The Unhedgeable Bet: What the Future Combat Systems Can Teach Us About Acquisition

The Pentagon describes Golden Dome for America as a “system of systems,” an integrated air and missile defense architecture that combines space-based sensors, orbital interceptors, ground systems, and a command network designed to defeat any aerial attack.

五角大楼将美国金圆顶描述为“系统的系统”，是一种综合防空和导弹防御架构，结合了天基传感器、轨道拦截器、地面系统和旨在击败任何空中攻击的指挥网络。

Eighteen months after its founding executive order, the program broke ground on its first operational site .

在其成立行政命令十八个月后，该计划在其第一个运营基地破土动工。

Its architecture remains so closely held that the Congressional Budget Office cannot fully price it , and cost estimates span from $252 billion to $3.6 trillion .

它的架构仍然受到严格控制，以至于国会预算办公室无法为其完全定价，成本估计从 2520 亿美元到 3.6 万亿美元不等。

The program also carries significant risk of failure, depending on how many tightly coupled, interdependent systems it attempts to integrate.

该程序还存在巨大的失败风险，具体取决于它尝试集成多少个紧密耦合、相互依赖的系统。

One of the last times the Department of Defense organized a warfighting concept around a tightly coupled architecture was the Army’s Future Combat Systems program.

国防部最后一次围绕紧密耦合的架构组织作战概念是陆军的未来作战系统计划。

The Army spent roughly $18 billion over six years without fielding a single vehicle, making it the most expensive canceled program in Army history .

陆军在六年内花费了大约 180 亿美元，但没有部署任何一辆车辆，这使其成为陆军历史上被取消的最昂贵的项目。

It failed because it made an unhedgeable bet on unproven, interdependent systems with no standalone value that couldn’t be abandoned once disproven.

它失败了，因为它对未经证实的、相互依赖的系统下了不可对冲的赌注，这些系统没有独立的价值，一旦被证实就不能放弃。

Golden Dome is not an unhedged program.

金顶并不是一个不受对冲的项目。

It is a layered portfolio with gated competitions, severable contracts, and layers that hold independent value, structured on paper to avoid the failure mode that doomed the Future Combat Systems program.

它是一个分层的组合，具有门控竞争、可分割的合同和具有独立价值的层，以纸面形式构建，以避免导致未来作战系统计划失败的失败模式。

Its hedges are still under pressure: lump sum funding outside annual congressional review, a final integration gate after the money’s spent, and a delivery date set by an administration term rather than technical readiness.

它的对冲仍然面临压力：在年度国会审查之外一次性提供资金，资金支出后的最终整合门，以及由管理期限而不是技术准备情况确定的交付日期。

The solution is to assign an independent authority, outside the program, empowered to fail its final gate.

解决方案是在该计划之外指定一个独立的机构，有权突破其最终大门。

The Future Combat Systems Concept After the Army struggled to deploy Task Force Hawk to Albania in 1999, it concluded that the force was too heavy to arrive in time but too light to win once it was there .

未来作战系统概念 1999 年，陆军在努力向阿尔巴尼亚部署“鹰”特遣部队后，得出的结论是，这支部队太重，无法及时到达，但又太轻，一旦到达就无法获胜。

The proposed solution consisted of eighteen new interdependent systems , including light vehicles, ground robots, drones, sensors, and missiles, designed to function as a complete set and connected via a hypothetical battlefield network.

拟议的解决方案由十八个新的相互依赖的系统组成，包括轻型车辆、地面机器人、无人机、传感器和导弹，旨在作为一个完整的集合发挥作用，并通过假设的战场网络连接。

The wager was simple.

赌注很简单。

Because a vehicle light enough to be carried aboard a C-130 transport aircraft could not survive a tank main-gun round, it could not be hit by one.

由于重量足够轻、可搭载 C-130 运输机的车辆无法在坦克主炮射击中幸存，因此它不会被击中。

Therefore, seeing and shooting first supplanted armor.

因此，观察和射击首先取代了盔甲。

The C-130 limit was a requirement rather than a tradeoff and changed everything that flowed from it.

C-130 限制是一种要求，而不是一种权衡，它改变了由此产生的一切。

This logic echoes Wayne Hughes’s maxim of “ attacking effectively first ,” but only half of it.

这个逻辑呼应了韦恩休斯的格言“先有效进攻”，但只说了一半。

Hughes paired striking first with staying power , the capacity to absorb hits and keep fighting, but warned that forces unable to absorb hits are one exchange away from defeat.

休斯将先发打击与持久力、吸收打击和继续战斗的能力结合在一起，但他警告说，无法吸收打击的部队距离失败只有一步之遥。

Acquisition programs are concept-driven by design.

采购计划是由设计概念驱动的。

What made the Future Combat Systems extraordinary was what the concept was asked to do — replace armored protection with a nascent property of a networked force that could not be tested until the force existed.

未来作战系统的非凡之处在于这个概念所要求的目标——用网络部队的新生特性取代装甲防护，而在部队存在之前无法对其进行测试。

The concept was self-reinforcing, requiring immature technologies to be viable and worth building.

这个概念是自我强化的，要求不成熟的技术可行且值得建设。

If networked protection underperformed, the force would not become proportionally less capable.

如果网络防护表现不佳，部队的能力也不会相应降低。

Instead, vehicles would become disproportionately more vulnerable.

相反，车辆将变得异常脆弱。

The Army traded a verifiable means of protection for an unverifiable one, then constrained vehicle weights to accommodate an aircraft’s load limits .

陆军将一种可验证的保护手段换成了一种不可验证的保护手段，然后限制车辆重量以适应飞机的负载限制。

When experiences in Iraq forced the issue, the Army mandated V-shaped hulls on the manned vehicles .

当伊拉克的经验迫使这个问题出现时，陆军强制要求载人车辆采用 V 形车体。

But fitting inside a C-130 penalized every pound of armor or added vertical height, reducing capabilities elsewhere while still not addressing the original survivability shortfalls.

但安装在 C-130 内会损失每一磅装甲或增加垂直高度，从而降低其他地方的能力，同时仍然无法解决最初的生存能力缺陷。

The Army was unable to convince civilian leadership that the modifications were enough .

陆军无法让文职领导层相信这些修改就足够了。

The result was coupled conceptual and technical risk.

结果是概念风险和技术风险结合在一起。

Future Combat Systems represented brittle holism : No single system held value outside the whole, and every interdependent system was a critical vulnerability.

未来作战系统代表了脆弱的整体论：没有一个系统在整体之外具有价值，并且每个相互依赖的系统都是一个严重的漏洞。

In a loosely connected portfolio, a failed sensor is a failed sensor.

在松散连接的产品组合中，失效的传感器就是失效的传感器。

In a tightly coupled architecture, it’s a failed operating concept, as tight coupling makes cascading, catastrophic failures nearly inevitable in complex interdependent systems .

在紧密耦合的架构中，这是一个失败的操作概念，因为紧密耦合使得在复杂的相互依赖的系统中几乎不可避免地会出现级联的灾难性故障。

Government Accountability Office auditors recognized this and identified integration itself as the Future Combat System program’s dominant risk factor.

政府问责办公室的审计人员认识到了这一点，并将集成本身视为未来作战系统计划的主要风险因素。

The Future Combat Systems’ network was the clearest case of possible failure.

未来作战系统的网络是最明显的可能失败的例子。

The program depended on the Joint Tactical Radio System, a separate program outside the Army, with costs outside the Systems’ budget.

该计划依赖于联合战术无线电系统，这是陆军之外的一个独立计划，其成本超出了系统的预算。

When they struggled to field the radio , the Army could neither replace the network nor field the force without it.

当他们努力部署无线电时，陆军既无法更换网络，也无法在没有无线电的情况下部署军队。

Golden Dome’s command-and-control layer presents the same risk.

金顶的指挥和控制层也存在同样的风险。

While its sensors and ground-based interceptors are mature, success depends on a new, yet-to-be-fielded network to marry them.

虽然其传感器和地面拦截器已经成熟，但成功取决于一个新的、尚未部署的网络来将它们结合起来。

This network is likely the Joint Fires Network , an ambitious effort that fuses disparate data across multiple transport layers with complex software and artificial intelligence.

该网络很可能是联合火力网络，这是一项雄心勃勃的努力，它将跨多个传输层的不同数据与复杂的软件和人工智能融合在一起。

The program is already under stress, with fielding and training delays drawing Inspector General scrutiny .

该计划已经面临压力，部署和训练的延误引起了监察长的审查。

If the Joint Fires Network layer fails, shooters will lack timely sensor data across layers that would otherwise function independently.

如果联合火力网络层发生故障，射手将缺乏跨层的及时传感器数据，否则这些数据将独立运行。

The questions Future Combat Systems poses are whether that layer is appreciated as the lynchpin it appears to be, and whether any alternative exists if it slips.

未来作战系统提出的问题是，这一层是否被视为关键，如果它出现问题，是否存在任何替代方案。

No public communication suggests one does.

没有任何公开信息表明有人这样做。

Three structural properties of Future Combat Systems made the bet impossible to hedge.

未来作战系统的三个结构特性使得该赌注无法对冲。

First, testing it was uneconomical.

首先，测试它是不经济的。

Validating the concept required the entire architecture to exist at once: the network, sensors, ground vehicles, and drones.

验证这一概念需要整个架构同时存在：网络、传感器、地面车辆和无人机。

Evidence of failure arrived only after the Army committed significant resources.

仅在陆军投入大量资源后，失败的证据才出现。

A portfolio structure would have allowed the Army to learn from a failed sensor program without risking the entire armored force.

组合结构将使陆军能够从失败的传感器计划中吸取教训，而不会让整个装甲部队面临风险。

Second, the program could not be de-scoped.

其次，该计划无法取消范围。

Because of tightly coupled interdependence, the program could not trade scope for affordability.

由于紧密耦合的相互依赖性，该计划无法以范围换取负担能力。

Software proved the most complex and inflexible part of the program , as dropping a system did not remove code so much as force a rewrite for every component that depended on it.

事实证明，软件是程序中最复杂和最不灵活的部分，因为删除系统并不能删除代码，而是强制重写依赖于该系统的每个组件。

Finally, the Army believed transformation could not wait.

最后，陆军认为转型刻不容缓。

The expedited schedule treated unfinished inventions and systems as on-demand deliverables.

加急的时间表将未完成的发明和系统视为按需交付。

Auditors continuously reported that most critical technologies were immature at launch and remained so years later .

审计人员不断报告说，大多数关键技术在推出时并不成熟，并且在多年后仍然如此。

Moving fast surfaced problems after commitment, the most expensive time for correction.

承诺之后，快速行动就会暴露出问题，这是纠正成本最高的时期。

This lesson in particular lands awkwardly today.

今天这个教训尤其尴尬。

The Pentagon has committed the department to higher risk thresholds, making accelerated production and rapid procurement the default .

五角大楼已要求该部门承担更高的风险阈值，默认加速生产和快速采购。

Much of that urgency is warranted, but there are tradeoffs between speed and validation.

这种紧迫性在很大程度上是有必要的，但速度和验证之间需要权衡。

The important distinction is between decisions that are cheap to reverse and decisions that are not.

重要的区别在于逆转成本较低的决策和成本较低的决策之间的区别。

Fielding a drone quickly and finding it lacking costs a production run.

快速部署无人机并发现其缺失会导致生产运行成本增加。

Committing a force architecture to an integration concept quickly and finding it wanting could cost a decade.

快速将部队架构融入一体化概念并发现其需要可能需要十年的时间。

While RAND’s retrospective attributed the Future Combat Systems’ failure to execution rather than concept, the program’s structure made good execution unverifiable until it was too late.

虽然兰德公司的回顾将未来作战系统的失败归咎于执行而不是概念，但该计划的结构使得良好的执行无法验证，直到为时已晚。

The warnings about the Future Combat Systems were neither secret nor occasional.

关于未来作战系统的警告既不是秘密也不是偶然的。

Government auditors, congressional researchers, and budget analysts published similar findings for half a decade, yet the program survived each review.

五年来，政府审计员、国会研究人员和预算分析师都发表了类似的调查结果，但该计划却通过了每次审查。

Auditors judged the business case inadequate as early as 2006 , and the same concerns persisted through 2008 .

早在 2006 年，审计人员就判定该业务案例不充分，并且同样的担忧持续到 2008 年。

Several mechanisms kept the Future Combat Systems program alive.

有多种机制使未来作战系统计划保持活力。

The program was the Army’s budget centerpiece and tied to its future identity, making the two difficult to separate.

该计划是陆军预算的核心，与其未来的身份息息相关，使得两者难以分开。

Further, sunk-cost fallacy and the Army’s advertisement that subcontracting work spanned more than 100 congressional districts also made canceling difficult.

此外，沉没成本谬误以及陆军关于分包工作跨越 100 多个国会选区的广告也使得取消变得困难。

Ending the program required an outsider with the political will and no emotional stake in the outcome.

结束该计划需要一个具有政治意愿的局外人，并且对结果没有任何情感上的利害关系。

Office of the Secretary of Defense oversight came late , and the independent review teams convened along the way lacked the independence and authority to force change.

国防部长办公室的监督来得太晚，一路上召集的独立审查小组缺乏强制变革的独立性和权威。

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates eventually canceled it in April 2009, amid two wars that fundamentally discredited the program.

国防部长罗伯特·盖茨最终于 2009 年 4 月取消了该计划，两次战争从根本上使该计划失去了信誉。

This was the institutional consequence of an unhedgeable bet.

这是不可对冲的赌注的制度后果。

When a concept becomes the service’s theory of itself, failure means conceding the theory, so the available responses narrow to continuing or canceling outright.

当一个概念成为服务本身的理论时，失败就意味着承认该理论，因此可用的响应范围缩小到继续或彻底取消。

A hedged program can be trimmed by its managers, but an unhedged one can only be stopped by someone who does not answer to them.

一项对冲计划可以由其管理者进行调整，但一项未对冲计划只能由不对其负责的人来阻止。

The lesson for Golden Dome is that the authority to fail its final gate should rest with someone who owns neither the program, its schedule, nor the money.

金顶的教训是，冲破最终大门的权力应该掌握在既不拥有该项目、时间表也不拥有资金的人手中。

Golden Dome offers a test of whether the department has learned the lesson of interdependence.

金顶可以检验该部门是否吸取了相互依赖的教训。

It derives value from integration, but unlike the Future Combat Systems program, its individual systems have standalone value.

它从集成中获得价值，但与未来作战系统计划不同的是，它的各个系统具有独立的价值。

THAAD and Patriot provide theater defense regardless of Golden Dome, and the missile-warning and tracking satellites are capabilities the Space Force is already investing in.

无论金顶如何，萨德和爱国者都能提供战区防御，而导弹预警和跟踪卫星是太空军已经投资的能力。

Many of the individual technologies have been demonstrated independently.

许多单独的技术已经被独立论证。

Yet industry concedes that assembling them into a working operational system is the hard part , and that assembly runs through a joint command-and-control network the program’s director has made a top priority .

然而业界承认，将它们组装成一个可运行的操作系统是困难的部分，并且组装通过联合指挥和控制网络进行，该项目的负责人已将其作为首要任务。

Despite the interdependency risks, its current structure reflects awareness and discipline.

尽管存在相互依赖的风险，但其当前的结构反映了意识和纪律。

The interceptor effort is a gated prize competition among twelve companies , moving from component testing through prototype and on-orbit demonstration, and the program states it will not make production requests until capabilities are proven .

拦截器项目是十二家公司之间的一项有奖竞赛，从组件测试到原型和在轨演示，该计划规定，在能力得到验证之前，不会提出生产请求。

However, two properties resist hedging, and they fail in different ways.

然而，有两种房产抵制对冲，而且它们以不同的方式失败。

The command-and-control network is the coupling risk, and it is Golden Dome’s version of the Future Combat Systems’ network: the program depends on but does not own the Joint Fires Network, and no viable alternative exists.

指挥控制网络是耦合风险，它是金顶版本的未来作战系统网络：该计划依赖但不拥有联合火力网络，并且不存在可行的替代方案。

The space-based interceptor layer is a different problem.

天基拦截层是一个不同的问题。

Continuous boost-phase coverage requires a minimum constellation of about 1,000 specialized satellites , so a partial constellation is not partial coverage but a gap.

连续的助推阶段覆盖需要至少约1000颗专用卫星的星座，因此部分星座不是部分覆盖，而是间隙。

That number, like the C-130 weight limit, is fixed outside the program’s discretion and changes everything downstream.

这个数字，就像 C-130 的重量限制一样，是在项目自行决定之外固定的，并且会改变下游的一切。

This property made the Future Combat Systems program impossible to de-scope, because reducing it did not produce a smaller version of the capability.

这一特性使得未来作战系统计划不可能取消范围，因为减少它并不会产生更小的版本的能力。

Unlike the terminal and midcourse layers, which retain value if the boost-phase layer never materializes, the boost-phase mission has no reduced form.

与末段和中段层不同的是，如果助推阶段层永远不会实现，末段和中段层仍保留价值，助推阶段任务没有简化形式。

This is why the program director’s testimony that space-based interceptors would be dropped if cost and scalability targets are not met matters more than it may appear.

这就是为什么项目主管的证词，即如果成本和可扩展性目标得不到满足，天基拦截器将被放弃，这一点比表面上看起来更重要。

It is a fold criterion set in advance, an acknowledgment that a layer with no reduced form should be abandoned entirely rather than fielded partially.

这是预先设定的折叠标准，承认没有简化形式的层应该完全放弃而不是部分部署。

Whether that acknowledgment survives contact with a constellation under contract is the question.

问题在于，这种确认是否在与合同下的星座接触后仍然有效。

That leaves two critical vulnerabilities: a network whose failure cascades across every dependent layer and a constellation that cannot be partially delivered.

这就留下了两个严重的漏洞：一个网络，其故障会级联到每个依赖层，以及一个无法部分交付的星座。

Both are tested at the final integration gate, when the money is already spent, and the hedges are thinnest.

两者都在最后的整合关口进行测试，此时资金已经花完，对冲也最薄弱。

A missile-defense advocate will likely object that the analogy proves too much.

导弹防御倡导者可能会反对，认为这种类比太过分了。

Future Combat Systems rested on unproven battlefield technologies, while missile-defense layers are demonstrated.

未来的作战系统依赖于未经证实的战场技术，而导弹防御层则已得到验证。

That objection is valid and should be conceded.

这一反对意见是有效的，应该予以承认。

Fielding more Patriot and THAAD capacity is cheap to reverse, and slowing that down is not defensible.

部署更多的“爱国者”和“萨德”反导系统的成本是昂贵的，而放慢速度是没有道理的。

But the constellation size and the integration architecture are not, and those two decisions should not be made before they are validated.

但星座规模和集成架构则不然，这两个决定在经过验证之前不应做出。

The appropriate question for Golden Dome is whether the structured hedges hold under pressure.

对于金顶来说，合适的问题是结构性对冲是否能承受压力。

The deadline is set by an administration’s term rather than technical readiness, a forcing function similar to the C-130 weight limit.

最后期限是由政府的任期而不是技术准备情况决定的，这是类似于 C-130 重量限制的强制功能。

Nearly all of the program’s funding arrived as a lump-sum reconciliation outside the annual budget review where cost growth would ordinarily draw scrutiny.

该计划的几乎所有资金都是在年度预算审查之外一次性核对的，而成本增长通常会受到审查。

And the final integration gate comes after the money is spent.

最后的整合门是在钱花完之后。

Will performance gates remain honest when political pressures mount against the demonstration schedule, and will the final integration gate be allowed to fail with production consequences?

当政治压力对演示计划产生影响时，性能门是否会保持诚实，并且最终的集成门会因生产后果而失败吗？

Two refinements would make those hedges real.

两项改进将使这些对冲成为现实。

First, gate criteria should include cost and performance thresholds committed before the gate, not negotiated at it.

首先，入门标准应包括在入门之前承诺的成本和性能阈值，而不是在入门时协商。

A program can pass technical demonstration while unit costs drift to where the affordable fleet falls below the coverage threshold, passing its gates but still failing to deliver the capability.

一个项目可以通过技术演示，但单位成本会下降到可承受的机队低于覆盖范围阈值，通过了大门但仍然无法提供功能。

The Future Combat Systems program’s overarching cost estimates grew sharply without triggering the Nunn-McCurdy statutory tripwire, but the radio its network depended on did .

未来作战系统计划的总体成本估算急剧增长，但没有触发纳恩-麦科迪法定绊线，但其网络所依赖的无线电却触发了。

Because the Pentagon measures cost overruns by individual program baselines rather than structural dependencies, it obscures the true systemic failure of an interdependent system of systems.

由于五角大楼通过单个计划基线而不是结构依赖性来衡量成本超支，因此它掩盖了相互依赖的系统的真正系统性故障。

Even when the wire tripped, it rarely stopped anything: All but four of the thirty-seven breaches between 2007 and 2016 were certified rather than acted on by curtailing the program.

即使电线跳闸，也很少能阻止任何事情：2007 年至 2016 年间发生的 37 起违规事件中，除了 4 起之外，所有违规行为都得到了认证，而不是通过限制该计划来采取行动。

Second, assign authority over the final integration gate now, and place it outside the program.

其次，现在分配最终集成门的权限，并将其放置在程序之外。

Early gates test technical risk component by component, but interdependence means the concept-level claim is tested only at the last one, where sunk cost, politics, and momentum of earlier successes press hardest.

早期的关卡逐个测试技术风险，但相互依赖意味着概念层面的主张只能在最后关口进行测试，而沉没成本、政治和早期成功的动力在这方面压力最大。

The Future Combat Systems record shows that late oversight and weak, dependent review teams do not work.

未来作战系统的记录表明，后期监督和薄弱、依赖的审查团队不起作用。

The remedy is a standing non-advocate review, chartered before the final gate, with cost and performance thresholds fixed in advance, and empowered to fail the gate outright.

补救措施是进行常设非倡导者审查，在最终关口之前特许，预先确定成本和性能阈值，并有权彻底失败。

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation already produce the independent judgments such a review needs, but neither holds the authority to act on them.

运行测试和评估总监以及成本评估和计划评估总监已经做出了审查所需的独立判断，但两人均无权采取行动。

In 2007, the Army paid for a theory of survival while fighting a war that demanded more protection than the concept could carry, with no way to change course short of cancellation.

2007年，陆军为生存理论付出了代价，而这场战争需要比这一概念所能提供的更多保护，除非取消，否则无法改变方向。

Golden Dome has gates, severable contracts, and an outside architecture authority — more structure than the Future Combat Systems program ever had.

金顶有大门、可分割的合同和外部架构权威——比未来作战系统计划拥有的结构更多。

What it lacks is a named independent authority allowed to fold the hand.

它所缺乏的是一个允许弃牌的指定的独立权威。

Until it does, its hedges are only as strong as the program’s willingness to admit failure, and Future Combat Systems proved that hedge does not exist.

在此之前，其对冲措施的强度取决于该计划是否愿意承认失败，而未来作战系统证明这种对冲措施并不存在。

Andrew Tenbusch is a U.S. Navy officer.

安德鲁·滕布什是一名美国海军军官。

He holds a Master of Science in Systems Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Business Administration in Aerospace and Defense from the University of Tennessee.

他拥有海军研究生院系统分析理学硕士学位和田纳西大学航空航天与国防工商管理硕士学位。

The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.

所表达的观点仅代表他自己的观点，并不反映美国海军或国防部的观点。

Trevor Phillips-Levine is a U.S. Navy officer.

特雷弗·菲利普斯·莱文是一名美国海军军官。

He holds a Master of Science in Systems Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Business Administration in Aerospace and Defense from the University of Tennessee.

他拥有海军研究生院系统分析理学硕士学位和田纳西大学航空航天与国防工商管理硕士学位。

The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.

所表达的观点仅代表他自己的观点，并不反映美国海军或国防部的观点。

***Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

***请注意，根据公司风格，岩石战争不会使用美国国防部的不同名称，除非美国国会根据法规更改该名称。