School of War or School of Battle? Educating for an Uncertain Future
In 1901, military analyst Jan Bloch declared that new military technologies had changed war so radically that the study of history had become useless.
1901 年，军事分析家扬·布洛赫 (Jan Bloch) 宣称，新的军事技术已经从根本上改变了战争，以至于历史研究变得毫无用处。
He castigated military officers who prepared for future war based on “musty precedents” and who failed to recognize that the past was as irrelevant to the future as the experiences of caterpillars were to butterflies.
他严厉批评那些根据“陈旧的先例”为未来战争做准备的军官，他们没有认识到过去与未来无关，就像毛毛虫的经历与蝴蝶一样。
Some of his tactical predictions did prove prescient: He anticipated that modern firepower and entrenchments would make decisive battle impossible.
他的一些战术预测确实具有先见之明：他预计现代火力和工事将使决战变得不可能。
But he was very wrong about the continued value of history.
但他对于历史的持续价值的看法是非常错误的。
After all, it was his study of past wars — above all the American Civil War — that produced his key tactical insights.
毕竟，正是他对过去战争（尤其是美国内战）的研究产生了他的关键战术见解。
Moreover, a broader view of history could have helped him avoid his dramatically wrong conclusions about the strategic implications of his tactical and operational predictions.
此外，更广泛的历史视野可以帮助他避免对战术和作战预测的战略影响得出严重错误的结论。
He thought that states, as rational actors, would abandon warfare, because its political gains could no longer justify its increased costs.
他认为，作为理性行为体的国家将放弃战争，因为其政治收益不再能够证明其增加的成本是合理的。
Thucydides could have taught him that wars originate as much from honor and fear as from calculated interest.
修昔底德本可以告诉他，战争既源于荣誉和恐惧，也源于精心策划的利益。
And a whole-war rather than tactical perspective on the history of the Civil War might have warned him off his mistaken belief that a proud nation could not endure the economic and human costs of modern warfare for more than a few months.
对内战历史的整体战争而不是战术视角可能会警告他不要错误地认为，一个自豪的国家无法承受现代战争的经济和人力成本超过几个月。
Had the military leaders of his day been more accepting of Bloch’s analysis, they might have been better prepared for the battles of 1914, but they would have been even less ready for the war of 1914 to 1918.
如果当时的军事领导人更接受布洛赫的分析，他们可能会为 1914 年的战斗做好更好的准备，但他们对 1914 年至 1918 年的战争的准备就更差了。
Bloch was part of a long line of reformers arguing that imminent “revolutions in military affairs” would change warfare so dramatically as to undermine the value of a broad, history-based education for officers.
布洛赫是众多改革者中的一员，他们认为即将到来的“军事革命”将极大地改变战争，从而破坏对军官进行广泛的、基于历史的教育的价值。
But experience has often proven that idea to be wrong.
但经验常常证明这种想法是错误的。
Recently, some writers have taken a similar stance on the technological advances transforming the character of warfare, and proposed rebalancing American professional military education by putting more emphasis on technical proficiency in warfighting in response to them.
最近，一些作家对技术进步改变战争性质也采取了类似的立场，并建议通过更加重视作战技术熟练程度来重新平衡美国职业军事教育。
Such changes are far from certain to make the United States better prepared for the fighting in the next war, because it is so difficult to predict the context of future combat.
这些变化远不能确定让美国为下一场战争做好更好的准备，因为预测未来战斗的背景非常困难。
More importantly — assuming the number of hours students dedicate to study at their service colleges does not increase — spending more time on “the technical dimensions” of war’s “changing character” must mean less time devoted to understanding the unchanging nature of war and the eternals of strategy.
更重要的是——假设学生在军校学习的时间没有增加——花更多时间研究战争“不断变化的特征”的“技术维度”必然意味着更少的时间花在理解战争不变的本质和永恒的战略上。
Given America’s recent history of tactical successes that failed to accomplish political goals, a strong case could be made for placing more emphasis on strategy, national security studies, and history as preparation to win wars — as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently called for — instead of cutting back in those areas.
鉴于美国最近在战术上取得成功但未能实现政治目标的历史，我们有充分理由更加重视战略、国家安全研究和历史，为赢得战争做好准备——正如国防部长皮特·赫格斯最近所呼吁的那样——而不是削减这些领域的开支。
We, however, will not make an explicit case for a rebalancing of that sort here — others have done so elsewhere and are even building programs along those lines.
然而，我们不会在这里明确提出此类再平衡的理由——其他人已经在其他地方这样做了，甚至正在沿着这些思路制定计划。
Instead, our prescription is more modest: First, do no harm.
相反，我们的处方更为温和：首先，不造成伤害。
The challenges posed by AI, drones, and “lessons” from recent conflicts may warrant changes to the educational modalities within the portions of service college curricula devoted to tactics and the operational art.
人工智能、无人机和最近冲突中的“教训”带来的挑战可能需要改变军种大学课程中专门讨论战术和作战艺术的部分的教育方式。
But a rebalancing that reduces the hours devoted to the broadening aspects of professional military education would not be wise.
但减少用于专业军事教育拓宽方面的时间的重新平衡并不明智。
Nor would it be in consonance with the philosophy that made the Army War College of the interwar period such an extraordinary institution for developing military leaders capable of achieving strategic success against the strongest enemies America ever faced.
它也不符合使两次世界大战期间的陆军战争学院成为一个非凡机构的哲学，它培养能够在对抗美国有史以来最强大的敌人时取得战略成功的军事领导人。
From the 1820s onward , commentators of every generation have suggested that war would be transformed into something unrecognizable by some new technology: from a steam-powered machine gun that would “render all valour useless” to railroads, anesthetic bullets, airplanes, nuclear weapons, precision munitions, and exquisite intelligence.
从1820年代开始，每一代评论家都认为，战争将因某种新技术而变得面目全非：从“让一切英勇变得无用”的蒸汽机枪到铁路、麻醉子弹、飞机、核武器、精确弹药和精湛的情报。
If the military did not focus on how to wield these innovations in combat, reformers worried, the nation could lose the next war.
改革者担心，如果军队不关注如何在战斗中运用这些创新，国家可能会输掉下一场战争。
The related question of whether the military schools of the United States should focus more on preparing officers for the next war, or educating them to be wise forever, is not a new one.
美国军事学校是否应该更多地关注为下一场战争培养军官，或者教育他们永远明智，这一相关问题并不是一个新问题。
Capt.
船长。
James S.
詹姆斯·S。
Pettit wrote in a prize-winning 1888 essay that the “general question” of military education — “how much time and labor shall be given to the absolutely utilitarian, and how much to accomplishments and general knowledge that broaden the mind” — remained unanswered.
佩蒂特在 1888 年的一篇获奖论文中写道，军事教育的“普遍问题”——“应该为绝对功利性的事物投入多少时间和劳动，以及拓宽思维的成就和常识”——仍然没有得到解答。
By the 1920s, however, the Army War College had developed curricula that balanced application with intellectual breadth.
然而，到了 20 年代，陆军战争学院开发了平衡应用与知识广度的课程。
Allied success in World War II owed much to the first-rate strategists produced by the third-rate army of the United States.
二战中盟军的成功很大程度上归功于美国三流军队培养出的一流战略家。
We concur with Thomas Bruscino , as well as with Benjamin Jensen and Brig.
我们同意托马斯·布鲁西诺、本杰明·詹森和布里格的观点。
Gen.
将军
Matthew Tracy , that the sources of that success merit careful attention.
马修·特雷西（Matthew Tracy）认为，成功的根源值得仔细关注。
Officer-students at the interwar War College developed military plans, conducted wargames, and wrote policy reports, but not at the expense of historical study, exposure to the classics of military theory, or, as Adm.
两次世界大战期间战争学院的军官学生制定军事计划、进行兵棋推演并撰写政策报告，但并不以牺牲历史研究、接触军事理论经典为代价，或者像海军上将那样。
William Halsey Jr.— a 1934 graduate — emphasized , a whole-war perspective.
小威廉·哈尔西（William Halsey Jr.）——1934 年的毕业生——强调了整个战争的视角。
These strategists witnessed rapid developments in military technology, but that did not dampen their enthusiasm for breadth of education.
这些战略家目睹了军事技术的快速发展，但这并没有浇灭他们对广泛教育的热情。
Dwight Eisenhower — who was more influenced by Clausewitz than by any more contemporary military writer — appreciated how education at the War College “ desert[ed] the formerly rather narrow business of winning a tactical victory on the battlefield ” to look at war as a national effort, though he also encouraged soldiers to study military engagements of the past — even the deep past — in detail.
德怀特·艾森豪威尔（Dwight Eisenhower）——他受克劳塞维茨的影响比任何当代军事作家的影响更大——赞赏战争学院的教育如何“抛弃了以前相当狭隘的在战场上赢得战术胜利的业务”，将战争视为一项国家努力，尽管他也鼓励士兵详细研究过去的军事交战——甚至是遥远的过去。
While “the facts of a given battle may no longer serve any practical purpose,” he later wrote ,
虽然“一场特定战斗的事实可能不再有任何实际目的，”他后来写道，
when the serious student of the military art delves into the reasons for the failure of a specific attack …
当认真学习军事艺术的学生深入研究特定攻击失败的原因时……
he is, by this very activity, preparing for a day in which he, under different circumstances, may be facing decisions of vital consequence to his country.
他正通过这项活动，为有一天他在不同情况下可能面临对他的国家产生重大影响的决定做好准备。
At the War College, Eisenhower and his classmates delved not just into the campaigns of World War I, but also into Austerlitz, Jena, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Sedan, and Mukden, not to mention Trafalgar and Jutland .
在战争学院，艾森豪威尔和他的同学不仅深入研究了第一次世界大战的战役，还研究了奥斯特里茨、耶拿、葛底斯堡、维克斯堡、色当和奉天，更不用说特拉法加和日德兰半岛了。
Robert Eichelberger found his War College study of Caesar, Napoleon, Wellington, and Sherman particularly valuable.
罗伯特·艾切尔伯格发现他在战争学院对凯撒、拿破仑、威灵顿和谢尔曼的研究特别有价值。
At the strategic level, George Marshall — an instructor when Eisenhower was a student — later concluded that “the lessons of history provide plain guidance” regarding the necessities of national security, and doubted that anyone could “ think with full wisdom ” about them without having studied the Peloponnesian War .
在战略层面，艾森豪威尔学生时期的讲师乔治·马歇尔后来得出结论，对于国家安全的必要性，“历史的教训提供了简单的指导”，并怀疑没有研究过伯罗奔尼撒战争的人能否“充分智慧地思考”这些问题。
Yet, argues historian and former Air Force officer Williamson Murray, the next generation of top military leaders — for whom combat experience had been far more important than schooling — lacked an equal appreciation for “the larger political and strategic framework, which a real education would have supplied.” In Vietnam, they and the officers they mentored had the expertise to win battles, but not to win the war.
然而，历史学家、前空军军官威廉姆森·默里认为，下一代高级军事领导人——对他们来说，战斗经验比学校教育重要得多——缺乏对“真正的教育本可以提供的更大的政治和战略框架”的同等认识。在越南，他们和他们指导的军官拥有赢得战斗的专业知识，但不是赢得战争的专业知识。
Overemphasis on superior technology and “game-theoretical assumptions” produced strategic hubris and ultimately failure.
过分强调先进技术和“博弈论假设”会导致战略傲慢并最终导致失败。
Defeat in Vietnam spurred a revival of interest in military history, cultural competency, and Clausewitz , though without abandoning American excellence in innovation, operations, and tactics.
越南的失败激发了人们对军事历史、文化能力和克劳塞维茨的兴趣，但并没有放弃美国在创新、作战和战术方面的卓越表现。
From 1976 through 1991, to quote Murray, “In every respect, American forces …
用默里的话来说，从 1976 年到 1991 年，“美国军队在各个方面......
trained and prepared themselves …
训练并准备好自己……
within a Clausewitzian approach.” The School of Advanced Military Studies especially “rested entirely on a Clausewitzian conception of the study of war” by integrating theory and history.
克劳塞维茨式的方法。”高级军事研究学院尤其“完全基于克劳塞维茨式的战争研究概念”，将理论和历史融为一体。
The “fundamental payoff” of that approach was overwhelming success, from the tactical level to the strategic, in the First Gulf War.
这种方法的“根本回报”是在第一次海湾战争中从战术层面到战略层面取得了压倒性的成功。
Writing in 1997, however, Murray worried that U.S. leaders had learned the wrong lessons from 1991.
然而，默里在 1997 年撰文担心美国领导人从 1991 年吸取了错误的教训。
Far too much attention was going to how technology was changing the character of war, as a putative “Revolution in Military Affairs” was expected to eliminate the fog of war, give American commanders complete “battlespace dominance,” and mean “the end of Clausewitz.” “The emerging American military culture,” Murray warned, “is throwing history and all its associated intangibles overboard,” and therefore “preparing our officer corps to repeat the Vietnam War.”
太多的注意力集中在技术如何改变战争的性质上，因为一场假定的“军事革命”有望消除战争迷雾，赋予美国指挥官完全的“战场主导权”，并意味着“克劳塞维茨的终结”。默里警告说，“新兴的美国军事文化正在将历史及其所有相关的无形资产抛到一边”，因此“让我们的军官队伍准备重演越南战争”。
As the United States labored to avoid that fate in Afghanistan eighteen years later, Lt.
十八年后，当美国在阿富汗努力避免这种命运时，中尉。
Gen.
将军
H.R.
H.R.
McMaster echoed Murray, warning against believing that “technology and firepower are sufficient to achieve lasting strategic results in war.” He dubbed that idea the “vampire fallacy” because, despite being killed by experience time after time, it kept rising from the grave.
麦克马斯特回应穆雷的观点，警告不要相信“技术和火力足以在战争中取得持久的战略成果”。他将这种想法称为“吸血鬼谬误”，因为尽管它一次又一次地被经验杀死，但它却不断地从坟墓里复活。
Reducing the time dedicated to analyzing strategy and military history to increase focus on new technology and enhanced lethality would be a move in the direction of the “Clausewitz Out, Computer In” era that Murray described 30 years ago.
减少用于分析战略和军事历史的时间，以更加关注新技术和增强杀伤力，将朝着穆雷 30 年前描述的“克劳塞维茨出局，计算机输入”时代的方向迈进。
How can educators arm military leaders with the tools they need to connect tactical victories to strategic objectives, while retaining the ability to win those fights in the first place?
教育工作者如何为军事领导人提供将战术胜利与战略目标联系起来所需的工具，同时保留首先赢得这些战斗的能力？
The current fixation on drones, AI, and the war in Ukraine has brought the question again to the fore.
当前对无人机、人工智能和乌克兰战争的关注使这个问题再次成为人们关注的焦点。
Jensen and Tracy recently offered their vision for transforming military education to match the new revolution in military affairs.
詹森和特雷西最近提出了他们改变军事教育以适应新军事革命的愿景。
Their underlying point is sound: Times change, and so too should military education and training.
他们的基本观点是正确的：时代在变，军事教育和训练也应该变。
Because AI and multi-domain operations are rapidly transforming the character of war, they argue, professional military education should devote more time to those areas, partly through an expansion of classified wargames in “a modern laboratory where officers test new ideas about military advantage.” The authors acknowledge the high resource demands for infrastructure and security associated with their proposal, but those would not be the only costs incurred and are not the ones with which we are most concerned.
他们认为，由于人工智能和多域作战正在迅速改变战争的性质，专业军事教育应该在这些领域投入更多时间，部分是通过在“现代化实验室”中扩大机密兵棋推演，军官们可以在其中测试有关军事优势的新想法。作者承认与他们的提案相关的基础设施和安全性的高资源需求，但这些并不是唯一产生的成本，也不是我们最关心的成本。
Jensen and Tracy recognize, and indeed elegantly express, the value and importance of history and strategic studies, and call for them to still have a place in a reformed curriculum.
詹森和特雷西认识到，并且确实优雅地表达了历史和战略研究的价值和重要性，并呼吁它们在改革后的课程中仍然占有一席之地。
But in the zero-sum game of curricular time, spending more of it developing technical expertise for near-future fights must leave less time for exploring questions like why Athens lost the Peloponnesian War, why Maj.
但在课程时间的零和游戏中，花更多的时间为不久的将来的战斗开发技术专长，必然会减少探索诸如雅典为何输掉伯罗奔尼撒战争、为何少校等问题的时间。
Gen.
将军
George McClellan failed to take Richmond, or why the United States lost in Vietnam.
乔治·麦克莱伦未能占领里士满，这也是美国在越南失败的原因。
The “main effort,” they argue, “shifts back to reflections on the art of warfighting and the science of joint all-domain operations.” In other words, they call for more emphasis on “the technical dimensions of modern war” with a “deep dive into tactics and operational art,” implying less focus on the political and strategic framing that they acknowledge shapes all wars.
他们认为，“主要努力”又回到了对作战艺术和全域联合作战科学的反思。换句话说，他们呼吁更多地强调“现代战争的技术层面”，“深入研究战术和作战艺术”，这意味着更少关注他们承认塑造所有战争的政治和战略框架。
We have no doubt that the educational experiences advocated by Jensen and Tracy are valuable, and it is very clear they are not among the “callow critics” who, to quote Gen.
我们毫不怀疑詹森和特雷西所倡导的教育经验是有价值的，而且很明显，他们不属于“幼稚的批评家”，引用Gen.
Douglas MacArthur , “hold that only in the most recent battles are there to be found truths applicable to our present problems.” The question is not whether officers benefit from “reviewing modern war plans”: Of course they do.
道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟，“认为只有在最近的战斗中才能找到适用于我们当前问题的真理。”问题不在于军官是否能从“审查现代战争计划”中受益：当然可以。
It is also not whether they benefit from reading Thucydides: Of course they do.
这也不是他们是否从修昔底德的阅读中受益：他们当然受益。
Rather, the question is whether military leaders will perform better in future wars if their education increases emphasis on discontinuities in the character of war introduced by current technologies and their implications for combat, while devoting correspondingly less time to reading the classics and analyzing continuities in war’s nature.
相反，问题是，如果军事领导人的教育更加强调当前技术带来的战争特征的不连续性及其对战斗的影响，同时相应地花更少的时间阅读经典和分析战争性质的连续性，他们是否会在未来的战争中表现更好。
The following three truths suggest the answer is no.
以下三个事实表明答案是否定的。
Jensen and Tracy argue that while there is still a place for history in military education, “there needs to be better balance to prepare students for the wars they will fight in the next decade.” That, however, presumes the U.S. military can predict what those wars will be like.
詹森和特雷西认为，虽然历史在军事教育中仍然占有一席之地，但“需要更好的平衡，让学生为未来十年将要进行的战争做好准备。”然而，这是假设美国军方能够预测这些战争将会是什么样子。
The problem is that while leaders can and should try to anticipate how technology might shape the fighting in the next war, their best guess will most likely be wrong, and may be very wrong.
问题在于，虽然领导人可以而且应该尝试预测技术将如何影响下一场战争的战斗，但他们的最佳猜测很可能是错误的，而且可能是非常错误的。
A broad education, rather than one focused on recent and current developments, is what gives officers a malleable framework for developing solutions in the wake of shattered expectations.
广泛的教育，而不是专注于最近和当前事态发展的教育，为官员们提供了一个可塑的框架，以便在期望破灭后制定解决方案。
Before World War I, military leaders steeped in the “lessons” of recent wars believed that offensive élan could overcome new defensive weapons.
第一次世界大战之前，吸取了最近战争“教训”的军事领导人相信，进攻性的活力可以战胜新的防御性武器。
They were disastrously wrong.
他们大错特错了。
Giulio Douhet postulated in 1921 that airpower would render ground forces “helpless,” and strategic bombing would bring quick victory in war to the side with the stronger air force.
朱利奥·杜黑 (Giulio Douhet) 于 1921 年提出假设，空中力量将使地面部队变得“无助”，而战略轰炸将为拥有更强大空军的一方带来战争的快速胜利。
The airpower theorists proved wrong, too.
事实证明，空中力量理论家也错了。
Bernard Brodie in 1946 argued that the development of atomic weapons meant armed forces should start concentrating on deterring war rather than fighting it — just before millions of soldiers clashed in brutal conventional fighting in Korea.
1946 年，伯纳德·布罗迪 (Bernard Brodie) 认为，原子武器的发展意味着武装部队应该开始集中力量威慑战争，而不是打仗——就在数百万士兵在朝鲜发生残酷的常规战斗之前。
The “ system of systems ” touted by Revolution in Military Affairs enthusiasts in the 1990s neither eliminated the fog of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, nor made it easy to deal with insurgents, snipers, or improvised explosive devices.
20世纪90年代军事革命热衷者鼓吹的“系统的系统”既没有消除阿富汗和伊拉克的战争迷雾，也没有让对付叛乱分子、狙击手或简易爆炸装置变得容易。
Directing military education toward preparing for a relatively narrow vision of near-future warfare could similarly leave today’s joint force ill-prepared to navigate an array of alternative battlefields.
将军事教育导向为相对狭隘的近期战争愿景做准备，同样可能导致今天的联合部队无法做好应对一系列替代战场的准备。
The catastrophic military errors of 1914 arose not just because of military leaders’ failure to anticipate how technology would affect tactics, but also because planners failed to account properly for the strategic characteristics of the most recent major conflict: the Russo-Japanese War.
1914 年发生的灾难性军事错误不仅是因为军事领导人未能预见到技术将如何影响战术，还因为规划者未能正确考虑最近的重大冲突：日俄战争的战略特征。
It was a war limited to two belligerents and waged far from the heartland of either one, not a clash of coalitions fighting for the survival of their nations.
这是一场仅限于两个交战方的战争，并且是在远离双方中心地带的地方进行的，而不是一场为各自国家的生存而战的联盟之间的冲突。
That is not an argument against the value of history, but rather an illustration of how history can be misleading when studied too narrowly.
这并不是反对历史价值的论点，而是说明当历史研究过于狭隘时，历史可能会产生误导。
A generation later, the Soviet Union studied the German Blitzkrieg of 1939, and planned to fight the next war as “ the most offensive-minded of all the attacking armies that ever existed .” But in 1941, the Soviet Union instead found itself fighting a deep defense against an attack it had failed to anticipate, and teetered on the brink of national extermination as a result.
一代人之后，苏联研究了 1939 年德国的闪电战，并计划作为“有史以来所有攻击性军队中最具攻击性的军队”来打下一场战争。但到了 1941 年，苏联却发现自己正在为一场未能预料到的袭击进行纵深防御，并因此濒临国家灭亡的边缘。
After 1991, many Americans thought the United States should and could expect the next war — like the one they had just finished — to involve the use of overwhelming force, have popular support, and be aimed at clear military objectives that would accomplish political ends without requiring nation-building.
1991年之后，许多美国人认为美国应该而且可以预期下一场战争——就像他们刚刚结束的那场战争一样——将使用压倒性的武力，获得民众的支持，并瞄准明确的军事目标，无需国家建设就能实现政治目的。
Once again, it didn’t work out that way in Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan.
但在索马里、伊拉克或阿富汗，情况再一次没有奏效。
Early in the “Global War on Terror,” U.S. Quadrennial Defense Reviews compared violent extremism to the fight against “communism and fascism before it,” and labeled “winning the Long War” against terrorism the “central objective of the [United States].” Military education adapted accordingly.
在“全球反恐战争”早期，美国四年一度的防务评论将暴力极端主义与“之前的共产主义和法西斯主义”的斗争进行了比较，并将“赢得反恐长期战争”标记为“[美国]的核心目标”。军事教育也相应地进行了调整。
But Russia’s invasions of Ukraine soon shifted strategic focus back to large-scale combat operations, and China’s military-industrial expansion pivoted Washington’s attention to the Pacific.
但俄罗斯入侵乌克兰很快将战略重点转向大规模作战行动，而中国的军工扩张则将华盛顿的注意力转向太平洋。
Counter-terrorism, the focus of national strategy in 2015 , was already relegated to a strategic footnote by 2022.
反恐作为2015年国家战略的重点，到2022年已经退居战略脚注。
Planning consistently proceeded from the belief that the present was the most valuable foundation for education and anticipation, because it was closer to the future than the past and therefore more likely to reflect its features.
规划始终基于这样的信念：现在是教育和预测最有价值的基础，因为它比过去更接近未来，因此更有可能反映未来的特征。
History shows that sometimes that is true, but often it is not.
历史表明，有时这是正确的，但通常并非如此。
Indeed, that presumption can lead not just to misguided preparations, but also to shock and slow adaptation when the predictions that guided planning prove incorrect .
事实上，这种假设不仅会导致准备工作的误导，而且当指导规划的预测被证明是错误的时，还会导致震惊和缓慢的适应。
The modern U.S. military excels in winning battles and conducting joint, multi-domain operations, but often struggles to connect those wins to strategic outcomes .
现代美国军队擅长赢得战斗和开展联合多域作战，但往往难以将这些胜利与战略成果联系起来。
As one observer wrote recently , many leaders are “calling for [professional military education] to focus on lethality and warfighting, [but] there seems to be little evidence that U.S. [strategic] defeats were due to a lack of ‘capability or capacity to destroy.’” The counterargument to this point assumes that AI and other new technologies have jeopardized America’s tactical edge, implying that the study of the theorists and wars of the past should be trimmed to allow more technical preparation.
正如一位观察家最近所写，许多领导人“呼吁[专业军事教育]关注杀伤力和作战能力，[但]似乎没有证据表明美国[战略]失败是由于缺乏‘破坏能力或能力’。”对此的反驳认为人工智能和其他新技术已经危及美国的战术优势，这意味着对过去的理论家和战争的研究应该进行修剪以进行更多的技术准备。
Jensen and Tracy, for instance, cite recent wars in which the United States has yet to commit ground combat forces, such as Ukraine, as evidence of this potentially diminishing tactical edge.
例如，詹森和特雷西引用了最近美国尚未派遣地面作战部队的战争，例如乌克兰，作为这种战术优势可能减弱的证据。
Despite the public emphasis on novelty in that war, some Ukrainian officers have found simpler weapons more useful in bypassing Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities.
尽管公众强调那场战争的新颖性，但一些乌克兰军官发现更简单的武器在绕过俄罗斯的电子战能力方面更有用。
Other commanders cite ammunition and equipment shortages as root causes of the stalemate there.
其他指挥官认为弹药和装备短缺是造成僵局的根本原因。
Former NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg even described the conflict as “a battle of ammunition,” and recent reports suggest that Ukraine’s heavy reliance on drones is “driven less by doctrine than by a shortage of other systems.” According to these accounts, the keys to victory in Ukraine are not necessarily tactical or doctrinal, but rather industrial — a lesson most notably recognized and applied during both world wars .
前北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格甚至将这场冲突描述为“一场弹药战”，最近的报告表明，乌克兰对无人机的严重依赖“与其说是由于条令，不如说是因为其他系统的短缺”。根据这些说法，乌克兰胜利的关键不一定是战术或理论，而是工业——这一教训在两次世界大战期间得到了最显着的认识和应用。
As Jensen and Tracy admit, hasty change in military institutions is risky .
正如詹森和特雷西承认的那样，仓促改变军事机构是有风险的。
It is even riskier, however, when those changes are driven by purported lessons extracted from disparate wars with as-yet-undetermined outcomes.
然而，当这些变化是由从不同战争中汲取的所谓经验教训推动时，而这些战争的结果尚未确定，风险就更大了。
The lessons of the Civil War appeared much different to observers in 1862 than they did in 1865.
在 1862 年的观察家看来，内战的教训与 1865 年有很大不同。
The same could be said of the lessons military leaders took away from the battles of 1915 compared to 1918, or 1940 and 1945.
与 1918 年、或 1940 年和 1945 年相比，军事领导人从 1915 年的战役中吸取的教训也是如此。
Moreover, transforming educational frameworks requires sacrifice , which means that even if the result is moderately successful, it is often a pyrrhic victory , not worth what it cost .
此外，转变教育框架需要牺牲，这意味着即使结果取得了一定的成功，也往往是一场代价高昂的胜利，得不偿失。
If reformers are wise — or lucky — enough that their changes enhance rather than undermine warfighting proficiency, that perceived gain will be a net loss if it comes at the price of an officer’s ability to provide good strategic advice or discern the broader implications of military operations on and beyond the battlefield.
如果改革者足够明智——或者说幸运——他们的变革提高而不是削弱了作战能力，那么如果以军官提供良好战略建议或辨别战场内外军事行动更广泛影响的能力为代价，那么这种感知到的收益将是净损失。
Any major change in professional military education should therefore aim not at shoring up current American advantages in lethality, but rather at improving how the joint force ties lethal and non-lethal effects to desired strategic outcomes.
因此，专业军事教育的任何重大变革不应旨在巩固美国目前在杀伤力方面的优势，而应旨在改善联合部队如何将致命和非致命效果与预期的战略结果联系起来。
That calls for emphasizing the continuities in warfare revealed by history, as McMaster advocates .
正如麦克马斯特所主张的那样，这就需要强调历史所揭示的战争的连续性。
The only thing we really can know about the next war is that it will share the characteristics present in all wars: War is political, war is human, war is uncertain, and war is a violent contest of physical and moral forces through the means of the former.
关于下一场战争，我们唯一能知道的是，它将具有所有战争所具有的特征：战争是政治性的，战争是人性的，战争是不确定的，战争是通过前者的手段进行的体力和道义力量的暴力较量。
Gaining a better understanding of those enduring truths, their interrelationships, and their implications fosters sound military judgment, and will pay dividends not only in the next war, but also in future conflicts that we cannot begin to imagine today.
更好地理解这些持久的真理、它们之间的相互关系及其影响，可以培养正确的军事判断力，不仅会在下一场战争中带来好处，而且也会在我们今天无法想象的未来冲突中带来好处。
We support pedagogical innovation, wargaming, and the responsible incorporation of AI into the classroom and the war-planning process.
我们支持教学创新、兵棋推演以及负责任地将人工智能纳入课堂和战争规划过程。
Dealing with the changing face of war does call for adjustments to curricula.
应对不断变化的战争面貌确实需要调整课程。
But it would be a mistake to reduce opportunities to study history, strategy, and the political context of warfighting.
但减少研究历史、战略和战争政治背景的机会将是错误的。
If other priorities and limited resources mean that the service colleges cannot expand instruction in these topics, then the time allocated to studying them should at least be protected from cutbacks, perhaps even by enshrining such protections within Chapter 107 of Title 10, U.S. Code.
如果其他优先事项和有限的资源意味着服务学院无法扩大这些主题的教学，那么至少应该保护分配给学习这些主题的时间不被削减，甚至可以通过将此类保护纳入《美国法典》第 10 章第 107 章来实现。
Legally obligating the study of history and strategy would ensure that future technological revolutions do not overrule the founding vision of American professional military education.
从法律上规定历史和战略研究的义务将确保未来的技术革命不会推翻美国职业军事教育的创始愿景。
In 1901, the same year that Bloch made the pronouncement that began this essay, Secretary of War Elihu Root stressed that officers’ wide range of responsibilities — both on and beyond the battlefield — and “the manifest necessity that the soldier, above all others, should be familiar with history” made it of “great importance” that they receive “a thorough and broad education.” Moving away from that prescription by the father of the War College would risk reinforcing America’s recent history of winning battles but losing wars.
1901 年，也就是布洛赫发表本文开篇声明的同一年，陆军部长伊莱休·鲁特强调，军官在战场上和战场外的广泛责任，以及“士兵首先应该熟悉历史的明显必要性”使得他们接受“全面而广泛的教育”变得“非常重要”。放弃战争学院之父的处方可能会加剧美国近来赢得战争但输掉战争的历史。
The U.S. military should continue training its leaders to apply doctrine in what the intelligence community assesses are the most likely theaters of war.
美国军方应继续培训其领导人，使其能够在情报界评估的最有可能发生战争的地区应用条令。
Officers spend most of their careers in the operational force learning to do that in combined training centers, joint commands, and multinational exercises.
军官们的大部分职业生涯都在作战部队中度过，在联合训练中心、联合指挥和多国演习中学习如何做到这一点。
But they should spend much of the little classroom time they have learning about war more broadly.
但他们应该花大量的课堂时间来更广泛地了解战争。
That includes applying the Clausewitzian method of integrating theory — and doctrine — with wide, deep, and contextualized study of experience, both current and past.
这包括应用克劳塞维茨的方法，将理论和学说与对当前和过去的经验进行广泛、深入和情境化的研究相结合。
The country needs not only officers who can do things right , but also leaders who think critically about how to do the right things.
国家不仅需要能够正确行事的官员，还需要能够批判性思考如何正确行事的领导人。
Professional military education should arm its graduates with the wisdom to perceive the difference.
专业军事教育应该赋予毕业生洞察差异的智慧。
If it fails to do so, future generations could be robbed of a proper foundation in military history — something Gen.
如果不这样做，子孙后代可能会失去军事历史的适当基础——这是将军的事情。
John R.
约翰·R。
Galvin referred to as “ the coin of the realm ” — and sent intellectually impoverished into the next war.
加尔文称其为“王国的硬币”，并把智力上的贫困带入了下一场战争。
Michael P.
迈克尔·P。
Ferguson is a U.S. Army officer and instructor in the Department of History and War Studies at West Point.
弗格森是一名美国陆军军官，也是西点军校历史和战争研究系的教官。
His previous assignments include combat tours to Iraq and Afghanistan, and operational billets in Europe and Africa.
他之前的任务包括前往伊拉克和阿富汗作战，并在欧洲和非洲执行任务。
He holds master’s degrees from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and San Diego State University, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at UNC Chapel Hill.
他拥有北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校和圣地亚哥州立大学的硕士学位，目前正在攻读博士学位。北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校的候选人。
His latest publications appeared in Parameters , Texas National Security Review , and the International Journal of Military History and Historiography .
他的最新出版物发表在《参数》、《德克萨斯国家安全评论》和《国际军事历史与史学杂志》上。
Clifford J.
克利福德·J.
Rogers, Ph.D., has taught the history of warfare and military theory at West Point since 1995, is a recipient of the U.S. Military Academy’s Dean’s Career Awards for Distinguished Excellence both in teaching and in scholarship, and helped develop West Point’s new War Studies major.
罗杰斯博士自 1995 年以来一直在西点军校教授战争史和军事理论，因其在教学和学术方面的杰出成就而获得美国军事学院院长职业奖，并帮助开发了西点军校的新战争研究专业。
His books and articles on military history have been awarded numerous accolades, including recognitions from the Society for Military History, De Re Militari , the Royal Historical Society, and the Army Historical Foundation.
他有关军事历史的书籍和文章获得了无数荣誉，包括军事历史学会、军事历史学会、皇家历史学会和陆军历史基金会的认可。
The views expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the U.S. Military Academy, its Department of History and War Studies, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
本文表达的观点仅代表作者的观点，而不是美国军事学院、其历史和战争研究系、美国陆军、国防部或美国政府任何部门的观点。
**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.
**请注意，出于内部风格的考虑，岩石战争不会对美国国防部使用不同的名称，除非美国国会根据法规更改该名称。