The AI-Assisted Strategic Own Goal in the Kill Chain

For eighty years, the Western alliance has anchored its strength in moral legitimacy, shared values, and the resulting credibility to shape international norms.

八十年来，西方联盟将其力量锚定在道德合法性、共同价值观以及由此产生的塑造国际规范的可信度上。

NATO’s durability through the Cold War rested on more than nuclear deterrence alone: a shared conviction that the alliance represented a rules-based order worth sustaining, in which the use of force was bounded by law, constrained by democratic accountability, and subject to independent scrutiny.

北约在冷战中的​​持久性不仅仅依赖于核威慑：一种共同的信念，即该联盟代表了一种值得维持的基于规则的秩序，在这种秩序中，武力的使用受到法律的约束，受到民主问责制的约束，并受到独立的审查。

Dozens of nations aligned with a framework in which power was subject to restraint.

数十个国家与权力受到限制的框架结盟。

That framework is now under pressure from several directions, but one unexpected contributor is the increasing use of AI embedded in the targeting processes of advanced militaries.

该框架现在面临着来自多个方向的压力，但一个意想不到的贡献者是越来越多地使用嵌入先进军队的目标确定过程中的人工智能。

During the war between the United States and Iran earlier this year, the Maven Smart System , built by Palantir and running Anthropic’s Claude, helped generate and prioritize targets at a pace inconceivable even just five years ago.

在今年早些时候的美国和伊朗战争期间，由 Palantir 构建并运行 Anthropic 的 Claude 的 Maven 智能系统帮助生成目标并确定优先级，其速度在五年前还是难以想象的。

It raises a pressing question: What happens to human decision-making as AI compresses the kill chain towards machine speed?

它提出了一个紧迫的问题：当人工智能将杀伤链压缩到机器速度时，人类的决策会发生什么？

This article focuses on one layer — the decision support systems that fuse intelligence, nominate and prioritize targets, and increasingly apply generative models to reason across all of it.

本文重点关注一层——决策支持系统，它融合情报、提名和优先考虑目标，并越来越多地应用生成模型来推理所有这些系统。

The race to automate that process risks becoming a strategic own goal disguised as a tactical capability gain if the West fails to implement it in line with its values.

如果西方未能按照其价值观来实施这一过程，那么自动化这一过程的竞赛就有可能成为伪装成战术能力增益的战略性目标。

Western militaries cannot preserve their current model and standard of human oversight while harnessing AI-enabled targeting at machine speed .

西方军队无法在以机器速度利用人工智能瞄准的同时，保留其当前的人类监督模式和标准。

Yet that should compel them to redesign oversight, not abandon it, because good oversight is ultimately a source of strategic advantage.

然而，这应该迫使他们重新设计监督，而不是放弃监督，因为良好的监督最终是战略优势的来源。

Allied governments should agree now on which judgments should remain human, before these systems are fully integrated, and should ensure the same technology that accelerates the kill chain also strengthens the quality of oversight itself.

在这些系统完全整合之前，盟国政府现在应该就哪些判断应该保持人性化达成一致，并应确保加速杀伤链的技术也能加强监督本身的质量。

A Familiar, But New Challenge From chemical to nuclear weapons, humanity has repeatedly confronted technologies that transformed warfare, and each time eventually developed doctrine, norms, and governance structures in response .

熟悉但新的挑战从化学武器到核武器，人类一再面对改变战争的技术，每一次最终都制定了相应的条令、规范和治理结构。

But what is novel with AI is that it changes how decisions are made, not just how well the weapons work or how effectively they can execute a human decision.

但人工智能的新颖之处在于，它改变了决策的方式，而不仅仅是武器的工作效果或它们执行人类决策的效率。

Earlier technological developments gave militaries more speed, accuracy, or scale, but a human had already decided what to hit.

早期的技术发展为军队提供了更高的速度、准确性或规模，但人类已经决定了打击目标。

A fire-and-forget munition, for example, carries out a human decision rather than making one itself.

例如，一种“发射后不管”的弹药是执行人类的决定，而不是自己做出决定。

Some technologies did reach further: Radar changed how targets are recognized.

有些技术确实更进一步：雷达改变了目标识别方式。

Automated air defenses are the closest comparator, completing engagements without human intervention — though only within a narrow envelope, against parameters set in advance by a human.

自动防空系统是最接近的比较器，可以在没有人为干预的情况下完成交战——尽管只是在一个狭窄的范围内，根据人类预先设定的参数。

Otherwise, previous technologies have only affected the input to a human decision, and left a human to reach a conclusion at human speed.

否则，以前的技术只会影响人类决策的输入，并让人类以人类的速度得出结论。

Oversight mechanisms were built around that speed.

监督机制是围绕这个速度建立的。

AI, on the other hand, reaches the verdict itself, faster than anyone can question it or even understand its reasoning.

另一方面，人工智能本身做出裁决的速度比任何人质疑它甚至理解其推理的速度都要快。

A physical weapon can be banned or restricted, while a judgment folded into a process is much harder to regulate.

物理武器可以被禁止或限制，而纳入程序的判断则更难监管。

The value proposition of AI in targeting is significantly increased speed and scale : more automation, more chance of battlefield victory, the argument goes.

人工智能在瞄准方面的价值主张是显着提高速度和规模：有人认为，自动化程度更高，战场胜利的机会更大。

But this is also where the strategic consequences of error become most acute.

但这也是错误的战略后果变得最严重的地方。

Much of the public debate has focused on whether AI in warfare can adhere to international humanitarian law.

大多数公开辩论都集中在战争中的人工智能是否能够遵守国际人道主义法。

Compliance with principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity, and humanity is vital and demanding, and is the foundation of the West’s moral authority.

遵守区别性、相称性、必要性和人道原则至关重要且要求严格，是西方道德权威的基础。

But it operates within a relatively well-defined framework, applying established rules to a given situation.

但它在一个相对明确的框架内运作，将既定规则应用于特定情况。

The considerations in a targeting decision extend well beyond whether a strike is lawful.

目标决定中的考虑因素远远超出了打击是否合法的范围。

In UK targeting doctrine, the legal adviser considers “could we strike it in compliance with international law,” while the policy adviser answers “should we?”

在英国的目标原则中，法律顾问考虑“我们能否按照国际法打击它”，而政策顾问则回答“我们应该吗？”

The “should we” question can be a more nuanced proposition.

“我们应该”的问题可能是一个更微妙的命题。

There is no fixed rule that resolves it.

没有固定的规则可以解决它。

It is a dynamic assessment of the strategic and political implications of action.

它是对行动的战略和政治影响的动态评估。

A lawful strike can still inflame a third party on whose support an eventual settlement depends, open a rift in a coalition whose unity is itself a strategic asset, or forfeit the cooperation of a local community whose consent and intelligence are relied upon.

合法的罢工仍然可能激怒最终解决方案所依赖的第三方，在团结本身就是战略资产的联盟中造成裂痕，或者失去当地社区的合作，而当地社区的同意和情报是依赖的。

A tactical military gain can be significantly outweighed by the strategic communications cost .

战略通信成本可能大大超过战术军事收益。

Consider a compound in a densely populated area where intelligence has identified a senior commander responsible for scores of coalition deaths.

考虑一下人口稠密地区的一个大院，情报机构已确定一名高级指挥官对联军数十人的死亡负有责任。

A strike is legally viable — the target is positively identified and the collateral damage estimate falls within proportionality thresholds.

打击在法律上是可行的——目标已被明确识别，附带损害估计在比例阈值内。

But the compound sits close to a site of profound cultural significance, and the commander is in talks with a faction quietly exploring ceasefire terms through a back channel that has taken months to establish.

但该大院靠近一处具有深远文化意义的地点，指挥官正在与一个派系进行谈判，通过花了数月时间才建立的秘密渠道，悄悄探讨停火条款。

Striking would almost certainly collapse those talks and generate imagery that allied governments would struggle to defend publicly, at a moment when domestic consent for the operation is already wavering.

罢工几乎肯定会破坏这些谈判，并产生盟国政府难以公开捍卫的形象，而此时国内对这次行动的同意已经发生动摇。

Then the commander prepares to move, with no intelligence on where he is going.

然后指挥官准备出发，但不知道他要去哪里。

The decision-maker should weigh striking now, before he disappears, against the near-certain collapse of the talks.

决策者现在应该在消失之前考虑对几乎肯定会破裂的谈判采取行动。

There is no algorithm that resolves this.

没有算法可以解决这个问题。

It requires a human being to weigh incommensurable values under immense pressure and accept accountability for the outcome.

它要求人类在巨大的压力下权衡不可通约的价值观，并接受对结果的责任。

The drive to automate targeting is often framed as a competitive necessity.

自动化定位的驱动力通常被视为竞争的必需品。

The West’s adversaries are pursuing AI-enabled warfare aggressively.

西方的对手正在积极推行人工智能战争。

If the West does not match their pace, the argument runs, it accepts a disadvantage that translates into operational and ultimately strategic defeat.

这种观点认为，如果西方国家跟不上他们的步伐，它就会接受一种劣势，这种劣势会转化为行动上的失败，最终导致战略上的失败。

This logic is not necessarily wrong, but it is incomplete.

这个逻辑不一定是错误的，但它是不完整的。

Matching adversary capabilities is a baseline requirement.

匹配对手的能力是一项基本要求。

The question is whether, in pursuing that baseline, militaries engineer out the very oversight mechanisms that distinguish how democratic societies wage war, and in doing so surrender the asymmetry that has underpinned Western strategic advantage for eighty years.

问题是，在追求这一基线的过程中，军队是否设计出了区分民主社会如何发动战争的监督机制，并在此过程中放弃了八十年来支撑西方战略优势的不对称性。

Democracies will never out-compete authoritarian regimes in the unconstrained application of force, nor should they try.

民主国家永远不会在无限制地使用武力方面击败独裁政权，也不应该尝试这样做。

Restraint is the architecture of the legitimacy that holds alliances together , sustains domestic political consent for military operations , and provides the moral authority to set international norms .

克制是合法性的架构，它使联盟团结在一起，维持国内政治对军事行动的同意，并提供制定国际规范的道德权威。

Yet no military can retain its current model of human oversight while harnessing the military advantage this technology can offer.

然而，没有任何一支军队能够在利用这项技术提供的军事优势的同时，保留其当前的人类监督模式。

A thousand strikes in twenty-four hours, widely cited as the tempo in the recent U.S.-Iran conflict , leaves roughly eighty-six seconds per targeting decision.

二十四小时内发动一千次袭击，被广泛认为是最近的美伊冲突的节奏，每个目标决定大约有八十六秒的时间。

Existing review processes were not built for that tempo, if they are indeed followed with integrity rather than rubber stamping machine decisions.

现有的审查流程并不是按照这种节奏建立的，如果它们确实是遵循完整性而不是橡皮图章机器决策的话。

There is, however, a case for optimism.

然而，我们也有理由保持乐观。

Safeguards and tempo are commonly assumed to be direct trade-offs.

保障措施和节奏通常被认为是直接的权衡。

But a fundamental redesign — one that makes use of AI — could improve the quality of oversight rather than merely preserve it, whilst keeping pace with machine speed at the same time.

但根本性的重新设计——利用人工智能——可以提高监督质量，而不仅仅是保留监督质量，同时与机器速度保持同步。

The capability could be turned inward: surfacing relevant precedents, flagging coalition sensitivities, or sharpening commanders’ understanding of the implications of expected collateral damage.

这种能力可以转向内部：揭示相关先例，削弱联盟的敏感性，或者加深指挥官对预期附带损害影响的理解。

More ambitiously, AI deployed in an adversarial capacity within the targeting process — as a live red team, continuously stress-testing targeting recommendations against legal, ethical, and strategic criteria — would represent a genuine advance on what unaided human review can achieve.

更雄心勃勃的是，在目标确定过程中以对抗性的方式部署人工智能——作为一支实时红队，根据法律、道德和战略标准不断对目标建议进行压力测试——将代表着在独立人类审查方面取得的真正进步。

Commanders have every incentive to want such considerations built in.

指挥官们完全有理由希望将这些考虑因素纳入其中。

It is their career, and potentially their liberty, at risk if they get it wrong.

如果他们做错了，他们的职业生涯以及潜在的自由都会面临风险。

Redesigning these processes will be bedevilled by complexity.

重新设计这些流程将会因复杂性而受到困扰。

AI-enabled workflows can quietly prestructure the decision space — a so-called “triage trap” that determines which options a commander ever sees — and interrogating machine reasoning can consume precisely the time these systems save .

支持人工智能的工作流程可以悄悄地预先构建决策空间，即所谓的“分类陷阱”，确定指挥官会看到哪些选项，而询问机器推理可以精确地消耗这些系统节省的时间。

Then there is automation bias : a well-documented tendency to defer uncritically to a sophisticated system, which will only intensify as AI grows more capable.

然后是自动化偏见：一种有据可查的倾向，不加批判地服从复杂的系统，随着人工智能变得更加强大，这种倾向只会加剧。

The notorious opacity of AI reasoning compounds these problems.

众所周知，人工智能推理的不透明性使这些问题变得更加复杂。

The existing targeting process learns from its own failures, as investigations and inquiries interrogate rationale and human logic: The 2021 review of an erroneous American strike in Kabul reconstructed what the analysts saw and what they assumed.

现有的目标确定过程从自身的失败中吸取了教训，因为调查和质询质疑了基本原理和人类逻辑：2021 年对美国在喀布尔的一次错误袭击的审查重建了分析人士的所见和假设。

That’s how processes are continuously improved to avoid mistakes happening in the future.

这就是不断改进流程以避免未来发生错误的方式。

An AI system that nominates targets by a route no one can follow breaks that loop.

人工智能系统通过无人能遵循的路线指定目标，从而打破了这一循环。

It is critical that such systems remain auditable.

此类系统保持可审计性至关重要。

However, I believe these critiques are not necessarily arguments against AI in the oversight of lethal force.

然而，我认为这些批评并不一定是反对人工智能监督致命武力的论据。

They are instead design requirements for it.

相反，它们是它的设计要求。

The question is not whether to keep humans in the loop, but how to make human judgment substantive at the tempo these systems impose.

问题不在于是否让人类参与其中，而在于如何让人类的判断按照这些系统施加的节奏做出实质性的判断。

That will require defense ministries and the commands that write doctrine to redesign how oversight is conducted — almost certainly placing greater trust in the technology than governments are currently comfortable with.

这将需要国防部门和制定条令的司令部重新设计监督方式——几乎可以肯定，对技术的信任程度会超出政府目前的承受范围。

The sooner those institutions confront that honestly, the sooner they can design something better.

这些机构越早诚实面对这一问题，就能越早设计出更好的东西。

AI may one day surpass human capacity to identify nuance, weigh competing considerations, and anticipate strategic consequences.

有一天，人工智能可能会超越人类识别细微差别、权衡竞争因素和预测战略后果的能力。

As it improves, the guardrails could move with it, albeit not uniformly.

随着它的改进，护栏可以随之移动，尽管不均匀。

On the “can we” side, where the test is compliance with a defined rule, delegation could expand as systems demonstrate reliability under strict testing and audit, overseen by a human legal adviser.

在“我们可以”方面，当测试符合既定规则时，随着系统在法律顾问监督下的严格测试和审计下证明可靠性，授权可以扩大。

On the “should we” side the guardrail is intrinsically anchored to accountability, and no improvement in the technology moves that dial.

在“我们应该”方面，护栏本质上是与问责制挂钩的，并且技术上没有任何改进。

But that is not the technology available today, and governments cannot afford to relax oversight on the promise of a capability that does not yet exist.

但这不是当今可用的技术，政府不能放松对尚不存在的能力承诺的监督。

A machine can never bear moral responsibility for the decision to take a human life.

机器永远无法为夺取人类生命的决定承担道德责任。

AI should therefore remain an input to the decisions that govern how force is used — much as legal or policy advice is today — not an authority in itself.

因此，人工智能应该仍然是控制如何使用武力的决策的输入——就像今天的法律或政策建议一样——而不是本身的权威。

The frameworks within which it operates should be designed, validated, owned, and audited by human beings, because the legitimacy of the use of force in a democracy ultimately rests on human accountability.

其运作的框架应该由人类设计、验证、拥有和审计，因为在民主国家使用武力的合法性最终取决于人类的责任。

As AI becomes embedded in how allies collect, process, and act on targeting information, it will create doctrinal interdependencies alongside the technical ones.

随着人工智能融入盟友如何收集、处理和针对目标信息采取行动，它将在技术方面产生理论上的相互依赖性。

Allies already navigate differing legal interpretations and proportionality thresholds , managed through national caveats, red-card procedures and case-by-case review at human tempo .

盟友已经在不同的法律解释和相称性门槛上进行了应对，并通过国家警告、红牌程序和按人的节奏逐案审查进行管理。

But AI-enabled targeting will demand agreement on the design principles of the system itself, in advance.

但人工智能瞄准需要提前就系统本身的设计原则达成一致。

Partners will need to satisfy themselves not merely that individual outputs meet their national standards, but that the system’s underlying framework does.

合作伙伴不仅需要满足自己的个人产出满足其国家标准的要求，而且还需要满足系统的底层框架的要求。

This is not insurmountable, but if left unsolved, incompatible standards for human oversight could render coalition operations functionally impossible.

这并非不可克服，但如果不解决，人类监督标准不兼容可能导致联盟行动无法运作。

Encouragingly, the foundations exist to build on.

令人鼓舞的是，已有基础可供继续发展。

The “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy” , endorsed by nearly sixty countries, outlines a normative framework for AI in military systems.

近六十个国家签署的《关于负责任地军事使用人工智能和自主的政治宣言》概述了军事系统中人工智能的规范框架。

The Dutch-led Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain proposed that safeguarding human agency, responsibility, and accountability should be integrated throughout the entire lifecycle of AI-enabled military systems.

荷兰领导的军事领域负责任人工智能全球委员会提出，应将维护人类能动性、责任和问责制纳入人工智能军事系统的整个生命周期。

These are the right instincts.

这些都是正确的直觉。

Translating these principles into practice means concrete steps by the relevant institutions.

将这些原则转化为实践需要相关机构采取具体行动。

Four proposals follow.

以下是四项建议。

First, governments should determine in advance which kinds of judgment are never delegated to AI.

首先，政府应该提前确定哪些判断永远不会委托给人工智能。

For example, a decision should revert to a human where competing considerations should be weighed rather than measured against a fixed rule; where it touches sensitivities designated in advance (in the manner of a no-strike list but extended to political and wider considerations); where the system’s own confidence or the currency of its data falls below a set threshold; or where the rules and thresholds themselves are being created or amended.

例如，决策应回归人类，应权衡相互竞争的考虑因素，而不是根据固定规则进行衡量；涉及预先指定的敏感问题（以禁止打击清单的方式，但扩展到政治和更广泛的考虑）；系统自身的信心或其数据的流通性低于设定的阈值；或者正在创建或修改规则和阈值本身。

Second, defense ministries should build an adversarial red team into the targeting process itself — an AI capability that stress-tests every nomination against legal, ethical and strategic criteria at the speed the system generates them, surfacing what a human should weigh rather than reaching the judgment itself.

其次，国防部门应该在目标确定过程本身中建立一支对抗性红队——一种人工智能能力，能够以系统生成提名的速度，根据法律、道德和战略标准对每一项提名进行压力测试，揭示出人类应该权衡的因素，而不是做出判断本身。

This should be a contractual requirement for AI targeting platforms, tested in exercises with the same rigour currently applied to systems designed to increase target-generation speed and scale.

这应该是人工智能目标平台的合同要求，并在与当前旨在提高目标生成速度和规模的系统相同严格的演习中进行测试。

Third, the reasoning behind target nomination and AI “decisions” should remain auditable to a sufficient standard for an inquiry to establish what happened and why.

第三，目标提名和人工智能“决策”背后的推理应该保持可审计性，达到足够的标准，以便进行调查以确定发生了什么以及为什么。

Systems should automatically log each nomination’s inputs, stated rationale and model version , alongside any related human decisions.

系统应自动记录每个提名的输入、说明的理由和模型版本，以及任何相关的人类决策。

Fourth, governments should adopt measures to stop a “human in the loop” from decaying into rubber-stamping.

第四，政府应采取措施阻止“人在循环中”沦为橡皮图章。

The problem is well studied outside defense.

这个问题在防守之外已经得到了很好的研究。

Systems that ask the decision-maker questions rather than simply issuing recommendations keep reviewers engaged, as might putting the red team’s case against striking alongside the case for it.

向决策者提出问题而不是简单地提出建议的系统可以让评审者保持参与，这可能会将红队反对罢工的理由与支持罢工的理由放在一起。

Imposed accountability measures work less well: The evidence suggests professionals who have internalized responsibility for checking machine outputs are the ones who actually do, which makes this a training and culture problem as much as a design one.

强加的问责措施效果不太好：证据表明，内部负责检查机器输出的专业人员才是真正这样做的人，这使得这既是一个设计问题，也是一个培训和文化问题。

All four start with policy and doctrine, owned by national defense ministries.

所有四个都从政策和学说开始，由国防部负责。

Each step serves the same purpose: to protect the judgment of whether a lawful strike is a wise one, and to keep it in hands that can be held accountable for it.

每一步都服务于相同的目的：保护对合法罢工是否明智的判断，并将其掌握在可以对此负责的人手中。

But this cannot be done in isolation.

但这不能孤立地完成。

The most obvious, if not the most straightforward, place to agree on coalition standards for human oversight in AI-enabled targeting is NATO.

最明显（如果不是最直接）的就人工智能目标的人类监督联盟标准达成一致的地方是北约。

None of this need be a limitation.

这些都不需要成为限制。

Rather, it is the West’s very advantage.

相反，这是西方的优势。

A doctrine that keeps human decision-making at its core reinforces the legitimacy, accountability, and trust that are the foundations of enduring strategic power.

以人类决策为核心的学说强化了合法性、责任感和信任，而这些是持久战略力量的基础。

Abandoning that would perhaps yield a few tactical successes, but it would surrender something far more decisive.

放弃这一点也许会带来一些战术上的成功，但它会放弃一些更具决定性的东西。

The West has faced moments like this previously, when new technologies tested the boundaries of what it stands for.

西方以前也曾面临过这样的时刻，新技术测试了它所代表的界限。

Each time, its edge has come not from discarding its values but from integrating them into the way it fights and prevails.

每一次，它的优势都不是来自于抛弃自己的价值观，而是来自于将这些价值观融入到自己的战斗和获胜方式中。

The West has done it before, and it can do it again.

西方以前已经做到过，而且还可以再做一次。

Dan Summers was the United Kingdom’s operational policy adviser for air operations in the Middle East in 2024 and was previously head of international relations for cyber in the UK Ministry of Defence.

丹·萨默斯 (Dan Summers) 是英国 2024 年中东空中行动的作战政策顾问，此前曾担任英国国防部网络国际关系主管。

The views and opinions expressed are those of the author alone and should not be taken to represent those of His Majesty’s Government, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, His Majesty’s Armed Forces or any government agency.

所表达的观点和意见仅代表作者本人，不应被视为代表国王陛下政府、英国国防部、国王陛下武装部队或任何政府机构的观点和意见。