Iran Faces Severe Challenges to Rebuild Missile and Drone Production
With the significant Israeli and U.S. military attacks against Iran in 2025 and early 2026, analysts have discussed and debated Iran’s ability to replenish its missile and drone arsenal.
随着 2025 年和 2026 年初以色列和美国对伊朗发动重大军事袭击，分析人士对伊朗补充导弹和无人机武库的能力进行了讨论和辩论。
Since 2024, Iran has burned through thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones in its retaliatory attacks against Israel, U.S. military bases, and other targets in the region.
自2024年以来，伊朗在对以色列、美国军事基地和该地区其他目标的报复性袭击中，已击毁数千枚弹道导弹、巡航导弹和单向攻击无人机。
In addition, air and missile strikes destroyed many more Iranian missiles and drones along with their launchers.
此外，空中和导弹袭击摧毁了更多伊朗导弹和无人机及其发射器。
Importantly, Israeli and U.S. attacks in 2024, 2025, and especially 2026 cumulatively caused severe damage to Iran’s missile and drone industry as well as its larger defense research-industrial base.
重要的是，以色列和美国在 2024 年、2025 年、尤其是 2026 年的袭击累计对伊朗的导弹和无人机工业及其更大的国防研究工业基地造成了严重损害。
Thus, Iran’s ability to replenish its arsenal of operational missiles and drones has become an important topic for policymakers, intelligence analysts, military planners, and outside experts.
因此，伊朗补充其作战导弹和无人机武器库的能力已成为政策制定者、情报分析师、军事规划者和外部专家的一个重要话题。
Since the Israeli and U.S. militaries halted their attacks on Iran’s missile and drone industries in April 2026, there have been conflicting claims about the status of Iran’s ability to produce new systems.
自 2026 年 4 月以色列和美国军方停止对伊朗导弹和无人机工业的攻击以来，关于伊朗生产新系统的能力状况一直存在相互矛盾的说法。
For instance, many American and Israeli officials have claimed that Iran can no longer produce missiles and drones.
例如，许多美国和以色列官员声称伊朗无法再生产导弹和无人机。
However, Iran’s rapid recovery after the spring 2026 war reportedly stunned some Israeli officials and raised concerns that Iran may return to producing hundreds of missiles per month.
然而，据报道，伊朗在 2026 年春季战争后的迅速复苏令一些以色列官员感到震惊，并引发了人们对伊朗可能恢复每月生产数百枚导弹的担忧。
For their part, Iranian officials have claimed that, despite the attacks, Iran has continued to produce and improve missiles and drones.
伊朗官员则声称，尽管发生了袭击，伊朗仍在继续生产和改进导弹和无人机。
This is likely bluster for deterrence purposes and, if anything, reflects Iran’s assembly of missiles from finished parts, rather than the reconstitution of its industries and supply chains.
这可能是出于威慑目的的恐吓，如果有的话，也反映了伊朗用成品零件组装导弹，而不是重建其工业和供应链。
So, what is the state of Iran’s missile and drone industry?
那么，伊朗的导弹和无人机产业现状如何？
What are Iran’s options for replenishing its arsenal and rebuilding its production capabilities?
伊朗补充核武库、重建生产能力有哪些选择？
What challenges does Iran face in replenishing and rebuilding?
伊朗在补给和重建方面面临哪些挑战？
In the shorter term, Iran can conceivably assemble new ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones — perhaps hundreds or even thousands — from its prewar stockpiles of finished components.
从短期来看，伊朗可以想象从战前库存的成品零部件中组装新的弹道导弹、巡航导弹和无人机——或许数百甚至数千。
In the longer term, Iran will need to rebuild its severely damaged missile and drone industries to produce new systems and, importantly, to make improvements to existing systems and to develop new ones.
从长远来看，伊朗将需要重建其严重受损的导弹和无人机工业，以生产新系统，更重要的是，改进现有系统并开发新系统。
Israeli and U.S. attacks targeted the production and supply chains of Iran’s missile and drone industries.
以色列和美国的袭击针对伊朗导弹和无人机行业的生产和供应链。
In doing so, they targeted both the core organizations that develop and produce missiles and drones, as well as the key domestic suppliers and industries that support them.
在此过程中，他们的目标既包括开发和生产导弹和无人机的核心组织，也包括支持它们的主要国内供应商和行业。
According to U.S. officials, the goal was to “obliterate Iran’s missiles and drones and facilities that produce them” and to destroy its defense‑industrial base to “ensure that Iran cannot reconstitute the ability to project power outside their borders.”
据美国官员称，其目标是“消灭伊朗的导弹、无人机及其生产设施”，并摧毁其国防工业基地，以“确保伊朗无法重建向境外投射力量的能力”。
According to my evolving assessment , the strikes from 2024 to 2026 targeted more than 40 ballistic missile industry sites, almost 20 cruise missile industry sites, and more than 20 drone industry sites — plus dozens of other defense research-industrial sites that support Iran’s missile and drone production.
根据我不断发展的评估，2024 年至 2026 年的袭击目标是 40 多个弹道导弹工业基地、近 20 个巡航导弹工业基地和 20 多个无人机工业基地，以及数十个支持伊朗导弹和无人机生产的其他国防研究工业基地。
In doing so, Israeli and U.S. military forces focused on critical “bottleneck” elements of Iran’s missile and drone industries, including sites important to guidance and control, propulsion, warheads, airframes, launchers, and the final assembly of missiles and drones.
在此过程中，以色列和美国军队重点关注伊朗导弹和无人机工业的关键“瓶颈”要素，包括对制导和控制、推进、弹头、机身、发射器以及导弹和无人机最终组装至关重要的地点。
Israel and the United States also targeted elements of Iran’s defense research establishment, including key universities that support the design and development of these systems.
以色列和美国还瞄准了伊朗国防研究机构的组成部分，包括支持这些系统设计和开发的重点大学。
Additionally, they struck dual‑use industrial facilities producing strategic materials such as carbon fiber, steel, and aluminum.
此外，他们还袭击了生产碳纤维、钢铁和铝等战略材料的军民两用工业设施。
The Israeli and U.S. campaigns severely degraded Iran’s research and development, production capacity, supply chains, and long‑standing pursuit of self‑sufficiency.
以色列和美国的行动严重削弱了伊朗的研发、生产能力、供应链以及长期以来对自给自足的追求。
Together, these elements have formed a central pillar of Iran’s asymmetric deterrence and warfighting strategy, enabling Tehran to use its missiles and drones to offset the conventional military superiority of Israel and the United States.
这些要素共同构成了伊朗不对称威慑和作战战略的核心支柱，使德黑兰能够利用其导弹和无人机来抵消以色列和美国的常规军事优势。
First, the cumulative strikes dealt a significant blow to the ability of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the regular military (Artesh), and associated organizations to conduct development, production, and supply activities across Iran’s aerospace sector.
首先，累积的袭击对国防部和武装部队后勤部、伊斯兰革命卫队、正规军（Artesh）和相关组织在伊朗航空航天领域进行开发、生产和供应活动的能力造成了重大打击。
The strikes severely impacted production lines for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, and, importantly, also degraded Iran’s ability to develop new and improved missiles and drones.
这些袭击严重影响了弹道导弹、巡航导弹和无人机的生产线，更重要的是，还削弱了伊朗开发新型和改进型导弹和无人机的能力。
Thus, the strikes have significantly affected Iran’s capacity to replenish its arsenal with existing missile and drone types, as well as its ability to make technical advancements and develop entirely new missiles and drones.
因此，袭击极大地影响了伊朗用现有导弹和无人机类型补充其武器库的能力，以及其技术进步和开发全新导弹和无人机的能力。
Iranian officials have highlighted efforts to increase warhead destructive power, extend range, improve accuracy, enhance maneuverability, reduce radar detection, and improve the ability to defeat enemy electronic warfare and air and missile defenses.
伊朗官员强调了增强弹头破坏力、扩大射程、提高精度、增强机动性、减少雷达探测以及提高击败敌方电子战、防空和导弹防御能力的努力。
The strikes have likely undermined these efforts, which Iran will need to resume to make improvements based on important technical and operational lessons it learned from its recent wars.
这些袭击可能破坏了这些努力，伊朗需要根据从最近的战争中吸取的重要技术和操作教训来恢复这些努力，以进行改进。
In addition, the fate of Iran’s apparent program to develop an unidentified new 4,000-kilometer-range intermediate-range ballistic missile — which it used in an unsuccessful attack against Diego Garcia in March 2026 — is in question.
此外，伊朗明显计划开发一种不明的新型4000公里射程中程弹道导弹——2026年3月伊朗使用该导弹对迪戈加西亚岛进行了一次未成功的袭击——这一计划的命运也受到质疑。
Similarly, the damage has also impacted the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics’ and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ambitious efforts to develop space launch vehicles — some of which would make highly capable long-range missiles if Tehran decided to do so.
同样，这次损害也影响了国防部和武装部队后勤部以及伊斯兰革命卫队开发太空运载火箭的雄心勃勃的努力——如果德黑兰决定这样做，其中一些运载火箭将制造高性能的远程导弹。
Second, the strikes severely degraded the supply chains of domestic suppliers that feed components, materials, and production and test equipment to the missile and drone programs.
其次，袭击严重削弱了为导弹和无人机项目提供零部件、材料以及生产和测试设备的国内供应商的供应链。
This includes key items that are “insourced” — made in-house by the core production organizations — and those that are “outsourced” to the wider network of dozens of Iranian industries, research centers, and companies.
这包括“内购”的关键产品（由核心生产组织内部制造）以及“外包”给由数十个伊朗工业、研究中心和公司组成的更广泛网络的关键产品。
Indeed, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei recently requested efforts and regular updates on the supply chain issue from the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, which produces missiles and drones.
事实上，最高领袖哈梅内伊最近要求生产导弹和无人机的伊斯兰革命卫队航空航天部队指挥官做出努力并定期更新供应链问题。
Third, through their cumulative impact on the development and production organizations and domestic supply chains, the Israeli and U.S. attacks severely undermined the self‑sufficiency of Iran’s aerospace industry.
第三，以色列和美国的袭击通过对研发和生产组织以及国内供应链的累积影响，严重损害了伊朗航空航天工业的自给自足。
For decades, Iran has sought to expand its domestic capabilities, increase its self-reliance , and minimize its dependence on foreign suppliers, particularly on strategic, bottleneck technologies.
几十年来，伊朗一直寻求扩大其国内能力，增强自力更生能力，并尽量减少对外国供应商的依赖，特别是对战略性瓶颈技术的依赖。
Of note, Israeli and U.S. strikes targeted critical sectors that Iran has spent decades developing, such as those involved in producing guidance and control components, solid rocket motors and solid propellants for ballistic missiles, turbojet and piston engines for cruise missiles and drones, explosives for warheads, and carbon fiber for composite missile airframes, to name a few.
值得注意的是，以色列和美国的袭击针对的是伊朗数十年来开发的关键部门，例如涉及生产制导和控制部件、弹道导弹的固体火箭发动机和固体推进剂、巡航导弹和无人机的涡轮喷气发动机和活塞发动机、弹头炸药以及复合导弹机身碳纤维等的生产部门。
As a result of the overall impact of the strikes, Iran’s dependence on foreign suppliers and illicit procurement networks will likely grow in the immediate term and for years to come, with its longstanding focus on self‑sufficiency temporarily given a back seat.
由于袭击的总体影响，伊朗对外国供应商和非法采购网络的依赖在短期内和未来几年可能会增加，其长期以来对自给自足的关注暂时退居二线。
In the face of this extensive damage, what are Iran’s options for replenishing its arsenal of missiles and drones and for rebuilding its production capabilities?
面对如此广泛的破坏，伊朗有哪些选择来补充其导弹和无人机武器库以及重建其生产能力？
To replenish its arsenal, Iran has three basic options.
为了补充其核武库，伊朗有三个基本选择。
First, it can assemble new systems using stockpiles of finished components in underground production sites — something Iran is reportedly already doing — which may be conducted within underground bases of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and in an underground production site run by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.
首先，它可以利用地下生产场所的成品零部件库存组装新系统——据报道伊朗已经在这样做——这可能在伊斯兰革命卫队的地下基地以及国防部和武装部队后勤部管理的地下生产场所进行。
In this way, Iran can restock its arsenal in limited numbers without relying on new production from its industries and supply chains.
这样，伊朗就可以在不依赖其工业和供应链新生产的情况下补充有限数量的核武库。
It is unclear how many missiles and drones — whether hundreds or thousands — Iran can build from existing stockpiles.
目前尚不清楚伊朗可以利用现有库存制造多少枚导弹和无人机——无论是数百还是数千。
It is also unclear how long these stocks will last.
目前还不清楚这些库存能持续多久。
In any case, assembling new missiles and drones from existing stockpiles will provide only a limited, short‑term fix, as these stockpiled components will run out and Iran cannot refill them without new production.
无论如何，从现有库存中组装新的导弹和无人机只能提供有限的短期解决方案，因为这些库存部件将会耗尽，而伊朗如果没有新的生产就无法补充它们。
Second, Iran can purchase complete missiles and drones from foreign suppliers.
其次，伊朗可以从外国供应商那里购买完整的导弹和无人机。
Iran has reportedly received some complete drones from Russia and is seeking more advanced ones.
据报道，伊朗已从俄罗斯收到了一些完整的无人机，并正在寻求更先进的无人机。
Furthermore, China has reportedly agreed to provide supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.
此外，据报道，中国已同意向伊朗提供超音速反舰巡航导弹。
Iran could pursue ballistic missiles and other cruise missiles and drones from these two countries, or possibly from North Korea.
伊朗可以从这两个国家或可能从朝鲜寻求弹道导弹和其他巡航导弹和无人机。
But this is also only a limited fix, and one that does not further Iran’s traditional emphasis on self-sufficiency.
但这也只是一种有限的解决方案，并且不会进一步推进伊朗对自给自足的传统强调。
Third, and likely its longer-term preference, Iran can seek to restart the development and production of new missiles and drones using newly produced components supplied by domestic and foreign sources.
第三，伊朗可能会寻求使用国内外供应商提供的新生产部件重新开始新型导弹和无人机的开发和生产，这可能是其长期偏好。
Iran will need to rebuild its domestic organizations and supply chains and will likely pursue both domestic and foreign pathways to do so.
伊朗将需要重建其国内组织和供应链，并可能会寻求国内和国外的途径来实现这一目标。
As part of its domestic pathway, Iran has four basic options to rebuild its ability to develop and produce missiles and drones.
作为其国内道路的一部分，伊朗有四个基本选择来重建其开发和生产导弹和无人机的能力。
First, it can repair and rebuild its existing sites, although we have seen little evidence of this happening so far, and Iran is likely well aware of the risk of renewed strikes on these facilities if Israel or the United States detects their resumed operation.
首先，它可以修复和重建现有场地，尽管到目前为止我们还没有看到这种情况发生的证据，而且伊朗很可能很清楚，如果以色列或美国发现这些设施恢复运作，伊朗可能会再次遭受袭击。
Second, Iran can relocate critical activities to secure sites.
其次，伊朗可以将关键活动转移到安全地点。
Iranian officials have claimed they moved critical bottleneck equipment from key facilities before the war and moved development and production activities underground .
伊朗官员声称，他们在战前将关键设施的关键瓶颈设备转移到地下，并将开发和生产活动转移到地下。
Third, Iran can build new facilities.
第三，伊朗可以建设新设施。
Iranian officials have claimed they reconstructed facilities in secure locations and that they were producing missiles and dronesin sites unknown to Iran’s adversaries.
伊朗官员声称，他们在安全地点重建了设施，并在伊朗对手不知道的地点生产导弹和无人机。
On this point, it is possible that Iran had already built new sites before 2026 that the open-source community has yet to identify.
在这一点上，伊朗有可能在 2026 年之前就已经建立了开源社区尚未确定的新站点。
Finally, Iran could convert the production lines of defense and non-military industries to supply missile and drone components, perhaps similar to how General Motors will reportedly make components for Patriot and other missiles for the U.S. missile industry.
最后，伊朗可以改造国防和非军事工业的生产线，以供应导弹和无人机零部件，这或许类似于据报道通用汽车为美国导弹工业的爱国者和其他导弹生产零部件的方式。
For instance, Iran might increasingly tap into companies located within its numerous industrial towns scattered across the country, many of which Iran has already used as suppliers .
例如，伊朗可能会越来越多地利用分布在全国各地的众多工业城镇内的公司，其中许多公司已经被伊朗用作供应商。
In any case, Iran will likely attempt a combination of all four options to increase the resilience and minimize the vulnerabilities of its missile and drone industries moving forward.
无论如何，伊朗可能会尝试结合所有四种选择，以提高其导弹和无人机行业的弹性并最大程度地减少其脆弱性。
One important distinction needs to be made: Rebuilding Iran’s industries and supply chains to produce ballistic missiles — and to a lesser extent, cruise missiles — will likely be a more complex and dangerous undertaking than for drones.
需要做出一个重要的区别：重建伊朗的工业和供应链以生产弹道导弹（以及较小程度的巡航导弹）可能比无人机更加复杂和危险。
The facilities, technologies, and processes involved in producing ballistic missiles are more complex, dangerous, and have a footprint that is harder to hide — and to move underground — than those required to produce drones.
与生产无人机所需的设施、技术和流程相比，生产弹道导弹所涉及的设施、技术和流程更加复杂、危险，并且其足迹更难以隐藏和转移到地下。
The manufacture and testing of liquid rocket engines and solid rocket motors provide an important example.
液体火箭发动机和固体火箭发动机的制造和测试提供了一个重要的例子。
Moreover, Iran can rely to a greater extent on commercial and dual-use components to produce drones than it can for ballistic missiles.
此外，与弹道导弹相比，伊朗可以在更大程度上依赖商业和军民两用部件来生产无人机。
As part of its foreign pathway, Iran will need to procure many types of parts, materials, and equipment from international suppliers — both to outfit rebuilt or new facilities and to restart missile and drone production lines and development programs.
作为其对外途径的一部分，伊朗将需要从国际供应商采购多种类型的零部件、材料和设备——既用于装备重建或新设施，又用于重启导弹和无人机生产线和开发项目。
Before the wars in 2025 and 2026, Iran already relied on foreign components to a certain extent for its missile and drone programs, but the “demand signal” for foreign technology has likely significantly increased, driven by the extensive damage to its core organizations and supply chains.
在2025年和2026年的战争之前，伊朗的导弹和无人机项目已经在一定程度上依赖外国部件，但由于其核心组织和供应链受到广泛破坏，对外国技术的“需求信号”可能显着增加。
Moving forward, Iran is apt to pursue extensive procurement from China, Russia, and possibly North Korea, while also relying on illicit procurement networks to acquire commercial and dual-use components, materials, and equipment from Western and Asian suppliers.
展望未来，伊朗可能会从中国、俄罗斯，甚至可能是朝鲜进行大量采购，同时也依靠非法采购网络从西方和亚洲供应商处获取商业和两用零部件、材料和设备。
In addition to purchasing complete weapon systems as noted above, Iran will probably seek complete subsystems, including engines for cruise missiles and drones; components such as guidance instruments, engine parts, and electronic components; raw materials, including chemicals for propellants and explosives, steel and aluminum alloys, and carbon fiber; and production and test equipment needed to manufacture systems, subsystems, components, and raw materials.
除了购买上述完整的武器系统外，伊朗可能还会寻求完整的子系统，包括巡航导弹和无人机的发动机；制导仪表、发动机零部件、电子元件等零部件；原材料，包括推进剂和炸药化学品、钢和铝合金以及碳纤维；以及制造系统、子系统、组件和原材料所需的生产和测试设备。
To highlight one important aspect of its rebuilding efforts, Iranian program managers and supply chain managers will be forced to review and recreate the many bills of materials that are critical to this work.
为了强调重建工作的一个重要方面，伊朗项目经理和供应链经理将被迫审查和重新创建对这项工作至关重要的许多材料清单。
Each production line and development program has its own unique bill of materials, which is a master list of the hundreds of components required to make a particular missile or drone, and the specific companies (domestic or foreign) that supply them.
每条生产线和开发项目都有自己独特的物料清单，这是制造特定导弹或无人机所需的数百个组件以及供应这些组件的特定公司（国内或国外）的主清单。
Iranian officials will need to assess each bill of materials based on the strike damage: What items did the strikes affect, especially bottleneck technologies?
伊朗官员需要根据袭击造成的损害评估每份材料清单：袭击影响了哪些项目，特别是瓶颈技术？
Were any warehouses with stored components destroyed?
储存组件的仓库是否被毁坏？
Was internal production damaged?
内部生产是否受损？
What suppliers sustained damage, and when (if at all) can they restart production?
哪些供应商遭受了损害，何时（如果有的话）可以重新开始生产？
Are alternative suppliers necessary?
是否需要替代供应商？
Importantly, the strikes will force Iranian officials to rethink “make versus buy” decisions for many of the items: What do we attempt to make internally?
重要的是，袭击将迫使伊朗官员重新考虑许多产品的“自制还是外购”决定：我们试图在内部制造什么？
What can we purchase from domestic suppliers?
我们可以从国内供应商那里采购什么？
What should we procure from foreign suppliers?
我们应该从国外供应商那里采购什么？
As a result of these reviews — and given severe resource constraints and competing military and civilian reconstruction priorities — Iranian officials may need to make difficult decisions to prioritize, streamline, or curtail missile and drone production lines and development programs.
这些审查的结果是，考虑到严重的资源限制以及相互竞争的军事和民用重建优先事项，伊朗官员可能需要做出艰难的决定，以优先考虑、精简或削减导弹和无人机生产线和开发项目。
This might require reorganization of Iran’s aerospace industries and possible merging of some key organizations and programs.
这可能需要重组伊朗航空航天工业，并可能合并一些关键组织和项目。
For at least the next few years, officials may be required to focus on the highest‑priority systems — and their associated technologies — rather than attempt to revive the dozens of pre‑war families of missiles and drones.
至少在接下来的几年里，官员们可能需要关注最优先的系统及其相关技术，而不是试图复兴数十种战前的导弹和无人机系列。
Iran faces significant challenges to rebuilding.
伊朗面临重建的重大挑战。
First, Iran will continue to face Western trade controls, sanctions, and interdictions designed to hinder procurement, alongside a reported Israeli covert campaign targeting its efforts to acquire technologies to restore damaged production lines.
首先，伊朗将继续面临西方贸易管制、制裁和旨在阻碍采购的拦截，此外据报道，以色列正在开展秘密行动，旨在获取技术以恢复受损的生产线。
It may also confront a renewed Israeli “ campaign between wars ,” including sabotage and assassinations, directed against its aerospace industry.
它还可能面临以色列新一轮的“战争之间的运动”，包括针对其航空航天业的破坏和暗杀。
Second, Iran will need to avoid foreign detection and identification of new facilities — both those involved in development and production as well as suppliers of key technologies.
其次，伊朗需要避免外国检测和识别新设施——包括参与开发和生产的设施以及关键技术的供应商。
Third, Iran will face serious logistical challenges and risks of moving critical activities underground.
第三，伊朗将面临严重的后勤挑战和将关键活动转移到地下的风险。
Building electronic and mechanical components underground poses limited risks, but if Iran attempts to move more hazardous activities underground — such as those associated with producing solid rocket motors and warheads — the hazards will be significant.
在地下建造电子和机械部件的风险有限，但如果伊朗试图将更多危险活动转移到地下，例如与生产固体火箭发动机和弹头相关的活动，那么危险将是巨大的。
Fourth, as noted above, Iran will increase its reliance on foreign suppliers, at least for the near term.
第四，如上所述，伊朗将增加对外国供应商的依赖，至少在短期内如此。
This increases its vulnerability to interdicted shipments and disrupted supply chains, and intensifies the need to protect against the risk of sabotaged components .
这增加了其对运输被拦截和供应链中断的脆弱性，并更加需要防范组件被破坏的风险。
Lastly, Iran’s rebuilding efforts face the prospect of renewed Israeli or U.S. military attacks, whether in the form of limited strikes to “mow the lawn” or conduct “spot hits” against critical bottleneck sites, or in the form of larger military operations.
最后，伊朗的重建努力面临着以色列或美国新一轮军事攻击的前景，无论是“修剪草坪”的有限打击或对关键瓶颈地点进行“定点打击”，还是更大规模的军事行动。
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that the threat posed by Iran’s missiles has been “distanced” but not eliminated, and that Israel would achieve its objectives either through agreement or military force.
以色列总理内塔尼亚胡表示，伊朗导弹构成的威胁已经“远离”，但并未消除，以色列将通过协议或军事力量实现其目标。
Consequently, Iran’s efforts to rebuild its missile and drone industries in the coming months and years will confront significant technological, industrial, economic, logistical, intelligence, and military challenges.
因此，伊朗在未来几个月和几年内重建导弹和无人机工业的努力将面临重大的技术、工业、经济、后勤、情报和军事挑战。
In the near term, Iran likely has a limited ability to replenish its missile and drone arsenal, although it can also acquire new systems from Russia and China.
短期内，伊朗补充其导弹和无人机武器库的能力可能有限，尽管它也可以从俄罗斯和中国获得新系统。
However, in the longer term, Iran faces significant challenges to reestablish something close to its prewar capability to develop and produce missiles and drones.
然而，从长远来看，伊朗面临着重建接近战前水平的导弹和无人机研发和生产能力的重大挑战。
These challenges to Tehran offer opportunities for the enhanced effectiveness of nonproliferation tools .
德黑兰面临的这些挑战为提高防扩散工具的有效性提供了机会。
First, the probable, significant uptick in Iran’s need for foreign components, materials, and equipment — which will likely include many items controlled by multilateral and national export controls — offers the opportunity to increase the effectiveness and “bite” of these controls to disrupt Iran’s rebuilding efforts.
首先，伊朗对外国零部件、材料和设备的需求可能大幅增加——其中可能包括许多受多边和国家出口管制控制的物品——提供了提高这些管制的有效性和“影响力”的机会，以扰乱伊朗的重建努力。
Countries can coordinate via the Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement to enhance their detection and disruption of Iranian illicit procurement efforts of critical items.
各国可以通过导弹技术控制制度和瓦森纳安排进行协调，以加强对伊朗关键物项非法采购活动的侦查和破坏。
This can include issuing updated and expanded watchlists of technologies and Iranian entities, as well as increased outreach to governments and companies around the world.
这可以包括发布更新和扩大的技术和伊朗实体观察名单，以及加强与世界各地政府和公司的联系。
Second, the opportunities for interdictions of sea shipments, especially from China, will probably increase due to the sheer quantity of items, such as propellant ingredients, that Iran will presumably seek from China .
其次，由于伊朗可能会从中国寻求大量物品，例如推进剂成分，因此拦截海上运输（尤其是来自中国的运输）的机会可能会增加。
Third, the expansion of Iranian procurement will create opportunities for increased engagement and cooperation through diplomatic and intelligence channels with countries concerned with Iran’s rebuilding, as well as for “ strategic disclosures ” and sanctions that publicly expose important Iranian procurement efforts and actors.
第三，伊朗采购的扩大将为通过外交和情报渠道加强与伊朗重建相关国家的接触与合作，以及公开揭露伊朗重要采购努力和行为者的“战略披露”和制裁创造机会。
Iran has expanded its missile and drone industries since the 1980s in the face of export controls, sanctions, interdictions, and other nonproliferation actions.
自 20 世纪 80 年代以来，面对出口管制、制裁、拦截和其他防扩散行动，伊朗不断扩大其导弹和无人机工业。
But Tehran’s urgency, plus the sheer scope and volume of what Iran will now likely seek from foreign suppliers — including sensitive, controlled items — increases the chances of these tools being more effective at detecting and disrupting Iran’s procurement efforts now than they were in the past.
但德黑兰的紧迫性，加上伊朗现在可能从外国供应商那里寻求的商品的范围和数量（包括敏感的受控物品），增加了这些工具比过去更有效地检测和破坏伊朗采购工作的机会。
But undermining Iran’s rebuilding efforts will not be easy.
但破坏伊朗的重建努力并不容易。
Iran can conceivably rely on domestic companies to supply some key items, as well as its decades of experience in conducting illicit foreign procurement , which it will employ to the maximum extent in the coming months and years.
可以想象，伊朗可以依靠国内公司来供应一些关键物品，以及其数十年进行非法外国采购的经验，并将在未来几个月和几年内最大限度地利用这些经验。
Importantly, efforts to disrupt assistance from China, Russia, and North Korea will be difficult.
重要的是，阻止中国、俄罗斯和朝鲜提供援助的努力将会很困难。
Iran has longstanding military and defense relationships with these countries, which may not be willing to limit or halt their cooperation with Iran.
伊朗与这些国家有着长期的军事和防务关系，这些国家可能不愿意限制或停止与伊朗的合作。
The options to disrupt their shipments to Iran — including those by air , rail, and via the Caspian Sea — will also face limitations.
中断向伊朗运输的选择——包括通过空运、铁路和里海运输——也将面临限制。
Although assessing the timeline for Iran’s rebuilding efforts is difficult, it will plausibly require several months to re-establish the most critical bottleneck elements, and at least two to three years to restore its wider industrial capabilities and domestic supply chains to something resembling their prewar status.
尽管评估伊朗重建工作的时间表很困难，但可能需要几个月的时间来重新建立最关键的瓶颈要素，并且至少需要两到三年的时间才能将其更广泛的工业能力和国内供应链恢复到类似于战前的状态。
But this is a low-confidence assessment due to the complexity of factors involved, such as the technical and industrial challenges Iran faces, the scope and nature of assistance from China, Russia, and other foreign suppliers, and especially the potential nonproliferation and military actions by foreign actors that could undermine Iran’s efforts.
但这是一个低可信度的评估，因为所涉及因素的复杂性，例如伊朗面临的技术和工业挑战，中国、俄罗斯和其他外国供应商援助的范围和性质，特别是外国行为者可能破坏伊朗努力的潜在防扩散和军事行动。
Looking forward, Iran will almost certainly work to restore some semblance of its prewar ability to produce and improve missiles and drones, as this is an important pillar of deterrence and resistance against Israel and the United States.
展望未来，伊朗几乎肯定会努力恢复战前生产和改进导弹和无人机的能力，因为这是威慑和抵抗以色列和美国的重要支柱。
Its capabilities to do so are clearly degraded, but its intentions to do so appear firmly intact; it remains to be seen whether Iran can overcome the significant challenges it faces to recover and restore its previous status.
它这样做的能力明显下降了，但它这样做的意图似乎完好无损；伊朗能否克服其面临的重大挑战，恢复其先前的地位还有待观察。
Jim Lamson is a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a visiting research fellow with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.
吉姆·拉姆森 (Jim Lamson) 是詹姆斯·马丁防扩散研究中心的高级研究员，也是伦敦国王学院战争研究系的客座研究员。
Prior to that, he worked for 23 years as an analyst with the CIA.
在此之前，他在中央情报局 (CIA) 担任分析师 23 年。
This article is based in part on his recent report, “ Israeli and US Strikes on Iran’s Aerospace Industry, 2024–2026: An Initial Impact Assessment and Future Outlook .”
本文部分基于他最近的报告“以色列和美国对伊朗航空航天工业的打击，2024-2026 年：初步影响评估和未来展望”。