Kindling, Catalyst, and Containment: Will the West Bank Ignite?

As violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank has escalated, often with the acquiescence or support of Israel’s military , and the Israeli government has increasingly constricted Palestinian daily life , the potential for a new intifada — or uprising — has intensified.

随着以色列定居者在约旦河西岸针对巴勒斯坦人的暴力升级（通常是在以色列军方的默许或支持下），以及以色列政府越来越多地限制巴勒斯坦人的日常生活，新的起义（或起义）的可能性已经加剧。

The first Palestinian intifada began in late 1987 and continued for several years.

第一次巴勒斯坦起义始于 1987 年底，并持续了数年。

Civil society played a major role in organizing the first intifada , which started as mostly nonviolent and included economic measures such as strikes and boycotts.

民间社会在组织第一次起义中发挥了重要作用，起义最初大多是非暴力的，包括罢工和抵制等经济措施。

The second intifada broke out in 2000 and lasted into 2005.

第二次起义于2000年爆发，一直持续到2005年。

It was much more violent than the first uprising, reflecting disillusionment with the peace process, increasing Israeli restrictions on Palestinians, and the rise of Hamas as a major political actor.

这次起义比第一次起义更加暴力，反映出人们对和平进程的幻灭、以色列对巴勒斯坦人的限制增加以及哈马斯作为主要政治行为体的崛起。

The situation did not improve for Palestinians after 2005, and poor conditions in the West Bank have dramatically deteriorated since the current Israeli government took office in late 2022, particularly after the Hamas-led attacks of Oct.

2005 年之后，巴勒斯坦人的处境并没有改善，自 2022 年底以色列现任政府上台以来，特别是在 10 月 10 日哈马斯领导的袭击之后，西岸的恶劣状况急剧恶化。

7, 2023 — producing significant potential kindling for a new intifada .

2023 年 12 月 7 日 — 为新的起义产生重要的潜在火种。

We asked four experts about what might spark an intifada in the West Bank, what might prevent it, and what a new uprising might look like.

我们询问了四位专家，了解什么可能会在约旦河西岸引发起义，什么可能会阻止它，以及新的起义可能会是什么样子。

Nathan Brown Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University

乔治华盛顿大学政治学和国际事务内森·布朗教授

“Intifada” can describe very different phenomena, but any sustained uprising requires some form of organization.

“起义”可以描述截然不同的现象，但任何持续的起义都需要某种形式的组织。

The first intifada drew on decades of local, associational, and factional organizing and was broadly popular in form, with widespread participation and strong social solidarity.

第一次起义借鉴了数十年的地方、协会和派别组织，形式广泛流行，参与广泛，社会团结有力。

The second quickly became what Palestinians themselves called “militarized,” dominated by armed groups and leaving much of the population as spectators, whether supportive or not.

第二个很快就变成了巴勒斯坦人自己所说的“军事化”，由武装团体主导，让大部分民众成为旁观者，无论是否支持。

Conditions in the West Bank today are far worse than in either 1987 or 2000, with virtually no sense of a political future.

今天西岸的状况比 1987 年或 2000 年要糟糕得多，几乎看不到政治未来。

There is no shortage of potential sparks — indeed, there are already blazing torches.

不乏潜在的火花——事实上，已经有熊熊燃烧的火把了。

But Palestinian society is far more atomized, established organizations are decrepit, and the younger generation is alienated from them to a degree that is startling.

但巴勒斯坦社会更加原子化，既定组织日渐衰弱，年轻一代与这些组织的疏远程度令人震惊。

If something recognizable as an uprising does emerge, it will therefore either be radically decentralized or depend on organizations and networks that are currently nonexistent — or invisible to outsiders.

如果确实出现了可识别为起义的事件，那么它要么是彻底去中心化的，要么依赖于目前不存在的组织和网络——或者外人看不见的组织和网络。

Dana El Kurd Associate Professor at the University of Richmond and Senior Nonresident Fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC

Dana El Kurd 里士满大学副教授兼华盛顿特区阿拉伯中心高级非常驻研究员

When Western policymakers imagine an intifada , they likely picture the fragmented armed uprising of the early 2000s.

当西方政策制定者想象一场起义时，他们可能会想到 2000 年代初期零散的武装起义。

They rarely recall the coordinated, largely nonviolent intifada of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

他们很少记得 20 世纪 80 年代末和 90 年代初发生的协调一致的非暴力起义。

For younger Palestinians, intifada also means the 2021 mass protests , which produced sustained strikes and activist networks that still exist today.

对于年轻的巴勒斯坦人来说，起义还意味着 2021 年的大规模抗议活动，这场抗议活动产生了持续的罢工和至今仍然存在的活动网络。

The likelihood of sustained action in the West Bank — in any form — is currently very low.

目前，在西岸采取任何形式的持续行动的可能性非常低。

Since 2021, Israel has cracked down more harshly than ever before, suffocating Palestinian society politically and economically.

2021年以来，以色列的镇压比以往任何时候都更加严厉，使巴勒斯坦社会在政治和经济上陷入窒息。

Rising state and settler violence and economic hardship have made a violent reaction more likely, but Palestinian capacity for coordinated action has weakened.

不断增加的国家和定居者暴力以及经济困难使得暴力反应的可能性更大，但巴勒斯坦协调行动的能力已经减弱。

Any intifada that emerges today would be far more violent, because fragmented movements are less likely to maintain tactical discipline, leading to outbidding between different armed actors — thus escalating the severity of violence.

今天出现的任何起义都将更加暴力，因为零散的运动不太可能维持战术纪律，导致不同武装分子之间竞价，从而加剧暴力的严重性。

Most importantly, if an intifada happens, it would occur in a context where both the Israeli military and Israeli settlers have become accustomed to operating with impunity, increasing the likelihood of extreme violence against Palestinian civilians.

最重要的是，如果发生起义，以色列军队和以色列定居者都已经习惯了不受惩罚的行动，从而增加了针对巴勒斯坦平民的极端暴力的可能性。

Zaha Hassan Senior Fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

扎哈·哈桑 卡内基国际和平基金会中东项目高级研究员

In 2005, I commuted between Ramallah and Bethlehem for work just as the final slabs of 30-foot-high concrete were being laid around Christ’s birthplace.

2005 年，我往返于拉马拉和伯利恒之间上班，当时基督出生地周围最后一块 30 英尺高的混凝土板正在铺设。

The purpose of the snake of concrete and electrified fencing was to isolate Palestinians in their towns and villages and make any resistance to the annexation of the West Bank impossible.

混凝土和电气化围栏的蛇形围栏的目的是隔离巴勒斯坦人的城镇和村庄，使任何对吞并西岸的抵抗变得不可能。

Having been a student during the first Palestinian uprising in 1987, I wondered what form nonviolent protest would take in the future, but today we don’t have to guess.

1987 年第一次巴勒斯坦起义期间，我还是一名学生，我想知道未来的非暴力抗议会采取什么形式，但今天我们不必猜测。

Social media, smart inter-movement organizing, and politically savvy diaspora populations in key capitals have forever changed international public opinion about the nature of the conflict.

社交媒体、明智的运动间组织以及主要首都政治上精明的侨民永远改变了国际公众对冲突性质的看法。

In just one example, 46 out of 47 Democratic senators voted last month to hold Israeli settlers and Israeli military forces accountable for attacks on Palestinians.

仅举一个例子，47 名民主党参议员中的 46 名参议员上个月投票要求以色列定居者和以色列军队对袭击巴勒斯坦人负责。

The third intifada is here.

第三次起义来了。

There are several potential triggers for a new intifada .

新的起义有几个潜在的触发因素。

The likeliest one is escalating Jewish terrorism against Palestinians in the West Bank leads to a particularly horrific attack that shocks Palestinians into an uprising.

最有可能的是，犹太教针对约旦河西岸巴勒斯坦人的恐怖主义不断升级，导致一场特别可怕的袭击，震惊巴勒斯坦人，引发起义。

Another potential trigger is a melee between Israelis and Palestinians that results in a harsh Israel Defense Forces response against only the Palestinian side.

另一个潜在的触发因素是以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间的混战，导致以色列国防军仅针对巴勒斯坦方面做出严厉反应。

A high-profile incident involving al-Aqsa Mosque or members of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces deciding to desert en masse and take up arms against Israeli forces could also trigger an intifada .

涉及阿克萨清真寺或巴勒斯坦权力机构安全部队成员决定集体逃兵并拿起武器对抗以色列军队的引人注目的事件也可能引发起义。

If an intifada breaks out, it may look like a combination of the popular nature of the first intifada , with many clusters of Palestinians participating, and the second intifada , which was deadlier.

如果爆发起义，它可能看起来像是第一次起义的大众性（有许多巴勒斯坦人参与）和第二次起义的结合，而第二次起义则更加致命。

The presence of Israelis much deeper inside the West Bank — including outposts in Areas A and B — and the proliferation of weapons in the hands of civilians on both sides would complicate a new uprising.

以色列人在西岸更深处的存在——包括A区和B区的前哨基地——以及双方平民手中武器的扩散将使新的起义复杂化。