Achieving Breakthrough: Maneuver Warfare in the Face of Robotic Mass

In 1914, European armies entered a war with forces designed to move.

1914 年，欧洲军队以机动部队参战。

Within months, they were digging themselves into the earth.

几个月之内，他们就开始把自己挖进土里。

Fires from newly introduced machine guns and heavy artillery made movement across exposed ground a proposition far more deadly than in any war that had ever afflicted humanity.

新引进的机枪和重炮的火力使得在裸露地面上的移动比以往任何一场折磨人类的战争都要致命得多。

More than a century later, armies are confronting an unsettling echo of that experience in Ukraine.

一个多世纪后，军队面临着乌克兰那段经历的令人不安的回响。

Drones and other robotic precision weapons fill the low-altitude airspace, detecting and destroying tanks and other large vehicles that appear anywhere near the Ukrainian front and devastating any attempts at mobile ground offensives by infantry.

无人机和其他机器人精确武器遍布低空空域，探测并摧毁出现在乌克兰前线附近任何地方的坦克和其他大型车辆，并摧毁步兵的机动地面进攻企图。

Western armies look anxiously at the implications because their warfighting doctrine depends on effective ground maneuver.

西方军队焦急地关注着这些影响，因为他们的作战理论依赖于有效的地面机动。

In response, U.S. military leaders plan to use mass drone-based fires to clear the path for future armored forces and protect their advance.

作为回应，美国军方领导人计划使用大规模无人机火力为未来装甲部队扫清道路并保护他们的前进。

This, they hope, may restore the ability of maneuver units to move and evade the deadly grip of drone-powered attrition warfare.

他们希望，这可以恢复机动部队的移动能力并躲避无人机消耗战的致命控制。

However, armies in World War I applied a similar logic, and it made their situation worse.

然而，第一次世界大战中的军队也采用了类似的逻辑，这让他们的处境变得更糟。

Maneuver is not dead — it remains crucial to ground warfare .

机动并没有消亡——它对于地面战仍然至关重要。

But to revive it, its proponents should move past the assumption that tanks and armored vehicles are its essential technological embodiment .

但为了重振它，它的支持者应该超越坦克和装甲车是其基本技术体现的假设。

Over the next decade and beyond, U.S. ground forces may need to make a leap like the one that ultimately provided escape from that earlier crisis of maneuver.

在未来十年及更长时间内，美国地面部队可能需要实现一次飞跃，就像最终摆脱早期机动危机的那样。

That means reinventing the maneuver combat platforms themselves and the corresponding units and tactics for the dawning robotic age.

这意味着要为即将到来的机器人时代重新发明机动作战平台本身以及相应的单位和战术。

There is a potential path to do this.

有一条潜在的途径可以做到这一点。

The very low-altitude airspace where small drones operate has become known as the air littoral.

小型无人机运行的极低空空域被称为“濒海空域”。

It offers opportunities for future maneuver that are as revolutionary as those it is already delivering for precision fires.

它为未来的机动提供了机会，这些机会与它已经为精确火力提供的机会一样具有革命性。

To seize them, doctrine innovators ought to stop thinking of the air littoral as a regime for “small-format airpower.” Treating drones only as aircraft leads naturally to thinking of them as means for delivering fires.

为了抓住这些机会，学说创新者应该停止将滨海空中力量视为“小型空中力量”的政权。仅将无人机视为飞机自然会导致将其视为灭火工具。

Instead, military innovators should also envision systems operating there as unmanned ground vehicles that do not touch the ground.

相反，军事创新者还应该设想在那里运行的系统是不接触地面的无人驾驶地面车辆。

That reframing opens the door to fundamental advances in maneuver forces as potentially dramatic as the leap from horse cavalry to tanks.

这种重新构建为机动部队的根本性进步打开了大门，其潜在的巨大进步就像从骑兵到坦克的飞跃一样。

New units based on such platforms could fully embrace the tactical advantages offered by robotics and AI and tip the battlefield advantage back to maneuver for decades to come.

基于此类平台的新部队可以充分利用机器人和人工智能提供的战术优势，并在未来几十年内将战场优势重新转向机动。

The power of drone-based precision fires, coordinated with surveillance and battle management systems, has grown rapidly.

基于无人机的精确火力，与监视和战斗管理系统相协调，其威力迅速增强。

Initially successful in surprising and defeating poor-quality Russian forces , in the last year, drone-savvy Ukrainian units demonstrated in exercises that they could swiftly defeat even front-line NATO armored units .

最初，精通无人机的乌克兰部队最初成功地突袭并击败了质量较差的俄罗斯军队，但去年，他们在演习中证明，他们甚至可以迅速击败北约前线装甲部队。

Hizballah units are using similar drones to inflict serious damage on Israeli forces in Lebanon.

真主党部队正在使用类似的无人机对黎巴嫩的以色列军队造成严重破坏。

Such experiences are forging a consensus that the oncoming revolution in robotic fires will require “a fundamental rethinking of how modern armies fight at the operational level.”

这些经历正在形成一种共识，即即将到来的机器人火力革命将需要“对现代军队在作战层面上的作战方式进行根本性的重新思考”。

Maneuver enables swift and efficient victory , not by grinding away an enemy force with fires while it attempts to grind away yours, but by using speed and tactics such as penetration, flanking, and envelopment to shatter its cohesion and deliver a knockout blow.

机动能够迅速而有效地取得胜利，不是在敌军试图碾压你的时候用火力碾压敌军，而是利用速度和战术，如渗透、侧翼、包围，粉碎其凝聚力，给予致命一击。

Maneuver doesn’t imply the absence of attrition, which is a feature of all warfare .

机动并不意味着不存在消耗，这是所有战争的一个特征。

Rather, it entails the ability to successfully execute the tactics that make swift maneuver victories possible.

相反，它需要成功执行使快速机动胜利成为可能的战术的能力。

Using waves of coordinated drone strikes to disrupt the enemy, suppress defensive fires, and create the conditions for ground units to concentrate and maneuver is a practical near-term approach.

利用一波又一波协调一致的无人机打击来扰乱敌人，压制防御火力，并为地面部队集中和机动创造条件，是一种实用的近期方法。

However, history provides a warning.

然而，历史给我们敲响了警钟。

When industrial-age machine guns and heavy artillery devastated horse cavalry and foot infantry in World War I, all sides decided that employing the new fires on a large scale was the path to overpowering the enemy.

当工业时代的机枪和重炮在第一次世界大战中摧毁骑兵和步兵时，各方都认为大规模使用新火力是压倒敌人的途径。

Tactical innovators overhauled assault tactics, using coordinated mass artillery fires in depth via the creeping barrage and the short, intense hurricane bombardment to disrupt the enemy and clear the way for the assaulting forces.

战术创新者彻底改革了突击战术，通过蠕动的弹幕和短暂而强烈的飓风轰炸，使用协调一致的大规模纵深炮火来扰乱敌人并为突击部队扫清道路。

Their maxim became “ the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.

他们的座右铭是“炮兵征服，步兵占领”。

” However, this only led to a snowballing scale of casualties for modest gains.

然而，这只是导致伤亡规模不断扩大，而收获却微乎其微。

No matter the mass and scale of fires that supported them, the pre-industrial maneuver units were cut to pieces by the enemy’s fires.

无论支持他们的火力有多大和规模，前工业化机动部队都被敌人的火力切成了碎片。

Leading militaries ultimately made the necessary leap during the interwar period.

领导军队最终在两次世界大战期间实现了必要的飞跃。

They perfected new, mechanized platforms such as the tank, and rebuilt their maneuver tactics and organization around them.

他们完善了坦克等新型机械化平台，并围绕它们重建了机动战术和组织。

Coordinating ground assaults with supporting fires from artillery, and later from airpower, did help — but only after horse cavalry and foot infantry had been replaced by systems characteristic of the new age.

协调地面攻击与炮兵火力支援以及后来的空中支援火力确实有所帮助——但只有在骑兵和步兵被新时代特征的系统所取代之后。

Recent drone-enabled maneuver concepts foreshadow the necessary transformation.

最近的无人机机动概念预示着必要的转变。

For instance, in the past year, authors such as Antonio Salinas, Mark Askew, and Jason P.

例如，在过去的一年里，Antonio Salinas、Mark Askew 和 Jason P.

LeVay noted that coordination could be most effective if maneuver units carry their own drone airpower with them, letting them conduct air littoral strike operations on demand.

勒维指出，如果机动部队携带自己的无人机空中力量，让他们能够根据需要进行空中沿海打击行动，那么协调可能是最有效的。

Others, such as Kenton G.

其他人，例如 Kenton G.

Fasana, observe that even today’s drones exhibit some qualities of maneuver platforms and can deliver quasi-maneuver effects distinct from airpower-like fires.

Fasana 观察到，即使是今天的无人机也表现出了机动平台的一些品质，并且可以提供与空中力量火力不同的准机动效果。

Fasana acknowledges that “for those who view drones as similar to manned aircraft , this may seem like a strange statement.” In addition, he suggests that future maneuver forces should be smaller and more numerous and be able to concentrate and disperse more quickly and flexibly than existing ground formations.

法萨纳承认，“对于那些认为无人机与有人驾驶飞机相似的人来说，这似乎是一个奇怪的说法。”此外，他建议未来的机动部队应该比现有的地面编队更小、数量更多，并且能够更快、更灵活地集中和分散。

In effect, the authors imply that maneuver forces should exhibit more of the qualities that drones enjoy, especially when in contact with the enemy.

实际上，作者暗示机动部队应该表现出更多无人机所具有的品质，特别是在与敌人接触时。

But how?

但如何呢？

Simply “unmanning” existing ground vehicles will make little difference.

简单地“无人”现有地面车辆不会产生什么影响。

To truly restore maneuver in the dawning robotic military age, leading militaries should develop new platforms designed from the outset to embody the tactical advantages offered by robotics and AI, such as asymmetric lethality, speed of action, remote presence and effect, persistence, elusiveness, and attritability, and build new tactics and organization around them.

为了真正恢复即将到来的机器人军事时代的机动性，主要军队应该从一开始就开发新的平台，以体现机器人和人工智能提供的战术优势，例如不对称杀伤力、行动速度、远程存在和效果、持久性、难以捉摸和可消耗性，并围绕它们建立新的战术和组织。

Why did mechanization restore maneuver in the interwar period?

为什么机械化在两次世界大战期间恢复了机动性？

It was not the protection of armor plating.

这并不是装甲板的保护。

The great interwar advocates agreed: It was a leap forward in mobility and the resulting tempo of battle.

两次世界大战之间的伟大倡导者一致认为：这是机动性和由此产生的战斗节奏的一次飞跃。

The speed of a mechanized advance enabled an attack to develop before the enemy could organize a large-scale coherent defense.

机械化推进的速度使得敌人能够在敌人组织大规模连贯防御之前发起进攻。

J.F.C.

J.F.C.

Fuller , the British advocate of armored maneuver, wrote that “the main power of the tank does not rest in its armor and weapons but in the paralyzing effect” of its speed.

英国装甲机动倡导者富勒写道，“坦克的主要威力并不在于其装甲和武器，而在于其速度的瘫痪效应”。

Heinz Guderian , the architect of German blitzkrieg warfare, wrote that “speed, therefore, is what is to be exacted before anything else from the armored weapon.” His German panzer divisions routinely favored lighter, faster tanks instead of the heavier, slower ones with thicker armor favored by the French.

德国闪电战的设计者海因茨·古德里安写道：“因此，对装甲武器来说，速度是最重要的要求。”他的德国装甲师通常喜欢更轻、更快的坦克，而不是法国人喜欢的更重、更慢、装甲更厚的坦克。

As a 1942 U.S. Army analysis of blitzkrieg victories summarized: “Speed makes possible the maximum degree of surprise because it overcomes delay in concentrating forces at chosen points.

正如 1942 年美国陆军对闪电战胜利的分析所总结的那样：“速度可以实现最大程度的出其不意，因为它克服了在选定地点集中兵力时的延迟。

Speed neutralizes the enemy defense by limiting the possibilities of fire from his antitank weapons.

速度通过限制反坦克武器开火的可能性来削弱敌人的防御。

The decisive factor is time accelerating the pace of battle.”

决定性的因素是时间，加快了战斗的节奏。”

On the Ukrainian battlefield today, armored vehicles are considered easy prey because they are slow compared to drones.

在今天的乌克兰战场上，装甲车被认为是容易被捕的猎物，因为它们比无人机速度慢。

They can no longer achieve surprise.

他们再也无法取得惊喜。

As they lumber forward, defenders observe, then mobilize and launch drones that concentrate against them.

当他们缓慢前进时，防御者会观察，然后动员并发射无人机集中攻击他们。

An initial precise hit can immobilize a vehicle , allowing additional drones time to arrive and finish it off.

最初的精确打击可以使车辆无法动弹，从而让更多的无人机有时间到达并消灭它。

Armored units are often caught and pinned down by drones and artillery in exposed kill zones, and at geographic choke points such as river crossings and mine-cleared roads.

装甲部队经常在暴露的杀伤区以及河流渡口和已清除地雷的道路等地理阻塞点被无人机和大炮捕获和牵制。

What is required is a new leap in mobility and speed that can once again allow a maneuver force to act before the defender can organize a coherent defense.

所需要的是机动性和速度的新飞跃，以便在防守者能够组织一致的防守之前再次允许机动部队采取行动。

That requires new platforms that can move at a similar speed to drones and enjoy the same immunity to terrain.

这需要新的平台能够以与无人机相似的速度移动，并具有相同的地形免疫力。

In 2019, I introduced the concept of the air littoral or air-ground littoral in the article “ Ground Combat Overmatch Through Control of the Atmospheric Littoral .” While the original framing emphasized its potential to revolutionize maneuver as well as fires, since 2021, others have tended to describe the unmanned systems there as tiny aircraft delivering a kind of small-format airpower .

2019年，我在《通过控制大气濒海实现地面作战优势》一文中介绍了空中濒海或空地濒海的概念。虽然最初的框架强调了其彻底改变机动和火力的潜力，但自 2021 年以来，其他人倾向于将那里的无人系统描述为提供一种小型空中力量的微型飞机。

Imagine them instead as unmanned ground vehicles that don’t touch the ground.

将它们想象为不接触地面的无人驾驶地面车辆。

Maneuver platforms that travel over, instead of on, the ground could move and shoot like vehicles but enjoy smooth and unimpeded movement in all directions, and nearly instantaneous concentration and dispersion.

在地面上而不是在地面上行驶的机动平台可以像车辆一样移动和射击，但可以在各个方向上平稳无阻碍地移动，并且几乎可以瞬时集中和分散。

They would be immune to anti-tank barriers, minefields, urban rubble, mud, open water, and many other obstacles.

他们将免受反坦克障碍、雷区、城市瓦砾、泥土、开放水域和许多其他障碍的影响。

They would achieve a potential sought for centuries: ground maneuver freed from the constraints of terrain.

他们将实现几个世纪以来所追求的潜力：不受地形限制的地面机动。

They could resemble familiar multi-rotor drones, but be reusable, larger, more capable, and more durable than the small expendable types common today.

它们可能类似于熟悉的多旋翼无人机，但比当今常见的小型消耗型无人机可重复使用、更大、能力更强、更耐用。

They could carry highly lethal compact precision weaponry such as AI-assisted guided missiles and automatic rifles.

它们可以携带高度致命的紧凑型精确武器，例如人工智能辅助制导导弹和自动步枪。

A light machine gun with precision fire control and ammunition and four light shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles weighs around 50 kilograms total, well within the capacity of a drone.

一挺配备精确火控和弹药的轻机枪以及四枚轻型肩扛式反坦克导弹总重约50公斤，完全在无人机的承载能力之内。

Existing cargo drones for military aerial resupply approach the minimum carrying capacity and endurance, and the Army has demonstrated guided weapons on one to strike ground and air targets.

现有的用于军用空中补给的货运无人机已接近最低运载能力和续航力，陆军已经在一架无人机上展示了制导武器，可以打击地面和空中目标。

Many of the enabling technologies are nearing readiness.

许多支持技术已接近准备就绪。

Individual drones like this would serve, in essence, like flying remote weapons stations .

像这样的个体无人机本质上就像飞行远程武器站一样。

They could travel over buildings, hills, forests, and other large barriers, conduct wide-area surveillance, and occupy the high ground in any tactical situation.

他们可以穿越建筑物、山丘、森林和其他大型障碍物，进行大范围监视，并在任何战术情况下占领制高点。

In the longer term, the maneuver potential of such systems may be realized by combining them into maneuver swarms, or arrays.

从长远来看，此类系统的机动潜力可以通过将它们组合成机动群或阵列来实现。

These are semi-autonomous groups of up to tens of drones capable of acting with the combat power and tactical discipline needed for combined-arms maneuver combat.

这些是由多达数十架无人机组成的半自主团体，能够以联合兵种机动作战所需的战斗力和战术纪律行动。

The array would become the key platform, replacing a current armored vehicle.

该阵列将成为关键平台，取代当前的装甲车。

Instead of piloting drones individually, one person could control a coordinated group as a unit from a distance.

一个人可以从远处控制作为一个整体的协调小组，而不是单独驾驶无人机。

Because the drones are physically separate, they could disperse, concentrate, and change formations as needed.

由于无人机在物理上是分开的，因此它们可以根据需要分散、集中和改变编队。

They could operate near ground level, or land to occupy locations and temporarily deny their use to the enemy.

它们可以在地面附近行动，或者登陆占领地点并暂时阻止敌人使用它们。

When desired, they could gain altitude and exhibit the capabilities currently associated with drones.

当需要时，它们可以获得高度并展示当前与无人机相关的功能。

An array could carry out most types of traditional ground force maneuvers, and many new ones.

一个阵列可以执行大多数类型的传统地面部队机动，以及许多新的机动。

When ordered, it could also execute semi-random swarming tactics under AI control.

当接到命令时，它还可以在人工智能控制下执行半随机蜂群战术。

Unlike many unmanned systems concepts that have niche missions, drone arrays would be highly flexible across missions, types of conflicts, and geographies.

与许多具有特定任务的无人系统概念不同，无人机阵列在任务、冲突类型和地理位置上具有高度灵活性。

They could team with various conventional units in operations ranging from humanitarian response to high-intensity combat.

他们可以与各种常规部队合作执行从人道主义响应到高强度战斗的行动。

They could be deployable to any theater, including the Pacific , where employment from ships and immunity to water barriers may be especially valuable in archipelagos and amphibious operations.

它们可以部署到包括太平洋在内的任何战区，在太平洋地区，船舶的使用和对水障的免疫力在群岛和两栖作战中可能特别有价值。

They may enjoy such powerful tactical advantages that they may not simply support ground maneuver forces, they may increasingly be the new forward maneuver striking element within a future combined-arms force.

它们可能享有如此强大的战术优势，以至于它们可能不仅仅是支持地面机动部队，它们可能日益成为未来合成部队中新的前沿机动打击要素。

Manned elements would follow to command and support them, operate long-range fires, and secure and hold ground.

载人部队将跟随他们指挥和支援，进行远程火力攻击，并保卫和坚守阵地。

A drone array would be more survivable than an armored vehicle in the new era when elusiveness is more valuable than physical protection .

在新时代，难以捉摸比物理保护更有价值，无人机阵列将比装甲车更具生存能力。

Its superior speed and terrain independence allow it to cross the danger zone in front of an enemy’s defensive positions swiftly, giving enemy forces little time to react.

其卓越的速度和地形独立性使其能够迅速穿越敌方防御阵地前的危险区域，给敌军几乎没有反应时间。

With only 1 percent or less of the mass of a Stryker vehicle, the individual drones within it would be much harder to detect and target.

由于重量仅为 Stryker 车辆的 1% 或更少，其中的单个无人机将更难被发现和瞄准。

If targeted, the separation between drones means an array could not be destroyed with a single blow of almost any weapon.

如果有目标，无人机之间的距离意味着几乎任何武器的一击都无法摧毁阵列。

A vehicle can be stopped with a single hit.

只需轻轻一击即可停止车辆。

A maneuver swarm cannot.

机动群则不能。

Arrays can also be more resistant to counter-drone defenses than today’s aerial drones.

阵列还比当今的空中无人机更能抵抗反无人机防御。

Instead of operating overhead in clear line of sight, as many current drones do, they could fully exploit the air littoral, which extends all the way to the ground.

它们可以充分利用一直延伸到地面的空中沿海地区，而不是像目前许多无人机那样在清晰的视线范围内进行空中飞行。

They could use ground features for cover and concealment, moving between trees, behind buildings, down urban streets, and otherwise exploiting the ultra-low-altitude maneuverability familiar from existing first-person view drones.

他们可以利用地面特征进行掩护和隐藏，在树木之间、建筑物后面、城市街道上移动，或者利用现有第一人称视角无人机所熟悉的超低空机动性。

In addition to being more elusive targets, many drones would have their own active counter-drone weapon, such as an AI-guided automatic rifle.

除了成为更难以捉摸的目标之外，许多无人机还拥有自己的主动反无人机武器，例如人工智能制导自动步枪。

These are emerging as mainstream and cost-effective short-range anti-drone defenses.

这些正在成为主流且具有成本效益的短程反无人机防御系统。

Future arrays would contain many such weapons for swarm defense .

未来的阵列将包含许多此类武器，用于群体防御。

Electronic warfare is a fierce and ever-evolving threat on the Ukrainian battlefield, yet it has not halted the rise of unmanned systems.

电子战是乌克兰战场上一个激烈且不断变化的威胁，但它并没有阻止无人系统的崛起。

Instead, it has accelerated rapid adaptation in areas including more resilient multi-band communication channels and improved autonomy such as AI-enabled computer vision and navigation.

相反，它加速了一些领域的快速适应，包括更具弹性的多频段通信渠道和改进的自主性，例如人工智能计算机视觉和导航。

These have enabled drones to complete their attacks under jam-proof AI control .

这些使得无人机能够在防干扰的人工智能控制下完成攻击。

Despite the challenges of electronic warfare, such improvements are driving robots toward the leading edge of maneuver rather than away from it.

尽管电子战面临挑战，但此类改进正在推动机器人走向机动前沿，而不是远离它。

The result is that Ukraine is expanding its use toward new roles, including spearheading ground assaults .

结果是乌克兰正在将其用途扩大到新的角色，包括带头进行地面攻击。

In addition, the attritability of robotic platforms is a unique enabler of maneuver tactics.

此外，机器人平台的可磨损性是机动战术的独特推动者。

While platforms are not expendable, losses are less costly than for manned systems.

虽然平台不是消耗性的，但损失的成本比载人系统要低。

An array cannot become pinned down like forces on the ground can be.

阵列不能像地面上的力量那样被固定。

Loss of a drone neither affects its morale nor reduces its tempo.

失去一架无人机既不会影响其士气，也不会降低其节奏。

Lastly, the likelihood that other militaries will eventually obtain similar systems doesn’t negate their effectiveness.

最后，其他军队最终获得类似系统的可能性并不会否定它们的有效性。

As the history of tanks and warplanes illustrates, where there is symmetry in platforms, advantage stems from initiative, surprise, local superiority, and similar timeless factors that have long delivered U.S. superiority in operational art.

正如坦克和战斗机的历史所表明的那样，只要平台具有对称性，优势就源于主动性、出其不意、局部优势以及类似的永恒因素，这些因素长期以来赋予了美国在作战艺术上的优势。

Individual maneuver combat drones could be built and fielded soon.

单兵机动作战无人机很快就会被制造出来并投入使用。

They could provide useful manned-unmanned teaming with existing ground units.

它们可以与现有地面部队进行有用的有人-无人协作。

However, creating powerful and affordable maneuver swarms requires continued advances in three main areas over the next decade and beyond.

然而，创造强大且负担得起的机动集群需要在未来十年及以后的三个主要领域不断取得进展。

This lets the array respond to orders as a unit, not as a collection of separate devices.

这使得阵列作为一个单元而不是作为单独设备的集合来响应命令。

Command should be easy and intuitive.

命令应该简单直观。

Military programs have demonstrated control of over 100 drones by a single operator.

军事项目已经证明，一名操作员可以控制 100 多架无人机。

Continual advances will be needed to enhance human-machine teaming, targeting, rules of engagement, and ethics.

需要不断进步来增强人机协作、目标定位、交战规则和道德规范。

However, these challenges are common to most applications of military autonomy, and steady progress is likely.

然而，这些挑战对于大多数军事自主应用来说都是常见的，并且可能会取得稳步进展。

Internal Self-Orchestration The array should adjust formations, avoid obstacles, and coordinate other collective movements autonomously.

内部自我编排 阵列应自主调整队形、避开障碍物并协调其他集体动作。

Researchers first demonstrated such complex group drone behaviors more than a decade ago .

十多年前，研究人员首次展示了如此复杂的群体无人机行为。

Today, many companies and researchers are advancing formation control and related collective swarm behaviors in more challenging operational environments.

如今，许多公司和研究人员正在更具挑战性的作战环境中推进编队控制和相关的集体群体行为。

Autonomous Self-Replenishment To conduct sustained operations with low burden on human operators, arrays should evolve to self-refuel and rearm in the field.

自主自我补给 为了在减轻人类操作员负担的情况下进行持续作战，阵列应该发展为能够在现场进行自我加油和重新武装。

Current battery-powered medium-lift drones have endurance of around 30 minutes.

目前电池供电的中型无人机的续航时间约为 30 分钟。

Many companies are introducing autonomous docking and charging systems that allow drones to recharge or swap batteries, letting them remain in action almost indefinitely in austere locations without human intervention.

许多公司正在推出自主对接和充电系统，允许无人机充电或更换电池，让它们在恶劣的环境下几乎无限期地保持行动，无需人工干预。

New liquid-fueled hybrid-electric propulsion offers three to five times longer endurance and almost instant refueling.

新型液体燃料混合动力电动推进装置的续航时间延长了三到五倍，并且几乎可以即时加油。

Several medium-lift hybrid-electric drones are already available .

几种中型混合电动无人机已经上市。

Liquid fuel can allow for cheap, dispersible, redundant, and rapidly replaceable replenishment points, such as fuel bladders with docking ports.

液体燃料可以实现廉价、可分散、冗余且可快速更换的补充点，例如带有对接端口的燃料囊。

Combining protected replenishment points on ground vehicles and others dispersed by unmanned ground vehicles or cargo drones up to tens of kilometers forward can help provide redundancy and resilience in different situations.

将地面车辆上的受保护补给点与无人驾驶地面车辆或货运无人机分散在前方数十公里处的其他补给点结合起来，有助于在不同情况下提供冗余和弹性。

Large ongoing investment in the manipulation technologies for drone package pickup and delivery will likely drive these capabilities forward in the coming years.

对无人机包裹拾取和投递操纵技术的持续大量投资可能会在未来几年推动这些能力的发展。

Today, the combination of capabilities would be too expensive, but replacing a $5–10 million Stryker with an array of 20 drones implies a per-drone price of $250,000–$500,000.

如今，这些功能的组合成本太高，但用 20 架无人机阵列替换价值 5-1000 万美元的 Stryker 意味着每架无人机的价格为 250,000-500,000 美元。

That is already not far from the current $650,000 price target for the Army’s new unmanned combat ground vehicle.

这已经距离陆军新型无人作战地面车辆目前 65 万美元的目标价格不远了。

Rapid development of the drone industry is driving cost curves down year by year.

无人机行业的快速发展正在推动成本曲线逐年下降。

The technologies are arriving.

技术正在到来。

The bigger challenge may be institutional.

更大的挑战可能是制度性的。

The U.S. military has transformed maneuver warfare several times, including with airmobile maneuver in the 1960s.

美国军队多次改变机动战方式，包括 20 世纪 60 年代的空中机动机动。

It should, for instance, remove internal barriers such as silos between maneuver, fires, and aviation communities that can block disruptive innovations that defy traditional categories.

例如，它应该消除内部障碍，例如机动、火力和航空界之间的孤岛，这些障碍可能会阻碍违背传统类别的颠覆性创新。

It can start small.

可以从小事做起。

Organizations such as the Army’s Transformation and Training Command can charter a prototype unit to work out the details of technology, organization, and operational doctrine, as the Army did with the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) .

陆军转型和训练司令部等组织可以包租一个原型部队来制定技术、组织和作战条令的细节，就像陆军对第 11 空中突击师（测试）所做的那样。

Such units can iterate and refine potential solutions through live exercises, including competitions against conventional units.

这些单位可以通过现场练习（包括与传统单位的竞争）来迭代和完善潜在的解决方案。

The optimal balance between the air littoral and ground-based parts of the maneuver force should be worked out over time.

机动部队的近海空中部分和地面部分之间的最佳平衡应该随着时间的推移而确定。

New high-priority initiatives such as the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group can help promote and fund these activities.

新的高度优先举措，例如国防自主作战小组，可以帮助促进和资助这些活动。

Industry can iterate quickly and win early revenue in collaboration with prototype units before scaling successful solutions for production.

在扩展成功的解决方案进行生产之前，行业可以与原型单元合作快速迭代并赢得早期收入。

Will drone arrays prove to be the iconic maneuver platforms of the robotic age, as tanks were for the mechanized age?

无人机阵列是否会成为机器人时代的标志性机动平台，就像机械化时代的坦克一样？

Possibly, and other ideas should also be welcomed.

有可能，其他想法也应该受到欢迎。

The essential step is to begin working proactively to determine what new maneuver platforms can most successfully embody the potential of robotics and AI and start building around them.

重要的一步是开始积极主动地确定哪些新的机动平台能够最成功地体现机器人和人工智能的潜力，并开始围绕它们进行构建。

It will take years to replace current platforms, organization, doctrine, and supply chains.

更换当前的平台、组织、条令和供应链需要数年时间。

It took 20 years to transform ground maneuver before the first blitzkrieg offensives, but major efforts in Europe and the United States began shortly after the end of World War I.

在第一次闪电战攻势之前，花了 20 年时间才改变地面机动，但欧洲和美国在第一次世界大战结束后不久就开始了重大努力。

Today, technology is evolving faster.

如今，技术发展得更快。

Approaches for coordinating drone strikes with existing ground units should proceed.

应继续采取协调无人机打击与现有地面部队的方法。

But those are transitional measures.

但这些都是过渡性措施。

Concepts such as maneuver in the air littoral can restore and re-empower maneuver warfare in the longer term by liberating it from the finite useful life of today’s manned armored vehicle.

从长远来看，诸如滨海机动等概念可以恢复和重新增强机动战能力，将其从当今载人装甲车有限的使用寿命中解放出来。

As with all innovation, advantage reigns while one side has mastered a new breakthrough in practice that competitors have not.

与所有创新一样，当一方在实践中掌握了竞争对手没有的新突破时，优势就占据了主导地位。

The U.S. and allied militaries should continue to explore more comprehensive reinvention if they, not their adversaries, are to be masters of maneuver warfare in the quickly emerging robotic age.

如果美国及其盟国军队，而不是他们的对手，想要在迅速兴起的机器人时代成为机动战的大师，就应该继续探索更全面的重塑。

George M.

乔治·M。

Dougherty, Ph.D., is a retired Air Force colonel with over 30 years of service in Air Force research, development, and acquisition.

多尔蒂博士是一位退役空军上校，在空军研究、开发和采购领域拥有 30 多年的服务经验。

He co-authored the Air Force’s current Science and Technology Strategy .

他与人合着了空军当前的科学技术战略。

Until June 2026, he served as the director of innovation for the Department of the Air Force’s Program Acquisition Executive for Command, Control, Communications, and Battle Management.

2026 年 6 月之前，他一直担任空军指挥、控制、通信和战斗管理项目采购执行部门的创新总监。

A reservist, he also served as an executive in two international management consulting firms advising high-tech and life sciences companies on product development strategy and executing strategic transformation.

作为一名预备役军人，他还曾在两家国际管理咨询公司担任高管，为高科技和生命科学公司提供产品开发战略和执行战略转型的咨询服务。

He is the author of Beast in the Machine: How Robotics and AI Will Transform Warfare and the Future of Human Conflict , and many peer-reviewed articles on accelerating disruptive military innovation.

他是《机器中的野兽：机器人和人工智能将如何改变战争和人类冲突的未来》一书的作者，以及许多关于加速颠覆性军事创新的同行评审文章。

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance and position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, or the U.S. Space Force.

所表达的观点仅代表作者的观点，并不反映美国政府、国防部、美国空军或美国太空军的官方指导和立场。

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

**请注意，出于内部风格的考虑，岩石战争不会对美国国防部使用不同的名称，除非美国国会根据法规更改该名称。