How Sudan Became a Laboratory for Drone Warfare, Thanks to Abu Dhabi
In June 2026, I visited Khartoum, my hometown, for the first time since the war broke out in Sudan in April 2023.
2026年6月，我自2023年4月苏丹爆发战争以来首次访问家乡喀土穆。
I left the city to seek safety with my family after the war spread into civilian neighborhoods.
战争蔓延到平民社区后，我离开这座城市与家人一起寻求安全。
I never imagined I would return to the same city.
我从未想过我会回到同一个城市。
I was very excited but also traumatized by the destruction I saw as the plane landed at Khartoum International Airport.
当飞机降落在喀土穆国际机场时，我非常兴奋，但也因看到的破坏而受到创伤。
The airport was busy, with many Sudanese returning after commercial flights resumed in May 2026.
2026 年 5 月商业航班恢复后，机场非常繁忙，许多苏丹人回国。
But the growing drone warfare that is spreading over Sudan threatens the return of hopeful Sudanese to their homes and normal life.
但苏丹上空日益猖獗的无人机战威胁着满怀希望的苏丹人重返家园和正常生活。
Sudan’s war has begun in April 2023.
苏丹战争于 2023 年 4 月开始。
The Sudanese Armed Forces are locked in a battle with the Rapid Support Forces, an ethnic militia that grew out of the notorious Janjaweed forces.
苏丹武装部队陷入了与快速支援部队的战斗，快速支援部队是一支从臭名昭著的金戈威德部队发展而来的民族民兵。
However, this time, a non-state militia is operating and using strategic drones in military operations.
然而，这一次，非国家民兵正在军事行动中操作和使用战略无人机。
The Rapid Support Forces began using limited-range drones during the first month of the war in Khartoum.
在喀土穆战争的第一个月，快速支援部队开始使用有限范围的无人机。
The Sudanese Armed Forces followed, with the help of Ukraine, turning civilian drones into armed drones, which proved to be very effective in urban warfare.
苏丹武装部队随后在乌克兰的帮助下，将民用无人机转变为武装无人机，事实证明这在城市战中非常有效。
This limited use did not last long.
这种有限的使用并没有持续多久。
The Rapid Support Forces began using long-range drones soon after the Sudanese army recaptured the capital, Khartoum, in March 2025.
2025 年 3 月苏丹军队夺回首都喀土穆后不久，快速支援部队就开始使用远程无人机。
In May 2025, the Rapid Support Forces were able to attack Port Sudan, Sudan’s de facto capital and humanitarian hub, from hundreds of kilometers away from the Rapid Support Forces’ strongholds.
2025年5月，快速支援部队能够从距离快速支援部队据点数百公里的地方攻击苏丹事实上的首都和人道主义中心苏丹港。
The nature of the drones and munitions used remains contested.
所使用的无人机和弹药的性质仍然存在争议。
Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab reported on April 24, 2025, that the Rapid Support Forces have six Chinese-manufactured CH-95 or FH-95 drones at Nyala Airport.
耶鲁大学人道主义研究实验室2025年4月24日报告称，快速支援部队在尼亚拉机场有六架中国制造的CH-95或FH-95无人机。
These drones have a 250-kilometer range , which can reach Port Sudan.
这些无人机的航程为250公里，可以到达苏丹港。
Moreover, the Centre for Information Resilience found similarities between remnants of the attack in Port Sudan and remnants reportedly from an earlier Rapid Support Forces attack in al-Malha, North Darfur.
此外，信息复原中心发现苏丹港袭击的残留物与据报道早先快速支援部队在北达尔富尔州马勒哈袭击的残留物有相似之处。
The attacks caused a total power outage in the city and suspended humanitarian flights to the country’s international airport.
袭击导致该市全面停电，并暂停飞往该国国际机场的人道主义航班。
The United Arab Emirates, a key U.S. and E.U.
阿拉伯联合酋长国是美国和欧盟的一个重要国家
security partner, is prolonging Sudan’s war and destabilizing the wider region by providing advanced drone technology to the Rapid Support Forces, a non-state militia responsible for genocide and grave war crimes.
安全伙伴，通过向快速支援部队提供先进的无人机技术，正在延长苏丹的战争并破坏更广泛地区的稳定。快速支援部队是一支对种族灭绝和严重战争罪行负有责任的非国家民兵组织。
According to Rosemary DiCarlo, the U.N.
联合国秘书长罗斯玛丽·迪卡洛 (Rosemary DiCarlo) 表示
under-secretary-general for political and peacebuilding affairs, over 1,100 civilians had died in drone strikes between January and June 2026, accounting for roughly 80 percent of all recorded civilian deaths in that period.
主管政治和建设和平事务副秘书长表示，2026 年 1 月至 6 月期间，超过 1,100 名平民在无人机袭击中丧生，约占同期所有有记录的平民死亡人数的 80%。
When I was in Khartoum in June 2026, I saw the destructive results of drone attacks on civilian infrastructure, as well as on airports and power stations.
2026 年 6 月我在喀土穆时，亲眼目睹了无人机袭击民用基础设施以及机场和发电站所造成的破坏性后果。
The Sudanese Armed Forces intercepted a couple of drone attacks when I was there.
当我在那里时，苏丹武装部队拦截了几次无人机袭击。
Electricity became a rare commodity in Khartoum, which appeared totally dark at night, mostly due to the destruction of this infrastructure.
电力在喀土穆成为一种稀有商品，夜间显得漆黑一片，这主要是由于基础设施遭到破坏。
Merowe Dam, which is the largest dam in Sudan, suffered several drone attacks by the Rapid Support Forces.
苏丹最大的水坝麦罗维水坝多次遭到快速支援部队的无人机袭击。
According to Sudan’s minister of energy, the electricity sector has lost about $14 billion since the war started.
据苏丹能源部长称，自战争爆发以来，电力行业已损失约 140 亿美元。
The war in Sudan is already a regional proxy war.
苏丹战争已经是一场地区代理人战争。
However, it has recently become a testing lab for a new drone-technology race between Chinese and Turkish systems.
然而，它最近成为中国和土耳其系统之间新无人机技术竞赛的测试实验室。
The battle for air supremacy has driven both sides to update their technology quickly , as their drones and air defense (also used as anti-drone systems) have become ineffective.
制空权之争促使双方迅速更新技术，因为他们的无人机和防空系统（也用作反无人机系统）已经变得无效。
The Sudanese Armed Forces would acquire a new Turkish drone and attack a Rapid Support Forces-controlled area — the Rapid Support Forces, in return, would deploy a Chinese anti-aircraft system.
苏丹武装部队将购买一架新型土耳其无人机并攻击快速支援部队控制的地区——作为回报，快速支援部队将部署中国的防空系统。
By September 2025, Janes had verified three crashes of Turkish-made Akıncı drones and identified a missile booster in Rapid Support Forces footage closely resembling a component of the Chinese-made FK-2000 air defense system.
到 2025 年 9 月，简斯已经核实了三起土耳其制造的 Akıncı 无人机坠毁事件，并在快速支援部队的视频中发现了一个与中国制造的 FK-2000 防空系统的组件非常相似的导弹助推器。
Soon after, the Rapid Support Forces attacked a Sudanese Armed Forces-controlled region, pushing the Sudanese Armed Forces to upgrade its existing Turkish anti-drone system to HİSAR-A, a Turkish defense system that can counter the newly used Chinese technology.
不久之后，快速支援部队袭击了苏丹武装部队控制的地区，迫使苏丹武装部队将其现有的土耳其反无人机系统升级为HISAR-A，这是一种可以对抗新使用的中国技术的土耳其防御系统。
In February 2026, a Bayraktar Akıncı operated by the Sudanese Armed Forces destroyed a Chinese-made FK-2000 air defense system used by the Rapid Support Forces in South Kordofan.
2026年2月，苏丹武装部队的Bayraktar Akıncı摧毁了南科尔多凡快速支援部队使用的中国制造的FK-2000防空系统。
That’s how the war quickly transitioned into a technology race between the two global competitors in the military drone industry.
这就是战争如何迅速转变为军用无人机行业两个全球竞争对手之间的技术竞赛的原因。
Furthermore, the Rapid Support Forces’ possession of advanced drone systems will have disastrous consequences for regional security.
此外，快速支援部队拥有先进的无人机系统将对地区安全造成灾难性后果。
The Rapid Support Forces operate in western Sudan and Chad and have recruited fighters from Arab tribes scattered across the Sahel.
快速支援部队在苏丹西部和乍得开展行动，并从分散在萨赫勒地区的阿拉伯部落招募了战士。
Those fighters could transfer the Rapid Support Forces’ drone technology across the border into the Sahel region, where terrorist and militant groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are active.
这些战士可以将快速支援部队的无人机技术跨境转移到萨赫勒地区，那里是基地组织和伊斯兰国等恐怖分子和激进组织活跃的地区。
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Colombian entities and mercenaries that not only trained the Rapid Support Forces’ soldiers, but also piloted drones.
美国财政部制裁了哥伦比亚实体和雇佣军，这些实体和雇佣军不仅训练快速支援部队的士兵，还驾驶无人机。
In 2024, the U.N.
2024 年，联合国
Institute for Disarmament Research further reported that terrorist groups and non-state actors have already acquired limited-range drones (quadcopters) for surveillance, intelligence, and propaganda purposes.
裁军研究所进一步报告称，恐怖组织和非国家行为者已经获得了用于监视、情报和宣传目的的有限范围无人机（四轴飞行器）。
More importantly, the report highlighted an increase in the terrorist deployment of drones around armed conflict settings, especially in the Lake Chad Basin region, where the Rapid Support Forces recruit through ethnic networks.
更重要的是，报告强调了恐怖分子在武装冲突地区部署无人机的情况有所增加，特别是在乍得湖盆地地区，快速支援部队通过种族网络招募人员。
The threat here is about knowledge transfer from the Rapid Support Forces’ strategic drone operations.
这里的威胁是来自快速支援部队战略无人机行动的知识转移。
In addition, drone proliferation in the Horn of Africa, especially in the hands of non-state actors, can endanger the strategic trade route along the Red Sea, which has already faced disruption by Houthi drone attacks .
此外，无人机在非洲之角的扩散，特别是在非国家行为者手中，可能会危及红海沿线的战略贸易路线，该路线已经面临胡塞无人机袭击的破坏。
Armies have widely used drones in warfare, but the war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed how militaries utilize them.
军队在战争中广泛使用无人机，但乌克兰战争从根本上改变了军队使用无人机的方式。
These range from civilian drones repurposed for military use to strategic, long-range, low-cost suicide drones.
这些范围从改装为军事用途的民用无人机到战略性、远程、低成本的自杀式无人机。
Both sides used strategic drones (those with long-range and high-altitude capabilities) in early 2022 as the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, but the Horn of Africa saw their first use in war by an African country, ultimately changing the trajectory of the Tigray War between Ethiopia’s federal army and the Tigrayan regional army in 2021.
2022 年初，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时，双方都使用了战略无人机（具有远程和高空能力），但非洲之角首次由非洲国家在战争中使用战略无人机，最终改变了 2021 年埃塞俄比亚联邦军队与提格雷地区军队之间提格雷战争的轨迹。
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front had been advancing southward toward Addis Ababa, the capital, when the government reversed the tide in a very successful counteroffensive.
提格雷人民解放阵线一直向南挺进首都亚的斯亚贝巴，政府军以非常成功的反攻扭转了局势。
Analysts pointed to Ethiopia’s government acquiring various strategic drones from China, Turkey, and Iran as the reason behind those battlefield victories.
分析人士指出，埃塞俄比亚政府从中国、土耳其和伊朗购买了各种战略无人机，这是这些战场胜利背后的原因。
Reports show that the Rapid Support Forces acquired these new strategic drones from Chinese companies through the United Arab Emirates.
报道显示，快速支援部队通过阿联酋从中国公司购买了这些新型战略无人机。
While it denies any support for the Rapid Support Forces, multiple U.N.
虽然它否认对快速支援部队提供任何支持，但多个联合国
and media reports have repeatedly accused the United Arab Emirates of arming and supporting the Rapid Support Forces since the beginning of the war.
媒体报道一再指责阿联酋自战争开始以来就武装和支持快速支援部队。
In fact, the New York Times reported that Emirati personnel were directing these Chinese drones from bases in Chad near the Sudanese border.
事实上，据《纽约时报》报道，阿联酋人员是从靠近苏丹边境的乍得基地指挥这些中国无人机的。
This new weaponry has enabled the Rapid Support Forces to attack cities and civilian communities that were far from the war zones.
这种新武器使快速支援部队能够攻击远离战区的城市和平民社区。
In October 2026, Rapid Support Forces drones attacked a displacement shelter, killing at least 13 children in al-Obeid, a city in the Kordofan region that has been under Rapid Support Forces siege since February of 2025.
2026 年 10 月，快速支援部队的无人机袭击了科尔多凡地区奥贝德市的一个流离失所者避难所，造成至少 13 名儿童死亡，该城市位于科尔多凡地区，自 2025 年 2 月以来一直受到快速支援部队的围困。
The Rapid Support Forces’ drone attacks on civilian infrastructure may appear distant from its military strategy on the battlefront in western Sudan and North Kordofan state after the militia’s defeat in central Sudan.
民兵在苏丹中部战败后，快速支援部队对民用基础设施的无人机袭击可能与其在苏丹西部和北科尔多凡州前线的军事战略相去甚远。
However, these drone attacks aim to hinder the return of millions of refugees and the displaced Sudanese population who left their homes after the war.
然而，这些无人机袭击的目的是阻碍数百万难民和战后离开家园的苏丹流离失所者返回家园。
A recent International Organization for Migration report indicated that about 4.65 million displaced civilians have returned to Sudan.
国际移民组织最近的一份报告显示，约465万流离失所的平民已返回苏丹。
That said, attacks on electricity grids, oil depots, and airports instill fear among returnees and deepen their suffering.
尽管如此，对电网、油库和机场的袭击给回返者带来了恐惧，加深了他们的痛苦。
The Sudanese Armed Forces, on the other hand, have expanded their drone operations, relying heavily on Turkish-made aircraft.
另一方面，苏丹武装部队扩大了无人机行动，严重依赖土耳其制造的飞机。
Although the army also operates Iranian drones, Turkish strategic drones and anti-aircraft systems play a prominent role in its recent operations.
尽管军队也使用伊朗无人机，但土耳其战略无人机和防空系统在其最近的行动中发挥了突出作用。
In 2024, Baykar, Turkey’s largest defense company, provided the Sudanese Armed Forces with eight TB2 drones and 600 warheads for about $120 million.
2024年，土耳其最大的国防公司Baykar向苏丹武装部队提供了8架TB2无人机和600枚弹头，价值约1.2亿美元。
As a result, the Sudanese military was able to strike Nyala, the Rapid Support Forces stronghold in South Darfur, repeatedly.
结果，苏丹军队得以多次袭击快速支援部队在南达尔富尔州的据点尼亚拉。
Sudan’s army drone strikes have also killed civilians in Darfur.
苏丹军队的无人机袭击也导致达尔富尔地区平民死亡。
In August 2026, the Emergency Lawyers Group, a local rights organization, reported an army drone attack on a court session that killed 35 people.
2026 年 8 月，当地人权组织紧急律师组织报告称，军队无人机袭击了法庭，造成 35 人死亡。
Recent reports show that the Sudanese Armed Forces have struck beyond Sudan’s borders, disrupting Rapid Support Forces logistical routes.
最近的报告显示，苏丹武装部队已越过苏丹边境发动袭击，扰乱了快速支援部队的后勤路线。
In February 2026, the New York Times reported an Egyptian air base used for drone operations by the Sudanese Armed Forces to attack Rapid Support Forces supply and recruitment routes from Libya and northern Chad.
2026 年 2 月，《纽约时报》报道称，苏丹武装部队使用埃及空军基地进行无人机行动，攻击来自利比亚和乍得北部的快速支援部队补给和招募路线。
Recently, Chad has accused the Sudanese government of striking locations within its borders.
最近，乍得指责苏丹政府袭击其境内地点。
On the eastern front near the Ethiopian border, the Sudanese Armed Forces claim to have downed strategic drones.
在靠近埃塞俄比亚边境的东部前线，苏丹武装部队声称击落了战略无人机。
Many reports indicate that the Rapid Support Forces have built a military training camp in western Ethiopian territory, including a recent report by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab that warned about imminent attacks on Sudan’s Blue Nile State, which borders Ethiopia.
许多报告表明，快速支援部队已在埃塞俄比亚西部领土建立了一个军事训练营，其中包括耶鲁大学人道主义研究实验室最近的一份报告，该报告警告称，与埃塞俄比亚接壤的苏丹青尼罗州即将遭受袭击。
These attacks now threaten civilians in Sudan’s eastern states, which were far away from military operations during previous years.
这些袭击现在威胁着苏丹东部各州的平民，这些州在前几年远离军事行动。
The proliferation of drone warfare in Sudan is met with inaction.
苏丹无人机战的扩散却遭到不作为。
The U.N.
联合国
Security Council has extended the Darfur sanctions regime established under Resolution 1591 until Dec.
安理会已将根据第1591号决议建立的达尔富尔制裁制度延长至12月17日。
11, 2026.
2026 年 11 月。
The U.S. envoy for Africa, Massad Boulos, proposed an all-country weapons embargo on Sudan, which was not successful.
美国非洲事务特使马萨德·布洛斯提议对苏丹实施全国武器禁运，但没有成功。
But Boulos reiterated that the United States remained committed to expanding the embargo across Sudan to protect civilians from increasingly frequent drone attacks.
但布洛斯重申，美国仍然致力于扩大对苏丹的禁运，以保护平民免受日益频繁的无人机袭击。
However, that step is unrealistic and inadequate, because China, Russia, and other council members want to keep the sanctions limited to Darfur.
然而，这一步骤是不现实和不充分的，因为中国、俄罗斯和其他安理会成员希望将制裁仅限于达尔富尔。
Sudan’s ambassador rejected it outright, arguing that expanding the arms embargo over Sudan would unfairly impose the same restrictions on the state protecting civilians as on the militias attacking them.
苏丹大使断然拒绝，认为扩大对苏丹的武器禁运将不公平地对保护平民的国家施加与攻击平民的民兵相同的限制。
The United Nations has had an arms embargo on Darfur since 2004 — which the United Arab Emirates and other actors have not respected — as weapons continue to reach the region.
自 2004 年以来，联合国一直对达尔富尔实施武器禁运，但阿拉伯联合酋长国和其他行为体并未遵守这一禁令，因为武器不断抵达该地区。
Additionally, the arms embargo would not significantly affect non-state actors, which are not bound by international law.
此外，武器禁运不会对不受国际法约束的非国家行为者产生重大影响。
Turkey might be inclined to restrict its arms sales because of its interest in Western markets and its membership in the NATO alliance, but the United Arab Emirates has no such inclination.
土耳其可能会因为对西方市场的兴趣以及其北约成员国身份而倾向于限制其武器销售，但阿拉伯联合酋长国没有这种倾向。
Instead, international and U.S. sanctions regimes should target non-state actors such as the Rapid Support Forces and designate them, and the Emirati arms companies that facilitate its arms deals, as terrorist organizations.
相反，国际和美国的制裁制度应针对快速支援部队等非国家行为者，并将其以及为其军火交易提供便利的阿联酋军火公司列为恐怖组织。
Congress should also block further U.S. arms sales to the United Arab Emirates and pass the Stand Up for Sudan Act to prohibit arms sales until Abu Dhabi ceases its support for the Rapid Support Forces.
国会还应阻止美国进一步向阿拉伯联合酋长国出售武器，并通过《支持苏丹法案》，禁止出售武器，直到阿布扎比停止对快速支援部队的支持。
Furthermore, existing international law prohibits inherently indiscriminate systems, but there is a need for Sudan-focused arms measures to address drone proliferation.
此外，现有国际法本质上禁止不分皂白的系统，但需要采取以苏丹为重点的武器措施来解决无人机扩散问题。
The Arms Trade Treaty provides an existing framework to block non-state militias from acquiring advanced drone systems.
《武器贸易条约》提供了阻止非国家民兵获取先进无人机系统的现有框架。
China is a state party to the treaty and should take steps to block its weapons diversion to Sudan.
中国是该条约的缔约国，应采取措施阻止其武器流入苏丹。
It should prohibit transfers that violate the binding U.N.
它应该禁止违反具有约束力的联合国的转让。
arms embargo under Article 6 .
第 6 条规定的武器禁运。
Article 7 requires export assessments, including the risk of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and refusal of authorization where an overriding risk remains after considering mitigation measures.
第 7 条要求进行出口评估，包括严重违反国际人道主义法和人权法的风险，以及在考虑缓解措施后仍然存在压倒性风险的情况下拒绝授权。
Article 11 requires measures to prevent diversion, including assessing diversion risks and addressing detected diversion.
第 11 条要求采取措施防止转移，包括评估转移风险和解决检测到的转移问题。
The United Arab Emirates is not a state party but has been a signatory to the treaty since 2013 .
阿拉伯联合酋长国不是该条约的缔约国，但自 2013 年以来一直是该条约的签署国。
The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union all have arms trade deals with the United Arab Emirates, and they should block these deals until the United Arab Emirates respects the treaty and the Darfur arms embargo.
美国、英国和欧盟都与阿联酋签订了武器贸易协议，他们应该阻止这些交易，直到阿联酋尊重该条约和达尔富尔武器禁运。
If non-state actors such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan continue to acquire drone and anti-drone technology, this will disrupt civilian return and humanitarian access.
如果苏丹快速支援部队等非国家行为者继续获取无人机和反无人机技术，这将扰乱平民回返和人道主义准入。
It will also disturb regional stability if drone technology reaches armed groups in neighboring countries through regional arms networks that stretch beyond Sudan.
如果无人机技术通过延伸到苏丹以外的区域武器网络到达邻国的武装团体，这也将扰乱区域稳定。
Yasir Zaidan, Ph.D., is an adjunct lecturer in Seattle University’s Department of Political Science and an instructor at the University of Washington, where he earned his Ph.D. from the Henry M.
Yasir Zaidan 博士是西雅图大学政治学系的兼职讲师，也是华盛顿大学的讲师，并在那里获得了博士学位。来自亨利·M.
Jackson School of International Studies.
杰克逊国际研究学院。
His research examines Middle Eastern influence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea port development.
他的研究探讨了中东对非洲之角和红海港口发展的影响。
Previously a research assistant at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he holds a master’s degree in statecraft and national security affairs from the Institute of World Politics and an electrical engineering degree from the University of Khartoum in Sudan.
他曾担任华盛顿近东政策研究所的研究助理，拥有世界政治研究所的治国方略和国家安全事务硕士学位以及苏丹喀土穆大学的电气工程学位。