The Discipline of Refusal: Constitutional Concerns About Lawful Orders in the U.S. Military
Military doctrine gives officers a clear rule for manifestly unlawful orders: Refuse them.
军事学说为军官们对于明显非法的命令制定了明确的规则：拒绝他们。
It offers no comparable rule when lawful action appears to threaten the constitutional structure the military serves.
当合法行动似乎威胁到军队所服务的宪法结构时，它没有提供类似的规则。
The first response is neither refusal nor resignation, but rather deliberative friction.
第一个反应既不是拒绝，也不是放弃，而是刻意的摩擦。
Deliberative friction is the professional duty to raise a credible constitutional concern in a form that remains attributable and survives the decision to execute.
故意摩擦是一种职业责任，以一种可归因的形式提出可信的宪法问题，并在决定执行后继续存在。
The officer submits the concern in writing to the commander and copies an inspector general, while the authorized decision-maker retains control of execution.
该军官以书面形式向指挥官提出问题，并抄送监察长，而授权决策者保留对执行的控制权。
An individual officer will often see only a fragment of a larger constitutional pattern.
个别官员常常只能看到更大宪法模式的一小部分。
Preserving that fragment gives institutions with broader visibility a chance to determine whether a pattern exists.
保留该片段使具有更广泛知名度的机构有机会确定某种模式是否存在。
I seek to define the threshold and limits of that duty and then test it with a case in which the objecting officer is wrong.
我试图定义该义务的门槛和限制，然后用反对官员错误的案例来测试它。
There is a clear need for an administrative process for command disposition, inspector-general retention, and congressional oversight.
显然需要一个用于指挥部署、监察长保留和国会监督的行政程序。
The My Lai massacre and the conviction of Lt.
美莱村大屠杀和中尉的定罪
William Calley made clear that a subordinate cannot claim a defense of following orders when a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the order was unlawful.
威廉·卡利明确表示，当一个具有普通理智和理解力的人知道该命令是非法的时，下属不能主张对遵守命令的辩护。
Officers today are taught to refuse orders to fire on noncombatants, to provide no quarter, or to cause undue civilian suffering by intentionally cutting off food or water .
如今，军官们被教导要拒绝向非战斗人员开枪的命令、不提供任何宽恕、或故意切断食物或水来造成过度的平民痛苦。
Doctrine says little about a lawful order with cumulative damage.
学说很少谈到具有累积损害的合法秩序。
Constitutional systems can be hollowed out through what Kim Lane Scheppele calls “autocratic legalism,” a sequence of actions, each carrying legitimate legal authority.
宪法制度可以通过金·莱恩·谢佩勒（Kim Lane Scheppele）所说的“专制法律主义”来掏空，这是一系列行动，每一项行动都具有合法的法律权威。
Like a welder laying seams into the steel hull of a warship, each action appears small and inconsequential.
就像焊工在军舰钢质船体上焊缝一样，每个动作都显得微不足道且无关紧要。
Someone watching the work sees nothing unusual.
观看作品的人并没有发现任何异常。
Only when the ship is complete does its purpose become clear.
只有当这艘船完工后，它的用途才变得清晰。
Constitutional corrosion is the use of lawful discretion to disable or bypass an institution’s independent constitutional function or convert fidelity to constitutional office into personal or partisan allegiance.
宪法腐蚀是指利用合法的自由裁量权来禁用或绕过一个机构的独立宪法职能，或将对宪法职位的忠诚转变为个人或党派的效忠。
Losing an interbranch contest is ordinary constitutional politics.
部门间竞争失败是正常的宪政政治。
Corrosion changes the contest by compromising an institution’s ability to exercise its constitutionally assigned role.
腐蚀通过损害机构行使其宪法赋予的作用的能力来改变竞争。
It need not be a constitutional violation that a court could adjudicate.
法院不一定可以裁定是否违反宪法。
Emergency powers invoked under real statutory authority, deployments permitted by the letter of the law but never intended by lawmakers, and loyalty tests disguised as routine personnel actions are all legal on the surface.
根据真正的法定权力援引的紧急权力、法律条文允许但立法者从未有意进行的部署，以及伪装成例行人事行动的忠诚度测试，表面上都是合法的。
Like the seams, each raises little concern on its own.
就像接缝一样，每一个接缝本身都不会引起任何关注。
Together, they can amount to something else entirely.
它们结合在一起可以产生完全不同的效果。
While nothing here depends on concluding that such a pattern exists today, the category is easier to define than to prove, which is why it needs a name.
虽然这里没有任何内容取决于今天是否存在这种模式的结论，但该类别更容易定义，而不是证明，这就是为什么它需要一个名称。
Officers are left with a difficult professional obligation.
官员们肩负着艰巨的职业义务。
They cannot declare the republic endangered and refuse every lawful order that advances a policy they consider corrosive.
他们不能宣布共和国处于危险之中，也不能拒绝每一项推进他们认为具有腐蚀性的政策的合法命令。
That would place military judgment above the elected government.
这将使军事判断凌驾于民选政府之上。
Huntington put neutrality and subordination at the center of military professionalism for exactly this reason.
正是出于这个原因，亨廷顿将中立性和从属性置于军事专业主义的中心。
Civilian control of the military depends on accepting that civilians can make consequential decisions an officer believes are wrong.
文官对军队的控制取决于接受文官可以做出军官认为错误的重大决定。
The danger runs in both directions.
危险是双向的。
Rachel VanLandingham warns that a Congress unwilling to exercise its war powers has left the military as “ a firewall made of parchment ” against unconstitutional war.
雷切尔·范兰丁厄姆警告说，国会不愿意行使其战争权力，已经让军队成为反对违宪战争的“羊皮纸防火墙”。
Carrie Lee finds that the professional obligation runs out of answers when orders that could undermine democracy may be ruled lawful.
卡丽·李发现，当可能破坏民主的命令可能被裁定为合法时，职业义务就失去了答案。
Risa Brooks, Jim Golby, and Heidi Urben warn of the opposite danger, an officer corps increasingly willing to pick and choose among lawful orders.
里萨·布鲁克斯、吉姆·戈尔比和海蒂·乌尔本警告说，存在着相反的危险，即军官队伍越来越愿意在合法命令中挑选。
They define the same dilemma without supplying an operational rule for what an officer owes when the challenged order remains lawful.
他们定义了同样的困境，但没有提供当受质疑的命令仍然合法时官员应承担的责任的操作规则。
Section 1034 already protects lawful communications to Congress and inspectors general, and the Department of Defense maintains procedures for evaluating and investigating reprisal complaints.
第 1034 条已经保护与国会和监察长的合法通信，国防部也维持评估和调查报复投诉的程序。
The remaining problem is defining the duty.
剩下的问题是定义职责。
Officers need a standard for when they must raise a constitutional concern about lawful action and what facts must support it.
官员们需要一个标准来确定何时必须对合法行动提出宪法问题以及必须有哪些事实来支持这一问题。
A force willing to execute whatever it is told is a disaster waiting for a bad order.
一支愿意执行任何命令的部队将是一场等待错误命令的灾难。
A force swift to refuse is a catastrophe waiting for an opportunity.
迅速拒绝的力量是一场等待机会的灾难。
Officers lack the authority to decide the constitutional question but have an obligation to notice it.
官员们无权决定宪法问题，但有义务注意到这一点。
That responsibility is deliberative friction.
这种责任就是故意的摩擦。
It is the duty to document a credible constitutional concern and place it before an institution able to preserve the concern or act on it.
有责任记录可信的宪法问题，并将其提交给能够保留该问题或对其采取行动的机构。
Friction guarantees an attributable record and an authorized disposition.
摩擦保证了可追溯的记录和授权的处置。
It promises no merits review or vindication.
它不承诺任何案情审查或辩护。
Unless someone with authority pauses action, execution continues.
除非有权力的人暂停行动，否则执行将继续。
The officer controls transmission, not resolution.
官员控制的是传输，而不是分辨率。
The available channels serve different purposes.
可用的渠道有不同的用途。
Judge advocates assess legality, while inspectors general investigate misconduct.
法官倡导者评估合法性，而监察员则调查不当行为。
Both remain inside the executive branch, and neither determines whether lawful actions impair another institution’s constitutional role or make personal loyalty a condition of service.
两者都保留在行政部门内部，都无法决定合法行为是否会损害另一个机构的宪法作用或将个人忠诚作为服务条件。
For this problem, Congress is the external institution postured to compare records across the executive branch, investigate recurring practices, and revise delegated authority.
对于这个问题，国会是一个外部机构，负责比较整个行政部门的记录、调查重复出现的做法并修改授权。
It serves as the external oversight body rather than the officer’s routing destination.
它充当外部监督机构，而不是官员的路由目的地。
The routing is deliberate.
路线是经过深思熟虑的。
The normal process sends the memorandum through the chain of command with a copy to an inspector general, while preserving the officer’s statutory right to communicate lawfully with Congress.
正常程序是通过指挥系统将备忘录连同副本发送给监察长，同时保留该官员与国会合法沟通的法定权利。
Making direct congressional submissions routine while a command decision is pending would invite officers to seek political support outside the chain.
在指挥决策悬而未决时，将直接向国会提交的文件作为例行公事，将导致军官们寻求链条之外的政治支持。
Inspector general record retention builds institutional memory without making the individual officer a political actor.
监察长的记录保留可以建立机构记忆，但不会使个别官员成为政治参与者。
Under the proposed process, Congress would receive aggregate reporting and could obtain the underlying records through ordinary oversight when recurrence warrants inquiry.
根据拟议的流程，国会将收到汇总报告，并在需要再次调查时通过普通监督获取基础记录。
Officers who remain silent are rarely confused about the channels — they are calculating that speaking carries more risk than silence.
保持沉默的警官很少对渠道感到困惑——他们认为说话比沉默带来的风险更大。
The proposed duty changes that professional calculation by treating a credible concern as information the officer owes the institution.
拟议的职责将可信的担忧视为官员欠机构的信息，从而改变了专业计算。
Because silence cannot be observed reliably, that obligation is professional rather than disciplinary.
由于无法可靠地遵守沉默，因此该义务是职业义务而不是纪律义务。
Peter Feaver uses the term “shirking” when the military substitutes its preferences for the civilian leader’s course of action by inflating cost estimates, dragging its feet, or reaching out to sympathetic politicians.
当军方通过夸大成本估算、拖延或与同情的政客接触来取代文职领导人的行动方针时，彼得·费弗使用了“推卸”一词。
Officers invoking friction state the objection in writing, accept the lawful disposition even when no investigation follows, and continue execution unless someone with authority pauses the order.
援引摩擦的官员以书面形式提出反对意见，即使没有进行调查，也接受合法处置，并继续执行，除非有权力的人暂停命令。
Feaver is right that compliant execution of foolish policy serves the republic better than principled evasion .
费弗是对的，顺从地执行愚蠢的政策比有原则的逃避更能为共和国服务。
The bigger risk lies in what repeated use teaches the profession.
更大的风险在于重复使用对行业的影响。
A force encouraged to test lawful action against constitutional criteria may begin to treat civilian policy as military jurisdiction.
鼓励根据宪法标准测试合法行动的部队可能会开始将民事政策视为军事管辖权。
Officers already make such judgments informally.
官员们已经非正式地做出了这样的判断。
An attributable and rejectable process makes them visible, bounded, and subject to correction.
可归因和可拒绝的过程使它们可见、有界限并且可以纠正。
It requires a written causal claim, creates no stay or presumption of merit, gives the officer no appellate role, and ends the officer’s part after an authorized disposition unless new facts arise.
它需要书面的因果主张，不产生中止或功绩推定，不赋予官员上诉的作用，并在授权处置后终止官员的职责，除非出现新的事实。
Filing earns no professional credit.
归档不会获得专业信用。
The process establishes a norm of bounded candor followed by disciplined execution.
该过程建立了一种有限坦诚的规范，随后是严格执行。
It grants officers no guardianship role.
它不赋予官员监护作用。
Resignation remains available, and the profession has long argued whether it is an honorable act of dissent or a dereliction of duty .
辞职仍然是可行的，业界长期以来一直争论这是否是一种光荣的异议行为或玩忽职守。
Sometimes leaving will be right.
有时候离开也是对的。
But resignation vacates the post and removes the officer from the decision.
但辞职会导致该职位空缺，并使该官员不再参与决策。
Friction keeps the officer inside the institution while requiring an attributable response to the concern.
摩擦将官员留在机构内，同时要求对问题做出可归因的回应。
The oath identifies the object of loyalty but prescribes no procedure.
宣誓确定了忠诚的对象，但没有规定程序。
U.S. officers swear to support and defend the Constitution rather than a president or political party, but personal constitutional judgment does not authorize an officer to halt lawful action.
美国官员发誓支持和捍卫宪法，而不是总统或政党，但个人的宪法判断并不授权官员停止合法行动。
Professional candor supplies the affirmative duty.
专业的坦诚提供了肯定的义务。
An officer entrusted with public authority owes candid judgment to those who direct and oversee its use, including civilian leadership.
受托公共权力的官员应对那些指导和监督公共权力使用的人（包括文职领导）做出坦率的判断。
Once facts encountered in that role create a credible constitutional concern, silence deprives authorities of the opportunity to consider it.
一旦在该角色中遇到的事实引起了可信的宪法关注，沉默就会剥夺当局考虑它的机会。
The officer must raise the concern through an authorized process and remain bound by the command decision unless someone with authority changes it.
警官必须通过授权程序提出问题，并继续遵守指挥决定，除非有权力的人改变决定。
The standard must be demanding yet within reach of a single officer, who need not prove a completed pattern.
该标准必须要求很高，但在单个官员的能力范围内，而无需证明完整的模式。
The written claim must identify facts and a credible causal mechanism by which an action, lawful in isolation, could disable or bypass an institution’s independent constitutional function or convert fidelity to constitutional office into personal or partisan allegiance.
书面主张必须确定事实和可信的因果机制，通过该机制，孤立合法的行动可能会禁用或绕过机构的独立宪法职能，或将对宪法职位的忠诚转变为个人或党派效忠。
A distasteful or unwise order is not enough.
令人厌恶或不明智的命令是不够的。
Personal disagreement, political opposition, and the belief that civilian leaders are making a serious mistake do not satisfy the standard because civilians are entitled to their mistakes.
个人分歧、政治反对以及认为文职领导人正在犯严重错误的观点都不符合标准，因为文职人员有权犯错误。
A standard that activates under one administration and lies dormant under another is not constitutional.
在一个政府领导下启动并在另一届政府领导下处于休眠状态的标准是不符合宪法的。
Written reasoning lets others decide whether the officer identified a genuine institutional danger or dressed a policy objection in constitutional language.
书面推理可以让其他人决定该官员是否发现了真正的制度危险或用宪法语言表达了政策反对意见。
After a serious security failure, a service secretary orders a rapid review of officers in critical planning billets.
在发生严重的安全故障后，一位军种部长下令对关键规划部门的官员进行快速审查。
A joint task force deploys in 72 hours.
联合特遣部队将在 72 小时内部署。
The criteria include professional judgment, discretion, execution of settled policy, and the confidence of senior leaders.
标准包括专业判断、判断力、既定政策的执行以及高层领导的信心。
Each falls within ordinary personnel authority.
每个人都属于普通人事权限。
Reassigned officers retain rank and pay but will miss the operation’s opening phase, which no later reassignment can restore.
重新分配的军官保留军衔和薪酬，但会错过行动的开始阶段，以后的重新分配无法恢复这一阶段。
The staff officer consolidating returns from several subordinate commands also staffed the planning process and knows which officers offered unwelcome advice.
负责整合多个下属司令部返回结果的参谋人员也参与了规划过程，并知道哪些军官提出了不受欢迎的建议。
The returns reveal a stark result: Those officers are being moved at three times the rate of colleagues who supported the approved plan.
调查结果揭示了一个严峻的结果：这些官员的调动速度是支持批准计划的同事的三倍。
No criterion mentions political belief.
没有任何标准提及政治信仰。
To the officer, “confidence” appears to mean agreement with senior leaders rather than willingness to execute their lawful decisions.
对于该官员来说，“信心”似乎意味着与高层领导的一致，而不是愿意执行他们的合法决定。
A judge advocate can confirm the secretary’s authority.
辩护法官可以确认秘书的权力。
An inspector general can investigate reprisal or abuse.
监察长可以调查报复或虐待行为。
Neither inquiry, standing alone, determines whether the disparity reflects professional performance or a loyalty screen.
这两项调查单独来看都无法确定这种差异是反映了职业表现还是忠诚度筛选。
The officer could keep the incumbents in place by holding the routing package.
该官员可以通过持有路由包来让现任者就位。
Review will pull personnel officers and lawyers from readiness work and could leave critical billets unfilled.
审查将使人事官员和律师退出战备工作，并可能导致关键职位空缺。
The officer has no authority to impose that delay.
该官员无权强制延迟。
The officer sends a signed constitutional-concern memorandum to the commander and inspector general, then releases the package.
该官员向指挥官和监察长发送一份签署的宪法问题备忘录，然后释放包裹。
The commander acknowledges the memorandum and directs the service personnel authority to review the supporting records but does not stay the reassignments.
指挥官认可了该备忘录，并指示军种当局审查支持记录，但不保留重新分配。
The inspector general screens the memorandum for existing jurisdiction without opening a merits investigation.
监察长审查现有管辖权的备忘录，但不启动案情调查。
The review pulls personnel officers and command lawyers off deployment work for two days while implementation continues.
此次审查将人事官员和指挥律师的部署工作暂停两天，同时实施仍在继续。
The orders issue, and the task force deploys with the replacement team.
命令下达后，特遣部队与替换小组一起部署。
The review confirms the disparity but rejects the officer’s explanation.
审查证实了这种差异，但拒绝了该官员的解释。
The reviewing authority finds that the reassigned officers obstructed implementation after civilian leaders approved the plan.
审查当局发现，在文职领导人批准该计划后，重新分配的官员阻碍了该计划的实施。
They allowed deadlines to slip, kept personnel working on rejected alternatives, and treated settled questions as open.
他们允许推迟最后期限，让人员继续研究被拒绝的替代方案，并将已解决的问题视为开放性问题。
Officers who offered equally forceful advice before the decision and then executed it were retained.
在决定之前提供同样有力的建议并随后执行的官员被保留。
The officer receives the disposition but not the protected personnel records supporting it.
该官员收到了处置结果，但没有收到支持该处置结果的受保护人员记录。
“Confidence” measured post-decision performance, not political agreement.
“信心”衡量的是决策后的表现，而不是政治共识。
The officer accepts the result.
该官员接受结果。
The review consumed two days of staff work, changed no assignment, and delayed no order.
此次审核耗费了员工两天的时间，没有改变任何任务，也没有延迟任何订单。
The record now contains both the concern and the evidence that defeated it.
现在的记录既包含了这种担忧，也包含了消除这种担忧的证据。
The two days were the price of testing a credible concern without delaying execution or transferring decision authority to the officer who raised it.
这两天是测试一个可信问题的代价，同时又不拖延执行或将决策权移交给提出问题的官员。
Every safeguard invites abuse, and friction is no exception.
每一项保障措施都会招致滥用，摩擦也不例外。
Politically motivated officers could cite constitutional concerns to obstruct policies they oppose.
出于政治动机的官员可以援引宪法问题来阻挠他们反对的政策。
Friction also costs time, and operations run on tempo.
摩擦也会耗费时间，而操作是有节奏的。
A duty invoked routinely would become indistinguishable from obstruction.
例行公事地履行的义务将与妨碍司法行为变得难以区分。
The commander, not the objecting officer, controls the clock.
控制时钟的是指挥官，而不是反对的军官。
The subordinate surfaces the concern — the commander decides whether anything waits and bears responsibility for any time granted to review.
下属提出问题——指挥官决定是否有任何事情需要等待，并承担审查时间的责任。
Military operations already absorb delays for legal reviews, collateral damage estimation, intelligence validation, and rules-of-engagement clarification without treating those safeguards as shirking.
军事行动已经吸收了法律审查、附带损害估计、情报验证和交战规则澄清方面的延误，而不将这些保障措施视为逃避。
The relevant questions are whether any delay is proportional to the claimed danger and whether someone other than the officer making the claim can review the concern.
相关问题是任何延误是否与所声称的危险成比例，以及除了提出索赔的官员之外的其他人是否可以审查该问题。
Attribution raises the cost of bad-faith obstruction.
归因会增加恶意阻碍的成本。
The officer must identify the constitutional mechanism, sign the claim, and accept rejection by someone with authority.
该官员必须确定宪法机制，签署声明，并接受权威人士的拒绝。
If the commander proceeds, the objection must still survive in an attributable record, and the officer must retain access to protected channels.
如果指挥官继续进行，该异议必须仍然保留在可归因记录中，并且军官必须保留对受保护频道的访问权限。
The commander may reject the concern but may not erase it or retaliate for raising it.
指挥官可以拒绝该担忧，但不得消除该担忧或对提出该担忧进行报复。
Lawful communications to Congress or an inspector general are protected .
与国会或监察长的合法通讯受到保护。
Communications made within the chain only receive that protection when they allege specified misconduct.
链内进行的通信只有在指控特定的不当行为时才会受到保护。
That is why the proposed memorandum goes to both the commander and the inspector general.
这就是为什么拟议的备忘录同时提交给指挥官和监察长。
Legal protection, however, does not eliminate informal career costs.
然而，法律保护并不能消除非正式职业成本。
External review carries political risk.
外部审查存在政治风险。
A documented objection can be leaked, selectively quoted, or exploited as a partisan cause.
记录在案的反对意见可能会被泄露、有选择地引用或被利用作为党派原因。
The officer may be cast as a hero or accused of insubordination, regardless of intent.
无论意图如何，该官员都可能被视为英雄或被指控不服从命令。
The obligation requires candor in raising the concern and restraint afterward.
这项义务要求坦诚地提出关切并在事后保持克制。
The officer must use authorized channels and testify when lawfully required.
该官员必须使用授权渠道并在法律要求时作证。
Any further statement must stay within the evidence, and military office must never become a platform for partisan advocacy.
任何进一步的声明都必须以证据为依据，军事办公室绝不能成为党派宣传的平台。
An officer who raises a credible constitutional concern only when it is safe and private has not accepted the duty.
仅在安全和私密的情况下才提出可信的宪法问题的官员没有接受这项职责。
Friction depends on institutions willing to receive the concern.
摩擦取决于愿意接受关注的机构。
Internal review can correct error and preserve evidence, but it cannot provide external accountability.
内部审查可以纠正错误并保存证据，但不能提供外部问责。
SHAMROCK and MINARET were not examples of deliberative friction, but they do show why institutional fragments must survive.
三叶草和尖塔并不是故意摩擦的例子，但它们确实表明了为什么制度碎片必须生存。
For decades, telegraph companies turned over Americans’ international cables under Operation SHAMROCK , and from 1967 to 1973 the National Security Agency placed roughly 1,650 Americans on a watch list under Project MINARET .
几十年来，电报公司在“三叶草行动”下移交了美国的国际电报，从 1967 年到 1973 年，国家安全局在“尖塔计划”下将大约 1,650 名美国人列入观察名单。
The Church Committee established the scale of the failure by obtaining and comparing records across agencies.
教会委员会通过获取和比较各机构的记录来确定失败的规模。
This was retrospective accountability, not real-time correction.
这是回顾性问责，而不是实时纠正。
When no institution with authority will act on the preserved concern, friction has reached its limit.
当没有权威机构对保留的关注采取行动时，摩擦就达到了极限。
An officer who then refuses a lawful order acts outside this doctrine and must accept the legal consequences.
拒绝合法命令的官员的行为超出了这一原则，必须接受法律后果。
Institutional failure does not authorize officers to substitute their own policy for civilian judgment.
制度失败并不授权官员用自己的政策代替民事判断。
Doing so initiates praetorian politics and destroys civilian control, no matter how sincere the officers involved.
这样做会引发禁卫军政治并破坏文官的控制，无论参与其中的军官有多么真诚。
The capacity for friction has to come from somewhere, and the Navy has taught its foundations for decades.
摩擦的能力必须来自某个地方，而海军几十年来一直在教授其基础知识。
James Stockdale spent more than seven years in North Vietnamese prisons, much of it as the senior American officer at the Hanoi Hilton.
詹姆斯·斯托克代尔在北越监狱度过了七年多时间，其中大部分时间是在河内希尔顿酒店担任美国高级官员。
When his captors wanted him for propaganda, he disfigured himself rather than provide the image.
当他的绑架者想要他进行宣传时，他毁容了自己，而不是提供形象。
He credited a battered copy of Epictetus , first read in graduate school, with his ability to endure.
他将自己的忍耐能力归功于他在研究生院时第一次读到的一本破旧的爱比克泰德著作。
As president of the Naval War College, he turned that into an elective, Foundations of Moral Obligation , still known as the Stockdale Course.
作为海军战争学院院长，他将其变成了选修课《道德义务基础》，仍称为斯托克代尔课程。
The Navy usually tells the first half of the story: endurance and the inner citadel, what Martin Cook calls Stoic armor against loss .
海军通常讲述故事的前半部分：耐力和内部堡垒，马丁库克称之为坚忍不拔的盔甲。
The course reaches further.
课程更进一步。
The discipline that let Stockdale keep his own judgment is what allowed him to refuse when refusal carried a price.
让斯托克代尔保持自己判断力的纪律，也让他在拒绝要付出代价时能够拒绝。
Stockdale’s ordeal is not analogous to filing a memorandum.
斯托克代尔的磨难与提交备忘录不同。
The connection lies in professional formation.
这种联系在于职业形成。
Officers who have never examined when refusal becomes obligatory have not fully examined what obedience demands.
从未检查过拒绝何时成为强制性的官员没有充分检查服从的要求。
That inquiry develops the judgment friction requires: reaching an independent conclusion, exposing it to correction, and remaining disciplined when authority rejects it.
该调查产生了所需的判断摩擦：得出独立的结论，接受纠正，并在权威拒绝时保持纪律。
The Stockdale Course gives officers a place to practice that judgment before a real order arrives.
斯托克代尔课程为官员提供了一个在真正的命令到达之前练习判断的地方。
The moment that requires this judgment will not arrive wearing a constitutional warning label.
需要做出这种判断的时刻不会被贴上宪法警告标签。
It will look like an ordinary order from a lawful authority.
它看起来就像来自合法当局的普通命令。
Time will be short, institutional pressure will favor immediate compliance, and no existing rule will fit exactly.
时间很短，机构压力将有利于立即遵守，而且现有的规则都不会完全适合。
Officers need judgment developed through smaller cases and enough humility to question their own certainty.
官员们需要通过较小的案件形成判断力，并需要足够的谦逊来质疑自己的确定性。
Teaching is the easy part.
教学是最容易的部分。
The profession already knows how to add a block of instruction.
该行业已经知道如何添加指令块。
The harder task is making the duty survive the chain of command and the evaluation system, where officers decide whether speaking is worth the risk.
更艰巨的任务是让这项职责能够通过指挥系统和评估系统，由官员们决定是否值得冒险发言。
The secretary of defense should establish a department-wide constitutional-concern memorandum and require a written command disposition.
国防部长应制定一份全部门范围的宪法关注备忘录，并要求书面命令处置。
The memorandum would go to the commander, with a copy to the Department of Defense Inspector General.
备忘录将提交给指挥官，并附上一份副本给国防部监察长。
It would describe the lawful action and explain why the facts suggest that it could disable or bypass an institution’s independent constitutional function or convert fidelity to constitutional office into personal or partisan allegiance.
它将描述合法行动，并解释为什么事实表明它可以禁用或绕过机构的独立宪法职能，或将对宪法职位的忠诚转变为个人或党派忠诚。
Filing would create no automatic delay or presumption of merit.
提交申请不会造成自动延迟或案情推定。
The commander could proceed but would have to acknowledge the memorandum and record the disposition.
指挥官可以继续行动，但必须承认备忘录并记录部署情况。
The Department of Defense inspector general should establish the intake and retention procedures.
国防部监察长应制定招募和保留程序。
The inspector general would acknowledge receipt and screen each memorandum for existing jurisdiction and administrative sufficiency.
监察长将确认收到并审查每份备忘录的现有管辖权和行政充分性。
Allegations of illegality, reprisal, abuse of authority, or gross mismanagement would enter ordinary inspector general channels.
对非法、报复、滥用权力或严重管理不善的指控将进入普通监察长渠道。
For a non-jurisdictional memorandum, the screen would ask only whether it identifies a specific lawful action, the constitutional function or fidelity relationship at risk, a causal mechanism, and the officer submitting it, without claiming authority to impose a delay.
对于无管辖权的备忘录，屏幕只会询问其是否确定了具体的合法行为、面临风险的宪法职能或忠诚关系、因果机制以及提交备忘录的官员，而不会声称有权施加延迟。
Importantly, the screen would not assess truth or merit.
重要的是，屏幕不会评估真相或优点。
A nonconforming communication would retain whatever protection existing law provides but would not be included in the constitutional-concern dataset.
不合格的通信将保留现有法律提供的任何保护，但不会包含在宪法问题数据集中。
The inspector general would retain qualifying non-jurisdictional memoranda under the approved records schedule and report annually to the congressional defense committees using department-wide totals and broad subject categories.
监察长将根据批准的记录时间表保留合格的非司法备忘录，并使用部门范围内的总数和广泛的主题类别每年向国会国防委员会报告。
Reports would contain no command-level or personal identifiers and would describe the filings as unverified concerns rather than findings of misconduct or measures of command climate.
报告将不包含指挥层或个人标识符，并将这些文件描述为未经证实的问题，而不是不当行为的调查结果或指挥气氛的措施。
The department would set no filing target or benchmark.
该部门不会设定备案目标或基准。
Aggregation cannot prevent political interpretation, but it keeps filing rates from becoming measures of individual commanders or units.
汇总并不能阻止政治解释，但它可以防止归档率成为个别指挥官或部队的衡量标准。
Congress could request the underlying records through its ordinary oversight authorities.
国会可以通过其普通监督机构索取基础记录。
Recurrence could identify a subject for inquiry but would prove nothing on its own.
重复出现可以确定一个调查主题，但其本身并不能证明什么。
Federal law prohibits unfavorable personnel action and the withholding of favorable personnel action as reprisal for protected communications.
联邦法律禁止采取不利的人事行动，并禁止将有利的人事行动作为对受保护通信的报复。
The memorandum would provide the dated evidence needed to identify and remedy reprisal related to this process.
该备忘录将提供识别和补救与此过程相关的报复所需的过时证据。
Fitness reports and promotion recommendations should neither identify the filing nor treat rejection as professional failure.
健康报告和晋升建议既不应表明申请的内容，也不应将拒绝视为职业失败。
The service secretaries should direct selection boards to disregard the filing itself if it enters the record.
如果文件进入记录，服务秘书应指示选拔委员会忽略该文件本身。
Formal accountability must continue to align with observable conduct.
正式问责制必须继续与可观察的行为保持一致。
The filing and its disposition should not be included in the officer’s evaluation.
备案及其处置不应包含在官员的评估中。
Reporting seniors and senior raters may evaluate independently observable conduct, including whether the officer continued to execute lawful orders and protected classified information.
举报高级人员和高级评估人员可以评估独立可观察的行为，包括该官员是否继续执行合法命令和受保护的机密信息。
False statements, unauthorized disclosures, and disobedience remain punishable.
虚假陈述、未经授权的披露和不服从仍然会受到惩罚。
Commanders remain accountable for suppression or reprisal.
指挥官仍然对镇压或报复负有责任。
A rejected good-faith concern is not misconduct.
被拒绝的善意关切并不是不当行为。
Professional military education should rehearse the judgment before the crisis arrives.
专业军事教育应该在危机到来之前预演判断。
We train officers to recognize and refuse unlawful orders.
我们训练官员识别和拒绝非法命令。
We owe them preparation and a protected institutional path for the harder case: raising a credible constitutional concern about a lawful order while remaining bound to execute it.
我们应该为更困难的情况做好准备并提供一条受保护的制度路径：对合法命令提出可信的宪法关切，同时仍然有义务执行它。
Kurt Shulkitas is a cryptologic warfare officer in the U.S. Navy.
库尔特·舒尔基塔斯 (Kurt Shulkitas) 是美国海军的一名密码战军官。
The argument here began as a series of essays he wrote in 2018 as a student in the Naval War College’s “Foundations of Moral Obligation” course, known as the Stockdale Course.
这里的争论始于他于 2018 年作为海军战争学院“道德义务基础”课程（即斯托克代尔课程）学生所写的一系列文章。
The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. government.
所表达的观点仅代表他个人的观点，并不反映海军部或美国政府的观点。
**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.
**请注意，出于内部风格的考虑，岩石战争不会对美国国防部使用不同的名称，除非美国国会根据法规更改该名称。