Jaw-Jaw With Belarus, Revisited Amid Ukraine War
In 2021, Michael Kimmage wrote, “ Belarus and the Ukraine Tra p,” where he argued the United States should adopt a realistic diplomatic relationship with Belarus that takes into account its strategic partnership with Russia and learns from overpromises made to Ukraine.
2021 年，迈克尔·金马奇 (Michael Kimmage) 撰写了《白俄罗斯与乌克兰陷阱》一书，他认为美国应该与白俄罗斯建立现实的外交关系，考虑到其与俄罗斯的战略伙伴关系，并从对乌克兰的过度承诺中吸取教训。
Five years later, we asked Michael to revisit his arguments.
五年后，我们要求迈克尔重新审视他的论点。
In your 2021 article, you named Belarus as one of the most likely places for a war to break out between Russia and the West.
在您 2021 年的文章中，您将白俄罗斯列为俄罗斯与西方最有可能爆发战争的地方之一。
Belarus became a staging ground for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet a direct confrontation with NATO has not occurred.
白俄罗斯成为俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的集结地，但尚未与北约发生直接对抗。
What factors explain why that war didn’t happen, and do you think the risk has passed or simply shifted
哪些因素可以解释为什么那场战争没有发生？您认为风险已经过去还是只是转移了
Belarus remains an exceptionally dangerous potential flashpoint between Russia and the West.
白俄罗斯仍然是俄罗斯与西方之间异常危险的潜在爆发点。
The reason why conflict has not arisen over Belarus in the past five years is that Alexander Lukashenko, the dictator who has long ruled the country, remains in power.
白俄罗斯近五年没有爆发冲突的原因是长期统治该国的独裁者卢卡申科仍然掌权。
He has tried to maintain some distance from the war in Ukraine, but he has also allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin to do what he wishes on Belarusian territory, where the Russian military is dug in and ubiquitous.
他试图与乌克兰战争保持一定距离，但他也允许俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在白俄罗斯领土上为所欲为，俄罗斯军队在那里扎根，无处不在。
If anything, the risk that military tensions or even outright war might follow Lukashenko’s departure from the scene, when that occurs, is greater today than it was in 2021.
如果说有什么不同的话，那就是卢卡申科离开现场后，军事紧张甚至全面战争的风险可能会比 2021 年更大。
If Lukashenko or Putin can find a political leader to uphold the ancien régime in Belarus, they will be content.
如果卢卡申科或普京能够找到一位政治领导人来维护白俄罗斯的旧政权，他们就会感到满意。
European countries, for their part, will not challenge a Belarus under tacit Russian control, since that is already the status quo.
就欧洲国家而言，它们不会挑战俄罗斯默许控制下的白俄罗斯，因为这已经是现状。
Lukashenko’s domestic-political legitimacy, however, has long been eroding.
然而，卢卡申科的国内政治合法性长期以来一直在受到侵蚀。
He has no discernible vision for his country, which he has unnaturally alienated from all of its neighbors other than Russia.
他对自己的国家没有明显的愿景，他不自然地疏远了除俄罗斯以外的所有邻国。
As in Ukraine in 2014, many in Belarus would like to see a European path for their country.
就像2014年的乌克兰一样，许多白俄罗斯人希望看到自己的国家走上欧洲之路。
They took to the streets in 2020 to make this point.
他们在2020年走上街头表达了这一点。
In theory, Europe would like to see Belarus travel down this path as well.
理论上，欧洲也希望看到白俄罗斯也走上这条道路。
Thus, the structural conditions that pushed Europe and Russia into an extended conflict in Ukraine, starting in 2014, also exist in Belarus.
因此，自 2014 年开始导致欧洲和俄罗斯在乌克兰陷入长期冲突的结构性条件在白俄罗斯也存在。
Changes to the Belarusian polity of any kind have little potential to cool regional tensions, especially if they come about spontaneously.
白俄罗斯政体的任何形式的改变都没有可能缓解地区紧张局势，尤其是自发发生的改变。
Additionally, such changes have considerable potential to inflame the region.
此外，此类变化很有可能激怒该地区。
Belarus now hosts Russian tactical nuclear weapons, and this month NATO shot down a drone that crossed from Belarus into Lithuania.
白俄罗斯现在拥有俄罗斯战术核武器，本月北约击落了一架从白俄罗斯越境进入立陶宛的无人机。
Has the country become too intertwined with Moscow for the long-game Western strategy you originally argued for to succeed?
这个国家是否与莫斯科的关系变得过于紧密，以致于您最初主张的西方长期战略无法取得成功？
It has.
确实如此。
Geopolitically, Belarus is not separate from Russia.
从地缘政治角度来看，白俄罗斯与俄罗斯并不分离。
It was not separate in 2021, but back then, Minsk and Moscow were less comprehensively bound together.
2021 年，它们并没有分开，但当时，明斯克和莫斯科的联系还不太紧密。
The problems Russia presents to both Europe and the United States are a larger version of the problems presented by Belarus.
俄罗斯给欧洲和美国带来的问题是白俄罗斯带来的问题的放大版。
Belarus may be the staging ground for further Russian invasions of Ukraine from the north.
白俄罗斯可能是俄罗斯从北部进一步入侵乌克兰的集结地。
Belarus is likely to continue weaponizing its border with the European Union and contributing to gray-zone sabotage and subversion efforts in Europe that are plotted and planned in Moscow.
白俄罗斯可能会继续将其与欧盟的边境武器化，并为莫斯科策划和计划的欧洲灰色地带破坏和颠覆活动做出贡献。
Lukashenko has tried to keep Belarusian troops out of Ukraine and prevent Ukraine from mounting strikes on Belarusian territory, but in this war there is no question which side Belarus is on.
卢卡申科试图阻止白俄罗斯军队进入乌克兰，并阻止乌克兰对白俄罗斯领土发动袭击，但在这场战争中，白俄罗斯站在哪一边是毫无疑问的。
Belarus gives Russia additional military options, augmenting Russian power.
白俄罗斯为俄罗斯提供了更多的军事选择，增强了俄罗斯的实力。
That is the strategic challenge for the United States and for NATO.
这是美国和北约面临的战略挑战。
A forward-looking strategy for Belarus should be designed to meet this challenge.
白俄罗斯应制定前瞻性战略来应对这一挑战。
Regime change is not worth considering, and an overthrow of the Belarusian government, which is not inconceivable, would have to be handled with great care by the NATO member states on the borders of Belarus.
政权更迭不值得考虑，推翻白俄罗斯政府并非不可想象，但白俄罗斯边境的北约成员国必须非常谨慎地处理。
There is no safe or easy way to shift Belarus out of Russia’s sphere of influence.
没有安全或简单的方法可以将白俄罗斯移出俄罗斯的势力范围。
A Western strategy for Belarus should therefore rest on two pillars: First is mitigating the harm Belarus causes by aiding Russia in its open war against Ukraine and somewhat less open hostilities toward Europe.
因此，西方对白俄罗斯的战略应该建立在两个支柱上：首先是通过援助俄罗斯对乌克兰的公开战争和对欧洲不太公开的敌对行动来减轻白俄罗斯造成的伤害。
This is a military project.
这是一个军事项目。
Second is including Belarus in the efforts to exhaust Russia over time and to convince Moscow that a sustained war against Ukraine — or Ukraine plus Europe — is futile.
其次，让白俄罗斯参与到逐渐耗尽俄罗斯力量的努力中，并让莫斯科相信，针对乌克兰（或乌克兰加欧洲）的持续战争是徒劳的。
This is an economic project, to which sanctions are crucial.
这是一个经济项目，制裁对其至关重要。
Within the broader goal of containing Russia is the related goal of containing Belarus.
在遏制俄罗斯的更广泛目标中，还有遏制白俄罗斯的相关目标。
You wrote that “jaw-jaw is better than war-war,” and you urged the West to keep channels open rather than isolating Belarus.
你写道，“吵架比战争好”，你敦促西方保持渠道畅通，而不是孤立白俄罗斯。
The Trump administration has done exactly that, engaging Lukashenko directly and securing the release of 250 political prisoners in March and 25 more this month in exchange for sanctions relief.
特朗普政府正是这么做的，直接与卢卡申科接触，并确保 3 月份释放 250 名政治犯，本月又释放 25 名政治犯，以换取制裁解除。
Yet Minsk stays firmly anchored to Moscow.
然而明斯克仍然牢牢地扎根于莫斯科。
Does this engagement vindicate your lesson, or does it fall into the trap critics warn of: legitimizing the regime while leaving its dependence on Russia untouched?
这次接触是否证明了你的教训，还是落入了批评者警告的陷阱：使政权合法化，同时不影响其对俄罗斯的依赖？
The experience of the last five years does not fully vindicate that unfalsifiable axiom that “jaw-jaw is better than war-war.” Nor does it prove that “jaw-jaw” legitimizes a regime that does not depend on the West for its legitimation.
过去五年的经验并不能完全证明“吵架胜于战争”这一不可证伪的公理。它也不能证明“下巴”可以使一个不依赖西方的政权合法化。
It was not the Trump administration’s outreach to Minsk that has prevented a new war — Belarus has no intention of beginning one.
特朗普政府对明斯克的接触并没有阻止一场新的战争——白俄罗斯无意发动一场战争。
It is of modest value, though in and of itself the release of prisoners negotiated by the Trump administration has been valuable and humane.
尽管特朗普政府谈判达成的释放囚犯本身就是有价值且人道的，但它的价值不大。
Keeping channels of communication open between Minsk and Washington still makes sense, but these channels cannot be separated from the strategic muddle that is the Trump administration’s approach both to Russia and to the war in Ukraine.
保持明斯克和华盛顿之间的沟通渠道畅通仍然有意义，但这些渠道不能与特朗普政府对俄罗斯和乌克兰战争的战略混乱分开。
“Jaw-jaw” with Belarus would work better if the Trump administration could set clear priorities for the U.S.-Russian relationship, work closely with Ukraine on securing Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, and strengthen the trans-Atlantic relationship.
如果特朗普政府能够为美俄关系确定明确的优先事项，与乌克兰密切合作以确保乌克兰的独立和领土完整，并加强跨大西洋关系，那么与白俄罗斯的“咬咬”将会效果更好。
Since the administration has neglected these lines of effort, its outreach to Belarus has an indeterminate and confusing quality.
由于政府忽视了这些努力，其对白俄罗斯的外展具有不确定性和令人困惑的性质。
As for Belarus’ dependence on Russia, this is something neither Europe nor the United States can change, at least while Lukashenko is still in power.
至于白俄罗斯对俄罗斯的依赖，这是欧洲和美国都无法改变的，至少在卢卡申科还在位期间是这样。
The problem with the Trump administration is not its willingness to send envoys and officials to Belarus or its ability to negotiate prisoner exchanges.
特朗普政府的问题不在于其向白俄罗斯派遣特使和官员的意愿，也不在于其谈判囚犯交换的能力。
The problem is an a priori lack of leverage combined with the absence — on Washington’s part — of a coherent and sensible regional strategy.
问题在于先验地缺乏影响力，加上华盛顿方面缺乏连贯且明智的地区战略。
Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, what would you change about your original arguments?
最后，事后看来，你会改变你最初的论点吗？
To answer this question, let me repeat the essay’s core arguments, which were stated in the form of four lessons: maintain a good balance between actual leverage and rhetorical commitments; acknowledge the scope of Russian military power where it exists; make full use of nonmilitary negotiating tools; play the long game.
为了回答这个问题，让我重复一下这篇文章的核心论点，这些论点以四个教训的形式阐述：在实际影响力和言辞承诺之间保持良好的平衡；承认俄罗斯现有军事力量的范围；充分利用非军事谈判工具；打持久战。
My original essay was published in July 2021, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
我的原创文章发表于 2021 年 7 月，当时俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰之前。
The invasion and subsequent ongoing war raise the stakes of my four points, having put them in a new geopolitical context.
入侵和随后持续的战争提高了我的四点的赌注，将它们置于新的地缘政治背景中。
The first lesson has been learned.
第一个教训已经吸取了。
Neither the Biden nor Trump administration made expansive rhetorical commitments to Belarus.
拜登和特朗普政府都没有对白俄罗斯做出广泛的口头承诺。
In the absence of significant leverage, the status quo has to be accepted, grudgingly perhaps, and so it is in the United States and in Europe.
在缺乏重要影响力的情况下，必须接受现状，也许是不情愿的，美国和欧洲也是如此。
The second lesson has also been learned.
第二个教训也已经吸取了。
In 2022, Western policymakers too often dismissed a large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine as unthinkable.
2022 年，西方政策制定者常常认为俄罗斯大规模入侵乌克兰是不可想象的。
While it was thought that Russia lacked the capacity to invade, the West lacked the imagination to see what was coming.
虽然人们认为俄罗斯缺乏入侵能力，但西方缺乏想象力来预见即将发生的事情。
Today, Russia has no need to invade Belarus, a country it already dominates, and, fortunately, Western policymakers are fully aware of the military power Russia possesses in Belarus and could project from there in the future.
今天，俄罗斯没有必要入侵白俄罗斯这个它已经占据主导地位的国家，幸运的是，西方政策制定者充分意识到俄罗斯在白俄罗斯拥有的军事力量，并可以在未来从那里投射。
In 2026, Belarus should be the subject of intensive scenario planning.
2026年，白俄罗斯应该成为密集情景规划的对象。
That which in the past was shocking about Russian actions in Ukraine should be debated and thought through in relation to Belarus.
过去俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动令人震惊的事情应该在白俄罗斯问题上进行辩论和思考。
On the topic of nonmilitary negotiating tools, I have lower expectations in 2026 than I did in 2021.
在非军事谈判工具这个话题上，我对 2026 年的期望低于 2021 年。
The Europe of 2021 was not burdened by the zero-sum divisions imposed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
2021 年的欧洲并未受到 2022 年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰所造成的零和分裂的影响。
In a war-shadowed Europe, avoiding worst-case scenarios and making a few practical gains is the most that can be expected from negotiation with Belarus.
在战争阴影笼罩的欧洲，与白俄罗斯的谈判最能期待的是避免最坏的情况并取得一些实际成果。
Fourth, the long game is even more important today than it was in 2021.
第四，今天的持久战比 2021 年更加重要。
Russia’s militarized authoritarianism is a losing proposition for Russia and its neighbors, although it will wreak great devastation while entrenched in the Kremlin.
俄罗斯的军事化威权主义对俄罗斯及其邻国来说是一个失败的主张，尽管它在克里姆林宫根深蒂固时会造成巨大的破坏。
Militarized authoritarianism creates significant risks in what remains the nuclear age, but over time it will not triumph.
军事化威权主义在核时代仍然存在巨大风险，但随着时间的推移，它不会取得胜利。
It will have to fail from within for it to be replaced by something else, at which time European possibilities for Belarus may become a reality.
它必须从内部失败，才能被其他东西取代，届时白俄罗斯在欧洲的可能性可能会成为现实。
To think about this region in decades rather than years is an invitation to step beyond the harsh facts of the present moment and to envision a better future.
用几十年而不是几年的时间来思考这个地区，是在邀请我们超越当前的严酷事实，展望更美好的未来。
Michael Kimmage is the director of the Kennan Institute and a senior non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution.
迈克尔·金马奇 (Michael Kimmage) 是凯南研究所所长，也是布鲁金斯学会的高级非常驻研究员。
He is the author of, among other books, Collisions: The War in Ukraine and the Origins of the New Global Instability , which was published by Oxford University Press in 2024 and will be out in paperback in 2027.
他是《碰撞：乌克兰战争和全球新不稳定的起源》等书的作者，该书由牛津大学出版社于 2024 年出版，平装本将于 2027 年出版。