March Separately, Strike Combined: Rethinking Mass and Maneuver on the Transparent Battlefield

Between May 10 and 13, 1940, German Panzer Group Kleist advanced through the densely wooded Ardennes Forest, which the French considered impenetrable to large, mechanized formations.

1940 年 5 月 10 日至 13 日期间，德国克莱斯特装甲集群穿过树木茂密的阿登森林，法国人认为大型机械化编队无法穿透这里。

Numbering five armored and three motorized infantry divisions, totaling around 41,000 vehicles, the entire panzer group moved along just four Rollbahnen, or axes of advance, creating the largest traffic jam in military history.

整个装甲集群由 5 个装甲师和 3 个摩托化步兵师组成，总计约 41,000 辆车辆，仅沿着 4 个 Rollbahnen（即前进轴）行驶，造成了军事历史上最严重的交通拥堵。

When the leading XIX Armored Corps , commanded by Gen.

当领先的第十九装甲军，由将军指挥。

Heinz Guderian, converged on the French city of Sedan, it epitomized the concept of Schwerpunkt , or point of main effort.

海因茨·古德里安（Heinz Guderian）聚集在法国城市色当（Sedan），它集中体现了“Schwerpunkt”（主要努力点）的概念。

Following his maxim “Klotzen, nicht kleckern” (hit with the fist, don’t feel with the fingers), Guderian concentrated his three armored divisions on a front just 10 kilometers wide, further narrowing the front to three kilometers for the initial crossing of the Meuse River.

遵循他的格言“Klotzen, nicht kleckern”（用拳头击打，不要用手指感觉），古德里安将他的三个装甲师集中在只有10公里宽的战线上，进一步将战线缩小到3公里，以便最初渡过默兹河。

With the artillery stuck on the clogged roads, the Luftwaffe compensated with over 1,200 sorties — its most concentrated bombing attack of the war — against a sector just four kilometers wide.

由于大炮被困在堵塞的道路上，德国空军出动了 1,200 多架次，这是战争中最集中的轰炸行动，针对的区域只有 4 公里宽。

After German infantry established a bridgehead, on May 14, engineers constructed a pontoon bridge, the first of three, enabling the crossing of some 600 tanks.

5 月 14 日，德国步兵建立桥头堡后，工程师们建造了一座浮桥，这是三座浮桥中的第一座，可供约 600 辆坦克通过。

For a brief but crucial phase, this bridge served as the sole lifeline for the German advance.

在短暂但关键的阶段，这座桥成为德军前进的唯一生命线。

True to his maxim, Guderian massed over 300 anti-aircraft guns for its protection.

古德里安秉承他的格言，集结了 300 多门高射炮来保护它。

With their fighter protection heavily outnumbered and only around 150 bombers available, the Allies lost a total of 167 fighters and bombers in the counterstrike, without scoring a single hit.

由于战斗机保护数量严重不足，且仅有约 150 架轰炸机可用，盟军在反击中总共损失了 167 架战斗机和轰炸机，但没有取得任何一击。

This enabled the crossing and continued advance of XIX Armored Corps’ 60,000 men and 22,000 vehicles, with the operation serving as the benchmark for maneuver warfare to this day.

这使得第十九装甲军的6万名官兵和2.2万辆车辆得以穿越并继续前进，这一行动至今仍成为机动战的标杆。

Military history has long been a valuable source of learning, yet amid the rapidly changing character of warfare, its relevance lies increasingly in the contrasts it reveals.

军事历史长期以来一直是宝贵的学习资源，但在战争特征迅速变化的情况下，其相关性越来越多地体现在它所揭示的对比中。

Just how much warfare has changed since World War II was demonstrated by a similar Russian bridgehead at Kherson, Ukraine, in the spring and summer of 2022.

2022 年春季和夏季，乌克兰赫尔松的俄罗斯类似桥头堡证明了自二战以来战争发生了多大变化。

Like the XIX Armored Corps at Sedan, Russian forces were dependent on three bridges for the logistical support of 20–30 battalion tactical groups operating on the western bank of the Dnipro River.

与色当的第十九装甲军一样，俄罗斯军队也依赖三座桥梁为在第聂伯河西岸作战的 20-30 个营的战术集群提供后勤支持。

Unlike Sedan, however, Russian ground lines of communication proved far more vulnerable to disruptions, especially after the arrival of U.S. High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems.

然而，与“轿车”不同，事实证明，俄罗斯地面通信线路更容易受到干扰，尤其是在美国高机动火炮火箭系统抵达之后。

Between July 19 and 28, 2022, Ukrainian forces conducted multiple successful rocket strikes, rendering all three bridges useless for vehicular traffic.

2022 年 7 月 19 日至 28 日期间，乌克兰军队多次成功进行火箭弹袭击，导致所有三座桥梁无法通行。

Although Russian troops resorted to pontoon bridges, these too were quickly rendered inoperable.

尽管俄罗斯军队使用了浮桥，但这些桥也很快就无法使用。

While Russian forces feverishly tried to repair the damaged crossings, Ukrainian forces continued strikes throughout the summer.

当俄罗斯军队积极尝试修复受损的过境点时，乌克兰军队整个夏天都在继续发动袭击。

On Nov.

十一月一日

9, after months of sustained interdiction, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu finally ordered a withdrawal toward the eastern bank of the river, which was completed two days later.

9月9日，经过数月的持续封锁，俄罗斯国防部长绍伊古终于下令向河东岸撤军，并于两天后完成。

This is one of many cases from the Russo-Ukrainian War that exemplify how much warfare has changed since the blitzkrieg years of 1940 to 1941.

这是俄乌战争中的众多案例之一，这些案例体现了自 1940 年至 1941 年闪电战时期以来战争发生了多大的变化。

The ability to generate mass enabled success at the point of contact at Sedan but proved fatal during the failed Russian river crossing of the Siverskyi Donets in May 2022.

产生质量的能力使得在色当的接触点取得了成功，但在 2022 年 5 月俄罗斯穿越西维尔斯基顿涅茨河的失败中被证明是致命的。

Beyond that, it provided the logistical sustainment for the continued advance across northern France, but its erosion slowly strangled the Russian bridgehead at Kherson.

除此之外，它还为跨越法国北部的持续推进提供了后勤保障，但它的侵蚀慢慢地扼杀了俄罗斯在赫尔松的桥头堡。

In recent years, increased battlefield transparency has enabled a shift from direct to indirect fire as a means of projecting combat power, with close combat gradually giving way to standoff engagements.

近年来，战场透明度的提高使得战斗力投送手段从直接火力转向间接火力，近距离战斗逐渐让位于对峙交战。

Long-range precision strike systems are now widely available at the lowest tactical echelons, not only expanding capabilities within the deep area (beyond direct contact) but also radically transforming fighting in the close area (in immediate contact with the enemy), as defined within the geographical framework .

远程精确打击系统现在在最低战术梯队中广泛使用，不仅扩大了纵深区域（超越直接接触）的能力，而且从根本上改变了地理框架内定义的近距离区域（与敌人直接接触）的战斗。

Although battlefield transparency is conditional rather than absolute, subject to weather and countermeasures, it is the product of multiple, mutually reinforcing systems, which makes it possible to degrade but difficult to deny.

尽管战场透明度是有条件的而不是绝对的，受天气和对策的影响，但它是多个相互加强的系统的产物，这使得其可能退化但难以否认。

Consequently, the survivability of concentrated formations has diminished considerably, while the front itself has significantly expanded in depth, forcing dispersion throughout the battlespace.

因此，集中编队的生存能力大大降低，而战线本身的纵深则显着扩大，迫使整个战场分散。

Because mechanized formations are heavily dependent on logistics that are usually centralized for efficiency, they are disproportionately exposed to interdiction.

由于机械化编队严重依赖为提高效率而通常集中的后勤保障，因此它们不成比例地受到拦截。

The relevance of mass at the point of contact is therefore declining and increasingly difficult to sustain, as both sides deliberately seek to isolate the combat area.

因此，由于双方都刻意寻求孤立战区，接触点的大规模集结的相关性正在下降，并且越来越难以维持。

As history shows, technological developments that radically alter battlefield conditions are, over time, usually accompanied by corresponding conceptual and, ultimately, organizational adjustments.

正如历史所表明的那样，随着时间的推移，从根本上改变战场条件的技术发展通常伴随着相应的概念调整，并最终伴随着组织调整。

German armored divisions, for example, were well-balanced, combined-arms formations that bore little resemblance to the massed French and British tank formations of World War I.

例如，德国装甲师是均衡的合成兵种编队，与第一次世界大战中法国和英国的大规模坦克编队几乎没有相似之处。

Despite the obvious shift toward standoff engagements, medium and especially heavy NATO brigades are still largely organized, trained, and equipped for what Allied Joint Publication 3.2 describes as the ability to “close with the adversary forces while under fire and engage the adversary with direct fire,” relying on mass and a concentration of forces as prerequisites for maneuver.

尽管明显转向对峙交战，但北约中型旅和特别重型旅的组织、训练和装备仍然很大程度上符合盟军联合出版物 3.2 所描述的“在火力下接近敌方部队并以直接火力与对手交战”的能力，依靠大规模和集中兵力作为机动的先决条件。

Unsurprisingly, experienced Ukrainian drone operators have repeatedly participated as opposing forces in NATO exercises with devastating consequences.

毫不奇怪，经验丰富的乌克兰无人机操作员多次作为敌对力量参加北约演习，造成了毁灭性的后果。

As British military theorist B.

正如英国军事理论家B.

H.

H.

Liddell Hart once wrote , “the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.”

利德尔·哈特曾经写道：“唯一比让新想法进入军事头脑更困难的事情就是淘汰旧想法。”

While the German breakthrough at Sedan exemplifies combat power predicated on a level of mass and concentration that is no longer attainable, some of its underlying principles remain instructive.

虽然德军在色当的突破体现了基于大规模和集中程度的战斗力已无法实现，但其一些基本原则仍然具有指导意义。

The operation therefore offers a contrasting benchmark for examining how principles such as concentration, dispersion, and security inform the application of combat power amid the changing character of contemporary warfare.

因此，这次行动提供了一个对比基准，用于检验集中、分散和安全等原则如何在当代战争不断变化的特征中影响战斗力的运用。

A river crossing like the one at Sedan may not be the most common tactical maneuver, but it does capture the essence of the contemporary tactical problem, since offensive action inevitably requires concentration.

像色当那样的渡河行动可能不是最常见的战术机动，但它确实抓住了当代战术问题的本质，因为进攻行动不可避免地需要集中注意力。

While dispersion increases survivability, it also complicates command and control, impedes the massing of combat power originating from direct fire, and constrains logistics .

虽然分散性提高了生存能力，但也使指挥和控制变得复杂，阻碍了直接火力的战斗力集结，并限制了后勤。

These are well-known historical phenomena, as is the emergence of a continuous, positional front, what Soviet military theorist Georgii Isserson called “ frontalism .”

这些都是众所周知的历史现象，就像连续的阵地战线的出现一样，苏联军事理论家格奥尔基·伊瑟森称之为“阵线主义”。

In Ukraine, near-total sensor coverage coupled with long-range, precise, and responsive fires has offset low troop density, leaving no open flanks to exploit operationally, forcing units into frontal assaults that culminate prematurely.

在乌克兰，传感器几乎全部覆盖，再加上远程、精确和反应灵敏的火力，抵消了部队密度低的影响，没有留下可供作战利用的侧翼，迫使部队进行正面攻击，并过早达到顶峰。

Consequently, maneuver transitions into positional fighting, and the resulting front can only be breached by a deliberate breakthrough operation requiring massive concentration of forces and a huge amount of logistical support.

因此，机动行动转变为阵地战斗，而由此形成的战线只能通过需要大量集中兵力和大量后勤支援的蓄意突破行动才能突破。

This brings the problem full circle, because the increasing transparency and sensor-to-shooter integration that created a continuous and positional front also prevent amassing the forces necessary to enable a penetration and breakthrough of that front, which is therefore likely to persist.

这使得问题又回到了原点，因为不断增加的透明度和传感器与射手的集成创造了一个连续的、有位置的战线，但也阻止了积聚实现突破和突破该战线所需的力量，因此这种战线很可能会持续下去。

Dispersion, however, does not in itself lead to lower casualties, as defense analyst Branko Ruzic has argued .

然而，正如国防分析师布兰科·鲁齐克（Branko Ruzic）所说，分散本身并不会导致伤亡人数减少。

Precision weapons are generally not particularly effective against enemy troop concentrations, but they are against individual targets, as opposed to traditional unguided area-effect munitions, which are ideally suited to target dense enemy formations and clusters of vehicles.

精确武器通常对敌方部队集结不是特别有效，但它们针对的是单个目标，而不是传统的非制导区域效应弹药，后者非常适合瞄准密集的敌方编队和车辆群。

During the first phase of the Ukraine war, therefore, artillery was the dominant factor , its effectiveness being enhanced through the use of reconnaissance drones, which enabled the adjustment of fires in real time across much larger distances than before.

因此，在乌克兰战争的第一阶段，火炮是主导因素，通过使用侦察无人机增强了火炮的效能，从而能够在比以前更远的距离上实时调整火力。

Consequently, units on both sides, especially Ukrainian units, given Russia’s artillery superiority, were forced to disperse in order to survive.

因此，鉴于俄罗斯的炮兵优势，双方部队，尤其是乌克兰部队，为了生存而被迫分散。

With the ascent of first-person-view drones, however, came the rise of mass precision fires , offering precision strike capabilities at scale against which dispersion offers little to no protection.

然而，随着第一人称视角无人机的兴起，大规模精确火力的兴起，提供了大规模的精确打击能力，而分散性几乎无法提供任何保护。

Protection should therefore be aimed toward finding the proper balance between concentration and dispersion, with the smallest unit of independent action being determined by the size of the protective canopy that can be established through layered kinetic and non-kinetic, as well as active and passive protection measures.

因此，防护应着眼于在集中和分散之间找到适当的平衡，独立行动的最小单位由防护罩的大小决定，防护罩可以通过分层的动能和非动能、主动和被动的防护措施来建立。

As history indicates, the lowest echelon capable of independent action always requires combined arms capabilities organic to that formation.

历史表明，能够独立行动的最低梯队总是需要与该编队有机结合的联合兵种能力。

To enable concentration, however, protection by itself is not enough.

然而，为了集中注意力，仅靠保护是不够的。

It is essential to actively disrupt, degrade, and suppress the components that constitute the enemy’s kill chain: command and control, sensors, and fires.

积极破坏、削弱和压制构成敌人杀伤链的组成部分至关重要：指挥和控制、传感器和火力。

What Jack Watling, Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, describes in his section “The Geometry of Maneuver in Positional Warfare” therefore functions like a protective screen, a modern-day creeping barrage , enabling assault formations to concentrate upon an objective.

英国皇家联合军种研究所陆战高级研究员杰克·沃特林（Jack Watling）在其“阵地战中的机动几何”部分中描述的内容因此就像一个防护屏，一个现代的爬行弹幕，使攻击编队能够集中于一个目标。

Although Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare) has traditionally been nearly synonymous with Auftragstaktik (mission command), this could become a point of friction when a tightly orchestrated window of opportunity requires swift concentration.

尽管 Bewegungskrieg（机动战）传统上几乎与 Auftragstaktik（任务指挥）同义，但当精心策划的机会之窗需要快速集中注意力时，这可能会成为摩擦点。

As military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady recently emphasized : “In order for convergence to work, you need to get rid of mission command to a certain degree, because …

正如军事分析家弗朗茨-斯特凡·加迪最近强调的那样：“为了使融合发挥作用，你需要在一定程度上摆脱任务指挥，因为……

the foundational element of convergence is synchronization.” Gady added that the lack of synchronization enabled mission command to flourish in the first place.

融合的基本要素是同步。”加迪补充说，缺乏同步使得任务指挥首先得以蓬勃发展。

A key question, however, is whether these new standoff capabilities at lower echelons should be regarded as part of the traditional deep or rather as an extension of the close.

然而，一个关键问题是，这些新的低层防区外能力是否应该被视为传统纵深的一部分，或者更确切地说，是近距离的延伸。

Deep operations , according to U.S. Army doctrine, are primarily “directed against uncommitted enemy forces or capabilities before they can engage friendly forces in the close fight.” Meanwhile, multi-domain operations conceptualize convergence mainly at the operational level, not at the lower tactical echelons where first-person-view and bomber drones operate.

根据美国陆军条令，纵深作战主要是“针对未投入战斗的敌方部队或能力，然后再与友军进行近战”。与此同时，多域作战主要在作战层面上概念化融合，而不是在第一人称视角和轰炸机无人机运行的较低战术梯队。

Yet these systems, left unaddressed at the division and corps levels, chiefly deny movement and concentration in the close, making it unlikely that multi-domain operations will by themselves enable company- and battalion-level advances.

然而，这些系统在师和军级别上没有得到解决，主要阻碍了近距离的移动和集中，使得多域作战本身不太可能实现连级和营级的进步。

Consequently, suppression should be conducted simultaneously across all echelons, including brigades and below, using sensors and indirect fires to create an overlapping web of coverage spanning the contested close, the traditional deep, and the recently termed “ middle battle area ,” from which the close can be supported and engaged.

因此，压制应在所有梯队（包括旅及以下）同时进行，利用传感器和间接火力创建一个覆盖有争议的近距离、传统纵深和最近被称为“中间战区”的重叠覆盖网，从中可以支持和参与近距离作战。

Notably, armies have diminished considerably since the Cold War, while in Ukraine, frontages at all echelons have increased at least threefold, compared to Cold War doctrinal norms.

值得注意的是，自冷战以来，军队数量大幅减少，而在乌克兰，与冷战理论规范相比，所有梯队的战线都增加了至少三倍。

A comparable advance toward Sedan today would thus involve a division at most.

因此，今天向轿车的类似进展最多只会涉及一个部门。

This contracting force-to-space ratio reflects a broader shift from mass to the combination of effects, with inevitable organizational consequences.

这种收缩力与空间的比率反映了从质量效应到效应组合的更广泛的转变，以及不可避免的组织后果。

Just as German armored divisions were well-balanced combined-arms formations reflecting the necessities of the day, the composition of modern brigades should likewise be reconsidered.

正如德国装甲师是反映当时需要的均衡的合成兵种编队一样，现代旅的组成也同样应该重新考虑。

Most NATO heavy brigades include three to four maneuver battalions, with usually just one artillery battalion in support.

大多数北约重型旅包括三到四个机动营，通常只有一个炮兵营提供支援。

By contrast, Chinese and Russian combined arms brigades field considerably more organic fires, air defense, and electronic warfare systems.

相比之下，中国和俄罗斯的合成旅部署了更多的建制火力、防空和电子战系统。

Additionally, Ukrainian brigades field one to two drone battalions, with organic drone capabilities at all echelons below.

此外，乌克兰旅还部署了一到两个无人机营，以下各梯队均具备建制无人机能力。

Russia intends to follow suit, reflecting a view of drones as a permanent feature of combined arms warfare.

俄罗斯打算效仿，这反映出无人机是联合军备战争的永久特征的观点。

To provide the necessary suppression, reconnaissance-strike elements should therefore account for a proportionally greater share of organic capability within NATO brigades, either by adding sensors and fires, including drones and loitering munitions, thereby increasing brigade size, or by reducing the number of maneuver units.

因此，为了提供必要的压制，侦察打击部队应该在北约旅内占据更大比例的建制能力，要么通过增加传感器和火力，包括无人机和徘徊弹药，从而增加旅规模，要么减少机动部队的数量。

Whereas maneuver units hold frontages, sensors and fires address the increased depth.

虽然机动部队占据正面，但传感器和火力可以解决增加的深度。

The answer, then, is a matter of scale.

那么，答案就是规模问题。

Either way, while brigades should retain three or ideally four maneuver elements, the predominance of standoff engagements justifies at least one additional artillery battalion and a considerable number of drones and loitering munitions.

不管怎样，虽然旅应该保留三个或理想情况下四个机动部队，但防区外交战的优势证明至少需要额外增加一个炮兵营和相当数量的无人机和徘徊弹药。

How the French and Germans approached the dynamics of frontalism at Sedan bears resemblance to, and relevance for, the current dilemmas in several ways, with each side’s prewar thinking leading toward a different outcome.

法国和德国在色当处理正面冲突动态的方式在几个方面与当前的困境有相似之处和相关性，双方的战前思维导致了不同的结果。

Convinced that technological developments during the interwar period had increased battlefield lethality, the French expected a return to positional warfare.

法国人深信两次世界大战期间的技术发展增加了战场杀伤力，因此期望回归阵地战。

The French methodical battle therefore emphasized defensive firepower over maneuver, deliberately seeking attrition.

因此，法军有条不紊的战斗强调防御火力而非机动，刻意寻求消耗。

Because the variety and complexity of modern weapons complicated coordination, with artillery at higher echelons enabling the infantry’s forward movement, command and control was highly centralized to synchronize effects.

由于现代武器的多样性和复杂性使协调变得复杂，较高梯队的火炮使步兵能够向前移动，指挥和控制高度集中以实现同步效果。

Avoiding encounter battles, they sought to attrit an attacker from prepared positions before a tightly choreographed counterattack.

为了避免遭遇战，他们试图在精心设计的反击之前从准备好的阵地上消耗掉攻击者。

As such, it closely resembles NATO’s Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative — a preconstructed, fires-centric approach designed to deny an attacker’s ability to mass, penetrate, and achieve momentum.

因此，它与北约的东侧威慑计划非常相似，这是一种预先构建的、以火力为中心的方法，旨在阻止攻击者集结、渗透和获得动力。

Although this approach ultimately failed to withstand the speed and shock of the German breakthrough in 1940, Ukraine’s Delta battlefield management system demonstrates that modern means can achieve synchronization without reproducing that same rigidity.

尽管这种方法最终未能承受德国 1940 年突破的速度和冲击力，但乌克兰的三角洲战场管理系统表明，现代手段可以实现同步，而无需重现同样的僵化。

Defensively, therefore, a centralized fires-centric approach is justifiable.

因此，在防御上，采取集中火力为中心的方法是合理的。

Whether the same holds for the tightly choreographed counterattack, however, remains an open question, as complexity increases with scale.

然而，同样的情况是否也适用于精心设计的反击仍然是一个悬而未决的问题，因为复杂性随着规模的增加而增加。

German military planners, by contrast , aimed for a swift decision, using mobility and mass directed against a vulnerable part of the enemy’s defense.

相比之下，德国军事规划者的目标是迅速做出决定，利用机动性和大规模攻击敌人防御的薄弱部分。

This, however, required an overwhelming concentration of firepower and a substantial amount of logistical support.

然而，这需要压倒性的集中火力和大量的后勤支援。

To sustain the advance, the entire Panzer Group Kleist was made partially self-sufficient through the Rucksack-Prinzip , or backpack principle, with every vehicle carrying its own ammunition, rations, and especially fuel.

为了维持进展，整个克莱斯特装甲集群通过背包原则实现了部分自给自足，每辆车都携带自己的弹药、口粮，尤其是燃料。

Additionally, Guderian’s XIX Armored Corps was deployed as Panzer Group Kleist’s vanguard, utilizing all four roads simultaneously, harking back to Prussian army chief of staff Helmuth von Moltke the Elder’s dictum that “more is lost in depth than is lost by extending the front.”

此外，古德里安的第十九装甲军被部署为克莱斯特装甲集群的先锋，同时使用所有四条道路，这让人回想起普鲁士陆军参谋长老赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇的格言：“纵深损失的比延伸战线损失的还要多”。

Moltke, in his own day, divided his army into several independently operating field armies and subordinate army corps deployed abreast, enabling rapid maneuvers along different axes of advance, thereby easing logistics, increasing mobility, and allowing flexible concentration during battle.

毛奇在他的时代，将他的军队分为几个独立作战的野战军和并列部署的下属军团，能够沿着不同的前进轴线进行快速机动，从而缓解了后勤保障，增加了机动性，并允许在战斗中灵活集中。

Guderian’s advance toward Sedan exemplified that converging on a point of concentration is achieved more rapidly from formations deployed abreast than from those advancing in column.

古德里安向色当推进的行动证明，并列部署的编队比纵队推进的编队能更快地集中于一个点。

Moltke’s approach eventually became known as “Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen,” or “March separately, strike combined.” At present, the value of Moltke’s maxim lies not in restoring the conditions for an operational breakthrough but rather in enabling dispersed forces to converge and temporarily concentrate on the objective.

毛奇的方法最终被称为“Getrennt marschieren，vereint schlagen”，即“单独行军，联合打击”。目前，毛奇格言的价值不在于恢复作战突破的条件，而在于使分散的力量能够集中起来，暂时集中于目标。

Finally, to substitute for the massed and vulnerable artillery needed for suppression at the point of main effort, the Germans deployed VIII Air Corps , the Luftwaffe’s primary close air support formation .

最后，为了替代主力压制所需的集中且脆弱的火炮，德国人部署了第 8 航空军，这是德国空军的主要近距离空中支援编队。

With German artillery unable to keep pace with the advance, VIII Air Corps supported the crossing itself.

由于德国炮兵无法跟上前进的步伐，第八航空军自行支援渡河。

Its taskings therefore resembled those of contemporary dedicated drone formations in the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces, albeit on a markedly different scale.

因此，它的任务类似于乌克兰和俄罗斯武装部队中当代专用无人机编队的任务，尽管规模明显不同。

What distinguishes Rubicon — Russia’s elite unmanned aerial vehicle center — and comparable Ukrainian drone regiments is not merely their technical sophistication and competence, but their function as a centralized, non-organic capability allocated to close a structural gap that conventional formations cannot close on their own, a role that, in historical terms, mirrors that of VIII Air Corps at Sedan.

卢比肯——俄罗斯的精锐无人机中心——与类似的乌克兰无人机团的区别不仅在于它们的技术复杂性和能力，还在于它们作为一种集中的、非建制的能力，旨在缩小常规编队无法自行缩小的结构性差距，从历史角度来看，这一角色与色当的第八航空军的角色相似。

Rubicon detachments can similarly establish a main effort quickly, without vulnerable massed fires and their logistical footprint, reinforcing critical front-line sectors in support of mechanized ground formations.

卢比孔河分遣队同样可以快速建立主力，无需脆弱的集体火力及其后勤足迹，加强关键的前线部门以支持机械化地面编队。

Throughout 2025, Rubicon played an important role in the Russian army’s priority sectors, including recapturing the Kursk salient.

整个2025年，卢比孔河在俄罗斯军队的优先领域发挥了重要作用，包括夺回库尔斯克突出部。

Occasionally, this has created conditions conducive to ground maneuver, although exploitation has thus far proven inconsistent.

有时，这会创造有利于地面机动的条件，尽管迄今为止的利用已被证明是不一致的。

Given Ukraine’s recent successes during the ongoing Operation Vivaldi, tactical adaptations appear to have matured into a new combined-arms approach enabling successful offensive action in positional warfare.

鉴于乌克兰最近在正在进行的维瓦尔第行动中取得的成功，战术调整似乎已经成熟为一种新的联合兵种方法，能够在阵地战中取得成功的进攻行动。

Nevertheless, these actions more closely resemble the “ bite-and-hold ” tactics of World War I than the large-scale operational breakthroughs of World War II.

然而，这些行动更像是第一次世界大战的“咬住”战术，而不是第二次世界大战的大规模作战突破。

Rather than attempting a hazardous but potentially far more decisive breakthrough, the British Expeditionary Force pursued limited, well-defined objectives, using meticulous fire planning and consolidating captured ground to defeat the anticipated counterattack.

英国远征军并没有尝试进行危险但可能更具决定性的突破，而是追求有限的、明确的目标，利用细致的火力计划和巩固占领的阵地来挫败预期的反击。

Similarly, current assault tactics require a tightly orchestrated convergence of effects, combining manned and unmanned systems, to enable incremental advances and relatively limited territorial gains.

同样，当前的攻击战术需要紧密协调的效果融合，结合有人和无人系统，以实现渐进式进展和相对有限的领土收益。

Even so, by severing Russian logistics to isolate the combat area, Operation Vivaldi supports a key argument: targeting logistics reduces the mass, and therefore combat power, an army can sustain at the front.

即便如此，通过切断俄罗斯后勤以孤立战区，维瓦尔第行动支持了一个关键论点：瞄准后勤减少了军队在前线可以维持的质量，从而减少了战斗力。

Although some will hail this as a return to maneuver warfare, from a historical perspective, we are closer to 1917 than to 1940.

尽管有些人会称赞这是机动战争的回归，但从历史角度来看，我们更接近 1917 年，而不是 1940 年。

Thus far, only two operations have come close to a breakthrough in the traditional sense: the Kharkiv offensive in 2022 and the Kursk incursion in 2024.

迄今为止，只有两次行动接近传统意义上的突破：2022年的哈尔科夫攻势和2024年的库尔斯克入侵。

In both cases, Russian defenses were thinly manned by poorly trained troops, translating into low sensor density, weak integration, and therefore limited responsiveness of fires.

在这两种情况下，俄罗斯的防御系统都由训练有素的部队组成，人员稀少，导致传感器密度低、集成度弱，因此火力响应能力有限。

Where defensive networks remain intact, however, maneuver usually stalls and reverts to positional fighting.

然而，在防御网络完好无损的情况下，机动通常会停滞并恢复为阵地战斗。

Although Operation Vivaldi demonstrates that even firmly established defensive networks can be suppressed locally, these can be quickly reestablished, bringing every advance within range of a reconstituted, intact part of the network.

尽管维瓦尔第行动表明，即使是牢固建立的防御网络也可以在局部进行压制，但这些网络可以快速重建，将每一次进展都纳入网络重建的完整部分的范围内。

As George Dougherty argues in a recent War on the Rocks article , just as the tank accelerated the pace of battle during the interwar period, restoring maneuver on the contemporary battlefield requires another leap in speed and mobility, allowing the attacker to outpace the defender’s efforts to reconstitute its network.

正如乔治·多尔蒂（George Dougherty）在最近的一篇《岩石战争》文章中指出的那样，正如坦克在两次世界大战期间加快了战斗节奏一样，在当代战场上恢复机动性需要速度和机动性的再次飞跃，从而使攻击者能够超越防御者重建其网络的努力。

Until such networks can be suppressed at scale and for sustained periods, or outpaced before they can be reconstituted, gains will remain incremental.

除非这些网络能够在持续一段时间内受到大规模压制，或者在重组之前超越它们，否则收益将保持增量。

Force design should therefore, first and foremost, be tailored to providing sufficient suppression.

因此，部队设计首先应该是能够提供足够的抑制。

Additionally, while in 1940 the speed of the German advance undermined French decision-making, nowadays it is the speed of turning intelligence into fires that determines whether an army can continue to advance.

此外，在1940年，德国的推进速度破坏了法国的决策，而如今，决定军队能否继续推进的却是情报转化为火力的速度。

The lesson is clear: combat power is no longer derived primarily from maneuver formations engaging in direct contact, but rather from indirect, precision fires and standoff strike capabilities.

教训很明确：战斗力不再主要来自直接接触的机动编队，而是来自间接、精确火力和防区外打击能力。

Although ground troops will remain necessary to seize objectives and physically destroy the enemy at close range, the mass and density employed for this purpose are no longer desirable or necessary.

尽管仍然需要地面部队来夺取目标并近距离物理摧毁敌人，但为此目的而采用的大规模和密度不再是可取或必要的。

After all, the mass that can be sustained at the point of contact is bounded by the capacity of the logistical pipeline that feeds it.

毕竟，接触点所能承受的质量受到为其输送物质的后勤管道的容量的限制。

Armies therefore need to reevaluate how they think about massing combat power and reconsider how traditional principles such as concentration, dispersion, and security should inform force design and command and control.

因此，军队需要重新评估他们如何看待集结战斗力，并重新考虑集中、分散和安全等传统原则应如何指导部队设计和指挥与控制。

In this sense, Moltke’s dictum to “march separately, strike combined” takes on renewed relevance for a battlefield now defined by dispersion, standoff fires, and the convergence of manned and unmanned effects.

从这个意义上说，毛奇的“分头行进，联合打击”的格言对于现在由分散、防区外火力以及有人和无人效果的融合所定义的战场来说具有了新的意义。

Randy Noorman is an officer in the Royal Netherlands Army.

兰迪·诺曼是荷兰皇家陆军的一名军官。

He works as a military historian and doctoral candidate at the Land Warfare Center of the Royal Netherlands Army.

他是荷兰皇家陆军陆战中心的军事历史学家和博士生。

He served in the Dutch 11th Air Mobile Brigade for over 15 years as a noncommissioned officer and completed multiple tours in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia.

他作为士官在荷兰第 11 空中机动旅服役超过 15 年，并多次前往阿富汗、伊拉克和波斯尼亚执行任务。

He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of Groningen and a master’s degree in military history from the University of Amsterdam.

他拥有格罗宁根大学历史学学士学位和阿姆斯特丹大学军事史硕士学位。

He has been published in Dutch and English, including in the Modern War Institute , Military Review , and Small Wars Journal .

他曾在《现代战争研究所》、《军事评论》和《小战争杂志》等杂志上发表过荷兰语和英语文章。