China’s Strategic Reassessment of India
As China and India have improved their relations in recent months, many observers have attributed this improvement to the end of U.S. strategic altruism toward India.
随着近几个月中国和印度关系的改善，许多观察家将这种改善归因于美国对印度战略利他主义的结束。
Indeed, in the past year, China has watched India lose its balance and simmer in a sense of strategic disorientation due to America’s change of heart.
事实上，在过去的一年里，中国眼睁睁地看着印度因美国变心而失去平衡并陷入战略迷失。
Delegation after delegation of Indian strategists visited China, trying to mend ties in search of balance in the Chinese view.
印度战略家一个又一个代表团访问中国，试图修补关系，寻求中国观点的平衡。
Many Chinese experts see India as returning to middle-power alignment for “ economic authority and strategic freedom ,” which translates into vigorous outreach to Europe, Japan, Canada, and all the middle powers.
许多中国专家认为，印度正为了“经济权威和战略自由”而回归中等强国联盟，这意味着印度将积极向欧洲、日本、加拿大和所有中等强国进行接触。
It’s almost as if India is returning to its middle-power roots.
印度似乎正在回归其中等强国的根源。
The Chinese reassessment of India’s power status and its strategic malleability — the extent to which its choices can be shaped — and predictability has significant implications for understanding future dynamics between the two powers.
中国对印度实力地位及其战略可塑性（其选择可以形成的程度）和可预测性的重新评估对于理解两个大国之间的未来动态具有重要意义。
The renewed improvement in ties raises questions about its sincerity and limits.
关系的重新改善引发了对其诚意和局限性的质疑。
While China recalibrates its relations with India, it is also building fences and chokeholds, first and foremost through supply chain dependence.
中国在重新调整与印度的关系的同时，也在筑起栅栏和封锁线，首先也是最重要的是通过供应链依赖。
It is unclear what future policy the next U.S. administration will pursue toward either China or India.
目前尚不清楚下一届美国政府将对中国或印度采取什么政策。
Both powers therefore keep their options open.
因此，两国都保留了自己的选择余地。
These assessments reflect ongoing research on China’s role in South Asia.
这些评估反映了对中国在南亚角色的持续研究。
They draw on 10 research trips to China, as well as roundtables and exchanges held online and in Washington with Chinese experts since January 2025.
他们借鉴了自 2025 年 1 月以来 10 次赴华考察以及在网上和华盛顿与中国专家举行的圆桌会议和交流的经验。
China demonstrates a strong tendency toward binary judgments on India’s alignment choice, while the reality is far more nuanced, as U.S. policy should be.
中国对印度的结盟选择表现出强烈的二元判断倾向，而现实则要微妙得多，正如美国的政策所应有的那样。
In the Chinese policy discourse on India, the first and foremost question has always been India’s power status: Is India a great power, or is it simply a middle power with great-power potential?
在中国对印政策话语中，首要的问题始终是印度的实力地位：印度是一个大国，还是一个具有大国潜力的中等强国？
While India’s gross domestic product has consistently been a fraction of China’s, its claim to great-power status has had major sway over China’s calculus.
尽管印度的国内生产总值一直只是中国的一小部分，但其对大国地位的宣称对中国的算盘产生了重大影响。
Vishwa Guru — “India the world’s guru” — is a famous slogan created under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi that, in the Chinese view, best represents India’s strategic aspiration: India not only aspires to be a world-class great power but also sees itself as superior and therefore will teach all the other great powers.
Vishwa Guru——“印度是世界的大师”——是纳伦德拉·莫迪总理政府创造的著名口号，在中国人看来，这最能代表印度的战略抱负：印度不仅渴望成为世界级大国，而且认为自己高人一等，因此将教导所有其他大国。
Although Chinese policymakers do not have romantic misperceptions of India’s actual power status, India’s aspiration and, even more so, its boldness have been no small shock to Chinese policymakers, who follow the tradition of overestimating adversaries’ capacity and hiding their own strength （料敌从宽，判己从严）.
尽管中国的决策者对印度的实际实力地位并没有浪漫的误解，但印度的野心，更重要的是它的大胆，对遵循料敌从宽，判己从严传统的中国决策者来说是不小的震撼。
India’s bold statement made Beijing question whether it underestimated fundamental aspects of Indian capability and potential that warranted India’s great-power status.
印度的大胆声明让北京质疑它是否低估了印度维持印度大国地位的能力和潜力的基本方面。
More importantly, during the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, China stopped questioning India’s great-power status.
更重要的是，在特朗普政府和拜登政府期间，中国不再质疑印度的大国地位。
India played a pivotal role in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy during these eight years, to the extent that Washington “hyped India’s power status” （大肆吹捧印度） and “exaggerated India’s development potential.”（夸大其发展潜力）
这八年来，印度在美国印太战略中发挥着举足轻重的作用，以至于华盛顿“大肆吹捧印度”、“夸大其发展潜力”。
America’s willingness to elevate India to a global great power and its seemingly endless provision of assistance to lift India up changed China’s original view that only real comprehensive national power mattered.
美国愿意将印度提升为全球大国，并似乎无休止地为印度提供援助，这改变了中国原来认为只有真正的综合国力才重要的观点。
India’s gross domestic product has been only about 20 percent of China’s and has been unlikely to catch up any time soon to become China’s peer.
印度的国内生产总值(GDP)仅为中国的20%左右，并且不太可能在短期内赶上中国。
However, that could entirely change if American support continues.
然而，如果美国继续提供支持，这种情况可能会完全改变。
Beijing knows this too well because China had been the beneficiary of similar American support and elevation from the 1970s to the 2000s.
北京非常清楚这一点，因为从 1970 年代到 2000 年代，中国一直是美国类似支持和提升的受益者。
The difference for China is that back then the United States supported China to counter the Soviet Union, and during the first Trump and Biden administrations, the United States lent similar support to India to counter China.
中国的不同之处在于，当时美国支持中国对抗苏联，而在特朗普和拜登执政期间，美国也向印度提供了类似的支持来对抗中国。
The lesson for China is that great-power status does not actually have to be expressed in real, current terms rather than future expectations and potentials, and U.S. support could very realistically and rapidly elevate India to a new height and single-handedly make India a new great power.
中国的教训是，大国地位实际上并不需要用实际的、当前的术语来表达，而是用未来的期望和潜力来表达，美国的支持可以非常现实地、迅速地将印度提升到一个新的高度，并单枪匹马地使印度成为一个新的大国。
Seeing India as an aspirational and rising power, China believes it followed a policy of accommodation with India throughout this period and beyond.
中国将印度视为一个雄心勃勃且正在崛起的大国，并认为自己在这一时期及以后一直奉行与印度和解的政策。
General Secretary Xi Jinping continued outreach and friendly messaging to Modi, including in 2018 (right after the Doklam standoff in 2017); in 2024 at the Kazan summit of the expanded economic bloc originally formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; and in 2025 when hosting Modi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
习近平总书记继续向莫迪进行外展和友好信息传递，包括在 2018 年（2017 年洞朗对峙之后）； 2024 年，在最初由巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非组成的扩大经济集团喀山峰会上； 2025年接待莫迪出席上海合作组织峰会时。
China did not pursue reciprocal, retaliatory economic policies toward India after 2020.
2020年后，中国并未对印度奉行互惠、报复性经济政策。
Even on the issue of visas, Chinese officials cited the 280,000 visas China issued to Indian nationals in 2025 to highlight the 2,000 visas India issued to Chinese nationals during the same period to demonstrate the vastly different treatments.
甚至在签证问题上，中国官员还以2025年中国向印度公民发放的28万份签证为例，来强调印度同期向中国公民发放的2000份签证，以显示待遇的巨大差异。
For China, these are all reflections of its unwillingness to completely sour ties with India.
对于中国来说，这些都反映出其不愿与印度关系彻底恶化。
But now, with India losing America’s favor, India’s great-power status has become much less persuasive.
但如今，随着印度失去美国的青睐，印度的大国地位的说服力也大打折扣。
Chinese strategists are returning to the view that perhaps, after all, India is just a middle power.
中国战略家正在回归这样的观点：也许印度毕竟只是一个中等强国。
It has great potential, but elements in the Indian strategic culture pose irremovable obstacles and consistently sabotage its ascension.
它具有巨大的潜力，但印度战略文化中的因素构成了不可消除的障碍，并持续阻碍其崛起。
As Chinese strategists observe the fluctuation of ties between the United States and India in the past nine years, it is unsettling and reassuring at the same time.
中国战略家观察到过去九年来美国和印度之间关系的波动，既令人不安又令人放心。
The vast scope and depth of what the United States and India could jointly achieve materially and in practice is unsettling for China, exacerbating China’s anxiety about India’s future alignment or alliance with the United States and how it could undermine China’s roles and aspirations.
美国和印度在物质和实践方面可以共同实现的广泛和深入的目标令中国感到不安，加剧了中国对印度未来与美国结盟或联盟以及它如何损害中国的角色和愿望的焦虑。
However, the limitations to what the United States could persuade India to do, even with great rewards and strategic benefits promised, are reassuring for Beijing.
然而，即使美国承诺给予印度丰厚的回报和战略利益，说服印度做的事情仍然有限，这让北京感到安心。
For example, despite the favors and support the United States is willing to provide India, India has refused to abandon its strategic autonomy.
例如，尽管美国愿意向印度提供优惠和支持，但印度却拒绝放弃战略自主权。
At the height of the Russo-Ukrainian War and American demand for India to cooperate, India refused to abandon economic and energy ties with Russia.
在俄乌战争最激烈的时期以及美国要求印度合作的时候，印度拒绝放弃与俄罗斯的经济和能源关系。
In private conversations, India’s foreign policy community firmly distinguished between “like-minded” and “same-minded” countries to protect its strategic autonomy, and Indian diplomats vehemently emphasized issue-based alignments rather than permanent, rigid alliances.
在私下谈话中，印度外交政策界坚决区分“志同道合”和“志同道合”的国家，以保护其战略自主权，印度外交官强烈强调基于问题的结盟，而不是永久、僵化的联盟。
For China, this is cognitively incomprehensible, as it essentially equates to “India wants to have its cake and eat it, too.” If the United States does not have full confidence in Indian loyalty and support, why would the United States spend its valuable resources to do India the favor and let India run with its own agenda?
对于中国来说，这在认知上是难以理解的，因为这本质上等同于“印度也想鱼与熊掌兼得”。如果美国对印度的忠诚和支持没有充分的信心，美国为什么要花费宝贵的资源来讨好印度，让印度按照自己的议程行事呢？
If the answer is a shared U.S.-Indian aspiration to curtail China’s rise and expansion, India’s expressed reluctance to support the United States and confront China militarily on China’s western flank in a future Taiwan contingency, a position that was reiterated amply in track two dialogues, has certainly made the case of “strategic altruism” less appealing for the United States.
如果答案是美印共同渴望遏制中国的崛起和扩张，那么印度明确表示不愿意支持美国，也不愿意在未来台湾突发事件时在中国西翼与中国进行军事对抗（这一立场在第二轨对话中得到了充分重申），这无疑降低了“战略利他主义”对美国的吸引力。
On the drastically different interpretations of U.S. support and Indian reactions, all of the China and India specialists I spoke with refer to the Indian concept of “ Dānā ” (almsgiving) to explain what they see as India’s “ungratefulness.” What the United States identified as strategic altruism, India sees as strategic egoism because, in Indian culture, the concept of almsgiving views the recipient as doing a favor to the giver by providing them an opportunity to clear negative karma and practice detachment.
对于美国的支持和印度的反应有着截然不同的解读，我采访过的所有中国和印度专家都提到了印度的“施舍”概念来解释他们眼中的印度的“忘恩负义”。美国认为是战略利他主义，而印度则认为是战略利己主义，因为在印度文化中，施舍的概念认为接受者是在为施予者提供一个清除恶业和实践超然的机会，从而为施予者提供帮助。
Following this logic, Indian acceptance of U.S. assistance is India doing the United States a favor, and the United States should be in debt to India consequently.
按照这个逻辑，印度接受美国的援助就是印度在帮美国的忙，美国理应欠印度的债。
The correctness of this Chinese argument is debatable, but Chinese specialists’ unanimous claim of this cultural reading of a religious tradition as the origin of Indian strategic behavior is certainly noteworthy.
中国这一论点的正确性值得商榷，但中国专家一致声称这种对宗教传统的文化解读是印度战略行为的起源，这当然值得注意。
Essentially, China perceives India’s strategic choice as unmalleable, which significantly, or even critically, undercuts India’s potential.
从本质上讲，中国认为印度的战略选择是不可改变的，这极大地甚至严重地削弱了印度的潜力。
Despite the amount of support the United States was willing to supply, India has adhered to its strategic autonomy and refuses to alienate Russia or support a U.S. military campaign against China.
尽管美国愿意提供大量支持，但印度坚持其战略自主权，拒绝疏远俄罗斯或支持美国对中国的军事行动。
Similarly, despite the amount of accommodation China sees itself as willing to provide India, including in economic cooperation, India also adheres to its longstanding position and refuses to forge closer ties.
同样，尽管中国认为自己愿意向印度提供包括经济合作在内的诸多便利，但印度也坚持其长期以来的立场，拒绝与印度建立更密切的关系。
That means India’s strategic choice is predictable and cannot be shaped by the enticement of rewards or the threat of punishments.
这意味着印度的战略选择是可以预测的，不能由奖励的诱惑或惩罚的威胁来决定。
That substantially reduces the strategic value of India as a U.S. partner in strategic competition with China, and consequently, China’s anxiety about India’s alignment with the United States.
这大大降低了印度作为美国伙伴在与中国战略竞争中的战略价值，从而降低了中国对印度与美国结盟的焦虑。
Meanwhile, because of the expected limitation to India’s cooperation with the U.S. on the latter’s competition with China, it also considerably decreases India’s strategic appeal for China to pursue.
同时，由于印度与美国在与中国竞争方面的合作预期受到限制，也大大降低了印度对中国追求的战略吸引力。
Once the strategic questions of India’s power status and its alignment choices are answered, China’s remaining choices concern tactical approaches.
一旦印度的实力地位及其结盟选择的战略问题得到解答，中国剩下的选择就涉及到战术方法了。
With diplomatic engagement and maneuvering ongoing, China is most confident in the supply chain dependence it has built up vis-à-vis India.
随着外交接触和演习的持续进行，中国对其对印度建立的供应链依赖最为有信心。
This is primarily prevalent in trade rather than investment, as India’s stringent domestic investment environment and the restrictions on Chinese investment have made investment an unlikely candidate to boost bilateral relations.
这主要是在贸易而非投资中普遍存在，因为印度严格的国内投资环境以及对中国投资的限制使得投资不太可能促进双边关系。
Trade tells a very different story.
贸易讲述了一个截然不同的故事。
It is in fact profitable for China, especially considering the overwhelming trade surplus China runs vis-à-vis India.
事实上，这对中国来说是有利可图的，特别是考虑到中国对印度存在巨额贸易顺差。
In fiscal year 2025 to 2026, the total bilateral trade volume reached $151.1 billion, but India ran a $112.1 billion trade deficit.
2025至2026财年，双边贸易总额达到1511亿美元，但印度贸易逆差为1121亿美元。
That means 87 percent of bilateral trade consisted of Chinese exports to India.
这意味着87%的双边贸易是中国对印度的出口。
The trade imbalance is therefore a prominent sore spot for India.
因此，贸易不平衡是印度的一个突出痛点。
What China has identified, however, is India’s middle position in the global supply chain.
然而，中国认为印度在全球供应链中处于中间位置。
The argument is that India primarily imports from China materials, parts, and equipment that Indian companies use to make finished products for export to developed-country markets.
争论的焦点是，印度主要从中国进口材料、零部件和设备，印度公司用这些材料、零部件和设备生产成品，然后出口到发达国家市场。
The deficit India runs vis-à-vis China translates into a trade surplus it runs with other trading partners, such as the United States.
印度对中国的逆差转化为对美国等其他贸易伙伴的贸易顺差。
India’s economic dependence on China, therefore, is already established despite New Delhi’s efforts to reduce supply chain risks associated with China.
因此，尽管新德里努力减少与中国相关的供应链风险，但印度对中国的经济依赖已经形成。
Decreasing India’s dependence on China will create significant economic pain for Indian industries and companies.
减少印度对中国的依赖将为印度工业和企业带来巨大的经济痛苦。
The same supply shock the United States experienced in 2025 in the tariff war with China will happen to India if New Delhi attempts to shut Chinese products out.
如果新德里试图将中国产品拒之门外，印度也将遭遇美国在 2025 年与中国的关税战中经历的同样的供应冲击。
This economic dependence alleviates China’s anxiety over India’s strategic autonomy and hostility, as it creates more leverage for China
这种经济依赖缓解了中国对印度战略自主权和敌意的焦虑，因为它为中国创造了更多筹码
The other distinct aspect of China’s economic relations with India is the missing element of “empowerment,” which is prevalent in China’s ties with the rest of the South Asian subcontinent.
中国与印度经济关系的另一个独特方面是缺乏“赋权”元素，而这一元素在中国与南亚次大陆其他国家的关系中普遍存在。
“Empowerment” has been a pillar of China’s Belt and Road Initiative engagement in developing countries, meaning China not only trades and invests in the recipient countries, but also utilizes trade, new productive forces, infrastructure development, and industrial cooperation to empower local economies from within.
“赋能”一直是中国“一带一路”倡议对发展中国家的重要支撑，这意味着中国不仅对沿线国家进行贸易和投资，而且通过贸易、新生产力、基础设施建设、产业合作从内部赋能当地经济。
Examples include agricultural technology transfers in Nepal, green technology and the digital economy in Pakistan, and campaigns such as “Smart Bangladesh.” However, “empowerment” is not an element in China’s economic engagement with India, which raises the question of whether China deliberately avoids economic engagement that could elevate India’s technological productivity, industrial upgrading, or high-tech development.
例如尼泊尔的农业技术转让、巴基斯坦的绿色技术和数字经济，以及“智能孟加拉国”等活动。然而，“赋权”并不是中国与印度经济接触的一个要素，这就提出了一个问题：中国是否故意避免可能提高印度技术生产力、产业升级或高科技发展的经济接触。
One could say India rejects it from China anyway, but the lack of Chinese intention is obvious.
可以说印度无论如何都拒绝了中国的提议，但中国的意图显而易见。
Predicting the future of Chinese-Indian relations is both easy and difficult.
预测中印关系的未来既容易又困难。
It is easy because bilateral relations have a ceiling, considering the many stressors from Pakistan to border disputes to regional competition to complicated geopolitical factors.
这很容易，因为双边关系是有上限的，考虑到巴基斯坦、边界争端、地区竞争和复杂的地缘政治因素等诸多压力。
It is hard because they could have no floor, given the potential for deterioration and the history of war, conflicts, and skirmishes between the two.
这很困难，因为考虑到局势恶化的可能性以及两国之间的战争、冲突和小冲突的历史，他们可能没有底线。
For the time being, bilateral relations are stabilizing and improving, but their sustainability is subject to at least two unpredictable factors.
当前，双边关系正在稳定和改善，但其可持续性至少受到两个不可预测因素的影响。
The first factor is Indian domestic politics , especially the relationship between the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the future successor to Modi.
第一个因素是印度国内政治，特别是人民群众团体（RSS）与印度人民党（BJP）以及莫迪未来继任者之间的关系。
Despite the RSS being the parent and ideological guide of the ruling BJP, Chinese observers have noted growing tensions between Modi and the RSS due to electoral friction and the centralization of power and control by Modi.
尽管RSS是执政的印度人民党的母体和意识形态指南，但中国观察家注意到，由于选举摩擦以及莫迪的集权和控制，莫迪和RSS之间的紧张关系日益加剧。
The recent trip by RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat to the United States is seen as a sign of the organization’s growing desire to raise its profile.
RSS 主席莫汉·巴格瓦特 (Mohan Bhagwat) 最近的美国之行被视为该组织日益渴望提高其形象的标志。
No matter who the next prime minister will be, that person is unlikely to command the vast popularity and persuasiveness Modi has enjoyed.
无论下一任总理是谁，这个人都不太可能拥有莫迪所享有的巨大声望和说服力。
As such, India’s future internal cohesiveness and foreign policy appeal remain a question for China.
因此，印度未来的内部凝聚力和外交政策吸引力对中国来说仍然是一个问题。
The bigger uncertainty in Chinese-Indian relations goes back to the United States.
中印关系更大的不确定性要追溯到美国。
Washington’s current India policy has taken a dramatic turn, but future shifts in the post-Trump era are also a high-probability event.
华盛顿当前的印度政策已经发生了巨大转变，但后特朗普时代的未来转变也是大概率事件。
There is no guarantee that the United States will not resume its competitive strategy vis-à-vis China and once again see India as a needed partner in the process.
无法保证美国不会恢复针对中国的竞争战略，并再次将印度视为这一过程中所需的合作伙伴。
China believes that India is also waiting for the United States to change its approach again — therefore, nothing current is set in stone.
中国认为，印度也在等待美国再次改变其做法——因此，目前的情况还不是一成不变的。
The result is that neither China nor India will be willing to lock in their future strategic posture.
其结果是，中国和印度都不愿意锁定自己未来的战略态势。
Keeping options open remains the optimal approach, but that also means the current rewarming of ties may have an expiration date sooner than people realize.
保持期权开放仍然是最佳方法，但这也意味着当前关系的重新升温可能会比人们意识到的更早到期。
These assessments have considerable implications for U.S. policy.
这些评估对美国政策具有相当大的影响。
If Chinese anxiety about the American-Indian relationship has genuinely diminished, then the deterrent value Washington derived from that relationship has diminished with it, which is a cost of the current policy that nobody is counting.
如果中国对美印关系的焦虑确实减少了，那么华盛顿从这种关系中获得的威慑价值也随之减少，这是目前政策的一个无人计算的成本。
If the Chinese read of Indian unmalleability is correct, then a post-Trump return to competition with China, and hence a return to cooperation with India, would face the same limits that frustrated the previous approach, and American planners should develop realistic expectations.
如果中国对印度不可塑性的理解是正确的，那么特朗普时代后重返与中国的竞争，进而重返与印度的合作，将面临与之前的做法受挫的同样的限制，美国的规划者应该制定现实的期望。
However, a more careful reading of the record also offers a more nuanced position on China’s largely binary interpretation of Indian “malleability versus unmalleability.” India by and large still holds significant skepticism and concern regarding China’s intentions, capabilities, and influence.
然而，更仔细地阅读记录也可以对中国对印度“可塑性与不可塑性”的二元解释提供更细致的立场。总体而言，印度仍然对中国的意图、能力和影响力抱有很大的怀疑和担忧。
Despite U.S. dissatisfaction with India’s lack of reciprocity, it would be erroneous to assume India’s position has not moved at all, such as on defense procurement and the issue of Taiwan.
尽管美国对印度缺乏互惠感到不满，但如果认为印度的立场没有任何改变，例如在国防采购和台湾问题上，那就是错误的。
The subtlety does not lie in whether things change, but to what degree.
微妙之处不在于事情是否改变，而在于改变到什么程度。
The takeaway is that the United States and India will have to resort to much more careful calibration and negotiation over the terms of their agreement, rather than throwing possible future cooperation entirely out of the window.
结论是，美国和印度将不得不就协议条款进行更加仔细的校准和谈判，而不是完全放弃未来可能的合作。
In March 2026, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau issued a blunt warning during the Raisina Dialogue that the United States would not repeat its “China mistake” with India.
2026年3月，副国务卿克里斯托弗·兰道在瑞西纳对话期间直言不讳地警告美国不会对印度重蹈“中国错误”。
The delicacy, however, lies in the cost-benefit analysis, as most policy options are about the measurement of relative losses and gains, rather than an absolute, binary, black-or-white answer.
然而，微妙之处在于成本效益分析，因为大多数政策选择都是关于相对损失和收益的衡量，而不是绝对的、二元的、非黑即白的答案。