整个纳粹战争机器有多重要?

James Holland11:20

Essential to the whole thing.

对整个事情至关重要。

11:20 This is all about this notion that is embedded into Hitler’s mind, and into the minds of the Nazi party, right from the word go is, there is a big sort of global conspiracy, the Jewish Bolshevik plot, I mean, completely misplaced, that Jews and Bolsheviks go hand in hand, and that somehow dovetail.

这就是根植于希特勒头脑和纳粹党头脑中的观念,从一开始,就有一个巨大的全球阴谋,犹太布尔什维克的阴谋,我的意思是,完全错位了,犹太人和布尔什维克齐头并进,并且以某种方式吻合。

They don’t, obviously.

显然,他们不这样做。

11:44 And the whole ideology is to crush this.

整个意识形态就是要粉碎这一点。

Part of the way the Nazis think, the way Hitler thinks is there is a them, and there’s us.

纳粹的部分思考方式,希特勒的思考方式是,有他们,也有我们。

We are the whites, Northern European Aryans, we should be the master race.

我们是白人,北欧雅利安人,我们应该是优等民族。

We’ve been threatened by a global Jewish Bolshevik plot.

我们受到全球犹太布尔什维克阴谋的威胁。

We’ve been stabbed in the back in 1918, at the end of the first World War.

1918 年,第一次世界大战结束时,我们在背后被捅了一刀。

We need to have to overcome, this is an existential battle for future survival.

我们需要克服,这是一场关乎未来生存的生存之战。

It’s a terrible task that has befallen our generation, but we have to do this, we have to overcome this or else we have no future.

这是我们这一代人面临的一项可怕的任务,但我们必须这样做,我们必须克服这个问题,否则我们就没有未来。

We will be crushed.

我们会被压垮的。

It’s absolutely cut and dry.

这绝对是切好的和干燥的。

12:27 And one of the things about Hitler is that he is a very kind of black and white, them or us, either/or, kind of person.

关于希特勒的一个特点是,他是一个非常黑白分明的人,他们或我们,非此即彼的人。

It’s always one thing or the other.

总是这样或那样的事情。

It’s a thousand-year Reich, or it’s Armageddon.

这是一个千年帝国,或者是世界末日。

There is no, there’s no middle ground, there’s no gray area.

不,没有中间地带,没有灰色地带。

It’s just one or the other.

这只是其中之一。

And that’s how, that’s his worldview.

就是这样,这就是他的世界观。

12:45 And the reason he came to the fore was because of the crystal clear clarity of his message, which is, “We’ve been stabbed in the back.

他之所以脱颖而出,是因为他传达的信息非常清晰,那就是:“我们背后被人捅了一刀。

There is a global plot.

有一个全球情节。

We have to overcome this.

我们必须克服这一点。

We are naturally the master race.

我们自然是优等种族。

We have to reassert ourselves.

我们必须重申自己。

We have to get rid of global Jewry, we have to get rid of global Bolshevism, and we have to prevail, or else.

我们必须摆脱全球犹太人,我们必须摆脱全球布尔什维主义,我们必须获胜,否则。

But if we do prevail, oh, what an amazing world it’s going to be.”

但如果我们真的获胜,哦,那将是一个多么神奇的世界啊。”

13:17 So he starts with this.

所以他就从这个开始。

Every speech he does, always starts with the same way, always starts from a kind of negative, and always ends with an incredible, positive, this sort of rabble-rousing crescendo of, if you’re in the front row, spittle, halitosis and gesticulation.

他所做的每一次演讲,总是以同样的方式开始,总是从某种消极开始,总是以令人难以置信的、积极的、这种煽动性的渐强结束,如果你坐在前排,就会有唾沫、口臭和手势。

I mean, you’ve seen pictures of him.

我的意思是,你看过他的照片。

I mean, I don’t know if you’ve ever seen pictures of him.

我的意思是,我不知道你是否见过他的照片。

He’s almost, he wants to grab the air and clutch it to him.

他几乎,他想抓住空气,把它紧紧地抱在怀里。

13:42 You can see the venom coming out of his mouth, just in a single still photograph.

你可以在一张静态照片中看到毒液从他嘴里喷出来。

I mean, it’s amazing.

我的意思是,这太棒了。

There’s apps you can get now, where you can translate his speeches, and it just sounds, by today’s standards, you would just think, “What a load of absolute wibble,” I mean, just total nonsense.

现在你可以找到一些应用程序,你可以在其中翻译他的演讲,而按照今天的标准,听起来你只会想,“真是一堆绝对的歪曲,”我的意思是,完全是胡说八道。

14:03 But you have to put yourself back in the shoes of people listening to him in 1922 or ’23, or indeed, 1933, and see how kind of captivating that is to a certain part of the population.

但你必须设身处地为 1922 年或 23 年,甚至 1933 年听他演讲的人们着想,看看这对某些人来说有多么着迷。

So, yeah, to go back to your original point, Lebensraum is absolutely part of it.

所以,是的,回到你原来的观点,生存空间绝对是其中的一部分。

So what you do is you crush the Bolsheviks, you crush world Jewry, then you expand.

所以你要做的就是粉碎布尔什维克,粉碎世界犹太人,然后扩张。

Britain has had this incredible empire, global empire.

英国拥有这个令人难以置信的帝国,全球帝国。

Germany needs that, too.

德国也需要这样。

14:32 Germany’s stuck in Europe, it doesn’t have access to the world’s oceans.

德国被困在欧洲,无法进入世界海洋。

So we’re not going to be a maritime empire.

所以我们不会成为一个海洋帝国。

We’re going to be a landmass empire, the whole of landmass of Europe, and into Asia, that’s going to be us.

我们将成为一个陆地帝国,整个欧洲大陆,进入亚洲,那就是我们。

We’re going to take that land, we’re going to take the breadbasket of Ukraine, we’re going to use that for our own ends.

我们将夺取那片土地,我们将夺取乌克兰的粮仓,我们将利用它来达到我们自己的目的。

14:53 We’re going to make ourselves rich, but we’re also going to spread our peoples.

我们将使自己变得富有,但我们也将传播我们的人民。

We’re going to spread the Aryan Northern Master race throughout Europe, and into the traditional Slavic areas, and we will prevail, and come out on top.

我们将把雅利安北方大师种族传播到整个欧洲,并进入传统的斯拉夫地区,我们将获胜,并脱颖而出。

15:06 And so, you have to understand that everything about Operation Barbarossa, the planned invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, is totally wrapped up in the Nazi ideology.

因此,你必须明白,关于 1941 年 6 月计划入侵苏联的巴巴罗萨行动的一切都完全被纳粹意识形态所包围。

And people, I’ve read it, that historians will go, “If only Hitler had realized that the Ukrainians have been quite happy to kind of fight on his side, if only he’d actually brought some of these Jewish scientists into the Nazi fold, then Germany might have prevailed in World War II.”

我读过,历史学家会说,“如果希特勒意识到乌克兰人非常乐意站在他一边战斗,如果他真的把一些犹太科学家带入纳粹阵营,那么德国可能会在第二次世界大战中获胜。”

15:35 And you kind of think, “Well, you’re missing the entire point.

你可能会想:“好吧,你没有抓住要点。

That’s just never going to happen, because this is an ideological war.”

这永远不会发生,因为这是一场意识形态战争。”

Lex Fridman15:41

Yeah, this is not a pragmatic rational leader.

是的,这不是一个务实理性的领导人。

James Holland15:46

No.

不。

Lex Fridman15:46

I mean part of his effectiveness, we should say, is probably the singular belief in this ideology.

我的意思是,我们应该说,他的有效性的一部分可能是对这种意识形态的独特信仰。

15:46 There’s pros and cons.

有优点也有缺点。

For an effective military machine, probably having that singular focus is effective.

对于一台有效的军事机器来说,拥有单一的焦点可能是有效的。

James Holland16:03

Yes, except that when you’re making military decisions, if those decisions are always being bracketed by an ideology, which is fundamentally flawed, from a pragmatic point of view, as much as a kind of …

是的,除了当你做出军事决定时,如果这些决定总是被一种意识形态所包围,从务实的角度来看,这种意识形态从根本上是有缺陷的,就像一种……

Lex Fridman16:17

Yeah, ethical.

是的,道德。

James Holland16:19

Reasonable point of view, you’re opening yourselves up for trouble.

从合理的角度来看,你正在给自己带来麻烦。

16:19 I mean, this is a problem he has with Barbarossa.

我的意思是,这是他与巴巴罗萨之间的问题。

They realize very early on, in 1941, when they’re war gaming this whole operation, that it’s not going to work.

他们很早就意识到,在 1941 年,当他们对整个行动进行兵棋推演时,他们就意识到这是行不通的。

16:34 So there’s people like General Paulus, who’s on the staff at the time.

所以有像保卢斯将军这样的人,他当时是参谋人员。

He’s in charge of war gaming this, and he goes, “This isn’t going to work.” And Keitel, who is the chief of the OKW, goes, “No, no, no, no, no.

他负责兵棋推演,他说:“这行不通。”最高统帅部负责人凯特尔说:“不,不,不,不,不。

Go back and make it work.” He goes, “Okay.” So he comes back with a plan that does work, but it’s bogus.

回去吧,让它发挥作用。”他说:“好吧。”所以他回来时提出了一个可行的计划,但它是假的。

I mean, it doesn’t work, because they don’t have.

我的意思是,这不起作用,因为他们没有。

They don’t have enough motorization.

他们没有足够的机动化。

17:04 They go into Barbarossa with 2,000 different types of vehicle.

他们带着 2000 辆不同类型的车辆进入巴巴罗萨。

Every single one of those vehicles has to have different distributor caps, and different leads, and plugs, and all sorts of different parts.

每一辆车辆都必须有不同的分电器盖、不同的引线、插头以及各种不同的零件。

17:19 The interoperability of the German mechanized arm is super inefficient.

德国机械化手臂的互操作性超级低效。

So you’ve got huge problems, because they kind of think, “Well, we took France in 1940, and that’s one of the most modern countries in the world, with one of the greatest armies and armed forces in the world, and we did that in six weeks.” So, Soviet Union, look, they struggled against Finland, for goodness sake.

所以你遇到了巨大的问题,因为他们会想,“好吧,我们在 1940 年占领了法国,那是世界上最现代化的国家之一,拥有世界上最强大的军队和武装力量之一,我们在六周内就做到了。”所以,苏联,看在上帝的份上,他们与芬兰进行了斗争。

I mean, how hard can it be?

我的意思是,这有多难?

17:45 But what you’re failing to understand is that attacking the Soviet Union is over a geographical landmass 10 times the size of France, just on the frontage.

但你没有理解的是,攻击苏联的地理范围是法国的十倍,而且就在正面。

And you haven’t really got much more mechanization than you had in May 1940, when they attacked the Low Countries and France.

与 1940 年 5 月他们袭击低地国家和法国时相比,现在的机械化水平并没有真正提高多少。

And you’ve actually got less Luftwaffe aircraft to support you, and you just do not have the operational mechanics to make it work successfully.

事实上,支持你的德国空军飞机越来越少,而且你也没有让它成功运作的操作机制。

18:10 I mean, it is largely down to incompetence of the Red Army and the Soviet leadership in the summer of 1941 that they get as far as they do.

我的意思是,1941 年夏天,红军和苏联领导层之所以能取得今天的成就,很大程度上要归咎于他们的无能。

I mean, Barbarossa should never have come close to being a victory.

我的意思是,巴巴罗萨根本不应该接近胜利。

Lex Fridman18:24

Let’s talk through it.

我们来谈谈吧。

18:24 So, Operation Barbarossa that you’re mentioning, and we’ll go back-

所以,你提到的巴巴罗萨行动,我们会回去-

James Holland18:28

Yeah, we’ve jupmed straight into ’41.

是的,我们直接跳到了 41 年。

Lex Fridman18:29

…

……

18:29 to ’39 and ’40, straight into it.

到'39和'40,直接进入它。

James Holland18:31

I’ve eaten off two years of war.

我已经吃掉了两年的战争。

Lex Fridman18:33

So this is June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, when Hitler invades the Soviet Union with, I think, the largest invading force in history, up to that point.

这是 1941 年 6 月的巴巴罗萨行动,当时希特勒入侵苏联,我认为这是迄今为止历史上最大规模的入侵力量。

James Holland18:45

Collectively, yeah.

集体来说,是的。

Lex Fridman18:46

And there’s three prongs, Army Group North, Army Group Center, Army Group South.

分为三个分支:北方集团军群、中央集团军群、南方集团军群。

18:46 North is going to Leningrad.

北去列宁格勒。

Center is going, it’s the strongest group, directly towards Moscow, and South is going and targeting Ukraine and the Caucasus.

中间是最强大的团体,直接前往莫斯科,南方则瞄准乌克兰和高加索地区。

19:02 So, can you linger on that on the details of this plan?

那么,您能详细谈谈这个计划的细节吗?

What was the thinking?

当时的想法是什么?

What was the strategy?

策略是什么?

What was the tactics?

战术是什么?

What was the logistics?

物流是什么?

There’s so many things to say, but one of them is to say that you often emphasize the importance of three ways to analyze military conflict, of the strategic, the operational and tactical.

有很多话要说,但其中之一就是您经常强调分析军事冲突的三种方法的重要性,即战略、战役和战术。

And the operational is often not given enough time attention, and it’s the logistics that make the war machine really work successfully, or fail.

而且作战行动往往没有得到足够的时间关注,而后勤保障才是战争机器真正成功或失败的关键。

James Holland19:35

Yeah, that’s absolutely spot-on.

是的,这绝对是正确的。

19:35 And it’s interesting, because the vast majority of general histories of World War II tend to focus on the strategic and the tactical.

这很有趣,因为绝大多数二战通史都倾向于关注战略和战术。

19:49 So what do I mean by that?

那么我这是什么意思呢?

Well, the strategic, just for those who don’t know, that’s your overall war aims, get to Moscow, whatever it might be, conquer the world.

好吧,战略,对于那些不知道的人来说,这就是你的总体战争目标,到达莫斯科,无论它是什么,征服世界。

That’s your strategy.

这就是你的策略。

19:59 The tactical side of things is, that’s the coalface of war.

战术方面是,这就是战争的正面。

That’s the attritional bit.

这就是消耗位。

That’s the following in his Spitfire, the tank crew, the soldier in his foxhole, it’s the actual kinetic fighting bit.

接下来是他的喷火战斗机、坦克乘员、散兵坑里的士兵,这是真正的动态战斗片段。

20:11 The operational bit is the level of war that links the strategic to the tactical.

作战部分是将战略与战术联系起来的战争级别。

So it is absolutely factories, it’s economics, it’s shipping, it’s supply chains, it’s how you manage your war.

所以这绝对是工厂、经济、运输、供应链、管理战争的方式。

And one of the things where I think people have been guilty in the past, historians have been guilty in the past, is by judging warfare all on the same level.

我认为人们过去有罪的事情之一,历史学家过去有罪的事情之一,就是在同一水平上判断战争。

But obviously, every competent nation has a different approach to war, because of the nation they are, the size they are, their geographical location.

但显然,每个有能力的国家都有不同的战争方式,因为它们的国家、规模和地理位置不同。

20:44 So Britain, for example, is an island nation.

例如,英国就是一个岛国。

Its priority is the Royal Navy, which is why the Royal Navy is known as the senior service.

它的优先级是皇家海军,这也是皇家海军被称为高级军种的原因。

And in 1939, it’s easy to forget it now when you see how depleted Britain is today, but in 1939, it has comfortably the world’s largest navy.

1939 年,当你看到今天的英国有多么疲惫时,你很容易忘记这一点,但在 1939 年,它拥有世界上最大的海军。

There’s something like 194 destroyers, I think it’s 15 battleships, seven aircraft carriers, and another kind of six on the way.

大约有 194 艘驱逐舰,我认为是 15 艘战列舰,7 艘航空母舰,还有 6 艘正在建造中。

21:13 America, it’s got the Pacific Ocean, it’s got the Atlantic Ocean, it’s got two seaboards.

美国,它有太平洋,它有大西洋,它有两个沿海地区。

It has the second-largest navy in the world, but a tiny army.

它拥有世界第二大海军,但陆军规模很小。

I mean, the US Army in September 1939 is the nineteen1h largest in the world, sandwiched between Portugal and Uruguay.

我的意思是,1939 年 9 月的美国陆军是世界上规模最大的陆军,夹在葡萄牙和乌拉圭之间。

And it’s just incredible.

这真是令人难以置信。

It’s 189,000 strong, which might seem reasonably large by today’s standards, but is absolutely tiny by 1939 standards.

它有 189,000 人,以今天的标准来看似乎相当大,但以 1939 年的标准来看绝对很小。

Whereas, Germany’s got an army of three and a half million in 1939.

而 1939 年,德国拥有 350 万军队。

So these are big, big, big differences.

所以这些差异非常非常大。

21:48 But America’s coming at it from a different perspective, Britain’s coming apart, from a different perspective.

但美国从不同的角度看待这个问题,英国则从不同的角度分崩离析。

Britain’s empire is all about, it’s a shipping, it’s a seaborne empire.

大英帝国就是一个航运帝国,一个海上帝国。

21:59 Whereas, there’s also another point, which is having large armies is actually inherently impractical and inefficient, because the larger the army, the more people you’ve got to feed, the more barracks you’ve got to have, the more space you’ve got to have for training, the more people you’re taking out of your workforce to produce tanks and shells, and all the rest of it, because they’re tramping around with rifles.

然而还有一点,拥有庞大的军队本质上是不切实际和低效的,因为军队越大,你要养活的人就越多,你需要有更多的营房,你需要有更多的训练空间,你需要从你的劳动力中抽出更多的人来生产坦克和炮弹等等,因为他们拿着步枪到处走。

22:21 So there’s an argument saying, actually, it’s really not a very good way of doing things.

所以有人说,实际上,这确实不是一个很好的做事方式。

So very much, the British way, and subsequently, the United States way, and the way of Britain’s dominions and empire, is to use steel, not our flesh, as a principle.

因此,英国的方式,以及随后的美国方式,以及英国的领土和帝国的方式,都是使用钢铁,而不是我们的肉体作为原则。

Because the idea is that you use technology, mechanization, modernity, global reach, to do a lot of your hard yards.

因为我们的想法是利用技术、机械化、现代化、全球影响力来完成很多艰苦的工作。

That’s the basic principle behind the strategic air campaign.

这是战略空袭背后的基本原则。

22:48 When we talk about the strategic air campaign, we’re talking about strategic air forces which are operating in isolation from other armed forces.

当我们谈论战略空袭时,我们谈论的是独立于其他武装部队作战的战略空军。

So a tactical air force, for example, is an Air force which is offering close air support for ground operations.

例如,战术空军是为地面行动提供近距离空中支援的空军。

A strategic air force has got nothing to do with ground operations, it’s just operating on its own.

战略空军与地面作战无关,它只是独立作战。

So that’s your bomber force, or whatever, that’s your B-17s and B 24s of the Eighth Air Force, flying out of East England, bombing the industrial complex of Germany, or whatever it might be.

这就是你们的轰炸机部队,或者其他什么,就是第八空军的 B-17 和 B 24,它们从东英格兰起飞,轰炸德国的工业园区,或者其他什么东西。

23:17 So it’s important to understand that when you compare, you have to have in the back of your mind that Britain, compared to Germany, for example, is coming at it from a completely different perspective.

因此,重要的是要明白,当你进行比较时,你必须记住,与德国相比,英国是从完全不同的角度来看待这一问题的。

And I would say one of the failures of Hitler is that he always views everybody through his own very narrow worldview, which is not particularly helpful.

我想说希特勒的失败之一是他总是用自己非常狭隘的世界观来看待每个人,这并不是特别有帮助。

You want to get inside the head of your enemy, and he’s sort of guilty of not doing that.

你想进入敌人的头脑,而他却因为没有这样做而感到内疚。

23:41 So when you’re talking about Operation Barbarossa, to go back to your original question, Lex, you’re dealing with an operation on such a vast scale, that that operational level of war is absolutely vital to its chances of success or failure.

因此,当您谈论巴巴罗萨行动时,回到您最初的问题,莱克斯,您正在处理如此大规模的行动,战争的作战水平对其成功或失败的机会绝对至关重要。

It doesn’t matter how good your individual commanders are at the front.

前线的个别指挥官有多出色并不重要。

If you haven’t got the backup, it’s not going to work.

如果您没有备份,它将无法工作。

24:02 And the problem that the Germans have is yes, they’ve got their three million men on the front, and they’ve got their kind of 3,000 aircraft, and all the rest of it.

德国人面临的问题是,他们在前线有 300 万人,他们有 3,000 架飞机,以及所有其他的东西。

But actually, what you need to do is break it down.

但实际上,你需要做的就是将其分解。

24:15 And who is doing the hard yards of that?

谁在做这件事?

The way that the German war machine works is that the machine bit is only the spearhead.

德国战争机器的工作方式是,机头只是矛头。

So people always talk about the Nazi war machine.

所以人们总是谈论纳粹战争机器。

In a way, it’s a kind of misnomer, because you’re sort of suggesting that it’s highly mechanized and industrialized, and all the rest of it.

在某种程度上,这是一种用词不当,因为你有点暗示它是高度机械化和工业化的,等等。

And nothing could be further from the truth.

事实并非如此。

The spearhead is, but the rest of it is not.

矛头是,但其余部分不是。

24:38 And this is the fatal flaw of the German armed forces in the whole of World War II, really, but even in this early stage, because in Barbarossa, you’re talking about 17 Panzer divisions out of the 100-odd that are involved in the initial attack.

这实际上是整个第二次世界大战中德国武装部队的致命缺陷,但即使是在这个早期阶段,因为在巴巴罗萨,你谈论的是参与最初攻击的 100 多个装甲师中的 17 个。

Well, 17, a Panzer division is not a division full of Panzers, tanks.

好吧,17,一个装甲师并不是一个充满装甲车、坦克的师。

25:02 It is a combined arms motorized outfit.

这是一种联合武器机动装备。

So, scouts on BMWs with sidecars, armored cars, infantry grenadiers, Panzer grenadiers, which are infantry in half tracks and trucks, mechanized.

因此,侦察兵在带有边车、装甲车、步兵掷弹兵、装甲掷弹兵的宝马车上进行侦察,这些步兵是半履带和卡车的步兵,机械化。

It is motorized artillery.

它是机动火炮。

It is motorized anti-aircraft artillery.

它是机动高射炮。

It is motorized anti-tank artillery.

它是机动反坦克炮。

Of course, it is tanks as well, Panzers.

当然,还有坦克,装甲车。

But those are a really, really small proportion of, you’re talking, less than 20% of your attacking force are those spearhead forces.

但这些只是非常非常小的一部分,你说的是,不到你的攻击力量的 20% 是那些先头部队。

And inevitably, they are going to be attrited as they go.

并且不可避免地,他们会随着时间的推移而被磨损。

You are going to take casualties.

你将会造成人员伤亡。

Not only that, you’re not going to just take battlefield casualties, you’re also going to have mechanical casualties, because of the huge spaces involved.

不仅如此,由于涉及的空间巨大,你不仅会遭受战场伤亡,还会造成机械伤亡。

You just simply can’t function.

你就是无法正常工作。

25:53 So what you see is, in the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, they surge forward.

所以你看到的是,在巴巴罗萨行动的最初阶段,他们向前推进。

Red Army’s got absolutely no answers to anything.

红军绝对没有任何答案。

Stalin, weirdly, hasn’t heeded all the warnings that this attack is brewing.

奇怪的是,斯大林并没有注意到这次袭击正在酝酿的所有警告。

And there have been plenty, incidentally.

顺便说一下,已经有很多了。

26:09 And Smolensk falls on the 15th of July, in just less than four weeks.

斯摩棱斯克于 7 月 15 日陷落,距今仅不到四个星期。

It’s just incredible.

这太不可思议了。

Three and a half weeks, Smolensk has gone, they’ve done, overwhelmed the rest of what had been Poland.

三周半的时间里,斯摩棱斯克已经消失了,他们已经做到了,淹没了波兰的其他地区。

They’ve surged into what is now Belarus, taken Smolensk.

他们已经涌入现在的白俄罗斯,占领了斯摩棱斯克。

This is Army Group Center.

这里是集团军群中心。

Army Group North thrust up into the Baltic.

北方集团军群挺进波罗的海。

It’s all going swimmingly well.

一切都很顺利。

26:29 But then, the next several months, they barely go a hundred miles, and that’s because they’re running out of steam.

但接下来的几个月,他们几乎只走了一百英里,那是因为他们已经失去了动力。

The 16th Panzer division, for example, by the time it’s taken Smolensk, involved in taking Smolensk on the 15th of July, 1941, the following day, it’s got 16 tanks left, 16 out of should have 180.

例如,第 16 装甲师在 1941 年 7 月 15 日攻占斯摩棱斯克时,第二天就剩下了 16 辆坦克,本应有 180 辆坦克,其中有 16 辆。

So it’s just being attrited.

所以它只是被磨损了。

They can’t sustain it, and they can’t sustain it, because as the Russians fall back, as the Soviet Red Army falls back, they do their own scorched earth policy.

他们无法维持,他们无法维持,因为当俄罗斯人撤退时,当苏联红军撤退时,他们会执行自己的焦土政策。

27:03 They also discover that the railway line is kind of a different loading gauge, so they’ve got to change it.

他们还发现铁路线是一种不同的载重计,所以他们必须改变它。

So it’s slightly, the Russian loading gauge is slightly wider.

所以稍微有点,俄罗斯的装载量规稍微宽一些。

So every single mile, every yard, every foot, every meter of the capturing of Russian railway has to be moved a couple of inches to the left, to make it fit the German Kriegslok, in the standard train of locomotive, of the Reichsbahn.

因此,捕获俄罗斯铁路的每一英里、每一码、每一英尺、每一米都必须向左移动几英寸,以使其适合德国铁路机车标准列车中的德国 Kriegslok。

Just imagine what that’s like.

想象一下那是什么样子的。

27:31 And also, Soviet trains are bigger, so they can take more water, which means, the water stops in between are fewer and far between.

而且,苏联火车更大,因此可以运载更多水,这意味着中间的供水站更少且间隔更远。

So they have to, the Germans, when they come in, their trains, their Kriegsloks are smaller.

所以他们必须这样做,德国人,当他们进来时,他们的火车,他们的 Kriegsloks 都较小。

27:43 So they have to be re-watered more often, and re-coaled more often.

因此,它们必须更频繁地重新浇水,并更频繁地重新涂煤。

I mean, it’s absolutely boggling just how complicated it is, and how badly planned it is, because they haven’t reckoned on this.

我的意思是,它的复杂性和计划的糟糕程度绝对令人难以置信,因为他们没有考虑到这一点。

They’re having to kind of think on their feet.

他们必须迅速思考。

Lex Fridman27:57

I love the logistical details of all of this, because yes, that’s a huge component of this, especially when you’re covering that much territory.

我喜欢所有这一切的后勤细节,因为是的,这是其中的一个重要组成部分,尤其是当你覆盖那么多领土时。

27:57 But there is a notion that if Hitler didn’t stop Army Group Center, it could have pushed all the way to Moscow.

但有一种观点认为,如果希特勒不阻止中央集团军群,它可能会一直推进到莫斯科。

It was only maybe a hundred miles away from Moscow.

距莫斯科大约只有一百英里。

Is that a possibility?

有这种可能吗?

28:20 Because it had so much success in the early days, pushing forward.

因为它在早期取得了巨大的成功,并不断向前推进。

Do you think it’s possible that if Hitler, as we mentioned from a military blunder perspective, didn’t make that blunder, that they could have defeated the Soviet Union, right there and then?

你认为如果希特勒,正如我们从军事错误的角度提到的那样,没有犯那个错误,他们是否有可能当场击败苏联?

James Holland28:38

Well, my own view is that they should never have got close.

嗯,我个人的观点是他们不应该接近。

28:38 The Red Army has plenty of men to be able to see off anything that the Germans can do.

红军有很多人能够击败德国人所做的一切。

The capture of Kyiv, for example, in September 1941, was a catastrophe for the Soviet Union, and should never have happened.

例如,1941 年 9 月攻占基辅对于苏联来说是一场灾难,根本不应该发生。

28:56 I mean, Zhukov is saying to Stalin, ” We’ve got to pull back across the Dnieper.” So I was going, “No, you can’t possibly do that.

我的意思是,朱可夫对斯大林说:“我们必须撤回第聂伯河。”所以我说:“不,你不可能那样做。

You can’t abandon Kyiv.

你不能放弃基辅。

It’s the third city in the Soviet Union.

这是苏联的第三座城市。

You just can’t, no way.

你就是做不到,没办法。

No, absolutely not.” And he goes, “Well, we are just going to be overwhelmed, we can’t hold this.” And he says, “Either back me or fire me, back me or sack me.” So Stalin sacks him.

不,绝对不。”他说:“好吧,我们会不知所措,我们无法忍受这个。”他说:“要么支持我,要么解雇我;要么支持我,要么解雇我。”于是斯大林解雇了他。

29:22 Obviously, as we know, Zhukov gets rehabilitated in pretty quick order, and Stalin does learn very quickly, thereafter, to learn the lessons.

显然,正如我们所知,朱可夫很快就平反了,而斯大林也确实很快就吸取了教训。

But the opening phase of Barbarossa has been a catastrophe.

但巴巴罗萨的开局阶段是一场灾难。

As a consequence of Stalin refusing to let his men retreat back across the Dnieper, which is a substantial barrier, and would be very difficult for the Germans to overwhelm, had they moved back in time, that’s another kind of 700,000 men put in the bag.

由于斯大林拒绝让他的部队撤回第聂伯河,这是一个巨大的障碍,如果德国人及时撤退,他们将很难克服,这又是另一种70万士兵的收入囊中。

I mean, that’s just staggering numbers.

我的意思是,这只是一个惊人的数字。

But yeah, I mean, there’s so many things wrong with the Barbarossa plan, too much of it.

但是,是的,我的意思是,巴巴罗萨计划有很多问题,太多了。

It’s just such a vast area.

这只是一个如此广阔的区域。

I mean, you’re talking about, kind of, 2,500 miles or something, of frontage.

我的意思是,你说的是 2,500 英里左右的临街面积。

30:13 Maybe if you put your Panzer groups, which are these spearheads, and you put them all in one big thrust, and just go hell for leather, straight across, on a much more narrow front of, let’s say, 400 miles, rather than 1,200, then they might have just sort of burnt away straight through to Moscow.

也许如果你把你的装甲集群,也就是这些矛头,你把它们全部放在一个大冲力中,然后拼尽全力,直接穿越,在一个更狭窄的正面,比方说,400英里,而不是1,200英里,那么他们可能会直接烧毁到莫斯科。

Lex Fridman30:32

They really caught the Red Army unprepared.

他们实在是让红军措手不及。

James Holland30:36

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman30:36

Is there something to be said about the strategic genius of that, or was it just luck?

是否有什么值得称赞的战略天才,或者只是运气?

James Holland30:46

No, I don’t think so.

不,我不这么认为。

30:46 I mean, what’s happened is, you’ve had the Soviet purges of the second half of the 1930s, where they have executed or imprisoned 22,500 officers, of which, three out of five marshals, God knows how many army commanders, et cetera, et cetera.

我的意思是,发生的情况是,苏联在 1930 年代后半叶进行了清洗,他们处决或监禁了 22,500 名军官,其中五分之三是元帅,天知道有多少陆军指挥官,等等。

So you’ve completely decapitated the Red Army, in terms of its command structure.

因此,就指挥结构而言,你已经彻底斩断了红军的头颅。

Lex Fridman31:12

So before that, would it be fair to say it was one of, if not the greatest army in the world?

那么在此之前,可以公平地说它是世界上最伟大的军队之一吗?

James Holland31:18

Well, there was a lot of experience.

嗯,有很多经验。

31:18 There’s a lot of experience there, that’s for sure.

那里有很多经验,这是肯定的。

Lex Fridman31:21

But also, technology material, the size of the army and the number of people that are mobilized?

而且,技术材料、军队规模和动员的人数?

James Holland31:28

Yes.

是的。

31:28 Yeah, and they’re the first people to adapt, create airborne troops, for example.

是的,他们是第一批适应的人,例如创建空降部队。

So yes, I think there is an argument to say that, but the decapitation is absolutely brutal.

所以,是的,我认为这样说是有争议的,但斩首绝对是残酷的。

If you’ve decapitated an army, you’ve then got to put new guys in charge.

如果你已经斩首了一支军队,那么你就必须让新人来负责。

31:42 And someone who looks, on paper, like a half decent peacetime commander might not be a very good wartime commander.

一个在纸面上看起来像个半正经的和平时期指挥官的人可能不是一个很好的战时指挥官。

They’re different disciplines and different skills, and you don’t know that until you’re tested.

它们是不同的学科和不同的技能,只有经过测试你才会知道这一点。

It’s very hard to kind of judge.

很难做出判断。

And of course, Stalin is existing in a vacuum of paranoia and suspicion all the time, which is unhelpful, when you’re trying to develop a strong armed forces.

当然,斯大林始终处于偏执和怀疑的真空中,当你试图发展一支强大的武装部队时,这毫无帮助。

32:06 So they go into Finland, in back end of 1939, and they get really badly hammered.

因此,他们在 1939 年底进入芬兰,并受到了严重的打击。

They do take about 50, they get the Karelia Peninsula, and they do take some ground, but at huge cost.

他们确实拿下了大约 50 人,他们获得了卡累利阿半岛,他们确实占领了一些土地,但代价巨大。

I mean, the casualties are five times as bad as those of the Finns, and it’s a humiliation.

我的意思是,伤亡是芬兰人的五倍,这是一种耻辱。

32:25 So Hitler sees that, and thinks, “Oh, okay, they’re not up to much cop.” Then Hitler loses the Battle of Britain, and he thinks, “I can’t afford to fight a war on two fronts.” That’s one of the reasons why Germany loses the war in 1914 to ’18, is fighting on the Eastern front, but also fighting on the Western front at the same time.

所以希特勒看到了这一点,心想:“哦,好吧,他们不擅长警察。”然后希特勒在不列颠之战中失败,他想:“我无力承担两线作战的费用。”这就是德国在1914年至18年战争中失败的原因之一,德国在东线作战,但同时也在西线作战。

32:43 “We’ve got to avoid that, but I’ve got to get rid of Britain.

“我们必须避免这种情况,但我必须摆脱英国。

And Britain hasn’t come out of the fight.

英国还没有退出这场战斗。

Britain is still fighting in the backend of 1940, having won the Battle of Britain.

英国在赢得不列颠之战后,仍在 1940 年代后期作战。

And so, maybe I’ll go into the Soviet Union now, while the Red Army is still weak.

所以,也许我现在就去苏联,趁红军还很弱的时候。

We’re not 100% ready ourselves, but let’s hurry the whole thing forward.”

我们自己还没有100%准备好,但让我们加快整件事的进展。”

33:00 Because originally, he’d been thinking of planning an operation in 1943 or 1944.

因为最初他一直在考虑计划在 1943 年或 1944 年进行手术。

So the idea is, you take Poland out, you take out France and the Low Countries, you conquer most of Western Europe, you knock out Britain, so therefore, you don’t have to worry so much about the United States, because they’re over on the other side of the Atlantic.

所以我们的想法是,你消灭了波兰,你消灭了法国和低地国家,你征服了西欧的大部分地区,你击败了英国,所以,你不必太担心美国,因为他们在大西洋的另一边。

33:17 That then gives him, buys him the time, to kind of rebuild up his strength for the all-out thrust on the Soviet Union.

这给了他,为他赢得了时间,为全面进攻苏联而重建自己的力量。

The failure to subdue Britain in 1940 changes all those plans and makes him think, “Actually, I’m going to go in early.”

1940 年征服英国的失败改变了所有这些计划,并让他想:“实际上,我要提前介入。”

33:30 And he’s also been kind of, he’s hoisted by his own petard, because he starts to believe his own genius.

他也有点自食其果,因为他开始相信自己的天才。

Everyone told him that he wouldn’t be able to beat France and the Low Countries.

每个人都告诉他,他无法击败法国和低地国家。

Everyone told him that it wouldn’t work out when he went into Poland, everyone was really nervous about it.

大家都告诉他,到了波兰就不行了,大家都很紧张。

“Well, go hang you, cautious, awful aristocratic Prussian generals.

“好吧,去绞死你吧,小心翼翼、可怕的普鲁士贵族将军。

I’m the best at this.

我最擅长这个。

I’ve told you, I’ve shown you.

我已经告诉过你,我已经向你展示过。

I’m the genius.

我是天才。

I can do it.” He starts to believe his own hype.

我能做到。”他开始相信自己的炒作。

33:59 And of course, this is a problem.

当然,这是一个问题。

He’s surrounded by sycophants, and people who are constantly telling him that he’s this incredible genius.

他周围都是阿谀奉承者,人们不断地告诉他他是个令人难以置信的天才。

So he starts to believe it, and he thinks everything is possible.

于是他开始相信,他认为一切皆有可能。

34:07 And he’s very much into this idea of the will of the German people, “This is our destiny, and I have a will.” As I say earlier on, it’s the thousand-year Reich, or Armageddon, “but momentum is with us, and we need to strike it, and only by gambling, only by being bold will the Germans prevail,” and all this kind of nonsense.

他非常认同德国人民的意志,“这是我们的命运,我有一个意志。”正如我之前所说,这是千年帝国,或世界末日,“但我们有动力,我们需要击中它,只有通过赌博,只有通过大胆,德国人才能获胜”,以及所有这些废话。

And so that’s why he goes into Soviet Union in June 1941, rather than a couple of, or even three years later.

这就是为什么他在 1941 年 6 月而不是几年甚至三年后才进入苏联。

Lex Fridman34:33

Yeah.

是的。

34:33 He really hated the Prussian generals, huh?

他真的很讨厌普鲁士将军吧?

James Holland34:35

Yeah, he hated them.

是的,他讨厌他们。

Lex Fridman34:36

Is there a case to be made that there, he was indeed, at times a military genius?

有没有理由证明他有时确实是一个军事天才?

James Holland34:42

No, I don’t think so.

不,我不这么认为。

34:42 Because none of the plan, I mean, even the plan for the invasion of France and the Low Countries isn’t his.

因为所有计划,我的意思是,甚至入侵法国和低地国家的计划都不是他的。

34:50 The concept is from Manstein’s, and the execution is Guderian’s, Heinz Guderian.

这个概念来自曼施坦因,而执行则是古德里安的海因茨·古德里安。

Heinz Guderian is the pioneer of the Panzer force, of the Panzer thrust, this …

海因茨·古德里安是装甲部队、装甲推进力的先驱,这……

35:00 …

……

pioneer of the Panzer force, the Panzer thrust, this idea of the ultra mechanized combined arms, Panzer arm spearhead doing this kind of lightning fast thrust.

装甲部队的先锋,装甲推力,这种超机械化联合兵种的理念,装甲臂矛头做这种闪电般的快速推力。

It’s not Hitler’s idea.

这不是希特勒的主意。

He adopts it and takes it as his own, because he’s the führer.

他采用了它并将其视为自己的,因为他是元首。

He can do what he likes, but it isn’t his.

他可以做他喜欢做的事,但这不是他的。

And up until that point, until that comes into being, until that plan is put forward to Franz Halder, who is the chief of staff of the German army at that time, Halder is just thinking, “How do we get out of this mess?

直到那时,直到这个计划成为现实,直到这个计划被提交给当时的德国陆军参谋长弗朗茨·哈尔德,哈尔德只是在想,“我们如何摆脱这个困境?

This is just a nightmare.” Because they know that France has got a larger army, they know that France has got more tanks, and know that France has got double the number of artillery pieces.

这只是一场噩梦。”因为他们知道法国拥有更强大的军队,他们知道法国拥有更多的坦克,并且知道法国拥有双倍数量的火炮。

It’s got parity in terms of air force.

它在空军方面具有同等地位。

And then you add Holland, then you add Belgium, then you add Great Britain.

然后添加荷兰,然后添加比利时,然后添加英国。

And that looks like a very, very tough nut to crack.

这看起来是一个非常非常难解决的难题。

I mean, the reason why France is subdued in 1940 is 50% brilliance of the Germans and their operational art in that particular instance, and 50% French failure really, and incompetence.

我的意思是,法国在 1940 年被压制的原因是德国人及其在特定情况下的作战艺术的 50% 的聪明才智,而法国人的 50% 的失败实际上是无能的。

Lex Fridman36:05

I mean, there is a kind of genius to be able to see, and take advantage, and set up the world stage in such a way that you have the appeasement from France and Britain, keep the United States out of it, just set up the world stage where you could just plow through everybody with very little resistance.

我的意思是,有一种天才能够看到并利用这一点,并以这样一种方式建立世界舞台,即你可以得到法国和英国的绥靖政策,将美国排除在外,只需建立一个世界舞台,让你可以在几乎没有阻力的情况下碾压所有人。

36:05 I mean, there is a kind of-

我的意思是,有一种——

James Holland36:29

Well, yes, if it works.

嗯,是的,如果它有效的话。

Lex Fridman36:30

…

……

36:30 geopolitical genius.

地缘政治天才。

James Holland36:32

If it works.

如果有效的话。

Lex Fridman36:32

Right.

正确的。

James Holland36:32

But it doesn’t.

但事实并非如此。

36:32 That’s a problem.

这是一个问题。

I mean, he goes into Poland on the assumption that Britain and France will not declare war.

我的意思是,他进入波兰是基于英国和法国不会宣战的假设。

He is not prepared for Britain and France declaring war on Germany.

他没有准备好英国和法国对德国宣战。

Lex Fridman36:45

Right.

正确的。

James Holland36:45

He thinks they won’t.

他认为他们不会。

Lex Fridman36:46

That’s right.

这是正确的。

36:46 So miscalculation, blunder.

所以算错了,失误了。

But then France does, right?

但法国确实这么做了,对吧?

And then France does not successfully do anything with this incredible army that it has.

然后法国并没有成功地用它拥有的这支令人难以置信的军队做任何事情。

James Holland37:01

It has the size.

它有尺寸。

37:01 But one of the problems that France has is that it’s very, very top-heavy.

但法国面临的问题之一是它非常非常头重脚轻。

It’s very cumbersome in the way it operates.

它的操作方式非常繁琐。

There’s no question that it’s got some brilliant young commanders, but at the top, the commanders are very old.

毫无疑问,它有一些才华横溢的年轻指挥官,但在高层,指挥官们都非常老了。

Most of them are first World War veterans, whether, I mean, Weygand, Gamelin, General Georges, these people, they’re all well into their 60s.

他们中的大多数都是第一次世界大战的老兵,我的意思是,无论是韦刚、甘美林、乔治将军,这些人,他们都已经 60 多岁了。

General Georges is the youngest army commander and he’s 60.

乔治将军现年 60 岁,是最年轻的陆军指挥官。

It’s too old to be an army commander.

当陆军司令已经太老了。

You need to be in your late 40s, early 50s.

你需要40岁末、50岁出头。

And they’re too just consumed by conservatism and the old ways.

他们也太沉迷于保守主义和旧方式了。

And what they assume is that any future war will be much like the first World War.

他们认为未来的任何战争都将与第一次世界大战非常相似。

It’ll be attritional, long and drawn out, but static.

它将是消耗性的、漫长的、漫长的,但却是静态的。

But actually they’re right on two parts of it.

但实际上他们在两方面是正确的。

As it turns out, it is going to be long, and drawn out, and attritional, but it’s going to be mobile rather than static.

事实证明,这将是漫长的、漫长的、消耗性的,但它将是移动的,而不是静态的。

And that’s a big miscalculation.

这是一个很大的误判。

Lex Fridman38:04

Here’s my question.

这是我的问题。

38:04 I think you’re being too nice on France, here.

我认为你对法国太好了。

So when Germany invaded Poland, correct me if I’m wrong, but it feels like France could have just went straight to Berlin.

因此,当德国入侵波兰时,如果我错了,请纠正我,但感觉法国可以直接前往柏林。

James Holland38:18

Yeah, they absolutely could have.

是的,他们绝对可以。

Lex Fridman38:21

And I know you said, “It’s very top-heavy,” and you’re saying all of these things, but they literally did basically nothing.

我知道你说过,“这非常头重脚轻”,你说了所有这些话,但他们实际上基本上什么也没做。

James Holland38:28

Yeah, they were appalling.

是的,他们太可怕了。

Lex Fridman38:32

And I think a part of that, and I think you described this well, maybe you could speak to that, is the insanity that is Hitler creating the psychological, with the propaganda, creating this feeling that there’s this Nazi force that’s unstoppable, so France just didn’t want to step into that.

我认为其中一部分,我认为你描述得很好,也许你可以说,希特勒通过宣传创造了心理上的疯狂,创造了一种纳粹力量不可阻挡的感觉,所以法国只是不想介入。

38:32 Maybe there were legitimately, I hesitate to say these words, but scared of war.

也许有正当理由,我犹豫着要不要说出这些话,但害怕战争。

James Holland39:00

A hundred percent they are, because France has been totally traumatized by the first World War.

百分之一百是这样,因为法国在第一次世界大战中受到了彻底的创伤。

Lex Fridman39:00

By World War.

到了世界大战。

James Holland39:06

It’s fought on their land, it’s fought in their industrial heartland.

它是在他们的土地上进行的,是在他们的工业中心地带进行的。

39:06 They lose three times the amount of people killed that Britain does.

他们损失的死亡人数是英国的三倍。

Britain’s traumatized by it, but not to the same degree that France is.

英国因此受到了创伤,但程度不及法国。

There is just no stomach to do that again.

只是没有胃口再这么做了。

So that makes them risk averse.

这使得他们厌恶风险。

And by being risk averse, you’re actually taking a far greater risk.

通过规避风险,你实际上承担了更大的风险。

That’s the irony of it.

这就是它的讽刺之处。

And the truth is also there isn’t the political will.

事实是也没有政治意愿。

And a successful military can only be successful if there is a political will at the top.

一支成功的军队只有在高层有政治意愿的情况下才能取得成功。

And the problem with France in the 1930s is it’s very politically divided.

20 世纪 30 年代法国的问题是政治分歧很大。

It’s a time of multiple governments, multiple prime ministers, coalition governments, really very extreme coalition governments from the sort of drawn from the left and the right as well as the center.

这是一个多政府、多总理、联合政府的时代,真正非常极端的联合政府,来自左翼、右翼和中间派。

39:53 And this is not a coalition of two parties.

这不是两党的联盟。

This is a coalition of multiple parties.

这是一个多党联盟。

No one can ever agree anything.

没有人能够同意任何事情。

I mean, that’s the problem.

我的意思是,这就是问题所在。

It’s amazing that the Maginot Line has even agreed, this incredibly strong defensive position down the western side of France border with Germany, which is kind of largely impregnable.

令人惊讶的是,马奇诺防线甚至同意了,这个位于法国与德国边境西侧的极其坚固的防御阵地,基本上是坚不可摧的。

But the problem is the bit that’s not impregnable, which is the hinge where the Maginot Line ends, and it sort of basically starts turning towards in a northerly direction and the border with Belgium.

但问题是,那一点并不是坚不可摧的,它是马其诺防线结束的枢纽,它基本上开始转向北边和比利时边境。

40:24 And what they should have done is built border defenses all along the northern coast of Belgium, because Belgium refused to allow any allied troops into its territory.

他们应该做的是在比利时北部海岸建立边境防御,因为比利时拒绝允许任何盟军进入其领土。

It was neutral.

这是中立的。

And France should have said, “Okay, fine.

法国应该说:“好吧,好吧。

Well, then we’ll defend.

好吧,那我们就防守。

We’re not going to come to your rescue if you get invaded.

如果您遭到入侵,我们不会来救援您。

That’s the payoff.

这就是回报。

And the consequence of that, we are going to stop [inaudible 00:40:50] that, and we’re not going to be drawn into the neutral territory should Germany invade from the west.” But they don’t do that because of the psychological damage of having fought a war in exactly that area a generation earlier.

其结果是,我们将停止[听不清 00:40:50],如果德国从西方入侵,我们也不会被拖入中立领土。”但他们没有这样做,因为上一代人在该地区打过一场战争,造成了心理伤害。

And that’s the problem.

这就是问题所在。

41:05 Germany is so weakened by the invasion of Poland.

德国因入侵波兰而被削弱。

There is literally nothing left.

几乎什么都没有剩下。

The back door into Western Germany is completely open.

进入西德的后门完全打开。

And so they do what they call the Saar offensive, but it’s not.

所以他们进行了所谓的萨尔攻势,但事实并非如此。

It’s a kind of reconnaissance in force where they go across the border, pick their noses for a few days, and then trundle back again.

这是一种强力侦察,他们越过边境,挖鼻孔几天,然后再缓缓返回。

And it’s embarrassing.

这很尴尬。

And what you’re seeing there is a nation which is just not ready for this, which is scared, which is politically divided, which is then having a knock on effect on the decision-making process, and which is just consumed by military complacency.

你所看到的国家还没有为此做好准备,他们感到害怕,政治上分裂,然后对决策过程产生连锁反应,并且被军事上的自满所消耗。

And that’s the big problem.

这就是个大问题。

There is this, the commanders at the very top of the French regime are complacent.

正是如此,法国政权最高层的指挥官们却沾沾自喜。

They haven’t bought into modern ways.

他们还没有接受现代方式。

They haven’t looked at how contemporary technology could help them.

他们没有考虑当代技术如何帮助他们。

42:02 I mean, it is absurd, for example, that there isn’t a single radio in the Chateau de Vincennes, which, it’s the headquarters of the commander in chief of the French armed forces to General Maurice Gamelin.

我的意思是,例如,文森城堡里没有一台收音机,这是荒谬的,它是法国武装部队总司令莫里斯·加梅林将军的总部。

I mean, it’s just unbelievable.

我的意思是,这简直令人难以置信。

But that is the case.

但事实就是如此。

And there’s no getting away from that.

这是无法回避的。

And it is all the more ironic when you consider that France is actually the most automotive society in Europe.

当你想到法国实际上是欧洲汽车最发达的社会时,这就更具有讽刺意味了。

It’s the second most automotive society in the world after the United States, by some margin, it has to be said as well.

不得不说,它是世界上仅次于美国的第二大汽车社会。

It has a fantastic transportation system.

它拥有出色的交通系统。

Railway network is superb.

铁路网络非常发达。

There are eight people for every motorized vehicle in France, which is way above Germany, which is in 1949, that figure is 47, for example.

法国每辆机动车辆搭载8人,远远高于1949年德国的47人。

Lex Fridman42:48

What?

什么?

James Holland42:48

It’s 106 in Italy.

意大利是106。

Lex Fridman42:49

So France is very mechanized, like-

所以法国非常机械化,就像-

James Holland42:51

Very mechanized.

非常机械化。

42:51 So come on, guys, pull your finger out, get it together.

所以来吧,伙计们,伸出你的手指,把它放在一起。

And they just don’t.

但他们就是不这样做。

They’re incredibly slow and cumbersome.

它们极其缓慢且笨重。

And what they think is what will happen is the Germans won’t think of going, they won’t do a pincer movement because you can’t possibly take motorized forces through the Ardennes.

他们认为将会发生的事情是德国人不会想到去,他们不会采取钳形行动,因为你不可能带着摩托化部队穿过阿登地区。

That just is not possible, which is the hinge area between the end of the Maginot, the northern part of the Maginot Line, which runs down the eastern border of France and the northern bit.

这是不可能的,这里是马其诺防线末端、马其诺防线北部部分之间的枢纽地区,该防线沿着法国东部边界延伸至北部部分。

And so, “What we’ll do with that hinge around the town of Sedan, we’ll move into Belgium, we’ll meet the Germans before they get anywhere near France.

因此,“我们将利用色当镇周围的枢纽做些什么,我们将进入比利时,我们将在德国人到达法国附近之前与他们会面。

We’ll hold them.

我们会抓住他们。

And while we’re holding them, we will bring up our reserves, and then we’ll counterattack, and crush them.” That’s the idea behind it.

当我们控制住他们的时候,我们就会拿出我们的预备队,然后我们就会反击,粉碎他们。”这就是其背后的想法。

But the problem is they don’t have a means of moving fast.

但问题是他们没有快速行动的方法。

43:37 And their communication systems are dreadful, absolutely dreadful.

他们的通讯系统很糟糕,绝对很糟糕。

They’re dependent on conventional telephone lines, which dive bombers and whatever are just absolutely wrecking.

他们依赖于传统的电话线,而俯冲轰炸机之类的东西绝对会造成破坏。

Suddenly the streets are clogged with refugees and people can’t move.

突然间,街道上挤满了难民,人们无法移动。

So then telephone lines are down, there’s no radios, so that you’re then dependent on sending dispatch riders on little motorbikes.

所以电话线断了,没有收音机,所以你只能依靠骑着小型摩托车派遣调度员。

General Maurice Gamelin sends out a dispatch rider at six o’clock in the morning.

莫里斯·甘梅林将军在早上六点派出一名派遣骑手。

By 12 o’clock he hasn’t come back, so you then send another one.

到了12点他还没有回来,你就再发一个。

Finally, the answer comes back, nine o’clock at night, by which time the Germans advance another 15 miles.

最后,晚上九点,答案回来了,此时德军又前进了 15 英里。

And the original message that you sent at six o’clock that morning is completely redundant and has passed its sell by date.

而你那天早上六点发送的原始消息完全是多余的,并且已经过了销售期限。

And that’s happening every step of the way.

这种情况每一步都在发生。

So you’ve got overall command headquarters, then you’ve got army group, then you’ve got army, then you’ve got corps, then you’ve got division.

所以你有总司令部,然后你有集团军群,然后你有陆军,然后你有军,然后你有师。

44:30 So the consequence of all that is that French just can’t move.

所以这一切的结果就是法国人无法动弹。

They’re just stuck.

他们只是被困住了。

They’re rabbits in headlights, and the Germans are able to move them, destroy them in isolation.

他们就像车头灯下的兔子,德国人能够移动他们,孤立地摧毁他们。

Meanwhile, they’re able to use their excellent communications to very, very good effect.

与此同时,他们能够利用出色的沟通能力取得非常非常好的效果。

And you were talking about the genius of war.

你正在谈论战争的天才。

It’s not Hitler that’s a genius.

希特勒不是天才。

If anyone’s a genius, it’s Goebbels, the propaganda chief.

如果说有谁是天才,那就是宣传部长戈培尔。

And it is their ability to harness that they are the kings of messaging.

正是他们的驾驭能力使他们成为消息传递之王。

They don’t have X, don’t have social media, but they do have new technology.

他们没有X,没有社交媒体,但他们确实拥有新技术。

And that new technology, that new approach is flooding the airwaves with their singular message, which is always the same, and has been ever since the Nazis come into power, and it is using radios.

新技术、新方法正在用它们独特的信息充斥着广播,这些信息总是一样的,自从纳粹上台以来就一直如此,它正在使用无线电。

And I think radios are really, really key to the whole story because there is no denser radio network anywhere in the world, including the United States, than Germany in 1939.

我认为无线电对于整个故事来说确实非常关键,因为世界上任何地方都没有比 1939 年的德国更密集的无线电网络,包括美国。

45:28 So while it’s really behind the times in terms of mechanization, it is absolutely on top of its game in terms of comms.

因此,虽然它在机械化方面确实落后于时代,但在通信方面绝对处于领先地位。

So 70% of households in Germany have radios by 1939, which is an unprecedented number.

因此,到 1939 年,德国 70% 的家庭拥有收音机,这是一个前所未有的数字。

That is only beaten by United States and only just.

那只是被美国打败了,而且只是而已。

So it is greater than any other nation in Europe.

所以它比欧洲任何其他国家都伟大。

And in terms of flooding the airwaves, it is the densest, because even for those who, the 30% who don’t have radios, “That’s not a problem because we’ll put them in the stairwells of apartment blocks, we’ll put them in squares, we’ll put them in cafés and bars.

就广播广播而言,它是最密集的,因为即使对于那些没有收音机的人来说,30% 的人也会说,“这不是问题,因为我们会把它们放在公寓楼的楼梯间里,我们会把它们放在广场上,我们会把它们放在咖啡馆和酒吧里。

And the same stuff, the Nazi state controls the radio airwaves as it does the movies, as it does newspapers, all aspects of the media are controlled by Goebbels and propaganda ministry.

同样的,纳粹国家控制无线电广播,就像控制电影、报纸一样,媒体的各个方面都由戈培尔和宣传部控制。

And they are putting out the same message over and over again.

他们一遍又一遍地发出同样的信息。

46:23 It’s not all Hitler’s ranting, it’s entertainment, light entertainment, some humorous shows.

不全是希特勒的咆哮,都是娱乐,轻松的娱乐,一些幽默的表演。

It is also Wagner, of course, and Richard Strauss.

当然,还有瓦格纳和理查·施特劳斯。

It’s a mixture.

这是一种混合物。

But the subliminal message is the same.

但潜意识的信息是相同的。

“We’re the best.

“我们是最好的。

We’re the top dogs.

我们是顶尖的狗。

Jewish Bolshevik plot is awful.

犹太布尔什维克的阴谋是可怕的。

That’s the existential threat to us.

这就是对我们的生存威胁。

We have to overcome that.

我们必须克服这一点。

We’re the top dogs, militarily, we’re the best.

我们是顶尖的,在军事上,我们是最好的。

We should feel really good about ourselves.

我们应该自我感觉良好。

We’re going to absolutely win and be the greatest nation in the world ever.

我们绝对会获胜并成为世界上最伟大的国家。

And Hitler’s a genius.” And that is just repeated over, and over, and over, and over again.

希特勒是个天才。”这只是一遍又一遍地重复。

And for all the modernity of the world in which we live in today, most people believe what they’re told repeatedly.

尽管我们今天生活的世界充满了现代性,但大多数人仍然相信他们反复被告知的事情。

Lex Fridman47:07

Yeah.

是的。

James Holland47:07

They still do.

他们仍然这样做。

47:07 If you just repeat, repeat, repeat over and over again, people will believe it.

如果你只是重复、重复、一遍又一遍地重复,人们就会相信。

If you are a diehard Trump supporter, you want to believe that, you’ll believe everything he says.

如果你是特朗普的铁杆支持者,你愿意相信这一点,你就会相信他所说的一切。

If you are a diehard Bernie Sanders man, you’re from the left.

如果你是伯尼·桑德斯的顽固分子,那么你就是左派。

You’ll believe everything he says because it’s reinforcing what you already want to believe.

你会相信他所说的一切,因为这强化了你已经想相信的事情。

Lex Fridman47:30

But the scary thing is radio is the technology of the day.

但可怕的是无线电是当今的技术。

47:30 The technology of the day today, which is a terrifying one for me, is I would say AI on social media.

今天的技术对我来说是一项可怕的技术,我想说的是社交媒体上的人工智能。

So bots.

所以机器人。

You can have basically bot farms, which I assume is used by Ukraine, by Russia, by US.

基本上你可以拥有机器人农场,我认为乌克兰、俄罗斯和美国都在使用它。

I would love to read the history written about this era about the information wars, who has the biggest bot farms, who has-

我很想阅读有关这个时代的信息战争的历史,谁拥有最大的机器人农场,谁拥有-

James Holland47:30

Yeah, that’s-

是的,那就是——

Lex Fridman48:00

…

……

48:00 the biggest propaganda machines?

最大的宣传机器?

And when I say bot, I mean both automated AI bots and humans operating large number of smartphones with SIM cards that are just able to boost messages enough to where they become viral, and then real humans with real opinions get excited also.

当我说机器人时,我指的是自动化人工智能机器人和操作大量带有 SIM 卡的智能手机的人类,这些智能手机能够将消息推向病毒式传播的程度,然后拥有真实观点的真实人类也会感到兴奋。

It’s like this vicious cycle.

就像这样的恶性循环。

So if you support your nation, all you need is a little boost.

因此,如果你支持你的国家,你所需要的只是一点动力。

And then everybody gets real excited.

然后每个人都变得非常兴奋。

And then now you’re chanting, and now you’re in this mass hysteria.

然后现在你在高喊口号,现在你陷入了集体歇斯底里。

James Holland48:33

Right.

对。

Lex Fridman48:33

And now it’s the 1984 Two Minutes of Hate.

现在是 1984 年的两分钟仇恨。

48:33 And the message is clear.

信息很明确。

I mean, that’s what propaganda does is it really-

我的意思是,这就是宣传的作用,真的吗——

James Holland48:40

Well-

嗯-

Lex Fridman48:40

…

……

48:40 clarifies the mind.

澄清头脑。

James Holland48:42

And that is exactly what Hitler, and the Nazis, and Goebbels, are doing in the 1930s.

这正是希特勒、纳粹和戈培尔在 20 世纪 30 年代所做的事情。

48:42 Well, they’re doing it in the 1920s as well, but more effectively once they come into power, of course.

嗯,他们在 20 世纪 20 年代也这样做过,但当然,一旦他们掌权,效果会更好。

And Hitler is so fortunate that he comes, he takes over the chancellorship in January, 1933, at a time where the economy is just starting to turn.

希特勒非常幸运,他在 1933 年 1 月接任总理,当时经济刚刚开始好转。

And he’s able to make the most of that.

他能够充分利用这一点。

And if you’re Germans, and you’ve been through hyperinflation in the early 1920s, you’ve been through the humiliation of Versailles Treaty, which was terrible error, in retrospect.

如果你是德国人,并且经历过 20 年代初的恶性通货膨胀,那么你也经历过《凡尔赛条约》的耻辱,现在回想起来,这是一个可怕的错误。

49:16 And you’ve been through, then having got through that, you’ve emerged into a democratic Weimar Republic, which is based on manufacturing.

你已经经历了,经历了这些,你已经进入了一个以制造业为基础的民主魏玛共和国。

Germany’s traditional genius engineering, and manufacturing, and production of high quality items.

德国传统的天才工程、制造和高品质产品的生产。

They’re merging through that.

他们正在通过这个融合。

Then you have the Wall Street crash.

然后就是华尔街崩盘。

And the loans that are coming in from America, which is propping up the entire German economy, suddenly get cut off, and you’ve suddenly got depression again, and massive unemployment.

来自美国的贷款支撑着整个德国经济,突然被切断,你会突然再次陷入萧条和大规模失业。

49:51 And suddenly Hitler comes in and everyone’s got jobs, and they’re rebuilding, and they’re growing their military.

希特勒突然上台,每个人都有工作,他们正在重建,他们正在发展军队。

And the message that’s coming out is, “We’re the greatest.

传达的信息是:“我们是最伟大的。

We’re the best.

我们是最好的。

We’re fantastic.” I was telling you earlier on about Hitler’s speeches, starting with the dark, starting dark and ending in hope, and light, and the sunlit uplands, that’s what you’re getting.

我们太棒了。”我早些时候告诉过你希特勒的演讲,从黑暗开始,从黑暗开始,到希望结束,然后是光明,还有阳光明媚的高地,这就是你所得到的。

You’re suddenly getting this vision of hope.

你突然看到了希望的景象。

This is sort of, “My God.

这有点像“我的上帝。

Actually, this is really working.

事实上,这确实有效。

Okay, so I’m not sure that I particularly buy into the kind of anti-Semitic thing, but we’ll sweep that under the carpet because overall, I’ve now got a job.

好吧,所以我不确定我是否特别相信那种反犹太主义的东西,但我们会把它扫到地毯下,因为总的来说,我现在找到了一份工作。

I’ve got money, I’ve got my new radio.” And then this is a genius about the radios, for example.

我有钱了,我有我的新收音机了。”例如,这是关于收音机的天才。

So they have the German receiver to start off with, the [German 00:50:38] and then they have the [German 00:50:41], which is the German little receiver, little radio.

所以他们从德国接收器开始,[德语 00:50:38],然后他们有[德语 00:50:41],这是德国的小接收器,小收音机。

These are genius.

这些都是天才。

This is as outrageous as the arrival of the iPod.

这就像 iPod 的问世一样令人震惊。

I mean, remember that?

我的意思是,还记得吗?

Suddenly you don’t have to have a Sony Walkman anymore.

突然之间,您不再需要索尼随身听了。

You can have something really, really small and miniature, and listen to thousands, of thousands, of thousands of songs all at once.

你可以拥有非常非常小和微型的东西,并同时聆听数千首歌曲。

What an amazing thing.

多么奇妙的事情啊。

50:58 And the [German 00:51:00] is nine inches by four inches by four inches.

[德语 00:51:00] 是九英寸乘四英寸乘四英寸。

It’s made of Bakelite.

它是由电木制成的。

And everyone can have one because it’s super cheap.

每个人都可以拥有一个,因为它非常便宜。

It’s just incredible.

这太不可思议了。

And no one else has said that, because up until that point, radios, generally speaking, are aspirational.

没有人这么说过,因为到目前为止,一般来说,收音机都是人们所向往的。

They’ve got sort of a walnut lacquer at the front, and you have them if you’re middle class, and you show them off to your neighbors to show how affluent and well-to-do you are, but suddenly everyone can have one.

它们的前面有一种胡桃木漆,如果你是中产阶级,你就会拥有它们,你会向你的邻居炫耀它们,以显示你是多么富裕和富裕,但突然之间每个人都可以拥有一个。

And if everyone can have one, then everyone can receive the same message.

如果每个人都可以拥有一个,那么每个人都可以收到相同的消息。

And you can also.

你也可以。

51:30 And this is the whole point about the Hitler youth as well.

这也是希特勒青年的全部意义所在。

The young guys, that’s where they’re most impressionistic.

年轻人,这就是他们最印象派的地方。

They’re least risk averse.

他们最不厌恶风险。

So they’re most gung ho.

所以他们非常热心。

They’re most full of excitement for the possibilities of life.

他们对生活的可能性充满了兴奋。

And they’re also, their minds are the most opened to suggestion.

而且他们的思想最容易接受建议。

So you get the youth, you hang on, you get them.

所以你得到了青春,你坚持下去,你得到了它们。

And so a whole generation of young men are brought up thinking about the genius of Hitler and how he’s delivering this much better nation, and returning, overhauling the humiliations of the first World War, were overcoming the stab in the back that happened in 1918, et cetera, et cetera.

因此,整整一代年轻人在成长过程中都在思考希特勒的天才,以及他如何建设这个更加美好的国家,并回归,彻底改变第一次世界大战的耻辱,克服 1918 年发生的背后刺伤,等等。

And as a young 16, 17-year-old German, you’re thinking, “Yeah, I want a piece of that.

作为一个 16、17 岁的德国年轻人,你会想,“是的,我想要其中的一部分。

And hey, guess what?

嘿,你猜怎么着?

They’ve got really cool uniforms, and come and join the SS, and get the throw line.

他们有非常酷的制服,来加入党卫军,并获得投掷线。

What’s not to like?” You can see why it’s so clever.

有什么不喜欢的?”你就会明白为什么它如此聪明了。

And what’s so interesting is propaganda today is still using those tenets that Goebbels was using back in the 1930s.

有趣的是,今天的宣传仍在使用戈培尔在 1930 年代使用的那些原则。

52:34 And this is why I say that history doesn’t repeat itself.

这就是为什么我说历史不会重演。

Of course it doesn’t.

当然不是。

It can’t possibly repeat itself because we’re always living in a constantly evolving time.

它不可能重演,因为我们总是生活在一个不断发展的时代。

But patterns of human behaviour do.

但人类行为模式确实如此。

And what you always get after economic crisis is political upheaval, always, always, always.

经济危机之后你总会遇到政治动荡,永远,永远,永远。

Because some people are in a worse off position than they were financially before.

因为有些人的经济状况比以前更糟。

They’re thinking, “Well, the current system doesn’t work.

他们在想:“好吧,当前的系统不起作用。

What’s the alternative?” So in the case of now, we in the West, first of all, we’ve faced the financial crisis of 2008.

还有什么选择呢?所以就现在的情况来说,我们西方首先面临的是2008年的金融危机。

Then we’ve had the double whammy of COVID.

然后我们就遭受了新冠病毒的双重打击。

And that has been incredibly unsettling.

这令人难以置信地令人不安。

And so we’re now in a situation of political turmoil.

因此,我们现在处于政治动荡的境地。

And whether you are pro-Trump or anti-Trump, what he’s offering is something completely different.

无论你是支持特朗普还是反对特朗普,他提供的都是完全不同的东西。

And he’s saying, “The old ways don’t work.

他说:“老方法行不通。

I’m just going to say what I think.

我只是说说我的想法。

I’m going to come out.

我要出来了。

I’m not going to bother with all the sheen of diplomacy and mealy mouth words that politicians always use, where you can’t trust anyone.

我不会去理会政客们总是使用的那些外交手段和粉墨登场的言辞,因为你不能相信任何人。

I’m just going to tell you as it is.”

我只是照原样告诉你而已。”

53:36 And obviously people respond to that.

显然人们对此做出了反应。

You can understand why that has an appeal.

您可以理解为什么它具有吸引力。

And if the country already feels broken, and here’s someone who is going to be a disruptor, and going to change the way you go about things, you can see why a reasonably large proportion of the population is going to go, “I’ll have a piece of that.

如果这个国家已经感觉支离破碎,而有人将成为颠覆者,并改变你做事的方式,你就会明白为什么相当大比例的人口会离开,“我会分一杯羹。

Thank you very much.”

非常感谢。”

Lex Fridman53:55

And especially one of the countries in the economic crisis like Germany was, I think you’ve written that the Treaty of Versailles created Hitler and the Wall Street crash and the Great Depression brought him to power.

尤其是像德国这样陷入经济危机的国家之一,我想你已经写过《凡尔赛条约》创造了希特勒,华尔街崩溃和大萧条让他上台。

James Holland53:55

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman54:11

And of course, the propaganda machine that you describe is the thing that got everybody else in Germany on board.

当然,你所描述的宣传机器正是让德国其他所有人都参与进来的东西。

James Holland54:18

Yep.

是的。

54:18 It’s amazing, because he comes in with 33% of the vote.

太神奇了,因为他获得了 33% 的选票。

He had 37% of the vote in July, 1932.

1932 年 7 月,他获得了 37% 的选票。

So again, this is another period of turmoil, just like it is in France, where you’re having constant different kind of coalitions and different chancellors, leaders of Germany.

再说一次,这是另一个动荡时期,就像在法国一样,那里不断有不同类型的联盟和不同的总理、德国领导人。

Lex Fridman54:37

So it’s very possible he wouldn’t have come to power.

所以他很有可能不会上台。

James Holland54:40

Well, he said, “We will only take our seats if I can be chancellor, otherwise forget it.

好吧,他说,“只有当我能担任总理时,我们才会就座,否则就算了。

54:40 I’m not coming into any coalition.” So then the government falls again in January 1933.

我不会加入任何联盟。”于是政府于 1933 年 1 月再次垮台。

They have the election.

他们有选举。

The Nazi vote is down from where it was the previous summer, but this time they go, “Okay, Hitler can be chancellor, but we’ll manipulate him.” How wrong they were.

纳粹的投票率比去年夏天有所下降,但这一次他们说:“好吧,希特勒可以当总理,但我们会操纵他。”他们错了。

He’s manipulating everyone.

他在操纵每个人。

And then Hindenburg, who is the president, dies the following summer and he’s able to get rid of the presidency.

然后总统兴登堡在第二年夏天去世,他就可以摆脱总统职位。

There is no more president of Germany.

德国不再有总统了。

There is just the führer, him and he gets rid of, he has, actually, Enabling act, which is where all other political parties are disbanded, and suddenly you’ve got a totalitarian state, just like that.

只有元首,他,他摆脱了,实际上,他有授权法案,这是解散所有其他政党的地方,突然间你就得到了一个极权主义国家,就像那样。

Lex Fridman55:31

I think there’s a lesson there.

我认为这是一个教训。

55:31 There’s many lessons there, but one of them is don’t let an extremist into government and assume you can control them.

其中有很多教训,但其中之一是不要让极端分子进入政府并假设你可以控制他们。

James Holland55:42

Yes, the arrogance of the existing politicians, you just completely screwed it up.

是的,现有政客的傲慢,你完全搞砸了。

Lex Fridman55:46

I mean, there is a real power to an extremist.

我的意思是,极端分子拥有真正的力量。

55:46 There’s a person who sees the world in black and white can really gain the attention and the support of the populace.

一个人看世界非黑即白,才能真正得到民众的关注和支持。

James Holland56:03

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman56:04

Especially when there’s a resentment about like Treaty of Versailles, when there’s economic hardship, and if there’s effective, modern technology that allows you to do propaganda and sell the message.

特别是当人们对《凡尔赛条约》等存在不满情绪时,当经济困难时,如果有有效的现代技术可以让你进行宣传和推销信息。

56:04 There’s something really compelling about the black and white message.

黑白信息确实令人信服。

James Holland56:20

It is because it’s simple.

这是因为它很简单。

56:20 And what Hitler does throughout the 1920s, is he sticks to this.

希特勒在整个 20 年代所做的就是坚持这一点。

There is actually, when he comes out of prison, so it is the Beer Hall Putsch in November, 1923, he gets charged with treason, which he has been, because he’s attempting a coup, and he gets sentenced to five years, which is pretty lenient for what he’s done.

事实上,当他出狱时,也就是 1923 年 11 月的啤酒馆政变,他被指控犯有叛国罪,他一直被指控犯有叛国罪,因为他试图发动政变,他被判处五年徒刑,这对他的所作所为来说是相当宽大的。

And he then gets let out after nine months.

九个月后他被释放。

Nazi party is banned at that point, but then comes back into being.

纳粹党当时被禁止,但随后又重新出现。

And the year that follows there is then a substantial debate about where the party should go.

接下来的一年,人们就该党应该走向何方展开了激烈的辩论。

And there are actually a large number of people who think that actually they should be looking at how the Soviets are doing things and taking some of the things that they consider to be positive out of the communist state, and applying those to the Nazis.

实际上有很多人认为他们实际上应该看看苏联是如何做事的,并从共产主义国家中吸取一些他们认为积极的东西,并将其应用于纳粹。

57:16 And Hitler goes, “No, no, no, no, no, no.

希特勒说:“不,不,不,不,不,不。

We’ve just got to stick to this kind of Jewish Bolshevik thing.

我们必须坚持这种犹太布尔什维克的东西。

This is how we’re going to do it.

这就是我们要做的。

This is how we’re going to do it.” Goebbels, for example, who is very open, Joseph Goebbels, he’s a not very successful journalist, but he does have a PhD in German literature.

这就是我们要做的。”例如戈培尔,他非常开放,约瑟夫·戈培尔,他是一个不太成功的记者,但他确实拥有德国文学博士学位。

He’s very disaffected because he was born with talipes, which is more commonly known as a club foot.

他非常不满,因为他生来就患有足内翻足,也就是俗称的马蹄内翻足。

He’s disabled.

他是残疾人。

He can’t fight in the first World War.

他无法参加第一次世界大战。

He’s very frustrated by that.

他对此感到非常沮丧。

He’s in a deep despair about the state of Germany in the first part of the early 1920s.

他对 20 年代初期德国的状况深感绝望。

He’s looking for a political messiah, a sort of quasi-religious messiah, thinks it’s Hitler, then discovers that Hitler is not open to any ideas at all about any deviation, but then sees the light.

他正在寻找一位政治救世主,一种准宗教救世主,他认为那就是希特勒,然后发现希特勒根本不接受任何关于任何偏差的想法,但随后看到了曙光。

Hitler recognizes that this guy is someone that he wants on his side, and so then goes to him, makes a real special effort.

希特勒认识到这个人是他想要站在他一边的人,所以他去找他,做出了真正的特别努力。

58:17 “Come on, come to dinner.

“走吧,来吃晚饭吧。

I think you’re great,” All this kind of stuff.

我认为你很棒,”诸如此类的事情。

Wins it about over.

胜利就结束了。

And Goebbels has this complete vault fast, discards his earlier kind of, “Hitler’s right, I was wrong.

戈培尔很快就完成了跳马,抛弃了他之前的那种“希特勒是对的,我错了。

Hitler is the kind of messiah figure that I want to follow.

希特勒是我想追随的那种弥赛亚人物。

I want to follow the hero leader.” And they come aboard and they absolutely work.

我要追随英雄领袖。”他们一上来就绝对有效。

And Hitler completely wins out of all dissenters within what had been the German Workers party, drop, becomes the German National Socialist Party, becomes the Nazis.

希特勒完全战胜了德国工人党内的所有异议者,放弃了,成为了德国国家社会党,成为了纳粹。

He comes out, emerges as the absolute, undisputed führer of that, leader of that party.

他出来了,成为了该党绝对的、无可争议的元首、领袖。

And what he says goes, and everyone toes him behind it.

他说什么就说什么,每个人都听从他的意见。

And part of the genius of that, Hitler does have some genius.

希特勒确实有一些天才,这也是其天才的一部分。

I just don’t think it’s military, but he does have some genius.

我只是不认为这是军事方面的,但他确实有一些天才。

And a question about is the simplicity of message.

一个问题是消息的简单性。

59:06 What he’s doing, it’s that us and them thing that we were talking about earlier on.

他正在做的事情,就是我们之前讨论过的我们和他们的事情。

It’s the kind of either/or.

这是一种非此即彼的情况。

It’s kind of, “It’s my way or the highway.” It’s kind of, “This is the only way.

有点像“要么走我的路,要么走高速公路”。有点像,“这是唯一的方法。

This is how we get to the sunlit uplands.

这就是我们到达阳光普照的高地的方式。

This is how create this amazing master race of this unification of German peoples, which dominates the world, which is the preeminent power in the world for the next thousand years, or its decay, and despair and being crushed by our enemies.

这就是如何创造出这个令人惊叹的德国人民统一的优等种族,它主宰着世界,它是未来一千年世界上的卓越力量,或者它的衰落、绝望和被我们的敌人压垮。

And our enemies are the Jews and the Bolsheviks, the communists.” And what he taps into as well is [German 00:59:44] and [German 00:59:48].

我们的敌人是犹太人、布尔什维克、共产主义者。”他还利用了 [German 00:59:44] 和 [German 00:59:48]。

There’s no direct English translation of [German 00:59:51] or indeed [German 00:59:52], but in its most basic form, it’s communities, it’s people, community or front veteran’s community.

[德语 00:59:51] 或 [德语 00:59:52] 没有直接的英文翻译,但就其最基本的形式而言,它是社区、人民、社区或前线退伍军人社区。

1:00:01 So the [German 01:00:02] is, “We are the guys.

所以 [German 01:00:02] 是,“我们就是这些人。

We are bonded because we were in the trenches.

我们之所以紧密相连,是因为我们曾在战壕中。

We were in the first World War.

我们正经历第一次世界大战。

We were the people who bravely stuck it out, saw our friends being slaughtered and blown to pieces.

我们是那些勇敢地坚持下去的人,看到我们的朋友被屠杀并被炸成碎片。

We did our duty as proud Germans, but we were let down by the elites and we were let down by this Jewish Bolshevik plot.

作为骄傲的德国人,我们履行了自己的职责,但精英们让我们失望了,布尔什维克犹太布尔什维克的阴谋让我们失望了。

We were stabbed in the back.”

我们被人背后捅了一刀。”

1:00:26 The myth of the stabbing in the back is very, very strong.

背后捅刀子的神话非常非常强烈。

So, “We’re bound, we’re bonded by our experiences of the first World War and the fact that we did what we should and what we could.

因此,“第一次世界大战的经历以及我们做了我们应该做的和我们能做的这一事实将我们联系在一起。

And we didn’t fail in what we were doing.

我们所做的事情并没有失败。

We were failed by our leaders, by the elites.” So that’s [German 01:00:47].

我们的领导人、精英们让我们失败了。”这就是 [德语 01:00:47]。

[German 01:00:49] is this sense of national unity.

[德语01:00:49]就是这种民族团结感。

It’s a cultural, ethnic bonding of people who speak German, who have a similar outlook on life.

这是讲德语的人们之间的文化和种族联系,他们有着相似的生活观。

And again, that just reinforces the us and them.

再说一次,这只会强化我们和他们。

Lex Fridman1:01:05

Good and evil.

善与恶。

James Holland1:01:05

It reinforces the black and white worldview.

它强化了黑白世界观。

1:01:05 And then you add that to this very simple message, which Hitler is repeating over and over again, “Communists are a big threat.

然后你将这一点添加到希特勒一遍又一遍地重复的这个非常简单的信息中:“共产党是一个巨大的威胁。

Jews are a big threat.

犹太人是一个巨大的威胁。

They’re the enemy.” You have to have an opposition in the them and us kind of process.

他们是敌人。”在他们和我们的过程中,你必须有反对的声音。

And that’s what he’s doing.

这就是他正在做的事情。

And people just buy into it.

人们只是相信它。

They go, “Yeah, we’re together.

他们说:“是的,我们在一起。

We’re Germans.

我们是德国人。

We’re a brotherhood.

我们是兄弟情谊。

We’ve got our [German 01:01:38].” So he cleverly ties into that and taps into that.

我们已经得到了我们的[德语 01:01:38]。”因此,他巧妙地融入并利用了这一点。

But they’re an irrelevance by the late 1920s.

但到了 20 年代末,它们就变得无关紧要了。

By 1928, he’s not going to get a deal for Mein Kampf Part II, he’s impoverished.

到了 1928 年,他已经无法与《我的奋斗2》达成协议了,他已经一贫如洗了。

The party’s impoverished.

党穷了。

Their numbers are down.

他们的人数下降了。

They’re at best an irrelevance.

它们充其量只是无关紧要的。

Lex Fridman1:01:59

Which is say he wrote Mein Kampf at this time, when he was in prison.

也就是说,他就是在这个时候,在监狱里写下《我的奋斗》的。

James Holland1:02:02

Well, he writes most of Mein Kampf in Landsberg prison.

嗯,《我的奋斗》的大部分内容都是他在兰茨贝格监狱写成的。

1:02:02 And then he writes the rest of it in what becomes known as the [German 01:02:10], which is this little wooden hut in the Obersalzberg.

然后他把剩下的部分写在后来被称为“德语 01:02:10”的地方,也就是上萨尔茨堡的这座小木屋。

And you can still see the remnants of that.

你仍然可以看到它的残余。

And unfortunately, there’s still little candles there and stuff in the woods by neo-Nazis and whatnot, what have you.

不幸的是,那里仍然有小蜡烛和新纳粹分子在树林里的东西等等,你有什么。

But that’s where he wrote the rest of it.

但这就是他写下其余部分的地方。

I mean, it Jean-Jacques Rousseau who says, “Man has his greatest thought when surrounded by nature.” That was something that Hitler took very much to heart.

我的意思是,让-雅克·卢梭(Jean-Jacques Rousseau)说过:“当人被自然包围时,他会产生最伟大的思想。”这是希特勒非常重视的事情。

There was a mentor of his called Dietrich Eckart.

他有一位导师,名叫迪特里希·埃卡特(Dietrich Eckart)。

Dietrich Eckart introduced him to the Obersalzberg and the beauty of the southeast Bavarian Alps around Berchtesgaden.

迪特里希·埃卡特向他介绍了上萨尔茨堡和贝希特斯加登周围巴伐利亚东南部阿尔卑斯山的美景。

And that was his favorite place on the planet, and that’s where he eventually bought the Berghof with the royalties, it has to be said, from Mein Kampf, which went from being almost pulp to suddenly being a runaway bestseller, unfortunately.

那是他在这个星球上最喜欢的地方,在那里,他最终用《我的奋斗》的版税购买了《伯格霍夫》,不幸的是,《我的奋斗》从几乎是通俗读物突然变成了一本失控的畅销书。

Lex Fridman1:03:02

Can you actually comment on that?

你真的能对此发表评论吗?

1:03:02 It’s a shitty manifesto as far as manifestos go.

就宣言而言,这是一份糟糕的宣言。

I think there’s a lot of values to understand from a first person perspective, the words of a dictator, of a person like Hitler.

我认为从第一人称视角,像希特勒这样的独裁者的话,有很多价值观需要理解。

But it just feels like that’s just such a shitty-

但就是感觉这实在是太糟糕了——

James Holland1:03:18

Yeah, I mean it’s banned in a number of countries.

是的,我的意思是它在许多国家被禁止。

1:03:18 You don’t need to, because no one’s going to read it, because it’s unreadable.

你不需要,因为没有人会读它,因为它不可读。

I mean, it’s very untidy.

我的意思是,它非常不整洁。

It’s very incoherent.

这是非常不连贯的。

There’s no narrative arc, to use a writer’s phrase.

用作家的话来说,没有叙事弧线。

I mean, but it does give you a very clear, the overall impression you get at the end of it is the communists and the Jews are to blame for everything.

我的意思是,但它确实给了你一个非常清晰的整体印象,你在最后得到的总体印象是共产主义者和犹太人应对一切负责。

Lex Fridman1:03:43

Yeah, but there’s also the component of predicting basically World War II there.

是的,但也有基本上预测第二次世界大战的部分。

1:03:43 So it’s not just they’re to blame for everything.

所以这一切不只是他们的错。

James Holland1:03:51

Oh, no.

哦,不。

1:03:51 He’s hungry for war.

他渴望战争。

Lex Fridman1:03:52

Right.

正确的。

James Holland1:03:52

He thinks that this is the natural state, that, “We have to have this terrible conflict.

他认为这是自然状态,“我们必须经历这场可怕的冲突。

1:03:52 And once the conflict’s over Germany will emerge victorious, and then there will be the Thousand-Year Reich.” I mean, I’m finding myself in talking to you, I keep saying this, “It’s Armageddon or the Thousand-Year Reich.

一旦冲突结束,德国就会取得胜利,然后就会出现千年帝国。”我的意思是,我发现自己在和你说话时,我一直在说,“这是世界末日或千年帝国。

It’s because it’s unavoidable, because that’s how he’s speaking the whole time.

因为这是不可避免的,因为他一直都是这么说话的。

It’s just this same message over, and over, and over, and over again.

这只是同样的信息,一遍又一遍,一遍又一遍。

Lex Fridman1:04:17

It’s a pretty unique way of speaking, allowing violence as a tool in this picture, that there’s a hierarchy, that there is a superior race and inferior races, and it’s okay to destroy the inferior ones.

这是一种非常独特的表达方式,在这张照片中允许暴力作为一种工具,存在等级制度,存在优越种族和劣等种族,消灭劣等种族是可以的。

James Holland1:04:32

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:04:32

Usually politicians don’t speak that way.

通常政客不会这样说话。

1:04:32 They just say, “Well, here’s good and evil.

他们只是说:“好吧,这就是善与恶。

We’re the good guys.

我们是好人。

And yeah, maybe we’ll destroy the evil a little bit.” Now here is like there’s a complete certainty about a very large number of people, “The Slavic people, they just need to be removed.”

是的,也许我们会稍微消灭邪恶。”现在,对于很多人来说,这是完全确定的,“斯拉夫人,他们只需要被移除。”

James Holland1:04:52

“Well, they need to be made in irrelevance.

“好吧,它们需要在无关紧要的情况下制作。

1:04:52 We have to take it.

我们必须接受它。

We have to take it.

我们必须接受它。

And in fact, if that kills millions of them, fine.

事实上,如果这会杀死数百万人,那也没关系。

Then they can sort of squish that way over to Siberia or- “

然后他们就可以挤到西伯利亚或者——”

Lex Fridman1:04:59

Right.

对。

1:04:59 It doesn’t matter where they go.

他们去哪里并不重要。

James Holland1:05:00

” …

”……

1:05:00 Kamchatka, wherever they go.

堪察加半岛,无论他们走到哪里。

I don’t care.

我不在乎。

But they- “

但他们——”

Lex Fridman1:05:01

“We just need to populate this land that belongs to the German people.”

“我们只需要在这片属于德国人民的土地上繁衍生息。”

James Holland1:05:06

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:05:06

“Because they’re the superior people.”

“因为他们是优秀的人。”

James Holland1:05:07

There’s no question that he glorified violence and war.

毫无疑问,他颂扬暴力和战争。

1:05:07 He’s absolutely chomping at the bit.

他绝对是在咬紧牙关。

And in a way, I think he’s a bit disappointed that in the 1930s, the conquests that he does undertake are also peaceful.

在某种程度上,我认为他有点失望,因为他在 1930 年代所做的征服也是和平的。

March 1938 goes straight into Austria.

1938 年 3 月直接进入奥地利。

There’s the Anschluss, not a shot is fired.

德奥合并,没有开一枪。

1936, goes into the Rhineland, reconquers that, retakes that over from the occupying allies, not a shot is fired.

1936年,进入莱茵兰,重新征服该地区,从占领的盟友手中夺回该地区,没有开一枪。

He takes the Sudetenland, barely a shot is fired, and then goes into the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939.

1939 年 3 月,他几乎不费一枪一弹就占领了苏台德地区,然后进入了捷克斯洛伐克的其他地区。

And again, barely a shot is fired.

再次,几乎没有开一枪。

And it’s a bit disappointing.

这有点令人失望。

He wants to be tested.

他想要接受考验。

He wants to have the wartime triumph.

他想要取得战争胜利。

You can see him being frustrated about this in the Munich crisis in 1938.

你可以在 1938 年慕尼黑危机中看到他对此感到沮丧。

He wants to fight.

他想战斗。

He’s absolutely spoiling for it.

他绝对喜欢它。

He’s desperate to go in.

他迫不及待地想进去。

He’s all ready and gung ho.

他已经准备好了并且干劲十足。

He’s built his Luftwaffe.

他建造了德国空军。

He is got his Panzers now.

他现在有了他的装甲车。

He’s got his massive armed forces.

他拥有庞大的武装部队。

He wants to test them.

他想测试一下他们。

He wants to get the show on the road and prove it.

他想让这部剧上路并证明这一点。

He is an arch gambler, Hitler.

他是一个大赌徒,希特勒。

Lex Fridman1:06:17

You make it seem so clear, but all the while to the rest of the world, to Chamberlain, to France, to Britain, to the rest of the world, he’s saying he doesn’t want that.

你说得很清楚,但对世界其他地方,对张伯伦,对法国,对英国,对世界其他地方,他一直在说他不希望这样。

1:06:17 He’s making agreements.

他正在达成协议。

Everything you just mentioned, you just went through it so quickly.

你刚才提到的一切,你都这么快就经历了。

But those are agreements that were made that he’s not going to do that.

但这些都是他不会这样做的协议。

And he does it over and over.

他一遍又一遍地这样做。

He violates the Treaty of Versailles.

他违反了凡尔赛条约。

He violates every single treaty.

他违反了每一项条约。

But he still is doing the meetings.

但他仍然在开会。

So maybe can you go through it, the lead up to the war, 1939, September 1st, what are the different agreements?

那么也许你可以回顾一下,战争爆发之前,1939 年,9 月 1 日,有哪些不同的协议?

What is the signaling he’s doing?

他正在发出什么信号?

And what is he doing secretly in terms of building up the military force?

而他又在秘密扩充军事力量方面做了什么?

James Holland1:07:05

Yes.

是的。

1:07:05 So part of the Treaty of Versailles, is you’re allowed very, very limited armed forces.

因此,《凡尔赛条约》的一部分是允许拥有非常非常有限的武装部队。

There’s restrictions on naval expansion.

海军扩张受到限制。

There’s restrictions on the size of the army.

军队规模有限制。

There’s restrictions on the weapons you can use.

您可以使用的武器有限制。

You’re not allowed an air force.

你不被允许拥有空军。

But he starts doing this all clandestinely.

但他开始秘密地做这一切。

There are people in, Krupp has got, for example, which is in the Ruhr, a big armaments manufacturer.

例如,克虏伯公司在鲁尔区有一家大型军火制造商。

They are producing tanks elsewhere, and parts elsewhere in, say the Netherlands, for example, and then shipping them back into Germany.

他们在其他地方(例如荷兰)生产坦克和零件,然后运回德国。

They’re doing Panzer training exercises actually in the Soviet Union at this time.

他们此时实际上正在苏联进行装甲训练演习。

There’s all sorts of things going on.

有各种各样的事情正在发生。

The Luftwaffe has been announced to the world in 1935, but it’s obviously been in the process of developing long before that.

德国空军早在 1935 年就已向全世界宣布,但显然早在这之前它就已经在发展之中了。

The Messerschmitt 109, a single engine fighter plane, for example, is created in 1934.

例如,梅塞施密特 109 是一款单引擎战斗机,诞生于 1934 年。

So they’re doing all these things against it.

所以他们正在做所有这些反对它的事情。

1:08:08 And the truth is, he’s just constantly pushing, “What can I get away with, here?” And of course, Britain, France, the rest of the world, the rest of the allies, they’re all reeling from the Wall Street crash and the depression as well.

事实上,他只是不断地追问:“在这里我能逃脱什么惩罚?”当然,英国、法国、世界其他国家、其他盟国也都受到华尔街崩盘和大萧条的影响。

So have they got the stomach for this?

那么他们有这个胃口吗?

Not really.

不是真的。

And, “Perhaps actually on reflection, the terms of Versailles Treaty are bit harsh anyway, so maybe we don’t need to worry about it.” There’s just no political will.

而且,“也许实际上仔细想想,凡尔赛条约的条款无论如何都有点苛刻,所以也许我们不需要担心。”只是没有政治意愿。

There’s no political will to fight against what Germany’s doing.

没有政治意愿反对德国的所作所为。

Then he gets away of it.

然后他就摆脱了它。

So he suddenly starts realizing that actually he can push this quite a long way, because no one’s going to stand up to him, which is why he makes a decision in 1936 to go back into the Rhineland, which has been occupied by French allied troops at that point.

所以他突然开始意识到,实际上他可以把这件事推得很远,因为没有人能对抗他,这就是为什么他在1936年决定返回莱茵兰,当时莱茵兰已经被法国盟军占领。

He just walks in, just goes, “Do your worst.” And no one’s going to do anything because there isn’t a stomach to do anything.

他只是走进来,说:“尽力而为。”没有人会做任何事,因为没有胃口做任何事。

Lex Fridman1:09:03

That was a big step in 1936, remilitarizing the Rhineland.

这是 1936 年迈出的一大步,使莱茵兰重新军事化。

1:09:03 I mean, that That’s a huge, huge step of like, “Oh, I don’t have to follow anybody’s rules and they’re going to do nothing.”

我的意思是,这是一个非常非常大的一步,“哦,我不必遵守任何人的规则,他们什么也不会做。”

James Holland1:09:15

And he’s looking at his military and he’s also looking at response.

他正在关注他的军队,也在关注回应。

1:09:15 So one of the things they do is really, it’s very clever.

所以他们做的一件事真的非常聪明。

So they go over the head of the army of the air, Armee de L’Air, which is the French air force, and they invite him over.

因此,他们越过法国空军Aree de L’Air 的负责人,并邀请他过来。

And Erhard Milch, who is the second command of the Luftwaffe invites him over.

德国空军二号司令埃哈德·米尔奇邀请他过来。

“So, come and see what we’re up to.

“那么,过来看看我们在做什么吧。

You are our European neighbors, we’re all friends together,” this kind of stuff.

你们是我们的欧洲邻居,我们都是朋友”之类的话。

“Come and see what we’ve got.” And he takes him to this airfield.

“过来看看我们有什么。”他带他去了这个机场。

There’s a row of Messerschmitt 109s all lined up, sort of 50 of them.

一排梅塞施密特 109 排成一排,大约有 50 架。

And the head of the Armee of the Air looks at it and goes, “Krikey, that’s impressive.” And Milch goes, “Well, let me go and take you to another airfield.” And they go out of the back route out of the airfield, and that’s long, circuitous test route in the Mercedes.

空中军团的首领看着它,说道:“Krikey,这太令人印象深刻了。”米尔奇说:“好吧,让我带你去另一个机场。”他们从机场后面的路线走出来,那是一条漫长而迂回的梅赛德斯测试路线。

Meanwhile, all of-

与此同时,所有的——

1:10:00 …

……

the airfield and is a long circuitous route in the Mercedes.

机场和梅赛德斯的路线是一条漫长的迂回路线。

1:10:03 Meanwhile, all the Messerschmitts take off from that airfield, going to land on the next airfield.

与此同时,所有梅塞施密特飞机都从该机场起飞,降落在下一个机场。

Here’s another one, and they’re all the same aircraft.

这是另一架,它们都是同一架飞机。

And the commander-in-chief of the army of Vienna goes back to France and goes, “We’re never going to be able to beat Germany.”

维也纳军队的总司令回到法国并说道:“我们永远无法击败德国。”

1:10:15 Earlier, you were alluding to this earlier on, how much is this, just this chutzpah of this ability to kind of portray the mechanized Moloch?

早些时候,你早些时候提到过这一点,这有多少,只是这种描绘机械化莫洛赫的能力的肆无忌惮?

Yeah, it absolutely cowls the enemy, so the increasing the effectiveness of their armed forces purely by propaganda and by mind games and by talking the talk.

是的,它绝对掩盖了敌人,因此纯粹通过宣传、心理游戏和空谈来提高武装部队的效率。

1:10:46 We might all think these military parades that the Nazis have looked rather silly by today’s standards, but you look what that looks like if you are the rest of the world.

我们可能都认为纳粹的这些阅兵以今天的标准来看相当愚蠢,但如果你是世界其他人,你就会看到那是什么样子。

You’re in Britain, and you’re still reeling from the Depression, and you see the triumph of the will.

你身在英国,仍深受大萧条的影响,但你看到了意志的胜利。

You see some of that footage, and you see these automatons in their steel helmets, and you see the swastikas, and you see hundreds of thousands of people all lined up and seig heiling and all the rest of it, you are going to think again before you go into war with people like that.

你看到一些镜头,你看到这些戴着钢盔的机器人,你看到纳粹标志,你看到成千上万的人排成一排,欢呼雀跃,以及所有其他的东西,在你与这样的人开战之前,你会再三考虑。

Lex Fridman1:11:13

It’s also hard to put yourself in the mind of those leaders now that we have nuclear weapons.

既然我们拥有核武器,你也很难将自己置于那些领导人的脑海中。

1:11:13 So nuclear weapons have created this kind of cloak of a kind of safety from mutually shared destruction that you think surely you will not do a million or 2 million soldier army invading another land, right?

因此,核武器创造了一种免于共同破坏的安全斗篷,你肯定不会认为你不会让一百万或两百万士兵的军队入侵另一片土地,对吗?

Just full-on gigantic hot war.

简直就是一场全面的大规模热战。

1:11:48 But at that time, that’s the real possibility.

但到了那个时候,这才是真正的可能性。

You remember World War I, you remember all of that.

你记得第一次世界大战,你记得所有这一切。

So okay, there’s a mad guy with a mustache.

好吧,有一个留着小胡子的疯子。

He’s making statements that this land belongs to Germany anyway, because it’s mostly German-populated, and like you said, Treaty of Versailles wasn’t really fair, and you can start justifying all kinds of things for yourself.

他声明这片土地无论如何都属于德国,因为这里主要是德国人,而且就像你说的,《凡尔赛条约》并不公平,你可以开始为自己辩解各种事情。

James Holland1:12:16

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

是啊,是啊,是啊。

1:12:16 And maybe they got a point about the Danzig Corridor.

也许他们对但泽走廊有一定的了解。

They are mainly Germans, German-speaking people there, and it’s disconnected from East Prussia, they’re saying, I sort of get it.

他们主要是德国人,那里讲德语的人,而且它与东普鲁士脱节,他们说,我有点明白了。

Maybe they’ve got a point.

也许他们说得有道理。

And is Poland really a kind of thriving democracy, anyway?

无论如何,波兰真的是一个繁荣的民主国家吗?

Not really.

不是真的。

By 1930, late 1930s, it’s not.

到了 1930 年,即 20 世纪 30 年代末,情况已不再如此。

It’s, to all intents and purposes, a dictatorship in Poland at that time.

从所有意图和目的来看,当时的波兰都是独裁政权。

1:12:36 I mean, it’s not right that you just go and take someone else’s country.

我的意思是,你去夺取别人的国家是不对的。

Of course, you can’t do that.

当然,你不能那样做。

But you can see why in Germany people are thinking they’ve got a point.

但你可以明白为什么德国人认为他们说得有道理。

You can also see why in France and Britain, they’re thinking, “Do we really care about the Poles?

你也可以理解为什么在法国和英国,他们在想:“我们真的关心波兰人吗?

I mean, is it worth going war over?” But there’s bigger things at play by this point.

我的意思是,值得为战争而战吗?”但此时还有更重要的事情在起作用。

That’s the point.

这就是重点。

Lex Fridman1:13:02

Yeah, but before we get to Poland, there is this meeting, September 1938.

是的,但在我们到达波兰之前,有一次 1938 年 9 月的会议。

1:13:02 So Chamberlain made three trips to meet with Hitler, which culminated in the Munich Conference.

于是张伯伦三度会见希特勒,并在慕尼黑会议上达到了顶峰。

James Holland1:13:17

Yeah, on the 30th of September.

是的,9月30日。

1:13:17 Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:13:19

Where was Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier, prime minister of France.

张伯伦、希特勒、墨索里尼和法国总理达拉第在哪里。

1:13:19 They met to discuss essentially Czechoslovakia without any of the government officials of Czechoslovakia participating.

他们开会主要讨论的是捷克斯洛伐克问题,没有任何捷克斯洛伐克政府官员参加。

And Hitler promised to make no more territorial conquests, and Chamberlain believed him.

希特勒承诺不再进行领土征服,张伯伦相信了他。

James Holland1:13:38

He chose to believe him, I think, is the thing, is the point.

我想,他选择相信他,这才是重点,才是重点。

1:13:38 It’s very interesting.

这很有趣。

So Chamberlain gets a very bad press.

所以张伯伦受到了非常负面的报道。

Lex Fridman1:13:46

Uh-oh.

呃哦。

James Holland1:13:47

Well, no.

嗯,不。

1:13:47 No, it’s not really uh-oh.

不,这并不是真的呃哦。

I just think there’s too much retrospective view on this.

我只是认为对此有太多回顾性的看法。

And that’s fine because the whole point of history is you can look back and you can judge decisions that were made at a certain point through the prism of what subsequently happened, which, of course, the people that are making the decisions at the time can’t because they’re in that particular moment.

这很好,因为历史的重点是你可以回顾过去,你可以通过随后发生的事情的棱镜来判断在某个时刻做出的决定,当然,当时做出决定的人不能这样做,因为他们正处于那个特定的时刻。

1:14:11 So I don’t think Chamberlain did trust Hitler, but he wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt.

所以我认为张伯伦并不信任希特勒,但他想给希特勒以无罪推论。

Britain was not obliged to Czechoslovakia at all.

英国对捷克斯洛伐克根本没有义务。

France was.

法国是。

France had signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1924, but Britain had not.

1924 年,法国与捷克斯洛伐克签署了条约,但英国却没有。

So there was no obligation at all for Britain to do this.

所以英国根本没有义务这样做。

The only reason why Britain would go to war over Czechoslovakia is because of the threat of Nazism and what the ramifications of not going to war with him.

英国之所以要为捷克斯洛伐克开战的唯一原因是纳粹主义的威胁以及不与他开战的后果。

1:14:40 But the problem is, is that Chamberlain is interesting because in 1935, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer when they started to sort of think, “Okay, we really do need to rearm.” He was very much in favor of substantially expanding and rehabilitating the navy, so updating existing battleships and so on, and also developing the air force.

但问题是,张伯伦很有趣,因为 1935 年,当他担任财政大臣时,他们开始思考,“好吧,我们确实需要重新武装。”他非常赞成大幅扩大和恢复海军,更新现有的战列舰等,并发展空军。

1:15:05 There’s not really much argument for having a large army because if you have a large army, you’ve got to maintain it.

拥有一支庞大的军队并没有太多争议,因为如果你拥有一支庞大的军队,你就必须维持它。

Britain is a small place.

英国是一个小地方。

Where do you put them?

你把它们放在哪里?

You’ve also got to transport them.

你还必须运输它们。

That’s complicated.

这很复杂。

You’ve got to train them, you’ve got to put them in barracks, you’ve got to feed them, all this kind of stuff.

你必须训练他们,你必须把他们关进营房,你必须喂养他们,所有这些东西。

There’s a kind of impracticality about having a large army.

拥有一支庞大的军队有些不切实际。

1:15:20 Whereas navy is great because you can keep them at sea, and they can be on the water.

而海军则很棒,因为你可以将它们留在海上,也可以在水面上。

1:15:25 Air force is slightly different.

空军略有不同。

Air power is viewed in very much the same way that naval power is viewed, that this is, we’re an island nation, we have a global assets and air power gives us the flexibility that an army doesn’t.

人们对空中力量的看法与对海军力量的看法非常相似,即我们是一个岛国,我们拥有全球资产,而空中力量为我们提供了陆军所没有的灵活性。

1:15:39 So he is all for backing the expansion of the army, of the air force and the navy in 1930s.

所以他完全支持20世纪30年代陆军、空军和海军的扩张。

Then he subsequently becomes prime minister and sticks to his guns on that.

随后他成为总理并坚持自己的立场。

1:15:47 It is he that enables the air force and the air ministry to develop the first fully-coordinated air defense system anywhere in the world.

正是他使空军和空军部能够开发出世界上第一个完全协调的防空系统。

There is not an air defense system in Poland, nor Norway, nor Denmark, nor the Netherlands, nor Belgium, nor France.

波兰、挪威、丹麦、荷兰、比利时、法国都没有防空系统。

There is in Britain, Britain is the only one, and frankly, it pays off big time in the summer of 1940.

英国有,英国是唯一的,坦率地说,它在 1940 年夏天得到了巨大的回报。

So you have to give him credit for that.

所以你必须相信他。

1:16:11 Britain interestingly is also the world’s leading armaments exporter in the 1930s, which is amazing really when you think everyone complains about the fact that we weren’t rearming enough.

有趣的是,英国在 20 世纪 30 年代也是世界领先的军备出口国,当你认为每个人都抱怨我们重新武装不够的事实时,这确实令人惊讶。

Actually, we were when we had all the infrastructure there and we were expanding that infrastructure dramatically.

事实上,当我们在那里拥有所有基础设施时,我们正在大幅扩展该基础设施。

I say we.

我说我们。

I’m only saying that because I’m British.

我这么说只是因为我是英国人。

So they were doing that.

所以他们就这么做了。

1:16:33 In 1938, Britain wasn’t ready for war.

1938 年,英国还没有做好战争准备。

Now you can argue that Germany wasn’t ready for war, either.

现在你可以说德国也没有做好战争准备。

But Chamberlain was prime minister in a democracy, a parliamentary democracy, where 92% of the population were against going to war in 1938.

但 1938 年,张伯伦是民主国家、议会民主国家的首相,那里 92% 的人口反对战争。

There was not a single democratic leader in the world that would go against the wishes of 92% of the population.

世界上没有任何一个民主领导人会违背92%人民的意愿。

1:16:59 Now you could say, ” Well, he should have just argued it better and presented his case better and all the rest of it.” But at that point, there was no legal obligation to go to the defense of Czechoslovakia.

现在你可以说,“好吧,他应该更好地论证并更好地陈述他的观点以及其他所有内容。”但那时,并没有法律义务去保卫捷克斯洛伐克。

Czechoslovakia was another of these new nations that been created out of 1919 and the Versailles Treaty.

捷克斯洛伐克是根据 1919 年《凡尔赛条约》创建的另一个新国家。

Who was to say we, in Britain, are able to judge the rights and wrongs of that?

谁敢说我们英国人能够判断其对错?

How fantastic it would be to go to war with a nation a long way away for people whom we know very little, et cetera, et cetera?

对于我们知之甚少的人来说,与一个遥远的国家开战是多么美妙的事情?

I’m paraphrasing his quote.

我正在解释他的引言。

1:17:30 But I’m not saying it was the right decision.

但我并不是说这是正确的决定。

I’m just saying I can see why, in September 1938, he is prepared to give him a chance.

我只是说我明白为什么在 1938 年 9 月他准备给他一个机会。

1:17:40 Now I do think he was a bit naive, and what he also does is this really interesting thing.

现在我确实觉得他有点天真,而且他所做的也是一件非常有趣的事情。

So he goes over to Hitler’s flat, completely ambushes him.

于是他去了希特勒的公寓,彻底伏击了他。

Goes to his flat on the afternoon of 30th of September and says to Hitler, “Look, I’ve got this, I’ve drawn up this agreement here, and this is to continue the naval agreement that we’ve already made.

9月30日下午,他回到自己的公寓,对希特勒说:“看,我已经拿到了,我在这里起草了这份协议,这是我们已经达成的海军协议的延续。

And by signing this, you are saying that Germany and Britain should never go to war with one another.” Hitler goes, “Yeah, whatever,” signs it.

通过签署此协议,您是在说德国和英国永远不应该互相开战。”希特勒说:“是的,无论如何,”他在上面签了字。

1:18:12 Chamberlain comes back, [inaudible 01:18:13] and waves this little piece of paper, peace in our time and all the rest of it, which obviously comes back to bite him in a very big way.

张伯伦回来了,[听不清 01:18:13] 挥舞着这张小纸片,我们这个时代的和平以及其他一切,这显然会以非常大的方式咬住他。

1:18:20 But it’s interesting that when Hitler then subsequently goes and moves and that they, France and Britain decide in rather the same way that there’s been discussion about deciding that large portions of Ukraine should just be handed back, handed over to Russia without consulting Ukraine a few weeks ago, it is incredible, I think, that France and Britain and Italy with Germany are deciding that, yes, it’s fine for Germany to go in and take Sudetenland without really consulting the Czechs.

但有趣的是,当希特勒随后离开并采取行动时,他们、法国和英国的决定与几周前讨论的决定将乌克兰的大部分地区归还给俄罗斯而不与乌克兰协商的方式相当相同,我认为令人难以置信的是,法国、英国、意大利和德国正在决定,是的,德国可以在没有真正与捷克人协商的情况下进入并占领苏台德地区。

It’s a sort of similar kind of scenario really, and it’s equally wrong.

这确实是一种类似的情况,而且同样是错误的。

But when Germany does then go and take over the whole of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, that’s the bottom line.

但当德国于 1939 年 3 月接管整个捷克斯洛伐克时,这就是底线。

That’s the point where Chamberlain goes, “Okay, I’ve given him the benefit of the doubt.

这就是张伯伦所说的:“好吧,我已经给了他无罪推论。

No more benefits than doubt.

没有比怀疑更多的好处了。

That’s it.

就是这样。

This is he’s crossed the line.” And so you reinforce your agreement with Poland, you do a formal agreement, you go, “Okay, we will uphold your sovereignty.

这就是他越界了。”因此,你加强了与波兰的协议,签订了正式协议,然后说:“好吧,我们将维护你的主权。

If you are invaded, we will go to war with you.”

如果你们被入侵,我们将与你们开战。”

1:19:27 And that is a ratcheting up of diplomacy in politics in a very, very big way.

这极大地加强了政治外交。

And it is that decision to make a treaty with the Poles is not heeded by Hitler, but it’s heeded by, literally, every one of his commanders.

希特勒并没有注意到与波兰人签订条约的决定,但实际上,他的每一位指挥官都注意到了这一决定。

1:19:48 And it’s also heeded by Goring who is his number two, and who is obviously a commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe and is president of Prussia and all the rest of it and is the second-most senior Nazi.

戈林也注意到了这一点,他是他的二号人物,显然是德国空军的总司令,也是普鲁士和其他国家的总统,也是纳粹的第二号人物。

And he’s going, “This is a catastrophe.

他说:“这是一场灾难。

This is the last thing we want to be doing is going to war against Britain and, indeed, France.”

这是我们最不想做的事情,就是与英国甚至法国开战。”

Lex Fridman1:20:13

The Munich Conference is a pretty interesting moment, I would say in all of human history, because you got the leaders of these bigger-than-life nations and the most dramatic brewing conflict in human history, Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier.

我想说,在整个人类历史上,慕尼黑会议是一个非常有趣的时刻,因为你有这些具有传奇色彩的国家的领导人,以及人类历史上正在酝酿的最戏剧性的冲突,张伯伦、希特勒、墨索里尼、达拉第。

1:20:13 It’s interesting when these bigger-than-life leaders are in a room together.

当这些具有传奇色彩的领导者共处一室时,这很有趣。

Is there something that you know about their interactions?

您对他们的互动有什么了解吗?

James Holland1:20:43

Yeah, I think one of the things that’s interesting is that Hitler’s got home advantage because it’s on his turf and the start off at the first meeting is at the Berghof, his beloved place in the Obersalzburg overlooking Berchtesgaden in the Alps.

是的,我认为有趣的事情之一是希特勒获得了主场优势,因为这是在他的地盘上,第一次会议的出发地点是伯格霍夫,这是他在上萨尔茨堡最喜欢的地方,俯瞰阿尔卑斯山的贝希特斯加登。

1:20:43 So he’s pretty confident because, “This is my manor, this is my turf.

所以他非常自信,因为,“这是我的庄园,这是我的地盘。

I’m not going to be bossed around by these guys.”

我不会被这些家伙摆布。”

1:21:03 But Chamberlain, for example, he’s going there thinking, “I’ve been around the blocks.

但以张伯伦为例,他去那里时会想:“我已经走过了街区。

No one can teach me anything.

没有人能教我任何东西。

I’ve been a politician for ages.

我当政治家已经很多年了。

I’m not going to be kind of capped out by this sort of Austrian upstart.”

我不会被这种奥地利暴发户所限制。”

1:21:15 So they’re both coming at it with a slight kind of superiority kind of conflict.

所以他们都带着一点点优越感的冲突来解决这个问题。

1:21:23 Interestingly, when you get to the actual meetings at the [inaudible 01:21:27] in Munich a couple of weeks later, Chamberlain is cheered by the crowds when his car comes in, when he goes to his hotel, when he’s moving from his hotel to the [inaudible 01:21:40].

有趣的是,当你几周后在慕尼黑参加[听不清 01:21:27] 的实际会议时,当张伯伦的汽车驶入时、当他前往酒店时、当他从酒店搬到[听不清 01:21:40] 时,人群都会为张伯伦欢呼。

There are cars cheering him, waving Union Jacks, all this kind of stuff.

有汽车在为他欢呼,挥舞着英国国旗,诸如此类。

1:21:44 Hitler does not like that at all, not at all, puts him on the back foot.

希特勒根本不喜欢这样,一点也不喜欢,让他处于不利地位。

And that’s because the German people don’t want war, in the same way that the British people don’t want war, nor do the German people.

这是因为德国人民不想要战争,就像英国人民不想要战争一样,德国人民也不想要战争。

1:21:58 The difference is that Hitler is a dictator and an autocrat and has the devotion of the people so he can do what he wants in a way that Chamberlain can’t.

不同的是,希特勒是一个独裁者和独裁者,他有人民的忠诚,所以他可以做他想做的事,而张伯伦却做不到。

Chamberlain’s hands are tied because he is an elected prime minister, an elected leader, political leader, and he’s not head of state.

张伯伦的双手被束缚,因为他是民选首相、民选领导人、政治领袖,但他不是国家元首。

So there is no question that it is Hitler and Chamberlain that are the top dogs in this particular discussion.

因此,毫无疑问,希特勒和张伯伦在这场特殊的讨论中处于领先地位。

1:22:24 Daladier takes the back seat.

达拉第坐在后座上。

Even Mussolini, although he’s there, he doesn’t want war, either.

即使是墨索里尼,虽然他在那里,但他也不想战争。

He wants to be left alone to do his own thing without anyone getting in the way.

他希望自己一个人做自己的事,不被任何人打扰。

But he doesn’t want, it’s not in his interest to have a European war so he’s trying to avoid it.

但他不想,发生欧洲战争不符合他的利益,所以他试图避免它。

1:22:37 So it is really, you see that the kind of alpha males in the room are Chamberlain and Hitler, and it’s really interesting because Hitler’s got this sort of slightly garrulous voice and very kind of pale blue eyes and such distinct features, quite a long nose.

确实如此,你看,房间里的雄性领袖是张伯伦和希特勒,这真的很有趣,因为希特勒的声音有点啰嗦,有一双淡蓝色的眼睛和如此明显的特征,还有一个很长的鼻子。

And he always says this is why he has the mustache is to kind of disguise the big nose.

他总是说这就是为什么他留胡子是为了掩盖大鼻子。

As I was saying to you earlier on before we started recording, he does have a sense of humor.

正如我在我们开始录制之前对你们说过的,他确实有幽默感。

It’s not one that you and I would kind of tap into, but he does have one.

这不是你我都会利用的一种,但他确实有。

1:23:09 Whereas Chamberlain, he sounds like bit like an old man.

而张伯伦,听起来有点像个老人。

He’s sort of silver-haired, and he looks like your sort archetypal kind of British gentleman with rolled-up umbrella and his Homburg hat and all the rest of it.

他有一头银发,看起来就像典型的英国绅士,卷着雨伞,戴着洪堡帽等等。

So they’re both sort of caricatures in a funny sort of way.

所以它们都是某种有趣的漫画。

1:23:24 And yet, the consequence of these discussions, these great events happening, you are absolutely going, even which way the Munich crisis comes out, you’re taking a step closer to war.

然而,这些讨论的结果,这些重大事件的发生,你绝对会去,即使慕尼黑危机以哪种方式出现,你也离战争更近了一步。

It’s just whether the war is going to happen next week or whether it’s going to happen a year, hence.

只是战争是下周发生还是一年后发生。

But the Munich crisis obviously doesn’t stem the inevitability of war at all.

但慕尼黑危机显然根本无法阻止战争的不可避免。

It just heightens it.

它只会加剧它。

Lex Fridman1:23:49

Do you think there are words that Chamberlain should have said, could have said that put more pressure on Hitler, intimidate Hitler more?

您认为张伯伦是否应该说一些话,可以说给希特勒更多的压力,更多地恐吓希特勒?

James Holland1:24:01

Yeah, it’s a really tricky one.

是的,这确实是一个棘手的问题。

1:24:01 It’s such a difficult one because you’re always looking at it through…

这是一件非常困难的事情,因为你总是通过……来看待它。

The enemy has a vote, and you don’t know what that vote is going to be, and you don’t know what it’s going to look like.

敌人有一张选票,而你不知道这张选票会是什么,也不知道它会是什么样子。

There’s no question that the rest of Europe is cowled by the kind of impression of military might that the Germans have put out.

毫无疑问,欧洲其他国家都被德国人所表现出的军事力量印象所蒙蔽。

They certainly fear they are stronger than they actually are.

他们当然担心自己比实际更强大。

1:24:27 And then on the other hand, they’re also going, “Yeah, but Germany doesn’t have natural resources, doesn’t have access to the world’s oceans.

另一方面,他们也会说,“是的,但德国没有自然资源,无法进入世界海洋。

It shouldn’t be able to win a war.” So they’re kind of contradicting themselves at the same time.

它不应该能够赢得战争。”所以他们同时有点自相矛盾。

So one minute they’re sort going, “Oh God, you don’t want to take on all those Nazis and all those swastikas and those automaton stormtroopers.” But on the other hand, they’re then saying, “But actually Germany doesn’t have much in its basket.

所以前一分钟他们会说,“哦上帝,你不想与所有那些纳粹分子、所有那些万字符和那些自动冲锋队作战。”但另一方面,他们又说:“但实际上德国的篮子里并没有太多东西。

It’s got actually quite a lot of weaknesses, and we should be to kind of able to prevail, blah, blah, blah.

它实际上有很多弱点,我们应该能够获胜,等等,等等。

We’ll just impose an economic blockade, and then it’ll be stuffed.”

我们只会实施经济封锁,然后就会被塞满。”

1:24:59 And Britain is not ready to fight a war in 1948, but nor is Hitler, nor is Germany, so one is sort of striking out the other.

英国还没有准备好在 1948 年打一场战争,希特勒和德国也没有准备好,所以一方正在打击另一方。

But it’s very easy to say that in hindsight, but at the time, where people kind of digging trenches in Hyde Park in Central London and barrage balloons going up over London and children being evacuated from the cities and 92% of the population not wanting to go to war, you could see why he takes the course he does.

但事后看来,这很容易说出来,但当时,人们在伦敦市中心的海德公园挖战壕,在伦敦上空拦截气球,孩子们从城市撤离,92%的人口不想参战,你可以明白为什么他会采取这样的做法。

1:25:25 I suppose that’s what I’m saying.

我想这就是我要说的。

I’m not saying it’s necessarily the right decision, but I think it’s an understandable decision.

我并不是说这一定是正确的决定,但我认为这是一个可以理解的决定。

Lex Fridman1:25:29

Oh, but what about even just on the human level?

哦,但是即使只是在人类层面呢?

1:25:29 If I go into a room with a British gentleman versus going to a room with Trump, it feels like it’s so much easier to read and manipulate the British gentleman.

如果我和一位英国绅士一起进入一个房间,而不是和特朗普一起进入一个房间,我会觉得解读和操纵英国绅士要容易得多。

1:25:46 Because Trump is like Trump-like characters.

因为特朗普就像特朗普一样的人物。

It seems like Hitler is similar, Churchill is similar.

看来希特勒很相似,丘吉尔也很相似。

It’s like this guy can do anything.

就好像这个家伙什么都能做一样。

There’s something terrifying about-

有件事很可怕——

James Holland1:25:57

Unpredictability, yeah.

不可预测性,是的。

Lex Fridman1:25:59

Yeah, it feels like there’s something very predictable about Chamberlain.

是的,感觉张伯伦身上有一些非常可预测的东西。

James Holland1:26:02

Yes, I think that’s true.

是的,我认为确实如此。

1:26:02 But also one has to take a step back and think about what Britain represents so, therefore, what Chamberlain represents in 1938.

但我们也必须退一步思考英国所代表的是什么,以及张伯伦在 1938 年所代表的是什么。

Britain has the largest empire the world has ever known in 1938.

1938 年,英国拥有世界上最大的帝国。

Lex Fridman1:26:14

Yeah, yeah.

是啊,是啊。

1:26:14 We shouldn’t forget that, right?

我们不应该忘记这一点,对吗?

James Holland1:26:17

Third of the world is pink, as the saying goes.

正如俗话所说,世界的三分之一是粉红色的。

1:26:17 And that saying comes from the kind of atlas of the world where all British territories are kind of colored pink.

这句话出自那种世界地图集,其中所有英国领土都是粉红色的。

1:26:24 And on top of that it has lots of extra imperial territories as well.

除此之外,它还有许多额外的帝国领土。

So if you look at, there’s this incredible map of global shipping in 1937, and there’s these little landlines of ships going out, and one of the strongest landlines is going down to Argentina and South America from Britain.

因此,如果你看一下,就会发现 1937 年这张令人难以置信的全球航运地图,还有这些小船的固定线路正在驶出,其中最强大的固定线路之一是从英国到阿根廷和南美洲。

So down past West Africa and down in Southern Atlantic, and there it is.

越过西非,到达南大西洋,它就在那里。

1:26:47 And that’s because Britain owns most of Argentina.

那是因为英国拥有阿根廷的大部分领土。

It owns huge great farming estates and ranches.

它拥有巨大的农场和牧场。

It owns the railway system.

它拥有铁路系统。

It owns many of the port facilities.

它拥有许多港口设施。

So you didn’t even need an empire.

所以你甚至不需要一个帝国。

You need the facilities that overseas trade and possessions can give you.

您需要海外贸易和财产可以为您提供的便利。

1:27:04 And Britain not only has the largest navy, it also has the largest merchant navy.

而英国不仅拥有最大的海军,还拥有最大的商船海军。

It has 33% of the world’s merchant shipping and access to a further 50% Greek, Norwegian, Canadian shipping that it can access.

它拥有全球 33% 的商船运输量,并拥有另外 50% 的希腊、挪威和加拿大运输权。

So if you’ve got access to 80, in excess of 80% of the world shipping, that puts you in an incredibly strong position.

因此,如果您能够访问 80 个(超过 80% 的全球航运),那么您就处于极其有利的地位。

1:27:27 And actually all sorts of other things have been going on.

事实上,各种各样的其他事情也一直在发生。

While they might not have been creating a huge army or producing enough Spitfires that they might want to, up until this point, what they have also been doing is stockpiling bauxite and copper and tungsten and huge reserves.

虽然他们可能没有建立一支庞大的军队,也没有生产出足够多的喷火战斗机,但到目前为止,他们一直在做的就是储存铝土矿、铜和钨以及大量的储备。

And because Britain has this huge global reach and because it has its empire and its extra-imperial assets, it can strike bargains that no one else can strike.

由于英国拥有巨大的全球影响力,并且拥有自己的帝国和帝国外资产,因此它可以达成其他人无法达成的协议。

1:27:50 So it can go into various countries around the world and can go, “Okay, I want you to guarantee me for the next five years every bit of your rubber supply.

因此,它可以进入世界各地的各个国家,并且可以说:“好吧,我希望你们向我保证未来五年你们的每一点橡胶供应。

I will pay over the asking price to secure that.” And it’s doing that in the 1930s.

我将支付高于要价的价格来确保这一点。” 20 世纪 30 年代正是这么做的。

So when war comes, it’s got everything it possibly needs.

因此,当战争来临时,它拥有可能需要的一切。

1:28:09 Now it always need more because it’s suddenly turning into a kind of proper global long drawn-out war.

现在它总是需要更多,因为它突然变成了一场真正的全球旷日持久的战争。

But that is a huge advantage.

但这是一个巨大的优势。

1:28:18 So it is with that mindset that Chamberlain is going into those talks and thinking, “Okay, well, I’m not going to get a war over Czechoslovakia.

因此,正是怀着这种心态,张伯伦在进行这些谈判时思考,“好吧,好吧,我不会因为捷克斯洛伐克而爆发战争。

Who cares about them?

谁关心他们?

But I am going to show Hitler that I mean business.” Hitler’s going, “Who’s this stuffy guy with his white hair?

但我要向希特勒表明我是认真的。”希特勒会说:“这个满头白发的古板家伙是谁?

I don’t give a toss about him.” And he’s coming at it from a completely different perspective.

我才不关心他呢。”他是从一个完全不同的角度来看待这个问题的。

1:28:37 And I think one of the things that’s so interesting from a dramatic point of view and from a historian’s point of view, or even a novelist’s point of view, in the case of Robert Harris writing his book about these negotiations, which I don’t know if you’ve read it, but it’s terrifically good, it’s the fact you’ve got two men, two alpha males who are going to those negotiations from totally different perspectives and vantage points.

我认为,从戏剧性的角度和历史学家的角度,甚至从小说家的角度来看,有一件非常有趣的事情,那就是罗伯特·哈里斯写了一本关于这些谈判的书,我不知道你是否读过这本书,但这非常好,事实是你有两个男人,两个雄性领袖,他们将从完全不同的角度和有利位置进行这些谈判。

1:29:01 And I think it’s very easy for people today to forget how elevated Britain was in the late 1930s.

我认为今天的人们很容易忘记 20 世纪 30 年代末英国的地位有多么高。

The gold standard was tied to the pound, not the dollar.

金本位制与英镑挂钩,而不是与美元挂钩。

And so Britain was the number one nation in the world at that time, and it just was, and it’s so diminished by comparison today that it’s hard to imagine it.

因此,当时英国是世界第一国家,事实也确实如此,但与今天相比,它的地位已经下降得令人难以想象。

1:29:26 And I think one of the interesting things about the historiography, about the narrative of how we tell World War II is that so much of it has been dictated by the shift in power that took place subsequent to 1945.

我认为关于史学、关于我们如何讲述第二次世界大战的叙述的一个有趣的事情是,其中很大一部分是由 1945 年之后发生的权力转移决定的。

And when people were starting to write these sort of major narratives in the 1970s and ’80s and into the 1990s, is through a prism of a very, very different world.

当人们在 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代以及进入 90 年代开始撰写此类主要叙事时,是通过一个非常非常不同的世界的棱镜。

1:29:49 And so, one of the reasons why you have this narrative that Britain was a bit rubbish and hanging on the shirttails of the Americans and all the blood was spilt in eastern front and Germany had the best army in the world and was only defeated because Hitler was mad and blah, blah, blah, that kind of traditional narrative, that narrative emerges through the prism of what was going on in the 1970s and what was going on in the 1980s and the changing world, rather than looking at it through the prism of the late 1930s or early 1940s.

所以,你有这样一种说法的原因之一是,英国有点垃圾,挂在美国人的衬衫下摆上,所有的鲜血都洒在东线,德国拥有世界上最好的军队,只是因为希特勒疯了而被击败,等等,等等,那种传统的叙述,这种叙述是通过 1970 年代发生的事情和 1980 年代发生的事情以及不断变化的世界的棱镜出现的,而不是透过 20 世纪 30 年代末或 1940 年代初的棱镜来看待它。

Lex Fridman1:30:19

So there is this moment of decision.

所以就有了这个决定的时刻。

1:30:19 What lesson do you take from that?

你从中得到什么教训?

When is the right time for appeasement, to negotiate, for diplomacy?

什么时候才是绥靖、谈判、外交的最佳时机?

And when is the right time for military strength, offensive, attacking, for military conflict?

什么时候是军事实力、进攻、进攻、军事冲突的最佳时机?

Where is that line?

那条线在哪里?

Where’s that-

那是哪里——

James Holland1:30:45

Well, I kind of think it probably was when it was.

嗯,我想可能就是那时的情况。

1:30:45 I mean-

我的意思是——

Lex Fridman1:30:51

Poland.

波兰。

James Holland1:30:52

Yeah.

是的。

1:30:52 Honestly, I’m not sure it would’ve been the right decision to go to war in 1938.

老实说,我不确定 1938 年发动战争是否是正确的决定。

I can’t predict because you can’t second-guess how things are going to play out because you just don’t know.

我无法预测,因为你无法事后猜测事情将如何发展,因为你根本不知道。

1:31:07 But I’m not sure that Chamberlain made the wrong decision.

但我不确定张伯伦做出了错误的决定。

I’m not saying he made the right decision.

我并不是说他做出了正确的决定。

I’m being a bit wishy-washy about this.

我对此有点犹豫不决。

Lex Fridman1:31:16

You could’ve threatened it more.

你本可以更进一步地威胁它。

1:31:16 Imagine Churchill in those same meetings.

想象一下丘吉尔参加同样的会议。

James Holland1:31:22

Yeah, but Churchill also appeases.

是的,但丘吉尔也安抚了。

1:31:22 I mean, he appeases Stalin all the time.

我的意思是,他总是安抚斯大林。

So the idea that Churchill is this big strong man and never appeases, and he’s gung-ho over war, Churchill’s out of the government at that time.

因此,认为丘吉尔是个大强人,永远不会安抚,而且他对战争充满热情,丘吉尔当时就离开了政府。

He recognizes that you can’t trust Hitler.

他认识到你不能相信希特勒。

He recognizes that Nazism is bad.

他认识到纳粹主义是不好的。

But he, because he’s out of the government, he doesn’t have a window on exactly where Britain is at that particular time, in a way that Chamberlain does.

但他,因为他不在政府之外,所以他无法像张伯伦那样了解英国在那个特定时间的确切状况。

1:31:49 I suppose what I’m saying is Chamberlain is better placed to make those decisions than Churchill is, which again, doesn’t mean that Chamberlain is right and Churchill is wrong.

我想我想说的是张伯伦比丘吉尔更适合做出这些决定,这并不意味着张伯伦是对的而丘吉尔是错的。

1:32:02 It’s just that’s a massive punt to go to war in 1938 when you still don’t have, you’ve got a handful of Spitfires, you’ve got a handful of Hurricanes, you haven’t got enough.

这只是 1938 年参战的一次巨大赌注,当时你还没有,你有一把喷火式战斗机,你有一把飓风式战斗机,你还没有足够的。

Your air defense system isn’t properly sorted at this point.

您的防空系统此时尚未正确排序。

Your navy is strong, but what’s that kind of look like, I mean, if you do go to war?

你们的海军很强大,但我的意思是,如果你们真的去打仗的话,那是什么样子的?

Because it’s not going to be army sweeping into Germany.

因为军队不会席卷德国。

It’s just it’s going to be accelerated industrialization for a year.

只是工业化要加速一年。

So even if you go to war in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia will not be saved.

所以即使你在1938年对捷克斯洛伐克发动战争,捷克斯洛伐克也无法被拯救。

France and Britain will not be going in and invading Germany.

法国和英国不会进入并入侵德国。

That is absolutely not going to happen.

那是绝对不会发生的。

1:32:44 So what’s the point, I mean, if you’re not going to do that?

那么,我的意思是,如果你不打算这样做,那还有什么意义呢?

Why didn’t you accelerate your rearmament thereafter, get your ducks in a row, and then you can consider it?

那你为什么不加速重整军备,把事情做好,然后再考虑呢?

I mean, after all, even in September 1939, they don’t really do anything.

我的意思是,毕竟,即使在 1939 年 9 月,他们也没有真正做任何事情。

I mean, we talked about the kind of Saar Offensive, which isn’t really an offensive at all.

我的意思是,我们讨论了萨尔攻势,这根本不是真正的攻势。

It’s firing a one round of machine gun and scuttling back again.

它正在发射一发机枪,然后又急速返回。

But I mean, they don’t even do that then.

但我的意思是,他们当时甚至不这样做。

They’re still buying time in 1939, and Britain is only just about ready to take on the onslaught of the Luftwaffe in summer of 1940.

他们仍在为 1939 年争取时间,而英国才刚刚准备好在 1940 年夏天应对德国空军的猛攻。

Lex Fridman1:33:19

Well, nobody’s ready for war.

好吧,没有人准备好战争。

James Holland1:33:21

No, and you always want more than you’ve got at any time, even when you’re winning.

不,你总是想要比你已经拥有的更多的东西,即使你赢了。

Lex Fridman1:33:25

But like really not ready.

但好像真的没有准备好。

1:33:25 Even like you mentioned with Barbarossa, Nazi Germany is really not ready.

即使就像你在《巴巴罗萨》中提到的那样,纳粹德国确实还没有准备好。

James Holland1:33:34

Not ready.

还没准备好。

Lex Fridman1:33:36

Except France.

除了法国。

1:33:36 I swear, France-

我发誓,法国——

James Holland1:33:41

[inaudible 01:33:41]

[听不清 01:33:41]

Lex Fridman1:33:41

Fine.

很好。

1:33:41 But come on, come on.

但是来吧,来吧。

When Nazi Germany invades Poland, I mean-

当纳粹德国入侵波兰时,我的意思是——

James Holland1:33:49

Yeah, it’s terrible.

是的,太可怕了。

1:33:49 It’s terrible because I also do think that had France gone in, in some force with some British troops as well, had they gone in, what would’ve happened is, is that would’ve, that easily could’ve brought down Hitler because most of his commanders are, his senior commanders are just thinking, “What the hell is going on?

这很可怕,因为我也确实认为,如果法国和一些英国军队一起进去,如果他们进去的话,会发生什么,是不是,很容易就能打倒希特勒,因为他的大多数指挥官,他的高级指挥官只是在想,“到底发生了什么?

This is a catastrophe.” I mean, to a man.

这是一场灾难。”我的意思是,对一个男人来说。

1:34:12 I mean, even Goring is thinking this is a terrible idea.

我的意思是,就连戈林也认为这是一个糟糕的主意。

They are absolutely not convinced.

他们绝对不相信。

And when Hitler does his big talk to his…

当希特勒对他的大人物发表讲话时……

He asked all his senior commanders to come to the Berghof to brief them about invasion of Poland, it’s just after the Ribbentrop Molotov back to the 22nd of August.

他要求所有高级指挥官来到贝格霍夫,向他们通报入侵波兰的情况,当时里宾特洛甫·莫洛托夫刚刚回到8月22日。

He calls them all to Berghof and says, “Come in mufti, come in civilian suits.”

他把他们都叫到伯格霍夫并说:“请穿便服,穿便装。”

1:34:34 They all turn up, and he gives them this kind of huge great speech and says, “This is the moment, this is the time.

他们都出现了,他给他们做了一场伟大的演讲,并说:“就是现在,就是时候了。

This is what we’re going to do.” And they’re all going, “What?

这就是我们要做的。”他们都会说:“什么?

You’re kidding me.

你在开玩笑吧。

What, we’re going to Poland on the 26th of August, that’s the plan, like two days’ time?

什么,我们8月26日要去波兰,计划就是这样,大约两天时间?

Where’s the plan?”

计划在哪里?”

1:34:51 The whole point is that they’re emerging and growing militarily, but they were supposed to have all these exercises where they’re coordinating ground forces, the Panzer spearhead with operations in the air with the Luftwaffe.

重点是,他们在军事上正在崛起和发展,但他们应该进行所有这些演习,协调地面部队,装甲部队作为先锋,与德国空军一起在空中作战。

1:35:04 None of that happens so Poland becomes the proving ground, and actually they discover that there’s lots of things that don’t work and lots of things that are wrong.

这些都没有发生,所以波兰成为了试验场,实际上他们发现有很多东西不起作用,有很多东西是错误的。

But it’s flying in the face of all convention, military convention that he does this without any kind of warning.

但他在没有任何警告的情况下这样做,这完全违背了所有惯例、军事惯例。

1:35:21 And even by the 1st of September where there’s been this kind of five-day delay at the last-minute negotiations.

甚至到了 9 月 1 日,最后一刻的谈判也出现了五天的延迟。

The last-minute negotiations are thrust upon Hitler by people like Goring and by Mussolini and the Italians going, “Oh my God, don’t do this.

最后一刻的谈判是由戈林、墨索里尼和意大利人强加给希特勒的,他们说:“天哪,不要这样做。

Don’t do this.

不要这样做。

There’s got to be a solution,” he was absolutely chomping at the bit.

一定有一个解决方案,”他绝对是在咬牙切齿。

Lex Fridman1:35:42

Well, in that case, from a dark militaristic perspective, his bet paid off.

好吧,在这种情况下,从黑暗军国主义的角度来看,他的赌注得到了回报。

James Holland1:35:49

Well, except that it ended in ruins in May 1945 with the total collapse of Germany, so you could say the worst decision he ever made was going into Poland in September 1930.

好吧,只不过随着 1945 年 5 月德国的彻底崩溃,一切都以废墟告终,所以你可以说他做过的最糟糕的决定就是 1930 年 9 月进入波兰。

1:35:49 Depends the way you look at it, but I mean, yes, it’s successful in that Poland is overrun in 18 days.

取决于你怎么看,但我的意思是,是的,它是成功的,因为波兰在 18 天内就被占领了。

Lex Fridman1:36:05

And there’s so many counterfactuals here.

这里有很多反事实的情况。

James Holland1:36:08

But I mean if you were to say to Hitler on the 30th of April as he’s sort of taking out the pistol from his holster on his sofa in the Fuhrerbank and going, “Yeah, so, Adolf, 1st of September 1939, still backing yourself on that one?” I mean, he might have a different view.

但我的意思是,如果你在 4 月 30 日对希特勒说,当时他正从元首银行沙发上的皮套里拿出手枪,然后说:“是的,所以,阿道夫,1939 年 9 月 1 日,你仍然支持自己吗?”我的意思是,他可能有不同的看法。

Lex Fridman1:36:24

The guy’s insane and full of blunder so he probably would’ve said, “Yeah, do it all over again.”

这家伙疯了,犯了很多错误,所以他可能会说:“是的,重来一遍。”

James Holland1:36:29

Yeah, I’m sure he would’ve done as well.

是的,我相信他也会这么做。

Lex Fridman1:36:31

Conquest Poland was not a mistake.

征服波兰并不是一个错误。

1:36:31 Soviet Union was not a mistake.

苏联没有一个错误。

James Holland1:36:35

No.

不。

Lex Fridman1:36:36

It’s just some of the-

这只是其中的一些——

James Holland1:36:37

Other people.

其他人。

1:36:37 “I was let down by people not being strong enough.”

“我对那些不够坚强的人感到失望。”

Lex Fridman1:36:39

Yeah, the Prussian generals are all-

是的,普鲁士将军都是——

James Holland1:36:41

Yeah, of course.

是的,当然。

1:36:41 That’s exactly what he’d say.

这正是他所说的。

“It wasn’t my fault.”

“这不是我的错。”

Lex Fridman1:36:45

He might have quietly done some different decisions about Barbarossa.

他可能悄悄地对巴巴罗萨做出了一些不同的决定。

1:36:45 Maybe the timing would be different.

也许时间会有所不同。

James Holland1:36:53

Maybe that all out central for us, rather than kind of splitting into three.

也许这对我们来说是核心,而不是分成三部分。

Lex Fridman1:36:56

Yeah.

是的。

James Holland1:36:56

Yep.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:36:56

But he was very sure, it seems like, maybe you can correct me, that Britain and France would still carry on with appeasement even after he invaded Poland.

但他非常确信,也许你可以纠正我,即使在他入侵波兰之后,英国和法国仍然会继续绥靖政策。

James Holland1:37:06

Absolutely.

绝对地。

1:37:06 He was completely convinced by it.

他对此彻底信服了。

There was clearly a sort of 10 to 15% level of doubt, “But what the heck, I’m going to do it anyway.”

显然有 10% 到 15% 的疑虑,“但是管它呢,无论如何我都会这么做。”

1:37:18 He’d ratcheted himself up into such a lava of kind of, “This is the moment.

他把自己逼入了这样的熔岩之中,“就是现在了。

I have to do it now.

我现在必须这么做。

This is fate.

这就是命运。

I’m 50, and I could be taken out by an assassin’s bullet.

我已经 50 岁了,我可能会被刺客的子弹杀死。

I’ve got this important life work that I’ve got to do.

我有这项重要的人生工作要做。

We’ve got to get on with it now.

我们现在必须继续做下去。

There could be no more delay.

不能再耽搁了。

This is my mission.

这是我的使命。

This is our mission of the German people, and the German people have got the will and the spirit to be able to pull it off.”

这是我们德国人民的使命,德国人民有意愿和精神来实现这一目标。”

1:37:43 Or “I was wrong, and, therefore, we don’t deserve to be a Thousand-Year Reich.

或者“我错了,因此,我们不配成为千年帝国。

We don’t deserve to be the master race, black or white.

我们不配成为优等种族,无论黑人还是白人。

[inaudible 01:37:52] same all the time.”

[听不清 01:37:52] 一直都是一样。”

Lex Fridman1:37:55

So can you tell the story of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939?

那么你能讲一下 1939 年莫洛托夫-里宾特洛甫条约的故事吗?

1:37:55 So they make an agreement, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and that leads us, just like you were mentioning, in a matter of days, how compact everything is.

所以他们达成了一项协议,纳粹德国和苏联,这导致我们,就像你提到的,在几天之内,一切都是多么紧凑。

It’s just really, really fascinating how crooked-

弯曲的程度真的非常非常令人着迷——

James Holland1:38:12

It’s a beautiful summer in Europe, summer of 1939.

1939 年的夏天,欧洲一个美丽的夏天。

1:38:12 It’s one of these glorious summers that sort of never rains.

这是一个从不下雨的灿烂夏天。

It’s just sunshine, sunny day after sunny day.

这只是阳光,一个又一个的阳光明媚的日子。

It’s like that sort of golden summer of 1914 as well, where sky always seems to be blue, fluffy, white clouds, everyone sort of, you know, but this sort of the storm clouds of war, to use that cliche, are kind of brewing.

这也就像 1914 年的那个金色夏天,天空似乎总是蓝色的、蓬松的、白云,每个人都有点,你知道,但这种战争的乌云,用那句老话来说,正在酝酿之中。

1:38:39 The Russians have reached out to Britain and France and said, “Come on over, let’s negotiate.

俄罗斯人已向英国和法国伸出援手,并表示:“过来吧,我们进行谈判。

Let’s see what we can do,” and there is just no stomach for that at all.

让我们看看我们能做什么”,但我们根本没有胃口这样做。

I mean, if ever there is, I think, a mistake that’s Britain and France should’ve been a bit more into realpolitiks than they were.

我的意思是,我认为,如果有一个错误的话,那就是英国和法国应该比以前更加关注现实政治。

It’s such an opportunity to ensure that, to snooker the Third Reich, and they don’t take it.

这是一个确保与第三帝国打斯诺克的机会,但他们没有抓住它。

Because in many ways they see the westward spread of communism in exactly the same way that the Nazis see the threat of the westward spread of communism as something that’s every bit as repellent as Nazism, and they don’t want to be getting into bed with these guys.

因为在很多方面,他们看待共产主义向西蔓延的方式与纳粹将共产主义向西蔓延的威胁视为与纳粹主义一样令人厌恶的东西一样,他们不想与这些家伙上床。

1:39:26 Of course, they have to kind of change tack on that one in summer of 1941 in very quick order, and that’s the whole point about Churchill appeasing Stalin.

当然,他们必须在 1941 年夏天迅速改变这一方针,这就是丘吉尔安抚斯大林的全部意义所在。

I mean, it’s all very well people saying, “Well, Churchill wouldn’t have appeased Hitler in the 1930s,” but he does appease.

我的意思是,人们说“好吧,丘吉尔不会在 1930 年代安抚希特勒”,这很好,但他确实安抚了希特勒。

He appeases all the time, and they miss that opportunity.

他总是安抚,他们却错过了这个机会。

1:39:49 And the French and British delegation is third-tier commanders, generals going over.

而法国和英国代表团则是三级指挥官、将军过来。

Yeah, it was a shit show.

是的,那是一场狗屎秀。

I mean, yeah, excuse my French, but I mean, it’s a nonsense that they’re not ready for it.

我的意思是,是的,请原谅我的法语,但我的意思是,他们还没有准备好,这是胡说八道。

They’re not prepared.

他们还没有准备好。

The British guy [inaudible 01:40:06] doesn’t have any authority.

英国人 [听不清 01:40:06] 没有任何权威。

The whole thing’s a complete joke.

整件事完全就是个笑话。

It’s never going to get anywhere.

它永远不会有任何进展。

Lex Fridman1:40:12

You tell the story of this quite beautifully, actually.

事实上,你把这个故事讲得非常漂亮。

1:40:12 Again, it’s such a human story.

再说一遍,这是一个人性化的故事。

I mean, it seems like the Stalin and the Soviet-

我的意思是,这似乎是斯大林和苏联——

James Holland1:40:22

They’ve already made up their mind.

他们已经下定决心了。

Lex Fridman1:40:23

But-

但是——

James Holland1:40:23

Well, I don’t they have.

好吧,我没有。

1:40:23 I think what they-

我认为他们-

Lex Fridman1:40:25

Wait, wait, wait.

等等,等等,等等。

1:40:25 I mean, you described quite well that they value in-person meeting.

我的意思是,你很好地描述了他们重视面对面的会面。

James Holland1:40:30

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:40:31

So Chamberlain should have just gone to Moscow.

所以张伯伦应该直接去莫斯科。

James Holland1:40:34

Yeah, get on a plane.

是的,上飞机吧。

Lex Fridman1:40:40

Maybe it’s a simplistic notion, but that could’ve changed the trajectory of human history right there.

也许这是一个简单化的想法,但这可能会改变人类历史的轨迹。

James Holland1:40:46

I really think it could’ve done.

我真的认为它可以做到。

1:40:46 I think that’s much more grievous mistake than the Munich.

我认为这比慕尼黑事件更严重。

Lex Fridman1:40:51

Why are leaders so hesitant to meet?

为什么领导人对会面如此犹豫?

1:40:51 I’m told now by a bunch of diplomats that, “No, no, no, no.

现在,一群外交官告诉我,“不,不,不,不。

There’s a process.

有一个过程。

At first, you have to have these diplomats meet, and they have to draft a bunch of stuff.”

首先,你必须让这些外交官会面,他们必须起草一堆文件。”

1:41:07 I sometimes have the simplistic notion, like, why not meet?

有时我会有一个简单的想法,比如,为什么不见面呢?

Why not meet?

为什么不见面?

I think there is a human element there, of course, especially when there’s this force that is Hitler.

当然,我认为其中存在人为因素,尤其是当有希特勒这样的力量时。

James Holland1:41:23

Well, yes, and because we, humans, we like to interact, and you like to see people in three dimensions, and I’m sure that’s why you always, quite rightly, insist on doing your podcast face-to-face.

嗯,是的,因为我们人类喜欢互动,而你喜欢在三维空间中看到人,我相信这就是为什么你总是坚持面对面地做播客,这是正确的。

1:41:23 Because you want to get the cut of someone’s jib, and you want to be able to see them, and you want to see the intonation and the expression and the whites of their eyes and all that kind of stuff.

因为你想要剪掉某人的三角帆,你想要能够看到他们,你想要看到他们的语调、表情、眼白等等。

1:41:46 And that just does make a difference, of course, because we’re fundamentally animals, and we want to be sizing people up.

当然,这确实会产生影响,因为我们本质上是动物,我们想要评估人。

And it’s much easier to do that when you’re a few feet away from each other than it is on a video screen or through the prism of someone else.

当你们彼此相距几英尺时,这比在视频屏幕上或通过其他人的棱镜要容易得多。

Lex Fridman1:42:02

Yeah, but there’s also just, you see the humanity in others.

是的,但还有一个原因,你可以看到别人身上的人性。

1:42:02 It’s so much easier, you see this in social media, it’s so much easier to talk shit about others when you’re not with them-

这要容易得多,你在社交媒体上看到这一点,当你不在别人身边时,谈论别人的坏话要容易得多——

James Holland1:42:13

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:42:13

…

……

1:42:13 and military conflict is the extreme version of that.

军事冲突是这种情况的极端版本。

You can construct these narratives that they’re not human, that they’re evil, that they’re…

你可以构建这些叙述,他们不是人类,他们是邪恶的,他们是......

You can construct communist ideology, all these…

你可以构建共产主义意识形态,所有这些......

You can project onto them the worst possible version of a human.

你可以将人类最糟糕的版本投射到他们身上。

But when you meet them, you’re like, “Oh.”

但当你见到他们时,你会说,“哦。”

James Holland1:42:36

They’re all just a person.

他们都只是一个人。

Lex Fridman1:42:37

They’re just a person.

他们只是一个人。

James Holland1:42:38

Well, it’s the world’s great tragedy that it’s only a few people that want to go to war, and the vast majority want to live happily contented lives getting on with their neighbors.

好吧,世界上最大的悲剧是,只有少数人想要打仗,绝大多数人都想和邻居和睦相处,过上幸福美满的生活。

1:42:38 I mean, it has been ever thus.

我的意思是,从来都是这样。

It’s just it is those few that kind ruin it for everybody else.

只是那些少数人毁掉了其他人的一切。

1:42:52 But anyway, to go back to Leningrad, back in August 1939, they go half-cocked.

但无论如何,回到 1939 年 8 月的列宁格勒,他们都半兴奋不已。

They’re disrespectful to Soviet Union as a result of that.

因此他们对苏联不尊重。

It gets nowhere.

它无处可去。

Had they been able to put on a really, really firm offer there and then to the Soviet Union, Soviet Union would’ve probably come in.

如果他们能够在那里向苏联提出非常非常坚定的报价,苏联可能会加入。

1:43:13 I mean, the big thing is, is that the Soviet Union said, “This is a big stumbling block.” The Soviet Union said, “Yeah, but we want to be able to march through Poland if we get threatened by Germany.”

我的意思是,最重要的是,苏联说,“这是一个很大的绊脚石。”苏联说:“是的,但是如果我们受到德国的威胁,我们希望能够穿过波兰。”

1:43:25 But the British and French just smell a massive rat there.

但英国人和法国人却闻到了那里有一只大老鼠的味道。

They’re basically saying if they agree to that, what they fear is that Soviet Union will just march into Poland and go, “Yeah, but you said we could,” and take it, which they unquestionably would’ve done, but it would’ve stopped the World War, probably.

他们基本上是说,如果他们同意这一点,他们担心的是苏联会进军波兰,然后说:“是的,但你说我们可以”,然后占领它,毫无疑问他们会这么做,但它可能会阻止世界大战。

Lex Fridman1:43:42

They’re willing to appease Hitler.

他们愿意安抚希特勒。

1:43:42 They’re not willing to appease Stalin in that situation.

在这种情况下他们不愿意安抚斯大林。

James Holland1:43:46

Well, they’re not willing to appease anybody by that stage, that’s the point.

好吧,到了那个阶段,他们不愿意安抚任何人,这就是重点。

Lex Fridman1:43:49

Well, they appeased Hitler because-

好吧,他们安抚了希特勒,因为——

James Holland1:43:51

They did, but you have [inaudible 01:43:52] there’s a bottom line, which is Poland, so it’s changed.

他们做到了,但是[听不清 01:43:52] 有一个底线,那就是波兰,所以它改变了。

1:43:51 That’s the point.

这就是重点。

Lex Fridman1:43:58

Right, right.

对,对。

James Holland1:43:59

But anyway, the bottom line is they don’t, there is a reluctance on the part of French and the British to negotiate with the Soviet Union because they’re communists, don’t like them, don’t trust them, worry about what they’re going to do with Poland, are they’re going to be jumping out of the fire into the kind of water, and it doesn’t come off.

但无论如何,底线是他们不这样做,法国和英国方面不愿意与苏联谈判,因为他们是共产主义者,不喜欢他们,不信任他们,担心他们将如何对待波兰,他们是否会从火中跳入那种水里,而且不会成功。

1:44:18 And as a consequence of that, Soviet Union continue to pursue more hardly, more and more vociferously the opportunities that the Germans are offering, which is the split of Poland.

结果,苏联继续更加严厉、越来越强烈地追求德国提供的机会,这就是分裂波兰。

Because Soviet Union wants that part of Poland back in its own sphere of influence, and it doesn’t want to go to war just yet.

因为苏联希望波兰的那部分地区回到自己的势力范围内,而且还不想开战。

Lex Fridman1:44:42

And the agreement that they won’t attack each other, essentially.

并同意他们基本上不会互相攻击。

James Holland1:44:46

Yep.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:44:46

You think Stalin actually believed that?

你认为斯大林真的相信这一点吗?

James Holland1:44:49

No, he believed it in the same way that Hitler believed it, that it was a cynical kind of convenient bit of realpolitik for now.

不,他相信这一点,就像希特勒相信的那样,目前这是一种愤世嫉俗的、方便的现实政治。

1:44:49 I mean, I think Soviet Union was as determined to get rid of the Nazis as the Nazis were determined to get rid of the Soviet Union.

我的意思是,我认为苏联决心摆脱纳粹,就像纳粹决心摆脱苏联一样。

I think whoever fired first-

我认为无论谁先开枪——

1:45:00 …

……

Nazis as the Nazis were determined to get rid of the Soviet Union.

纳粹就像纳粹一样,决心消灭苏联。

I think whoever fired first was not decided at that point, but I do think that from the moment that Hitler takes power in 1933, a conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany is inevitable.

我认为当时谁先开枪还没有决定,但我确实认为从1933年希特勒上台那一刻起,苏联和纳粹德国之间的冲突是不可避免的。

Lex Fridman1:45:13

So either direction, you think it’s inevitable.

所以无论哪个方向,你都认为这是不可避免的。

James Holland1:45:17

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:45:17

I think, yeah, there’s a huge amount of evidence for that.

我认为,是的,有大量证据证明这一点。

1:45:17 Stalin probably wanted it, what, in ’42, ’43?

斯大林可能想要它,什么,在 42、43 年?

James Holland1:45:23

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:45:23

Something like that?

类似的事情?

James Holland1:45:24

Yeah.

是的。

1:45:24 And they’re doing exercises and stuff and building out, but he’s not ready yet because he knows he’s done the purges and he’s got to get his armed forces back into shape and all the rest of it.

他们正在进行演习和其他工作,但他还没有准备好,因为他知道他已经完成了清洗,他必须让他的武装部队恢复原状以及其他所有工作。

So they have this incredibly cynical agreement, but at that point, Hitler’s hands are untied.

所以他们达成了这个令人难以置信的愤世嫉俗的协议,但到那时,希特勒的手就松开了。

He no longer has to worry about the threat from the Soviet Union.

他再也不用担心来自苏联的威胁了。

He’s got carte blanche to go into Poland, and he doesn’t believe that France and Britain are going to go to war over Poland.

他拥有进入波兰的全权,而且他不相信法国和英国会因波兰而开战。

He’s wrong about that, obviously.

显然,他的想法是错误的。

But France and Britain, despite going to war with him, still do nothing.

但法国和英国尽管与他开战,却仍然无动于衷。

So he’s got away with it.

所以他侥幸逃脱了惩罚。

Lex Fridman1:45:57

Who was Churchill, and how did Churchill come to power at this moment?

丘吉尔是谁,丘吉尔是如何在此时上台的?

James Holland1:46:02

Well, Churchill is this absolutely towering figure in British politics.

嗯,丘吉尔是英国政坛绝对的拔尖人物。

1:46:02 He’s first minister in the naughties of the 20th century and the first years of the 20th century.

他是 20 世纪和 20 世纪初期的第一任部长。

First of the liberals, then of the conservatives.

首先是自由派,然后是保守派。

He’s a former Chancellor of the Exchequer.

他是前财政大臣。

He’s a towering figure, but he’s been in the wilderness because he’s out of favor with the Stanley Baldwin government.

他是一位高大人物,但由于不受斯坦利·鲍德温政府的青睐,他一直处于荒野之中。

He’s out of favor with Chamberlain, but he is this towering figure, and he has been very outspoken as a backbencher, which basically means you’re not a minister, you’re not in the cabinet, you’re just an ordinary member of parliament.

他不受张伯伦的青睐,但他是一个高大人物,而且作为后座议员他一直非常直言不讳,这基本上意味着你不是部长,你不在内阁,你只是一个普通的议会议员。

But obviously you are an ordinary member of parliament, but you’re also an ordinary member of parliament who has had ministries of state and who is this towering figure.

但显然你是一个普通的国会议员,但你也是一个曾经担任过国家部委的普通国会议员,这个巍峨的人物是谁。

So he’s listened to in a way that other backbenchers aren’t.

因此,他的意见得到了其他后座议员所没有的倾听。

1:46:54 And he has been saying, “We need to stand up to the dictators.

他一直在说:“我们需要反抗独裁者。

We need to do this.

我们需要这样做。

We need to rearm more heavily,” and blah, blah, blah.

我们需要更大规模地重新武装”,等等等等。

So when war is declared, he’s brought back into the admiralty in charge of the Navy, which is Britain’s senior service, and suddenly he’s there.

因此,当宣战时,他被带回海军部负责海军,这是英国的高级军种,突然间他就到了那里。

And what happens is Britain doesn’t really do anything.

但实际情况是英国并没有真正采取任何行动。

It’s very difficult working with France because France is so politically fractured that they can’t make any decisions.

与法国合作非常困难,因为法国在政治上四分五裂,无法做出任何决定。

When you can’t make any decisions, you are just impotent.

当你无法做出任何决定时,你就是无能为力。

And so Churchill first mentions going into Norway mining the leads.

因此,丘吉尔首先提到了前往挪威挖掘线索。

So the idea is that you’re making life very difficult for the Germans to get iron ore out of Sweden.

所以我们的想法是让德国人从瑞典获取铁矿石变得非常困难。

Their main source of iron ore is up in the northern part of Sweden in the Arctic Circle, and then goes on a railway through the northern tip of Norway and then gets shipped down the west coast of Norway into Germany, into the Baltic.

他们的铁矿石主要来源位于北极圈内的瑞典北部,然后通过铁路穿过挪威北端,然后沿着挪威西海岸运往德国,进入波罗的海。

1:47:48 So Churchill suggests, in September 1939, why don’t we mine the leads?

因此丘吉尔在 1939 年 9 月建议我们为什么不挖掘线索呢?

Which the leads are these passageways out of the fjords in the north into the North Sea.

这些通道是从北部峡湾进入北海的通道。

Why don’t we mine those and stop the Germans from taking this?

我们为什么不开采这些地雷并阻止德国人拿走它呢?

And everyone goes, “Well, yeah, that’s quite a good idea.” But they can’t decide, and the French are nervous that if they do that, the Germans would retaliate in bomb France and all this kind of stuff.

每个人都会说:“嗯,是的,这是个好主意。”但他们无法决定,法国人很紧张,因为如果他们这样做,德国人会用轰炸法国和所有类似的东西进行报复。

So no decision is made until April 19, 1940.

因此直到 1940 年 4 月 19 日才做出决定。

They go up to start mining the leads on exactly the same day that the Germans invade Denmark and Norway, and so they’re caught off guard.

他们在德国入侵丹麦和挪威的同一天开始开采铅矿,所以他们措手不及。

And at that moment, really it’s seen as a failure of Chamberlain’s government.

在那一刻,这确实被视为张伯伦政府的失败。

And there is a mounting realization that no matter how good he was or competent he was as a peacetime Prime Minister, he’s not a wartime Prime Minister.

人们越来越认识到,无论他作为和平时期的总理多么优秀或多么有能力,他都不是战时的总理。

1:48:36 He’s not served in the armed forces himself.

他本人并未在武装部队服役。

He doesn’t really understand it.

他不太明白。

It needs a different set of hands.

它需要不同的双手。

And his government falls on the 9th of May.

他的政府将于 5 月 9 日垮台。

It becomes inevitable that he’s going to have to resign.

他不得不辞职是不可避免的。

And the obvious person to take his place is Lord Halifax, who is in the House of Lords, but you could still be a Prime Minister.

显然,接替他位置的人是哈利法克斯勋爵,他是上议院议员,但你仍然可以担任首相。

And he is, without question, the most respected politician in the country.

毫无疑问,他是这个国家最受尊敬的政治家。

He’s the former Viceroy of India.

他是印度前总督。

He’s seen as an incredibly safe pair of hands, man of resolute sound judgment, et cetera, et cetera.

他被视为一双令人难以置信的安全之手,具有坚定而正确判断力的人,等等。

But he doesn’t want to take it.

但他不想接受。

He feels physically ill at the prospect, doesn’t want this responsibility.

他对这个前景感到身体不适,不想承担这个责任。

He is also not really a military man.

他也不是真正的军人。

He’s got a slightly withered hand, which has prevented him from doing military service.

他的手有点干枯,这使他无法服兵役。

1:49:23 And he just blanches at this moment, and that really leaves only one other figure that could possibly take on this position, and that’s Churchill.

而他此刻脸色惨白,这样一来,真正有可能担任这个职位的人物就只剩下一个了,那就是丘吉尔。

So when Chamberlain resigns on the 9th of May and Halifax says, “It’s not for me,” the only person who’s going to step into that position is Churchill, and he becomes Prime Minister, and he accepts it gladly.

因此,当张伯伦于 5 月 9 日辞职并且哈利法克斯说:“这不适合我”时,唯一能够接任这一职位的人是丘吉尔,他成为了首相,并且他很高兴地接受了这一职位。

He feels like it is his mission in life.

他觉得这是他人生的使命。

This is his moment come of the outcome of the man.

这就是他这个男人的结局的时刻。

But he comes with a huge amount of baggage.

但他背负着巨大的行李。

He’s known as a man who drinks too much, whose judgment hasn’t always been great.

他被认为是一个酗酒的人,而且他的判断力并不总是很好。

He was Chancellor during the time of the General Strike in 1926.

1926年大罢工期间,他担任总理。

He backed Edward VIII over the monarchy crisis when the King wanted to marry Wallis Simpson, the Catholic divorcee, et cetera, et cetera.

当爱德华八世想要娶天主教离婚者沃利斯·辛普森等等时,他支持爱德华八世应对君主制危机。

So his judgment has been brought into question.

所以他的判断受到了质疑。

He is the man who came up with the idea of the Gallipoli campaign, which was an ignominious failure, blah, blah, blah.

他是提出加里波利战役想法的人,这是一次可耻的失败,等等,等等。

1:50:18 So there are issues over him.

所以他身上有问题。

He is seen as a hothead and a man who doesn’t have the sound judgment of Halifax.

他被认为是一个性急的人,没有哈利法克斯那样的健全判断力。

So the jury is very much out.

所以,目前还没有定论。

And I think, again, it’s one of those things where you have to look at this through the prism of what people were thinking in May 1940.

我再次认为,这是你必须通过 1940 年 5 月人们思考的棱镜来看待的事情之一。

Yes, he was considered [inaudible 01:50:38] politician, but he is seen also as a loose cannon and by no means the right person in this hour of darkness.

是的,他被认为是[听不清 01:50:38] 政治家,但他也被视为一门松散的大炮,在这个黑暗的时刻绝不是合适的人选。

And it is coincidental that the 10th of May 1940, when he takes over as Prime Minister, becomes Prime Minister, not through an election, but by default of a new nationalist government.

巧合的是,1940年5月10日他接任总理时,并不是通过选举,而是默认新的民族主义政府成为总理。

So no longer a conservative government, but a nationalist cross-party coalition government for the duration of the war, which includes members of the Liberal Party and also the Labour Party as well as conservatives, that it is by no means certain that he is going to be able to deliver the goods.

因此,不再是保守派政府,而是战争期间的民族主义跨党派联合政府,其中包括自由党成员、工党成员以及保守派成员,因此决不能确定他是否能够兑现承诺。

1:51:20 And it is also coincidentally the same day that the Germans launched Case Yellow, Operation Yellow, the invasion of the low countries in France.

而恰巧同一天,德国人发动了黄色行动,入侵法国低地国家。

So these are tumultuous events, to put it mildly.

因此,温和地说,这些都是动荡的事件。

And it is also the case that only a couple of weeks before, Paul Reynaud has taken over his Prime Minister of yet another coalition government in France from Daladier.

同样的情况是,就在几周前,保罗·雷诺从达拉第手中接任了法国另一个联合政府的总理。

So political turmoil is very much the watchword at this time for the Western democracies, just at the moment that the Germans are making their hammer strike into the West.

因此,此时此刻,政治动荡已成为西方民主国家的口号,而此时正是德国人向西方大举进攻的时刻。

Lex Fridman1:52:00

This might be a good moment to bring up this idea that has been circulating recently brought up by Darryl Cooper, who hyperbolically stated that Churchill was the quote, chief villain of the Second World War.

现在可能是提出这个想法的好时机,达里尔·库珀最近提出了这个想法,他夸张地说丘吉尔是第二次世界大战的主要恶棍。

1:52:00 To give a good faith interpretation of that, I believe he meant that Churchill forced Hitler to escalate the expansion of Nazi Germany beyond Poland into a global war.

为了对此做出真诚的解释,我相信他的意思是丘吉尔迫使希特勒将纳粹德国的扩张升级为波兰以外的全球战争。

So Churchill is the one that turned this narrow war, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, into a global one.

因此,丘吉尔是将这场捷克斯洛伐克、奥地利、波兰之间的狭隘战争变成了全球战争的人。

Is that accurate?

准确吗?

James Holland1:52:41

No, I don’t think it is, not least because the decisions over Poland were made by Chamberlain’s government when Churchill was out of government.

不,我不这么认为,尤其是因为有关波兰的决定是在丘吉尔下台时由张伯伦政府做出的。

1:52:41 So Churchill wasn’t even involved in that decision-making process at the time.

所以丘吉尔当时甚至没有参与该决策过程。

No, I don’t think so.

不,我不这么认为。

Again, I go back to Britain’s position in the world in 1939.

我再次回顾 1939 年英国在世界上的地位。

If you say, “We are going to defend the sovereignty of Poland,” and then you don’t, that looks really bad globally.

如果你说,“我们要捍卫波兰的主权”,但你却不这么做,那么这在全球范围内看起来真的很糟糕。

Britain’s prestige would plummet.

英国的威望将会直线下降。

It would lead all sorts of problems.

这会导致各种各样的问题。

You are saying that you are giving carte blanche to dictators to just run amok and take whatever territory they want.

你们说你们全权委托独裁者胡作非为,夺取他们想要的任何领土。

You are risking a future upheaval of the global order away from democracies into the hands of dictators.

你正冒着未来全球秩序发生剧变的风险,从民主国家落入独裁者手中。

In the West people believe in democracy and believe in advancement of freedoms of people.

在西方,人们相信民主,相信人民自由的进步。

1:53:37 To echo the words of Roosevelt in August 1941, they’re responding to a world free of want and fear.

呼应罗斯福 1941 年 8 月的言论,他们正在应对一个没有匮乏和恐惧的世界。

Now obviously, there are still some issues with the form that democracy takes in the 1930s.

显然,20世纪30年代的民主形式仍然存在一些问题。

It’s not democratic for everyone.

这对每个人来说都不是民主的。

Try saying that if you are in Nigeria or India or whatever, or if you’re in the black Southern states of the United States.

尝试说如果你在尼日利亚或印度或其他地方,或者如果你在美国南部黑人各州。

But the aspirations are there.

但愿望就在那里。

And I think that’s an important distinction.

我认为这是一个重要的区别。

And I think by saying that Churchill is the chief warmonger of the Second World War, I think, is ludicrous.

我认为说丘吉尔是第二次世界大战的主要战争贩子是荒谬的。

It’s the same thing about the bombing.

爆炸事件也是如此。

The detractors of strategic air campaign always go, “Yeah, but Germans had the Holocaust, but weren’t the Allies just as bad just killing all those civilians?’ It’s like, no, because the moment Hitler stopped the war, the bombing would stop.

战略空袭的批评者总是说,“是的,但是德国人进行了大屠杀,但盟军不是同样糟糕,只是杀死了所有这些平民吗?”就像,不,因为希特勒一停止战争,轰炸就会停止。

The moment the war stopped in Hitler’s favor, the killing would continue and be accelerated.

一旦战争以对希特勒有利的方式停止,杀戮就会继续并加速。

Lex Fridman1:54:37

So the thing you mentioned initially is the idealist perspective of well, Britain can’t allow this warmonger to break all these pacts and be undemocratic, murder a large number of people and do conquests of territory.

所以你一开始提到的是理想主义的观点,英国不能允许这个好战分子破坏所有这些条约,不民主,谋杀大量人民,征服领土。

1:54:37 That’s idealistic.

这是理想主义的。

But if we look at the realist perspective, what decisions would minimize the amount of suffering on the continent in the next 50 years?

但如果我们从现实主义的角度来看,什么样的决定可以最大限度地减少非洲大陆在未来 50 年遭受的苦难?

So one of the arguments that he’s making, I happen to disagree with it, to put it mildly, is that Churchill increased the amount of suffering, so Churchill’s presence and decisions.

因此,他提出的论点之一,我碰巧不同意,温和地说,丘吉尔增加了痛苦,因此丘吉尔的存在和决定。

So we’re not talking about idealistic perspective, we’re talking about a realistic.

所以我们不是在谈论理想主义的观点,而是在谈论现实的观点。

The reality of the war of Stalin, of Hitler, of Churchill, of France and FDR, did Churchill drag Hitler into a world war?

斯大林、希特勒、丘吉尔、法国和罗斯福战争的现实,丘吉尔是否把希特勒拖入了世界大战?

Did he force Hitler to invade the Soviet Union?

他迫使希特勒入侵苏联吗?

Did he force Hitler to then attack Britain?

他是否迫使希特勒进攻英国?

James Holland1:56:03

Well, no, because Hitler was always going to invade the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Union invaded Germany first.

嗯,不,因为希特勒总是要入侵苏联,除非苏联首先入侵德国。

1:56:03 So that was always going to happen.

所以这种事总会发生。

No one asked Hitler to invade the low countries and Norway and Denmark and attack Britain.

没有人要求希特勒入侵低地国家以及挪威和丹麦并攻击英国。

He does that, of course, because he’s not given a free hand in Poland.

当然,他这样做是因为他在波兰没有自由行事。

But there’s no question that Hitler would have also wanted to subdue France or certainly turn France from a democracy into a totalitarian state as well.

但毫无疑问,希特勒也想征服法国,或者肯定也想将法国从民主国家变成极权国家。

I’m absolutely certain about that.

我对此绝对确定。

Lex Fridman1:56:40

So I think there’s pretty definitive evidence, it’s obvious from everything he’s said, from everything he’s written, from everything everywhere, that he was going to invade the Soviet Union no matter what.

所以我认为有相当明确的证据,从他所说的一切、他所写的一切、世界各地的一切,很明显,他无论如何都会入侵苏联。

1:56:40 And France?

法国呢?

Most likely yes also.

很可能也是。

James Holland1:56:55

He would have done a deal with Britain.

他本来会与英国达成协议。

1:56:55 Britain could have coexisted.

英国本可以共存。

Lex Fridman1:56:59

So actually, there is a possible reality, I don’t know, maybe you can correct me on this, where Hitler basically takes all of Europe except Britain.

所以实际上,有一个可能的现实,我不知道,也许你可以纠正我,希特勒基本上占领了除英国之外的整个欧洲。

James Holland1:57:10

Yes, but then he would have got so strong that he would have then turned on Britain as well, because the fear is that if you let him do this, then he gets greedy.

是的,但他会变得如此强大,以至于他也会转向英国,因为担心的是,如果你让他这样做,那么他会变得贪婪。

1:57:10 He wants the next one, then he wants the next one, then he wants the next one, and then he wants to take over the whole world.

他想要下一个,然后他想要下一个,然后他想要下一个,然后他想要接管整个世界。

That is the fear of the British.

这就是英国人的恐惧。

That is the fear of the Americans.

这就是美国人的恐惧。

That’s the fear of President Roosevelt.

这就是罗斯福总统的恐惧。

We haven’t even touched on this yet, but he has a very difficult case on his hands because he has come into power also in January of 1933 as President of the United States on an isolationist ticket with a retrenching, with a step away from the European old order.

我们还没有触及这一点,但他面临着一个非常困难的案子,因为他也是在 1933 年 1 月作为美国总统上台执政,他的主张是紧缩开支,远离欧洲旧秩序。

It’s time for the Europeans to stand on their own.

现在是欧洲人自力更生的时候了。

It all sounds very familiar right now.

这一切现在听起来很熟悉。

1:57:58 And suddenly he’s got to do this gargantuan political [inaudible 01:58:01] and prepare the nation for war because he also fears, like Churchill fears, like Chamberlain feared as well, that Hitler’s designs are not purely on Eastern Europe and the Lebensraum there, but would get ever bigger.

突然之间,他必须做这个巨大的政治[听不清 01:58:01] 并为国家做好战争准备,因为他也担心,就像丘吉尔的担心,也像张伯伦的担心一样,希特勒的计划并不纯粹是针对东欧和那里的生存空间,而是会变得越来越大。

And I don’t doubt that they’re right.

我毫不怀疑他们是对的。

I think if he’d prevailed in the Soviet Union, he’d have always wanted more, because his whole concept is the master race.

我认为,如果他在苏联获胜,他总是想要更多,因为他的整个概念就是优等种族。

Lex Fridman1:58:29

Yeah, I think it should be said if we measure human suffering, if there was not Britain on the other side, if it was not a two-front war, that the chances of Hitler succeeding in the Soviet Union is much higher, or at least a more prolonged war, and there would be more dead, more enslaved and more tortured in all of this.

是的,我认为应该说,如果我们衡量人类的苦难,如果另一边没有英国,如果不是两线战争,希特勒在苏联取得成功的机会要高得多,或者至少是一场更持久的战争,所有这一切都会有更多的死亡、更多的奴役和更多的折磨。

James Holland1:58:52

Yes and ditto.

是的,同上。

1:58:52 If the Allies hadn’t got involved against Imperial Japan, it would have been catastrophic.

如果盟军没有介入对抗日本帝国,那将是灾难性的。

20 to 30 million Chinese dead anyway with American and British intervention.

不管怎样,在美国和英国的干预下,有20到3000万中国人死亡。

What’s it going to be in China without that?

如果没有这个,中国会怎样?

And elsewhere.

还有其他地方。

Because the reason why Japan invades French Indochina, now Vietnam, and Hong Kong and Malaya and Singapore and so on, and Burma is because it’s not winning in China, and it needs more resources because it’s resource poor, and America has cut off the tap.

因为日本之所以入侵法属印度支那、现在的越南、香港、马来亚、新加坡等,还有缅甸,是因为它在中国没有获胜,它需要更多的资源,因为它的资源贫乏,而美国已经切断了水龙头。

So it’s going into these countries to get what it needs, its rubber and oil and natural resources and ores, precious ores and all the rest of it.

因此,它进入这些国家是为了获取它所需要的东西,橡胶、石油、自然资源和矿石、珍贵矿石和所有其他东西。

And if it had been unchecked, it would have done so, and then it would have absolutely built up its strength and overrun the whole of China with even more deaths.

而如果不加以制止,它就会这样做,然后它绝对会壮大力量,席卷整个华夏,死的人会更多。

1:59:55 So I think one of the interesting things about the Second World War is lots of wars and why people get involved in them are extremely questionable.

所以我认为第二次世界大战的一个有趣的事情是有很多战争,而人们为什么卷入其中是非常值得怀疑的。

But I think there is a moral crusade to the Allies and what they’re doing that I think is entirely justified.

但我认为盟军正在进行一场道德十字军东征,他们所做的事情我认为是完全合理的。

What I think is interesting also is that as the war progresses, if the Allies are supposed to be on the force of the good, how come they’re doing so much bad?

我认为有趣的是,随着战争的进展,如果盟军应该是善意的,为什么他们却做了这么多坏事呢?

And at what point is doing bad stopping you from doing good?

做坏事在什么时候会阻止你做好事?

And at what point are you doing good, but also doing bad at the same time?

什么时候你在做好事的同时又在做坏事?

Such as destruction of cities, destruction of monasteries on outcrops in southern Italy, killing of lots of civilians, et cetera, et cetera.

例如摧毁城市、摧毁意大利南部露头的修道院、杀害大量平民等等。

These are difficult questions to answer sometimes.

有时这些问题很难回答。

They’re also incredibly interesting, and I think that moral component starts to blur a little bit by middle of the war, by 1943.

它们也非常有趣,我认为到 1943 年战争中期,道德成分开始变得有点模糊。

It’s easy to have a fairly cut-and-dry war in North Africa, in the deserts of North Africa, where the only people getting in the way are a few Bedouin tribesmen or something.

在北非的沙漠里,很容易发生一场相当直接的战争,唯一阻碍的人就是一些贝都因部落成员或其他什么人。

2:01:10 But once you start getting into Europe or getting into the meat of highly populated countries in the Far East, for example, that’s a different color of fish because the scale of destruction is absolutely immense.

但是,一旦你开始进入欧洲或进入远东人口稠密国家的肉类,那么鱼的颜色就会不同,因为破坏的规模绝对是巨大的。

But it’s also the job of political leaders to look after and defend their own peoples first and foremost.

但政治领导人的职责也是首先照顾和捍卫自己的人民。

And so what you’re doing is you’re trying to protect your own sovereignty of your own people before you’re protecting other people.

因此,你所做的就是在保护其他人之前,先努力保护自己人民的主权。

And so that’s what leads to the whole way in which the the Western Allies are protracting war is to try and minimize the number of deaths of their own young men as much as they possibly can, whilst at the same time winning the war.

因此,这就是导致西方盟国拖延战争的整个方式的原因,就是试图尽可能地减少自己年轻人的死亡人数,同时赢得战争。

2:01:56 And that means bringing lots of destruction to your enemies, but also trying to minimize it.

这意味着给你的敌人带来大量破坏,但也要尽力将其最小化。

And the way you bring lots of destruction to your enemies is by using immense firepower and this concept of steel not our flesh, which I mentioned earlier on, and technology, so that you don’t have to bring to bear too many of your young men’s lives and you don’t have a repeat of the slaughter of the First World War.

你给敌人带来大量破坏的方式是使用巨大的火力和我之前提到的钢铁而不是肉体的概念和技术,这样你就不必承受太多年轻人的生命,也不会重蹈第一次世界大战的屠杀。

So it’s really interesting that in our mind’s eye, when we’re thinking of the Western Allies in the Second World War, probably the first thing that comes into mind is Americans jumping out of landing craft on Omaha Beach on D-Day, for example.

因此,非常有趣的是,在我们的脑海中,当我们想到第二次世界大战中的西方盟国时,首先想到的可能是美国人在诺曼底登陆日从奥马哈海滩上的登陆艇上跳下来。

Those are infantrymen, they’re the front line, they are the cold face, they’re the first people going into the fire of the enemy.

他们是步兵,他们是前线,他们是冷面,他们是第一批冲进敌人火力的人。

And we tend to think about guys in tanks, infantrymen with their Garand rifles or machine guns or whatever.

我们倾向于想到坦克里的人、拿着加兰德步枪或机关枪或其他什么的步兵。

That’s what springs to mind.

这就是我想到的。

2:02:48 Yet actually they’re a comparatively small proportion of the army.

但实际上他们只占军队的一小部分。

So no more than 14 to 15% of any army, Allied army, is infantry.

因此,任何军队(盟军)中步兵的比例不超过 14% 到 15%。

45% are service corps, service troops, driving trucks and cooks and bottle washers and people lugging great big boxes of stuff.

45%是服务队、服务部队、卡车司机、厨师、洗瓶工以及拖着大箱子东西的人。

And that’s because by that stage, the Allies have worked out the way of war, which is to use is what I call big war, this concept of a very long tail, logistics, the operational arts, making sure that people have the absolute best you possibly can, great medical care, huge advances in first aid and medical care of troops, getting them back onto the battlefield.

那是因为到了那个阶段,盟军已经找到了战争的方式,那就是使用我所说的大规模战争,这种非常长的尾巴概念,后勤,作战艺术,确保人们拥有绝对最好的,良好的医疗保健,在急救和部队医疗方面的巨大进步,让他们回到战场。

And you’re using firepower and technology and mechanization to do a lot of your hard yards.

你正在使用火力、技术和机械化来完成你的许多硬庭院。

So that’s the principle behind strategic bombing.

这就是战略轰炸背后的原理。

2:03:37 If you go over and bomb and you can destroy infrastructure and civilians and households, that makes it much harder for Krupp to make those Panzer tanks and tiger tanks or whatever it might be, and guns, and you’re disrupting the transportation system in Germany, you’re making life difficult for them to do what they need to do, then that means it’s going to be easier for those 14, 15% of infantry when you’ve got to jump out of a landing craft to do their job.

如果你去轰炸,你可以摧毁基础设施、平民和家庭,这会让克虏伯更难制造那些装甲坦克和虎式坦克或其他什么东西,还有枪支,而且你扰乱了德国的交通系统,你让他们的生活变得困难,让他们做他们需要做的事情,那么这意味着当你必须从登陆艇上跳下来完成他们的工作时,这意味着对于那14%、15%的步兵来说,这会更容易。

And you’re trying to keep that to a minimum.

你正试图将其保持在最低限度。

And you’d have to say, broadly speaking, that’s a very sensible policy that makes an awful lot of sense.

你不得不说,从广义上讲,这是一项非常明智的政策,意义重大。

The consequence of that is a huge amount of destruction, and maybe that’s what Darryl Cooper’s driving at.

其后果是巨大的破坏,也许这就是达里尔·库珀的目的。

But no one asked Hitler to invade Poland.

但没有人要求希特勒入侵波兰。

That is the bottom line.

这是底线。

No one asked Germany to go to war.

没有人要求德国参战。

No one asked Hitler to come up with this ludicrous ideology.

没有人要求希特勒提出这种荒唐的意识形态。

Lex Fridman2:04:30

There’s complex ethical discussions here about just as you described.

正如您所描述的那样,这里存在复杂的道德讨论。

James Holland2:04:36

Which are fascinating.

哪些令人着迷。

Lex Fridman2:04:37

Which are fascinating.

哪些令人着迷。

2:04:37 And war is hell, and there’s many ways in which it is hell.

战争就是地狱,而且它在很多方面都是地狱。

Just for a little bit, the steel man, what Darryl, where he might be coming from is since World War II, the simplistic veneration of Churchill, so saying Churchill good, Hitler bad, has been used as a template to project other conflicts to justify military intervention.

就一点而言,钢铁侠,达里尔,他可能来自二战以来,对丘吉尔的简单化崇拜,所以说丘吉尔好,希特勒坏,已被用作模板来投射其他冲突,以证明军事干预的合理性。

And so his and other people like Libertarians, for example, resistance to that overly simplistic veneration of somebody like Churchill has to do with the fact that that seems to be by neocons or warmongers in the military industrial complex in the United States and elsewhere, using Hitler way too much, using Churchill way too much to justify invading everywhere and anywhere.

因此,他和其他像自由主义者这样的人,例如,对像丘吉尔这样的人过于简单化的崇拜的抵制与这样一个事实有关:这似乎是美国和其他地方的军事工业联合体中的新保守派或战争贩子过多地利用希特勒,过多地利用丘吉尔来为无处不在的入侵辩护。

James Holland2:05:42

Well, I do agree with that.

嗯,我确实同意这一点。

2:05:42 I think oversimplification of anything is a mistake.

我认为任何事情过于简单化都是错误的。

Life is nuanced.

生活是微妙的。

The past is nuanced.

过去是微妙的。

It’s okay to be proud about certain things, and it’s okay to be disgusted by other things.

对某些事情感到自豪是可以的,对其他事情感到厌恶也是可以的。

That’s absolutely fine.

那绝对没问题。

We have a complicated relationship with our past.

我们与过去有着复杂的关系。

It doesn’t need to be black and white, and life is not a straight line.

它不需要非黑即白,生活也不是一条直线。

And of course, the Allies made plenty of mistakes in World War II.

当然,盟军在第二次世界大战中犯了很多错误。

Overall, I think they made the right calls.

总的来说,我认为他们做出了正确的决定。

And I think one of the things that’s really interesting is I think that the Allies, for the most part, use their resources much more judiciously and sensibly than the Axis powers do.

我认为真正有趣的事情之一是我认为同盟国在很大程度上比轴心国更明智和明智地使用他们的资源。

And good, because that means they prevail.

这很好,因为这意味着他们获胜了。

2:06:28 I think there are so many lessons from World War II that could have been brought into the history of the last 30 years, which weren’t, such as if you decapitate an incredibly strong leader, you get a power vacuum.

我认为二战中有很多教训本可以纳入过去 30 年的历史中,但事实并非如此,比如如果你斩首一位极其强大的领导人,你就会陷入权力真空。

And if you don’t have a solution for that power vacuum, lots of bad elements are going to sweep into that in very quick order, which of course, is exactly what happens in Iraq.

如果你没有解决权力真空的办法,许多坏因素就会很快席卷其中,当然,这正是伊拉克所发生的情况。

So Donald Rumsfeld is going, “We don’t do reconstruction.” Well, you freaking well should do.

所以唐纳德拉姆斯菲尔德会说,“我们不进行重建。”好吧,你应该这么做。

If you’re going to take on this particular challenge, you’ve got to see it through.

如果你要接受这个特殊的挑战,你就必须坚持到底。

That’s simply not good enough.

这还不够好。

It’s not good enough to go into Afghanistan and go, “We’re going to change things around.

进入阿富汗并说“我们要改变周围的事情”是不够的。

It’s going to be great.

会很棒的。

All the women are going to have education.

所有妇女都将接受教育。

They won’t have to cover up their bodies anymore.

他们不必再遮盖自己的身体了。

Anything goes.

一切都会发生。

We love liberalism.

我们热爱自由主义。

It’s great.

这很棒。

Let’s make Kabul into a thriving city once more,” and then suddenly bug out.

让我们让喀布尔再次成为一座繁荣的城市”,然后突然消失了。

Because what’s going to happen?

因为会发生什么?

You’re going to undo everything.

你将撤销一切。

2:07:31 And this is a bit of a segue, Lex, but I remember being in northern Helmand Province back in, when was it?

这有点绕,莱克斯,但我记得当时在赫尔曼德省北部,那是什么时候?

January 2008.

2008 年 1 月。

And British troops had just taken over an absolute dump of a town called Musa Qala, and I remember talking to this Afghan guy.

英国军队刚刚占领了一个叫做穆萨卡拉的城镇的垃圾场,我记得和这个阿富汗人交谈过。

He just had all his willow trees chopped down to make room for a helipad the Allies wanted, which they put those cages with rubble in the protective wall.

他刚刚砍掉了所有的柳树,为盟军想要的直升机停机坪腾出空间,他们将那些装有碎石的笼子放在防护墙上。

Is it called HESCO?

是叫HESCO吗?

I think it was called.

我认为是这样称呼的。

Anyway, I said to him, “What do you think about the British being there?” And he just went and shrugged at me and lifted up his hands and said, “Well, if they stayed great, but they won’t.” And he said, “If they stay, then brilliant.” But he said, “I’ll tell you what he said, Taliban weren’t great, they weren’t fantastic.” He said, “But I could leave my purse on the wall and no one would touch it.

不管怎样,我对他说:“你觉得英国人在那里怎么样?”他只是走过去对我耸耸肩,举起双手说:“好吧,如果他们保持出色的话,但他们不会。”他说:“如果他们留下来,那就太棒了。”但他说,“我告诉你他说的话,塔利班并不伟大,他们并不出色。”他说:“但我可以把钱包放在墙上,没人会碰它。

I could leave it on a wall for a week and no one would touch it.” He said, “Will they bring that kind of order?

我可以把它放在墙上一周,没有人会碰它。”他说:“他们会发出这样的命令吗?

Will we have peace here?

我们这里会有和平吗?

They’ve just chopped down my willow trees.

他们刚刚砍倒了我的柳树。

Thanks a lot.”

多谢。”

2:08:39 You’re seeing a total lack of understanding of the culture, ethnic differences.

你会发现人们完全缺乏对文化和种族差异的理解。

You’re trying to impose a Western-centric view onto a nation which isn’t ready for that.

你试图将一种以西方为中心的观点强加给一个还没有做好准备的国家。

Now, there are ways in which it looked like Afghanistan was starting to emerge, and there was a path, and then just at the critical moment, the West moves out with catastrophic consequences.

现在,从某些方面来看,阿富汗似乎开始出现,并且有一条道路,然后就在关键时刻,西方撤出了,带来了灾难性后果。

What you have to say though is that in the West post-1945, the rehabilitation of Italy, of Japan, of Western Germany was really good.

但你不得不说的是,1945年后的西方,意大利、日本、西德的复兴确实很好。

The consequence of all that destruction, all that turmoil was thriving, high-producing democracies, which burst forth into the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century in pretty good order.

所有这些破坏和动乱的结果是繁荣、高产的民主国家,它们在 20 世纪下半叶和 21 世纪井然有序地蓬勃发展。

So the lessons of the previous generation, from the First World War, had been learned, even though the scale of destruction, the displacement of people is unprecedented in 1945.

因此,上一代人从第一次世界大战中吸取了教训,尽管 1945 年的破坏规模和人民流离失所是前所未有的。

Lex Fridman2:09:57

In 1939, what was the state of the militaries?

1939年,军队状况如何?

2:09:57 What were the most powerful militaries on the world’s stage at that time?

当时世界舞台上最强大的军队是什么?

James Holland2:10:04

Well, in terms of naval power, Britain, as we’ve already discussed, and the United States.

嗯,就海军力量而言,我们已经讨论过英国和美国。

2:10:04 France has a pretty large navy.

法国拥有一支相当庞大的海军。

Japan has a pretty large navy.

日本拥有相当庞大的海军。

Italy has a pretty large navy, but Italy’s navy is, by far and away, the most modern aspect of its three services, air, land, and sea, but it doesn’t have any aircraft carriers and it doesn’t have any radar.

意大利拥有一支相当庞大的海军,但意大利海军无疑是其海陆空三大军种中最现代化的,但它没有任何航空母舰,也没有任何雷达。

So they’ve got modern battleships and battle cruisers, but without key modern bits of technology.

因此,他们拥有现代战列舰和战列巡洋舰,但没有关键的现代技术。

Lex Fridman2:10:32

So Italy is really not ready for it.

所以意大利确实还没有做好准备。

James Holland2:10:34

Oh, it’s so not.

哦,原来不是。

2:10:34 It’s so not.

事实并非如此。

It’s just, again, both Hitler and Mussolini, they lack geopolitical understanding.

只是希特勒和墨索里尼都缺乏地缘政治了解。

That’s because they’re so focused on their narrow worldview, and they view everything through that prism, but they can’t see that bigger picture.

那是因为他们太专注于狭隘的世界观,他们通过棱镜看待一切,但他们看不到更大的图景。

Lex Fridman2:10:51

And we should say that Mussolini, maybe you can correct me, but I don’t think at any point he wants a war.

我们应该说,墨索里尼,也许你可以纠正我,但我认为他在任何时候都不想爆发战争。

James Holland2:10:57

He doesn’t want a war.

他不想要战争。

2:10:57 What he does want is he wants his own new Roman Empire, which extends over the Mediterranean, certainly the eastern half of the Mediterranean, North Africa, all the way down to East Africa, controlling the Suez Canal.

他真正想要的是他想要自己的新罗马帝国,它横跨地中海,当然是地中海东半部、北非,一直到东非,控制着苏伊士运河。

That’s what he wants.

这就是他想要的。

Lex Fridman2:11:13

And I think he made clear that he was …

我认为他明确表示他是……

2:11:13 There was always this little brother, jealous-of-Hitler situation because he wanted absolute power the way Hitler did.

总是有这个弟弟嫉妒希特勒的情况,因为他像希特勒一样想要绝对权力。

James Holland2:11:24

But doesn’t have it.

但没有它。

Lex Fridman2:11:24

He doesn’t have it.

他没有。

2:11:24 And he described-

他描述了——

James Holland2:11:26

Because he’s the king.

因为他是国王。

Lex Fridman2:11:26

Yeah, there’s a-

是的,有一个——

James Holland2:11:27

Monarchy.

君主制。

2:11:27 Often forgotten.

经常被遗忘。

It’s amazing.

太棒了。

Lex Fridman2:11:31

So there’s always this limit.

所以总是有这个限制。

2:11:31 And Hitler, quite brilliantly, once he gets some power, he takes it all, complete.

而希特勒,非常出色,一旦他获得了一些权力,他就会完全夺取一切。

James Holland2:11:41

He completely emasculates Mussolini.

他彻底阉割了墨索里尼。

2:11:41 And he likes him though.

而且他还是喜欢他。

It’s really weird.

真的很奇怪。

Even when Mussolini is about to fall in July 1943, he has a meeting at Feltre just literally a few days before Mussolini tumbles.

即使 1943 年 7 月墨索里尼即将倒台,他也在费尔特雷举行了一次会议,而就在墨索里尼倒台的前几天。

And he does that because he likes Mussolini.

他这样做是因为他喜欢墨索里尼。

He likes him as a man and thinks he’s been his friend, and he respects him to a certain extent, even though he definitely views himself as top dog.

他喜欢他这个男人,认为他是他的朋友,并且在一定程度上尊重他,尽管他绝对认为自己是最棒的。

Hitler does, that is.

希特勒就是这么做的。

So it’s curious because I don’t think Hitler particularly likes anyone really, but he does seem to Mussolini.

所以这很奇怪,因为我认为希特勒并不特别喜欢任何人,但墨索里尼确实喜欢他。

But anyway, the problem with Mussolini is Mussolini’s Italy is very impoverished from the First World War, and that, of course, leads to the rise of fascism and the overthrow of parliamentary democracy and why Mussolini takes place in the first place.

但无论如何,墨索里尼的问题是墨索里尼的意大利在第一次世界大战中非常贫穷,这当然导致了法西斯主义的兴起和议会民主的推翻,这也是墨索里尼首先上台的原因。

Again, it’s that there’s been this terrible disruption.

再说一遍,这是一次可怕的破坏。

There’s been financial crisis.

出现了金融危机。

That leads to people looking at an alternative.

这导致人们寻找替代方案。

2:12:42 What’s the alternative?

还有什么选择呢?

Well, Mussolini is going, “We can be proud Italians again,” lots of chest thumping, wearing great uniforms, all the rest of it.

好吧,墨索里尼会说,“我们可以再次成为自豪的意大利人”,胸口重重地拍打,穿着漂亮的制服,等等。

And people think, “Well, I want a piece of that,” and it works, and proverbially the trains work on time under him, and so on and so forth.

人们会想,“好吧,我想要一块,”它起作用了,众所周知,在他的领导下火车准时运行,等等。

But he just gets ahead of himself.

但他只是超前了。

And actually the writings on the war in 1935 when he goes into Abyssinia, and again, what effectively are by first world European standards primitive tribesmen in Abyssinia, they have quite a tough fight there.

事实上,他在 1935 年进入阿比西尼亚时写了关于战争的著作,而且,按照第一世界欧洲标准,阿比西尼亚的原始部落居民实际上是在那里进行了一场艰苦的战斗。

They do prevail, but it’s not a complete walkover.

他们确实占了上风,但这并不是完全的胜利。

And they get a bit of a bloody nose at times, and they shouldn’t have done.

他们有时会流鼻血,但他们不应该这样做。

2:13:22 And they’re just not ready.

他们只是还没有准备好。

They don’t have the industry.

他们没有这个产业。

They’re tied up into the Mediterranean.

他们被束缚在地中海上。

They don’t have access to the world’s oceans.

他们无法进入世界海洋。

They do have some merchant shipping, but not a huge amount.

他们确实有一些商业运输,但数量不多。

They just don’t have what is required.

他们只是没有所需的东西。

They’re dependent on Britain for coal.

他们依赖英国的煤炭。

Britain is the leading coal exporter in the world in the 1930s.

英国是 20 世纪 30 年代世界领先的煤炭出口国。

So Britain’s approach to fascist Spain and approach to fascist Italy has been very much stick and carrot.

因此,英国对法西斯西班牙和法西斯意大利的态度一直是大棒加胡萝卜。

It’s like, we’ll let you do what you do as long as you stay in your box, and we’ll continue to provide you with supplies and coal and whatever it is you need as long as you don’t go too far.

就像,只要你待在盒子里,我们就会让你做你该做的事,只要你不走得太远,我们就会继续为你提供补给和煤炭以及任何你需要的东西。

2:14:05 And so that’s why Mussolini is very anxious in 1938, and again in 1939, to be the power broker and not let Germany go to war.

这就是为什么墨索里尼在 1938 年和 1939 年都非常渴望成为权力掮客,不让德国陷入战争。

But Germany, they signed the Axis Pact of Steel in May 1939, where they become formal allies, this is Hitler and Mussolini, Italy and Germany.

但是德国,他们在1939年5月签署了《轴心国钢铁条约》,成为正式盟友,这是希特勒和墨索里尼、意大利和德国。

But it’s always a very, very unequal partnership right from the word go.

但这从一开始就是一种非常非常不平等的伙伴关系。

And one of the reasons Mussolini signs it is because he fears that Germany has designs on Italy.

墨索里尼签署的原因之一是他担心德国对意大利有图谋。

It’s not because he thinks, oh, these guys are great, they’re our natural bedfellows.

这并不是因为他认为,哦,这些人很棒,他们是我们天然的同床异梦。

It’s a mutually convenient pact whereby Germany gets on with whatever it wants to do up in Northern Europe and Eastern Europe.

这是一项双方都方便的协议,德国可以在北欧和东欧为所欲为。

Italy is given a free hand to do whatever it wants to do.

意大利可以自由地做任何它想做的事。

They’ll just watch each other’s backs.

他们只会看着彼此的背影。

They have borders, Austria and Italy border one another, and they’ll just do their own thing, and they’ll help each other out with supplies and stuff.

他们有边界,奥地利和意大利彼此接壤,他们只会做自己的事情,他们会在物资和物品方面互相帮助。

But basically they’ll be their own …

但基本上他们将是他们自己的......

It’s a marriage of convenience.

这是一场权宜婚姻。

2:15:09 They’re never expecting to be fighting alongside each other on the battlefield.

他们从来没想过要在战场上并肩作战。

Not really.

并不真地。

There is a kind of obligation to do so, but it’s an obligation with no expectation of it ever actually happening.

有一种这样做的义务,但这是一种不期望它真正发生的义务。

And so from Mussolini’s point of view, the Pact of Steel is just sailing your flag to one particular mast and trying to cover your back.

因此,从墨索里尼的角度来看,钢铁条约只是将你的旗帜悬挂在一根特定的桅杆上,并试图掩护你的背部。

And so long as he plays his cards right, he can still get his coal supplies from Britain, and he doesn’t have to worry about that.

只要他打得好,他仍然可以从英国获得煤炭供应,而他不必担心这一点。

And the Pact of Steel doesn’t make any difference to that.

钢铁契约对此没有任何影响。

The problem for him is that in June 1940, he thinks that France is about to be defeated and that Britain will surely follow.

他面临的问题是,在 1940 年 6 月,他认为法国即将被击败,而英国也肯定会紧随其后。

2:15:48 And so he thinks, ah, I’ve got some rich pickings.

所以他想,啊,我有一些丰富的选择。

I can take Malta, I can take British possessions, I can overrun Egypt and now is my time, but I also need to join the fight before France is completely out of the fight.

我可以占领马耳他,我可以占领英国领土,我可以占领埃及,现在是我的时候了,但我还需要在法国完全退出战斗之前加入战斗。

Otherwise, it looks like I’m a Johnny-come-lately, and I won’t get those spoils because the Germans will go, “You can’t have all this stuff.

否则,看起来我就像是一个迟到的约翰尼,我不会得到那些战利品,因为德国人会说,“你不能拥有所有这些东西。

You’ve turned up too late.

你来得太晚了。

You need to be in the fight.” So he does it in what he thinks is the perfect timing.

你需要参加战斗。”所以他在他认为最完美的时机做了这件事。

And it turns out to be a catastrophic timing because of course, Britain doesn’t exit the fight.

事实证明这是一个灾难性的时机,因为英国当然不会退出战斗。

Britain is still there.

英国还在。

And by February 1941, a very, very tiny British army in Egypt has overrun two entire Italian armies and taken 133,000 prisoners in North Africa.

到 1941 年 2 月,驻扎在埃及的一支非常非常小的英国军队已经击溃了两支意大利军队,并在北非俘虏了 133,000 名战俘。

Lex Fridman2:16:26

So you mentioned in the sea who were the dominant armies.

所以你提到在海上谁是占主导地位的军队。

2:16:26 Who was dominant in the air?

谁在空中占据主导地位?

James Holland2:16:33

Well, in the air it has to be the Luftwaffe, and it is also the Imperial Japanese, both in the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army.

好吧,在空中它必须是德国空军,而且它也是日本帝国,无论是日本帝国海军还是日本帝国陆军。

2:16:33 They both have air forces.

他们都有空军。

And one of the reasons for that is because the quality of the pilots in Japan is extremely high, because it’s so difficult to get to the top position.

原因之一是因为日本飞行员的素质非常高,因为要达到最高位置非常困难。

You are going to your frontline squadrons with at least 500 hours in your logbook.

你要去前线中队,你的日志中至少有 500 个小时。

To put that into some perspective, a British RAF or Luftwaffe pilot will be joining their frontline squadrons with 150 to 170 hours in the logbook.

从某种角度来看,英国皇家空军或德国空军飞行员将加入他们的前线中队,飞行日志中将有 150 至 170 小时的飞行时间。

So these guys are disciplined within an inch of their lives.

所以这些家伙在他们的生活中受到了纪律处分。

There are academic tests as well as physical endurance tests.

有学术测试和身体耐力测试。

They are the elite of the elite, and they are extremely good.

他们都是精英中的精英,而且都非常优秀。

2:17:20 The problem they have is that there is a good number of them, but there’s not that many.

他们面临的问题是,他们的数量很多,但数量并不多。

The Luftwaffe is the largest air force in the world in 1939, but it is already at a parity in aircraft production with Britain, and the French have a similar size army, but they’re very, very badly organized.

德国空军在 1939 年是世界上最大的空军,但它的飞机产量已经与英国持平,法国也有类似规模的军队,但他们的组织非常非常糟糕。

So they’re organized into different regions, and one region is not really talking to another.

因此,它们被组织成不同的区域,而一个区域并没有真正与另一个区域对话。

And one of the problems when Case Yellow, the invasion German invasion of the West starts, France’s army of the air is spread throughout France and has its own little area.

当黄色事件发生时,问题之一是德国入侵西方开始,法国的空中军队遍布法国各地,并拥有自己的一小块区域。

So you have one bunch of fighters and bombers in that block in the Marseille area.

所以在马赛地区的那个街区有一群战斗机和轰炸机。

You have another block on the Brittany coast, and you have another block around Sudan, and you have another that.

你在布列塔尼海岸有另一个街区,在苏丹周围有另一个街区,还有另一个街区。

2:18:07 So consequently, they’re never able to bring their full strength to bear.

因此,他们永远无法发挥出全部力量。

So although they’ve both got about three-and-a-half thousand aircraft on paper and about two-and-a-half thousand that are fit to fly on any one given day, the Luftwaffe, because they’re the aggressor, could choose how they amass their aircraft and where they attack and when.

因此,尽管他们都拥有大约三千架飞机和大约两千架适合在任何一天飞行的飞机,但德国空军,因为他们是侵略者,可以选择他们如何聚集他们的飞机以及他们攻击的地点和时间。

So in other words, the Luftwaffe can send over overwhelming amounts of bombers and fighter planes and pulverize a French airfield and catch them napping.

换句话说,德国空军可以派出大量轰炸机和战斗机,摧毁法国机场,让他们打瞌睡。

And because the French don’t have a defense system, they can’t see whether they’re coming.

而且因为法国人没有防御系统,所以他们看不到他们是否来了。

So their only hope is to take off and just hope they stooge around the sky and hope they bump into some Luftwaffe.

所以他们唯一的希望就是起飞,只希望他们在天空中走来走去,希望他们能撞上一些德国空军。

Of course, that’s inherently inefficient, and they get destroyed, and they get destroyed in penny packets rather than en masse.

当然,这本质上是低效的,并且它们会被销毁,并且它们会以便士包的形式被销毁,而不是集体销毁。

2:18:56 The difference with the RAF is the RAF is not done on an Air Force basis where each air corps or air fleet has a handful of bombers, a handful of fighters, a handful of reconnaissance planes.

与英国皇家空军的不同之处在于,英国皇家空军不是以空军为基础的,每个空军军或空军机队都拥有少量轰炸机、少量战斗机、少量侦察机。

They have different commands.

他们有不同的命令。

So they have bomber command, fighter command, training command, coastal command, and they all have very specific roles, so they’re structured in a completely different way.

所以他们有轰炸机指挥部、战斗机指挥部、训练指挥部、沿海指挥部,他们都有非常具体的角色,所以他们的结构完全不同。

And that’s because they’re an island nation and because they see their role militarily in a different way and because the re-arming that Britain has done in the 1930s is all about defense.

这是因为他们是一个岛国,因为他们以不同的方式看待自己的军事角色,而且因为英国在 20 世纪 30 年代所做的重新武装都是为了防御。

It is not about aggression at this point, not about taking it to the enemy.

此时此刻,这不是侵略,也不是将其带给敌人。

It is showing you are tough, but also first and foremost, getting your ducks in a row and making sure that you don’t get defeated.

这表明你很坚强,但首先也是最重要的是,让你的鸭子排成一排并确保你不会被击败。

2:19:43 So this is the principle behind the world’s first fully coordinated air defense system, which is the radar chain.

这就是世界上第一个完全协调的防空系统,即雷达链背后的原理。

It is the observer corps, it is control rooms, it is interesting technology such as Identification Friend or Foe, IFF, which is where you have a little pulse.

这是观察团,是控制室,是敌我识别、敌我识别等有趣的技术,这是你有一点脉搏的地方。

So you have these control rooms, and you have a map table, and you have a-

所以你有这些控制室,你有一个地图表,你有一个-

2:20:00 …

……

So you have these control rooms and you have a map table, and you have a tote board in front of you where you can see what squadrons are airborne, what stage of readiness they’re at, whether they’re engaging the enemy, little lights come on and show you.

所以你有这些控制室,你有一个地图桌,你面前有一个手提板,你可以在上面看到哪些中队正在空降,他们处于什么准备阶段,他们是否正在与敌人交战,小灯会亮起来告诉你。

You can see weather maps, you can see the cloud ceiling, you see all that at a glance.

你可以看到天气图,你可以看到云顶,你一目了然。

Then you are on a dais and then down in front of you is a massive great map of Southern England.

然后你站在讲台上,然后在你面前的是一张巨大的英格兰南部地图。

You’ve got croupiers, sort of moving plots, so you can, through a combination of radar, which picks up a rough idea of what’s coming towards you combined with the Observer Corps, you have overlapping Observer Corps stations all over Britain covering every single inch of airspace over Britain, looking up into the air and seeing how many aircraft there are and at what height they are.

你有荷官,有点移动的情节,所以你可以通过雷达的组合,与观察员军团结合,大致了解即将到来的情况,你在英国各地都有重叠的观察员军团站,覆盖英国上空的每一寸领空,抬头看看空中,看看有多少架飞机以及它们的高度。

2:20:43 And you have a little thing called a pantograph, which is a piece of equipment which helps you judge altitude.

还有一个叫做受电弓的小东西,它是一种可以帮助你判断高度的设备。

You then ring through that.

然后你就可以拨通了。

That all comes into the control room along with the information from the radar stations, which is going into a single filter room at Fighter Command Headquarters, which is then being pushed straight back out to the sector stations.

所有这些都与来自雷达站的信息一起进入控制室,这些信息将进入战斗机司令部总部的一个过滤室,然后被直接推回各区站。

So this information is being updated all the time.

所以这个信息一直在更新。

So you have a plot and it looks like it might be enemy bombers 30-plus, for example.

例如,您有一个情节,看起来可能是敌方 30 架以上的轰炸机。

That’s constantly being adapted.

这是不断调整的。

So as more information comes in, you would change that and then you can see that actually it’s only 20 aircraft or 22 aircraft or whatever.

因此,随着更多信息的出现,你会改变它,然后你会发现实际上只有 20 架飞机或 22 架飞机或其他什么。

2:21:21 So you’re updating that and that little figure is put on your little plot and moved across and so you can see, and then because you can identify your own aircraft, you can then see where they are moving.

所以你正在更新它,那个小数字被放在你的小地块上并移动,这样你就可以看到,然后因为你可以识别你自己的飞机,所以你可以看到它们正在移动的地方。

And you’re also on, the guys in the air are on the radio to ground controllers, who are in these control rooms and they’re saying, “Okay, well if you proceed at angels 18, 18,000 feet on a vector of 150 degrees, you should be seeing your enemy bombing formation any moment now.” And what that means is that you are not on the ground when the enemy are coming towards you with their bombers to hit your airfield, which means you are in the air, so that all they’re doing is hitting a grass airfield, which you’ve already got bulldozers and diggers and graders and lots of scalping and earth ready to fill in the potholes.

而且你也在,空中的人正在通过无线电向地面控制人员发送信息,地面控制人员在这些控制室里,他们说,“好吧,如果你在 18,000 英尺高度上以 150 度的矢量前进,你现在应该随时都能看到敌人的轰炸编队。”这意味着,当敌人带着轰炸机向你袭来攻击你的机场时,你并不在地面上,这意味着你在空中,所以他们所做的只是攻击草地机场,而你已经有了推土机、挖掘机、平地机以及大量的剥皮机和泥土,准备填补坑洼。

And it means you’re good to go.

这意味着你可以走了。

2:22:13 And it means as a consequence of all that, when the Germans do launch their all out assault on Adlertag, Eagle Day on the 13th of August 1940, the British are ready.

这意味着,当德国人在 1940 年 8 月 13 日鹰日对阿德勒塔格发动全面进攻时,英国人已经做好了准备。

They can see them coming.

他们可以看到他们来了。

They know what to expect and they can anticipate, and it means that they’re not being caught with their trousers down on the ground.

他们知道会发生什么并且可以预见,这意味着他们不会因为裤子掉在地上而被抓住。

As a consequence of that, of the 138 RAF airfields that there are in Britain, only one of them is knocked out for more than 48 hours in the entire summer of 1940.

结果,在英国 138 个英国皇家空军机场中,只有一个机场在 1940 年整个夏天被毁坏了 48 小时以上。

And that’s Manston on the tip of the Kent Coast, which was abandoned for the duration.

那就是位于肯特海岸顶端的曼斯顿,在此期间这里被遗弃了。

Lex Fridman2:22:48

So these are the two biggest Air Forces?

那么这是两个最大的空军吗?

James Holland2:22:51

So those are the two biggest Air Forces.

这是两个最大的空军。

Lex Fridman2:22:52

So Luftwaffe, we should say German, I mean they’re like the legendary, the terrifying Air Force.

所以德国空军,我们应该说德国空军,我的意思是他们就像传说中的、可怕的空军。

James Holland2:23:02

They are.

他们是。

Lex Fridman2:23:04

Maybe-

也许-

James Holland2:23:05

They’re slightly believing their own hype.

他们有点相信自己的炒作。

2:23:05 There’s no question about it.

毫无疑问。

Lex Fridman2:23:08

Well, the rest of the world is also, right?

嗯,世界其他地方也是如此,对吧?

James Holland2:23:09

They’ve just had it too easy.

他们实在是太容易了。

2:23:09 So they don’t have ground controllers, they don’t have an air defense system in Germany because why would you need an air defense system, we’re going to be the aggressor.

所以他们没有地面控制器,他们在德国没有防空系统,因为为什么需要防空系统,我们将成为侵略者。

There’s no scenario where we’ll have to defend the airspace of the Third Reich because we’re on the offensive.

我们不会因为处于进攻状态而必须保卫第三帝国的领空。

So they just haven’t prepared it.

所以他们只是还没有准备好。

Lex Fridman2:23:27

So there’s that clash, the Battle of Britain, the clash of Air Forces.

所以这就是冲突,不列颠之战,空军的冲突。

2:23:27 What explains the success of Britain in defending?

英国卫冕成功的原因是什么?

James Holland2:23:36

Well, everyone always says, the few were the last line of defense against the Nazi hordes and all this kind of stuff, and it’s all rubbish.

好吧,每个人总是说,少数人是对抗纳粹部落和所有此类东西的最后一道防线,但这都是垃圾。

2:23:36 They’re the first line of defense.

他们是第一道防线。

Second line of defense is the Royal Navy, which is the world’s largest, and there’s absolutely no chance on earth that a German invasion force made up of Rhine River barges, one out of every three is motorized, and the other two aren’t, is ever going to get successfully across the English Channel and even if they did, they will be repulsed.

第二道防线是英国皇家海军,它是世界上最大的防线,由莱茵河驳船组成的德国入侵部队(三分之一是机动化的,另外两艘不是机动化的)绝对不可能成功穿越英吉利海峡,即使他们成功了,也会被击退。

There’s just no chance.

只是没有机会。

And it is often forgotten that while the Luftwaffe is coming over and bombing Britain every single day, so is the RAF going over and bombing Germany and one of the problems that the Germans have is that these bombers need fighter protection.

人们常常忘记,虽然德国空军每天都在轰炸英国,但英国皇家空军也在轰炸德国,而德国面临的问题之一是这些轰炸机需要战斗机保护。

Fighter planes are there to protect the bombers and they don’t have much fuel.

战斗机是用来保护轰炸机的,但它们没有太多燃料。

2:24:28 And the Messerschmitt-109E, the Emil, as a model of 1940 is the mainstay of the German fighter force in the summer of 1940.

而梅塞施密特-109E,即埃米尔,作为1940年的型号,是1940年夏天德国战斗机部队的中流砥柱。

And they don’t have much fuel.

而且他们没有太多燃料。

So they need to conserve their fuel, which means they need to be as close to Britain as they possibly can, which is why the majority of them are all in airfields, which are hastily created in July 1940 following the fall of France in the Pas-de-Calais, which is the closest point.

因此,他们需要节省燃料,这意味着他们需要尽可能靠近英国,这就是为什么他们中的大多数都在机场中,这些机场是 1940 年 7 月法国陷落后在加莱海峡匆忙建造的,这是最近的点。

That’s where the Channel is at its narrowest and all the rest of it, and also in the Northern Normandy, and that’s where they’re flying from.

那是英吉利海峡及其其余部分最狭窄的地方,也是诺曼底北部的地方,也是他们起飞的地方。

2:24:59 But what that means is that even if you are completely rubbish bombing, which the British are in 1940, they haven’t developed those navigational aids that create untold accuracy by the end of the war, in 1940 they don’t have that luxury, it’s a target-rich environment.

但这意味着,即使你的轰炸完全是垃圾轰炸,就像英国在 1940 年所做的那样,他们还没有开发出那些在战争结束时创造出难以估量的准确性的导航设备,在 1940 年,他们没有那种奢侈,这是一个目标丰富的环境。

You can barely miss, if you go over to the Pas-de-Calais.

如果您前往加来海峡,您几乎不会错过。

It is literally, it’s just like one huge great kind of hub of fighter airfields.

从字面上看,它就像一个巨大的战斗机机场中心。

And consequently, that means that every single German squadron, which only is 12 airplanes strong on establishment and very often even fewer than that, always has to leave two airplanes behind to defend their own airfields.

因此,这意味着每个德国中队都必须留下两架飞机来保卫自己的机场,尽管其编制数量只有 12 架飞机,而且往往数量甚至更少。

2:25:36 And it’s really interesting when you look at prisoner war statements from Luftwaffe ground crew that have been downed, they’re all bugged in a holding place called Trent Park.

当你看到被击落的德国空军地勤人员的战俘声明时,这真的很有趣,他们都在一个叫特伦特公园的拘留所里被窃听。

You can see the transcripts of these conversations.

您可以查看这些对话的文字记录。

They’re all going about how annoying it was that the RAF were over every night and they can’t sleep, and if only they’d just shut up and leave them alone and not bomb them.

他们都在说,英国皇家空军每天晚上都在巡逻,他们睡不着觉,真烦人,要是他们能闭嘴,别打扰他们,不要轰炸他们就好了。

This is just part of the narrative of the Battle of Britain that’s completely left out.

这只是不列颠之战的叙述的一部分,被完全遗漏了。

It’s always the stocky, the plucky few against the Nazi hordes and all the rest of it.

对抗纳粹部落和其他人的总是少数壮实而勇敢的人。

And it’s a complete misnomer.

这完全是用词不当。

2:26:04 And by that time, aircraft production in Britain is massively outpacing the Germans and the best ratio that the Germans achieve in 1940s, July 1940, when the British produced 496 new Hurricanes and Spitfires, single-engine fighters, and the Germans only produced 240 single-engine fighters.

到那时,英国的飞机产量已大大超过德国,也是德国在 1940 年代达到的最佳比例,1940 年 7 月,英国生产了 496 架新型飓风和喷火式单引擎战斗机,而德国只生产了 240 架单引擎战斗机。

That’s the best ratio.

这就是最佳比例。

And of course, that is the British outproducing the Germans 2:1.

当然,这是英国队以 2:1 的比分击败德国队。

And what that means is by the end of October 1940, when the Battle of Britain is officially designated as being over, the single-engine fighter force of Luftwaffe is less than 200, from 750 or whatever it was in beginning of July, whereas the British fighter force had been 650 or whatever at the beginning of July, is now well over 750.

这意味着,到 1940 年 10 月底,当不列颠之战正式结束时,德国空军的单引擎战斗机数量已从 7 月初的 750 架降至不到 200 架,而英国战斗机数量在 7 月初为 650 架左右,现在已远远超过 750 架。

Lex Fridman2:26:53

And Britain is outproducing?

英国的产量超过了?

James Holland2:26:55

Yeah, to a massive degree.

是的,在很大程度上。

2:26:55 And that continues, and that is a ratio that just increases as the war progresses.

这种情况还在继续,而且随着战争的进展,这个比例只会增加。

Britain produces 132,500 aircraft in the second World War.

英国在第二次世界大战期间生产了 132,500 架飞机。

America produces 315,000.

美国产量为315,000。

Lex Fridman2:27:12

So why is there this legend of the Luftwaffe?

那么为什么会有德国空军的这个传说呢?

James Holland2:27:16

Well, because it’s the spearhead of the Blitzkrieg.

嗯,因为它是闪电战的先锋。

Lex Fridman2:27:18

So it has to do with the Blitzkrieg?

那么这和闪电战有关吗?

James Holland2:27:19

It has to do with the Blitzkrieg.

这与闪电战有关。

2:27:19 The Luftwaffe becomes kind of the bogeyman of the Third Reich.

德国空军成为第三帝国的恶魔。

They’re blamed for everything, but that’s because they’re completely abused.

他们因一切而受到指责,但那是因为他们完全受到了虐待。

They’re the only part of the Third Reich’s Armed services, only part of the Wehrmacht, the Wehrmacht being the Navy, the army, and the Air force, that is in constant use the whole time, or constant abuse, I should say.

他们是第三帝国武装部队的唯一部分,只是国防军的一部分,国防军是海军、陆军和空军,我应该说,它们一直在不断地使用,或者不断地被滥用。

2:27:45 In Britain and America, they rotate their pilots really, really carefully.

在英国和美国,他们非常非常仔细地轮换飞行员。

By the time that you’ve got the eight Fighter Command, for example, part of the Mighty Eighth, the Eighth Air Force operating in Britain, by the end of 1943, you would have, in a squadron, that would have 16, you would never have more than 16 airborne from a squadron at any one time.

例如,到 1943 年底,当你拥有八架战斗机司令部时,它是在英国作战的第八空军的一部分,在一个中队中,你将拥有 16 架战斗机,在任何时候,一个中队的空降飞机数量都不会超过 16 架。

You would have 40 to 45 pilots to service 16 in the air and similar number of aircraft, which means you’re not overusing these guys.

你将有 40 到 45 名飞行员来服务空中的 16 架和类似数量的飞机,这意味着你没有过度使用这些人。

2:28:15 And what would happen by that stage of the war, by 1943, a young fighter pilot coming to a Thunderbolt Squadron or a Mustang Squadron, for example, at the end of 1943, beginning of 1944, he’d have 350 hours of consecutive flying because you can train in America, in Florida or California or Texas or wherever, you can process many, many more people because the training is much more intense because you’ve got clear skies.

战争的那个阶段会发生什么,到1943年,一名年轻的战斗机飞行员来到雷电中队或野马中队,例如,在1943年底、1944年初,他将连续飞行350小时,因为你可以在美国、佛罗里达州、加利福尼亚州或德克萨斯州或任何地方训练,你可以处理更多、更多的人,因为训练更加激烈,因为你有晴朗的天空。

So it’s not a question of, “Oh, we’d like to take you out Fritz this morning, but it’s a bit cloudy and oh, the RAF are over or Air Force are over, so we can’t fly today.” So in Germany, pilot training is constant.

所以这不是一个问题,“哦,我们今天早上想带你出去弗里茨,但天气有点阴天,哦,英国皇家空军结束了或空军结束了,所以我们今天不能飞。”因此在德国,飞行员培训是持续不断的。

Aircrew training is constantly being interrupted by the war, by shortage of fuel, by inclement weather, et cetera, et cetera.

机组人员的训练经常因战争、燃料短缺、恶劣天气等等而中断。

In America, you have none of those problems.

在美国,你不存在这些问题。

And Britain, because of its global reach also has training bases in what was Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe and South Africa, Canada as well.

英国由于其全球影响力,也在以前的罗得西亚、现在的津巴布韦、南非和加拿大设有训练基地。

And so you are able to process these guys much better.

这样你就能更好地处理这些人。

2:29:17 You’re able to give them more training, so that when they come, they are absolutely the finished article as pilots.

你可以给他们更多的培训,这样当他们来的时候,他们绝对是成品飞行员。

Well, they’re not the finished article, as they say, a bomber pilot or as a fighter pilot.

好吧,正如他们所说,他们不是轰炸机飞行员或战斗机飞行员。

But that’s okay because you join your squadron of 40 other guys with 16 airborne, and the old hands kind of take you up a few times.

但这没关系,因为你加入了由 40 名其他人员组成的中队,其中有 16 名空降兵,老手们会带你上来几次。

So you arrive at, I don’t know, let’s say some airfield in Suffolk in East Anglia in England, and you’ll have 10 days to two weeks acclimatizing, getting used to it.

所以你到达,我不知道,比方说英格兰东安格利亚萨福克的某个机场,你将有 10 天到两周的时间来适应、习惯它。

The old hands will put you through your paces, give you some trips, tips.

老手会带你了解你的步伐,给你一些旅行和建议。

You can pick their brains while you’re having some chow and listening on some briefings.

你可以一边吃东西、听简报,一边听取他们的意见。

Then, the first mission you do will be a milk run over to France where the danger’s kind of pretty minimal and you can build up your experience, so that by the time you’re actually sent over on a mission to Berlin or Bremen or the Ruhr or whatever, you are absolutely in the business.

然后,你执行的第一个任务将是运送牛奶到法国,那里的危险相当小,你可以积累经验,这样当你真正被派往柏林、不来梅、鲁尔或其他地方执行任务时,你就绝对参与其中了。

2:30:11 So qualitatively and quantitatively, you are just vastly superior to anything the Luftwaffe has got.

因此,无论从质量还是数量上来说,你们都远远优于德国空军所拥有的任何东西。

The Luftwaffe by that stage, in contrast, 1940, new pilots coming to frontline squadrons with 150, 170 hours in their logbooks, less than a 100, 100, 90, 92 hours, something like that.

相比之下,1940 年那个阶段的德国空军,新飞行员来到前线中队,飞行日志中的飞行时间为 150、170 小时,少于 100、100、90、92 小时等。

It’s not enough.

这还不够。

And they’re just being flung straight into battle and they’re getting absolutely slaughtered.

他们只是被直接投入战斗,然后彻底被屠杀。

And they’re also because their machines are quite complicated, there’s no two-seaters really, so no two-seater trainers.

而且他们还因为他们的机器相当复杂,实际上没有两人座,所以没有两人座教练机。

So the first time you’re flying in your Focke-Wulf 190 or your Messerschmitt-109, it’s this horrendous leap of faith for which you as a young, bright Luftwaffe fighter pilot know that you are not ready for this and it can bite you.

因此,当您第一次驾驶 Focke-Wulf 190 或 Messerschmitt-109 飞行时,作为一名年轻、聪明的德国空军战斗机飞行员,您会面临这种可怕的信念飞跃,因为您知道自己还没有为此做好准备,而且它可能会咬伤您。

And something like a Messerschmitt-109 has a very high wing loading, so it’s very maneuverable in the air, but it’s got its tiny wings.

像梅塞施密特-109这样的飞机具有非常高的机翼载荷,因此它在空中的机动性非常好,但它的机翼很小。

It’s got this incredible torque, this Daimler-Benz DB 605 engine with this huge amount of torque, and it just wants to flip you over.

它拥有令人难以置信的扭矩,这款戴姆勒-奔驰 DB 605 发动机具有如此巨大的扭矩,它只想让您翻倒。

So if you’re not used to it, and it’s got a narrow undercarriage as well, if you’re not used to it, you could just crash.

所以如果你不习惯它,而且它的起落架也很窄,如果你不习惯它,你可能会坠毁。

2:31:18 So in the first couple of months of 1944, they lose something like 2,400 aircraft in the air and pilots and about 3,400 are accidents.

因此,在 1944 年的头几个月里,他们损失了大约 2,400 架飞机和飞行员,其中约 3,400 架是事故。

Lex Fridman2:31:30

So it has to do with training, really?

那么这确实与训练有关吗?

James Holland2:31:32

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:31:33

Not training enough?

训练不够?

James Holland2:31:33

It’s training and resources and supply.

这是培训、资源和供应。

2:31:33 And the Second World War, more than any other conflict is a war of numbers.

第二次世界大战比任何其他冲突都更加是一场人数之战。

There are differences, that decisions that generals can make.

将军们可以做出的决定存在差异。

There are moments where particular brilliance and bravery can seize the day, take the bridge, hold the enemy at bay or whatever.

在某些时刻,特殊的才华和勇敢可以抓住时机,夺取桥梁,将敌人拒之门外或其他什么。

But ultimately, you’re talking about differences, which might make a month’s difference, six months’ difference, maybe even several years’ difference.

但最终,你谈论的是差异,这可能会造成一个月的差异、六个月的差异,甚至可能几年的差异。

But ultimately, there’s a certain point in the Second World War where the outcome is absolutely inevitable because the guys that lose can’t compete with the numbers that the guys are going to win.

但最终,在第二次世界大战的某个时刻,结果是绝对不可避免的,因为失败的人无法与将要获胜的人竞争。

Lex Fridman2:32:18

So in that sense, you could think of World War II as a battle of factories?

那么从这个意义上说,你可以将第二次世界大战视为一场工厂之战吗?

James Holland2:32:25

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:32:26

What does it take to win in the battle of factories out manufacturing military equipment against the allies?

怎样才能在制造军事装备的工厂与盟国的战斗中获胜?

James Holland2:32:36

It’s efficiency really.

这确实是效率。

2:32:36 So I always think, let’s take the example of the Sherman tank, for example, the mainstay of the Western Allied Forces and a fair number of them sent to the Soviet Union as well for that matter.

所以我一直认为,让我们以谢尔曼坦克为例,它是西方盟军的中流砥柱,也有相当数量的坦克被派往苏联。

Lex Fridman2:32:48

I think you’ve said it doesn’t get the respect it deserves maybe.

我想你已经说过它可能没有得到应有的尊重。

James Holland2:32:52

It doesn’t get the respect it deserves.

它没有得到应有的尊重。

2:32:52 So the Sherman tank, the 75-mm main battle gun, which that’s medium velocity, can fire a shell around 2000 feet per second compared to the notorious infamous German 88 mm, which can fire at third fast again, like 3000 feet per second.

因此,谢尔曼坦克的 75 毫米主战炮具有中等射速,可以以每秒 2000 英尺左右的速度发射炮弹,而臭名昭著的德国 88 毫米炮则可以以第三快的速度发射炮弹,比如每秒 3000 英尺。

But on paper, a Tiger tank coming around the corner and a Sherman tank coming around the corner, it should be no match at all.

但从纸面上看,一辆虎式坦克即将驶来,一辆谢尔曼坦克即将驶来,应该根本无法匹敌。

Tiger tank is 58 tons, looks scary, is scary, it’s got a massive gun, got really thick armor.

虎式坦克重58吨,看起来很吓人,很吓人,它有一门巨大的火炮,装甲很厚。

Sherman tank doesn’t have as thick armor, doesn’t have a gun that’s as big.

谢尔曼坦克没有那么厚的装甲,没有那么大的火炮。

It should be an absolute walkover.

这应该是绝对的轻松。

And yet, at about 5:30 PM on Monday the 26th of June 1944, a Sherman tank came around the corner of a road called Rue Massue, a little village called Fontenay-le-Pesnel in Normandy, came face to face with a Tiger tank.

然而,1944 年 6 月 26 日星期一下午 5:30 左右,一辆谢尔曼坦克驶过诺曼底丰特奈勒佩内尔小村庄马苏街 (Rue Massue) 的路口,与一辆虎式坦克面对面。

And one, how does this happen?

第一,这是怎么发生的?

2:33:47 Well, I’ll tell you how it happened because the commander of the Sherman tank was experienced, had one up the spout.

好吧,我会告诉你这是怎么发生的,因为谢尔曼坦克的指挥官经验丰富,有一个在喷嘴上。

So what I mean by that is he had an armor piercing round already in the breech.

所以我的意思是他的后膛里已经有一发穿甲弹了。

Soon as he saw the Tiger tank, he just said, “Fire.” That armor piercing round did not penetrate the Tiger tank, it was never going to.

当他看到虎式坦克时,他只是说:“开火。”那枚穿甲弹没有击穿虎式坦克,也永远不会击穿。

But what it did do is it hit the gun mantlet, which is a bit of reinforced steel that you have just as the barrel is entering the turret.

但它所做的是击中了炮盾,这是当枪管进入炮塔时你所拥有的一点钢筋。

And that caused spalling, which is the little shards of little bits of molten metal, which then hit the driver of the Tiger tank in the head.

这导致了剥落,即熔化金属的小碎片,然后击中了虎式坦克驾驶员的头部。

And he was screaming, gotten him or whatever, and he couldn’t really see.

他尖叫着,抓住了他或者其他什么,但他真的看不到。

The moment they got hit, the commander of the Tiger tank retreated into the turret of the Tiger.

被击中的那一刻,虎式坦克的车长就退回到了虎式坦克的炮塔里。

The moment you retreat into a turret, you can’t see, you can see ’cause you’ve got periscopes, but your visibility is nothing like as good as it is when you’ve got your head above the turret.

当你退回炮塔的那一刻,你就看不到了,你可以看到,因为你有潜望镜,但你的能见度并不像你把头放在炮塔上方时那么好。

2:34:42 Immediately after that, the armor piercing round from the Sherman tank was repeated by a number of high explosive rounds, which are rounds, which detonate, have a little minor charge, then there’s a second charge, which creates lots of smoke.

紧接着,谢尔曼坦克的穿甲弹又发射了多发高爆弹,这些子弹爆炸时带有少量装药,然后是第二次装药,产生大量烟雾。

And in moments, in the first 30 seconds, 10 rounds from that Sherman tank had hit the Tiger tank before the Tiger tank had unleashed a single round itself.

就在最初的30秒内,在虎式坦克自己发射一发子弹之前,谢尔曼坦克的10发子弹就击中了虎式坦克。

The crew then surrendered.

船员随后投降。

So you didn’t need to destroy the Tiger tank, you just need to stop it operating.

所以你不需要摧毁虎式坦克,你只需要停止它的运行即可。

If it hasn’t got a crew, it’s just a chunk of metal that’s inoperable.

如果没有工作人员,它就只是一块无法操作的金属。

So that’s all you need to do.

这就是您需要做的全部。

2:35:18 And what that tells you is that experience counts, training counts.

这告诉你经验很重要,培训也很重要。

The agility of the Sherman tank also counts.

谢尔曼坦克的敏捷性也很重要。

It’s a smaller shelf, therefore it’s easy to manhandle, which means you can put more in a breach quicker.

它的架子较小,因此很容易操作,这意味着您可以更快地将更多东西放入缺口中。

There’s features on a Sherman tank like it’s the first tank to have a gun stabilizing gyro, which means it’s more effective on the move.

谢尔曼坦克有一些特点,比如它是第一款配备火炮稳定陀螺仪的坦克,这意味着它在移动时更有效。

There’s also an override switch on the underside of the turret so that the commander, if he just sees something out of the corner of his eye, can immediately start moving the turret before the gunner, who is down in the belly of the turret, can react.

炮塔底部还有一个超控开关,这样车长只要用眼角的余光看到什么东西,就可以在位于炮塔腹部的炮手做出反应之前立即开始移动炮塔。

There’s many different facts of it.

有很多不同的事实。

But the main fact of all is of 1,347 Tigers built, there were 49,000 Shermans.

但最主要的事实是,在生产的 1,347 辆虎式坦克中,有 49,000 辆谢尔曼坦克。

So that means there’s 36 Shermans to every single Tiger.

这意味着每辆虎式坦克对应 36 辆谢尔曼坦克。

Lex Fridman2:35:59

So you actually have an incredible video.

所以你实际上有一个令人难以置信的视频。

2:35:59 You talk about this a lot from different angles about the top five tanks and then the bottom five tanks of World War II.

您从不同角度谈论了很多关于二战中排名前五的坦克和排名后五的坦克。

I think, was it the Tiger that made both the top five and the bottom five?

我想,前五名和后五名都是老虎吗?

James Holland2:36:13

The problem with the Tiger tank is really huge.

虎式坦克的问题确实很大。

Lex Fridman2:36:15

We should say that you keep saying the problem, but one of the pros of the Tiger tank-

应该说,你一直在说这个问题,但是虎式坦克的优点之一——

James Holland2:36:20

It’s very huge.

这是非常巨大的。

Lex Fridman2:36:21

…

……

2:36:21 is the psychological warfare aspect of it is terrifying.

它的心理战方面是可怕的。

James Holland2:36:25

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:36:26

I don’t know what the other pros, I guess yeah, the 88 mm high velocity and all the rest of it-

我不知道其他优点是什么,我想是的,88 毫米高速以及所有其他的 -

James Holland2:36:32

It’s pretty fearsome, but there are pragmatic problems.

这是相当可怕的,但也存在实际问题。

2:36:32 The big problem is the Germans are incapable of mass production on a scale, but Americans could do.

最大的问题是德国人无法大规模生产,但美国人可以。

Frankly, even the British could do.

坦率地说,即使是英国人也能做到。

They’re just not in that league.

他们只是不属于那个联盟。

The reason they’re not in that league is because they’re in the middle of Europe.

他们不属于那个联盟的原因是因为他们位于欧洲中部。

They don’t have access to the world’s oceans.

他们无法进入世界海洋。

They don’t have a merchant fleet, they can’t get this stuff.

他们没有商船队,他们拿不到这些东西。

It hasn’t gone terribly well in the Soviet Union.

苏联的情况不太好。

They can’t process it, and they’re being bombed 24 hours a day.

他们无法处理它,而且每天 24 小时都在遭受轰炸。

And so all their factories are, they’re having to split them all up and that is inherently inefficient because then having to move different parts around and you then having the whole process of having to travel from one place to another to get stuff, you haven’t got much fuel.

因此,他们所有的工厂都必须将它们全部分开,这本质上是低效的,因为然后必须移动不同的部件,然后你必须从一个地方前往另一个地方获取东西的整个过程,你没有太多燃料。

2:37:14 So the consequence of that is that what you do is you think, “Okay, well ,we can’t mass produce, so let’s make really brilliant tanks.” But they’ve lost sight of what a really brilliant is.

因此,这样做的结果就是你会想,“好吧,我们无法大规模生产,所以让我们制造真正出色的坦克吧。”但他们却忽视了什么是真正的才华横溢。

Really brilliant to their eyes is big, scary, big gun, lots of armor.

在他们看来,真正精彩的是大、可怕、大枪、大量装甲。

But actually what conflict in World War II shows you is that you need more than that.

但实际上,第二次世界大战的冲突告诉你,你需要的不仅仅是这些。

You need ease of maintenance, you need reliability.

您需要易于维护,需要可靠性。

And the problem with having the bigger the tank, the more complex the maintenance equipment is, you need a bigger hoist, which then means you need a bigger truck, which then uses more fuel.

问题是油箱越大,维护设备就越复杂,你需要更大的起重机,这意味着你需要更大的卡车,从而使用更多的燃料。

So for example, the Tiger tank is so big that it doesn’t fit on the loading gauge of the European Railway system.

举例来说,虎式坦克太大了,以至于无法安装在欧洲铁路系统的装载量规上。

So they have to have different tracks to roll onto the wagons that will then transport them from A to B, take them from West Germany to Normandy, then they have to take them off, then they have to take off the tracks, put on combat tracks, then move them into battle and hope that they don’t break down.

所以他们必须有不同的履带滚到马车上,然后将他们从A运到B,从西德运到诺曼底,然后他们必须把它们取下来,然后他们必须取下履带,换上战斗履带,然后将它们移入战斗并希望它们不会抛锚。

2:38:12 The problem is when you start the war, it’s not very automotive and you’ve only got 47 people for every motorized vehicle in Germany compared to three in the United States or eight in France, is that you’ve got lots of people who don’t know how to drive.

问题是,当你开始战争时,汽车并不是很发达,德国每辆机动车辆只有 47 人,而美国是 3 人,法国是 8 人,而且有很多人不知道如何开车。

And it also means you haven’t got lots of garages and mechanics and gas stations and so on.

这也意味着你没有很多车库、机械师和加油站等。

And so you are then creating an incredibly complex beast.

所以你正在创造一个极其复杂的野兽。

But you want that complex thing to be as simple as you possibly can be.

但您希望复杂的事情尽可能简单。

And that’s the beauty of the Sherman tank.

这就是谢尔曼坦克的美妙之处。

All those guys in America, they’re used to driving stick cars.

所有在美国的人,他们都习惯驾驶棒车。

There’s three people for every automobile, and that includes the old and children, so almost every young man knows how to drive.

每辆车搭载三个人,包括老人和孩子,所以几乎每个年轻人都会开车。

And when you get into a Sherman tank, it’s got a clutch, it’s got a throttle.

当你进入谢尔曼坦克时,它有一个离合器,它有一个油门。

The brakes are the steering mechanism.

制动器是转向机构。

The clutch is where you would expect the clutch to be.

离合器位于您所期望的位置。

It’s got a manual shift.

它有手动换档。

You put your foot on the clutch and you shove it into second gear and off you go or reverse or whatever.

你把脚放在离合器上,然后将其推入二档,然后你就可以前进或倒车或其他什么。

And it literally can be easier.

而且它实际上可以更容易。

2:39:10 Anyone who can drive a stick car could drive a Sherman tank, seriously.

说真的,任何会驾驶棒车的人都可以驾驶谢尔曼坦克。

Not everyone can drive a Tiger tank.

并不是每个人都能驾驶虎式坦克。

It’s incredibly complex, really, really is.

它非常复杂,真的,真的。

And that comes with a whole host of problems.

这会带来一系列问题。

And of course, you don’t have the numbers.

当然,你没有数字。

You don’t have the numbers.

你没有数字。

You’ve got 1,347 of them, you’ve got 492 King Tigers, which are even bigger and at a time where you are really short of fuel and you are really short of absolutely everything.

你有 1,347 架,你有 492 架虎王,它们甚至更大,而且在你真的很缺乏燃料并且你真的什么都缺的时候。

And those shells are huge and they’re harder to manhandle and weird little things that the Germans do, for all their design genius, the loader is always on the right-hand side.

这些炮弹很大,很难处理,而且德国人做的事情也很奇怪,尽管他们的设计天才,装载机总是在右手边。

Now, in the 1920s and 19 teens and thirties, children were taught to be right-handed.

现在,在 20 年代、19 岁和 30 年代,孩子们被教导要惯用右手。

You weren’t allowed to be left-handed, so you were right-handed.

不允许你是左撇子,所以你是右撇子。

So you want to be on the left-hand side of the gun so you can take the shell from your right and swivel it into the breach from your right side.

因此,你需要位于枪的左侧,这样你就可以从右侧取出炮弹,然后从右侧将其旋转到缺口中。

2:40:05 But the loader in a Jagdpanther or Panther or a Tiger is always on the right-hand side of the breach, which ergonomically makes no sense whatsoever.

但是“猎豹”、“黑豹”或“虎式”的装载机总是位于缺口的右侧,从人体工程学角度来看,这毫无意义。

Why do they do this?

他们为什么要这样做?

I’ve never found an answer to this.

我从来没有找到这个问题的答案。

So there’s all these little things, and as a soldier coming up against, you are an American GI and you’re coming up against a Tiger tank, you don’t care about the fact that it’s difficult to maintain or the problems involved of trying to get it to the battlefield.

所以有所有这些小事情,作为一名士兵,你是一名美国大兵,你面对的是一辆虎式坦克,你不关心它难以维护的事实,也不关心试图将其送上战场所涉及的问题。

All you care about is this monster coming in front of you, it’s squeaking and clanking away, and it’s incredibly scary and it’s about to blow you to bits.

你所关心的只是这个怪物来到你面前,它吱吱作响,叮当作响,非常可怕,即将把你炸成碎片。

That’s all you care about and quite understandably so.

这就是你所关心的一切,而且这是可以理解的。

2:40:41 But those who are protracting the war at a higher level and historians that come subsequently and look at all this stuff, they do need to worry about all these things.

但那些在更高层面上拖延战争的人以及随后而来并关注所有这些事情的历史学家,他们确实需要担心所有这些事情。

I remember the same Georg Thomas, the architect of the Hunger Plan, I found there’s minutes of this meeting, which I think was either on the 4th of December or the 5th of December 1941, so it’s just before the Red Army counterattacks outside Moscow in the winter of 1941.

我记得格奥尔格·托马斯,饥饿计划的设计者,我发现有这次会议的记录,我认为是在1941年12月4日或12月5日,所以就在1941年冬天红军在莫斯科郊外反击之前。

And it’s a meeting about weaponry, and this is a verbatim quote.

这是一次关于武器的会议,这是逐字引述。

He says, “We have to stop making such complete unaesthetic weapons.” In other words, we’ve constantly building over-engineered and aesthetically-pleasing weapons up until this point and they sort of half manage it, but don’t quite.

他说:“我们必须停止制造这种完全不美观的武器。”换句话说,我们一直在不断地制造过度设计和美观的武器,直到现在,他们已经做到了一半,但还没有完全做到。

Lex Fridman2:41:31

We could probably talk for many hours about each of these topics.

我们可能可以就这些主题中的每一个话题讨论很多个小时。

2:41:31 We could talk for 10 hours about tanks.

我们可以谈论坦克 10 个小时。

I encourage people to listen to your podcast, World War II Pod, We Have Ways of Making You Talk.

我鼓励人们听你的播客,二战播客,我们有办法让你说话。

It’s great.

这很棒。

James Holland2:41:47

Yeah, we also do, we got a new YouTube channel and website called World War II Headquarters.

是的,我们也这样做,我们有一个新的 YouTube 频道和网站,名为“二战总部”。

2:41:47 There are lots of walking the ground and videos of that and all sorts of stuff and little explainers of going around tanks and stuff and the weaponry and documents and photographic archives.

有很多在地面上行走的视频和各种各样的东西,还有关于坦克和东西、武器、文件和摄影档案的小解释。

So the idea is to turn it into a real hub of anyone who’s interested in this subject.

因此,我们的想法是将其变成任何对此主题感兴趣的人的真正中心。

It’s a place where they can go and find out just a whole load more.

他们可以去那里了解更多信息。

Lex Fridman2:42:17

I love it.

我喜欢它。

2:42:17 So like I said, we could probably talk for many hours at each of these topics, but let’s look at some of the battles and maybe you can tell me which jumps out at you.

所以就像我说的,我们可能可以就这些主题中的每一个话题讨论很多个小时,但是让我们看看一些战斗,也许你可以告诉我哪一个让你印象深刻。

I want to talk to you about the Western Front and definitely talk about Normandy.

我想和你谈谈西线,当然还有诺曼底。

So there’s the Battle of Midway in 1942, which is a naval battle.

于是就有了1942年的中途岛海战,这是一场海战。

There’s Eastern Front Stalingrad, probably the deadliest battle in human history.

东线斯大林格勒战役可能是人类历史上最致命的战役。

Then there’s the Battle of Kursk, which is a tank battle, the largest tank battle in history, probably the largest battle period in history, 6,000 tanks, 2 million troops, 4,000 aircraft.

然后是库尔斯克战役,这是一场坦克战,历史上最大的坦克战,可能是历史上规模最大的战役时期,6000辆坦克,200万军队,4000架飞机。

And then that takes us also to the Battle of the Bulge in Normandy, the Italian Campaign that you talk a lot about.

然后我们还谈到了诺曼底突出部战役,即您经常谈论的意大利战役。

So what do you think is interesting to try to extract some wisdom before we get to Normandy?

那么,您认为在我们到达诺曼底之前尝试提取一些智慧有什么有趣的地方?

Do you find, as a historian, the Battle of Kursk or the Battle of Stalingrad more interesting?

作为历史学家,您认为库尔斯克战役还是斯大林格勒战役更有趣?

Stalingrad is often seen as the turning point.

斯大林格勒通常被视为转折点。

James Holland2:43:23

Well, yeah, I think so.

嗯,是的,我想是的。

2:43:23 It’s really interesting.

这真的很有趣。

So they get through in 1941, Barbarossa doesn’t happen as the Germans hope it will.

所以他们熬过了 1941 年,巴巴罗萨并没有像德国人希望的那样发生。

The whole point is to completely destroy the Red Army in three months and that just doesn’t happen.

重点是在三个月内彻底摧毁红军,但这并没有发生。

And I think you can argue and argue convincingly that by, let’s say, beginning of December 1941, Germany is just not going to win, it just can’t.

我认为你可以令人信服地争论说,到 1941 年 12 月开始,德国就不会获胜,它就是不能获胜。

And let me tell you what I mean by that.

让我告诉你我的意思。

So if you take an arbitrary date, let’s say the 15th of June 1941, Germany at that moment has one enemy, which is Great Britain, albeit Great Britain plus Dominion Empire.

因此,如果你任意选择一个日期,比如说 1941 年 6 月 15 日,德国当时有一个敌人,那就是英国,尽管是英国加上自治帝国。

Fast-forward six months to let’s say the 16th of December, it’s got three enemies.

快进六个月,到 12 月 16 日,它遇到了三个敌人。

It’s got Great Britain, Dominion Empire, USSR, and the USA.

其中包括英国、自治帝国、苏联和美国。

It is just not going to win.

它只是不会赢。

For all the talks of wonder weapons and all the rest, it’s just not going to, it has lost that battle.

对于所有关于神奇武器和其他所有的讨论,它只是不会,它已经输掉了这场战斗。

2:44:24 Having said that, Soviet Union is still in a really, really bad situation.

话虽如此,苏联的处境仍然非常非常糟糕。

It is being helped out a huge amount by supplies from the United States and from Britain, just unprecedented amounts of material being sent through the Arctic or across Alaska into the Soviet Union at that time.

来自美国和英国的物资给它提供了巨大的帮助,当时通过北极或穿越阿拉斯加运往苏联的物资数量是空前的。

It is absolutely staggering how much is committed by Roosevelt and Churchill to try and stem the flow in the Soviet Union because for all the announcements and pride that the Soviet Union has about moving factories to the other side of the Urals and stuff, which they do in 1941, huge amounts are overrun intact by the Germans in the opening stages of Barbarossa, really colossal losses, huge amounts.

罗斯福和丘吉尔为阻止难民流入苏联做出了多少努力,这绝对令人震惊,因为尽管苏联曾多次宣布将工厂迁至乌拉尔山脉的另一边以及他们在 1941 年所做的事情,但在巴巴罗萨战争的初期阶段,德国人完好无损地侵占了大量资金,这确实是巨大的损失,数额巨大。

So the grain is gone, coal is gone, entire factories have gone.

所以粮食没有了,煤炭没有了,整个工厂都没有了。

Steel production goes down by 80% in the Soviet Union in 1941 and in 1942.

1941 年和 1942 年,苏联的钢铁产量下降了 80%。

So in 1942, despite the vast amount of numbers of men that they have at their hands, they create 80 new divisions in the second half of 1941, for example.

因此,在 1942 年,尽管他们手头有大量人员,但他们还是在 1941 年下半年创建了 80 个新师。

Britain never has 80 divisions in the entire Second World War, division being about, rule of thumb, 15,000 men.

在整个第二次世界大战中,英国从未拥有过 80 个师,根据经验,该师大约有 15,000 人。

2:45:42 So despite that, and that is because Stalin’s meddling, the woeful state of the Red Army in 1941, et cetera, et cetera, which we’ve already sort of touched upon.

尽管如此,那是因为斯大林的干涉,1941年红军的悲惨状况等等,我们已经谈到了。

So 1942, it’s still in a really bad way, but Germany’s in a really bad way too.

所以 1942 年,情况仍然很糟糕,但德国的情况也很糟糕。

The attrition it suffered in 1941, it’s winning itself to death in 1941.

它在 1941 年遭受了消耗,现在它正在 1941 年赢得死亡。

So it’s having these huge great encirclements, like the encirclement of Kiev in September 1941, capturing the further best part of 700,000 Red Army troops, et cetera, et cetera.

所以它有这些巨大的大包围,就像1941年9月对基辅的包围,俘获了70万红军的大部分,等等,等等。

But in the process of doing that, it is constantly being attrited, both in battle casualties but in also mechanical casualties too, just can’t cope.

但在这样做的过程中,它不断受到磨损,无论是战斗伤亡还是机械伤亡,都无法应对。

The scale is just too big.

规模太大了。

2:46:27 What happens is with every moment that the German forces, that ultimate victory slips away.

所发生的事情是,德国军队的每一刻,最终的胜利都会溜走。

So Hitler’s personal handling of the battle increases.

因此希特勒个人对这场战斗的处理增加了。

And [inaudible 02:46:41] like about him, but he just hasn’t had the military training to do that.

[听不清 02:46:41] 喜欢他,但他只是没有接受过这样做的军事训练。

He might have amazing attention to detail, he might be able to understand, have an enormous capacity to remember units and where they are on a map, but he was only a half corporal in the First World war.

他可能对细节有着惊人的关注,他可能能够理解,有巨大的能力记住单位和它们在地图上的位置,但他在第一次世界大战中只是一名半下士。

He’s never been to staff college.

他从未上过职员学院。

He might have read lots about Frederick, the Great, I’ve read lots of history, but that doesn’t mean to say I’d be a competent field marshal.

他可能读过很多关于腓特烈大帝的书,我读过很多历史,但这并不意味着我会成为一名称职的陆军元帅。

So he is not the right person for the job at all.

所以他根本不是这份工作的合适人选。

And he micromanages and he looks at statistics and figures and doesn’t understand what it’s like at the actual front, the coal phase.

他进行微观管理,查看统计数据和数字,但不了解煤炭阶段的实际情况。

So he’s stifling the very thing that made the German army effective, which is the ability to give commanders at the front the freedom on their leash to be able to make decisions and battle command decisions, and he’s taken that away from them.

因此,他扼杀了德国军队的高效能力,即给予前线指挥官自由决策和战斗指挥决策的能力,而他剥夺了他们的这种自由。

2:47:30 So he’s basically making them go into battle with decreasing amounts of supplies and firepower and with one hand behind their back in terms of decision-making process.

所以他基本上是让他们在减少补给和火力的情况下投入战斗,并且在决策过程中一只手在背后。

And that is not a good combination.

这不是一个好的组合。

The other problem is that he decides rather than going from Moscow in 1942, ’cause basically there’s a cooling off period in the winter because of the conditions, but everyone knows, the Soviet Union know, the Red Army knows that the moment spring comes, there’s going to be another offensive, another major offensive in the summer, that is absolutely as certain as day following night, et cetera.

另一个问题是他决定不在1942年从莫斯科出发,因为基本上在冬天有一个冷静期,因为条件的原因,但是每个人都知道,苏联知道,红军知道,春天到来的那一刻,将会有另一场攻势,夏季的另一场重大攻势,这绝对像白天接着黑夜一样确定,等等。

The problem that the Germans have is they just don’t have enough.

德国人面临的问题是他们没有足够的东西。

They have less than they had when they launched Barbarossa the previous year.

他们的资金比去年推出“巴巴罗萨”时要少。

The Soviet Union has more, it’s better prepared, it knows what’s coming now.

苏联拥有更多,准备得更好,它知道现在会发生什么。

It’s kind of learning some of the lessons, starting to absorb the lessons.

这是一种学习一些教训,开始吸收教训。

Stalin coincidentally is pulling back from his very tight leash in the way that Hitler is doing the opposite and increasing his micromanagement and control freak-ery.

巧合的是,斯大林正在摆脱他非常严格的束缚,就像希特勒正在做相反的事情一样,并增加了他的微观管理和控制怪癖。

2:48:29 What Hitler decides is rather than going for Moscow, he’s going to go for the oilfields.

希特勒决定不去莫斯科,而是去油田。

This is absolutely insane because what’s going to happen when they get to the oilfields?

这绝对是疯狂的,因为当他们到达油田时会发生什么?

Does he think really that the Soviet Union are going to let those oilfields come into German hands intact?

他真的认为苏联会让这些油田完好无损地落入德国手中吗?

Even if he does let them get in intact, what are they going to do with that oil?

即使他让他们完好无损地进入,他们将如何处理这些石油呢?

Oil needs to be refined.

石油需要精炼。

Where are you going to refine it?

你要在哪里完善它?

They don’t have many oil refineries.

他们没有很多炼油厂。

How are you going to ship that oil to where you need it to be in the factories in the Third Reich and into your process into gasoline and then get it to diesel and get it to your U-boats, get it to your tanks, get it to your armored units.

你如何将这些石油运送到你需要的地方,在第三帝国的工厂里,进入你的汽油加工过程,然后将其转化为柴油,输送到你的潜艇,输送到你的坦克,输送到你的装甲部队。

How are you going to do that?

你打算怎么做?

How do you transport it from the Caucasus, which is a long, long way away from Berlin, how are you going to do that?

你如何从距离柏林很远很远的高加索地区运输它,你打算怎么做?

2:49:20 There’s no pipelines.

没有管道。

There’s only some pipelines that have been built by American money and American engineering, and they’re going backwards towards the Urals, not forwards.

只有一些管道是由美国的资金和美国的工程建造的,它们是向后通往乌拉尔山脉的,而不是向前的。

They have no more rail capacity whatsoever.

他们已经没有更多的铁路运力了。

They just don’t have the oil tankers.

他们只是没有油轮。

So it’s absolute la-la land.

所以这绝对是啦啦之地。

It is incredible that when you look at the detailed literature that the Germans have, no one is asking this question in the spring and early summer of 1942.

令人难以置信的是,当你查看德国人拥有的详细文献时,会发现在 1942 年春和初夏没有人问这个问题。

Lex Fridman2:49:46

The logistics question in part?

部分物流问题?

James Holland2:49:48

No one is saying, “Okay, it’s great that we’re going to go to the Caucasus and get all this oil, but then what?” No one is asking that question.

没有人说:“好吧,我们要去高加索地区获取所有这些石油真是太棒了,但是然后呢?”没有人问这个问题。

Lex Fridman2:49:55

Nor how do you provide resources and feed the soldiers and all that kind of stuff?

也不知道如何提供资源并为士兵提供食物以及诸如此类的东西?

2:49:55 I mean, it’s…

我的意思是,这是……

James Holland2:50:00

So the Case Blue, first of all, they get distracted by going into Crimea and they go, “Well, we’ve got to do that first.” So they have to get Sevastopol and the Crimea, which they do, and then they have to push on, and at this point, suddenly looming in front of them is Stalingrad on the banks of the Volga, this city, this industrial city, which has Stalin’s name.

因此,蓝案首先,他们因进入克里米亚而分心,然后他们说:“好吧,我们必须首先这样做。”所以他们必须拿下塞瓦斯托波尔和克里米亚,他们确实这么做了,然后他们必须继续前进,此时,突然出现在他们面前的是伏尔加河畔的斯大林格勒,这座城市,这座以斯大林的名字命名的工业城市。

2:50:00 And Hitler goes, “Okay, what I’m going to do now is I’m going to split my forces.

希特勒说道:“好吧,我现在要做的就是分散我的部队。

So half of you can go south towards the Caucasus and the rest of you can confront Stalingrad,” and von Bock who’s the commander, just goes, “That’s nuts.

所以你们一半人可以向南前往高加索,剩下的人可以对抗斯大林格勒,”指挥官冯·博克说,“这太疯狂了。

That makes no sense whatsoever.

这毫无意义。

You are splitting the mission.” So Hitler fires him.

你们正在分裂任务。”于是希特勒解雇了他。

So suddenly they get into this assault for Stalingrad and it becomes this sort of street fight.

突然间,他们投入了对斯大林格勒的进攻,这变成了巷战。

Street fighting is the worst kind of fighting.

巷战是最残酷的战斗。

The reason why the Israelis have just blown everything up in Gaza is because otherwise you can’t see, you need a field of fire.

以色列人之所以炸毁加沙的一切,是因为否则你就看不到东西,你需要一片火场。

This is fighting in a buildup area, it’s horrendous.

这是在集结地里的战斗,太可怕了。

Lex Fridman2:51:01

To clarify, we were talking about urban warfare, door-to-door, building-to-building.

澄清一下,我们谈论的是城市战,挨家挨户,建筑物到建筑物。

James Holland2:51:05

It’s incredibly difficult, and home advantage is colossal, in this instance.

这是非常困难的,在这种情况下,主场优势是巨大的。

2:51:05 And of course, it’s piping hot when they attack in kind of August into early September, and then it suddenly gets very, very cold.

当然,当他们在八月到九月初进攻时,天气会非常炎热,然后突然变得非常非常冷。

And at the same time, American mechanization and slightly a British mechanization, but primarily American trucks are enabling Zhukov to plan this great pincer movement.

与此同时,美国的机械化和稍微有点英国的机械化,但主要是美国的卡车,使朱可夫能够策划这场伟大的钳形运动。

And Russians will hate me for saying this, and I probably will get a whole load of bots on the back of it, but the truth is, it is not the street fighting that destroys Sixth Army, it is the encirclement, the subsequent encirclement.

俄罗斯人会讨厌我这么说,而且我可能会得到一大堆机器人,但事实是,摧毁第六集团军的不是巷战,而是包围圈,随后的包围圈。

2:51:45 So the Germans have been sucked into this street battle in Stalingrad, cannot give up.

所以德军已经被卷入了斯大林格勒的这场巷战,无法放弃。

We cannot give up, we cannot back down, we cannot pull out.

我们不能放弃,不能退缩,不能退出。

We’ve got to destroy this city.

我们必须摧毁这座城市。

Meanwhile, while their backs are turned, and while most of their forces are going off to the Caucasus on a wild goose chase for absolutely zero oil incidentally, and they never get remotely close to Baku, this huge pincer movement is being planned and it is only possible through mechanization from the United States.

与此同时,尽管他们背弃了立场,尽管他们的大部分部队正前往高加索地区进行徒劳的追逐,顺便追求绝对零石油,而且他们从未远离巴库,但这场巨大的夹击运动正在计划之中,而且只有通过美国的机械化才有可能实现。

And that is the big turning point because from that moment onwards, the Germans are on the back foot.

这是一个重大的转折点,因为从那一刻起,德国人就处于不利地位。

They’re basically going backwards.

他们基本上是在倒退。

There are little small counterattacks, there is obviously the Kursk Salient, for example, but it’s game over.

几乎没有小规模的反击,例如库尔斯克突出部,但游戏结束了。

The catastrophe of the surrender of, the final surrender, the writing’s on the wall at the end of 1942, by November 1942.

投降的灾难,最后的投降,在 1942 年底、1942 年 11 月之前就已经不祥之兆了。

When the two Soviet fronts meet up, then there is no possible chance of escape for Sixth Army and they are consigned, they are toast.

当苏军两条战线相遇时,第六集团军就没有任何逃跑的机会,他们就被托付了,他们完蛋了。

2:52:53 And their final surrender, obviously, happens at the very beginning of February 1943.

显然,他们的最后投降发生在 1943 年 2 月初。

But that’s all over.

但一切都结束了。

And then, at the same time that that is happening, disaster is unfolding in North Africa because Hitler has insisted on massively resupplying the Mediterranean Theater.

然后,与此同时,灾难正在北非展开,因为希特勒坚持要向地中海战区大规模补给。

And the problem there is the amount of equipment that is lost in North Africa is greater than it is at Stalingrad.

问题是北非损失的装备数量比斯大林格勒损失的还要多。

I don’t think you could argue that psychologically Tunisia is a greater loss than Stalingrad.

我认为你不能说突尼斯在心理上比斯大林格勒遭受了更大的损失。

It absolutely isn’t.

绝对不是。

But you have to see them in tandem, as this is two fronts.

但你必须同时看到它们,因为这是两条战线。

This is Eastern Front, Southern Western front, and this is the first time that the Americans have been on the ground against Axis forces, and they lose big time.

这是东线、南西线,这是美国人第一次在地面上对抗轴心国军队,他们损失惨重。

2:53:35 The allies become masters of the North African shores on the 13th of May 1943, and it is a catastrophe.

1943 年 5 月 13 日,盟军成为北非海岸的主人,这是一场灾难。

And in that time, 2,700 aircraft have been, Luftwaffe aircraft have been destroyed over North Africa between November 1942 and May 1943.

1942 年 11 月至 1943 年 5 月期间,德国空军有 2,700 架飞机在北非上空被摧毁。

And overall, the subsequent summer as well, it’s really interesting, the Luftwaffe lose, between June and October 1943, so this is including the Kursk Battle, which that takes place in July 1943, in that period, the Luftwaffe loses 702 aircraft over the Eastern Front, but 3,704 aircraft over the Mediterranean.

总的来说,接下来的夏天,这真的很有趣,德国空军在 1943 年 6 月到 10 月之间失败了,所以这包括 1943 年 7 月发生的库尔斯克战役,在那段时期,德国空军在东线损失了 702 架飞机,但在地中海损失了 3,704 架飞机。

2:54:13 So I think one has to also, one of the lessons about studying the Second World War is one has to be careful not to assign strategic importance to boots on the ground.

所以我认为人们也必须这样做,研究第二次世界大战的教训之一是必须小心,不要将战略重要性赋予地面部队。

It can be of great strategic importance, but not necessarily.

它可能具有重大战略意义,但不一定。

No one would argue, for example, that the Guadalcanal is not an absolutely game-changing battle in the Pacific War, and yet the number of troops compared to what’s going on in the Eastern Front or even the Western Front is tiny in comparison.

例如,没有人会争辩说,瓜达尔卡纳尔岛并不是太平洋战争中一场绝对改变游戏规则的战役,但与东线甚至西线的情况相比,其部队数量却显得微乎其微。

So it is absolutely true that the most German blood is lost on the Eastern Front, but that doesn’t mean to say that it’s more strategically important in the Western Front, and it’s not saying that the Western Front is more strategic either.

因此,德国人在东线流血最多是绝对正确的,但这并不意味着西线更具战略重要性,也不是说西线更具战略意义。

It’s just you have to be balanced about this.

只是你必须对此保持平衡。

The psychological blow-over for Stalingrad is immense, and you cannot belittle that.

斯大林格勒的心理打击是巨大的,你不能低估这一点。

Lex Fridman2:55:02

I mean, there’s the…

我的意思是,有……

James Holland2:55:00

It’s immense, and you cannot belittle that.

它是巨大的,你不能低估它。

Lex Fridman2:55:02

I mean, we went over it really fast, but there is a human drama element.

我的意思是,我们很快就讲完了,但其中有一个人性的戏剧元素。

James Holland2:55:08

Yes, yes.

是的,是的。

Lex Fridman2:55:09

When we were talking about the operational side, the material loss of a battle is also extremely important to the big picture of the war.

当我们谈论作战方面时,一场战斗的物质损失对于战争的全局来说也是极其重要的。

2:55:09 And we often don’t talk about that because, of course, with war, the thing to focus on is the human drama of it-

我们经常不谈论这一点,因为当然,对于战争,我们应该关注的是它的人性戏剧——

James Holland2:55:25

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:55:27

…

……

2:55:27 because we’re humans.

因为我们是人类。

James Holland2:55:28

I also think that what’s interesting is the Nazi High Command’s response to Stalingrad, which is not to go, “We’re screwed.” It’s to double down.

我还认为有趣的是纳粹最高统帅部对斯大林格勒的反应,这并不是说“我们完蛋了”。这是要加倍。

2:55:28 Then so Goebbels, for example, gives his infamous speech in the Sportpalast in third week of February in 1943, where he goes, “Are you ready for this?

例如,1943 年 2 月第三周,戈培尔在体育宫发表了臭名昭著的演讲,他说道:“你准备好了吗?

This is now total war.

现在这是全面战争。

The war is coming.

战争即将来临。

This is a fight for survival.

这是一场生存之战。

We’re all in it together.

我们都在一起。

You are in this as well, every single one, every single German is now.

现在,你们也身处其中,每一个德国人,每一个德国人。

This is a fight for survival and we are now in total war.”

这是一场生存之战,我们现在正处于全面战争之中。”

2:56:02 And everyone is just so depressed by this.

每个人都因此感到沮丧。

I mean, they realize that they are going to reap what they have sown.

我的意思是,他们意识到他们将会收获他们所播种的东西。

Because everyone knows what’s been going on in the Eastern Front.

因为每个人都知道东线发生了什么。

Because first part of the war, Germans have loads and loads of cameras.

在战争初期,德国人拥有大量相机。

They’re really into photographing everything, taking cine footage of everything, still part of the recording the greatness of the Reich and the triumphs of the Reich.

他们真的很喜欢拍摄一切,拍摄一切的电影镜头,仍然是记录帝国的伟大和帝国胜利的一部分。

They want it recorded.

他们希望将其记录下来。

2:56:26 So all this stuff is a bit like the radios, is made very, very cheap, so lots of them have it, and people are sending it all back.

所以所有这些东西都有点像收音机,制造得非常非常便宜,所以很多人都有它,人们把它们全部寄回去。

And the people that are developing this stuff are all seeing it, and people are talking about it, and then it’s being sent to families, and they’re all seeing it.

开发这些东西的人都看到了它,人们都在谈论它,然后它被发送给家庭,他们都看到了它。

And they’re seeing pictures of Jews being rounded up and beaten, and they’re seeing Ukrainian partisans being executed.

他们看到犹太人被围捕和殴打的照片,他们看到乌克兰游击队被处决。

And they’re seeing villages being torched.

他们看到村庄被烧毁。

And everyone knows.

每个人都知道。

They all know.

他们都知道。

2:56:55 This whole idea is do they really know what was going on?

整个想法是他们真的知道发生了什么吗?

Yeah, they do.

是的,他们确实这么做了。

They do know what’s going on, to lesser or greater detail, of course.

当然,他们确实知道发生了什么,或多或少的细节。

There’s some people who don’t.

有些人不这样做。

And a bit like people know about the news today, some people do, some people don’t.

就像人们今天知道新闻一样,有些人知道,有些人不知道。

“Oh, I never read the newspaper.

“噢,我从来没有读过报纸。

I never listen to the news.” So you have that, of course.

我从来不听新闻。”所以你当然有这个。

But it is widely understood and widely known that really brutal things have been going on in the east.

但众所周知,东部正在发生真正残酷的事情。

And troops are coming back utterly traumatized by what they have taken part in, what they have witnessed, the kind of unspeakable brutality.

部队归来后,因他们所参与的、所目睹的、那种难以形容的暴行而受到彻底的创伤。

This is war on a completely different level to anything that’s been seen in recent years.

这是与近年来所见的任何战争完全不同的水平的战争。

Lex Fridman2:57:35

Yeah, we should mention that the Western Front and the Eastern Front are very different in this regard.

是的,我们应该提到,西线和东线在这方面有很大不同。

James Holland2:57:40

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:57:41

So a lot of the Holocaust by bullets, the Holocaust with the concentration camps and the extermination camps is not in Germany, is not in the Western Front.

所以很多用子弹进行的大屠杀,集中营和灭绝营的大屠杀不是在德国,不是在西线。

2:57:41 It’s in Poland, it’s in the Soviet Union.

在波兰,在苏联。

James Holland2:57:54

Yeah, but don’t forget that even Auschwitz, for example, is part of the New Reich.

是的,但不要忘记,即使是奥斯威辛集中营也是新帝国的一部分。

2:57:54 It is part of an area which has been absorbed into Germany.

它是已并入德国的地区的一部分。

So as far as they’re concerned, it’s now no longer got the Polish name.

所以对他们来说,它现在不再有波兰名字了。

It’s now called Auschwitz, which is a German name.

它现在被称为奥斯威辛,这是一个德国名字。

It is part of Germany.

它是德国的一部分。

And there are German people moving there into this, air comma, model town, and they all know exactly what’s going on.

还有德国人搬进了这个空气逗号模型小镇,他们都清楚地知道发生了什么。

Lex Fridman2:58:18

Yeah.

是的。

2:58:18 You, by the way, have a nice podcast series of four episodes on Auschwitz, the evolution of the dream world town that becomes a camp, a work camp, then becomes an extermination camp.

顺便说一句,您有一个关于奥斯威辛集中营的精彩播客系列,共四集,梦想世界城镇的演变成为一个营地,一个工作营,然后变成一个灭绝营。

James Holland2:58:35

On a big boon of factory for IG Farben, which never produces a single bit of rubber.

对于 IG Farben 来说,这家工厂是一个巨大的福音,因为它从不生产一点橡胶。

Lex Fridman2:58:41

So, this for sure is something I would have to dive deep in.

所以,这肯定是我必须深入研究的事情。

2:58:41 There’s a book you recommended, KL.

你推荐了一本书,KL。

James Holland2:58:50

Yes, it’s just called KL.

是的,它就叫KL。

2:58:50 It’s about the whole concentration camp system, because K is Konzentration, in German.

这是关于整个集中营系统的,因为 K 在德语中是 Konzentration。

Lager is a camp.

啤酒是一个营地。

It’s an exhaustive book, and I am full of admiration for him for writing it, just because, jeepers, it must have been so…

这是一本详尽的书,我对他写的这本书充满钦佩,只是因为,吉普斯,它一定是这样……

I mean, I was very depressed doing that work on Auschwitz, that deep dive.

我的意思是,在奥斯维辛集中营进行这项深入研究的工作时,我感到非常沮丧。

I just found the whole thing utterly dispiriting.

我发现整件事非常令人沮丧。

And I’ve been there a few times, and it’s ghastly.

我去过那里几次,那真是太可怕了。

So, how he wrote a whole book on it, I don’t know.

所以,我不知道他是如何写出一整本书的。

Lex Fridman2:59:21

I think in the details, there’s two ways, I think, to look at the Holocaust.

我认为在细节上,我认为有两种方式来看待大屠杀。

2:59:21 One is Man’s Search For Meaning, but Viktor Frankl, this philosophical thing about how a human being can confront that and find meaning.

其中一本是《人类寻找意义》,但维克多·弗兰克尔是一部关于人类如何面对这一问题并找到意义的哲学作品。

And what does the human condition look like in the context of such evil?

在如此罪恶的背景下,人类的处境又会是什么样子呢?

2:59:45 And then there is the more sort of detailed, okay, well how do you actually implement something like the Final Solution?

然后还有更详细的问题,好吧,你如何实际实现最终解决方案之类的东西?

So, you have this ideology of evil implemented.

所以,你实施了这种邪恶的意识形态。

James Holland2:59:59

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:59:59

And at the fine detail of, what are the different technologies used?

详细来说,使用了哪些不同的技术?

2:59:59 What are the different humans and the hierarchy of humans at a camp?

营地里有哪些不同的人类以及人类的等级制度?

What’s the actual experience of the individual person who shows up at a camp?

参加营地的个人的实际经历是什么?

Just get into the details, and in those details, I think there’s some deep profound human truth that can emerge.

只要深入细节,我认为在这些细节中,可以浮现出一些深刻的人类真理。

The mundane one step at a time is how you can achieve evil, and you can get lost in the mundane.

凡俗一步步成就邪恶,你也可能迷失在凡俗中。

James Holland3:00:33

Yes, the banality of evil, it’s incredible.

是的,邪恶的平庸,令人难以置信。

3:00:33 I think what is so completely horrific is that half the 6 million were killed by bullets to the back of the head.

我认为最可怕的是 600 万人中有一半是死于后脑勺子弹。

And the reason they stopped doing that and they wanted to stop doing that was because the guys, the perpetrators were finding it so traumatic.

他们停止这样做以及他们想要停止这样做的原因是因为那些家伙,肇事者发现这太痛苦了。

3:00:55 Himmler goes and visits an execution in Ukraine, or maybe it’s in the Baltic states, I can’t remember where he goes, but he witnessed some in the summer of 1941.

希姆莱去乌克兰观看了一场处决,或者也许是在波罗的海国家,我不记得他去了哪里,但他在 1941 年夏天目睹了一些处决。

He thinks, “Oh, that’s horrible.

他想:“噢,这太可怕了。

They don’t have to do that.

他们不必这样做。

I don’t want my men having to do that.

我不希望我的手下这么做。

Got to find a more humane way of doing it.” When he’s talk about a more humane way of doing it, humane for the executioners, not for the victims.

必须找到一种更人道的方式来做到这一点。”当他谈论一种更人道的做法时,对刽子手人道,而不是对受害者人道。

3:01:16 Because, trust me, Zyklon B is not a nice way to go.

因为,相信我,Zyklon B 并不是一个好的选择。

Basically, it’s bursting all the capillaries in your lungs.

基本上,它会爆裂肺部的所有毛细血管。

It’s extremely painful, and you can no longer breathe.

这是非常痛苦的,你无法再呼吸。

And it can take up to 20, 25 minutes.

最多可能需要 20、25 分钟。

Some people, it can take a couple of minutes.

有些人可能需要几分钟。

3:01:32 But all of those who are standing naked in that gas chamber, first of all, extremely humiliated by this process in the first place.

但所有赤身裸体站在毒气室里的人,首先都因为这个过程而感到极大的羞辱。

Then there’s a sudden realization of that they’re not having a shower.

然后突然意识到他们没有洗澡。

They’re actually being gassed, and they’re all going to die.

他们实际上是被毒气杀死了,他们都会死。

3:01:46 Imagine what you’re thinking as that processes you, because you might be the first, but you’re still going to…

想象一下当它处理你时你在想什么,因为你可能是第一个,但你仍然会……

Even the first person is going to know that, “I can’t breathe, and I’m dying.” Everyone else is going to see the first few dying, and then going to realize that is what’s going to happen to them.

即使是第一个人也会知道,“我无法呼吸,我快要死了。”其他人都会看到最初的几个人死去,然后就会意识到这就是他们身上会发生的事情。

And you’ve got those minutes, sometimes many minutes, where you’ve got to contemplate that, and that’s in extreme pain and panic.

你有几分钟的时间,有时是很多分钟,你必须思考这个问题,这是极度痛苦和恐慌的。

And just think about how cruel that is.

想想那是多么残酷。

Lex Fridman3:02:14

While being humiliated all the way through.

虽然一路上都被羞辱着。

James Holland3:02:17

While being humiliated all the way through.

虽然一路上都被羞辱着。

3:02:19 So the, inverted commas, humanity of the gas chambers is anything but.

所以,带引号的毒气室的人性绝非如此。

It’s disgusting.

那真令人恶心。

And the fact that people could do this is just beyond terrific.

人们能够做到这一点的事实实在是太棒了。

And then the fact that you are taking your Jewish prisoners and getting them to cut off all the hair, pull out the teeth of the dead before you put them on a lift and incinerate them.

事实上,你正在抓捕你的犹太囚犯,让他们剪掉所有的头发,拔掉死者的牙齿,然后再把他们放在电梯上焚烧。

If you go to Auschwitz now, and you go to the collapse of the blown up gas chambers, which the Germans destroyed before the Russians overran them, in January ’45, you can still see some of the ash ponds, and there are bits of bone.

如果你现在去奥斯维辛,你会看到被炸毁的毒气室的倒塌,德国人在 45 年 1 月占领毒气室之前将其摧毁,你仍然可以看到一些灰池,还有一些骨头。

Yeah, they’re still there, from the ash.

是的,它们还在那里,从灰烬中出来。

It is utterly repulsive.

这是完全令人厌恶的。

3:03:02 And imagine arriving from that train on that incredibly long journey, where you’ve had no comforts whatsoever.

想象一下,从那趟火车出发,经历一段令人难以置信的漫长旅程,在那里你没有任何舒适感。

Again, you’ve had humiliations and privation, the privations you’ve had to suffer as a result of that, of having to defecate in a bucket in the corner in front of other people.

再一次,你经历过羞辱和贫困,你不得不因此而遭受的贫困,不得不在其他人面前在角落里的桶里排便。

It was just horrendous.

这太可怕了。

3:03:18 And then you get there bewildered, and immediately your kids are taken away from you.

然后你困惑地到达那里,你的孩子立刻就被带走了。

Or your husband and wife who’ve been married 20 years, they’re separated just like that, sent off into different groups, straight to the gas chambers.

或者你的丈夫和妻子结婚20年了,他们就这样被分开,被分成不同的组,直接送进毒气室。

I mean, the scale of cruelty is so immense.

我的意思是,残酷的程度是如此之大。

It’s hard to fathom.

很难理解。

3:03:35 And the thing that I find really difficult to reconcile, and this is where I think the warning from history is important, is that Germany is such an amazing nation.

我发现真正难以调和的事情是,德国是一个如此神奇的国家,这也是我认为历史警告很重要的地方。

It’s the country of Beethoven and Strauss and of Goethe, and incredible art and culture and some of the greatest engineers and scientists have ever lived.

这是贝多芬、施特劳斯和歌德的祖国,有着令人难以置信的艺术和文化,以及有史以来最伟大的工程师和科学家。

And look how quickly it flipped into the descent of unspeakable inhumanity, which manifested itself in the Holocaust and the gas chambers and those executions into pits and tiny places and creeks in Lithuania or Ukraine or whatever.

看看它多么迅速地转变为难以形容的不人道行为,这体现在大屠杀和毒气室以及立陶宛或乌克兰等地的坑、小地方和小溪中的处决中。

I mean, it’s just horrendous.

我的意思是,这太可怕了。

And this is from a nation which, a decade earlier, had been a democracy.

这是来自一个十年前还是民主国家的国家。

Lex Fridman3:04:29

It seems like, as a human civilization, we walk that Solzhenitsyn line between good and evil, and it’s a thin line, and we have to walk it carefully.

看起来,作为一个人类文明,我们走在善与恶之间的索尔仁尼琴线,这是一条细线,我们必须小心翼翼地走。

James Holland3:04:39

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman3:04:41

One of the great battles in World War II on the Western Front is Normandy.

诺曼底是第二次世界大战西线最伟大的战役之一。

3:04:41 I have to talk to you about Normandy,

我必须和你谈谈诺曼底

James Holland3:04:52

Have to talk about it.

不得不说一下。

Lex Fridman3:04:53

D-Day, the Normandy landings, the famous on June 6th, 1944.

1944 年 6 月 6 日,著名的诺曼底登陆日。

3:04:53 This was a Allied invasion of Nazi occupied Western Europe.

这是盟军对纳粹占领的西欧的入侵。

James Holland3:05:03

Yep.

是的。

Lex Fridman3:05:03

What was the planning?

计划是什么?

3:05:03 And it was lengthy planning.

这是一个漫长的计划。

What was the planning?

计划是什么?

What was the execution of the Normandy landings?

诺曼底登陆的执行情况如何?

James Holland3:05:09

Well, the decision to finally go in…

嗯,最后决定进去……

3:05:09 That when the Americans joined the war in December 1941, there’s the Arcadia Conference a few days later, a week later, between the British chiefs of staff and political leaders and Churchill and Roosevelt and his own chiefs of staff, about what the policy should be.

当美国于 1941 年 12 月参战时,几天后、一周后,英国参谋长和政治领导人与丘吉尔、罗斯福和他自己的参谋长之间召开了阿卡迪亚会议,讨论政策应该是什么。

And the policy is to get American troops over to Europe as quickly as possible, get them over to Britain, get them training and get them across the channel ASAP and start the liberation of Europe.

政策是尽快让美国军队前往欧洲,让他们前往英国,让他们接受训练,让他们尽快渡过海峡,开始解放欧洲。

3:05:38 The reality is that, in 1942, the Americans just aren’t ready.

现实是,1942 年,美国人还没有准备好。

They’ve gone from this incredibly tiny army.

他们已经离开了这支极其微小的军队。

They’re still growing.

他们仍在成长。

They’ve got no battlefield experience.

他们没有任何战场经验。

The British are still recovering.

英国人仍在康复中。

They’re good on the naval power.

他们擅长海军力量。

They’re increasingly good on air power, but land power they’ve had to make up from the loss of their ally, France, and expand as well.

他们在空中力量方面越来越擅长,但他们必须弥补盟友法国的损失,并扩大陆地力量。

3:05:59 So, ground zero for both America and Britain has been kind of June 1940, when France is out, and suddenly that’s the strategic earthquake, and that’s the issue that needs settling.

因此,美国和英国都处于归零状态,就像 1940 年 6 月法国出局一样,突然发生了战略地震,这就是需要解决的问题。

And they need to just completely realign everything that they’d thought in 1939.

他们需要彻底重新调整 1939 年的想法。

They’ve got to start again.

他们必须重新开始。

3:06:17 But it’s also becomes clear that it’s they’re not really ready in 1943 either.

但很明显,他们在 1943 年还没有真正做好准备。

One of the problems is that Molotov, who is the Soviet foreign minister, has come over to Britain, in May 1942, and said, “We need you to do your bit and get on the campaign trail against the Germans and fight on the ground.” And the British were going, “Well, yeah, but cross-channel invasion is not really going to happen.

问题之一是,苏联外交部长莫洛托夫于 1942 年 5 月来到英国,并表示:“我们需要你尽自己的一份力量,踏上对抗德国的战役,并在实地进行战斗。”英国人说:“嗯,是的,但是跨海峡入侵实际上不会发生。

We know we’re doing that in North Africa at the moment.”

我们知道目前我们正在北非这样做。”

3:06:39 Then he goes over to Washington, and the Americans go, “We are definitely going to go and take on the attack to the Germans in 1942.” They’ve made this promise.

然后他去了华盛顿,美国人说:“我们肯定会去参加 1942 年对德国人的进攻。”他们已经做出了这个承诺。

So the summer of 1942, it becomes clear that they can’t keep that.

1942 年夏天,很明显他们无法保留这一点。

So Churchill says, “Well, look, here’s an idea.

所以丘吉尔说:“好吧,看,这是一个想法。

We’ve already got an army in Egypt.

我们已经在埃及拥有一支军队。

Why don’t we land another one in Northwest Africa.

我们为什么不在西北非再登陆一颗呢?

That’s run by Vichy France, which is pro-Axis French colonies.

它由维希法国管理,维希法国是亲轴心国的法国殖民地。

Why don’t we take that?

我们为什么不接受呢?

We can do that, and then we can meet in the middle.

我们可以做到这一点,然后我们可以在中间见面。

We can pence around.

我们可以闲逛。

We can conquer the whole of North Africa.

我们可以征服整个北非。

You can kill two birds with one stone.

一石二鸟。

It’s because you can get some experience fighting against Axis troops, test some of your equipment and commanders.

这是因为你可以获得一些与轴心国军队作战的经验,测试你的一些装备和指挥官。

What’s not to like?

有什么不喜欢的?

And then we can see how it goes.” So, this is a opportunistic strategy.

然后我们就可以看看事情进展如何。”所以,这是一种机会主义策略。

3:07:24 Whereas the Americans are very much, “We want to draw a straight line to Berlin, and that’s the quickest way.

而美国人则非常愿意,“我们想画一条直线到柏林,这是最快的方法。

Let’s do it that way.” So it’s a different viewpoint, but Roosevelt gets that and agrees to that.

我们就这样吧。”所以这是一个不同的观点,但罗斯福明白并同意这一点。

So, that’s where the whole North Africa-Mediterranean campaign comes from.

所以,这就是整个北非-地中海战役的由来。

3:07:39 And as a consequence of the huge commitment to Tunisia, three and a half thousand aircraft, huge navies, two Allied armies in North Africa.

由于对突尼斯做出了巨大承诺,在北非部署了三千架飞机、庞大的海军和两支盟军。

By the time Tunisia is won in mid-May 1943, they think, “Well, we’ve got all this here.

当 1943 年 5 月中旬赢得突尼斯时,他们想:“好吧,我们已经拥有了这一切。

We might as well really try and put the nail into the coffin of Italy’s war, get them out of the battle.

我们还不如真正尝试在意大利战争的棺材上钉上钉子,让他们退出战斗。

Sicily is an obvious one.

西西里岛就是其中之一。

Let’s go in there, and then we can take a view.”

我们进去看看吧。”

3:08:01 But between Sicily happening and the fall of North Africa is the Trident Conference in Washington, and that is where the decisions made.

但在西西里事件发生和北非沦陷之间,有华盛顿举行的三叉戟会议,决策就是在那里做出的。

The Americans go, “Okay, enough of this opportunistic stuff.

美国人说:“好吧,这种机会主义的事情已经够多了。

Okay, we get it, we buy it, but no more faffing around.

好吧,我们明白了,我们买了它,但不再胡闹了。

May 1944, one year, hence, we are going to cross the Atlantic.” And the British go, “Okay, fair cop.

1944 年 5 月,一年后,我们将横渡大西洋。”英国人说:“好吧,公平的警察。

We’ll do that.” So, that is where Operation Overlord, as it becomes, gets given its code name, its operational name.

我们会这么做的。”因此,这就是“霸主行动”的代号和行动名称。

That’s when the planning starts.

那就是计划开始的时候。

3:08:32 Serious planning starts at the beginning of 1944.

认真的计划从 1944 年初开始。

One of the lessons from Sicily to Normandy is that you can’t have commanders fighting one battle whilst preparing for the next one.

从西西里岛到诺曼底的教训之一是,你不能让指挥官一边打一场战斗,一边为下一场战斗做准备。

You have to have a separate command structure.

你必须有一个单独的命令结构。

And that’s okay because, by this time, we’ve got enough people that have got experience with battlefield command that you can actually split it.

这没关系,因为到了这个时候,我们已经拥有足够多具有战场指挥经验的人,你实际上可以将其分开。

There are very good reasons for going into Italy, not least getting the Foggia airfields so that you can further tighten the noose around Nazi Germany.

进入意大利有很好的理由,尤其是获得福贾机场,这样你就可以进一步收紧纳粹德国周围的绞索。

3:09:00 And one of the great prerequisites for the Normandy invasion is total control of the airspace, not just over Normandy, but over a large swathe of Northwest Europe.

入侵诺曼底的重要先决条件之一是完全控制空域,不仅是诺曼底,而且是西北欧的大片地区。

Why is that?

这是为什么?

Because the moment you land in Normandy, the cat is out of the bag, and it’s then a race between which side can build up men and material quickest.

因为当你登陆诺曼底的那一刻,一切都已经泄露了,接下来的比赛就是哪一方能够最快地建立人员和物资。

Is it going to be the Allies, who’ve got to come from Southern England, which is a distance of a slow journey across seas, and a distance between 80 and 130 miles away, or is it going to be the Germans that are already on the continent?

是来自英格兰南部的盟军,这是一段缓慢的跨海路程,距离在 80 到 130 英里之间,还是已经在欧洲大陆的德国人?

Well, clearly, on paper, it’s the Germans, so you have to slow up the Germans.

嗯,很明显,从纸面上看,是德国人,所以你必须放慢德国人的速度。

3:09:36 Well, how do you do that?

那么,你怎么做呢?

Well, you do that by destroying their means of getting there, so bridges.

好吧,你可以通过摧毁他们到达那里的手段来做到这一点,比如桥梁。

Destroy all the bridges over the Seine.

摧毁塞纳河上的所有桥梁。

Destroy all the bridges over the Loire hit the marshalling yards.

摧毁卢瓦尔河上所有到达编组站的桥梁。

The glue that keeps the German war machine together is the Reichsbahn, the German railway network.

将德国战争机器凝聚在一起的粘合剂是德国铁路网 Reichsbahn。

So destroy the railway as much as you possibly can and make it difficult for the Germans to reinforce the Normandy British head, as and when it comes.

因此,尽可能地摧毁铁路,让德国人很难增援诺曼底的英国人。

But the way you do that, in turn, is by very low-level precision bombing.

但反过来,你做到这一点的方法是通过非常低水平的精确轰炸。

And that has to be done by twin engine, faster, smaller bombers going in low.

这必须通过双引擎、速度更快、体积更小的轰炸机低空飞行来完成。

But the problem is you can’t go low and destroy those bridges if you’ve got Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts hovering above you.

但问题是,如果福克-沃尔夫和梅塞施密特在你上方盘旋,你就无法低空摧毁这些桥梁。

So you’ve got to destroy those, which is why you need to have air superiority over this large swathe of Northwest Europe to do that.

所以你必须摧毁它们,这就是为什么你需要对西北欧这片大片地区拥有空中优势才能做到这一点。

3:10:21 The problem is that while the industrial heartland of Nazi Germany is in the west, is in the Ruhr area, which is very convenient for bombers coming out of Lincolnshire or East Anglia on the east flats, east side of Great Britain, the aircraft industry is much deeper into the Reich, and it is beyond the range of fighter escorts for the bombers.

问题是,虽然纳粹德国的工业中心在西部,鲁尔区,对于从英国东部的林肯郡或东安格利亚起飞的轰炸机来说非常方便,但飞机工业却深入帝国腹地,超出了轰炸机的战斗机护航范围。

3:10:42 And the American daylight bombers who are going over are discovering that, despite being called flying fortresses, they’re not fortresses.

正在飞越的美国昼间轰炸机发现,尽管被称为飞行堡垒,但它们并不是堡垒。

They’re actually getting decimated.

他们实际上正在被消灭。

And whenever their bombers go in strength over to try and hit the aircraft industry in Germany beyond fighter range, they get decimated, first, infamously, on the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid on the 17th of August 1943, coincidentally the same day that Sicily falls to the Allies, and also coincidentally the same day that face-to-face negotiations begin with the Italians for an armistice, in Lisbon.

每当他们的轰炸机试图在战斗机射程之外打击德国的飞机工业时,他们首先会在 1943 年 8 月 17 日的施韦因富特-雷根斯堡袭击中惨遭重创,巧合的是,就在同一天,西西里岛落入盟军之手,也巧合的是,就在同一天,他们在里斯本与意大利开始了面对面的停战谈判。

3:11:13 But on that day of the 324 heavy bombers that the Americans send over to hit Schweinfurt and Regensburg, where there are a Messerschmitt plant and also a ball bearing plant, which is essential for aircraft manufacturing, they lose 60, shot down, and a further 130 odd, really, really badly damaged.

但在美国派出 324 架重型轰炸机袭击施韦因富特和雷根斯堡的那天,那里有梅塞施密特工厂和滚珠轴承工厂,这对于飞机制造至关重要,他们损失了 60 架,被击落,还有 130 多架,非常非常严重地受损。

And even for the vast numbers of manpower and bombers that are coming out of America, this is too much, so they can’t sustain it.

即使对于来自美国的大量人力和轰炸机来说,这也太多了,所以他们无法维持。

So, they’ve got to find a fighter escort that’s going to be able to escort them all the way into the Reich.

因此,他们必须找到一架护航战斗机​​,能够一路护送他们进入帝国。

3:11:43 And the race is on because, basically, if they haven’t got one airspace by April 1944, it’s game over.

这场竞赛之所以打响,是因为基本上,如果到 1944 年 4 月他们还没有获得一处空域,比赛就结束了。

You can’t do a cross-channel invasion.

你无法进​​行跨渠道入侵。

You have to have that control of the airspace beforehand.

你必须事先控制空域。

So the race is on.

所以比赛开始了。

And fortunately, they come up with a solution which is the P-51 Mustang, which has originally been commissioned in May 1940 by the British, developed from sketches to reality in 117 days.

幸运的是,他们想出了一个解决方案,那就是 P-51 野马,它最初于 1940 年 5 月由英国委托服役,从草图到现实只用了 117 天的时间。

It’s a work of absolute genius.

这绝对是天才的作品。

3:12:07 But to start off, it’s harnessed with a really bad engine.

但首先,它配备了一个非常糟糕的引擎。

The Allison engine is just not right for that aircraft.

艾里逊发动机不适合该飞机。

And it’s not until a Rolls-Royce Merlin, which is the same one that powers the Lancaster, the Mosquito, and the Spitfire and Hurricane, is put into the P-51 Mustang, that suddenly you’ve got your solution because that means it can now fly with extra drop tanks and fuel tanks.

直到将劳斯莱斯 Merlin(与为兰卡斯特、蚊式、喷火式战斗机和飓风提供动力的同一台发动机)安装到 P-51 野马上时,您才突然找到了解决方案,因为这意味着它现在可以使用额外的副油箱和油箱飞行。

It’s so aerodynamic, and it’s so good, the higher it goes with this engine, the more fuel efficient it becomes.

它非常符合空气动力学,而且非常好,这款发动机越高,燃油效率就越高。

It can actually fly over 1400 miles, which gets you not just to Berlin and back, but to Warsaw and back.

它实际上可以飞行超过 1400 英里,不仅可以往返柏林,还可以往返华沙。

So, suddenly you’ve got that solution.

所以,突然间你就得到了这个解决方案。

3:12:39 And actually, by April 1944, they have cleared airspace.

事实上,到 1944 年 4 月,他们已经清理了空域。

And by the end of May 1944, just on the eve of the invasion, Operation Overlord, the closest German aircraft that is seen fighting Allied aircraft is 500 miles from the beachhead.

到 1944 年 5 月底,就在入侵前夕,“霸王行动”——与盟军飞机作战的最近的德国飞机距离滩头阵地有 500 英里。

Lex Fridman3:12:55

Wow.

哇。

James Holland3:12:55

So it is absolutely job done.

所以这绝对是工作完成了。

3:12:55 Meanwhile, comparatively new ground attack fighter planes, like Typhoons and Tempests and adapted P-47 Thunderbolts, are attacking the German radar stations all along the coastline because they, now, do have an air defense system.

与此同时,相对较新的地面攻击战斗机,如台风和暴风雨以及改装的 P-47 雷电,正在攻击沿海岸线的德国雷达站,因为它们现在确实拥有防空系统。

They’re destroying 90% of their effectiveness.

他们正在破坏 90% 的效率。

3:13:18 And in the intelligence game, they’re winning that one as well.

在智力游戏中,他们也赢得了胜利。

They’re just much better because, in Germany, intelligence is power, so people tend to…

他们只是更好,因为在德国,智力就是力量,所以人们倾向于……

And Hitler always has this kind of divide and rule thing going on, so you have parallel command structures, which is not conducive to bringing together of intelligence.

希特勒总是进行这种分而治之的事情,所以你有平行的指挥结构,这不利于汇集情报。

3:13:33 And while much play has been made about the successes of Bletchley and code-breaking and all the rest of it, actually what you have to do is you have to see the decrypts that the Bletchley cryptanalysts do as just a cog.

尽管人们对布莱奇利和密码破译以及其他所有方面的成功进行了很多讨论,但实际上您要做的是您必须看到布莱奇利密码分析者只是将其作为一个齿轮进行解密。

And those various cogs together, from listening services to photo reconnaissance to agents on the ground to [inaudible 03:13:52], the cogs collectively add up to more than some of their individual parts.

这些不同的齿轮加在一起,从监听服务到照片侦察,再到地面特工,再到 [听不清 03:13:52],这些齿轮加起来比它们各自的部分还要多。

And so the intelligence picture is a broad picture rather than just code-breaking.

因此,情报图景是一幅广阔的图景,而不仅仅是密码破译。

But anyway, they win that particular battle as well.

但无论如何,他们也赢得了那场特殊的战斗。

3:14:03 And what you see, really, with D-Day, I think, is the zenith of coalition warfare.

我认为,你在诺曼底登陆日所看到的,实际上是联合战争的顶峰。

What you’ve got is you’ve got multiple nations who have different overall aims, different cultures, different attitudes, different start points, but they have all coalesced into one common goal.

多个国家有着不同的总体目标、不同的文化、不同的态度、不同的起点,但他们都凝聚成一个共同的目标。

And until they’ve achieved that common goal, they’re going to put differences to one side.

在实现共同目标之前,他们会将分歧放在一边。

Much play has been made about Anglophobia amongst American commanders and America phobia amongst Ally British commanders, but actually it’s nothing.

人们对美国指挥官中的英国恐惧症和英国盟国指挥官中的美国恐惧症进行了很多讨论,但实际上这没什么。

It’s a marriage made in heaven compared to the way Germany looks after its own allies, for example.

例如,与德国对待自己盟友的方式相比,这是天作之合。

3:14:40 And what is remarkable about the Allies is they’re not actually allies, they’re coalition partners.

同盟国的非凡之处在于,他们实际上并不是盟友,而是联盟伙伴。

So, there’s no formal alliance at all, and there is a subtle difference there.

所以,根本不存在正式的联盟,而且存在细微的差别。

But what you see them is that you see them really, really pulling together.

但你看到的是他们真的非常团结。

And you see that manifest itself on D-Day, I think, where you’ve got 6,939 vessels of which there are 1,213 warships, 4,127 assault craft, 12 and a half thousand aircraft, 155,000 men landed and dropped from the air in 24-hour period.

我想,这一点在诺曼底登陆日就体现出来了,那里有 6,939 艘舰艇,其中 1,213 艘军舰、4,127 艘攻击艇、12 架半飞机、155,000 名人员在 24 小时内起降和空降。

It is phenomenal.

这是惊人的。

It is absolutely phenomenal.

这绝对是非凡的。

3:15:22 And while it is still seen as a predominantly American show, all three service commanders are British.

虽然它仍然被视为主要是美国节目,但所有三名军种指挥官都是英国人。

Two-thirds of the aircraft are British.

三分之二的飞机是英国的。

Two-thirds of the men landed are British and Dominion.

登陆的人中有三分之二是英国人和自治领。

3:15:35 You never forget the Canadians who consistently punch massively above their weight in the Second World War, in all aspects, it has to be said, air, land and sea.

你永远不会忘记加拿大人在第二次世界大战中始终在空中、陆地和海上的各个方面都表现出超乎寻常的表现。

They’re key in the Battle of the Atlantic.

他们是大西洋战役的关键。

They’re key in air power.

它们是空中力量的关键。

Their key D-Day and, indeed, in the battle for Italy, as well.

他们的关键诺曼底登陆日以及意大利之战也是如此。

So, the Canadians should never be forgotten.

所以,加拿大人永远不应该被忘记。

3:15:55 But one of the reasons it is the British Navy that dominates in D-Day is because, of course, the incredibly enormous strength of the Royal Navy in the first place, but partly because most of the U.S. Navy is, by this stage, in the Pacific fighting its own fight.

但英国海军在诺曼底登陆中占据主导地位的原因之一当然是因为英国皇家海军拥有令人难以置信的巨大力量,但部分原因是美国海军的大部分力量在现阶段都在太平洋上进行着自己的战斗。

So, it’s not slacking by any stretch of the imagination.

所以,无论怎么想,它都不会放松。

It is because it’s elsewhere doing its bit for the overall allied cause.

这是因为它在其他地方为整个盟军事业尽了自己的一份力量。

3:16:18 But D-Day is just extraordinary, and despite the terrible weather, which is such a debilitating factor in the whole thing.

但诺曼底登陆日却是非同寻常的,尽管天气恶劣,这对整个事件来说是一个令人衰弱的因素。

I mean, it puts people off course.

我的意思是,这会让人们偏离轨道。

It means many more people get killed on Omaha Beach than they might have done, and on other beaches besides, incidentally.

这意味着在奥马哈海滩上被杀的人比他们可能的要多得多,顺便说一句,在其他海滩上也有更多的人被杀。

And actually, in terms of lies lost, proportionally, it is the Canadians that suffer the worst, more so than the Americans.

事实上,就失去的谎言而言,按比例计算,加拿大人遭受的损失最严重,比美国人更严重。

It’s just it’s fewer of them, overall.

总体而言,只是数量较少。

3:16:43 D-Day has to be seen as an unqualified success.

诺曼底登陆必须被视为一次绝对的成功。

I mean, it is absolutely extraordinary what they achieve.

我的意思是,他们所取得的成就绝对是非凡的。

And while they don’t 100% achieve their overall D-Day objectives, the objectives are always going to be the outer reach of what can be achieved, and you’d need absolutely perfect conditions for that to happen.

虽然他们没有 100% 实现诺曼底登陆的总体目标,但这些目标始终是可以实现的目标,而你需要绝对完美的条件才能实现这一目标。

And they don’t get perfect conditions, but they’re so balanced, they’ve so thought of absolutely everything, and their logistics apply.

他们并没有获得完美的条件,但他们非常平衡,他们考虑到了一切,而且他们的后勤工作也很适用。

3:17:09 I mean, even things like the minesweeping operations, it’s the biggest single minesweeping operation of the entire war because there’s huge minefields off the Normandy coast.

我的意思是,即使是扫雷行动,这也是整个战争中规模最大的一次扫雷行动,因为诺曼底海岸附近有巨大的雷区。

And ahead of the invasion force, the minesweepers, which amount to, I think, something like 242 different minesweepers in five different operations opposite every single beach, creating lanes through these minefields through which the invasion force can go, not a single ship is lost to a mine in the actual invasion.

在入侵部队之前,扫雷艇,我认为大约有 242 艘不同的扫雷艇,在每个海滩对面的五次不同行动中,在这些雷区中开辟出通道,供入侵部队通过,在实际入侵中,没有一艘船因水雷而损失。

That is phenomenal and can only be done with the greatest of skill and planning, and all in a period where there are no computers.

这是惊人的,只有通过最出色的技巧和规划才能完成,而且所有这一切都是在没有计算机的时期完成的。

There’s no GPS.

没有 GPS。

There’s nothing.

什么也没有。

I mean, it is absolutely astonishing, and the scale of it is just, frankly, mind-boggling.

我的意思是,这绝对令人震惊,坦率地说,其规模令人难以置信。

Lex Fridman3:17:50

Yeah, and that was really the nail in the coffin, the beginning of the end for Hitler, now, for the European theater.

是的,这确实是棺材上的钉子,是希特勒终结的开始,现在是欧洲战区的终结。

James Holland3:18:00

Yeah, once you get the…

是的,一旦你得到了...

3:18:00 The only cause for doubt is, will they be able to secure that bridgehead?

唯一令人怀疑的是,他们能否确保桥头堡的安全?

The moment they get that bridgehead, it is game over.

当他们占领桥头堡的那一刻,游戏就结束了。

There is no other way it’s going to be because of the overwhelming amount of men and material that the Allies have compared to the Germans at this stage of the war.

没有其他办法,因为在战争的这个阶段,盟军与德国人相比,拥有压倒性的人员和物资。

And, of course, you’re being attacked on three fronts because there’s the Italian front to the south, and of course, in a very major way, you’ve also got the Eastern Front.

当然,你会在三个方面受到攻击,因为南部有意大利前线,当然,在很大程度上,你也有东​​线。

And Operation Bagration, which is launched that summer as well, is enormous.

同年夏天启动的巴格拉季昂行动规模巨大。

Lex Fridman3:18:33

Let’s go to the very end, the Battle of Berlin, Hitler sitting in his bunker, his suicide, Germany surrender.

让我们看最后,柏林战役,希特勒坐在他的地堡里,他自杀了,德国投降。

3:18:33 You actually said that Downfall, the movie, was a very accurate representation.

你实际上说过,电影《堕落》是一个非常准确的表述。

James Holland3:18:49

I think it is, really, except that Goebbels took cyanide, didn’t shoot himself.

我认为确实如此,只是戈培尔服用了氰化物,而不是开枪自杀。

Lex Fridman3:18:53

Oh, details, but I think it’s probably…

哦,细节,但我想这可能是……

3:18:53 It might be my favorite World War II movie, which is strange to say because it’s not really about World War II.

这可能是我最喜欢的二战电影,这说起来很奇怪,因为它并不是真正关于二战的。

It’s about Hitler in a bunker, but…

这是关于希特勒在地堡里的故事,但是……

James Holland3:19:06

What was his name?

他叫什么名字?

3:19:06 Bruno Ganz, wasn’t it?

布鲁诺·甘茨,不是吗?

I think he nailed him.

我认为他钉住了他。

Lex Fridman3:19:12

Yeah.

是的。

James Holland3:19:13

There’s so many accounts of that.

对此有很多记载。

3:19:13 There’s so much written about Hitler.

关于希特勒的文章太多了。

There’s millions and millions of Hitler’s words that you can read.

您可以阅读数以百万计的希特勒话语。

There are translations of many of his conferences.

他的许多会议都有翻译。

You can see what he’s saying.

你可以看到他在说什么。

You can get inside his head in a very clear way, and much more clearly than you can Stalin or just about any other leader really.

你可以非常清晰地了解他的头脑,而且比斯大林或任何其他领导人都清楚得多。

So, what has a very, very strong impression of what Hitler was like in the bunker in those last days.

那么,对希特勒最后几天在地堡里的样子有非常非常强烈的印象。

There’s so many accounts of it, and it just feels like they nailed it.

有很多关于它的报道,感觉就像他们做到了。

It just feels like they’ve got it spot on, to me.

对我来说,感觉他们已经做到了这一点。

Lex Fridman3:19:54

I mean, it’s a fascinating story of a evil maniac, and then in this certainty, crumbling, realizing that this vision of the thousand-year Reich is…

我的意思是,这是一个关于一个邪恶的疯子的引人入胜的故事,然后在这种确定性中,崩溃,意识到这个千年帝国的愿景是......

James Holland3:20:11

And Hitler says, “My reputation won’t be good to start off with, but I hope in a few years time that people start to realize that kind of all the good I was trying to bring.”

希特勒说:“一开始我的名声并不好,但我希望几年后人们开始意识到我试图带来的所有好处。”

Lex Fridman3:20:18

Yeah.

是的。

James Holland3:20:19

And that sort of…

还有那种……

Lex Fridman3:20:20

They’re all the same, aren’t they?

它们都是一样的,不是吗?

3:20:20 You always believe you’re doing good.

你总是相信自己做得很好。

James Holland3:20:20

Yep.

是的。

Lex Fridman3:20:24

And there’s so many deep lessons there.

其中有很多深刻的教训。

3:20:24 So, now, you have written so much.

那么,现在你已经写了这么多了。

You have said so much.

你已经说了这么多了。

You have studied this so much.

你已经研究了这么多。

What to you, looking at World War II, is the lessons we should take away?

回顾二战,您认为我们应该吸取什么教训?

James Holland3:20:41

Well, I suppose it’s what happens when you allow these individuals to take hold of great power and great authority and make these terrible decisions.

好吧,我想,当你允许这些人掌握巨大的权力和权威并做出这些可怕的决定时,就会发生这种情况。

3:20:41 If you allow that to happen, there are consequences.

如果你允许这种情况发生,就会产生后果。

You have to recognize the moments of trouble when they arise.

当麻烦出现时,你必须认清它们。

So when there are financial crisis, you know that political unrest is going to come, and you need to be prepared for that.

因此,当出现金融危机时,你知道政治动荡将会到来,你需要为此做好准备。

You need to be able to see the writing on the wall.

你需要能够看到墙上的文字。

3:21:12 You can’t be complacent.

你不能自满。

Complacency is such a dirty word, isn’t it?

自满是一个肮脏的词,不是吗?

You’ve got to keep your wits, and you can’t take things for granted.

你必须保持理智,不能认为事情是理所当然的。

You’ve got to recognize, I think, that the freedoms we enjoy in the West are…

我认为,你必须认识到,我们在西方享有的自由是……

They’re not necessarily permanent, and you need to make the most of them, while you’ve got them, and cherish them and consider what happens if the milk turns sour and what the consequences of that are.

它们不一定是永久性的,当你拥有它们时,你需要充分利用它们,珍惜它们,并考虑如果牛奶变酸会发生什么以及后果是什么。

I mean, that’s the overriding theme.

我的意思是,这是最重要的主题。

3:21:46 Because, although I don’t think there will ever be a war on the scale of the Second World War, you’ve only got to look at pictures of those opening days of the war in Ukraine and see knocked out Russian tanks and dead bodies, bloated bodies all over the place.

因为,虽然我认为不会发生第二次世界大战规模的战争,但你只要看看乌克兰战争刚开始几天的照片,就会看到被击毁的俄罗斯坦克和尸体,到处都是浮肿的尸体。

Put that into black and white, and it could be the road out of Falaise in 1944.

把它变成白纸黑字,它可能就是 1944 年离开法莱斯的道路。

It could be any number of German battlefields in World War II.

它可能是二战中任意数量的德国战场。

And the similarities in the trenches and the people hiding in foxholes, that’s horribly reminiscent, as are the huge casualties that they’re suffering on both sides, whether they be Russian or Ukrainian.

战壕和躲在散兵坑里的人们的相似之处,令人可怕地让人想起,双方都遭受了巨大的伤亡,无论是俄罗斯人还是乌克兰人。

3:22:24 And it’s a shock.

这真是令人震惊。

It’s a shock to see that.

看到这一点真是令人震惊。

It reminds you of just how quickly, I think, things can descend.

我认为,它提醒你事情的下降速度有多快。

I mean, that’s the other thing.

我的意思是,那是另一回事。

That point I was making about how quickly Germany descended from this amazing nation of arts and culture and science and development and engineering into one of the Holocaust.

我所说的这一点是关于德国如何迅速地从这个令人惊叹的艺术、文化、科学、发展和工程国家沦为大屠杀国家之一。

I mean, life is fragile, and peace is fragile, and you take it for granted at your peril.

我的意思是,生命是脆弱的,和平也是脆弱的,如果你认为这是理所当然的,那么你就会面临危险。

Lex Fridman3:22:57

And you take for granted, at our peril, that nobody will use nuclear weapons ever again.

你们理所当然地认为没有人会再次使用核武器,而我们将面临危险。

3:22:57 And that’s not a thing we should take for granted.

我们不应该认为这是理所当然的。

James Holland3:23:08

No, sir.

不,先生。

Lex Fridman3:23:09

What gives you hope about the future of human civilization?

是什么让您对人类文明的未来充满希望?

3:23:09 We’ve been talking about all this darkness in the 20th century.

我们一直在谈论 20 世纪的所有黑暗。

What’s the source of light?

光源是什么?

James Holland3:23:20

The source of light is that I think the vast majority of people are good people, who want to live peacefully, and want to live happily, and are not filled with hate.

光明的来源是,我认为绝大多数人都是好人,想要安宁地生活,想要幸福地生活,而不是充满仇恨。

3:23:20 There are some brilliant minds out there, and I think the capacity for the human brain to come up with new developments and new answers to problems and challenges is infinite.

那里有一些聪明的头脑,我认为人类大脑对问题和挑战提出新发展和新答案的能力是无限的。

I think that’s what gives me hope.

我想这就是给我希望的原因。

Lex Fridman3:23:50

James, I’m a big fan.

詹姆斯,我是他的忠实粉丝。

3:23:50 This was an honor to talk to you, and please keep putting incredible history out there.

很荣幸与您交谈,请继续将令人难以置信的历史放在那里。

I can’t wait to see what you do next.

我迫不及待地想看看你下一步会做什么。

Thank you so much for talking today.

非常感谢您今天的发言。

James Holland3:24:02

Well, thank you, Lex.

好吧,谢谢你,莱克斯。

3:24:02 It’s a privilege to talk to you.

很荣幸能与您交谈。

Lex Fridman3:24:06

Thanks for listening to this conversation with James Holland.

感谢您收听与詹姆斯·霍兰德的对话。

3:24:06 To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description or at lexfridman.com/sponsors.

为了支持此播客,请在说明中或访问 lexfridman.com/sponsors 查看我们的赞助商。

3:24:15 And now, let me leave you some words from Winston Churchill.

现在,让我给你们留下温斯顿·丘吉尔的话。

“If you’re going through hell, keep going.” Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

“如果你正在经历地狱,就继续前进。”感谢您的聆听,并希望下次再见。

文稿来自 Lex Fridman 官网公开发布的官方 Transcript(含说话人与时间戳)。
James Holland (00:00:00): And you see that manifest itself on D-Day, where you’ve got 6,939 vessels, of which there are 1,213 warships, 4,127 assault craft, 12,500 aircraft. 155,000 men landed, and dropped from the air, in a 24-hour period. It is phenomenal. It is absolutely phenomenal. Lex Fridman (00:00:27): The following is a conversation with James Holland, a historian specializing in World War II, who has written a lot of amazing books on the subject, especially covering the Western front, often providing fascinating details at multiple levels of analysis, including strategic, operational, tactical, technological, and of course the human side, the personal accounts from the war. Lex Fridman (00:00:51): He also co-hosts a great podcast on World War II, called We Have Ways of Making You Talk. This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description, or at lex fridman.com/sponsors. And now, dear friends, here’s James Holland. Lex Fridman (00:01:13): In Volume One of the War in the West, your book series on World War II, you write, “The Second World War witnessed the deaths of more than 60 million people, from over 60 different countries. Entire cities were laid waste, national borders were redrawn, and many millions more people found themselves displaced. Over the past couple of decades, many of those living in the Middle East, or parts of Africa and the Balkans, Afghanistan, and even the United States, may feel justifiably that these troubled times have already proved the most traumatic in their recent past. Yet globally, the Second World War was and remains the single biggest catastrophe of modern history. In terms of human drama, it is unrivaled. No other war has affected so many lives, in such a large number of countries.” Lex Fridman (00:02:11): So what to you makes World War II the biggest catastrophe in human drama in modern history, and maybe from a historian perspective, the most fascinating subject to study? James Holland (00:02:22): The thing about World War II is, it really is truly global. It’s fought in deserts, it’s fought in the Arctic, it’s fought across oceans, it’s fought in the air, it’s in jungle, it’s in the hills, it is on the beaches, it’s also on the Russian steppe, and it’s also in Ukraine. So it’s that global nature of it. James Holland (00:02:44): And I just think, where there’s war, there is always incredible human drama. And I think for most people, and certainly the true, in my case, you get drawn to the human drama of it. It’s that thought that, “Gosh, if I’d been 20 years old, how would I have dealt with it? Would I have been in the Army? Would I have been in the Air Force? Would I have been on a Royal Navy destroyer? Or how would I have coped with it? And how would I have dealt with that separation?” James Holland (00:03:08): I mean, I’ve interviewed people who were away for four years. I remember talking to a tank man from Liverpool in England called Sam Bradshaw, and he went away for four years. And when he came home, he’d been twice wounded, he’d been very badly wounded in North Africa, and then, he was shot in the neck in Italy, eventually got home. James Holland (00:03:27): And when he came home, his mother had turned gray. His little baby sister, who had been 13 when he left, was now a young woman. His old school had been destroyed by Luftwaffe bombs. He didn’t recognize the place. And do you know what he did? He joined up again, went back out of Europe, and was one of the first people in Belsen, so … Lex Fridman (00:03:49): What was his justification for that, for joining right back? James Holland (00:03:52): He just felt completely disconnected to home. He felt that the Gulf of time, his experiences had separated him from all the normalities of life, and he felt that the normalities of the life that he had known, before he’d gone away to war, had just been severed, in a really kind of cruel way, that he didn’t really feel he was able to confront at that particular point. James Holland (00:04:14): But he decided to rejoin, couldn’t go back to the Third Royal Tank Regiment, so he went back to a different unit. It went from, kind of the Italian campaign, to the European theater. Didn’t see so much action at the end, but a lot of British troops, if you were in a certain division at a certain time, you know, ended up passing very close to Belsen, and you suddenly realize, “Okay, this was the right thing to do. We did have to get rid of Nazism. We did have to do this, because this is the consequence. It’s not just the oppression, it’s not just the secret police. It’s not just the expansionism of Nazism.” It is also the Holocaust, which hadn’t been given its name at that point, but you’re witnessing this kind of untold cruelty. James Holland (00:04:55): And I’ve always sort of, I think a lot about Sam. I mean, he’s no longer with us, but he was one of the first people that I interviewed, and I interviewed him at great length. And I know you like a long interview, Lex, and I totally, totally get that. Because when you have a long interview, you really start getting to the nuts and bolts of it. James Holland (00:05:14): One of the frustrations, for me, when I’m looking at oral histories of Second World War vets is usually, they’re kind of, they’re put on YouTube, or they’re put on a museum website. They’re 30 minutes, an hour, if you’re lucky, and you’re just scratching the surface. You never really get to know it, and you feel that they’re just repeating kind of stuff they’ve read in books themselves after the war, and stuff. James Holland (00:05:36): I always leave, kind of feeling frustrated that I haven’t had a chance to kind of grill them on the kind of stuff that I would grill them on, if I was put in front of them. Lex Fridman (00:05:44): So tank man. What was maybe the most epic, the most intense, or the most interesting story that he told you? James Holland (00:05:53): Well, I do remember him telling me, funny enough, it’s not really about the conflict. I remember him telling me about the importance of letters, and there was this guy who, literally every few weeks, the post would arrive intermittently. There was no kind of regular post, so it was supposed to be regular, but it didn’t come around regularly. So you might suddenly, suddenly get a flurry of five, all in one day. James Holland (00:06:18): But he said there was this guy in his tank, a member of a different tank troop. He was a good friend of his in the same squadron. You had British half squadrons for their armor, which is,Americans would have a company. Lex Fridman (00:06:32): I should say that in your book, one of the wonderful things you do is you use the correct term in the language for the particular army involved, whether it’s the German or the British or the American. James Holland (00:06:42): Well, that’s not to be pretentious. That’s really just because you’re dealing with so many numbers, and different units, and it can go over your head, and you can get sort of consumed by the detail, if you’re not careful. And as a reader, it can be very unsatisfying, because you just can’t keep pace with everything. James Holland (00:06:58): So one of the things about writing in the vernacular German, or in the American spelling, or more, rather than our mauer, as we Brits would spell it, is it just immediately tells the reader, “Okay, this is American, yeah, okay, I’ve got that. Or, this is German, I’ve got that, or Italian, or whatever it might be.” James Holland (00:07:17): But yeah, to go back to Sam, so Sam, there was this guy in his squadron, and he’d get his letters from his girlfriend, his wife, and he said, “It was like a soap opera.” He said, “We all just waited for his letters to come in, so we could find out whether his daughter had got to school or something, won the swimming contest, or whatever it was.” The sort of details of this day to day kind of banal life was just absolute catnip to these guys. They absolutely loved it. James Holland (00:07:49): And then, the letter arrived, the Dear John letter saying, “Sorry, I’ve found someone else, and it’s over.” And his friend was just absolutely devastated. It was the only thing that was keeping him going, this sense of this sort of continuity of home, this sort of foundation of his life back at home. James Holland (00:08:12): Sam said he could see he was in a really, really bad way, and he thought, “He’s going to do something stupid.” And he went up to him, and he said, “Look, I know it’s bad, and I know it’s terrible, and I know you’re absolutely devastated, but you’ve got your mates here, just don’t do anything silly. Maybe when it’s all over, you can patch things up or sort things out.” And he said, “You’ve got to understand it from her point of view. It’s a long way. You haven’t seen you for two years,” this kind of stuff, “so just don’t do anything rash.” And of course, the next engagement, two days later, he was killed. And he said it was just a kind of, he just knew that was going to happen. So it was a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. James Holland (00:08:49): That’s something I’ve never forgotten, that story, and I just thought, “It’s about human drama, that’s the truth of it,” and how people react to this totally alien situation. For the most part, the Second World War is fought by ordinary everyday people doing extraordinary things. James Holland (00:09:10): And I think that’s something that’s so fascinating. I think, instinctively, I’m quite slapdash, I think. So I think I would’ve bought it literally. I don’t think it would have ended well for me. I’m just a bit careless. Lex Fridman (00:09:25): Yeah, I think I also have an element in me, where I can believe in the idea of nation, and fight for a nation, especially when the conflict is as grand. James Holland (00:09:38): There are things worse than death. Lex Fridman (00:09:39): Yes, as the propaganda would explain very clearly, but also in reality, yes. So a nation, France, Britain, was maybe facing the prospect of being essentially enslaved. The Soviet Union was facing the prospect of being enslaved, literally. Lex Fridman (00:09:58): I mean, it was very, very clearly stated what they’re going to do. They’re going to repopulate the land with Germanic people, so … James Holland (00:10:06): Well, they’re not just going to do that. They’re also going to starve lots and lots of Soviet individuals to death by the Hunger Plan, for example, which is planned really very casually, and not by the, this is not SS units or anything like this. James Holland (00:10:21): This is the Wehrmacht, this is the economic division of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the German combined general staff. General Georg Thomas comes up, and Hermann Backe, who’s the, kind of Minister for Food. They come up, “What are we going to do? We haven’t got enough food,” largely because German farming is inefficient, and they think, “Well, this is part of Lebensraum. We’ll go in and we’ll take the food.” James Holland (00:10:50): And there’s been this colossal urbanization of the Soviet Union since the revolution in 1917. “So they’re just not going to get their food, these people in these cities because we’re going to take it all. And that’s going to lead to a lot of deaths.” “Umpteen millions” is the phrase that Georg Thomas used. Lex Fridman (00:11:11): So let’s talk about the Hunger Plan. How important was the Hunger Plan and Lebensraum to Nazi ideology, and to the whole Nazi war machine? James Holland (00:11:20): Essential to the whole thing. This is all about this notion that is embedded into Hitler’s mind, and into the minds of the Nazi party, right from the word go is, there is a big sort of global conspiracy, the Jewish Bolshevik plot, I mean, completely misplaced, that Jews and Bolsheviks go hand in hand, and that somehow dovetail. They don’t, obviously. James Holland (00:11:44): And the whole ideology is to crush this. Part of the way the Nazis think, the way Hitler thinks is there is a them, and there’s us. We are the whites, Northern European Aryans, we should be the master race. We’ve been threatened by a global Jewish Bolshevik plot. We’ve been stabbed in the back in 1918, at the end of the first World War. We need to have to overcome, this is an existential battle for future survival. It’s a terrible task that has befallen our generation, but we have to do this, we have to overcome this or else we have no future. We will be crushed. It’s absolutely cut and dry. James Holland (00:12:27): And one of the things about Hitler is that he is a very kind of black and white, them or us, either/or, kind of person. It’s always one thing or the other. It’s a thousand-year Reich, or it’s Armageddon. There is no, there’s no middle ground, there’s no gray area. It’s just one or the other. And that’s how, that’s his worldview. James Holland (00:12:45): And the reason he came to the fore was because of the crystal clear clarity of his message, which is, “We’ve been stabbed in the back. There is a global plot. We have to overcome this. We are naturally the master race. We have to reassert ourselves. We have to get rid of global Jewry, we have to get rid of global Bolshevism, and we have to prevail, or else. But if we do prevail, oh, what an amazing world it’s going to be.” James Holland (00:13:17): So he starts with this. Every speech he does, always starts with the same way, always starts from a kind of negative, and always ends with an incredible, positive, this sort of rabble-rousing crescendo of, if you’re in the front row, spittle, halitosis and gesticulation. I mean, you’ve seen pictures of him. I mean, I don’t know if you’ve ever seen pictures of him. He’s almost, he wants to grab the air and clutch it to him. James Holland (00:13:42): You can see the venom coming out of his mouth, just in a single still photograph. I mean, it’s amazing. There’s apps you can get now, where you can translate his speeches, and it just sounds, by today’s standards, you would just think, “What a load of absolute wibble,” I mean, just total nonsense. James Holland (00:14:03): But you have to put yourself back in the shoes of people listening to him in 1922 or ’23, or indeed, 1933, and see how kind of captivating that is to a certain part of the population. So, yeah, to go back to your original point, Lebensraum is absolutely part of it. So what you do is you crush the Bolsheviks, you crush world Jewry, then you expand. Britain has had this incredible empire, global empire. Germany needs that, too. James Holland (00:14:32): Germany’s stuck in Europe, it doesn’t have access to the world’s oceans. So we’re not going to be a maritime empire. We’re going to be a landmass empire, the whole of landmass of Europe, and into Asia, that’s going to be us. We’re going to take that land, we’re going to take the breadbasket of Ukraine, we’re going to use that for our own ends. James Holland (00:14:53): We’re going to make ourselves rich, but we’re also going to spread our peoples. We’re going to spread the Aryan Northern Master race throughout Europe, and into the traditional Slavic areas, and we will prevail, and come out on top. James Holland (00:15:06): And so, you have to understand that everything about Operation Barbarossa, the planned invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, is totally wrapped up in the Nazi ideology. And people, I’ve read it, that historians will go, “If only Hitler had realized that the Ukrainians have been quite happy to kind of fight on his side, if only he’d actually brought some of these Jewish scientists into the Nazi fold, then Germany might have prevailed in World War II.” James Holland (00:15:35): And you kind of think, “Well, you’re missing the entire point. That’s just never going to happen, because this is an ideological war.” Lex Fridman (00:15:41): Yeah, this is not a pragmatic rational leader. James Holland (00:15:46): No. Lex Fridman (00:15:46): I mean part of his effectiveness, we should say, is probably the singular belief in this ideology. There’s pros and cons. For an effective military machine, probably having that singular focus is effective. James Holland (00:16:03): Yes, except that when you’re making military decisions, if those decisions are always being bracketed by an ideology, which is fundamentally flawed, from a pragmatic point of view, as much as a kind of … Lex Fridman (00:16:17): Yeah, ethical. James Holland (00:16:19): Reasonable point of view, you’re opening yourselves up for trouble. I mean, this is a problem he has with Barbarossa. They realize very early on, in 1941, when they’re war gaming this whole operation, that it’s not going to work. James Holland (00:16:34): So there’s people like General Paulus, who’s on the staff at the time. He’s in charge of war gaming this, and he goes, “This isn’t going to work.” And Keitel, who is the chief of the OKW, goes, “No, no, no, no, no. Go back and make it work.” He goes, “Okay.” So he comes back with a plan that does work, but it’s bogus. I mean, it doesn’t work, because they don’t have. They don’t have enough motorization. James Holland (00:17:04): They go into Barbarossa with 2,000 different types of vehicle. Every single one of those vehicles has to have different distributor caps, and different leads, and plugs, and all sorts of different parts. James Holland (00:17:19): The interoperability of the German mechanized arm is super inefficient. So you’ve got huge problems, because they kind of think, “Well, we took France in 1940, and that’s one of the most modern countries in the world, with one of the greatest armies and armed forces in the world, and we did that in six weeks.” So, Soviet Union, look, they struggled against Finland, for goodness sake. I mean, how hard can it be? James Holland (00:17:45): But what you’re failing to understand is that attacking the Soviet Union is over a geographical landmass 10 times the size of France, just on the frontage. And you haven’t really got much more mechanization than you had in May 1940, when they attacked the Low Countries and France. And you’ve actually got less Luftwaffe aircraft to support you, and you just do not have the operational mechanics to make it work successfully. James Holland (00:18:10): I mean, it is largely down to incompetence of the Red Army and the Soviet leadership in the summer of 1941 that they get as far as they do. I mean, Barbarossa should never have come close to being a victory. Lex Fridman (00:18:24): Let’s talk through it. So, Operation Barbarossa that you’re mentioning, and we’ll go back- James Holland (00:18:28): Yeah, we’ve jupmed straight into ’41. Lex Fridman (00:18:29): … to ’39 and ’40, straight into it. James Holland (00:18:31): I’ve eaten off two years of war. Lex Fridman (00:18:33): So this is June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, when Hitler invades the Soviet Union with, I think, the largest invading force in history, up to that point. James Holland (00:18:45): Collectively, yeah. Lex Fridman (00:18:46): And there’s three prongs, Army Group North, Army Group Center, Army Group South. North is going to Leningrad. Center is going, it’s the strongest group, directly towards Moscow, and South is going and targeting Ukraine and the Caucasus. Lex Fridman (00:19:02): So, can you linger on that on the details of this plan? What was the thinking? What was the strategy? What was the tactics? What was the logistics? There’s so many things to say, but one of them is to say that you often emphasize the importance of three ways to analyze military conflict, of the strategic, the operational and tactical. And the operational is often not given enough time attention, and it’s the logistics that make the war machine really work successfully, or fail. James Holland (00:19:35): Yeah, that’s absolutely spot-on. And it’s interesting, because the vast majority of general histories of World War II tend to focus on the strategic and the tactical. James Holland (00:19:49): So what do I mean by that? Well, the strategic, just for those who don’t know, that’s your overall war aims, get to Moscow, whatever it might be, conquer the world. That’s your strategy. James Holland (00:19:59): The tactical side of things is, that’s the coalface of war. That’s the attritional bit. That’s the following in his Spitfire, the tank crew, the soldier in his foxhole, it’s the actual kinetic fighting bit. James Holland (00:20:11): The operational bit is the level of war that links the strategic to the tactical. So it is absolutely factories, it’s economics, it’s shipping, it’s supply chains, it’s how you manage your war. And one of the things where I think people have been guilty in the past, historians have been guilty in the past, is by judging warfare all on the same level. But obviously, every competent nation has a different approach to war, because of the nation they are, the size they are, their geographical location. James Holland (00:20:44): So Britain, for example, is an island nation. Its priority is the Royal Navy, which is why the Royal Navy is known as the senior service. And in 1939, it’s easy to forget it now when you see how depleted Britain is today, but in 1939, it has comfortably the world’s largest navy. There’s something like 194 destroyers, I think it’s 15 battleships, seven aircraft carriers, and another kind of six on the way. James Holland (00:21:13): America, it’s got the Pacific Ocean, it’s got the Atlantic Ocean, it’s got two seaboards. It has the second-largest navy in the world, but a tiny army. I mean, the US Army in September 1939 is the nineteen1h largest in the world, sandwiched between Portugal and Uruguay. And it’s just incredible. It’s 189,000 strong, which might seem reasonably large by today’s standards, but is absolutely tiny by 1939 standards. Whereas, Germany’s got an army of three and a half million in 1939. So these are big, big, big differences. James Holland (00:21:48): But America’s coming at it from a different perspective, Britain’s coming apart, from a different perspective. Britain’s empire is all about, it’s a shipping, it’s a seaborne empire. James Holland (00:21:59): Whereas, there’s also another point, which is having large armies is actually inherently impractical and inefficient, because the larger the army, the more people you’ve got to feed, the more barracks you’ve got to have, the more space you’ve got to have for training, the more people you’re taking out of your workforce to produce tanks and shells, and all the rest of it, because they’re tramping around with rifles. James Holland (00:22:21): So there’s an argument saying, actually, it’s really not a very good way of doing things. So very much, the British way, and subsequently, the United States way, and the way of Britain’s dominions and empire, is to use steel, not our flesh, as a principle. Because the idea is that you use technology, mechanization, modernity, global reach, to do a lot of your hard yards. That’s the basic principle behind the strategic air campaign. James Holland (00:22:48): When we talk about the strategic air campaign, we’re talking about strategic air forces which are operating in isolation from other armed forces. So a tactical air force, for example, is an Air force which is offering close air support for ground operations. A strategic air force has got nothing to do with ground operations, it’s just operating on its own. So that’s your bomber force, or whatever, that’s your B-17s and B 24s of the Eighth Air Force, flying out of East England, bombing the industrial complex of Germany, or whatever it might be. James Holland (00:23:17): So it’s important to understand that when you compare, you have to have in the back of your mind that Britain, compared to Germany, for example, is coming at it from a completely different perspective. And I would say one of the failures of Hitler is that he always views everybody through his own very narrow worldview, which is not particularly helpful. You want to get inside the head of your enemy, and he’s sort of guilty of not doing that. James Holland (00:23:41): So when you’re talking about Operation Barbarossa, to go back to your original question, Lex, you’re dealing with an operation on such a vast scale, that that operational level of war is absolutely vital to its chances of success or failure. It doesn’t matter how good your individual commanders are at the front. If you haven’t got the backup, it’s not going to work. James Holland (00:24:02): And the problem that the Germans have is yes, they’ve got their three million men on the front, and they’ve got their kind of 3,000 aircraft, and all the rest of it. But actually, what you need to do is break it down. James Holland (00:24:15): And who is doing the hard yards of that? The way that the German war machine works is that the machine bit is only the spearhead. So people always talk about the Nazi war machine. In a way, it’s a kind of misnomer, because you’re sort of suggesting that it’s highly mechanized and industrialized, and all the rest of it. And nothing could be further from the truth. The spearhead is, but the rest of it is not. James Holland (00:24:38): And this is the fatal flaw of the German armed forces in the whole of World War II, really, but even in this early stage, because in Barbarossa, you’re talking about 17 Panzer divisions out of the 100-odd that are involved in the initial attack. Well, 17, a Panzer division is not a division full of Panzers, tanks. James Holland (00:25:02): It is a combined arms motorized outfit. So, scouts on BMWs with sidecars, armored cars, infantry grenadiers, Panzer grenadiers, which are infantry in half tracks and trucks, mechanized. It is motorized artillery. It is motorized anti-aircraft artillery. It is motorized anti-tank artillery. Of course, it is tanks as well, Panzers. But those are a really, really small proportion of, you’re talking, less than 20% of your attacking force are those spearhead forces. And inevitably, they are going to be attrited as they go. You are going to take casualties. Not only that, you’re not going to just take battlefield casualties, you’re also going to have mechanical casualties, because of the huge spaces involved. You just simply can’t function. James Holland (00:25:53): So what you see is, in the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, they surge forward. Red Army’s got absolutely no answers to anything. Stalin, weirdly, hasn’t heeded all the warnings that this attack is brewing. And there have been plenty, incidentally. James Holland (00:26:09): And Smolensk falls on the 15th of July, in just less than four weeks. It’s just incredible. Three and a half weeks, Smolensk has gone, they’ve done, overwhelmed the rest of what had been Poland. They’ve surged into what is now Belarus, taken Smolensk. This is Army Group Center. Army Group North thrust up into the Baltic. It’s all going swimmingly well. James Holland (00:26:29): But then, the next several months, they barely go a hundred miles, and that’s because they’re running out of steam. The 16th Panzer division, for example, by the time it’s taken Smolensk, involved in taking Smolensk on the 15th of July, 1941, the following day, it’s got 16 tanks left, 16 out of should have 180. So it’s just being attrited. They can’t sustain it, and they can’t sustain it, because as the Russians fall back, as the Soviet Red Army falls back, they do their own scorched earth policy. James Holland (00:27:03): They also discover that the railway line is kind of a different loading gauge, so they’ve got to change it. So it’s slightly, the Russian loading gauge is slightly wider. So every single mile, every yard, every foot, every meter of the capturing of Russian railway has to be moved a couple of inches to the left, to make it fit the German Kriegslok, in the standard train of locomotive, of the Reichsbahn. Just imagine what that’s like. James Holland (00:27:31): And also, Soviet trains are bigger, so they can take more water, which means, the water stops in between are fewer and far between. So they have to, the Germans, when they come in, their trains, their Kriegsloks are smaller. James Holland (00:27:43): So they have to be re-watered more often, and re-coaled more often. I mean, it’s absolutely boggling just how complicated it is, and how badly planned it is, because they haven’t reckoned on this. They’re having to kind of think on their feet. Lex Fridman (00:27:57): I love the logistical details of all of this, because yes, that’s a huge component of this, especially when you’re covering that much territory. But there is a notion that if Hitler didn’t stop Army Group Center, it could have pushed all the way to Moscow. It was only maybe a hundred miles away from Moscow. Is that a possibility? Lex Fridman (00:28:20): Because it had so much success in the early days, pushing forward. Do you think it’s possible that if Hitler, as we mentioned from a military blunder perspective, didn’t make that blunder, that they could have defeated the Soviet Union, right there and then? James Holland (00:28:38): Well, my own view is that they should never have got close. The Red Army has plenty of men to be able to see off anything that the Germans can do. The capture of Kyiv, for example, in September 1941, was a catastrophe for the Soviet Union, and should never have happened. James Holland (00:28:56): I mean, Zhukov is saying to Stalin, ” We’ve got to pull back across the Dnieper.” So I was going, “No, you can’t possibly do that. You can’t abandon Kyiv. It’s the third city in the Soviet Union. You just can’t, no way. No, absolutely not.” And he goes, “Well, we are just going to be overwhelmed, we can’t hold this.” And he says, “Either back me or fire me, back me or sack me.” So Stalin sacks him. James Holland (00:29:22): Obviously, as we know, Zhukov gets rehabilitated in pretty quick order, and Stalin does learn very quickly, thereafter, to learn the lessons. But the opening phase of Barbarossa has been a catastrophe. As a consequence of Stalin refusing to let his men retreat back across the Dnieper, which is a substantial barrier, and would be very difficult for the Germans to overwhelm, had they moved back in time, that’s another kind of 700,000 men put in the bag. I mean, that’s just staggering numbers. But yeah, I mean, there’s so many things wrong with the Barbarossa plan, too much of it. It’s just such a vast area. I mean, you’re talking about, kind of, 2,500 miles or something, of frontage. James Holland (00:30:13): Maybe if you put your Panzer groups, which are these spearheads, and you put them all in one big thrust, and just go hell for leather, straight across, on a much more narrow front of, let’s say, 400 miles, rather than 1,200, then they might have just sort of burnt away straight through to Moscow. Lex Fridman (00:30:32): They really caught the Red Army unprepared. James Holland (00:30:36): Yeah. Lex Fridman (00:30:36): Is there something to be said about the strategic genius of that, or was it just luck? James Holland (00:30:46): No, I don’t think so. I mean, what’s happened is, you’ve had the Soviet purges of the second half of the 1930s, where they have executed or imprisoned 22,500 officers, of which, three out of five marshals, God knows how many army commanders, et cetera, et cetera. So you’ve completely decapitated the Red Army, in terms of its command structure. Lex Fridman (00:31:12): So before that, would it be fair to say it was one of, if not the greatest army in the world? James Holland (00:31:18): Well, there was a lot of experience. There’s a lot of experience there, that’s for sure. Lex Fridman (00:31:21): But also, technology material, the size of the army and the number of people that are mobilized? James Holland (00:31:28): Yes. Yeah, and they’re the first people to adapt, create airborne troops, for example. So yes, I think there is an argument to say that, but the decapitation is absolutely brutal. If you’ve decapitated an army, you’ve then got to put new guys in charge. James Holland (00:31:42): And someone who looks, on paper, like a half decent peacetime commander might not be a very good wartime commander. They’re different disciplines and different skills, and you don’t know that until you’re tested. It’s very hard to kind of judge. And of course, Stalin is existing in a vacuum of paranoia and suspicion all the time, which is unhelpful, when you’re trying to develop a strong armed forces. James Holland (00:32:06): So they go into Finland, in back end of 1939, and they get really badly hammered. They do take about 50, they get the Karelia Peninsula, and they do take some ground, but at huge cost. I mean, the casualties are five times as bad as those of the Finns, and it’s a humiliation. James Holland (00:32:25): So Hitler sees that, and thinks, “Oh, okay, they’re not up to much cop.” Then Hitler loses the Battle of Britain, and he thinks, “I can’t afford to fight a war on two fronts.” That’s one of the reasons why Germany loses the war in 1914 to ’18, is fighting on the Eastern front, but also fighting on the Western front at the same time. James Holland (00:32:43): “We’ve got to avoid that, but I’ve got to get rid of Britain. And Britain hasn’t come out of the fight. Britain is still fighting in the backend of 1940, having won the Battle of Britain. And so, maybe I’ll go into the Soviet Union now, while the Red Army is still weak. We’re not 100% ready ourselves, but let’s hurry the whole thing forward.” James Holland (00:33:00): Because originally, he’d been thinking of planning an operation in 1943 or 1944. So the idea is, you take Poland out, you take out France and the Low Countries, you conquer most of Western Europe, you knock out Britain, so therefore, you don’t have to worry so much about the United States, because they’re over on the other side of the Atlantic. James Holland (00:33:17): That then gives him, buys him the time, to kind of rebuild up his strength for the all-out thrust on the Soviet Union. The failure to subdue Britain in 1940 changes all those plans and makes him think, “Actually, I’m going to go in early.” James Holland (00:33:30): And he’s also been kind of, he’s hoisted by his own petard, because he starts to believe his own genius. Everyone told him that he wouldn’t be able to beat France and the Low Countries. Everyone told him that it wouldn’t work out when he went into Poland, everyone was really nervous about it. “Well, go hang you, cautious, awful aristocratic Prussian generals. I’m the best at this. I’ve told you, I’ve shown you. I’m the genius. I can do it.” He starts to believe his own hype. James Holland (00:33:59): And of course, this is a problem. He’s surrounded by sycophants, and people who are constantly telling him that he’s this incredible genius. So he starts to believe it, and he thinks everything is possible. James Holland (00:34:07): And he’s very much into this idea of the will of the German people, “This is our destiny, and I have a will.” As I say earlier on, it’s the thousand-year Reich, or Armageddon, “but momentum is with us, and we need to strike it, and only by gambling, only by being bold will the Germans prevail,” and all this kind of nonsense. And so that’s why he goes into Soviet Union in June 1941, rather than a couple of, or even three years later. Lex Fridman (00:34:33): Yeah. He really hated the Prussian generals, huh? James Holland (00:34:35): Yeah, he hated them. Lex Fridman (00:34:36): Is there a case to be made that there, he was indeed, at times a military genius? James Holland (00:34:42): No, I don’t think so. Because none of the plan, I mean, even the plan for the invasion of France and the Low Countries isn’t his. James Holland (00:34:50): The concept is from Manstein’s, and the execution is Guderian’s, Heinz Guderian. Heinz Guderian is the pioneer of the Panzer force, of the Panzer thrust, this … James Holland (00:35:00): … pioneer of the Panzer force, the Panzer thrust, this idea of the ultra mechanized combined arms, Panzer arm spearhead doing this kind of lightning fast thrust. It’s not Hitler’s idea. He adopts it and takes it as his own, because he’s the führer. He can do what he likes, but it isn’t his. And up until that point, until that comes into being, until that plan is put forward to Franz Halder, who is the chief of staff of the German army at that time, Halder is just thinking, “How do we get out of this mess? This is just a nightmare.” Because they know that France has got a larger army, they know that France has got more tanks, and know that France has got double the number of artillery pieces. It’s got parity in terms of air force. And then you add Holland, then you add Belgium, then you add Great Britain. And that looks like a very, very tough nut to crack. I mean, the reason why France is subdued in 1940 is 50% brilliance of the Germans and their operational art in that particular instance, and 50% French failure really, and incompetence. Lex Fridman (00:36:05): I mean, there is a kind of genius to be able to see, and take advantage, and set up the world stage in such a way that you have the appeasement from France and Britain, keep the United States out of it, just set up the world stage where you could just plow through everybody with very little resistance. I mean, there is a kind of- James Holland (00:36:29): Well, yes, if it works. Lex Fridman (00:36:30): … geopolitical genius. James Holland (00:36:32): If it works. Lex Fridman (00:36:32): Right. James Holland (00:36:32): But it doesn’t. That’s a problem. I mean, he goes into Poland on the assumption that Britain and France will not declare war. He is not prepared for Britain and France declaring war on Germany. Lex Fridman (00:36:45): Right. James Holland (00:36:45): He thinks they won’t. Lex Fridman (00:36:46): That’s right. So miscalculation, blunder. But then France does, right? And then France does not successfully do anything with this incredible army that it has. James Holland (00:37:01): It has the size. But one of the problems that France has is that it’s very, very top-heavy. It’s very cumbersome in the way it operates. There’s no question that it’s got some brilliant young commanders, but at the top, the commanders are very old. Most of them are first World War veterans, whether, I mean, Weygand, Gamelin, General Georges, these people, they’re all well into their 60s. General Georges is the youngest army commander and he’s 60. It’s too old to be an army commander. You need to be in your late 40s, early 50s. And they’re too just consumed by conservatism and the old ways. And what they assume is that any future war will be much like the first World War. It’ll be attritional, long and drawn out, but static. But actually they’re right on two parts of it. As it turns out, it is going to be long, and drawn out, and attritional, but it’s going to be mobile rather than static. And that’s a big miscalculation. Lex Fridman (00:38:04): Here’s my question. I think you’re being too nice on France, here. So when Germany invaded Poland, correct me if I’m wrong, but it feels like France could have just went straight to Berlin. James Holland (00:38:18): Yeah, they absolutely could have. Lex Fridman (00:38:21): And I know you said, “It’s very top-heavy,” and you’re saying all of these things, but they literally did basically nothing. James Holland (00:38:28): Yeah, they were appalling. Lex Fridman (00:38:32): And I think a part of that, and I think you described this well, maybe you could speak to that, is the insanity that is Hitler creating the psychological, with the propaganda, creating this feeling that there’s this Nazi force that’s unstoppable, so France just didn’t want to step into that. Maybe there were legitimately, I hesitate to say these words, but scared of war. James Holland (00:39:00): A hundred percent they are, because France has been totally traumatized by the first World War. Lex Fridman (00:39:00): By World War. James Holland (00:39:06): It’s fought on their land, it’s fought in their industrial heartland. They lose three times the amount of people killed that Britain does. Britain’s traumatized by it, but not to the same degree that France is. There is just no stomach to do that again. So that makes them risk averse. And by being risk averse, you’re actually taking a far greater risk. That’s the irony of it. And the truth is also there isn’t the political will. And a successful military can only be successful if there is a political will at the top. And the problem with France in the 1930s is it’s very politically divided. It’s a time of multiple governments, multiple prime ministers, coalition governments, really very extreme coalition governments from the sort of drawn from the left and the right as well as the center. James Holland (00:39:53): And this is not a coalition of two parties. This is a coalition of multiple parties. No one can ever agree anything. I mean, that’s the problem. It’s amazing that the Maginot Line has even agreed, this incredibly strong defensive position down the western side of France border with Germany, which is kind of largely impregnable. But the problem is the bit that’s not impregnable, which is the hinge where the Maginot Line ends, and it sort of basically starts turning towards in a northerly direction and the border with Belgium. James Holland (00:40:24): And what they should have done is built border defenses all along the northern coast of Belgium, because Belgium refused to allow any allied troops into its territory. It was neutral. And France should have said, “Okay, fine. Well, then we’ll defend. We’re not going to come to your rescue if you get invaded. That’s the payoff. And the consequence of that, we are going to stop [inaudible 00:40:50] that, and we’re not going to be drawn into the neutral territory should Germany invade from the west.” But they don’t do that because of the psychological damage of having fought a war in exactly that area a generation earlier. And that’s the problem. James Holland (00:41:05): Germany is so weakened by the invasion of Poland. There is literally nothing left. The back door into Western Germany is completely open. And so they do what they call the Saar offensive, but it’s not. It’s a kind of reconnaissance in force where they go across the border, pick their noses for a few days, and then trundle back again. And it’s embarrassing. And what you’re seeing there is a nation which is just not ready for this, which is scared, which is politically divided, which is then having a knock on effect on the decision-making process, and which is just consumed by military complacency. And that’s the big problem. There is this, the commanders at the very top of the French regime are complacent. They haven’t bought into modern ways. They haven’t looked at how contemporary technology could help them. James Holland (00:42:02): I mean, it is absurd, for example, that there isn’t a single radio in the Chateau de Vincennes, which, it’s the headquarters of the commander in chief of the French armed forces to General Maurice Gamelin. I mean, it’s just unbelievable. But that is the case. And there’s no getting away from that. And it is all the more ironic when you consider that France is actually the most automotive society in Europe. It’s the second most automotive society in the world after the United States, by some margin, it has to be said as well. It has a fantastic transportation system. Railway network is superb. There are eight people for every motorized vehicle in France, which is way above Germany, which is in 1949, that figure is 47, for example. Lex Fridman (00:42:48): What? James Holland (00:42:48): It’s 106 in Italy. Lex Fridman (00:42:49): So France is very mechanized, like- James Holland (00:42:51): Very mechanized. So come on, guys, pull your finger out, get it together. And they just don’t. They’re incredibly slow and cumbersome. And what they think is what will happen is the Germans won’t think of going, they won’t do a pincer movement because you can’t possibly take motorized forces through the Ardennes. That just is not possible, which is the hinge area between the end of the Maginot, the northern part of the Maginot Line, which runs down the eastern border of France and the northern bit. And so, “What we’ll do with that hinge around the town of Sedan, we’ll move into Belgium, we’ll meet the Germans before they get anywhere near France. We’ll hold them. And while we’re holding them, we will bring up our reserves, and then we’ll counterattack, and crush them.” That’s the idea behind it. But the problem is they don’t have a means of moving fast. James Holland (00:43:37): And their communication systems are dreadful, absolutely dreadful. They’re dependent on conventional telephone lines, which dive bombers and whatever are just absolutely wrecking. Suddenly the streets are clogged with refugees and people can’t move. So then telephone lines are down, there’s no radios, so that you’re then dependent on sending dispatch riders on little motorbikes. General Maurice Gamelin sends out a dispatch rider at six o’clock in the morning. By 12 o’clock he hasn’t come back, so you then send another one. Finally, the answer comes back, nine o’clock at night, by which time the Germans advance another 15 miles. And the original message that you sent at six o’clock that morning is completely redundant and has passed its sell by date. And that’s happening every step of the way. So you’ve got overall command headquarters, then you’ve got army group, then you’ve got army, then you’ve got corps, then you’ve got division. James Holland (00:44:30): So the consequence of all that is that French just can’t move. They’re just stuck. They’re rabbits in headlights, and the Germans are able to move them, destroy them in isolation. Meanwhile, they’re able to use their excellent communications to very, very good effect. And you were talking about the genius of war. It’s not Hitler that’s a genius. If anyone’s a genius, it’s Goebbels, the propaganda chief. And it is their ability to harness that they are the kings of messaging. They don’t have X, don’t have social media, but they do have new technology. And that new technology, that new approach is flooding the airwaves with their singular message, which is always the same, and has been ever since the Nazis come into power, and it is using radios. And I think radios are really, really key to the whole story because there is no denser radio network anywhere in the world, including the United States, than Germany in 1939. James Holland (00:45:28): So while it’s really behind the times in terms of mechanization, it is absolutely on top of its game in terms of comms. So 70% of households in Germany have radios by 1939, which is an unprecedented number. That is only beaten by United States and only just. So it is greater than any other nation in Europe. And in terms of flooding the airwaves, it is the densest, because even for those who, the 30% who don’t have radios, “That’s not a problem because we’ll put them in the stairwells of apartment blocks, we’ll put them in squares, we’ll put them in cafés and bars. And the same stuff, the Nazi state controls the radio airwaves as it does the movies, as it does newspapers, all aspects of the media are controlled by Goebbels and propaganda ministry. And they are putting out the same message over and over again. James Holland (00:46:23): It’s not all Hitler’s ranting, it’s entertainment, light entertainment, some humorous shows. It is also Wagner, of course, and Richard Strauss. It’s a mixture. But the subliminal message is the same. “We’re the best. We’re the top dogs. Jewish Bolshevik plot is awful. That’s the existential threat to us. We have to overcome that. We’re the top dogs, militarily, we’re the best. We should feel really good about ourselves. We’re going to absolutely win and be the greatest nation in the world ever. And Hitler’s a genius.” And that is just repeated over, and over, and over, and over again. And for all the modernity of the world in which we live in today, most people believe what they’re told repeatedly. Lex Fridman (00:47:07): Yeah. James Holland (00:47:07): They still do. If you just repeat, repeat, repeat over and over again, people will believe it. If you are a diehard Trump supporter, you want to believe that, you’ll believe everything he says. If you are a diehard Bernie Sanders man, you’re from the left. You’ll believe everything he says because it’s reinforcing what you already want to believe. Lex Fridman (00:47:30): But the scary thing is radio is the technology of the day. The technology of the day today, which is a terrifying one for me, is I would say AI on social media. So bots. You can have basically bot farms, which I assume is used by Ukraine, by Russia, by US. I would love to read the history written about this era about the information wars, who has the biggest bot farms, who has- James Holland (00:47:30): Yeah, that’s- Lex Fridman (00:48:00): … the biggest propaganda machines? And when I say bot, I mean both automated AI bots and humans operating large number of smartphones with SIM cards that are just able to boost messages enough to where they become viral, and then real humans with real opinions get excited also. It’s like this vicious cycle. So if you support your nation, all you need is a little boost. And then everybody gets real excited. And then now you’re chanting, and now you’re in this mass hysteria. James Holland (00:48:33): Right. Lex Fridman (00:48:33): And now it’s the 1984 Two Minutes of Hate. And the message is clear. I mean, that’s what propaganda does is it really- James Holland (00:48:40): Well- Lex Fridman (00:48:40): … clarifies the mind. James Holland (00:48:42): And that is exactly what Hitler, and the Nazis, and Goebbels, are doing in the 1930s. Well, they’re doing it in the 1920s as well, but more effectively once they come into power, of course. And Hitler is so fortunate that he comes, he takes over the chancellorship in January, 1933, at a time where the economy is just starting to turn. And he’s able to make the most of that. And if you’re Germans, and you’ve been through hyperinflation in the early 1920s, you’ve been through the humiliation of Versailles Treaty, which was terrible error, in retrospect. James Holland (00:49:16): And you’ve been through, then having got through that, you’ve emerged into a democratic Weimar Republic, which is based on manufacturing. Germany’s traditional genius engineering, and manufacturing, and production of high quality items. They’re merging through that. Then you have the Wall Street crash. And the loans that are coming in from America, which is propping up the entire German economy, suddenly get cut off, and you’ve suddenly got depression again, and massive unemployment. James Holland (00:49:51): And suddenly Hitler comes in and everyone’s got jobs, and they’re rebuilding, and they’re growing their military. And the message that’s coming out is, “We’re the greatest. We’re the best. We’re fantastic.” I was telling you earlier on about Hitler’s speeches, starting with the dark, starting dark and ending in hope, and light, and the sunlit uplands, that’s what you’re getting. You’re suddenly getting this vision of hope. This is sort of, “My God. Actually, this is really working. Okay, so I’m not sure that I particularly buy into the kind of anti-Semitic thing, but we’ll sweep that under the carpet because overall, I’ve now got a job. I’ve got money, I’ve got my new radio.” And then this is a genius about the radios, for example. So they have the German receiver to start off with, the [German 00:50:38] and then they have the [German 00:50:41], which is the German little receiver, little radio. These are genius. This is as outrageous as the arrival of the iPod. I mean, remember that? Suddenly you don’t have to have a Sony Walkman anymore. You can have something really, really small and miniature, and listen to thousands, of thousands, of thousands of songs all at once. What an amazing thing. James Holland (00:50:58): And the [German 00:51:00] is nine inches by four inches by four inches. It’s made of Bakelite. And everyone can have one because it’s super cheap. It’s just incredible. And no one else has said that, because up until that point, radios, generally speaking, are aspirational. They’ve got sort of a walnut lacquer at the front, and you have them if you’re middle class, and you show them off to your neighbors to show how affluent and well-to-do you are, but suddenly everyone can have one. And if everyone can have one, then everyone can receive the same message. And you can also. James Holland (00:51:30): And this is the whole point about the Hitler youth as well. The young guys, that’s where they’re most impressionistic. They’re least risk averse. So they’re most gung ho. They’re most full of excitement for the possibilities of life. And they’re also, their minds are the most opened to suggestion. So you get the youth, you hang on, you get them. And so a whole generation of young men are brought up thinking about the genius of Hitler and how he’s delivering this much better nation, and returning, overhauling the humiliations of the first World War, were overcoming the stab in the back that happened in 1918, et cetera, et cetera. And as a young 16, 17-year-old German, you’re thinking, “Yeah, I want a piece of that. And hey, guess what? They’ve got really cool uniforms, and come and join the SS, and get the throw line. What’s not to like?” You can see why it’s so clever. And what’s so interesting is propaganda today is still using those tenets that Goebbels was using back in the 1930s. James Holland (00:52:34): And this is why I say that history doesn’t repeat itself. Of course it doesn’t. It can’t possibly repeat itself because we’re always living in a constantly evolving time. But patterns of human behaviour do. And what you always get after economic crisis is political upheaval, always, always, always. Because some people are in a worse off position than they were financially before. They’re thinking, “Well, the current system doesn’t work. What’s the alternative?” So in the case of now, we in the West, first of all, we’ve faced the financial crisis of 2008. Then we’ve had the double whammy of COVID. And that has been incredibly unsettling. And so we’re now in a situation of political turmoil. And whether you are pro-Trump or anti-Trump, what he’s offering is something completely different. And he’s saying, “The old ways don’t work. I’m just going to say what I think. I’m going to come out. I’m not going to bother with all the sheen of diplomacy and mealy mouth words that politicians always use, where you can’t trust anyone. I’m just going to tell you as it is.” James Holland (00:53:36): And obviously people respond to that. You can understand why that has an appeal. And if the country already feels broken, and here’s someone who is going to be a disruptor, and going to change the way you go about things, you can see why a reasonably large proportion of the population is going to go, “I’ll have a piece of that. Thank you very much.” Lex Fridman (00:53:55): And especially one of the countries in the economic crisis like Germany was, I think you’ve written that the Treaty of Versailles created Hitler and the Wall Street crash and the Great Depression brought him to power. James Holland (00:53:55): Yes. Lex Fridman (00:54:11): And of course, the propaganda machine that you describe is the thing that got everybody else in Germany on board. James Holland (00:54:18): Yep. It’s amazing, because he comes in with 33% of the vote. He had 37% of the vote in July, 1932. So again, this is another period of turmoil, just like it is in France, where you’re having constant different kind of coalitions and different chancellors, leaders of Germany. Lex Fridman (00:54:37): So it’s very possible he wouldn’t have come to power. James Holland (00:54:40): Well, he said, “We will only take our seats if I can be chancellor, otherwise forget it. I’m not coming into any coalition.” So then the government falls again in January 1933. They have the election. The Nazi vote is down from where it was the previous summer, but this time they go, “Okay, Hitler can be chancellor, but we’ll manipulate him.” How wrong they were. He’s manipulating everyone. And then Hindenburg, who is the president, dies the following summer and he’s able to get rid of the presidency. There is no more president of Germany. There is just the führer, him and he gets rid of, he has, actually, Enabling act, which is where all other political parties are disbanded, and suddenly you’ve got a totalitarian state, just like that. Lex Fridman (00:55:31): I think there’s a lesson there. There’s many lessons there, but one of them is don’t let an extremist into government and assume you can control them. James Holland (00:55:42): Yes, the arrogance of the existing politicians, you just completely screwed it up. Lex Fridman (00:55:46): I mean, there is a real power to an extremist. There’s a person who sees the world in black and white can really gain the attention and the support of the populace. James Holland (00:56:03): Yes. Lex Fridman (00:56:04): Especially when there’s a resentment about like Treaty of Versailles, when there’s economic hardship, and if there’s effective, modern technology that allows you to do propaganda and sell the message. There’s something really compelling about the black and white message. James Holland (00:56:20): It is because it’s simple. And what Hitler does throughout the 1920s, is he sticks to this. There is actually, when he comes out of prison, so it is the Beer Hall Putsch in November, 1923, he gets charged with treason, which he has been, because he’s attempting a coup, and he gets sentenced to five years, which is pretty lenient for what he’s done. And he then gets let out after nine months. Nazi party is banned at that point, but then comes back into being. And the year that follows there is then a substantial debate about where the party should go. And there are actually a large number of people who think that actually they should be looking at how the Soviets are doing things and taking some of the things that they consider to be positive out of the communist state, and applying those to the Nazis. James Holland (00:57:16): And Hitler goes, “No, no, no, no, no, no. We’ve just got to stick to this kind of Jewish Bolshevik thing. This is how we’re going to do it. This is how we’re going to do it.” Goebbels, for example, who is very open, Joseph Goebbels, he’s a not very successful journalist, but he does have a PhD in German literature. He’s very disaffected because he was born with talipes, which is more commonly known as a club foot. He’s disabled. He can’t fight in the first World War. He’s very frustrated by that. He’s in a deep despair about the state of Germany in the first part of the early 1920s. He’s looking for a political messiah, a sort of quasi-religious messiah, thinks it’s Hitler, then discovers that Hitler is not open to any ideas at all about any deviation, but then sees the light. Hitler recognizes that this guy is someone that he wants on his side, and so then goes to him, makes a real special effort. James Holland (00:58:17): “Come on, come to dinner. I think you’re great,” All this kind of stuff. Wins it about over. And Goebbels has this complete vault fast, discards his earlier kind of, “Hitler’s right, I was wrong. Hitler is the kind of messiah figure that I want to follow. I want to follow the hero leader.” And they come aboard and they absolutely work. And Hitler completely wins out of all dissenters within what had been the German Workers party, drop, becomes the German National Socialist Party, becomes the Nazis. He comes out, emerges as the absolute, undisputed führer of that, leader of that party. And what he says goes, and everyone toes him behind it. And part of the genius of that, Hitler does have some genius. I just don’t think it’s military, but he does have some genius. And a question about is the simplicity of message. James Holland (00:59:06): What he’s doing, it’s that us and them thing that we were talking about earlier on. It’s the kind of either/or. It’s kind of, “It’s my way or the highway.” It’s kind of, “This is the only way. This is how we get to the sunlit uplands. This is how create this amazing master race of this unification of German peoples, which dominates the world, which is the preeminent power in the world for the next thousand years, or its decay, and despair and being crushed by our enemies. And our enemies are the Jews and the Bolsheviks, the communists.” And what he taps into as well is [German 00:59:44] and [German 00:59:48]. There’s no direct English translation of [German 00:59:51] or indeed [German 00:59:52], but in its most basic form, it’s communities, it’s people, community or front veteran’s community. James Holland (01:00:01): So the [German 01:00:02] is, “We are the guys. We are bonded because we were in the trenches. We were in the first World War. We were the people who bravely stuck it out, saw our friends being slaughtered and blown to pieces. We did our duty as proud Germans, but we were let down by the elites and we were let down by this Jewish Bolshevik plot. We were stabbed in the back.” James Holland (01:00:26): The myth of the stabbing in the back is very, very strong. So, “We’re bound, we’re bonded by our experiences of the first World War and the fact that we did what we should and what we could. And we didn’t fail in what we were doing. We were failed by our leaders, by the elites.” So that’s [German 01:00:47]. [German 01:00:49] is this sense of national unity. It’s a cultural, ethnic bonding of people who speak German, who have a similar outlook on life. And again, that just reinforces the us and them. Lex Fridman (01:01:05): Good and evil. James Holland (01:01:05): It reinforces the black and white worldview. And then you add that to this very simple message, which Hitler is repeating over and over again, “Communists are a big threat. Jews are a big threat. They’re the enemy.” You have to have an opposition in the them and us kind of process. And that’s what he’s doing. And people just buy into it. They go, “Yeah, we’re together. We’re Germans. We’re a brotherhood. We’ve got our [German 01:01:38].” So he cleverly ties into that and taps into that. But they’re an irrelevance by the late 1920s. By 1928, he’s not going to get a deal for Mein Kampf Part II, he’s impoverished. The party’s impoverished. Their numbers are down. They’re at best an irrelevance. Lex Fridman (01:01:59): Which is say he wrote Mein Kampf at this time, when he was in prison. James Holland (01:02:02): Well, he writes most of Mein Kampf in Landsberg prison. And then he writes the rest of it in what becomes known as the [German 01:02:10], which is this little wooden hut in the Obersalzberg. And you can still see the remnants of that. And unfortunately, there’s still little candles there and stuff in the woods by neo-Nazis and whatnot, what have you. But that’s where he wrote the rest of it. I mean, it Jean-Jacques Rousseau who says, “Man has his greatest thought when surrounded by nature.” That was something that Hitler took very much to heart. There was a mentor of his called Dietrich Eckart. Dietrich Eckart introduced him to the Obersalzberg and the beauty of the southeast Bavarian Alps around Berchtesgaden. And that was his favorite place on the planet, and that’s where he eventually bought the Berghof with the royalties, it has to be said, from Mein Kampf, which went from being almost pulp to suddenly being a runaway bestseller, unfortunately. Lex Fridman (01:03:02): Can you actually comment on that? It’s a shitty manifesto as far as manifestos go. I think there’s a lot of values to understand from a first person perspective, the words of a dictator, of a person like Hitler. But it just feels like that’s just such a shitty- James Holland (01:03:18): Yeah, I mean it’s banned in a number of countries. You don’t need to, because no one’s going to read it, because it’s unreadable. I mean, it’s very untidy. It’s very incoherent. There’s no narrative arc, to use a writer’s phrase. I mean, but it does give you a very clear, the overall impression you get at the end of it is the communists and the Jews are to blame for everything. Lex Fridman (01:03:43): Yeah, but there’s also the component of predicting basically World War II there. So it’s not just they’re to blame for everything. James Holland (01:03:51): Oh, no. He’s hungry for war. Lex Fridman (01:03:52): Right. James Holland (01:03:52): He thinks that this is the natural state, that, “We have to have this terrible conflict. And once the conflict’s over Germany will emerge victorious, and then there will be the Thousand-Year Reich.” I mean, I’m finding myself in talking to you, I keep saying this, “It’s Armageddon or the Thousand-Year Reich. It’s because it’s unavoidable, because that’s how he’s speaking the whole time. It’s just this same message over, and over, and over, and over again. Lex Fridman (01:04:17): It’s a pretty unique way of speaking, allowing violence as a tool in this picture, that there’s a hierarchy, that there is a superior race and inferior races, and it’s okay to destroy the inferior ones. James Holland (01:04:32): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:04:32): Usually politicians don’t speak that way. They just say, “Well, here’s good and evil. We’re the good guys. And yeah, maybe we’ll destroy the evil a little bit.” Now here is like there’s a complete certainty about a very large number of people, “The Slavic people, they just need to be removed.” James Holland (01:04:52): “Well, they need to be made in irrelevance. We have to take it. We have to take it. And in fact, if that kills millions of them, fine. Then they can sort of squish that way over to Siberia or- “ Lex Fridman (01:04:59): Right. It doesn’t matter where they go. James Holland (01:05:00): ” … Kamchatka, wherever they go. I don’t care. But they- “ Lex Fridman (01:05:01): “We just need to populate this land that belongs to the German people.” James Holland (01:05:06): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:05:06): “Because they’re the superior people.” James Holland (01:05:07): There’s no question that he glorified violence and war. He’s absolutely chomping at the bit. And in a way, I think he’s a bit disappointed that in the 1930s, the conquests that he does undertake are also peaceful. March 1938 goes straight into Austria. There’s the Anschluss, not a shot is fired. 1936, goes into the Rhineland, reconquers that, retakes that over from the occupying allies, not a shot is fired. He takes the Sudetenland, barely a shot is fired, and then goes into the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. And again, barely a shot is fired. And it’s a bit disappointing. He wants to be tested. He wants to have the wartime triumph. You can see him being frustrated about this in the Munich crisis in 1938. He wants to fight. He’s absolutely spoiling for it. He’s desperate to go in. He’s all ready and gung ho. He’s built his Luftwaffe. He is got his Panzers now. He’s got his massive armed forces. He wants to test them. He wants to get the show on the road and prove it. He is an arch gambler, Hitler. Lex Fridman (01:06:17): You make it seem so clear, but all the while to the rest of the world, to Chamberlain, to France, to Britain, to the rest of the world, he’s saying he doesn’t want that. He’s making agreements. Everything you just mentioned, you just went through it so quickly. But those are agreements that were made that he’s not going to do that. And he does it over and over. He violates the Treaty of Versailles. He violates every single treaty. But he still is doing the meetings. So maybe can you go through it, the lead up to the war, 1939, September 1st, what are the different agreements? What is the signaling he’s doing? And what is he doing secretly in terms of building up the military force? James Holland (01:07:05): Yes. So part of the Treaty of Versailles, is you’re allowed very, very limited armed forces. There’s restrictions on naval expansion. There’s restrictions on the size of the army. There’s restrictions on the weapons you can use. You’re not allowed an air force. But he starts doing this all clandestinely. There are people in, Krupp has got, for example, which is in the Ruhr, a big armaments manufacturer. They are producing tanks elsewhere, and parts elsewhere in, say the Netherlands, for example, and then shipping them back into Germany. They’re doing Panzer training exercises actually in the Soviet Union at this time. There’s all sorts of things going on. The Luftwaffe has been announced to the world in 1935, but it’s obviously been in the process of developing long before that. The Messerschmitt 109, a single engine fighter plane, for example, is created in 1934. So they’re doing all these things against it. James Holland (01:08:08): And the truth is, he’s just constantly pushing, “What can I get away with, here?” And of course, Britain, France, the rest of the world, the rest of the allies, they’re all reeling from the Wall Street crash and the depression as well. So have they got the stomach for this? Not really. And, “Perhaps actually on reflection, the terms of Versailles Treaty are bit harsh anyway, so maybe we don’t need to worry about it.” There’s just no political will. There’s no political will to fight against what Germany’s doing. Then he gets away of it. So he suddenly starts realizing that actually he can push this quite a long way, because no one’s going to stand up to him, which is why he makes a decision in 1936 to go back into the Rhineland, which has been occupied by French allied troops at that point. He just walks in, just goes, “Do your worst.” And no one’s going to do anything because there isn’t a stomach to do anything. Lex Fridman (01:09:03): That was a big step in 1936, remilitarizing the Rhineland. I mean, that That’s a huge, huge step of like, “Oh, I don’t have to follow anybody’s rules and they’re going to do nothing.” James Holland (01:09:15): And he’s looking at his military and he’s also looking at response. So one of the things they do is really, it’s very clever. So they go over the head of the army of the air, Armee de L’Air, which is the French air force, and they invite him over. And Erhard Milch, who is the second command of the Luftwaffe invites him over. “So, come and see what we’re up to. You are our European neighbors, we’re all friends together,” this kind of stuff. “Come and see what we’ve got.” And he takes him to this airfield. There’s a row of Messerschmitt 109s all lined up, sort of 50 of them. And the head of the Armee of the Air looks at it and goes, “Krikey, that’s impressive.” And Milch goes, “Well, let me go and take you to another airfield.” And they go out of the back route out of the airfield, and that’s long, circuitous test route in the Mercedes. Meanwhile, all of- James Holland (01:10:00): … the airfield and is a long circuitous route in the Mercedes. James Holland (01:10:03): Meanwhile, all the Messerschmitts take off from that airfield, going to land on the next airfield. Here’s another one, and they’re all the same aircraft. And the commander-in-chief of the army of Vienna goes back to France and goes, “We’re never going to be able to beat Germany.” James Holland (01:10:15): Earlier, you were alluding to this earlier on, how much is this, just this chutzpah of this ability to kind of portray the mechanized Moloch? Yeah, it absolutely cowls the enemy, so the increasing the effectiveness of their armed forces purely by propaganda and by mind games and by talking the talk. James Holland (01:10:46): We might all think these military parades that the Nazis have looked rather silly by today’s standards, but you look what that looks like if you are the rest of the world. You’re in Britain, and you’re still reeling from the Depression, and you see the triumph of the will. You see some of that footage, and you see these automatons in their steel helmets, and you see the swastikas, and you see hundreds of thousands of people all lined up and seig heiling and all the rest of it, you are going to think again before you go into war with people like that. Lex Fridman (01:11:13): It’s also hard to put yourself in the mind of those leaders now that we have nuclear weapons. So nuclear weapons have created this kind of cloak of a kind of safety from mutually shared destruction that you think surely you will not do a million or 2 million soldier army invading another land, right? Just full-on gigantic hot war. Lex Fridman (01:11:48): But at that time, that’s the real possibility. You remember World War I, you remember all of that. So okay, there’s a mad guy with a mustache. He’s making statements that this land belongs to Germany anyway, because it’s mostly German-populated, and like you said, Treaty of Versailles wasn’t really fair, and you can start justifying all kinds of things for yourself. James Holland (01:12:16): Yeah, yeah, yeah. And maybe they got a point about the Danzig Corridor. They are mainly Germans, German-speaking people there, and it’s disconnected from East Prussia, they’re saying, I sort of get it. Maybe they’ve got a point. And is Poland really a kind of thriving democracy, anyway? Not really. By 1930, late 1930s, it’s not. It’s, to all intents and purposes, a dictatorship in Poland at that time. James Holland (01:12:36): I mean, it’s not right that you just go and take someone else’s country. Of course, you can’t do that. But you can see why in Germany people are thinking they’ve got a point. You can also see why in France and Britain, they’re thinking, “Do we really care about the Poles? I mean, is it worth going war over?” But there’s bigger things at play by this point. That’s the point. Lex Fridman (01:13:02): Yeah, but before we get to Poland, there is this meeting, September 1938. So Chamberlain made three trips to meet with Hitler, which culminated in the Munich Conference. James Holland (01:13:17): Yeah, on the 30th of September. Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:13:19): Where was Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier, prime minister of France. They met to discuss essentially Czechoslovakia without any of the government officials of Czechoslovakia participating. And Hitler promised to make no more territorial conquests, and Chamberlain believed him. James Holland (01:13:38): He chose to believe him, I think, is the thing, is the point. It’s very interesting. So Chamberlain gets a very bad press. Lex Fridman (01:13:46): Uh-oh. James Holland (01:13:47): Well, no. No, it’s not really uh-oh. I just think there’s too much retrospective view on this. And that’s fine because the whole point of history is you can look back and you can judge decisions that were made at a certain point through the prism of what subsequently happened, which, of course, the people that are making the decisions at the time can’t because they’re in that particular moment. James Holland (01:14:11): So I don’t think Chamberlain did trust Hitler, but he wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt. Britain was not obliged to Czechoslovakia at all. France was. France had signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1924, but Britain had not. So there was no obligation at all for Britain to do this. The only reason why Britain would go to war over Czechoslovakia is because of the threat of Nazism and what the ramifications of not going to war with him. James Holland (01:14:40): But the problem is, is that Chamberlain is interesting because in 1935, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer when they started to sort of think, “Okay, we really do need to rearm.” He was very much in favor of substantially expanding and rehabilitating the navy, so updating existing battleships and so on, and also developing the air force. James Holland (01:15:05): There’s not really much argument for having a large army because if you have a large army, you’ve got to maintain it. Britain is a small place. Where do you put them? You’ve also got to transport them. That’s complicated. You’ve got to train them, you’ve got to put them in barracks, you’ve got to feed them, all this kind of stuff. There’s a kind of impracticality about having a large army. James Holland (01:15:20): Whereas navy is great because you can keep them at sea, and they can be on the water. James Holland (01:15:25): Air force is slightly different. Air power is viewed in very much the same way that naval power is viewed, that this is, we’re an island nation, we have a global assets and air power gives us the flexibility that an army doesn’t. James Holland (01:15:39): So he is all for backing the expansion of the army, of the air force and the navy in 1930s. Then he subsequently becomes prime minister and sticks to his guns on that. James Holland (01:15:47): It is he that enables the air force and the air ministry to develop the first fully-coordinated air defense system anywhere in the world. There is not an air defense system in Poland, nor Norway, nor Denmark, nor the Netherlands, nor Belgium, nor France. There is in Britain, Britain is the only one, and frankly, it pays off big time in the summer of 1940. So you have to give him credit for that. James Holland (01:16:11): Britain interestingly is also the world’s leading armaments exporter in the 1930s, which is amazing really when you think everyone complains about the fact that we weren’t rearming enough. Actually, we were when we had all the infrastructure there and we were expanding that infrastructure dramatically. I say we. I’m only saying that because I’m British. So they were doing that. James Holland (01:16:33): In 1938, Britain wasn’t ready for war. Now you can argue that Germany wasn’t ready for war, either. But Chamberlain was prime minister in a democracy, a parliamentary democracy, where 92% of the population were against going to war in 1938. There was not a single democratic leader in the world that would go against the wishes of 92% of the population. James Holland (01:16:59): Now you could say, ” Well, he should have just argued it better and presented his case better and all the rest of it.” But at that point, there was no legal obligation to go to the defense of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was another of these new nations that been created out of 1919 and the Versailles Treaty. Who was to say we, in Britain, are able to judge the rights and wrongs of that? How fantastic it would be to go to war with a nation a long way away for people whom we know very little, et cetera, et cetera? I’m paraphrasing his quote. James Holland (01:17:30): But I’m not saying it was the right decision. I’m just saying I can see why, in September 1938, he is prepared to give him a chance. James Holland (01:17:40): Now I do think he was a bit naive, and what he also does is this really interesting thing. So he goes over to Hitler’s flat, completely ambushes him. Goes to his flat on the afternoon of 30th of September and says to Hitler, “Look, I’ve got this, I’ve drawn up this agreement here, and this is to continue the naval agreement that we’ve already made. And by signing this, you are saying that Germany and Britain should never go to war with one another.” Hitler goes, “Yeah, whatever,” signs it. James Holland (01:18:12): Chamberlain comes back, [inaudible 01:18:13] and waves this little piece of paper, peace in our time and all the rest of it, which obviously comes back to bite him in a very big way. James Holland (01:18:20): But it’s interesting that when Hitler then subsequently goes and moves and that they, France and Britain decide in rather the same way that there’s been discussion about deciding that large portions of Ukraine should just be handed back, handed over to Russia without consulting Ukraine a few weeks ago, it is incredible, I think, that France and Britain and Italy with Germany are deciding that, yes, it’s fine for Germany to go in and take Sudetenland without really consulting the Czechs. It’s a sort of similar kind of scenario really, and it’s equally wrong. But when Germany does then go and take over the whole of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, that’s the bottom line. That’s the point where Chamberlain goes, “Okay, I’ve given him the benefit of the doubt. No more benefits than doubt. That’s it. This is he’s crossed the line.” And so you reinforce your agreement with Poland, you do a formal agreement, you go, “Okay, we will uphold your sovereignty. If you are invaded, we will go to war with you.” James Holland (01:19:27): And that is a ratcheting up of diplomacy in politics in a very, very big way. And it is that decision to make a treaty with the Poles is not heeded by Hitler, but it’s heeded by, literally, every one of his commanders. James Holland (01:19:48): And it’s also heeded by Goring who is his number two, and who is obviously a commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe and is president of Prussia and all the rest of it and is the second-most senior Nazi. And he’s going, “This is a catastrophe. This is the last thing we want to be doing is going to war against Britain and, indeed, France.” Lex Fridman (01:20:13): The Munich Conference is a pretty interesting moment, I would say in all of human history, because you got the leaders of these bigger-than-life nations and the most dramatic brewing conflict in human history, Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier. It’s interesting when these bigger-than-life leaders are in a room together. Is there something that you know about their interactions? James Holland (01:20:43): Yeah, I think one of the things that’s interesting is that Hitler’s got home advantage because it’s on his turf and the start off at the first meeting is at the Berghof, his beloved place in the Obersalzburg overlooking Berchtesgaden in the Alps. So he’s pretty confident because, “This is my manor, this is my turf. I’m not going to be bossed around by these guys.” James Holland (01:21:03): But Chamberlain, for example, he’s going there thinking, “I’ve been around the blocks. No one can teach me anything. I’ve been a politician for ages. I’m not going to be kind of capped out by this sort of Austrian upstart.” James Holland (01:21:15): So they’re both coming at it with a slight kind of superiority kind of conflict. James Holland (01:21:23): Interestingly, when you get to the actual meetings at the [inaudible 01:21:27] in Munich a couple of weeks later, Chamberlain is cheered by the crowds when his car comes in, when he goes to his hotel, when he’s moving from his hotel to the [inaudible 01:21:40]. There are cars cheering him, waving Union Jacks, all this kind of stuff. James Holland (01:21:44): Hitler does not like that at all, not at all, puts him on the back foot. And that’s because the German people don’t want war, in the same way that the British people don’t want war, nor do the German people. James Holland (01:21:58): The difference is that Hitler is a dictator and an autocrat and has the devotion of the people so he can do what he wants in a way that Chamberlain can’t. Chamberlain’s hands are tied because he is an elected prime minister, an elected leader, political leader, and he’s not head of state. So there is no question that it is Hitler and Chamberlain that are the top dogs in this particular discussion. James Holland (01:22:24): Daladier takes the back seat. Even Mussolini, although he’s there, he doesn’t want war, either. He wants to be left alone to do his own thing without anyone getting in the way. But he doesn’t want, it’s not in his interest to have a European war so he’s trying to avoid it. James Holland (01:22:37): So it is really, you see that the kind of alpha males in the room are Chamberlain and Hitler, and it’s really interesting because Hitler’s got this sort of slightly garrulous voice and very kind of pale blue eyes and such distinct features, quite a long nose. And he always says this is why he has the mustache is to kind of disguise the big nose. As I was saying to you earlier on before we started recording, he does have a sense of humor. It’s not one that you and I would kind of tap into, but he does have one. James Holland (01:23:09): Whereas Chamberlain, he sounds like bit like an old man. He’s sort of silver-haired, and he looks like your sort archetypal kind of British gentleman with rolled-up umbrella and his Homburg hat and all the rest of it. So they’re both sort of caricatures in a funny sort of way. James Holland (01:23:24): And yet, the consequence of these discussions, these great events happening, you are absolutely going, even which way the Munich crisis comes out, you’re taking a step closer to war. It’s just whether the war is going to happen next week or whether it’s going to happen a year, hence. But the Munich crisis obviously doesn’t stem the inevitability of war at all. It just heightens it. Lex Fridman (01:23:49): Do you think there are words that Chamberlain should have said, could have said that put more pressure on Hitler, intimidate Hitler more? James Holland (01:24:01): Yeah, it’s a really tricky one. It’s such a difficult one because you’re always looking at it through… The enemy has a vote, and you don’t know what that vote is going to be, and you don’t know what it’s going to look like. There’s no question that the rest of Europe is cowled by the kind of impression of military might that the Germans have put out. They certainly fear they are stronger than they actually are. James Holland (01:24:27): And then on the other hand, they’re also going, “Yeah, but Germany doesn’t have natural resources, doesn’t have access to the world’s oceans. It shouldn’t be able to win a war.” So they’re kind of contradicting themselves at the same time. So one minute they’re sort going, “Oh God, you don’t want to take on all those Nazis and all those swastikas and those automaton stormtroopers.” But on the other hand, they’re then saying, “But actually Germany doesn’t have much in its basket. It’s got actually quite a lot of weaknesses, and we should be to kind of able to prevail, blah, blah, blah. We’ll just impose an economic blockade, and then it’ll be stuffed.” James Holland (01:24:59): And Britain is not ready to fight a war in 1948, but nor is Hitler, nor is Germany, so one is sort of striking out the other. But it’s very easy to say that in hindsight, but at the time, where people kind of digging trenches in Hyde Park in Central London and barrage balloons going up over London and children being evacuated from the cities and 92% of the population not wanting to go to war, you could see why he takes the course he does. James Holland (01:25:25): I suppose that’s what I’m saying. I’m not saying it’s necessarily the right decision, but I think it’s an understandable decision. Lex Fridman (01:25:29): Oh, but what about even just on the human level? If I go into a room with a British gentleman versus going to a room with Trump, it feels like it’s so much easier to read and manipulate the British gentleman. Lex Fridman (01:25:46): Because Trump is like Trump-like characters. It seems like Hitler is similar, Churchill is similar. It’s like this guy can do anything. There’s something terrifying about- James Holland (01:25:57): Unpredictability, yeah. Lex Fridman (01:25:59): Yeah, it feels like there’s something very predictable about Chamberlain. James Holland (01:26:02): Yes, I think that’s true. But also one has to take a step back and think about what Britain represents so, therefore, what Chamberlain represents in 1938. Britain has the largest empire the world has ever known in 1938. Lex Fridman (01:26:14): Yeah, yeah. We shouldn’t forget that, right? James Holland (01:26:17): Third of the world is pink, as the saying goes. And that saying comes from the kind of atlas of the world where all British territories are kind of colored pink. James Holland (01:26:24): And on top of that it has lots of extra imperial territories as well. So if you look at, there’s this incredible map of global shipping in 1937, and there’s these little landlines of ships going out, and one of the strongest landlines is going down to Argentina and South America from Britain. So down past West Africa and down in Southern Atlantic, and there it is. James Holland (01:26:47): And that’s because Britain owns most of Argentina. It owns huge great farming estates and ranches. It owns the railway system. It owns many of the port facilities. So you didn’t even need an empire. You need the facilities that overseas trade and possessions can give you. James Holland (01:27:04): And Britain not only has the largest navy, it also has the largest merchant navy. It has 33% of the world’s merchant shipping and access to a further 50% Greek, Norwegian, Canadian shipping that it can access. So if you’ve got access to 80, in excess of 80% of the world shipping, that puts you in an incredibly strong position. James Holland (01:27:27): And actually all sorts of other things have been going on. While they might not have been creating a huge army or producing enough Spitfires that they might want to, up until this point, what they have also been doing is stockpiling bauxite and copper and tungsten and huge reserves. And because Britain has this huge global reach and because it has its empire and its extra-imperial assets, it can strike bargains that no one else can strike. James Holland (01:27:50): So it can go into various countries around the world and can go, “Okay, I want you to guarantee me for the next five years every bit of your rubber supply. I will pay over the asking price to secure that.” And it’s doing that in the 1930s. So when war comes, it’s got everything it possibly needs. James Holland (01:28:09): Now it always need more because it’s suddenly turning into a kind of proper global long drawn-out war. But that is a huge advantage. James Holland (01:28:18): So it is with that mindset that Chamberlain is going into those talks and thinking, “Okay, well, I’m not going to get a war over Czechoslovakia. Who cares about them? But I am going to show Hitler that I mean business.” Hitler’s going, “Who’s this stuffy guy with his white hair? I don’t give a toss about him.” And he’s coming at it from a completely different perspective. James Holland (01:28:37): And I think one of the things that’s so interesting from a dramatic point of view and from a historian’s point of view, or even a novelist’s point of view, in the case of Robert Harris writing his book about these negotiations, which I don’t know if you’ve read it, but it’s terrifically good, it’s the fact you’ve got two men, two alpha males who are going to those negotiations from totally different perspectives and vantage points. James Holland (01:29:01): And I think it’s very easy for people today to forget how elevated Britain was in the late 1930s. The gold standard was tied to the pound, not the dollar. And so Britain was the number one nation in the world at that time, and it just was, and it’s so diminished by comparison today that it’s hard to imagine it. James Holland (01:29:26): And I think one of the interesting things about the historiography, about the narrative of how we tell World War II is that so much of it has been dictated by the shift in power that took place subsequent to 1945. And when people were starting to write these sort of major narratives in the 1970s and ’80s and into the 1990s, is through a prism of a very, very different world. James Holland (01:29:49): And so, one of the reasons why you have this narrative that Britain was a bit rubbish and hanging on the shirttails of the Americans and all the blood was spilt in eastern front and Germany had the best army in the world and was only defeated because Hitler was mad and blah, blah, blah, that kind of traditional narrative, that narrative emerges through the prism of what was going on in the 1970s and what was going on in the 1980s and the changing world, rather than looking at it through the prism of the late 1930s or early 1940s. Lex Fridman (01:30:19): So there is this moment of decision. What lesson do you take from that? When is the right time for appeasement, to negotiate, for diplomacy? And when is the right time for military strength, offensive, attacking, for military conflict? Where is that line? Where’s that- James Holland (01:30:45): Well, I kind of think it probably was when it was. I mean- Lex Fridman (01:30:51): Poland. James Holland (01:30:52): Yeah. Honestly, I’m not sure it would’ve been the right decision to go to war in 1938. I can’t predict because you can’t second-guess how things are going to play out because you just don’t know. James Holland (01:31:07): But I’m not sure that Chamberlain made the wrong decision. I’m not saying he made the right decision. I’m being a bit wishy-washy about this. Lex Fridman (01:31:16): You could’ve threatened it more. Imagine Churchill in those same meetings. James Holland (01:31:22): Yeah, but Churchill also appeases. I mean, he appeases Stalin all the time. So the idea that Churchill is this big strong man and never appeases, and he’s gung-ho over war, Churchill’s out of the government at that time. He recognizes that you can’t trust Hitler. He recognizes that Nazism is bad. But he, because he’s out of the government, he doesn’t have a window on exactly where Britain is at that particular time, in a way that Chamberlain does. James Holland (01:31:49): I suppose what I’m saying is Chamberlain is better placed to make those decisions than Churchill is, which again, doesn’t mean that Chamberlain is right and Churchill is wrong. James Holland (01:32:02): It’s just that’s a massive punt to go to war in 1938 when you still don’t have, you’ve got a handful of Spitfires, you’ve got a handful of Hurricanes, you haven’t got enough. Your air defense system isn’t properly sorted at this point. Your navy is strong, but what’s that kind of look like, I mean, if you do go to war? Because it’s not going to be army sweeping into Germany. It’s just it’s going to be accelerated industrialization for a year. So even if you go to war in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia will not be saved. France and Britain will not be going in and invading Germany. That is absolutely not going to happen. James Holland (01:32:44): So what’s the point, I mean, if you’re not going to do that? Why didn’t you accelerate your rearmament thereafter, get your ducks in a row, and then you can consider it? I mean, after all, even in September 1939, they don’t really do anything. I mean, we talked about the kind of Saar Offensive, which isn’t really an offensive at all. It’s firing a one round of machine gun and scuttling back again. But I mean, they don’t even do that then. They’re still buying time in 1939, and Britain is only just about ready to take on the onslaught of the Luftwaffe in summer of 1940. Lex Fridman (01:33:19): Well, nobody’s ready for war. James Holland (01:33:21): No, and you always want more than you’ve got at any time, even when you’re winning. Lex Fridman (01:33:25): But like really not ready. Even like you mentioned with Barbarossa, Nazi Germany is really not ready. James Holland (01:33:34): Not ready. Lex Fridman (01:33:36): Except France. I swear, France- James Holland (01:33:41): [inaudible 01:33:41] Lex Fridman (01:33:41): Fine. But come on, come on. When Nazi Germany invades Poland, I mean- James Holland (01:33:49): Yeah, it’s terrible. It’s terrible because I also do think that had France gone in, in some force with some British troops as well, had they gone in, what would’ve happened is, is that would’ve, that easily could’ve brought down Hitler because most of his commanders are, his senior commanders are just thinking, “What the hell is going on? This is a catastrophe.” I mean, to a man. James Holland (01:34:12): I mean, even Goring is thinking this is a terrible idea. They are absolutely not convinced. And when Hitler does his big talk to his… He asked all his senior commanders to come to the Berghof to brief them about invasion of Poland, it’s just after the Ribbentrop Molotov back to the 22nd of August. He calls them all to Berghof and says, “Come in mufti, come in civilian suits.” James Holland (01:34:34): They all turn up, and he gives them this kind of huge great speech and says, “This is the moment, this is the time. This is what we’re going to do.” And they’re all going, “What? You’re kidding me. What, we’re going to Poland on the 26th of August, that’s the plan, like two days’ time? Where’s the plan?” James Holland (01:34:51): The whole point is that they’re emerging and growing militarily, but they were supposed to have all these exercises where they’re coordinating ground forces, the Panzer spearhead with operations in the air with the Luftwaffe. James Holland (01:35:04): None of that happens so Poland becomes the proving ground, and actually they discover that there’s lots of things that don’t work and lots of things that are wrong. But it’s flying in the face of all convention, military convention that he does this without any kind of warning. James Holland (01:35:21): And even by the 1st of September where there’s been this kind of five-day delay at the last-minute negotiations. The last-minute negotiations are thrust upon Hitler by people like Goring and by Mussolini and the Italians going, “Oh my God, don’t do this. Don’t do this. There’s got to be a solution,” he was absolutely chomping at the bit. Lex Fridman (01:35:42): Well, in that case, from a dark militaristic perspective, his bet paid off. James Holland (01:35:49): Well, except that it ended in ruins in May 1945 with the total collapse of Germany, so you could say the worst decision he ever made was going into Poland in September 1930. Depends the way you look at it, but I mean, yes, it’s successful in that Poland is overrun in 18 days. Lex Fridman (01:36:05): And there’s so many counterfactuals here. James Holland (01:36:08): But I mean if you were to say to Hitler on the 30th of April as he’s sort of taking out the pistol from his holster on his sofa in the Fuhrerbank and going, “Yeah, so, Adolf, 1st of September 1939, still backing yourself on that one?” I mean, he might have a different view. Lex Fridman (01:36:24): The guy’s insane and full of blunder so he probably would’ve said, “Yeah, do it all over again.” James Holland (01:36:29): Yeah, I’m sure he would’ve done as well. Lex Fridman (01:36:31): Conquest Poland was not a mistake. Soviet Union was not a mistake. James Holland (01:36:35): No. Lex Fridman (01:36:36): It’s just some of the- James Holland (01:36:37): Other people. “I was let down by people not being strong enough.” Lex Fridman (01:36:39): Yeah, the Prussian generals are all- James Holland (01:36:41): Yeah, of course. That’s exactly what he’d say. “It wasn’t my fault.” Lex Fridman (01:36:45): He might have quietly done some different decisions about Barbarossa. Maybe the timing would be different. James Holland (01:36:53): Maybe that all out central for us, rather than kind of splitting into three. Lex Fridman (01:36:56): Yeah. James Holland (01:36:56): Yep. Lex Fridman (01:36:56): But he was very sure, it seems like, maybe you can correct me, that Britain and France would still carry on with appeasement even after he invaded Poland. James Holland (01:37:06): Absolutely. He was completely convinced by it. There was clearly a sort of 10 to 15% level of doubt, “But what the heck, I’m going to do it anyway.” James Holland (01:37:18): He’d ratcheted himself up into such a lava of kind of, “This is the moment. I have to do it now. This is fate. I’m 50, and I could be taken out by an assassin’s bullet. I’ve got this important life work that I’ve got to do. We’ve got to get on with it now. There could be no more delay. This is my mission. This is our mission of the German people, and the German people have got the will and the spirit to be able to pull it off.” James Holland (01:37:43): Or “I was wrong, and, therefore, we don’t deserve to be a Thousand-Year Reich. We don’t deserve to be the master race, black or white. [inaudible 01:37:52] same all the time.” Lex Fridman (01:37:55): So can you tell the story of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939? So they make an agreement, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and that leads us, just like you were mentioning, in a matter of days, how compact everything is. It’s just really, really fascinating how crooked- James Holland (01:38:12): It’s a beautiful summer in Europe, summer of 1939. It’s one of these glorious summers that sort of never rains. It’s just sunshine, sunny day after sunny day. It’s like that sort of golden summer of 1914 as well, where sky always seems to be blue, fluffy, white clouds, everyone sort of, you know, but this sort of the storm clouds of war, to use that cliche, are kind of brewing. James Holland (01:38:39): The Russians have reached out to Britain and France and said, “Come on over, let’s negotiate. Let’s see what we can do,” and there is just no stomach for that at all. I mean, if ever there is, I think, a mistake that’s Britain and France should’ve been a bit more into realpolitiks than they were. It’s such an opportunity to ensure that, to snooker the Third Reich, and they don’t take it. Because in many ways they see the westward spread of communism in exactly the same way that the Nazis see the threat of the westward spread of communism as something that’s every bit as repellent as Nazism, and they don’t want to be getting into bed with these guys. James Holland (01:39:26): Of course, they have to kind of change tack on that one in summer of 1941 in very quick order, and that’s the whole point about Churchill appeasing Stalin. I mean, it’s all very well people saying, “Well, Churchill wouldn’t have appeased Hitler in the 1930s,” but he does appease. He appeases all the time, and they miss that opportunity. James Holland (01:39:49): And the French and British delegation is third-tier commanders, generals going over. Yeah, it was a shit show. I mean, yeah, excuse my French, but I mean, it’s a nonsense that they’re not ready for it. They’re not prepared. The British guy [inaudible 01:40:06] doesn’t have any authority. The whole thing’s a complete joke. It’s never going to get anywhere. Lex Fridman (01:40:12): You tell the story of this quite beautifully, actually. Again, it’s such a human story. I mean, it seems like the Stalin and the Soviet- James Holland (01:40:22): They’ve already made up their mind. Lex Fridman (01:40:23): But- James Holland (01:40:23): Well, I don’t they have. I think what they- Lex Fridman (01:40:25): Wait, wait, wait. I mean, you described quite well that they value in-person meeting. James Holland (01:40:30): Yes. Lex Fridman (01:40:31): So Chamberlain should have just gone to Moscow. James Holland (01:40:34): Yeah, get on a plane. Lex Fridman (01:40:40): Maybe it’s a simplistic notion, but that could’ve changed the trajectory of human history right there. James Holland (01:40:46): I really think it could’ve done. I think that’s much more grievous mistake than the Munich. Lex Fridman (01:40:51): Why are leaders so hesitant to meet? I’m told now by a bunch of diplomats that, “No, no, no, no. There’s a process. At first, you have to have these diplomats meet, and they have to draft a bunch of stuff.” Lex Fridman (01:41:07): I sometimes have the simplistic notion, like, why not meet? Why not meet? I think there is a human element there, of course, especially when there’s this force that is Hitler. James Holland (01:41:23): Well, yes, and because we, humans, we like to interact, and you like to see people in three dimensions, and I’m sure that’s why you always, quite rightly, insist on doing your podcast face-to-face. Because you want to get the cut of someone’s jib, and you want to be able to see them, and you want to see the intonation and the expression and the whites of their eyes and all that kind of stuff. James Holland (01:41:46): And that just does make a difference, of course, because we’re fundamentally animals, and we want to be sizing people up. And it’s much easier to do that when you’re a few feet away from each other than it is on a video screen or through the prism of someone else. Lex Fridman (01:42:02): Yeah, but there’s also just, you see the humanity in others. It’s so much easier, you see this in social media, it’s so much easier to talk shit about others when you’re not with them- James Holland (01:42:13): Yes. Lex Fridman (01:42:13): … and military conflict is the extreme version of that. You can construct these narratives that they’re not human, that they’re evil, that they’re… You can construct communist ideology, all these… You can project onto them the worst possible version of a human. But when you meet them, you’re like, “Oh.” James Holland (01:42:36): They’re all just a person. Lex Fridman (01:42:37): They’re just a person. James Holland (01:42:38): Well, it’s the world’s great tragedy that it’s only a few people that want to go to war, and the vast majority want to live happily contented lives getting on with their neighbors. I mean, it has been ever thus. It’s just it is those few that kind ruin it for everybody else. James Holland (01:42:52): But anyway, to go back to Leningrad, back in August 1939, they go half-cocked. They’re disrespectful to Soviet Union as a result of that. It gets nowhere. Had they been able to put on a really, really firm offer there and then to the Soviet Union, Soviet Union would’ve probably come in. James Holland (01:43:13): I mean, the big thing is, is that the Soviet Union said, “This is a big stumbling block.” The Soviet Union said, “Yeah, but we want to be able to march through Poland if we get threatened by Germany.” James Holland (01:43:25): But the British and French just smell a massive rat there. They’re basically saying if they agree to that, what they fear is that Soviet Union will just march into Poland and go, “Yeah, but you said we could,” and take it, which they unquestionably would’ve done, but it would’ve stopped the World War, probably. Lex Fridman (01:43:42): They’re willing to appease Hitler. They’re not willing to appease Stalin in that situation. James Holland (01:43:46): Well, they’re not willing to appease anybody by that stage, that’s the point. Lex Fridman (01:43:49): Well, they appeased Hitler because- James Holland (01:43:51): They did, but you have [inaudible 01:43:52] there’s a bottom line, which is Poland, so it’s changed. That’s the point. Lex Fridman (01:43:58): Right, right. James Holland (01:43:59): But anyway, the bottom line is they don’t, there is a reluctance on the part of French and the British to negotiate with the Soviet Union because they’re communists, don’t like them, don’t trust them, worry about what they’re going to do with Poland, are they’re going to be jumping out of the fire into the kind of water, and it doesn’t come off. James Holland (01:44:18): And as a consequence of that, Soviet Union continue to pursue more hardly, more and more vociferously the opportunities that the Germans are offering, which is the split of Poland. Because Soviet Union wants that part of Poland back in its own sphere of influence, and it doesn’t want to go to war just yet. Lex Fridman (01:44:42): And the agreement that they won’t attack each other, essentially. James Holland (01:44:46): Yep. Lex Fridman (01:44:46): You think Stalin actually believed that? James Holland (01:44:49): No, he believed it in the same way that Hitler believed it, that it was a cynical kind of convenient bit of realpolitik for now. I mean, I think Soviet Union was as determined to get rid of the Nazis as the Nazis were determined to get rid of the Soviet Union. I think whoever fired first- James Holland (01:45:00): … Nazis as the Nazis were determined to get rid of the Soviet Union. I think whoever fired first was not decided at that point, but I do think that from the moment that Hitler takes power in 1933, a conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany is inevitable. Lex Fridman (01:45:13): So either direction, you think it’s inevitable. James Holland (01:45:17): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:45:17): I think, yeah, there’s a huge amount of evidence for that. Stalin probably wanted it, what, in ’42, ’43? James Holland (01:45:23): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:45:23): Something like that? James Holland (01:45:24): Yeah. And they’re doing exercises and stuff and building out, but he’s not ready yet because he knows he’s done the purges and he’s got to get his armed forces back into shape and all the rest of it. So they have this incredibly cynical agreement, but at that point, Hitler’s hands are untied. He no longer has to worry about the threat from the Soviet Union. He’s got carte blanche to go into Poland, and he doesn’t believe that France and Britain are going to go to war over Poland. He’s wrong about that, obviously. But France and Britain, despite going to war with him, still do nothing. So he’s got away with it. Lex Fridman (01:45:57): Who was Churchill, and how did Churchill come to power at this moment? James Holland (01:46:02): Well, Churchill is this absolutely towering figure in British politics. He’s first minister in the naughties of the 20th century and the first years of the 20th century. First of the liberals, then of the conservatives. He’s a former Chancellor of the Exchequer. He’s a towering figure, but he’s been in the wilderness because he’s out of favor with the Stanley Baldwin government. He’s out of favor with Chamberlain, but he is this towering figure, and he has been very outspoken as a backbencher, which basically means you’re not a minister, you’re not in the cabinet, you’re just an ordinary member of parliament. But obviously you are an ordinary member of parliament, but you’re also an ordinary member of parliament who has had ministries of state and who is this towering figure. So he’s listened to in a way that other backbenchers aren’t. James Holland (01:46:54): And he has been saying, “We need to stand up to the dictators. We need to do this. We need to rearm more heavily,” and blah, blah, blah. So when war is declared, he’s brought back into the admiralty in charge of the Navy, which is Britain’s senior service, and suddenly he’s there. And what happens is Britain doesn’t really do anything. It’s very difficult working with France because France is so politically fractured that they can’t make any decisions. When you can’t make any decisions, you are just impotent. And so Churchill first mentions going into Norway mining the leads. So the idea is that you’re making life very difficult for the Germans to get iron ore out of Sweden. Their main source of iron ore is up in the northern part of Sweden in the Arctic Circle, and then goes on a railway through the northern tip of Norway and then gets shipped down the west coast of Norway into Germany, into the Baltic. James Holland (01:47:48): So Churchill suggests, in September 1939, why don’t we mine the leads? Which the leads are these passageways out of the fjords in the north into the North Sea. Why don’t we mine those and stop the Germans from taking this? And everyone goes, “Well, yeah, that’s quite a good idea.” But they can’t decide, and the French are nervous that if they do that, the Germans would retaliate in bomb France and all this kind of stuff. So no decision is made until April 19, 1940. They go up to start mining the leads on exactly the same day that the Germans invade Denmark and Norway, and so they’re caught off guard. And at that moment, really it’s seen as a failure of Chamberlain’s government. And there is a mounting realization that no matter how good he was or competent he was as a peacetime Prime Minister, he’s not a wartime Prime Minister. James Holland (01:48:36): He’s not served in the armed forces himself. He doesn’t really understand it. It needs a different set of hands. And his government falls on the 9th of May. It becomes inevitable that he’s going to have to resign. And the obvious person to take his place is Lord Halifax, who is in the House of Lords, but you could still be a Prime Minister. And he is, without question, the most respected politician in the country. He’s the former Viceroy of India. He’s seen as an incredibly safe pair of hands, man of resolute sound judgment, et cetera, et cetera. But he doesn’t want to take it. He feels physically ill at the prospect, doesn’t want this responsibility. He is also not really a military man. He’s got a slightly withered hand, which has prevented him from doing military service. James Holland (01:49:23): And he just blanches at this moment, and that really leaves only one other figure that could possibly take on this position, and that’s Churchill. So when Chamberlain resigns on the 9th of May and Halifax says, “It’s not for me,” the only person who’s going to step into that position is Churchill, and he becomes Prime Minister, and he accepts it gladly. He feels like it is his mission in life. This is his moment come of the outcome of the man. But he comes with a huge amount of baggage. He’s known as a man who drinks too much, whose judgment hasn’t always been great. He was Chancellor during the time of the General Strike in 1926. He backed Edward VIII over the monarchy crisis when the King wanted to marry Wallis Simpson, the Catholic divorcee, et cetera, et cetera. So his judgment has been brought into question. He is the man who came up with the idea of the Gallipoli campaign, which was an ignominious failure, blah, blah, blah. James Holland (01:50:18): So there are issues over him. He is seen as a hothead and a man who doesn’t have the sound judgment of Halifax. So the jury is very much out. And I think, again, it’s one of those things where you have to look at this through the prism of what people were thinking in May 1940. Yes, he was considered [inaudible 01:50:38] politician, but he is seen also as a loose cannon and by no means the right person in this hour of darkness. And it is coincidental that the 10th of May 1940, when he takes over as Prime Minister, becomes Prime Minister, not through an election, but by default of a new nationalist government. So no longer a conservative government, but a nationalist cross-party coalition government for the duration of the war, which includes members of the Liberal Party and also the Labour Party as well as conservatives, that it is by no means certain that he is going to be able to deliver the goods. James Holland (01:51:20): And it is also coincidentally the same day that the Germans launched Case Yellow, Operation Yellow, the invasion of the low countries in France. So these are tumultuous events, to put it mildly. And it is also the case that only a couple of weeks before, Paul Reynaud has taken over his Prime Minister of yet another coalition government in France from Daladier. So political turmoil is very much the watchword at this time for the Western democracies, just at the moment that the Germans are making their hammer strike into the West. Lex Fridman (01:52:00): This might be a good moment to bring up this idea that has been circulating recently brought up by Darryl Cooper, who hyperbolically stated that Churchill was the quote, chief villain of the Second World War. To give a good faith interpretation of that, I believe he meant that Churchill forced Hitler to escalate the expansion of Nazi Germany beyond Poland into a global war. So Churchill is the one that turned this narrow war, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, into a global one. Is that accurate? James Holland (01:52:41): No, I don’t think it is, not least because the decisions over Poland were made by Chamberlain’s government when Churchill was out of government. So Churchill wasn’t even involved in that decision-making process at the time. No, I don’t think so. Again, I go back to Britain’s position in the world in 1939. If you say, “We are going to defend the sovereignty of Poland,” and then you don’t, that looks really bad globally. Britain’s prestige would plummet. It would lead all sorts of problems. You are saying that you are giving carte blanche to dictators to just run amok and take whatever territory they want. You are risking a future upheaval of the global order away from democracies into the hands of dictators. In the West people believe in democracy and believe in advancement of freedoms of people. James Holland (01:53:37): To echo the words of Roosevelt in August 1941, they’re responding to a world free of want and fear. Now obviously, there are still some issues with the form that democracy takes in the 1930s. It’s not democratic for everyone. Try saying that if you are in Nigeria or India or whatever, or if you’re in the black Southern states of the United States. But the aspirations are there. And I think that’s an important distinction. And I think by saying that Churchill is the chief warmonger of the Second World War, I think, is ludicrous. It’s the same thing about the bombing. The detractors of strategic air campaign always go, “Yeah, but Germans had the Holocaust, but weren’t the Allies just as bad just killing all those civilians?’ It’s like, no, because the moment Hitler stopped the war, the bombing would stop. The moment the war stopped in Hitler’s favor, the killing would continue and be accelerated. Lex Fridman (01:54:37): So the thing you mentioned initially is the idealist perspective of well, Britain can’t allow this warmonger to break all these pacts and be undemocratic, murder a large number of people and do conquests of territory. That’s idealistic. But if we look at the realist perspective, what decisions would minimize the amount of suffering on the continent in the next 50 years? So one of the arguments that he’s making, I happen to disagree with it, to put it mildly, is that Churchill increased the amount of suffering, so Churchill’s presence and decisions. So we’re not talking about idealistic perspective, we’re talking about a realistic. The reality of the war of Stalin, of Hitler, of Churchill, of France and FDR, did Churchill drag Hitler into a world war? Did he force Hitler to invade the Soviet Union? Did he force Hitler to then attack Britain? James Holland (01:56:03): Well, no, because Hitler was always going to invade the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Union invaded Germany first. So that was always going to happen. No one asked Hitler to invade the low countries and Norway and Denmark and attack Britain. He does that, of course, because he’s not given a free hand in Poland. But there’s no question that Hitler would have also wanted to subdue France or certainly turn France from a democracy into a totalitarian state as well. I’m absolutely certain about that. Lex Fridman (01:56:40): So I think there’s pretty definitive evidence, it’s obvious from everything he’s said, from everything he’s written, from everything everywhere, that he was going to invade the Soviet Union no matter what. And France? Most likely yes also. James Holland (01:56:55): He would have done a deal with Britain. Britain could have coexisted. Lex Fridman (01:56:59): So actually, there is a possible reality, I don’t know, maybe you can correct me on this, where Hitler basically takes all of Europe except Britain. James Holland (01:57:10): Yes, but then he would have got so strong that he would have then turned on Britain as well, because the fear is that if you let him do this, then he gets greedy. He wants the next one, then he wants the next one, then he wants the next one, and then he wants to take over the whole world. That is the fear of the British. That is the fear of the Americans. That’s the fear of President Roosevelt. We haven’t even touched on this yet, but he has a very difficult case on his hands because he has come into power also in January of 1933 as President of the United States on an isolationist ticket with a retrenching, with a step away from the European old order. It’s time for the Europeans to stand on their own. It all sounds very familiar right now. James Holland (01:57:58): And suddenly he’s got to do this gargantuan political [inaudible 01:58:01] and prepare the nation for war because he also fears, like Churchill fears, like Chamberlain feared as well, that Hitler’s designs are not purely on Eastern Europe and the Lebensraum there, but would get ever bigger. And I don’t doubt that they’re right. I think if he’d prevailed in the Soviet Union, he’d have always wanted more, because his whole concept is the master race. Lex Fridman (01:58:29): Yeah, I think it should be said if we measure human suffering, if there was not Britain on the other side, if it was not a two-front war, that the chances of Hitler succeeding in the Soviet Union is much higher, or at least a more prolonged war, and there would be more dead, more enslaved and more tortured in all of this. James Holland (01:58:52): Yes and ditto. If the Allies hadn’t got involved against Imperial Japan, it would have been catastrophic. 20 to 30 million Chinese dead anyway with American and British intervention. What’s it going to be in China without that? And elsewhere. Because the reason why Japan invades French Indochina, now Vietnam, and Hong Kong and Malaya and Singapore and so on, and Burma is because it’s not winning in China, and it needs more resources because it’s resource poor, and America has cut off the tap. So it’s going into these countries to get what it needs, its rubber and oil and natural resources and ores, precious ores and all the rest of it. And if it had been unchecked, it would have done so, and then it would have absolutely built up its strength and overrun the whole of China with even more deaths. James Holland (01:59:55): So I think one of the interesting things about the Second World War is lots of wars and why people get involved in them are extremely questionable. But I think there is a moral crusade to the Allies and what they’re doing that I think is entirely justified. What I think is interesting also is that as the war progresses, if the Allies are supposed to be on the force of the good, how come they’re doing so much bad? And at what point is doing bad stopping you from doing good? And at what point are you doing good, but also doing bad at the same time? Such as destruction of cities, destruction of monasteries on outcrops in southern Italy, killing of lots of civilians, et cetera, et cetera. These are difficult questions to answer sometimes. They’re also incredibly interesting, and I think that moral component starts to blur a little bit by middle of the war, by 1943. It’s easy to have a fairly cut-and-dry war in North Africa, in the deserts of North Africa, where the only people getting in the way are a few Bedouin tribesmen or something. James Holland (02:01:10): But once you start getting into Europe or getting into the meat of highly populated countries in the Far East, for example, that’s a different color of fish because the scale of destruction is absolutely immense. But it’s also the job of political leaders to look after and defend their own peoples first and foremost. And so what you’re doing is you’re trying to protect your own sovereignty of your own people before you’re protecting other people. And so that’s what leads to the whole way in which the the Western Allies are protracting war is to try and minimize the number of deaths of their own young men as much as they possibly can, whilst at the same time winning the war. James Holland (02:01:56): And that means bringing lots of destruction to your enemies, but also trying to minimize it. And the way you bring lots of destruction to your enemies is by using immense firepower and this concept of steel not our flesh, which I mentioned earlier on, and technology, so that you don’t have to bring to bear too many of your young men’s lives and you don’t have a repeat of the slaughter of the First World War. So it’s really interesting that in our mind’s eye, when we’re thinking of the Western Allies in the Second World War, probably the first thing that comes into mind is Americans jumping out of landing craft on Omaha Beach on D-Day, for example. Those are infantrymen, they’re the front line, they are the cold face, they’re the first people going into the fire of the enemy. And we tend to think about guys in tanks, infantrymen with their Garand rifles or machine guns or whatever. That’s what springs to mind. James Holland (02:02:48): Yet actually they’re a comparatively small proportion of the army. So no more than 14 to 15% of any army, Allied army, is infantry. 45% are service corps, service troops, driving trucks and cooks and bottle washers and people lugging great big boxes of stuff. And that’s because by that stage, the Allies have worked out the way of war, which is to use is what I call big war, this concept of a very long tail, logistics, the operational arts, making sure that people have the absolute best you possibly can, great medical care, huge advances in first aid and medical care of troops, getting them back onto the battlefield. And you’re using firepower and technology and mechanization to do a lot of your hard yards. So that’s the principle behind strategic bombing. James Holland (02:03:37): If you go over and bomb and you can destroy infrastructure and civilians and households, that makes it much harder for Krupp to make those Panzer tanks and tiger tanks or whatever it might be, and guns, and you’re disrupting the transportation system in Germany, you’re making life difficult for them to do what they need to do, then that means it’s going to be easier for those 14, 15% of infantry when you’ve got to jump out of a landing craft to do their job. And you’re trying to keep that to a minimum. And you’d have to say, broadly speaking, that’s a very sensible policy that makes an awful lot of sense. The consequence of that is a huge amount of destruction, and maybe that’s what Darryl Cooper’s driving at. But no one asked Hitler to invade Poland. That is the bottom line. No one asked Germany to go to war. No one asked Hitler to come up with this ludicrous ideology. Lex Fridman (02:04:30): There’s complex ethical discussions here about just as you described. James Holland (02:04:36): Which are fascinating. Lex Fridman (02:04:37): Which are fascinating. And war is hell, and there’s many ways in which it is hell. Just for a little bit, the steel man, what Darryl, where he might be coming from is since World War II, the simplistic veneration of Churchill, so saying Churchill good, Hitler bad, has been used as a template to project other conflicts to justify military intervention. And so his and other people like Libertarians, for example, resistance to that overly simplistic veneration of somebody like Churchill has to do with the fact that that seems to be by neocons or warmongers in the military industrial complex in the United States and elsewhere, using Hitler way too much, using Churchill way too much to justify invading everywhere and anywhere. James Holland (02:05:42): Well, I do agree with that. I think oversimplification of anything is a mistake. Life is nuanced. The past is nuanced. It’s okay to be proud about certain things, and it’s okay to be disgusted by other things. That’s absolutely fine. We have a complicated relationship with our past. It doesn’t need to be black and white, and life is not a straight line. And of course, the Allies made plenty of mistakes in World War II. Overall, I think they made the right calls. And I think one of the things that’s really interesting is I think that the Allies, for the most part, use their resources much more judiciously and sensibly than the Axis powers do. And good, because that means they prevail. James Holland (02:06:28): I think there are so many lessons from World War II that could have been brought into the history of the last 30 years, which weren’t, such as if you decapitate an incredibly strong leader, you get a power vacuum. And if you don’t have a solution for that power vacuum, lots of bad elements are going to sweep into that in very quick order, which of course, is exactly what happens in Iraq. So Donald Rumsfeld is going, “We don’t do reconstruction.” Well, you freaking well should do. If you’re going to take on this particular challenge, you’ve got to see it through. That’s simply not good enough. It’s not good enough to go into Afghanistan and go, “We’re going to change things around. It’s going to be great. All the women are going to have education. They won’t have to cover up their bodies anymore. Anything goes. We love liberalism. It’s great. Let’s make Kabul into a thriving city once more,” and then suddenly bug out. Because what’s going to happen? You’re going to undo everything. James Holland (02:07:31): And this is a bit of a segue, Lex, but I remember being in northern Helmand Province back in, when was it? January 2008. And British troops had just taken over an absolute dump of a town called Musa Qala, and I remember talking to this Afghan guy. He just had all his willow trees chopped down to make room for a helipad the Allies wanted, which they put those cages with rubble in the protective wall. Is it called HESCO? I think it was called. Anyway, I said to him, “What do you think about the British being there?” And he just went and shrugged at me and lifted up his hands and said, “Well, if they stayed great, but they won’t.” And he said, “If they stay, then brilliant.” But he said, “I’ll tell you what he said, Taliban weren’t great, they weren’t fantastic.” He said, “But I could leave my purse on the wall and no one would touch it. I could leave it on a wall for a week and no one would touch it.” He said, “Will they bring that kind of order? Will we have peace here? They’ve just chopped down my willow trees. Thanks a lot.” James Holland (02:08:39): You’re seeing a total lack of understanding of the culture, ethnic differences. You’re trying to impose a Western-centric view onto a nation which isn’t ready for that. Now, there are ways in which it looked like Afghanistan was starting to emerge, and there was a path, and then just at the critical moment, the West moves out with catastrophic consequences. What you have to say though is that in the West post-1945, the rehabilitation of Italy, of Japan, of Western Germany was really good. The consequence of all that destruction, all that turmoil was thriving, high-producing democracies, which burst forth into the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century in pretty good order. So the lessons of the previous generation, from the First World War, had been learned, even though the scale of destruction, the displacement of people is unprecedented in 1945. Lex Fridman (02:09:57): In 1939, what was the state of the militaries? What were the most powerful militaries on the world’s stage at that time? James Holland (02:10:04): Well, in terms of naval power, Britain, as we’ve already discussed, and the United States. France has a pretty large navy. Japan has a pretty large navy. Italy has a pretty large navy, but Italy’s navy is, by far and away, the most modern aspect of its three services, air, land, and sea, but it doesn’t have any aircraft carriers and it doesn’t have any radar. So they’ve got modern battleships and battle cruisers, but without key modern bits of technology. Lex Fridman (02:10:32): So Italy is really not ready for it. James Holland (02:10:34): Oh, it’s so not. It’s so not. It’s just, again, both Hitler and Mussolini, they lack geopolitical understanding. That’s because they’re so focused on their narrow worldview, and they view everything through that prism, but they can’t see that bigger picture. Lex Fridman (02:10:51): And we should say that Mussolini, maybe you can correct me, but I don’t think at any point he wants a war. James Holland (02:10:57): He doesn’t want a war. What he does want is he wants his own new Roman Empire, which extends over the Mediterranean, certainly the eastern half of the Mediterranean, North Africa, all the way down to East Africa, controlling the Suez Canal. That’s what he wants. Lex Fridman (02:11:13): And I think he made clear that he was … There was always this little brother, jealous-of-Hitler situation because he wanted absolute power the way Hitler did. James Holland (02:11:24): But doesn’t have it. Lex Fridman (02:11:24): He doesn’t have it. And he described- James Holland (02:11:26): Because he’s the king. Lex Fridman (02:11:26): Yeah, there’s a- James Holland (02:11:27): Monarchy. Often forgotten. It’s amazing. Lex Fridman (02:11:31): So there’s always this limit. And Hitler, quite brilliantly, once he gets some power, he takes it all, complete. James Holland (02:11:41): He completely emasculates Mussolini. And he likes him though. It’s really weird. Even when Mussolini is about to fall in July 1943, he has a meeting at Feltre just literally a few days before Mussolini tumbles. And he does that because he likes Mussolini. He likes him as a man and thinks he’s been his friend, and he respects him to a certain extent, even though he definitely views himself as top dog. Hitler does, that is. So it’s curious because I don’t think Hitler particularly likes anyone really, but he does seem to Mussolini. But anyway, the problem with Mussolini is Mussolini’s Italy is very impoverished from the First World War, and that, of course, leads to the rise of fascism and the overthrow of parliamentary democracy and why Mussolini takes place in the first place. Again, it’s that there’s been this terrible disruption. There’s been financial crisis. That leads to people looking at an alternative. James Holland (02:12:42): What’s the alternative? Well, Mussolini is going, “We can be proud Italians again,” lots of chest thumping, wearing great uniforms, all the rest of it. And people think, “Well, I want a piece of that,” and it works, and proverbially the trains work on time under him, and so on and so forth. But he just gets ahead of himself. And actually the writings on the war in 1935 when he goes into Abyssinia, and again, what effectively are by first world European standards primitive tribesmen in Abyssinia, they have quite a tough fight there. They do prevail, but it’s not a complete walkover. And they get a bit of a bloody nose at times, and they shouldn’t have done. James Holland (02:13:22): And they’re just not ready. They don’t have the industry. They’re tied up into the Mediterranean. They don’t have access to the world’s oceans. They do have some merchant shipping, but not a huge amount. They just don’t have what is required. They’re dependent on Britain for coal. Britain is the leading coal exporter in the world in the 1930s. So Britain’s approach to fascist Spain and approach to fascist Italy has been very much stick and carrot. It’s like, we’ll let you do what you do as long as you stay in your box, and we’ll continue to provide you with supplies and coal and whatever it is you need as long as you don’t go too far. James Holland (02:14:05): And so that’s why Mussolini is very anxious in 1938, and again in 1939, to be the power broker and not let Germany go to war. But Germany, they signed the Axis Pact of Steel in May 1939, where they become formal allies, this is Hitler and Mussolini, Italy and Germany. But it’s always a very, very unequal partnership right from the word go. And one of the reasons Mussolini signs it is because he fears that Germany has designs on Italy. It’s not because he thinks, oh, these guys are great, they’re our natural bedfellows. It’s a mutually convenient pact whereby Germany gets on with whatever it wants to do up in Northern Europe and Eastern Europe. Italy is given a free hand to do whatever it wants to do. They’ll just watch each other’s backs. They have borders, Austria and Italy border one another, and they’ll just do their own thing, and they’ll help each other out with supplies and stuff. But basically they’ll be their own … It’s a marriage of convenience. James Holland (02:15:09): They’re never expecting to be fighting alongside each other on the battlefield. Not really. There is a kind of obligation to do so, but it’s an obligation with no expectation of it ever actually happening. And so from Mussolini’s point of view, the Pact of Steel is just sailing your flag to one particular mast and trying to cover your back. And so long as he plays his cards right, he can still get his coal supplies from Britain, and he doesn’t have to worry about that. And the Pact of Steel doesn’t make any difference to that. The problem for him is that in June 1940, he thinks that France is about to be defeated and that Britain will surely follow. James Holland (02:15:48): And so he thinks, ah, I’ve got some rich pickings. I can take Malta, I can take British possessions, I can overrun Egypt and now is my time, but I also need to join the fight before France is completely out of the fight. Otherwise, it looks like I’m a Johnny-come-lately, and I won’t get those spoils because the Germans will go, “You can’t have all this stuff. You’ve turned up too late. You need to be in the fight.” So he does it in what he thinks is the perfect timing. And it turns out to be a catastrophic timing because of course, Britain doesn’t exit the fight. Britain is still there. And by February 1941, a very, very tiny British army in Egypt has overrun two entire Italian armies and taken 133,000 prisoners in North Africa. Lex Fridman (02:16:26): So you mentioned in the sea who were the dominant armies. Who was dominant in the air? James Holland (02:16:33): Well, in the air it has to be the Luftwaffe, and it is also the Imperial Japanese, both in the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army. They both have air forces. And one of the reasons for that is because the quality of the pilots in Japan is extremely high, because it’s so difficult to get to the top position. You are going to your frontline squadrons with at least 500 hours in your logbook. To put that into some perspective, a British RAF or Luftwaffe pilot will be joining their frontline squadrons with 150 to 170 hours in the logbook. So these guys are disciplined within an inch of their lives. There are academic tests as well as physical endurance tests. They are the elite of the elite, and they are extremely good. James Holland (02:17:20): The problem they have is that there is a good number of them, but there’s not that many. The Luftwaffe is the largest air force in the world in 1939, but it is already at a parity in aircraft production with Britain, and the French have a similar size army, but they’re very, very badly organized. So they’re organized into different regions, and one region is not really talking to another. And one of the problems when Case Yellow, the invasion German invasion of the West starts, France’s army of the air is spread throughout France and has its own little area. So you have one bunch of fighters and bombers in that block in the Marseille area. You have another block on the Brittany coast, and you have another block around Sudan, and you have another that. James Holland (02:18:07): So consequently, they’re never able to bring their full strength to bear. So although they’ve both got about three-and-a-half thousand aircraft on paper and about two-and-a-half thousand that are fit to fly on any one given day, the Luftwaffe, because they’re the aggressor, could choose how they amass their aircraft and where they attack and when. So in other words, the Luftwaffe can send over overwhelming amounts of bombers and fighter planes and pulverize a French airfield and catch them napping. And because the French don’t have a defense system, they can’t see whether they’re coming. So their only hope is to take off and just hope they stooge around the sky and hope they bump into some Luftwaffe. Of course, that’s inherently inefficient, and they get destroyed, and they get destroyed in penny packets rather than en masse. James Holland (02:18:56): The difference with the RAF is the RAF is not done on an Air Force basis where each air corps or air fleet has a handful of bombers, a handful of fighters, a handful of reconnaissance planes. They have different commands. So they have bomber command, fighter command, training command, coastal command, and they all have very specific roles, so they’re structured in a completely different way. And that’s because they’re an island nation and because they see their role militarily in a different way and because the re-arming that Britain has done in the 1930s is all about defense. It is not about aggression at this point, not about taking it to the enemy. It is showing you are tough, but also first and foremost, getting your ducks in a row and making sure that you don’t get defeated. James Holland (02:19:43): So this is the principle behind the world’s first fully coordinated air defense system, which is the radar chain. It is the observer corps, it is control rooms, it is interesting technology such as Identification Friend or Foe, IFF, which is where you have a little pulse. So you have these control rooms, and you have a map table, and you have a- James Holland (02:20:00): … So you have these control rooms and you have a map table, and you have a tote board in front of you where you can see what squadrons are airborne, what stage of readiness they’re at, whether they’re engaging the enemy, little lights come on and show you. You can see weather maps, you can see the cloud ceiling, you see all that at a glance. Then you are on a dais and then down in front of you is a massive great map of Southern England. You’ve got croupiers, sort of moving plots, so you can, through a combination of radar, which picks up a rough idea of what’s coming towards you combined with the Observer Corps, you have overlapping Observer Corps stations all over Britain covering every single inch of airspace over Britain, looking up into the air and seeing how many aircraft there are and at what height they are. James Holland (02:20:43): And you have a little thing called a pantograph, which is a piece of equipment which helps you judge altitude. You then ring through that. That all comes into the control room along with the information from the radar stations, which is going into a single filter room at Fighter Command Headquarters, which is then being pushed straight back out to the sector stations. So this information is being updated all the time. So you have a plot and it looks like it might be enemy bombers 30-plus, for example. That’s constantly being adapted. So as more information comes in, you would change that and then you can see that actually it’s only 20 aircraft or 22 aircraft or whatever. James Holland (02:21:21): So you’re updating that and that little figure is put on your little plot and moved across and so you can see, and then because you can identify your own aircraft, you can then see where they are moving. And you’re also on, the guys in the air are on the radio to ground controllers, who are in these control rooms and they’re saying, “Okay, well if you proceed at angels 18, 18,000 feet on a vector of 150 degrees, you should be seeing your enemy bombing formation any moment now.” And what that means is that you are not on the ground when the enemy are coming towards you with their bombers to hit your airfield, which means you are in the air, so that all they’re doing is hitting a grass airfield, which you’ve already got bulldozers and diggers and graders and lots of scalping and earth ready to fill in the potholes. And it means you’re good to go. James Holland (02:22:13): And it means as a consequence of all that, when the Germans do launch their all out assault on Adlertag, Eagle Day on the 13th of August 1940, the British are ready. They can see them coming. They know what to expect and they can anticipate, and it means that they’re not being caught with their trousers down on the ground. As a consequence of that, of the 138 RAF airfields that there are in Britain, only one of them is knocked out for more than 48 hours in the entire summer of 1940. And that’s Manston on the tip of the Kent Coast, which was abandoned for the duration. Lex Fridman (02:22:48): So these are the two biggest Air Forces? James Holland (02:22:51): So those are the two biggest Air Forces. Lex Fridman (02:22:52): So Luftwaffe, we should say German, I mean they’re like the legendary, the terrifying Air Force. James Holland (02:23:02): They are. Lex Fridman (02:23:04): Maybe- James Holland (02:23:05): They’re slightly believing their own hype. There’s no question about it. Lex Fridman (02:23:08): Well, the rest of the world is also, right? James Holland (02:23:09): They’ve just had it too easy. So they don’t have ground controllers, they don’t have an air defense system in Germany because why would you need an air defense system, we’re going to be the aggressor. There’s no scenario where we’ll have to defend the airspace of the Third Reich because we’re on the offensive. So they just haven’t prepared it. Lex Fridman (02:23:27): So there’s that clash, the Battle of Britain, the clash of Air Forces. What explains the success of Britain in defending? James Holland (02:23:36): Well, everyone always says, the few were the last line of defense against the Nazi hordes and all this kind of stuff, and it’s all rubbish. They’re the first line of defense. Second line of defense is the Royal Navy, which is the world’s largest, and there’s absolutely no chance on earth that a German invasion force made up of Rhine River barges, one out of every three is motorized, and the other two aren’t, is ever going to get successfully across the English Channel and even if they did, they will be repulsed. There’s just no chance. And it is often forgotten that while the Luftwaffe is coming over and bombing Britain every single day, so is the RAF going over and bombing Germany and one of the problems that the Germans have is that these bombers need fighter protection. Fighter planes are there to protect the bombers and they don’t have much fuel. James Holland (02:24:28): And the Messerschmitt-109E, the Emil, as a model of 1940 is the mainstay of the German fighter force in the summer of 1940. And they don’t have much fuel. So they need to conserve their fuel, which means they need to be as close to Britain as they possibly can, which is why the majority of them are all in airfields, which are hastily created in July 1940 following the fall of France in the Pas-de-Calais, which is the closest point. That’s where the Channel is at its narrowest and all the rest of it, and also in the Northern Normandy, and that’s where they’re flying from. James Holland (02:24:59): But what that means is that even if you are completely rubbish bombing, which the British are in 1940, they haven’t developed those navigational aids that create untold accuracy by the end of the war, in 1940 they don’t have that luxury, it’s a target-rich environment. You can barely miss, if you go over to the Pas-de-Calais. It is literally, it’s just like one huge great kind of hub of fighter airfields. And consequently, that means that every single German squadron, which only is 12 airplanes strong on establishment and very often even fewer than that, always has to leave two airplanes behind to defend their own airfields. James Holland (02:25:36): And it’s really interesting when you look at prisoner war statements from Luftwaffe ground crew that have been downed, they’re all bugged in a holding place called Trent Park. You can see the transcripts of these conversations. They’re all going about how annoying it was that the RAF were over every night and they can’t sleep, and if only they’d just shut up and leave them alone and not bomb them. This is just part of the narrative of the Battle of Britain that’s completely left out. It’s always the stocky, the plucky few against the Nazi hordes and all the rest of it. And it’s a complete misnomer. James Holland (02:26:04): And by that time, aircraft production in Britain is massively outpacing the Germans and the best ratio that the Germans achieve in 1940s, July 1940, when the British produced 496 new Hurricanes and Spitfires, single-engine fighters, and the Germans only produced 240 single-engine fighters. That’s the best ratio. And of course, that is the British outproducing the Germans 2:1. And what that means is by the end of October 1940, when the Battle of Britain is officially designated as being over, the single-engine fighter force of Luftwaffe is less than 200, from 750 or whatever it was in beginning of July, whereas the British fighter force had been 650 or whatever at the beginning of July, is now well over 750. Lex Fridman (02:26:53): And Britain is outproducing? James Holland (02:26:55): Yeah, to a massive degree. And that continues, and that is a ratio that just increases as the war progresses. Britain produces 132,500 aircraft in the second World War. America produces 315,000. Lex Fridman (02:27:12): So why is there this legend of the Luftwaffe? James Holland (02:27:16): Well, because it’s the spearhead of the Blitzkrieg. Lex Fridman (02:27:18): So it has to do with the Blitzkrieg? James Holland (02:27:19): It has to do with the Blitzkrieg. The Luftwaffe becomes kind of the bogeyman of the Third Reich. They’re blamed for everything, but that’s because they’re completely abused. They’re the only part of the Third Reich’s Armed services, only part of the Wehrmacht, the Wehrmacht being the Navy, the army, and the Air force, that is in constant use the whole time, or constant abuse, I should say. James Holland (02:27:45): In Britain and America, they rotate their pilots really, really carefully. By the time that you’ve got the eight Fighter Command, for example, part of the Mighty Eighth, the Eighth Air Force operating in Britain, by the end of 1943, you would have, in a squadron, that would have 16, you would never have more than 16 airborne from a squadron at any one time. You would have 40 to 45 pilots to service 16 in the air and similar number of aircraft, which means you’re not overusing these guys. James Holland (02:28:15): And what would happen by that stage of the war, by 1943, a young fighter pilot coming to a Thunderbolt Squadron or a Mustang Squadron, for example, at the end of 1943, beginning of 1944, he’d have 350 hours of consecutive flying because you can train in America, in Florida or California or Texas or wherever, you can process many, many more people because the training is much more intense because you’ve got clear skies. So it’s not a question of, “Oh, we’d like to take you out Fritz this morning, but it’s a bit cloudy and oh, the RAF are over or Air Force are over, so we can’t fly today.” So in Germany, pilot training is constant. Aircrew training is constantly being interrupted by the war, by shortage of fuel, by inclement weather, et cetera, et cetera. In America, you have none of those problems. And Britain, because of its global reach also has training bases in what was Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe and South Africa, Canada as well. And so you are able to process these guys much better. James Holland (02:29:17): You’re able to give them more training, so that when they come, they are absolutely the finished article as pilots. Well, they’re not the finished article, as they say, a bomber pilot or as a fighter pilot. But that’s okay because you join your squadron of 40 other guys with 16 airborne, and the old hands kind of take you up a few times. So you arrive at, I don’t know, let’s say some airfield in Suffolk in East Anglia in England, and you’ll have 10 days to two weeks acclimatizing, getting used to it. The old hands will put you through your paces, give you some trips, tips. You can pick their brains while you’re having some chow and listening on some briefings. Then, the first mission you do will be a milk run over to France where the danger’s kind of pretty minimal and you can build up your experience, so that by the time you’re actually sent over on a mission to Berlin or Bremen or the Ruhr or whatever, you are absolutely in the business. James Holland (02:30:11): So qualitatively and quantitatively, you are just vastly superior to anything the Luftwaffe has got. The Luftwaffe by that stage, in contrast, 1940, new pilots coming to frontline squadrons with 150, 170 hours in their logbooks, less than a 100, 100, 90, 92 hours, something like that. It’s not enough. And they’re just being flung straight into battle and they’re getting absolutely slaughtered. And they’re also because their machines are quite complicated, there’s no two-seaters really, so no two-seater trainers. So the first time you’re flying in your Focke-Wulf 190 or your Messerschmitt-109, it’s this horrendous leap of faith for which you as a young, bright Luftwaffe fighter pilot know that you are not ready for this and it can bite you. And something like a Messerschmitt-109 has a very high wing loading, so it’s very maneuverable in the air, but it’s got its tiny wings. It’s got this incredible torque, this Daimler-Benz DB 605 engine with this huge amount of torque, and it just wants to flip you over. So if you’re not used to it, and it’s got a narrow undercarriage as well, if you’re not used to it, you could just crash. James Holland (02:31:18): So in the first couple of months of 1944, they lose something like 2,400 aircraft in the air and pilots and about 3,400 are accidents. Lex Fridman (02:31:30): So it has to do with training, really? James Holland (02:31:32): Yeah. Lex Fridman (02:31:33): Not training enough? James Holland (02:31:33): It’s training and resources and supply. And the Second World War, more than any other conflict is a war of numbers. There are differences, that decisions that generals can make. There are moments where particular brilliance and bravery can seize the day, take the bridge, hold the enemy at bay or whatever. But ultimately, you’re talking about differences, which might make a month’s difference, six months’ difference, maybe even several years’ difference. But ultimately, there’s a certain point in the Second World War where the outcome is absolutely inevitable because the guys that lose can’t compete with the numbers that the guys are going to win. Lex Fridman (02:32:18): So in that sense, you could think of World War II as a battle of factories? James Holland (02:32:25): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:32:26): What does it take to win in the battle of factories out manufacturing military equipment against the allies? James Holland (02:32:36): It’s efficiency really. So I always think, let’s take the example of the Sherman tank, for example, the mainstay of the Western Allied Forces and a fair number of them sent to the Soviet Union as well for that matter. Lex Fridman (02:32:48): I think you’ve said it doesn’t get the respect it deserves maybe. James Holland (02:32:52): It doesn’t get the respect it deserves. So the Sherman tank, the 75-mm main battle gun, which that’s medium velocity, can fire a shell around 2000 feet per second compared to the notorious infamous German 88 mm, which can fire at third fast again, like 3000 feet per second. But on paper, a Tiger tank coming around the corner and a Sherman tank coming around the corner, it should be no match at all. Tiger tank is 58 tons, looks scary, is scary, it’s got a massive gun, got really thick armor. Sherman tank doesn’t have as thick armor, doesn’t have a gun that’s as big. It should be an absolute walkover. And yet, at about 5:30 PM on Monday the 26th of June 1944, a Sherman tank came around the corner of a road called Rue Massue, a little village called Fontenay-le-Pesnel in Normandy, came face to face with a Tiger tank. And one, how does this happen? James Holland (02:33:47): Well, I’ll tell you how it happened because the commander of the Sherman tank was experienced, had one up the spout. So what I mean by that is he had an armor piercing round already in the breech. Soon as he saw the Tiger tank, he just said, “Fire.” That armor piercing round did not penetrate the Tiger tank, it was never going to. But what it did do is it hit the gun mantlet, which is a bit of reinforced steel that you have just as the barrel is entering the turret. And that caused spalling, which is the little shards of little bits of molten metal, which then hit the driver of the Tiger tank in the head. And he was screaming, gotten him or whatever, and he couldn’t really see. The moment they got hit, the commander of the Tiger tank retreated into the turret of the Tiger. The moment you retreat into a turret, you can’t see, you can see ’cause you’ve got periscopes, but your visibility is nothing like as good as it is when you’ve got your head above the turret. James Holland (02:34:42): Immediately after that, the armor piercing round from the Sherman tank was repeated by a number of high explosive rounds, which are rounds, which detonate, have a little minor charge, then there’s a second charge, which creates lots of smoke. And in moments, in the first 30 seconds, 10 rounds from that Sherman tank had hit the Tiger tank before the Tiger tank had unleashed a single round itself. The crew then surrendered. So you didn’t need to destroy the Tiger tank, you just need to stop it operating. If it hasn’t got a crew, it’s just a chunk of metal that’s inoperable. So that’s all you need to do. James Holland (02:35:18): And what that tells you is that experience counts, training counts. The agility of the Sherman tank also counts. It’s a smaller shelf, therefore it’s easy to manhandle, which means you can put more in a breach quicker. There’s features on a Sherman tank like it’s the first tank to have a gun stabilizing gyro, which means it’s more effective on the move. There’s also an override switch on the underside of the turret so that the commander, if he just sees something out of the corner of his eye, can immediately start moving the turret before the gunner, who is down in the belly of the turret, can react. There’s many different facts of it. But the main fact of all is of 1,347 Tigers built, there were 49,000 Shermans. So that means there’s 36 Shermans to every single Tiger. Lex Fridman (02:35:59): So you actually have an incredible video. You talk about this a lot from different angles about the top five tanks and then the bottom five tanks of World War II. I think, was it the Tiger that made both the top five and the bottom five? James Holland (02:36:13): The problem with the Tiger tank is really huge. Lex Fridman (02:36:15): We should say that you keep saying the problem, but one of the pros of the Tiger tank- James Holland (02:36:20): It’s very huge. Lex Fridman (02:36:21): … is the psychological warfare aspect of it is terrifying. James Holland (02:36:25): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:36:26): I don’t know what the other pros, I guess yeah, the 88 mm high velocity and all the rest of it- James Holland (02:36:32): It’s pretty fearsome, but there are pragmatic problems. The big problem is the Germans are incapable of mass production on a scale, but Americans could do. Frankly, even the British could do. They’re just not in that league. The reason they’re not in that league is because they’re in the middle of Europe. They don’t have access to the world’s oceans. They don’t have a merchant fleet, they can’t get this stuff. It hasn’t gone terribly well in the Soviet Union. They can’t process it, and they’re being bombed 24 hours a day. And so all their factories are, they’re having to split them all up and that is inherently inefficient because then having to move different parts around and you then having the whole process of having to travel from one place to another to get stuff, you haven’t got much fuel. James Holland (02:37:14): So the consequence of that is that what you do is you think, “Okay, well ,we can’t mass produce, so let’s make really brilliant tanks.” But they’ve lost sight of what a really brilliant is. Really brilliant to their eyes is big, scary, big gun, lots of armor. But actually what conflict in World War II shows you is that you need more than that. You need ease of maintenance, you need reliability. And the problem with having the bigger the tank, the more complex the maintenance equipment is, you need a bigger hoist, which then means you need a bigger truck, which then uses more fuel. So for example, the Tiger tank is so big that it doesn’t fit on the loading gauge of the European Railway system. So they have to have different tracks to roll onto the wagons that will then transport them from A to B, take them from West Germany to Normandy, then they have to take them off, then they have to take off the tracks, put on combat tracks, then move them into battle and hope that they don’t break down. James Holland (02:38:12): The problem is when you start the war, it’s not very automotive and you’ve only got 47 people for every motorized vehicle in Germany compared to three in the United States or eight in France, is that you’ve got lots of people who don’t know how to drive. And it also means you haven’t got lots of garages and mechanics and gas stations and so on. And so you are then creating an incredibly complex beast. But you want that complex thing to be as simple as you possibly can be. And that’s the beauty of the Sherman tank. All those guys in America, they’re used to driving stick cars. There’s three people for every automobile, and that includes the old and children, so almost every young man knows how to drive. And when you get into a Sherman tank, it’s got a clutch, it’s got a throttle. The brakes are the steering mechanism. The clutch is where you would expect the clutch to be. It’s got a manual shift. You put your foot on the clutch and you shove it into second gear and off you go or reverse or whatever. And it literally can be easier. James Holland (02:39:10): Anyone who can drive a stick car could drive a Sherman tank, seriously. Not everyone can drive a Tiger tank. It’s incredibly complex, really, really is. And that comes with a whole host of problems. And of course, you don’t have the numbers. You don’t have the numbers. You’ve got 1,347 of them, you’ve got 492 King Tigers, which are even bigger and at a time where you are really short of fuel and you are really short of absolutely everything. And those shells are huge and they’re harder to manhandle and weird little things that the Germans do, for all their design genius, the loader is always on the right-hand side. Now, in the 1920s and 19 teens and thirties, children were taught to be right-handed. You weren’t allowed to be left-handed, so you were right-handed. So you want to be on the left-hand side of the gun so you can take the shell from your right and swivel it into the breach from your right side. James Holland (02:40:05): But the loader in a Jagdpanther or Panther or a Tiger is always on the right-hand side of the breach, which ergonomically makes no sense whatsoever. Why do they do this? I’ve never found an answer to this. So there’s all these little things, and as a soldier coming up against, you are an American GI and you’re coming up against a Tiger tank, you don’t care about the fact that it’s difficult to maintain or the problems involved of trying to get it to the battlefield. All you care about is this monster coming in front of you, it’s squeaking and clanking away, and it’s incredibly scary and it’s about to blow you to bits. That’s all you care about and quite understandably so. James Holland (02:40:41): But those who are protracting the war at a higher level and historians that come subsequently and look at all this stuff, they do need to worry about all these things. I remember the same Georg Thomas, the architect of the Hunger Plan, I found there’s minutes of this meeting, which I think was either on the 4th of December or the 5th of December 1941, so it’s just before the Red Army counterattacks outside Moscow in the winter of 1941. And it’s a meeting about weaponry, and this is a verbatim quote. He says, “We have to stop making such complete unaesthetic weapons.” In other words, we’ve constantly building over-engineered and aesthetically-pleasing weapons up until this point and they sort of half manage it, but don’t quite. Lex Fridman (02:41:31): We could probably talk for many hours about each of these topics. We could talk for 10 hours about tanks. I encourage people to listen to your podcast, World War II Pod, We Have Ways of Making You Talk. It’s great. James Holland (02:41:47): Yeah, we also do, we got a new YouTube channel and website called World War II Headquarters. There are lots of walking the ground and videos of that and all sorts of stuff and little explainers of going around tanks and stuff and the weaponry and documents and photographic archives. So the idea is to turn it into a real hub of anyone who’s interested in this subject. It’s a place where they can go and find out just a whole load more. Lex Fridman (02:42:17): I love it. So like I said, we could probably talk for many hours at each of these topics, but let’s look at some of the battles and maybe you can tell me which jumps out at you. I want to talk to you about the Western Front and definitely talk about Normandy. So there’s the Battle of Midway in 1942, which is a naval battle. There’s Eastern Front Stalingrad, probably the deadliest battle in human history. Then there’s the Battle of Kursk, which is a tank battle, the largest tank battle in history, probably the largest battle period in history, 6,000 tanks, 2 million troops, 4,000 aircraft. And then that takes us also to the Battle of the Bulge in Normandy, the Italian Campaign that you talk a lot about. So what do you think is interesting to try to extract some wisdom before we get to Normandy? Do you find, as a historian, the Battle of Kursk or the Battle of Stalingrad more interesting? Stalingrad is often seen as the turning point. James Holland (02:43:23): Well, yeah, I think so. It’s really interesting. So they get through in 1941, Barbarossa doesn’t happen as the Germans hope it will. The whole point is to completely destroy the Red Army in three months and that just doesn’t happen. And I think you can argue and argue convincingly that by, let’s say, beginning of December 1941, Germany is just not going to win, it just can’t. And let me tell you what I mean by that. So if you take an arbitrary date, let’s say the 15th of June 1941, Germany at that moment has one enemy, which is Great Britain, albeit Great Britain plus Dominion Empire. Fast-forward six months to let’s say the 16th of December, it’s got three enemies. It’s got Great Britain, Dominion Empire, USSR, and the USA. It is just not going to win. For all the talks of wonder weapons and all the rest, it’s just not going to, it has lost that battle. James Holland (02:44:24): Having said that, Soviet Union is still in a really, really bad situation. It is being helped out a huge amount by supplies from the United States and from Britain, just unprecedented amounts of material being sent through the Arctic or across Alaska into the Soviet Union at that time. It is absolutely staggering how much is committed by Roosevelt and Churchill to try and stem the flow in the Soviet Union because for all the announcements and pride that the Soviet Union has about moving factories to the other side of the Urals and stuff, which they do in 1941, huge amounts are overrun intact by the Germans in the opening stages of Barbarossa, really colossal losses, huge amounts. So the grain is gone, coal is gone, entire factories have gone. Steel production goes down by 80% in the Soviet Union in 1941 and in 1942. So in 1942, despite the vast amount of numbers of men that they have at their hands, they create 80 new divisions in the second half of 1941, for example. Britain never has 80 divisions in the entire Second World War, division being about, rule of thumb, 15,000 men. James Holland (02:45:42): So despite that, and that is because Stalin’s meddling, the woeful state of the Red Army in 1941, et cetera, et cetera, which we’ve already sort of touched upon. So 1942, it’s still in a really bad way, but Germany’s in a really bad way too. The attrition it suffered in 1941, it’s winning itself to death in 1941. So it’s having these huge great encirclements, like the encirclement of Kiev in September 1941, capturing the further best part of 700,000 Red Army troops, et cetera, et cetera. But in the process of doing that, it is constantly being attrited, both in battle casualties but in also mechanical casualties too, just can’t cope. The scale is just too big. James Holland (02:46:27): What happens is with every moment that the German forces, that ultimate victory slips away. So Hitler’s personal handling of the battle increases. And [inaudible 02:46:41] like about him, but he just hasn’t had the military training to do that. He might have amazing attention to detail, he might be able to understand, have an enormous capacity to remember units and where they are on a map, but he was only a half corporal in the First World war. He’s never been to staff college. He might have read lots about Frederick, the Great, I’ve read lots of history, but that doesn’t mean to say I’d be a competent field marshal. So he is not the right person for the job at all. And he micromanages and he looks at statistics and figures and doesn’t understand what it’s like at the actual front, the coal phase. So he’s stifling the very thing that made the German army effective, which is the ability to give commanders at the front the freedom on their leash to be able to make decisions and battle command decisions, and he’s taken that away from them. James Holland (02:47:30): So he’s basically making them go into battle with decreasing amounts of supplies and firepower and with one hand behind their back in terms of decision-making process. And that is not a good combination. The other problem is that he decides rather than going from Moscow in 1942, ’cause basically there’s a cooling off period in the winter because of the conditions, but everyone knows, the Soviet Union know, the Red Army knows that the moment spring comes, there’s going to be another offensive, another major offensive in the summer, that is absolutely as certain as day following night, et cetera. The problem that the Germans have is they just don’t have enough. They have less than they had when they launched Barbarossa the previous year. The Soviet Union has more, it’s better prepared, it knows what’s coming now. It’s kind of learning some of the lessons, starting to absorb the lessons. Stalin coincidentally is pulling back from his very tight leash in the way that Hitler is doing the opposite and increasing his micromanagement and control freak-ery. James Holland (02:48:29): What Hitler decides is rather than going for Moscow, he’s going to go for the oilfields. This is absolutely insane because what’s going to happen when they get to the oilfields? Does he think really that the Soviet Union are going to let those oilfields come into German hands intact? Even if he does let them get in intact, what are they going to do with that oil? Oil needs to be refined. Where are you going to refine it? They don’t have many oil refineries. How are you going to ship that oil to where you need it to be in the factories in the Third Reich and into your process into gasoline and then get it to diesel and get it to your U-boats, get it to your tanks, get it to your armored units. How are you going to do that? How do you transport it from the Caucasus, which is a long, long way away from Berlin, how are you going to do that? James Holland (02:49:20): There’s no pipelines. There’s only some pipelines that have been built by American money and American engineering, and they’re going backwards towards the Urals, not forwards. They have no more rail capacity whatsoever. They just don’t have the oil tankers. So it’s absolute la-la land. It is incredible that when you look at the detailed literature that the Germans have, no one is asking this question in the spring and early summer of 1942. Lex Fridman (02:49:46): The logistics question in part? James Holland (02:49:48): No one is saying, “Okay, it’s great that we’re going to go to the Caucasus and get all this oil, but then what?” No one is asking that question. Lex Fridman (02:49:55): Nor how do you provide resources and feed the soldiers and all that kind of stuff? I mean, it’s… James Holland (02:50:00): So the Case Blue, first of all, they get distracted by going into Crimea and they go, “Well, we’ve got to do that first.” So they have to get Sevastopol and the Crimea, which they do, and then they have to push on, and at this point, suddenly looming in front of them is Stalingrad on the banks of the Volga, this city, this industrial city, which has Stalin’s name. And Hitler goes, “Okay, what I’m going to do now is I’m going to split my forces. So half of you can go south towards the Caucasus and the rest of you can confront Stalingrad,” and von Bock who’s the commander, just goes, “That’s nuts. That makes no sense whatsoever. You are splitting the mission.” So Hitler fires him. So suddenly they get into this assault for Stalingrad and it becomes this sort of street fight. Street fighting is the worst kind of fighting. The reason why the Israelis have just blown everything up in Gaza is because otherwise you can’t see, you need a field of fire. This is fighting in a buildup area, it’s horrendous. Lex Fridman (02:51:01): To clarify, we were talking about urban warfare, door-to-door, building-to-building. James Holland (02:51:05): It’s incredibly difficult, and home advantage is colossal, in this instance. And of course, it’s piping hot when they attack in kind of August into early September, and then it suddenly gets very, very cold. And at the same time, American mechanization and slightly a British mechanization, but primarily American trucks are enabling Zhukov to plan this great pincer movement. And Russians will hate me for saying this, and I probably will get a whole load of bots on the back of it, but the truth is, it is not the street fighting that destroys Sixth Army, it is the encirclement, the subsequent encirclement. James Holland (02:51:45): So the Germans have been sucked into this street battle in Stalingrad, cannot give up. We cannot give up, we cannot back down, we cannot pull out. We’ve got to destroy this city. Meanwhile, while their backs are turned, and while most of their forces are going off to the Caucasus on a wild goose chase for absolutely zero oil incidentally, and they never get remotely close to Baku, this huge pincer movement is being planned and it is only possible through mechanization from the United States. And that is the big turning point because from that moment onwards, the Germans are on the back foot. They’re basically going backwards. There are little small counterattacks, there is obviously the Kursk Salient, for example, but it’s game over. The catastrophe of the surrender of, the final surrender, the writing’s on the wall at the end of 1942, by November 1942. When the two Soviet fronts meet up, then there is no possible chance of escape for Sixth Army and they are consigned, they are toast. James Holland (02:52:53): And their final surrender, obviously, happens at the very beginning of February 1943. But that’s all over. And then, at the same time that that is happening, disaster is unfolding in North Africa because Hitler has insisted on massively resupplying the Mediterranean Theater. And the problem there is the amount of equipment that is lost in North Africa is greater than it is at Stalingrad. I don’t think you could argue that psychologically Tunisia is a greater loss than Stalingrad. It absolutely isn’t. But you have to see them in tandem, as this is two fronts. This is Eastern Front, Southern Western front, and this is the first time that the Americans have been on the ground against Axis forces, and they lose big time. James Holland (02:53:35): The allies become masters of the North African shores on the 13th of May 1943, and it is a catastrophe. And in that time, 2,700 aircraft have been, Luftwaffe aircraft have been destroyed over North Africa between November 1942 and May 1943. And overall, the subsequent summer as well, it’s really interesting, the Luftwaffe lose, between June and October 1943, so this is including the Kursk Battle, which that takes place in July 1943, in that period, the Luftwaffe loses 702 aircraft over the Eastern Front, but 3,704 aircraft over the Mediterranean. James Holland (02:54:13): So I think one has to also, one of the lessons about studying the Second World War is one has to be careful not to assign strategic importance to boots on the ground. It can be of great strategic importance, but not necessarily. No one would argue, for example, that the Guadalcanal is not an absolutely game-changing battle in the Pacific War, and yet the number of troops compared to what’s going on in the Eastern Front or even the Western Front is tiny in comparison. So it is absolutely true that the most German blood is lost on the Eastern Front, but that doesn’t mean to say that it’s more strategically important in the Western Front, and it’s not saying that the Western Front is more strategic either. It’s just you have to be balanced about this. The psychological blow-over for Stalingrad is immense, and you cannot belittle that. Lex Fridman (02:55:02): I mean, there’s the… James Holland (02:55:00): It’s immense, and you cannot belittle that. Lex Fridman (02:55:02): I mean, we went over it really fast, but there is a human drama element. James Holland (02:55:08): Yes, yes. Lex Fridman (02:55:09): When we were talking about the operational side, the material loss of a battle is also extremely important to the big picture of the war. And we often don’t talk about that because, of course, with war, the thing to focus on is the human drama of it- James Holland (02:55:25): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:55:27): … because we’re humans. James Holland (02:55:28): I also think that what’s interesting is the Nazi High Command’s response to Stalingrad, which is not to go, “We’re screwed.” It’s to double down. Then so Goebbels, for example, gives his infamous speech in the Sportpalast in third week of February in 1943, where he goes, “Are you ready for this? This is now total war. The war is coming. This is a fight for survival. We’re all in it together. You are in this as well, every single one, every single German is now. This is a fight for survival and we are now in total war.” James Holland (02:56:02): And everyone is just so depressed by this. I mean, they realize that they are going to reap what they have sown. Because everyone knows what’s been going on in the Eastern Front. Because first part of the war, Germans have loads and loads of cameras. They’re really into photographing everything, taking cine footage of everything, still part of the recording the greatness of the Reich and the triumphs of the Reich. They want it recorded. James Holland (02:56:26): So all this stuff is a bit like the radios, is made very, very cheap, so lots of them have it, and people are sending it all back. And the people that are developing this stuff are all seeing it, and people are talking about it, and then it’s being sent to families, and they’re all seeing it. And they’re seeing pictures of Jews being rounded up and beaten, and they’re seeing Ukrainian partisans being executed. And they’re seeing villages being torched. And everyone knows. They all know. James Holland (02:56:55): This whole idea is do they really know what was going on? Yeah, they do. They do know what’s going on, to lesser or greater detail, of course. There’s some people who don’t. And a bit like people know about the news today, some people do, some people don’t. “Oh, I never read the newspaper. I never listen to the news.” So you have that, of course. But it is widely understood and widely known that really brutal things have been going on in the east. And troops are coming back utterly traumatized by what they have taken part in, what they have witnessed, the kind of unspeakable brutality. This is war on a completely different level to anything that’s been seen in recent years. Lex Fridman (02:57:35): Yeah, we should mention that the Western Front and the Eastern Front are very different in this regard. James Holland (02:57:40): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:57:41): So a lot of the Holocaust by bullets, the Holocaust with the concentration camps and the extermination camps is not in Germany, is not in the Western Front. It’s in Poland, it’s in the Soviet Union. James Holland (02:57:54): Yeah, but don’t forget that even Auschwitz, for example, is part of the New Reich. It is part of an area which has been absorbed into Germany. So as far as they’re concerned, it’s now no longer got the Polish name. It’s now called Auschwitz, which is a German name. It is part of Germany. And there are German people moving there into this, air comma, model town, and they all know exactly what’s going on. Lex Fridman (02:58:18): Yeah. You, by the way, have a nice podcast series of four episodes on Auschwitz, the evolution of the dream world town that becomes a camp, a work camp, then becomes an extermination camp. James Holland (02:58:35): On a big boon of factory for IG Farben, which never produces a single bit of rubber. Lex Fridman (02:58:41): So, this for sure is something I would have to dive deep in. There’s a book you recommended, KL. James Holland (02:58:50): Yes, it’s just called KL. It’s about the whole concentration camp system, because K is Konzentration, in German. Lager is a camp. It’s an exhaustive book, and I am full of admiration for him for writing it, just because, jeepers, it must have been so… I mean, I was very depressed doing that work on Auschwitz, that deep dive. I just found the whole thing utterly dispiriting. And I’ve been there a few times, and it’s ghastly. So, how he wrote a whole book on it, I don’t know. Lex Fridman (02:59:21): I think in the details, there’s two ways, I think, to look at the Holocaust. One is Man’s Search For Meaning, but Viktor Frankl, this philosophical thing about how a human being can confront that and find meaning. And what does the human condition look like in the context of such evil? Lex Fridman (02:59:45): And then there is the more sort of detailed, okay, well how do you actually implement something like the Final Solution? So, you have this ideology of evil implemented. James Holland (02:59:59): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:59:59): And at the fine detail of, what are the different technologies used? What are the different humans and the hierarchy of humans at a camp? What’s the actual experience of the individual person who shows up at a camp? Just get into the details, and in those details, I think there’s some deep profound human truth that can emerge. The mundane one step at a time is how you can achieve evil, and you can get lost in the mundane. James Holland (03:00:33): Yes, the banality of evil, it’s incredible. I think what is so completely horrific is that half the 6 million were killed by bullets to the back of the head. And the reason they stopped doing that and they wanted to stop doing that was because the guys, the perpetrators were finding it so traumatic. James Holland (03:00:55): Himmler goes and visits an execution in Ukraine, or maybe it’s in the Baltic states, I can’t remember where he goes, but he witnessed some in the summer of 1941. He thinks, “Oh, that’s horrible. They don’t have to do that. I don’t want my men having to do that. Got to find a more humane way of doing it.” When he’s talk about a more humane way of doing it, humane for the executioners, not for the victims. James Holland (03:01:16): Because, trust me, Zyklon B is not a nice way to go. Basically, it’s bursting all the capillaries in your lungs. It’s extremely painful, and you can no longer breathe. And it can take up to 20, 25 minutes. Some people, it can take a couple of minutes. James Holland (03:01:32): But all of those who are standing naked in that gas chamber, first of all, extremely humiliated by this process in the first place. Then there’s a sudden realization of that they’re not having a shower. They’re actually being gassed, and they’re all going to die. James Holland (03:01:46): Imagine what you’re thinking as that processes you, because you might be the first, but you’re still going to… Even the first person is going to know that, “I can’t breathe, and I’m dying.” Everyone else is going to see the first few dying, and then going to realize that is what’s going to happen to them. And you’ve got those minutes, sometimes many minutes, where you’ve got to contemplate that, and that’s in extreme pain and panic. And just think about how cruel that is. Lex Fridman (03:02:14): While being humiliated all the way through. James Holland (03:02:17): While being humiliated all the way through. James Holland (03:02:19): So the, inverted commas, humanity of the gas chambers is anything but. It’s disgusting. And the fact that people could do this is just beyond terrific. And then the fact that you are taking your Jewish prisoners and getting them to cut off all the hair, pull out the teeth of the dead before you put them on a lift and incinerate them. If you go to Auschwitz now, and you go to the collapse of the blown up gas chambers, which the Germans destroyed before the Russians overran them, in January ’45, you can still see some of the ash ponds, and there are bits of bone. Yeah, they’re still there, from the ash. It is utterly repulsive. James Holland (03:03:02): And imagine arriving from that train on that incredibly long journey, where you’ve had no comforts whatsoever. Again, you’ve had humiliations and privation, the privations you’ve had to suffer as a result of that, of having to defecate in a bucket in the corner in front of other people. It was just horrendous. James Holland (03:03:18): And then you get there bewildered, and immediately your kids are taken away from you. Or your husband and wife who’ve been married 20 years, they’re separated just like that, sent off into different groups, straight to the gas chambers. I mean, the scale of cruelty is so immense. It’s hard to fathom. James Holland (03:03:35): And the thing that I find really difficult to reconcile, and this is where I think the warning from history is important, is that Germany is such an amazing nation. It’s the country of Beethoven and Strauss and of Goethe, and incredible art and culture and some of the greatest engineers and scientists have ever lived. And look how quickly it flipped into the descent of unspeakable inhumanity, which manifested itself in the Holocaust and the gas chambers and those executions into pits and tiny places and creeks in Lithuania or Ukraine or whatever. I mean, it’s just horrendous. And this is from a nation which, a decade earlier, had been a democracy. Lex Fridman (03:04:29): It seems like, as a human civilization, we walk that Solzhenitsyn line between good and evil, and it’s a thin line, and we have to walk it carefully. James Holland (03:04:39): Yes. Lex Fridman (03:04:41): One of the great battles in World War II on the Western Front is Normandy. I have to talk to you about Normandy, James Holland (03:04:52): Have to talk about it. Lex Fridman (03:04:53): D-Day, the Normandy landings, the famous on June 6th, 1944. This was a Allied invasion of Nazi occupied Western Europe. James Holland (03:05:03): Yep. Lex Fridman (03:05:03): What was the planning? And it was lengthy planning. What was the planning? What was the execution of the Normandy landings? James Holland (03:05:09): Well, the decision to finally go in… That when the Americans joined the war in December 1941, there’s the Arcadia Conference a few days later, a week later, between the British chiefs of staff and political leaders and Churchill and Roosevelt and his own chiefs of staff, about what the policy should be. And the policy is to get American troops over to Europe as quickly as possible, get them over to Britain, get them training and get them across the channel ASAP and start the liberation of Europe. James Holland (03:05:38): The reality is that, in 1942, the Americans just aren’t ready. They’ve gone from this incredibly tiny army. They’re still growing. They’ve got no battlefield experience. The British are still recovering. They’re good on the naval power. They’re increasingly good on air power, but land power they’ve had to make up from the loss of their ally, France, and expand as well. James Holland (03:05:59): So, ground zero for both America and Britain has been kind of June 1940, when France is out, and suddenly that’s the strategic earthquake, and that’s the issue that needs settling. And they need to just completely realign everything that they’d thought in 1939. They’ve got to start again. James Holland (03:06:17): But it’s also becomes clear that it’s they’re not really ready in 1943 either. One of the problems is that Molotov, who is the Soviet foreign minister, has come over to Britain, in May 1942, and said, “We need you to do your bit and get on the campaign trail against the Germans and fight on the ground.” And the British were going, “Well, yeah, but cross-channel invasion is not really going to happen. We know we’re doing that in North Africa at the moment.” James Holland (03:06:39): Then he goes over to Washington, and the Americans go, “We are definitely going to go and take on the attack to the Germans in 1942.” They’ve made this promise. So the summer of 1942, it becomes clear that they can’t keep that. So Churchill says, “Well, look, here’s an idea. We’ve already got an army in Egypt. Why don’t we land another one in Northwest Africa. That’s run by Vichy France, which is pro-Axis French colonies. Why don’t we take that? We can do that, and then we can meet in the middle. We can pence around. We can conquer the whole of North Africa. You can kill two birds with one stone. It’s because you can get some experience fighting against Axis troops, test some of your equipment and commanders. What’s not to like? And then we can see how it goes.” So, this is a opportunistic strategy. James Holland (03:07:24): Whereas the Americans are very much, “We want to draw a straight line to Berlin, and that’s the quickest way. Let’s do it that way.” So it’s a different viewpoint, but Roosevelt gets that and agrees to that. So, that’s where the whole North Africa-Mediterranean campaign comes from. James Holland (03:07:39): And as a consequence of the huge commitment to Tunisia, three and a half thousand aircraft, huge navies, two Allied armies in North Africa. By the time Tunisia is won in mid-May 1943, they think, “Well, we’ve got all this here. We might as well really try and put the nail into the coffin of Italy’s war, get them out of the battle. Sicily is an obvious one. Let’s go in there, and then we can take a view.” James Holland (03:08:01): But between Sicily happening and the fall of North Africa is the Trident Conference in Washington, and that is where the decisions made. The Americans go, “Okay, enough of this opportunistic stuff. Okay, we get it, we buy it, but no more faffing around. May 1944, one year, hence, we are going to cross the Atlantic.” And the British go, “Okay, fair cop. We’ll do that.” So, that is where Operation Overlord, as it becomes, gets given its code name, its operational name. That’s when the planning starts. James Holland (03:08:32): Serious planning starts at the beginning of 1944. One of the lessons from Sicily to Normandy is that you can’t have commanders fighting one battle whilst preparing for the next one. You have to have a separate command structure. And that’s okay because, by this time, we’ve got enough people that have got experience with battlefield command that you can actually split it. There are very good reasons for going into Italy, not least getting the Foggia airfields so that you can further tighten the noose around Nazi Germany. James Holland (03:09:00): And one of the great prerequisites for the Normandy invasion is total control of the airspace, not just over Normandy, but over a large swathe of Northwest Europe. Why is that? Because the moment you land in Normandy, the cat is out of the bag, and it’s then a race between which side can build up men and material quickest. Is it going to be the Allies, who’ve got to come from Southern England, which is a distance of a slow journey across seas, and a distance between 80 and 130 miles away, or is it going to be the Germans that are already on the continent? Well, clearly, on paper, it’s the Germans, so you have to slow up the Germans. James Holland (03:09:36): Well, how do you do that? Well, you do that by destroying their means of getting there, so bridges. Destroy all the bridges over the Seine. Destroy all the bridges over the Loire hit the marshalling yards. The glue that keeps the German war machine together is the Reichsbahn, the German railway network. So destroy the railway as much as you possibly can and make it difficult for the Germans to reinforce the Normandy British head, as and when it comes. But the way you do that, in turn, is by very low-level precision bombing. And that has to be done by twin engine, faster, smaller bombers going in low. But the problem is you can’t go low and destroy those bridges if you’ve got Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts hovering above you. So you’ve got to destroy those, which is why you need to have air superiority over this large swathe of Northwest Europe to do that. James Holland (03:10:21): The problem is that while the industrial heartland of Nazi Germany is in the west, is in the Ruhr area, which is very convenient for bombers coming out of Lincolnshire or East Anglia on the east flats, east side of Great Britain, the aircraft industry is much deeper into the Reich, and it is beyond the range of fighter escorts for the bombers. James Holland (03:10:42): And the American daylight bombers who are going over are discovering that, despite being called flying fortresses, they’re not fortresses. They’re actually getting decimated. And whenever their bombers go in strength over to try and hit the aircraft industry in Germany beyond fighter range, they get decimated, first, infamously, on the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid on the 17th of August 1943, coincidentally the same day that Sicily falls to the Allies, and also coincidentally the same day that face-to-face negotiations begin with the Italians for an armistice, in Lisbon. James Holland (03:11:13): But on that day of the 324 heavy bombers that the Americans send over to hit Schweinfurt and Regensburg, where there are a Messerschmitt plant and also a ball bearing plant, which is essential for aircraft manufacturing, they lose 60, shot down, and a further 130 odd, really, really badly damaged. And even for the vast numbers of manpower and bombers that are coming out of America, this is too much, so they can’t sustain it. So, they’ve got to find a fighter escort that’s going to be able to escort them all the way into the Reich. James Holland (03:11:43): And the race is on because, basically, if they haven’t got one airspace by April 1944, it’s game over. You can’t do a cross-channel invasion. You have to have that control of the airspace beforehand. So the race is on. And fortunately, they come up with a solution which is the P-51 Mustang, which has originally been commissioned in May 1940 by the British, developed from sketches to reality in 117 days. It’s a work of absolute genius. James Holland (03:12:07): But to start off, it’s harnessed with a really bad engine. The Allison engine is just not right for that aircraft. And it’s not until a Rolls-Royce Merlin, which is the same one that powers the Lancaster, the Mosquito, and the Spitfire and Hurricane, is put into the P-51 Mustang, that suddenly you’ve got your solution because that means it can now fly with extra drop tanks and fuel tanks. It’s so aerodynamic, and it’s so good, the higher it goes with this engine, the more fuel efficient it becomes. It can actually fly over 1400 miles, which gets you not just to Berlin and back, but to Warsaw and back. So, suddenly you’ve got that solution. James Holland (03:12:39): And actually, by April 1944, they have cleared airspace. And by the end of May 1944, just on the eve of the invasion, Operation Overlord, the closest German aircraft that is seen fighting Allied aircraft is 500 miles from the beachhead. Lex Fridman (03:12:55): Wow. James Holland (03:12:55): So it is absolutely job done. Meanwhile, comparatively new ground attack fighter planes, like Typhoons and Tempests and adapted P-47 Thunderbolts, are attacking the German radar stations all along the coastline because they, now, do have an air defense system. They’re destroying 90% of their effectiveness. James Holland (03:13:18): And in the intelligence game, they’re winning that one as well. They’re just much better because, in Germany, intelligence is power, so people tend to… And Hitler always has this kind of divide and rule thing going on, so you have parallel command structures, which is not conducive to bringing together of intelligence. James Holland (03:13:33): And while much play has been made about the successes of Bletchley and code-breaking and all the rest of it, actually what you have to do is you have to see the decrypts that the Bletchley cryptanalysts do as just a cog. And those various cogs together, from listening services to photo reconnaissance to agents on the ground to [inaudible 03:13:52], the cogs collectively add up to more than some of their individual parts. And so the intelligence picture is a broad picture rather than just code-breaking. But anyway, they win that particular battle as well. James Holland (03:14:03): And what you see, really, with D-Day, I think, is the zenith of coalition warfare. What you’ve got is you’ve got multiple nations who have different overall aims, different cultures, different attitudes, different start points, but they have all coalesced into one common goal. And until they’ve achieved that common goal, they’re going to put differences to one side. Much play has been made about Anglophobia amongst American commanders and America phobia amongst Ally British commanders, but actually it’s nothing. It’s a marriage made in heaven compared to the way Germany looks after its own allies, for example. James Holland (03:14:40): And what is remarkable about the Allies is they’re not actually allies, they’re coalition partners. So, there’s no formal alliance at all, and there is a subtle difference there. But what you see them is that you see them really, really pulling together. And you see that manifest itself on D-Day, I think, where you’ve got 6,939 vessels of which there are 1,213 warships, 4,127 assault craft, 12 and a half thousand aircraft, 155,000 men landed and dropped from the air in 24-hour period. It is phenomenal. It is absolutely phenomenal. James Holland (03:15:22): And while it is still seen as a predominantly American show, all three service commanders are British. Two-thirds of the aircraft are British. Two-thirds of the men landed are British and Dominion. James Holland (03:15:35): You never forget the Canadians who consistently punch massively above their weight in the Second World War, in all aspects, it has to be said, air, land and sea. They’re key in the Battle of the Atlantic. They’re key in air power. Their key D-Day and, indeed, in the battle for Italy, as well. So, the Canadians should never be forgotten. James Holland (03:15:55): But one of the reasons it is the British Navy that dominates in D-Day is because, of course, the incredibly enormous strength of the Royal Navy in the first place, but partly because most of the U.S. Navy is, by this stage, in the Pacific fighting its own fight. So, it’s not slacking by any stretch of the imagination. It is because it’s elsewhere doing its bit for the overall allied cause. James Holland (03:16:18): But D-Day is just extraordinary, and despite the terrible weather, which is such a debilitating factor in the whole thing. I mean, it puts people off course. It means many more people get killed on Omaha Beach than they might have done, and on other beaches besides, incidentally. And actually, in terms of lies lost, proportionally, it is the Canadians that suffer the worst, more so than the Americans. It’s just it’s fewer of them, overall. James Holland (03:16:43): D-Day has to be seen as an unqualified success. I mean, it is absolutely extraordinary what they achieve. And while they don’t 100% achieve their overall D-Day objectives, the objectives are always going to be the outer reach of what can be achieved, and you’d need absolutely perfect conditions for that to happen. And they don’t get perfect conditions, but they’re so balanced, they’ve so thought of absolutely everything, and their logistics apply. James Holland (03:17:09): I mean, even things like the minesweeping operations, it’s the biggest single minesweeping operation of the entire war because there’s huge minefields off the Normandy coast. And ahead of the invasion force, the minesweepers, which amount to, I think, something like 242 different minesweepers in five different operations opposite every single beach, creating lanes through these minefields through which the invasion force can go, not a single ship is lost to a mine in the actual invasion. That is phenomenal and can only be done with the greatest of skill and planning, and all in a period where there are no computers. There’s no GPS. There’s nothing. I mean, it is absolutely astonishing, and the scale of it is just, frankly, mind-boggling. Lex Fridman (03:17:50): Yeah, and that was really the nail in the coffin, the beginning of the end for Hitler, now, for the European theater. James Holland (03:18:00): Yeah, once you get the… The only cause for doubt is, will they be able to secure that bridgehead? The moment they get that bridgehead, it is game over. There is no other way it’s going to be because of the overwhelming amount of men and material that the Allies have compared to the Germans at this stage of the war. And, of course, you’re being attacked on three fronts because there’s the Italian front to the south, and of course, in a very major way, you’ve also got the Eastern Front. And Operation Bagration, which is launched that summer as well, is enormous. Lex Fridman (03:18:33): Let’s go to the very end, the Battle of Berlin, Hitler sitting in his bunker, his suicide, Germany surrender. You actually said that Downfall, the movie, was a very accurate representation. James Holland (03:18:49): I think it is, really, except that Goebbels took cyanide, didn’t shoot himself. Lex Fridman (03:18:53): Oh, details, but I think it’s probably… It might be my favorite World War II movie, which is strange to say because it’s not really about World War II. It’s about Hitler in a bunker, but… James Holland (03:19:06): What was his name? Bruno Ganz, wasn’t it? I think he nailed him. Lex Fridman (03:19:12): Yeah. James Holland (03:19:13): There’s so many accounts of that. There’s so much written about Hitler. There’s millions and millions of Hitler’s words that you can read. There are translations of many of his conferences. You can see what he’s saying. You can get inside his head in a very clear way, and much more clearly than you can Stalin or just about any other leader really. So, what has a very, very strong impression of what Hitler was like in the bunker in those last days. There’s so many accounts of it, and it just feels like they nailed it. It just feels like they’ve got it spot on, to me. Lex Fridman (03:19:54): I mean, it’s a fascinating story of a evil maniac, and then in this certainty, crumbling, realizing that this vision of the thousand-year Reich is… James Holland (03:20:11): And Hitler says, “My reputation won’t be good to start off with, but I hope in a few years time that people start to realize that kind of all the good I was trying to bring.” Lex Fridman (03:20:18): Yeah. James Holland (03:20:19): And that sort of… Lex Fridman (03:20:20): They’re all the same, aren’t they? You always believe you’re doing good. James Holland (03:20:20): Yep. Lex Fridman (03:20:24): And there’s so many deep lessons there. So, now, you have written so much. You have said so much. You have studied this so much. What to you, looking at World War II, is the lessons we should take away? James Holland (03:20:41): Well, I suppose it’s what happens when you allow these individuals to take hold of great power and great authority and make these terrible decisions. If you allow that to happen, there are consequences. You have to recognize the moments of trouble when they arise. So when there are financial crisis, you know that political unrest is going to come, and you need to be prepared for that. You need to be able to see the writing on the wall. James Holland (03:21:12): You can’t be complacent. Complacency is such a dirty word, isn’t it? You’ve got to keep your wits, and you can’t take things for granted. You’ve got to recognize, I think, that the freedoms we enjoy in the West are… They’re not necessarily permanent, and you need to make the most of them, while you’ve got them, and cherish them and consider what happens if the milk turns sour and what the consequences of that are. I mean, that’s the overriding theme. James Holland (03:21:46): Because, although I don’t think there will ever be a war on the scale of the Second World War, you’ve only got to look at pictures of those opening days of the war in Ukraine and see knocked out Russian tanks and dead bodies, bloated bodies all over the place. Put that into black and white, and it could be the road out of Falaise in 1944. It could be any number of German battlefields in World War II. And the similarities in the trenches and the people hiding in foxholes, that’s horribly reminiscent, as are the huge casualties that they’re suffering on both sides, whether they be Russian or Ukrainian. James Holland (03:22:24): And it’s a shock. It’s a shock to see that. It reminds you of just how quickly, I think, things can descend. I mean, that’s the other thing. That point I was making about how quickly Germany descended from this amazing nation of arts and culture and science and development and engineering into one of the Holocaust. I mean, life is fragile, and peace is fragile, and you take it for granted at your peril. Lex Fridman (03:22:57): And you take for granted, at our peril, that nobody will use nuclear weapons ever again. And that’s not a thing we should take for granted. James Holland (03:23:08): No, sir. Lex Fridman (03:23:09): What gives you hope about the future of human civilization? We’ve been talking about all this darkness in the 20th century. What’s the source of light? James Holland (03:23:20): The source of light is that I think the vast majority of people are good people, who want to live peacefully, and want to live happily, and are not filled with hate. There are some brilliant minds out there, and I think the capacity for the human brain to come up with new developments and new answers to problems and challenges is infinite. I think that’s what gives me hope. Lex Fridman (03:23:50): James, I’m a big fan. This was an honor to talk to you, and please keep putting incredible history out there. I can’t wait to see what you do next. Thank you so much for talking today. James Holland (03:24:02): Well, thank you, Lex. It’s a privilege to talk to you. Lex Fridman (03:24:06): Thanks for listening to this conversation with James Holland. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description or at lexfridman.com/sponsors. Lex Fridman (03:24:15): And now, let me leave you some words from Winston Churchill. “If you’re going through hell, keep going.” Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

本集资源与出处