Rated Ready is Not Ready: What America’s Korea Exercises Actually Measure
“We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can.
“我们希望尽可能阻止朝鲜人远离釜山。
Block the main road as far north as possible.
尽可能向北封锁主要道路。
Contact General Church.
联系总教会。
If you can’t locate him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can.
如果你找不到他，可以的话就去大田及更远的地方。
Sorry I can’t give you more information.
抱歉，我无法向您提供更多信息。
That’s all I’ve got.
这就是我所拥有的一切。
Good luck to you, and God bless you and your men.” -Maj.
祝你好运，上帝保佑你和你的部下。” -少校。
Gen.
将军
William F.
威廉·F.
Dean, orders to Lt.
迪恩，向中尉发出命令。
Col.
上校
Charles B.
查尔斯·B.
Smith, July 1, 1950, four days before Task Force Smith was overrun at Osan.
史密斯，1950 年 7 月 1 日，四天前，史密斯特遣部队在乌山被击败。
The battery I served in at Camp Casey, South Korea, the 333rd Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battery, existed to do one thing if North Korea attacked: find the enemy’s guns so our guns could fire back.
我在韩国凯西营服役的第 333 野战炮兵目标获取连，其存在的目的是在朝鲜发动攻击时做一件事：找到敌人的枪支，以便我们的枪支可以还击。
That was the whole of our unit’s job.
这就是我们单位的全部工作。
I was a private first class and fire support specialist in that battery: the soldier who tells the guns where to shoot.
我是该连的一等兵和火力支援专家：告诉炮兵向哪里射击的士兵。
On Nov.
十一月一日
23, 2010, news reached us that North Korea shelled an island called Yeonpyeong, somewhere to the west.
2010 年 2 月 23 日，我们收到消息称，朝鲜炮击了位于西部某处的一座名为延坪岛的岛屿。
That was about all I knew.
这就是我所知道的一切。
Our sergeant ordered us to put on armor, go to the armory, and draw live rounds.
我们的中士命令我们穿上盔甲，去军械库，进行实弹射击。
After drawing ammunition, my squad and I were directed to wait in our Humvee — a task even four junior enlisted men had no trouble executing with minimal direction.
取出弹药后，我和我的小队被指示在我们的悍马车里等待——这项任务即使是四名初级士兵也能在最少的指导下轻松执行。
That, however, was where our direction ended.
然而，我们的方向就到此为止了。
No one in that vehicle knew what we were supposed to do next.
那辆车里没有人知道我们下一步应该做什么。
Nothing in any of the exercises we had done up to that point, which were to prepare us for this exact moment, had given us a next move for that afternoon.
到目前为止，我们所做的任何练习（这些练习都是为了让我们为这一刻做好准备）都没有为我们那天下午的下一步行动提供依据。
So, we stayed where the day had put us: in the motor pool, in the Humvee, waiting.
所以，我们留在了当天安排的地方：在汽车池里，在悍马车里，等待。
16 years later, the exercises got shorter; Ulchi Freedom Shield, planned for 11 days, ended after only five, following U.S. President Donald Trump’s direction to his defense secretary in a social media post to “substantially reduce” exercises on the Korean Peninsula.
16年后，练习时间变短了；美国总统唐纳德·特朗普在社交媒体上发帖指示国防部长“大幅减少”朝鲜半岛的演习，原计划为期 11 天的“乙支自由盾”活动仅持续了 5 天就结束了。
The president gave four reasons: his relationship with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, the cost, the “hostile” signal the exercises send, and Seoul’s refusal to join America’s military operation to denuclearize Iran.
总统给出了四个理由：他与朝鲜领导人金正恩的关系、成本、演习发出的“敌对”信号，以及首尔拒绝加入美国实现伊朗无核化的军事行动。
Readiness was not on the list.
准备情况并不在清单上。
Retired American and South Korean officers called the cut a blow to readiness, while the Pentagon assured that the move “preserve(s) essential readiness” and resulted in “no degradation to U.S. training objectives.” That assurance applied only to American training objectives — what constitutes “essential” readiness remains undefined.
美国和韩国的退休军官称此举是对战备状态的打击，而五角大楼则保证此举“保持了基本的战备状态”，并导致“美国的训练目标不会下降”。这一保证仅适用于美国的训练目标——什么构成“基本”战备仍然没有定义。
Neither claim can be checked because the readiness the critics invoke and the training objectives the Pentagon cites have never been publicly disclosed.
这两种说法都无法得到证实，因为批评者所援引的准备情况和五角大楼引用的训练目标从未公开披露过。
The wider implications of the cut for the alliance are a separate question, but what Washington and Seoul ought to be asking at this juncture is far narrower: What are these exercises actually for?
削减对联盟的更广泛影响是一个单独的问题，但华盛顿和首尔此时应该问的问题要窄得多：这些演习实际上是为了什么呢？
The alliance has one public answer to that question, but it sits at the top of the chain.
该联盟对这个问题有一个公开的答案，但它位于链条的顶端。
Both governments state openly that the command post exercise certifies whether a future combined command under a South Korean four-star can meet the conditions for taking wartime operational control — an assessment that was underway in this year’s exercise when the president halved it, with Seoul pressing for a transfer decision at October’s Security Consultative Meeting .
两国政府公开表示，指挥所演习旨在证明未来韩国四星联合司令部是否能够满足获得战时作战控制权的条件——今年的演习中正在进行这一评估，当时总统将演习数量减半，首尔则敦促在 10 月份的安全协商会议上做出移交决定。
South Korea’s defense minister, Ahn Gyu-back, told the National Assembly that the evaluation, including the counterfire portion, finished within the five days that it ran — analysts in Seoul counter that a halved exercise narrows the basis for judging the command Seoul proposes to lead.
韩国国防部长安圭巴克 (Ahn Gyu-back) 向国民议会表示，包括反击部分在内的评估在五天内完成——首尔的分析人士反驳说，演习减半缩小了判断首尔提议领导的指挥的基础。
No outsider can score that dispute either — the communiqués state that “all assessment tasks met the criteria” without listing any tasks, naming any formation, or showing any criteria.
外人也无法对这一争议进行评分——公报指出“所有评估任务都符合标准”，但没有列出任何任务、命名任何阵型或显示任何标准。
The alliance certifies publicly and grades privately.
该联盟公开认证并私下评分。
It is hard for me to say the exercises of 2010 produced “readiness.” What they produced, at my level, was a private in a motor pool with live rounds and no idea what to do.
我很难说2010年的演习产生了“准备”。在我的水平上，他们生产的是一个私人汽车池里的实弹，不知道该怎么做。
Perhaps I was too junior to see the plan; perhaps Private Hoffman was failing to meet the standard; or perhaps the exercises today produce something different — I cannot say, and neither can anything in the public record.
也许我还太年轻，看不到这个计划；也许二等兵霍夫曼没有达到标准；也许今天的演习会产生不同的结果——我不能说，公共记录中也不能说。
If these are rehearsals for war, the alliance can show it without declassifying a page: which units rehearse which wartime missions, in which exercise, graded by whom.
如果这些是战争排练，联盟可以在不解密页面的情况下展示它：哪些单位排练哪些战时任务，进行哪些演习，由谁评分。
The grades can stay classified, and so can the passing mark, but the syllabus cannot.
成绩可以保持分类，及格分数也可以，但教学大纲不能。
Exercise Team Spirit put 200,000 troops in the field at its peak and ended in 1993.
“团队精神”演习最高峰时有20万士兵参战，于1993年结束。
The surviving line —Ulchi Focus Lens, then Ulchi Freedom Guardian, now Ulchi Freedom Shield — has been a command post exercise since 1976.
幸存的防线——乙支聚焦透镜，后来的乙支自由卫士，现在的乙支自由盾——自 1976 年以来一直是指挥所演习。
Robert Collins, former chief of strategy for Combined Forces Command, described Key Resolve, Ulchi’s spring counterpart, as being intended to “train staff instead of field units.” Team Spirit trained the field, and its survivors train the command post.
联合部队司令部前战略主管罗伯特·柯林斯 (Robert Collins) 将乙支春季对应的“关键决心”描述为“培训参谋人员而不是野战部队”。团队精神训练战场，幸存者训练指挥所。
The exercise both sides are now arguing over is a staff exercise with field events attached.
双方现在争论的演习是一场附有现场活动的参谋演习。
In August 2010, the Ulchi Freedom Guardian I was in ran with 30,000 American and 56,000 South Korean participants — the Army called it the world’s largest annual command post exercise.
2010 年 8 月，乙支自由卫士 I 号与 30,000 名美国参与者和 56,000 名韩国参与者一起参加了演习——陆军称其为世界上最大的年度指挥所演习。
My squad’s piece of it was in a bunker at Camp Red Cloud, where we ran 12-hour shifts watching terminals inside a theater-level wargame.
我小队的部分工作在红云营的一个掩体中，我们在那里进行 12 小时轮班，监视战区级兵棋推演中的终端。
Nothing in that week trained the task my squad existed to perform.
那一周没有任何事情可以训练我的小队执行的任务。
I am not calling the week worthless, but it was a headquarters exercise doing headquarters training: Four junior enlisted combat arms soldiers were furniture in it.
我并不是说这一周毫无价值，但这是一次进行总部训练的总部演习：四名初级入伍战斗兵种士兵是其中的家具。
Collins’ view of the spring exercise came from the Chief of Strategy’s office, and my view in August looked the same from the bunker.
柯林斯对春季演习的看法来自战略主管办公室，而我在八月的地堡中的看法看起来也是如此。
Ulchi Freedom Shield runs in two phases, defense and then counterattack — the president’s directive cut the counterattack phase, planned for Aug.
乙支自由盾行动分为两个阶段，先防御，然后反击——总统的指示取消了原计划于 8 月 12 日进行的反击阶段。
24 to 27.
24 至 27。
The field training scheduled alongside the command post exercise took its own cut: The allies halved those events from fourteen to seven, deferring the rest or converting them to simulations.
与指挥所演习一起安排的现场训练也有其自身的局限性：盟军将这些活动从十四个减少到七个，推迟其余的或将其转换为模拟。
This year’s exercise involved about 18,000 South Korean troops and an unspecified number of Americans.
今年的演习约有 18,000 名韩国士兵和数量不详的美国人参加。
Defense Minister Ahn says 159 field training exercises remain on this year’s calendar.
安防长表示，今年的日历上仍有 159 场野战训练演习。
That the soldiers on the peninsula train at volume is not in question.
半岛上的士兵进行大量训练是毫无疑问的。
What is in question is whether that volume trains them for the fight they would actually find themselves in.
问题在于，这本书是否训练了他们应对实际的战斗。
At 2:34 p.m.
下午 2:34
on Nov.
十一月
23, 2010, the alliance came as close to that fight as it had been in 60 years when a North Korean multiple rocket launcher battery south of the village of Kaun-gol fired a barrage of 170 rounds onto Yeonpyeong Island.
2010 年 12 月 23 日，朝鲜在 Kaun-gol 村以南的多管火箭炮连向延坪岛发射了 170 发子弹，是 60 年来最接近的一场战斗。
The island’s Firefinder counter-battery radar, the same model my battery fielded at Camp Casey, was down with an unknown fault.
岛上的“猎火者”反炮台雷达，与我在凯西营部署的炮台型号相同，因未知故障而瘫痪。
The fire control center could not locate the launchers.
消防控制中心无法找到发射器。
The South Korean Marine artillery crews, with most of their guns ready, executed pre-planned counter-battery fire: Only after the radar came back online could they find and engage the rocket battery.
韩国海军陆战队炮兵已准备好大部分火炮，执行了预先计划的反炮兵火力：只有在雷达恢复正常后，他们才能发现并攻击火箭炮。
The attack killed two marines and two civilians.
这次袭击造成两名海军陆战队员和两名平民死亡。
Yeonpyeong lies about 125 kilometers west-southwest of Camp Casey.
延坪岛位于凯西营西南偏西约 125 公里处。
The battery that responded was South Korean by design: Peacetime operational control of South Korean forces returned to Seoul in December 1994.
做出回应的炮台是韩国设计的：和平时期韩国军队的作战控制权于 1994 年 12 月返回首尔。
And the intended American response was to hold fire — which is what we did in that motor pool.
美国的预期反应是不开火——这就是我们在汽车池中所做的。
But the fight was a counterfire fight, and my battery was built around the exact radar that went down on Yeonpyeong.
但这场战斗是一场反击战，我的炮台是围绕着落在延坪岛的雷达建造的。
Maybe we had a useful task that afternoon, or maybe we had none.
也许那天下午我们有一项有用的任务，也可能没有。
That judgment lived echelons above me, and I cannot make it.
这个判断比我高，但我做不到。
But the confusion at my level wasn’t in the waiting.
但以我的水平来说，困惑并不在于等待。
We knew our equipment and our basic combat tasks: Every field exercise we had run tested one or the other.
我们了解我们的装备和基本作战任务：我们进行的每一次野外演习都测试了其中之一。
What nothing had taught us was how we were intended to apply that training if North Korea attacked.
我们没有学到的是，如果朝鲜发动袭击，我们该如何运用这种训练。
Army doctrine has held since 1993 that a commander’s intent must be understood two echelons down, so that a unit can act when orders stop.
自 1993 年以来，陆军条令一直规定，指挥官的意图必须被两梯队理解，这样部队才能在命令停止时采取行动。
That is the Army’s standard, and it is the only one I measure that afternoon against.
这是陆军的标准，也是我那天下午衡量的唯一标准。
The obvious reply is that command post exercises never claimed to be for junior soldiers, so of course a private saw nothing of his job in them.
显而易见的答案是，指挥所演习从未声称是针对初级士兵的，所以当然，一个列兵在其中看不到他的工作。
But training the headquarters and training the field are not either-or, and the Army was proving it at the time in two wars at once.
但训练总部和训练野战并不是非此即彼的，陆军当时在两场战争中同时证明了这一点。
The National Training Center put whole brigades, squads to staffs, into one simulated fight, with every echelon evaluated against its mission-essential tasks.
国家训练中心将整个旅、班到参谋都安排在一场模拟战斗中，每个梯队都根据其关键任务进行评估。
I went through it as a specialist, still junior enlisted, before Afghanistan, and left with a working idea of what was expected of me when orders ran out.
在阿富汗战争之前，我还是一名初级入伍军人，作为一名专家经历了这一切，并在离开时对订单用完时对我的期望有了一个可行的想法。
The command posts got their training in the same rotation — nobody had to choose.
指挥所以相同的轮换方式接受训练——没有人必须选择。
Readiness includes the warfighters expected to do the fighting knowing, at least in outline, what they will be asked to do.
准备状态包括预计参加战斗的战士至少知道他们将被要求做什么。
It also includes the taxpayers who fund the training, and the committees that oversee it, being able to learn what it is for.
它还包括资助培训的纳税人以及监督培训的委员会，以便能够了解培训的用途。
If a private’s wartime task in Korea is to wait for orders, fine.
如果一名列兵在朝鲜的战时任务是等待命令，那没问题。
Then train soldiers to expect it and say so the next time someone defends an exercise as readiness.
然后训练士兵做好准备，并在下次有人为演习辩护时说出来。
If standby is the design, it is fair to ask, before anyone mourns or celebrates this cut, why thousands of troops are counted as participants, how many of them are training their actual wartime tasks, and whether the format ever needed the scale both sides are fighting over.
如果待命是设计，那么在任何人哀悼或庆祝这次削减之前，我们可以公平地问一下，为什么数千名士兵被算作参与者，其中有多少人正在训练他们的实际战时任务，以及这种形式是否需要双方正在争夺的规模。
Within weeks of the 2010 shelling, Seoul announced Firefinder radars for the border islands and, within a year, reinforced Yeonpyeong’s garrison.
2010 年炮击事件发生后的几周内，首尔宣布为边境岛屿部署 Firefinder 雷达，并在一年内加强了延坪岛的驻军。
The American side replaced its Firefinders too.
美国方面也更换了探火者。
Every asset-level fix is documented, and anyone can check it.
每个资产级别的修复都有记录，任何人都可以检查。
The same cannot be said for training.
对于训练则不然。
Camp Casey’s own release says its ammunition-upload and alert drills are designed to “test the brigade’s ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy.” I went looking for the rest.
凯西营自己发布的消息称，其弹药装载和警报演习旨在“测试该旅快速动员和部署的能力”。我去找剩下的。
The closest the public record comes is U.S. Forces Korea’s own exercise instruction, which states a grading system exists for seven mission-essential tasks and monthly readiness assessments.
最接近的公开记录是驻韩美军自己的演习指示，其中规定有针对七项关键任务和每月战备评估的分级系统。
The seven tasks are not listed, nor does anything in the public record state what qualifies as “readiness.” Whether that means being prepared for a North Korean thrust across the Demilitarized Zone or, as in 2010, refreshing basic skills with no scenario attached, nothing in the open source can say.
这七项任务没有列出，公共记录中也没有任何内容说明什么是“准备就绪”。无论这意味着为朝鲜冲过非军事区做好准备，还是像 2010 年那样，在不附加任何场景的情况下更新基本技能，开源中没有任何内容可以说明。
Descriptive material on the exercises is plentiful — press releases, hearings, and posture statements — what is lacking is any information about what these exercises actually measure below the headquarters.
关于演习的描述性材料有很多——新闻稿、听证会和态势声明——但缺乏的是关于这些演习在总部以下实际测量的内容的任何信息。
Other theaters publish more.
其他剧院出版更多。
Pacific Command certifies the First Marine Expeditionary Force as a joint task force in print during Balikatan.
太平洋司令部在并肩作战期间将第一海军陆战队远征军认证为联合特遣部队。
Japan’s Joint Staff publishes a 10-item list of what its combined exercise with American forces will train.
日本联合参谋部公布了与美军联合演习的 10 项训练内容清单。
The Army even publishes its mission-essential task standards outright.
陆军甚至直接公布了其关键任务标准。
Korea publishes the least: An instruction with no formation and no task attached.
韩国发布最少：没有编队、没有任务的指令。
No exercise anywhere puts those pieces together — the formation, the task, and the standard it is judged against.
任何地方的练习都没有将这些部分整合在一起——形成、任务和评判标准。
Washington has spent nearly 50 years asking what its exercises accomplish.
华盛顿花了近 50 年的时间来询问其演习的成果。
In 1979, congressional auditors found exercise objectives lacked “meaningful criteria against which to measure accomplishment.” In 2017, the Government Accountability Office conceded the return on exercises resists measurement and may take years to recognize.
1979 年，国会审计员发现演习目标缺乏“衡量成就的有意义的标准”。 2017 年，政府问责办公室承认，演习的回报难以衡量，可能需要数年时间才能认识到。
The alliance ran a version of this year’s experiment in 2018, when the Ulchi Freedom Guardian was suspended outright in favor of reshaped command post training.
该联盟在 2018 年进行了今年实验的一个版本，当时乙支自由卫士被彻底暂停，转而重组指挥所训练。
Gen.
将军
Robert Abrams, then the nominee to command U.S. Forces Korea, told the Senate there was “certainly degradation to the readiness of the force,” then called it “slight.” Secretary of Defense James Mattis kept slight the next day and added that there was “nothing significant to it.” Eight months later, in command, Abrams said combined training and readiness “haven’t slowed down one bit,” citing more than a hundred exercises run since January — a recovery possible only on paper, and only because the measure on offer was a count of exercises rather than anything measured in the field.
当时的驻韩美军司令候选人罗伯特·艾布拉姆斯告诉参议院，“部队的战备状态确实出现了下降”，然后称其“轻微”。第二天，国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯保持了轻描淡写的态度，并补充说“没有什么重要的事情”。八个月后，艾布拉姆斯上任指挥后表示，综合训练和战备“丝毫没有放缓”，他列举了自一月份以来进行的一百多次演习——这种恢复只能在纸面上实现，而且只是因为所提供的衡量标准是演习次数，而不是现场测量的任何数据。
The Army learned the cost of that arithmetic in the Korean War.
陆军在朝鲜战争中了解到了这种算术的成本。
In July 1950, Gen.
1950 年 7 月，将军。
Dean directed Task Force Smith to blunt the North Korean thrust at Osan: Most of Col.
迪恩指示史密斯特遣部队削弱朝鲜对乌山的进攻：大部分上校。
Smith’s soldiers, like my squad 60 years later, were young and combat-inexperienced.
史密斯的士兵和 60 年后我的小队一样，都很年轻，缺乏战斗经验。
Also like us, they had been rated ready by the Army’s evaluation.
和我们一样，他们也被陆军评估评为准备就绪。
North Korean forces overran the unit in seven hours.
朝鲜军队在七小时内占领了该部队。
Rated ready and ready are different standards.
额定就绪和就绪是不同的标准。
The Army has known this for 76 years.
陆军 76 年前就知道这一点。
I cannot say whether theater-specific training would have helped the soldiers of Task Force Smith, nor can I say if additional guidance would have saved lives.
我不能说针对特定战区的训练是否会对史密斯特遣部队的士兵有所帮助，也不能说额外的指导是否会挽救生命。
What I can say is that the threadbare orders Col.
我能说的是，这个破旧的命令上校。
Smith received days before his soldiers were sent into combat mirror the level of awareness we had the day we were ordered to draw live rounds and wait.
史密斯在他的士兵被派往战斗前几天收到的信息反映了我们被命令进行实弹射击并等待那天的意识水平。
Washington and Seoul, through the Security Consultative Meeting , should direct their joint chiefs’ Military Committee and the combined command to publish the syllabus: which formations own which wartime missions, which exercise trains each, and who certifies the result.
华盛顿和首尔应通过安全协商会议指示其参谋长联席会议军事委员会和联合司令部公布大纲：哪些编队负责哪些战时任务，各自进行哪些演习训练，以及谁对结果进行认证。
The criteria and the grades can stay classified, but the soldier should get the rest of it, his own task in full, and none of that ever has to leave his unit.
标准和等级可以保密，但士兵应该得到其余的，完整的他自己的任务，而这些都不必离开他的部队。
One may object that the theaters that publish more train at a distance from the adversary, while the alliance’s wartime missions begin inside North Korean artillery range, but both Washington and Seoul have already judged it safe to disclose mission ownership.
有人可能会反对，因为联盟的战时任务是在朝鲜炮兵射程内开始的，所以发布更多训练的战区距离对手较远，但华盛顿和首尔都已经判断，披露任务所有权是安全的。
The 210th Field Artillery Brigade, my former brigade in Korea, publicized its deep-strike mission on U.S. Army Pacific’s Facebook page last year.
我以前驻扎在韩国的第 210 野战炮兵旅去年在美国太平洋陆军的 Facebook 页面上公布了其深度打击任务。
Seoul’s defense ministry identifies the Ground Operations Command’s counterfire headquarters as responsible for targeting the North’s long-range artillery.
首尔国防部确定地面作战司令部的反火力总部负责瞄准朝鲜的远程火炮。
A staff officer may object that linking those missions to an exercise calendar would tell Pyongyang who rehearses what and when.
一名参谋可能会反对，认为将这些任务与演习日历联系起来会告诉平壤谁在排练什么以及何时排练。
Yet both governments already announce each exercise, as the U.S. Forces Korea spokesman put it this August, “to the entire world before it even starts.”
然而，正如驻韩美军发言人今年八月所说，两国政府已经“在演习开始之前就向全世界宣布了每次演习”。
Congress, for its part, should attach a reporting requirement to the transfer of command itself.
国会则应在指挥权移交时附加报告要求。
Before wartime operational control passes to a South Korean four-star, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea should report to the defense committees which wartime tasks the assessment measured, which exercises measured them, and how the command graded the result: The Comptroller General should review that report against the missions each formation would own under the new command, and keep reviewing it each year after, as it does now for the F-35.
在战时作战控制权移交给韩国四星之前，驻韩美军指挥官应向国防委员会报告评估所衡量的战时任务、哪些演习衡量了这些任务，以及司令部如何对结果进行评分：总审计长应根据新指挥下每个编队将承担的任务来审查该报告，并在以后每年继续审查，就像现在对 F-35 所做的那样。
The yardstick already exists: U.S. Forces Korea wrote it into its own exercise instruction, and while the device is not perfect, Congress already uses it across domains.
标准已经存在：驻韩美军将其写入自己的演习指令中，虽然该设备并不完美，但国会已经在各个领域使用它。
A member who believes the cut damaged readiness needs the review to prove it, and a member who believes the Pentagon’s no-degradation claim needs it just as much.
认为削减损害了战备状态的成员需要审查来证明这一点，而相信五角大楼的不退化声明的成员也同样需要它。
So too does a member who wants the operational control transfer to happen on time — a certification no outsider can check is the easiest kind to hold up.
希望运营控制权按时转移的成员也是如此——没有外人可以检查的认证是最容易保留的。
That would close a loop opened in 1979, when the auditors asked for readiness measures built into the exercise program and the Pentagon answered that readiness could not be quantified.
这将结束 1979 年出现的循环，当时审计员要求将战备措施纳入演习计划，五角大楼回答说战备状态无法量化。
47 years is a long enough wait to give it another try.
47年的等待已经足够漫长，可以再试一次。
When I was stationed at Camp Casey, we jokingly called ourselves the speed bumps.
当我驻扎在凯西营时，我们开玩笑地称自己为“减速带”。
Even at the lowest levels of the force, we understood that our role in a Korean contingency, much like Task Force Smith before us, was to sell our lives as expensively as possible to buy the rest of the force time.
即使在部队的最低层，我们也明白，我们在朝鲜突发事件中的角色，就像我们之前的史密斯特遣队一样，就是尽可能昂贵地出卖自己的生命，以换取部队剩余的时间。
Every soldier in America’s Korean footprint knows they may be asked to do what the soldiers of 1950 were asked to do.
美国在朝鲜足迹中的每一位士兵都知道，他们可能会被要求做 1950 年士兵被要求做的事情。
If they are asked again, the Army should be able to give them more than Gen.
如果再次询问他们，陆军应该能够给他们比将军更多的东西。
Dean could give Col.
迪恩可以给上校。
Smith.
史密斯.
That begins with training, with a published standard commanders are accountable to, and with the alliance answering what these exercises are actually for.
首先是训练，指挥官要对已发布的标准负责，而联盟则要回答这些演习的实际目的。
Alexei Hoffman is a research associate with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
阿列克谢·霍夫曼（Alexei Hoffman）是战略与国际研究中心航空航天安全项目的研究员。
A former U.S. Army forward observer, he served in a counterfire target acquisition battery at Camp Casey, South Korea, during the 2010 Yeonpyeong crisis and later deployed to Afghanistan.
作为一名前美国陆军前沿观察员，他在 2010 年延平危机期间在韩国凯西营的反火力目标获取连服役，后来被部署到阿富汗。
He holds a master’s degree in Asian studies from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and was named a 2024 Next Generation U.S.-ROK Leadership Fellow at the Wilson Center.
他拥有乔治城大学沃尔什外交学院亚洲研究硕士学位，并被威尔逊中心任命为 2024 年下一代美韩领导研究员。
His writing on Asian security topics has appeared in the U.S. Army’s Military Review , the Yale Journal of International Affairs , and Marine Corps University Press.
他有关亚洲安全主题的文章曾发表在《美国陆军军事评论》、《耶鲁国际事务杂志》和海军陆战队大学出版社上。
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
所表达的观点仅代表作者个人观点，并不反映作者所属任何组织（包括战略与国际研究中心）的官方立场。