MacGyver at Scale: Winning Future Air Wars of Rapid Technological Adaptation

During a recent training exercise in the western Pacific, a small group of engineers single-handedly saved the day.

在最近在西太平洋进行的一次训练演习中，一小群工程师单枪匹马挽救了局面。

In the scenario, adversary covert forces used first-person view drones to intercept American helicopters that were shuttling between austere forward island airbases.

在这个场景中，敌方秘密部队使用第一人称视角无人机拦截在严峻的前沿岛屿空军基地之间穿梭的美国直升机。

Some helicopters were shot down, and the rest were forced to suspend flight operations, meaning the island bases were cut off from each other and from easy resupply.

一些直升机被击落，其余的被迫暂停飞行，这意味着岛屿基地之间的联系被切断，补给也被切断。

Fortunately, one of the U.S. bases included a small, forward-deployed team of military engineers and their equipment.

幸运的是，美国的一个基地有一支小型前沿部署的军事工程师团队及其设备。

They analyzed the adversary radio control techniques and then designed and built custom self-protection radio jammers, fabricating the circuit boards on-site and mounting them to the helicopters using 3D-printed housings.

他们分析了对手的无线电控制技术，然后设计并制造了定制的自我保护无线电干扰器，现场制造电路板并使用 3D 打印外壳将其安装到直升机上。

The jammers were software-reprogrammable, allowing them to easily adapt to new radio frequencies.

干扰器可通过软件重新编程，使其能够轻松适应新的无线电频率。

Within days, the U.S. helicopters were back in action, protected by their new jamming pods.

几天之内，美国直升机在新干扰吊舱的保护下重新投入行动。

This scenario was simulated, but the on-location engineering was real.

这个场景是模拟的，但现场工程是真实的。

The team, called the Science and Engineering Demand Force Team , consisted of volunteer junior officers from the Air Force Research Laboratory.

该团队称为科学与工程需求部队团队，由来自空军研究实验室的志愿初级军官组成。

Had it been an actual combat situation, their system would have neutralized the adversary’s new threat.

如果是实战情况，他们的系统将消除对手的新威胁。

It was a powerful, though small, demonstration of rapid technological adaptation in combat.

这是战斗中技术快速适应的一次强有力的展示，尽管规模很小。

Efforts to transform military acquisition and accelerate innovation have often omitted an element essential to achieving rapid adaptation during active combat: the role of uniformed military technologists.

转变军事采办和加速创新的努力往往忽略了在实际战斗中实现快速适应所必需的要素：军装军事技术人员的作用。

Solving technological problems that emerge suddenly during operations , on timelines of weeks, days, and sometimes hours, will demand engineering capability on-location, not hundreds or thousands of miles away.

要在数周、数天甚至数小时的时间内解决操作过程中突然出现的技术问题，将需要现场工程能力，而不是数百或数千英里外的工程能力。

The Ukrainian military has shown that this not only enables immediate fielding of improvised solutions, but also effective remote collaboration with the nation’s other technical experts and companies.

乌克兰军方已经证明，这不仅可以立即部署临时解决方案，还可以与该国其他技术专家和公司进行有效的远程协作。

Unfortunately, the U.S. Air Force is not currently organized to do this beyond pilot projects, many of which are eager for wider application.

不幸的是，除了试点项目外，美国空军目前还没有组织这样做，其中许多项目都渴望更广泛的应用。

The Air Force has thousands of uniformed military scientists and engineers, but nearly all manage development programs at stateside development centers far from the fight.

空军拥有数千名身穿制服的军事科学家和工程师，但几乎所有人都在远离战斗的美国本土开发中心管理开发项目。

That won’t be enough to win a prolonged contest of technological adaptation against a fast-moving peer adversary.

这不足以赢得与快速发展的同行对手的长期技术适应竞赛。

How to reorganize this force for rapid combat adaptation has been an unanswered question preventing meaningful change.

如何重组这支部队以快速适应战斗一直是一个悬而未决的问题，阻碍了有意义的变革。

I co-led an Air Force-wide program tasked to determine how to implement rapid technological adaptation at scale across the force.

我共同领导了一项空军范围的计划，其任务是确定如何在整个部队中大规模实施快速技术适应。

This program yielded a clear six-component framework for practical implementation.

该计划产生了一个明确的实际实施框架，由六部分组成。

Validated repeatedly across conflicts and contexts, military leaders should prioritize these components as they prepare to deploy military technologists to conduct rapid combat adaptation at scale and set them up for success.

经过在冲突和环境中反复验证，军事领导人在准备部署军事技术人员进行大规模快速战斗适应并为成功做好准备时，应优先考虑这些组成部分。

A Direction Seeking a Roadmap Plentiful recent studies bestow directional advice for accelerating military innovation.

寻求路线图的方向 最近的大量研究为加速军事创新提供了方向性建议。

Decentralize it .

分散它。

Identify and communicate operational needs faster .

更快地识别和传达运营需求。

Establish tight feedback loops between warfighters and developers .

在作战人员和开发人员之间建立紧密的反馈循环。

Prototype quickly and iterate based on operational feedback.

快速制作原型并根据运营反馈进行迭代。

Leverage off-the-shelf commercial technologies and agile startups.

利用现成的商业技术和敏捷的初创公司。

Standardize to enable scaling of successes.

标准化以扩大成功规模。

But how should deployed forces be re-engineered to enable all that?

但应该如何重新设计部署的部队才能实现这一切呢？

In Ukraine, many innovations are first prototyped within earshot of the front, by military teams composed partly by draftees with technology backgrounds.

在乌克兰，许多创新首先是在前线能听到的范围内由部分由具有技术背景的应征入伍者组成的军事团队进行原型设计。

Ukrainian tech companies visit them often.

乌克兰科技公司经常拜访他们。

Similar activities support Ukrainian air combat.

类似的活动支持乌克兰空战。

Ad-hoc U.S. and Ukrainian teams quickly integrated Western weapons and sensors with ex-Soviet Ukrainian aircraft using “MacGyver-like” workarounds including mounting tablet-based interfaces in cockpits.

美国和乌克兰的特设团队使用“类似麦盖龙”的解决方法，包括在驾驶舱内安装基于平板电脑的界面，迅速将西方武器和传感器与前苏联乌克兰飞机集成。

Ukrainian air defenders improvised low-cost air defense sensors , and built realistic decoys to confuse Russian attacks on airfields .

乌克兰防空部队临时搭建了低成本防空传感器，并建造了逼真的诱饵来迷惑俄罗斯对机场的攻击。

But the U.S. military cannot simply copy Ukrainian practices.

但美国军方不能简单复制乌克兰的做法。

Ukraine is fighting in its own backyard (in driving distance from civilian innovators), but the United States mostly fights far from home.

乌克兰是在自己的后院作战（距离民间创新者只有很远的距离），而美国则大多在远离家乡的地方作战。

Remote locations, such as those in the Pacific, limit outside civilian help.

偏远地区，例如太平洋地区，限制了外部平民的帮助。

U.S. forces are all-volunteer and operate more complex equipment.

美军全部是志愿兵，并且操作着更复杂的装备。

In addition, the highly decentralized, ad-hoc Ukrainian model has sometimes produced inefficiency and chaos , and shortcomings in mission integration and scaling .

此外，高度分散的、临时的乌克兰模式有时会造成效率低下和混乱，以及任务整合和扩展方面的缺陷。

These realities require a uniquely American approach to battlefield innovation.

这些现实需要美国独特的战场创新方法。

After several months of striving to help the Ukrainian Air Force improvise technological solutions, in 2022 the Department of the Air Force quietly launched an effort to determine how to prepare itself.

经过几个月的努力帮助乌克兰空军临时制定技术解决方案，空军部于 2022 年悄悄启动了一项工作，以确定如何做好准备。

I co-led this effort with Col.

我与 Col. 共同领导了这项工作。

Mario Serna, under the joint sponsorship of the chief scientist of the Air Force and the commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory.

马里奥·塞尔纳，在空军首席科学家和空军研究实验室指挥官的联合资助下。

We named it Project Doolittle, after the famous World War II military innovator Jimmy Doolittle who improvised the surprise raid on Tokyo in April 1942 .

我们将其命名为“杜立特计划”，以纪念二战期间著名的军事创新家吉米·杜立特 (Jimmy Doolittle)，他在 1942 年 4 月临时策划了对东京的突袭。

We assembled a network of dozens of leaders from across the Air Force and Space Force with experience in rapid adaptation.

我们组建了一个由来自空军和太空部队的数十名领导人组成的网络，他们具有快速适应的经验。

Together, we combined lessons from over twenty past and present pilot programs and ad-hoc activities involved in rapid prototyping, field modification, and technical improvisation.

我们共同结合了过去和现在的二十多个试点项目以及涉及快速原型设计、现场修改和技术即兴创作的临时活动的经验教训。

They included support to air combat activities in Ukraine, programs during the Global War on Terror, and innovative projects within Air Force major commands and combatant commands.

其中包括对乌克兰空战活动的支持、全球反恐战争期间的计划以及空军主要司令部和作战司令部内的创新项目。

Its findings, until now, have gone unpublished.

到目前为止，其研究结果尚未发表。

Among the wealth of findings, a set of six basic components emerged across different times, places, and operational contexts.

在大量的研究结果中，在不同的时间、地点和操作环境中出现了一组六个基本组成部分。

Programs that lacked one or more at the start often built the missing component as the deficit became apparent.

一开始就缺少一个或多个组件的项目通常会在缺陷变得明显时构建缺失的组件。

This “convergent evolution” establishes them as the foundation for all other implementation activities.

这种“趋同演化”将它们确立为所有其他实施活动的基础。

To be effective, technologists must integrate directly with on-site operational units.

为了提高效率，技术人员必须直接与现场运营部门集成。

This lets them understand and solve many problems immediately, without relying on outside support or connectivity.

这使他们能够立即理解并解决许多问题，而无需依赖外部支持或连接。

A close relationship between technologists (preferably servicemembers ready to fight alongside their host units) and operators, founded on trust and honed through shared experience, is the foundation for everything else.

技术人员（最好是准备好与所在部队并肩作战的军人）和操作人员之间建立在信任基础上并通过共享经验磨练的密切关系是其他一切的基础。

U.S. operational personnel describe the ideal relationship as like technology Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (airmen embedded with forward units to orchestrate close air support and other offensive air operations).

美国作战人员将这种理想的关系描述为技术联合终端攻击控制器（飞行员嵌入前沿部队以协调近距离空中支援和其他进攻性空中行动）。

A similar philosophy motivated today’s forward-deployed software engineers or liaison officers who develop new code at military command and control centers .

类似的理念激励着当今在军事指挥和控制中心开发新代码的前沿部署软件工程师或联络官。

An agile team of five to ten personnel is optimum for forward integration with operators.

由五到十人组成的敏捷团队最适合与运营商进行前向集成。

The teams should contain a mix of technical competencies and favor multi-functional service members who can solve novel engineering problems, understand operational needs, collaborate with distant “reachback” experts at companies and labs when practical, work closely with technically skilled operators, and manufacture working prototypes in austere conditions.

这些团队应包含多种技术能力，并偏向多功能服务人员，他们能够解决新的工程问题，了解操作需求，在实际情况下与公司和实验室的远程“回访”专家合作，与技术熟练的操作员密切合作，并在严峻的条件下制造工作原型。

These should be specially trained and self-sufficient teams, not ad-hoc collections of host unit personnel.

这些应该是经过专门培训和自给自足的团队，而不是东道单位人员的临时集合。

Very different organizations, from the Ukrainian military intelligence service’s innovation cells to the Science and Engineering Demand Force Team (now known as SHADOW Tech), have reached the same conclusion.

从乌克兰军事情报部门的创新小组到科学与工程需求部队小组（现称为影子技术），截然不同的组织都得出了相同的结论。

Forward-deployed teams must be paired with a central hub providing coordination and access to larger resources such as industrial production.

前沿部署的团队必须与一个中央枢纽配对，提供协调和获取工业生产等更大资源的机会。

The force must propagate effective solutions, standardize them where efficient, and deploy them at scale.

部队必须传播有效的解决方案，在有效的情况下将其标准化，并大规模部署。

A higher-echelon “hub” unifies the forward-deployed “spokes,” speeds knowledge sharing, and engages industrial and acquisition support , including via agile commercial procurement offices such as AFWERX and the Defense Innovation Unit .

更高层次的“中心”统一了前沿部署的“辐条”，加速知识共享，并提供工业和采办支持，包括通过灵活的商业采购办公室，如 AFWERX 和国防创新部门。

In Ukraine, civil-military organizations like Brave1 help fill this role.

在乌克兰，Brave1 等军民组织帮助填补了这一角色。

The hub also coordinates manpower, training, and other enablement, and provides a single point of contact for coordination with other unit headquarters and functions in the theater.

该中心还协调人力、培训和其他支持，并提供与战区其他部队总部和职能部门协调的单点联系。

To function at combat speed, some authorities in areas such as system safety, airworthiness, and software authority to operate must be delegated to the field.

为了以战斗速度运行，系统安全、适航性和软件操作权限等领域的一些权限必须下放给现场。

When improvising the integration of western weapons onto Ukrainian jets , there was no need for approval from a MiG-29 program office, nor a restrictive vendor contract limiting the freedom to modify the aircraft.

当临时将西方武器集成到乌克兰喷气式飞机上时，不需要获得 MiG-29 项目办公室的批准，也不需要限制改装飞机的自由的限制性供应商合同。

That is usually not the case with U.S.-made platforms and systems, which may have restrictive tech orders, engineering change approval processes, and data rights.

美国制造的平台和系统通常并非如此，它们可能具有限制性的技术订单、工程变更审批流程和数据权利。

It does not have to be like this.

它不一定是这样的。

For instance, the engineering teams that conduct aircraft battle damage repair wield many authorities to approve the improvised fixes that get aircraft back into operation.

例如，进行飞机战损修复的工程团队拥有许多权力来批准使飞机恢复运行的临时修复。

The Air Force can leverage such precedents to empower forward-deployed adaptation teams.

空军可以利用此类先例来增强前沿部署的适应团队的能力。

Hands-on engineering at the tactical edge is a unique skill set developed through training and practice, which most engineers and technicians don’t receive through their academic training.

战术优势的实践工程是通过培训和实践开发的独特技能，大多数工程师和技术人员都没有通过学术培训获得这些技能。

Most military hardware is complex.

大多数军事硬件都很复杂。

Specialist teams that conduct rapid technology adaptation, akin to special forces for engineering, must “train as they fight” and become mission-ready well before combat operations begin.

进行快速技术适应的专家团队，类似于工程特种部队，必须“边打边训练”，并在战斗行动开始之前做好任务准备。

The Air Force’s Project Arc , for instance, identified two important levels of selection and training, including baseline training on transferable skills and more specialized pre-deployment training customized to mission and theater.

例如，空军的 Arc 项目确定了两个重要的选拔和培训级别，包括可转移技能的基线培训和针对任务和战区定制的更专业的部署前培训。

The SHADOW Tech teams and the Air Force Institute of Technology are developing initial training curricula for future rapid technology adaptation practitioners, informed by field exercises.

SHADOW Tech 团队和空军理工学院正在根据现场演​​习为未来快速技术适应从业人员制定初步培训课程。

To enable effective field adaptation, new weapons and other systems should be built for easy modification.

为了实现有效的现场适应，应建造新武器和其他系统以便于修改。

Modular design, easy physical access, open systems software architecture, and other features allow teams to swiftly implement changes and upgrades.

模块化设计、轻松的物理访问、开放的系统软件架构和其他功能使团队能够快速实施更改和升级。

In addition, the forward-deployed teams need special supplies and equipment.

此外，前沿部署小组需要特殊的物资和装备。

The SHADOW Tech teams, for instance, deploy with containerized 3D printers, microcontroller boards, antennas, computer-aided drafting and engineering software, and other gear, and are skilled at finding local resources to meet needs.

例如，SHADOW Tech 团队部署了集装箱式 3D 打印机、微控制器板、天线、计算机辅助绘图和工程软件以及其他设备，并且擅长寻找本地资源来满足需求。

The Air Force Spark innovation program is producing containerized combat innovation labs.

空军 Spark 创新计划正在建设集装箱式战斗创新实验室。

In short, the Air Force should redeploy some of its military science and engineering workforce into forward rapid adaptation teams, integrate them with deployable combat units at the wing or base level, and establish an integrating hub — potentially one within each theater.

简而言之，空军应该将部分军事科学和工程人员重新部署到前线快速适应小组中，将其与联队或基地一级的可部署作战部队整合，并建立一个整合中心——可能每个战区都有一个。

It can integrate or expand upon many existing pilot-scale capabilities to accelerate this scaleup.

它可以集成或扩展许多现有的试点规模功能，以加速这一规模扩大。

Since 2025, a Technology Maneuver Task Force led by the Air Force Research Laboratory has been refining how to best implement the components — and many other details — in practice.

自 2025 年以来，由空军研究实验室领导的技术机动工作组一直在完善如何在实践中最好地实施这些组件以及许多其他细节。

Project Doolittle focused on experiences in the air domain, but they provide a widely applicable starting point for tailoring to different services and domains.

杜立特项目专注于航空领域的经验，但它们为针对不同服务和领域的定制提供了广泛适用的起点。

For instance, the Space Force launches and operates space systems largely from the homeland where “reachback” support from labs and industry may be closer.

例如，太空部队主要在本土发射和操作太空系统，实验室和工业界的“回馈”支持可能更近。

Therefore, the way that rapid adaptation teams might be optimally structured and employed could differ.

因此，快速适应团队的最佳结构和使用方式可能会有所不同。

Some components may also be in tension with one another.

一些组件之间也可能存在张力。

For instance, if a centralized coordination function becomes too powerful, it could suppress innovation and initiative by the forward-deployed teams.

例如，如果集中协调功能变得过于强大，它可能会抑制前沿部署团队的创新和主动性。

The hub and spokes therefore need clearly written charters that separate their responsibilities.

因此，中心和辐条需要明确的书面章程来区分各自的职责。

Similar agreements should detail working relationships between the adaptation teams and the combat units and leaders they support.

类似的协议应该详细说明适应小组与他们支持的作战单位和领导人之间的工作关系。

Some other important challenges include the delegation of authorities, designing for adaptability, and talent and manpower, each of which must be addressed in turn.

其他一些重要的挑战包括权力下放、适应性设计以及人才和人力，每一个挑战都必须依次解决。

Delegation of Authorities This issue is complex enough that Project Doolittle established a separate sub-team dedicated to it.

授权 这个问题非常复杂，杜立特计划专门成立了一个单独的小组来解决这个问题。

Strict requirements in areas such as safety, airworthiness, and cybersecurity exist for a reason.

安全、适航和网络安全等领域的严格要求是有原因的。

However, current policy contains exceptions that enable flexibility.

然而，当前的政策包含一些例外情况，以实现灵活性。

For instance, the Air Force’s Form 1067 process for approving modifications to fielded systems provides delegated authority for temporary or test modifications, and many rapid combat modifications can qualify.

例如，空军用于批准对已部署系统进行修改的 1067 表格流程为临时或测试修改提供了授权，并且许多快速战斗修改都符合资格。

The central hub can then process longer-term approvals for modifications that may become permanent or scale across the force.

然后，中央枢纽可以处理长期的修改批准，这些修改可能会成为永久性的或在整个部队中规模化。

Delegation of authorities will not be easy, and challenging negotiations lie ahead.

授权并不容易，未来的谈判也充满挑战。

However, we found that the pressure of recent conflicts has increased support at the top levels of the military system engineering authorities.

然而，我们发现，近期冲突的压力增加了军事系统工程当局高层的支持。

For instance, by working with a cooperative program office, the Special Operations Command team that developed new capabilities for the MQ-9 Reaper strike drone implemented a rapid approval cycle that let it invent, approve, and field about 15 upgrades every year.

例如，通过与合作项目办公室合作，为 MQ-9 Reaper 攻击无人机开发新功能的特种作战司令部团队实施了快速审批周期，使其每年发明、批准和部署约 15 项升级。

Design for Adaptability Fielding systems whose hardware and software can be quickly modified runs counter to traditional defense contractor practices that favor proprietary architectures and vendor-lock.

适应性设计 硬件和软件可以快速修改的部署系统与传统国防承包商偏爱专有架构和供应商锁定的做法背道而驰。

However, enabling practices such as the modular open systems approach are already required under Pentagon acquisition reform mandates .

然而，五角大楼采办改革授权已经要求采用模块化开放系统方法等有利实践。

Emerging defense tech companies are embracing them decisively , and established primes and defense industry groups are advocating them as well.

新兴的国防科技公司正在果断地拥抱它们，老牌总理和国防工业集团也在倡导它们。

However, issues such as the intellectual property status of field modifications, such as changes to software, remain to be fully addressed in guidance .

然而，诸如软件变更等现场修改的知识产权状况等问题仍有待在指南中充分解决。

Talent and Manpower Scaling rapid technological adaptation with the needed training and support across many units and commands could stress limited resources.

人才和人力 通过许多单位和司令部所需的培训和支持来扩大快速技术适应可能会对有限的资源造成压力。

However, the Air Force has a strong existing corps of thousands of uniformed scientists and engineers, many of which are hungry to apply their skills more directly.

然而，空军现有一支强大的队伍，由数千名身穿制服的科学家和工程师组成，其中许多人渴望更直接地应用他们的技能。

While much larger than existing pilot efforts, the modest size of rapid adaptation teams and coordination hubs means that only a few hundred may be needed to integrate rapid technology adaptation capabilities across the several dozen deployable wings.

虽然比现有的试点工作规模大得多，但快速适应团队和协调中心的规模不大，这意味着可能只需要几百人就可以在数十个可部署机翼中集成快速技术适应能力。

Technically skilled officers from other career fields, enlisted, and newly established warrant officer grades could augment the talent pool.

来自其他职业领域的技术熟练军官、入伍军官和新设立的准尉级别可以扩大人才库。

In addition, the Air Force could incorporate and build upon existing structures such as the Spark Cells already present at over 100 units and bases.

此外，空军可以整合并构建现有结构，例如已在 100 多个单位和基地部署的 Spark Cells。

The resource needs for training, equipment, and other support are relatively small, but will still require careful planning.

培训、设备和其他支持的资源需求相对较小，但仍需要仔细规划。

Winning future wars will depend not only on fielding better technology before conflict begins, but on building deployed military forces capable of evolving faster than the enemy throughout the conflict itself, sometimes literally overnight.

赢得未来战争不仅取决于在冲突开始前部署更好的技术，还取决于建立能够在整个冲突期间（有时甚至是一夜之间）比敌人更快发展的部署军事力量。

As a Ukrainian military innovator observed, in emerging warfare it’s increasingly “ not the strongest who survive, but the most adaptable .” Project Doolittle identified how to do this by integrating uniformed military technologists into combat forces at scale.

正如一位乌克兰军事创新者所观察到的那样，在新兴战争中，“生存下来的不再是最强者，而是最适应者”。杜立特计划确定了如何通过将军装军事技术人员大规模整合到作战部队中来实现这一目标。

With the right framework and institutional support, adaptation superiority can belong to the U.S. Air Force and its fast-adapting sister services.

有了正确的框架和机构支持，美国空军及其快速适应的姊妹军种就可以拥有适应优势。

George M.

乔治·M。

Dougherty, Ph.D., is a retired Air Force colonel with over 30 years of service in Air Force development and acquisition.

多尔蒂博士是一位退役空军上校，在空军开发和采购领域拥有 30 多年的经验。

He co-authored the Air Force’s current Science and Technology Strategy.

他与人合着了空军当前的科学技术战略。

Until June 2026, he served as the director of innovation for the Department of the Air Force’s Program Acquisition Executive for Command, Control, Communications, and Battle Management.

2026 年 6 月之前，他一直担任空军指挥、控制、通信和战斗管理项目采购执行部门的创新总监。

A reservist, he also served as an executive in two international management consulting firms advising high-tech and life sciences companies to optimize product development and navigate strategic change.

作为一名预备役军人，他还曾在两家国际管理咨询公司担任高管，为高科技和生命科学公司提供优化产品开发和引导战略变革的咨询服务。

He is the author of Beast in the Machine: How Robotics and AI Will Transform Warfare and the Future of Human Conflict , and many peer-reviewed articles on accelerating disruptive military innovation.

他是《机器中的野兽：机器人和人工智能将如何改变战争和人类冲突的未来》一书的作者，以及许多关于加速颠覆性军事创新的同行评审文章。

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance and position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

所表达的观点仅代表作者的观点，并不反映美国政府、国防部、美国空军或美国太空军的官方指导和立场。