How China and America Can Move from Competition to Stability
The American team thought it was signaling restraint.
美国队认为这是克制的信号。
The Chinese team saw preparations for combat.
中国队看到了战斗的准备。
In a closed-door Sino-American crisis simulation I helped organize in the 2010s — which the U.S. military funded as part of a long-term project — the Americans repositioned an aircraft carrier away from a maritime dispute between China and the Philippines, expecting the move to reassure Beijing.
2010年代，我帮助组织了一场闭门的中美危机模拟——美国军方作为长期项目的一部分资助了这次模拟——美国将一艘航空母舰重新部署在远离中国和菲律宾之间海上争端的地方，希望此举能够安抚北京。
Instead, the Chinese participants became deeply alarmed.
相反，中国与会者却深感震惊。
They believed the carrier was now ideally positioned to launch combat operations while remaining less vulnerable to attack.
他们认为，航母现在处于发起战斗行动的理想位置，同时不易受到攻击。
The episode revealed how suspicion could turn an intended reassurance into an apparent threat.
这一事件揭示了怀疑如何将原本的保证变成明显的威胁。
This danger becomes more intense when each side views the other primarily through the lens of strategic competition.
当双方主要通过战略竞争的视角来看待对方时，这种危险就会变得更加严重。
For nearly a decade , strategic competition has framed the U.S. approach to China, shaping military planning and operations, alliance diplomacy, trade and technology relations, investment policy, and — increasingly — scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges.
近十年来，战略竞争塑造了美国对华政策，影响着军事规划和行动、联盟外交、贸易和技术关系、投资政策，以及越来越多的科学、教育和文化交流。
While strengthening deterrence and inspiring improvements in America’s competitive capabilities, strategic competition has become an end in itself, encouraging dangerous policies often based on rigid, worst-case assumptions about Chinese intentions and abilities.
在加强威慑并激励提高美国竞争能力的同时，战略竞争本身已成为目的，鼓励了往往基于对中国意图和能力的僵化、最坏情况假设的危险政策。
And the same dynamic operates on the Chinese side.
同样的动态也发生在中国方面。
The framework fails to answer a central question: What kind of stable and beneficial U.S.-Chinese relationship is such competition intended to produce?
该框架未能回答一个核心问题：这种竞争旨在产生什么样的稳定和有益的美中关系？
Both sides require greater reassurance, positive incentives to exercise restraint and cooperation, and recognition of the need for an enduring, stable balance supported by substantive, lasting agreements.
双方都需要更多的保证、积极的激励措施来实行克制与合作，并认识到需要在实质性、持久的协议的支持下实现持久、稳定的平衡。
Without these, stress on strategic competition is likely to produce recurring crises, accelerating arms competition, economic and technological fragmentation, and even a full-scale war, potentially involving nuclear weapons and most likely over Taiwan.
如果没有这些，对战略竞争的压力可能会产生反复的危机，加速军备竞争、经济和技术分裂，甚至可能涉及核武器并最有可能围绕台湾问题爆发全面战争。
Even without such a catastrophic outcome, strategic competition will almost certainly diminish cooperation on potentially existential, global threats such as climate change and the disruptive effects of emerging technologies like AI.
即使没有这样的灾难性结果，战略竞争几乎肯定会削弱在气候变化等潜在的全球威胁以及人工智能等新兴技术的破坏性影响方面的合作。
The 2026 National Defense Strategy states that the United States does not seek to “dominate,” “strangle,” or “humiliate” China.
《2026年国防战略》指出，美国无意“主宰”、“扼杀”或“羞辱”中国。
It also describes the American objective as an Indo-Pacific balance of power that allows a “decent peace,” and stresses homeland and Western Hemisphere security.
它还将美国的目标描述为印度-太平洋地区的力量平衡，以实现“体面的和平”，并强调国土和西半球的安全。
It also does not mention Taiwan, a major potential source of conflict.
它还没有提及台湾这个主要的潜在冲突根源。
Such wording suggests the Trump administration is moving away from intense strategic competition backed by American superiority.
这样的措辞表明特朗普政府正在摆脱以美国优势为后盾的激烈战略竞争。
And yet, the same document calls for a strong denial defense against China along the first island chain extending from the Korean Peninsula to Southeast Asia, as well as an overall “ favorable balance of power” in the Asia-Pacific, implying a continued need to geographically contain China through superior military power, as opposed to a stable balance based on mutual denial capabilities.
然而，同一份文件呼吁沿从朝鲜半岛延伸至东南亚的第一岛链对中国进行强有力的拒止防御，以及在亚太地区总体上“有利的力量平衡”，这意味着继续需要通过优势军事力量在地理上遏制中国，而不是基于相互拒止能力的稳定平衡。
The strategy does not offer reciprocal political limits or an agreed end-state for the relationship.
该战略没有为这种关系提供互惠的政治限制或商定的最终状态。
And U.S. force modernization, alliance cooperation, and technology restrictions remain heavily shaped by concerns about a threatening China.
美国军队的现代化、联盟合作和技术限制仍然在很大程度上受到对中国威胁的担忧的影响。
Despite the positive rhetoric occurring in parts of the National Defense Strategy and during both of this year’s meetings between President Donald Trump and General Secretary Xi Jinping , U.S. policy remains a largely zero-sum competitive struggle requiring clearly superior, if not entirely dominant, military power to contain or constrain Beijing.
尽管在《国防战略》的部分内容以及今年唐纳德·特朗普总统和习近平总书记的两次会晤中出现了积极的言论，但美国的政策在很大程度上仍然是一种零和竞争性斗争，需要明显优越的（即使不是完全占主导地位的）军事力量来遏制或限制北京。
The emphasis remains on “winning” a competition over creating a stable, beneficial outcome.
重点仍然是“赢得”竞争，而不是创造稳定、有益的结果。
As a result, the relationship still lacks an operational political framework for the “decent peace” called for by the United States.
结果，两国关系仍然缺乏美国所呼吁的“体面和平”的可操作的政治框架。
Washington should pursue a strategy that bounds bilateral competition within a relationship that protects both countries’ vital interests while reducing conflict risks and expanding opportunities for positive-sum outcomes.
华盛顿应该奉行一项战略，将双边竞争限制在一种保护两国切身利益的关系中，同时减少冲突风险并扩大实现正和成果的机会。
This process is best described by the Chinese concept endorsed by both leaders during the Beijing summit: constructive strategic stability.
两国领导人在北京峰会期间认可的中国理念最能描述这一过程：建设性战略稳定。
In an attempt to define this concept, Beijing has articulated broad principles and both governments have announced specific cooperative initiatives, but neither has publicly set out a coherent, sequenced framework linking specific political assurances to verifiable reciprocal restraint measures and, ultimately, durable agreements.
为了定义这一概念，北京阐明了广泛的原则，两国政府也宣布了具体的合作举措，但两国政府都没有公开制定一个连贯、有序的框架，将具体的政治保证与可验证的相互限制措施以及最终的持久协议联系起来。
There are many reasons why a policy of strategic competition does not serve American (or Chinese) interests.
战略竞争政策不符合美国（或中国）利益的原因有很多。
First, it offers no clear, stable, mutually beneficial political end-state.
首先，它没有提供明确、稳定、互利的政治最终状态。
Instead, the United States largely measures success through stronger military deployments, tighter anti-China alliances, export and investment controls, tariffs, and other restrictions.
相反，美国主要通过更强大的军事部署、更紧密的反华联盟、出口和投资控制、关税和其他限制来衡量成功。
Under this approach, competition becomes self-reinforcing, as Chinese trade and technological gains invite additional restrictions, military modernization justifies larger deployments and increased defense spending, and diplomatic or political advances prompt zero-sum counters.
在这种方法下，竞争会自我强化，因为中国的贸易和技术进步会带来额外的限制，军事现代化证明更大规模的部署和增加国防开支是合理的，而外交或政治进步则引发零和对抗。
Much the same set of responses is seen on the Chinese side.
中国方面也做出了大致相同的反应。
Second, as a result, this approach encourages both sides to securitize nearly every aspect of the relationship, from trade and technology to scientific exchanges.
其次，这种做法鼓励双方将关系的几乎各个方面（从贸易和技术到科学交流）安全化。
As a result, an increasing number of activities by either side become subject to intense restrictions or prohibitions for real and imagined “national security” reasons.
结果，双方越来越多的活动因真实和想象的“国家安全”原因而受到严格限制或禁止。
Third, this dynamic deepens mistrust and encourages worst-case planning.
第三，这种动态加深了不信任并鼓励最坏情况的计划。
The trajectory points toward either a competition for predominance or an unstable balance in which both sides constantly seek leverage, increasing the danger of military confrontation and conflict.
其发展轨迹要么指向主导地位的竞争，要么指向不稳定的平衡，双方不断寻求影响力，从而增加了军事对抗和冲突的危险。
In such an environment, procedural “guardrails” will prove insufficient unless the two governments also reach substantive, reciprocal arrangements that reduce the underlying sources of conflict.
在这样的环境下，除非两国政府也达成实质性的互惠安排，减少冲突的根本根源，否则程序性的“护栏”将被证明是不够的。
Fourth, while any lasting strategy requires realistic assessments of each side’s capabilities, strategic competition encourages inflated views of both the challenges each side poses and each side’s ability to counter them, producing unrealistic expectations.
第四，虽然任何持久的战略都需要对各方的能力进行现实的评估，但战略竞争会鼓励对各方提出的挑战和应对挑战的能力抱有夸大的看法，从而产生不切实际的期望。
China is a formidable economic, technological, and military power and at times uses its capabilities to counter U.S. interests, including by restricting critical-mineral exports to the United States and, according to U.S. intelligence and cybersecurity agencies, penetrating U.S. critical-infrastructure networks to prepare for disruption during a crisis or conflict.
中国是一个强大的经济、技术和军事大国，有时利用其能力对抗美国的利益，包括限制对美国的关键矿产出口，以及根据美国情报和网络安全机构的说法，渗透美国关键基础设施网络，为危机或冲突期间的破坏做好准备。
It also undermines U.S. interests by supporting both Russia and Iran with military and dual-use components in their respective conflicts with Ukraine and the United States.
它还通过在俄罗斯和伊朗与乌克兰和美国的冲突中向俄罗斯和伊朗提供军事和军民两用组件来支持它们，从而损害了美国的利益。
But such actions do not justify portraying Beijing as an existential threat in other than nuclear warfare terms, or assuming its growth and influence in every case come at America’s expense, necessitating a U.S. drive for dominance or clear superiority and zero-sum pushback on every front.
但此类行动并不能证明将北京描绘成核战争以外的生存威胁，或假设其增长和影响力在任何情况下都以美国为代价，从而需要美国在各个方面追求主导地位或明显的优势和零和抵制。
Despite efforts to reduce its vulnerability to outside pressure and its desire to stress state sovereignty and collective rights over liberal democratic ideas, China remains deeply integrated into the international economy, from which it has benefited and to which it has contributed significantly .
尽管中国努力减少其对外部压力的脆弱性，并希望在自由民主思想上强调国家主权和集体权利，但中国仍然深深融入国际经济，并从中受益并做出了重大贡献。
Moreover, China faces structural constraints on its ability to achieve global normative and power dominance, such as adverse demographics, high debt and property sector weakness, and slowing productivity and growth.
此外，中国实现全球规范和权力主导地位的能力还面临结构性限制，例如人口结构不利、债务高企和房地产行业疲软，以及生产率和增长放缓。
It also suffers under ideological constraints and a political system with limited international appeal .
它还受到意识形态的限制和国际吸引力有限的政治制度的影响。
While posing a military challenge to U.S. maritime predominance in the Western Pacific that requires sustained balancing, Beijing is highly unlikely to be able to assemble the capabilities needed for global military dominance in the foreseeable future — if ever — including extensive alliances, overseas bases , worldwide logistics, and broad international acceptance of Chinese leadership.
虽然对美国在西太平洋的海上优势构成了需要持续平衡的军事挑战，但北京极不可能在可预见的未来（如果有的话）聚集全球军事主导地位所需的能力，包括广泛的联盟、海外基地、全球后勤以及国际社会对中国领导力的广泛接受。
For its part, the United States is constrained in sustaining its historical predominance by steadily growing fiscal pressures, political polarization, public resistance to military escalation and prolonged wars (evident in polling on Iran), less-compliant allies , and a broader diffusion of global power .
就美国而言，它在维持其历史主导地位方面面临着持续增长的财政压力、政治两极分化、公众对军事升级和长期战争的抵制（在对伊朗的民意调查中显而易见）、不太顺从的盟友以及全球权力更广泛扩散等方面的限制。
Finally, open-ended strategic competition distorts American priorities and damages prosperity and long-term strength.
最后，无限制的战略竞争扭曲了美国的优先事项，损害了繁荣和长期实力。
The administration’s budget proposals prioritize defense spending while reducing overall funding for civilian programs, weakening investment in the domestic foundations of competitiveness and national well-being.
政府的预算提案优先考虑国防支出，同时减少民用项目的总体资金，削弱对国内竞争力和国家福祉基础的投资。
In rejecting strategic competition, America should not return to engagement and hedging .
在拒绝战略竞争的同时，美国不应再回到接触和对冲的状态。
While producing decades of relative stability, mutually beneficial economic interaction, and normalized exchanges, that policy downplayed unavoidable competition and became associated with unrealistic expectations of Chinese political liberalization and near-complete acceptance of the U.S.-led international system.
尽管该政策带来了数十年的相对稳定、互利的经济互动和正常化的交往，但它淡化了不可避免的竞争，并与对中国政治自由化和近乎完全接受美国主导的国际体系的不切实际的期望联系在一起。
Alhough hedging was arguably a logical form of insurance against a more aggressive China, Washington never fully defined, delimited, and implemented the concept.
尽管对冲可以说是针对更具侵略性的中国的一种合乎逻辑的保险形式，但华盛顿从未完全定义、界定和实施这一概念。
Moreover, as with strategic competition, neither notion defined a sustainable end-state for the relationship.
此外，与战略竞争一样，这两个概念都没有定义这种关系的可持续最终状态。
The term “strategic stability” has its roots in Cold War efforts to limit the dangers of U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition.
“战略稳定”一词源于冷战时期限制美苏核竞争危险的努力。
Its current usage is much broader, however, referring to the overall Sino-American relationship.
然而，它目前的用法要广泛得多，指的是整个中美关系。
American officials such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio have employed “strategic stability” in this broader sense.
国务卿马可·卢比奥等美国官员在更广泛的意义上使用了“战略稳定”。
But the full term, “constructive strategic stability,” was apparently first used by Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders.
但“建设性战略稳定”的全称显然是习近平和其他中国领导人首先使用的。
They defined a relationship marked by cooperation as the foundation, with moderate competition, manageable differences, and a durable peace.
双方确立了以合作为基础、适度竞争、可控分歧、持久和平的关系。
The American side then accepted the full term (not necessarily China’s definition), adding “ …on the basis of fairness and reciprocity .”
美方随后接受了完整术语（不一定是中国的定义），并添加了“……在公平和互惠的基础上……”。
The Chinese origin and definition of constructive strategic stability might make some observers cautious, but that is not a reason to reject it.
中国对建设性战略稳定的起源和定义可能会让一些观察家持谨慎态度，但这并不是拒绝它的理由。
The test should be whether Washington defines the term and accepts it in ways that protect and advance American interests and constrain dangerous behavior on both sides.
考验应该是华盛顿是否以保护和促进美国利益并限制双方危险行为的方式定义和接受该术语。
Washington should resist any definition equating the concept to one-sided respect for Beijing’s red lines.
华盛顿应该抵制任何将这一概念等同于片面尊重北京红线的定义。
As I use the term, constructive strategic stability denotes both a political process and an outcome: a stable, mutually advantageous relationship and orientation to the international order.
在我使用这个术语时，建设性战略稳定既指政治进程，也指结果：稳定、互利的关系和国际秩序的方向。
It assumes that neither the United States nor China is an existential threat to the other in every day-to-day circumstance outside the extreme case of a nuclear war, nor on a path to inevitable decline or dominance of one over the other.
它假设，除了核战争这种极端情况之外，美国和中国在日常情况下都不会对对方构成生存威胁，也不会走上不可避免的衰落或主导对方的道路。
It recognizes that both, through their interaction, create dangerous, virtually unbounded competition.
它认识到，两者通过相互作用产生了危险的、几乎无限制的竞争。
And it posits that global and national order and prosperity require extensive bilateral cooperation and mutual benefit, which necessitate substantive accommodation and reciprocal restraint.
它认为，全球和国家秩序与繁荣需要广泛的双边合作和互利，这就需要实质性的包容和相互克制。
Some level of rivalry and competition are unavoidable, given the two powers’ contrasting political systems and search for security and prosperity amid scarce resources.
鉴于两个大国截然不同的政治制度以及在稀缺资源中寻求安全和繁荣，某种程度的对抗和竞争是不可避免的。
Nonetheless, Beijing and Washington should not allow rivalry to overshadow the obvious need to create lasting stability in their relationship and address those major, sometimes existential threats demanding cooperation, including climate warming, pandemics, AI governance, global financial stability, and nuclear conflict.
尽管如此，北京和华盛顿不应让竞争掩盖了在两国关系中创造持久稳定的明显需要，并解决那些需要合作的重大、有时是生存的威胁，包括气候变暖、流行病、人工智能治理、全球金融稳定和核冲突。
Building constructive strategic stability should not depend on a severe, restraint-inducing crisis or different, more restraint-oriented political leaders.
建设建设性的战略稳定不应依赖一场严重的、引发克制的危机或不同的、更加克制的政治领导人。
The present administration has provided the political language needed to begin this process, including the National Defense Strategy’s call for strategic stability and a “decent peace” with China, the Beijing summit’s endorsement of a constructive relationship of strategic stability based on fairness and reciprocity, and similar comments made during Xi’s September 2026 visit to Washington.
本届政府提供了开始这一进程所需的政治语言，包括《国防战略》呼吁与中国实现战略稳定和“体面的和平”、北京峰会认可建立在公平和互惠基础上的战略稳定的建设性关系，以及习近平在 2026 年 9 月访问华盛顿期间发表的类似言论。
The political constituency for this relationship, in both the United States and China, could begin with officials who favor strong deterrence but want to avoid an open-ended crisis and address common concerns, as well as military professionals interested in reducing the risk of accidental escalation and conflict.
在美国和中国，这种关系的政治支持者可能首先是那些赞成强力威慑但希望避免无休止的危机并解决共同关切的官员，以及对降低意外升级和冲突风险感兴趣的军事专业人士。
It could also include business and technology constituencies that favor a predictable, profitable relationship and resist its expanding securitization.
它还可能包括支持可预测、有利可图的关系并抵制其不断扩大的证券化的商业和技术支持者。
Constructive strategic stability cannot emerge through a single summit, a comprehensive “grand bargain,” or declarations of goodwill.
建设性的战略稳定不可能通过单一峰会、全面的“大谈判”或善意宣言来实现。
Nor can it rest on unilateral concessions followed by expectations of reciprocity.
它也不能依赖于单方面让步和随后的互惠期望。
It should develop gradually through concrete, mutually beneficial, verifiable interactions.
它应该通过具体的、互利的、可验证的互动逐步发展。
The purpose of such interactions is to test intentions through behavior, convert successful exchanges into lasting institutionalized commitments, and move from zero-sum strategic competition with guardrails toward reciprocal restraint, negotiated accommodation, and binding cooperation that does far more than just avoid war.
这种互动的目的是通过行为检验意图，将成功的交流转化为持久的制度化承诺，从有护栏的零和战略竞争转向相互克制、谈判和解以及有约束力的合作，而这不仅仅是避免战争。
This effort thus moves beyond an argument I made in War on the Rocks in 2024 about the inadequacy of existing crisis-management mechanisms, and revisited after the May summit in June 2026.
因此，这项努力超越了我在 2024 年的《岩石战争》中提出的关于现有危机管理机制不足的论点，并在 2026 年 6 月的 5 月峰会后重新审视了这一论点。
Improving crisis management should be only one step toward a basic shift in the relationship’s framework.
改善危机管理应该只是两国关系框架发生根本转变的第一步。
The process should move through four overlapping stages: political communication, operational reassurance, reciprocal restraint, and institutionalization.
这一过程应经历四个相互重叠的阶段：政治沟通、行动保证、相互克制和制度化。
These stages should cover three main policy arenas: Taiwan and Asian security; economics and technology; and nuclear, cyber, and AI.
这些阶段应涵盖三个主要政策领域：台湾和亚洲安全；经济和技术；以及核、网络和人工智能。
Early measures are to be limited, verifiable, and generally reversible.
早期的措施是有限的、可验证的并且通常是可逆的。
More consequential steps should come only after less costly ones have shown their value.
只有在成本较低的措施显示出其价值之后，才应该采取更重要的措施。
Failure in one area should not destroy cooperation elsewhere.
一个领域的失败不应破坏其他领域的合作。
The August 2022 crisis following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan illustrated the danger of contradictory U.S. policy signals without clearly understood political boundaries.
2022 年 8 月的危机继当时的美国之后众议院议长南希·佩洛西对台湾的访问说明了在没有明确政治界限的情况下美国政策信号相互矛盾的危险。
Pelosi, a highly provocative figure in U.S.-Chinese relations, took what her office described as an “ official visit ” to Taiwan, despite the supposedly unofficial nature of the U.S. relationship with the island.
佩洛西是美中关系中极具挑衅性的人物，她的办公室称其对台湾进行了“正式访问”，尽管美国与台湾的关系被认为是非正式的。
The crisis demonstrated the need to communicate consistently and clearly what political actions are deemed intolerable and what assurances are expected.
这场危机表明，有必要一致、清晰地沟通哪些政治行动被认为是不能容忍的，以及哪些政治行动是值得期待的。
The first step in building constructive strategic stability should thus be an authoritative (perhaps joint) statement by the two leaders defining the relationship they desire and the dangers they intend to avoid.
因此，建立建设性战略稳定的第一步应该是两国领导人发表权威（或许是联合）声明，明确他们所希望的关系以及他们想要避免的危险。
It should clearly state that neither will seek the strategic subordination, economic collapse, or political weakening or disintegration of the other, and that both nations will remain to some significant extent mutually dependent to ensure mutual benefit.
它应该明确指出，双方都不会寻求对方的战略从属、经济崩溃或政治削弱或分裂，两国将在一定程度上保持相互依赖，以确保互利。
Regarding Taiwan, Trump has moved partway toward these assurances.
关于台湾，特朗普已朝着这些保证迈出了一步。
After the Beijing summit, he clearly reemphasized a longstanding U.S. policy by publicly cautioning against a Taiwan declaration of independence, while declining to say — in contrast to Biden ’s remark — whether the United States would defend the island and stating that he had made no commitment to Xi regarding Taiwan.
北京峰会后，他明确重申了美国的长期政策，公开警告台湾不要宣布独立，但与拜登的言论相反，他拒绝透露美国是否会保卫台湾，并表示他没有就台湾问题向习近平做出任何承诺。
However, Trump also created concern in Taiwan and the United States by questioning the viability of defending the island and casting doubt on a pending arms sale package.
然而，特朗普质疑保卫台湾的可行性并对悬而未决的军售方案表示怀疑，这也引起了台湾和美国的担忧。
In place of this ambiguity, the president should consistently provide a balanced set of deterrence and assurance signals, such as: The United States will oppose any unilateral attempts by either side to change the status quo in fundamental ways, toward either independence or unification, as defined and interpreted by Washington.
为了消除这种模糊性，总统应始终如一地提供一套平衡的威慑和保证信号，例如：美国将反对任何一方单方面从根本上改变现状的企图，无论是实现华盛顿所定义和解释的独立还是统一。
This would go beyond the existing “ do not support ” statement of U.S. policy regarding Taiwan’s independence, to convey Washington’s clear and strong resolve to actively oppose such an action when necessary.
这将超越现有的“不支持”美国台独政策声明，以传达华盛顿在必要时积极反对此类行动的明确而坚定的决心。
Such attempts could include a formal effort by Taipei to endorse or codify a One China, One Taiwan policy, or, regarding China and unification, a direct Chinese use of force (however limited) against Taiwan.
这些尝试可能包括台北正式支持或编纂“一个中国、一个台湾”政策，或者就中国和统一而言，中国直接对台湾使用武力（但有限）。
Equally important, the Trump administration should also clearly reverse efforts to undermine the One China policy and unambiguously reaffirm its commitment to that policy .
同样重要的是，特朗普政府还应该明确扭转破坏一个中国政策的努力，并明确重申其对这一政策的承诺。
Specifically, the president should state that he will not place combat units on the island or take other actions suggesting a military alliance with Taipei and will emphasize only defensive capabilities in U.S. assistance to Taiwan.
具体来说，总统应该声明，他不会在岛上部署作战部队，也不会采取其他暗示与台北建立军事联盟的行动，并且在美国对台援助中只强调防御能力。
He should also clearly assert, as the One China policy stipulates , that Washington remains open to any peaceful, uncoerced resolution of the Taiwan issue acceptable to people on both sides of the strait, and should press Taipei to stop undermining that policy by portraying Taiwan as a vital U.S. strategic asset that, by implication, must remain separate from China.
他还应该明确宣称，正如一个中国政策所规定的那样，华盛顿对两岸人民都能接受的任何和平、非胁迫的台湾问题解决方案持开放态度，并应向台北施压，要求其停止将台湾描绘成美国重要的战略资产，暗示台湾必须与中国保持分离，从而破坏这一政策。
Even Taiwan’s possession of high-technology semiconductor fabrication capabilities does not justify such a portrayal.
即使台湾拥有高科技半导体制造能力，也不能证明这种描述是正确的。
On the Chinese side, Xi Jinping should reiterate unambiguously that peaceful unification remains China’s preferred objective, state unequivocally that there is no fixed timetable for unification, and assert a willingness to significantly reduce military activities around Taiwan as part of a larger tension-reduction effort.
中国方面，习近平应明确重申和平统一仍然是中国的首选目标，明确表示统一没有固定时间表，并表示愿意大幅减少台湾周边的军事活动，作为更大范围的缓和紧张局势的一部分。
Although unlikely to end distrust, these baseline declarations would establish political benchmarks for behavior and test both sides’ willingness to engage in reciprocal assurances and accommodations.
尽管不太可能结束不信任，但这些基线声明将为行为建立政治基准，并测试双方参与相互保证和便利的意愿。
Political assurances have little value unless they shape the conduct of military and other instruments of state power.
政治保证除非能够影响军事和其他国家权力工具的行为，否则没有什么价值。
On Oct.
十月号
24, 2023, a Chinese J-11 fighter intercepted an American B-52 over the South China Sea and, according to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, passed within roughly 10 feet at night, creating a serious collision risk.
2023 年 12 月 24 日，一架中国 J-11 战斗机在南海上空拦截了一架美国 B-52，据美国印太司令部称，该战斗机于夜间在大约 10 英尺范围内飞过，造成了严重的相撞风险。
This was not an isolated incident .
这不是一个孤立的事件。
Unsafe encounters have continued involving U.S. allies: According to Australia’s Department of Defence, a Chinese naval helicopter maneuvered dangerously close to an Australian helicopter over the Yellow Sea on March 4, 2026, forcing its crew to take evasive action.
涉及美国盟友的不安全遭遇仍在继续：据澳大利亚国防部称，2026 年 3 月 4 日，一架中国海军直升机在黄海上空危险地接近一架澳大利亚直升机，迫使其机组人员采取规避行动。
The 2023 incident showed the limitations of a 2014 memorandum and a 2015 air-to-air safety annex on safe U.S.-Chinese air and maritime encounters, whose rules have not consistently prevented unsafe encounters.
2023 年的事件显示了 2014 年备忘录和 2015 年关于中美空中和海上安全相遇的空对空安全附件的局限性，这些规则并没有始终如一地防止不安全相遇。
Washington could propose a 90-day trial period — following the authoritative presidential assurances outlined above and marked by immediate, reciprocal obligations that both militaries avoid unsafe encounters — in which the two sides would routinely employ designated emergency communications channels, investigate reported violations within an agreed period, and exchange advance notification of unusually large exercises and major missile tests.
华盛顿可以提出一个为期 90 天的试验期——在上述权威的总统保证之后，并以双方军队避免不安全相遇的立即、对等义务为标志——在此期间，双方将例行使用指定的紧急通信渠道，在商定的期限内调查报告的违规行为，并就异常大规模的演习和重大导弹试验交换预先通知。
During the same period, the Pentagon could conduct a classified review, without yet implementing its recommendations, of close-in reconnaissance missions to determine whether a significant number could be conducted at greater distance, lower frequency, or with different platforms without materially reducing intelligence collection.
在同一时期，五角大楼可以在尚未实施其建议的情况下对近距离侦察任务进行分类审查，以确定是否可以在不实质性减少情报收集的情况下以更远的距离、更低的频率或使用不同的平台进行大量的侦察任务。
None of these steps would require Washington to abandon deterrence, change its one-China policy, curtail lawful military operations, or concede a Chinese red line.
这些步骤都不需要华盛顿放弃威慑、改变其一个中国政策、限制合法的军事行动或承认中国的红线。
During the 90-day trial period, Chinese forces would have to consistently meet the above observable benchmarks before Washington proceeded to reconnaissance reductions.
在 90 天的试验期内，中国军队必须始终满足上述可观察的基准，然后华盛顿才会开始削减侦察行动。
If Beijing persistently failed to meet these benchmarks while insisting that Washington alone must demonstrate “respect,” the initiative should stop at the reassurance stage, without the United States having altered its military posture.
如果北京始终未能达到这些基准，同时坚持华盛顿必须单独表现出“尊重”，那么这一举措应该停止在安抚阶段，而美国还没有改变其军事姿态。
In economics and technology, Washington and Beijing should work both independently and together to distinguish genuine security requirements from commercial competition.
在经济和技术方面，华盛顿和北京应该既独立又共同努力，区分真正的安全需求和商业竞争。
Each should explain the national-security rationale behind major technology and investment restrictions and consult, when feasible, before enacting new ones.
每个国家都应解释重大技术和投资限制背后的国家安全理由，并在可行的情况下在制定新限制之前进行磋商。
Although dual-use capabilities present challenges, more can be done to reverse expanding securitization.
尽管双重用途能力带来了挑战，但可以采取更多措施来扭转不断扩大的证券化。
Both sides should evaluate technologies with possible indirect applications against transparent, mutually understood criteria.
双方应根据透明、相互理解的标准评估可能间接应用的技术。
In addition, the two governments should establish regular, results-oriented dialogues on industrial subsidies, investment screening, intellectual-property protection, scientific cooperation, and AI, as well as cyber and nuclear operations.
此外，两国政府应就产业补贴、投资筛选、知识产权保护、科学合作、人工智能以及网络和核行动等问题建立定期、注重成果的对话。
The latter three areas ought to include procedures for notifying one another of major incidents that appear accidental or unintended.
后三个领域应包括相互通报看似偶然或非故意的重大事件的程序。
These dialogues would identify red lines and opportunities for mutual assurances and sustained cooperation.
这些对话将确定相互保证和持续合作的红线和机会。
Finally, the two sides should strengthen crisis-prevention and management mechanisms through an official military and civilian Track One dialogue supported by unofficial Track Two discussions addressing both the political and military sources of crises and the guidelines and communication channels needed to manage them.
最后，双方应通过正式的军事和民事第一轨道对话以及非正式的第二轨道讨论来加强危机预防和管理机制，讨论危机的政治和军事根源以及管理危机所需的指导方针和沟通渠道。
My recently published crisis management manual addresses these and other issues in detail.
我最近出版的危机管理手册详细讨论了这些问题和其他问题。
The economic and technological relationship between Beijing and Washington demonstrates why reassurance should eventually produce concrete restraint.
北京和华盛顿之间的经济和技术关系表明，为什么保证最终会产生具体的克制。
On Oct.
十月号
7, 2022 , Washington announced sweeping controls on China’s access to advanced computing chips and semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, and subsequently expanded those restrictions.
2022 年 12 月 7 日，华盛顿宣布对中国获取先进计算芯片和半导体制造设备进行全面控制，并随后扩大了这些限制。
Beijing responded by requiring licenses for exports of materials important to semiconductor, defense, and battery supply chains.
北京的回应是要求对半导体、国防和电池供应链重要的材料出口获得许可证。
Both governments invoked national security, but neither defined a mutually understood limiting principle, a process for consultation, or conditions under which they might narrow or remove restrictions.
两国政府都援引了国家安全的理由，但都没有定义相互理解的限制原则、协商程序或缩小或取消限制的条件。
The result was a self-reinforcing cycle in which each side’s attempt to reduce vulnerability increased the other’s incentive to retaliate.
其结果是一个自我强化的循环，每一方减少脆弱性的尝试都增加了对方报复的动机。
Constructive strategic stability must therefore move beyond verbal reassurance and temporary “truces” to reciprocal, verifiable, and enduring restraints on the activities each side finds most destabilizing.
因此，建设性的战略稳定必须超越口头保证和临时“休战”，而是对双方认为最破坏稳定的活动进行相互的、可验证的和持久的限制。
In security, after Beijing has demonstrated consistent compliance during the 90-day military-safety trial outlined above, Washington could implement the classified review’s recommendations to reduce close-in reconnaissance operations, especially those providing marginal intelligence value relative to their political and crisis-instability costs.
在安全方面，在北京在上述为期 90 天的军事安全试验中表现出一贯的合规性后，华盛顿可以实施机密审查的建议，以减少近距离侦察行动，特别是那些相对于政治和危机不稳定成本提供边际情报价值的行动。
These adjustments would preserve essential deterrent and intelligence capabilities and remain reversible.
这些调整将保留必要的威慑和情报能力，并且保持可逆性。
Beijing would have to sustain safe intercept behavior and measurably reduce coercive military activities around Taiwan (including frequent median-line crossings, large-scale encirclement exercises, and simulated blockade operations) before further steps, such as reciprocal exercise observations, are taken.
北京必须维持安全拦截行为，并大幅减少台湾周边的胁迫性军事活动（包括频繁穿越中线、大规模合围演习和模拟封锁行动），然后才能采取进一步措施，例如相互演习观察。
Washington could invite Chinese observers to selected military exercises, including the major multinational Rim of the Pacific exercise, subject to applicable statutory restrictions.
华盛顿可以邀请中国观察员参加选定的军事演习，包括大型多国环太平洋演习，但须遵守适用的法律限制。
Beijing could reciprocate U.S. invitations by inviting American observers to People’s Liberation Army exercises.
北京可以通过邀请美国观察员参加中国人民解放军演习来回应美国的邀请。
Economic and technology policies should reduce securitization, with Washington narrowing or removing those export controls whose demonstrated security benefits do not justify their costs to civilian production, research, and beneficial exchange.
经济和技术政策应减少安全化，华盛顿应缩小或取消那些已证明的安全效益不足以证明其民用生产、研究和有益交换成本合理的出口管制。
Restrictions affecting semiconductor manufacturing and biotechnology equipment deserve particular scrutiny, with controls tailored to specific security risks.
影响半导体制造和生物技术设备的限制值得特别审查，并针对特定安全风险制定控制措施。
Beijing should narrow politically motivated market access restrictions, strengthen protections against forced technology transfer , reduce critical mineral export controls , and provide more equal treatment for foreign companies in China .
北京方面应缩小出于政治动机的市场准入限制，加强对强制技术转让的保护，减少关键的矿产出口管制，并为在华外国公司提供更加平等的待遇。
In nuclear, cyber, and AI policy, Washington and Beijing should curtail, if not end, provocative operations that raise fears of nuclear escalation, removal of human control over nuclear use, or attacks on critical civilian infrastructure.
在核、网络和人工智能政策方面，华盛顿和北京应该减少（如果不是结束的话）挑衅性行动，这些行动会引发人们对核升级、人类对核使用控制的取消或对关键民用基础设施的攻击的担忧。
As verification capabilities develop, they should negotiate a formal cyber noninterference declaration prohibiting peacetime attacks against nuclear command-and-control systems, civilian electrical grids, hospitals, and other critical civilian infrastructure, while establishing incident-notification and consultation procedures.
随着核查能力的发展，他们应该谈判达成正式的网络不干涉声明，禁止和平时期对核指挥控制系统、民用电网、医院和其他关键民用基础设施进行攻击，同时建立事件通知和协商程序。
And they should establish a clear link and protocol for the AI-incident communication channel created when Xi Jinping visited Washington.
他们应该为习近平访问华盛顿时创建的人工智能事件沟通渠道建立明确的链接和协议。
Make Restraint Durable The 2015 cyber agreement illustrates both the value and the fragility of institutionalized restraint.
让约束持久 2015 年的网络协议说明了制度化约束的价值和脆弱性。
President Barack Obama and Xi agreed that neither government would conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial advantage.
巴拉克·奥巴马总统和习近平一致认为，两国政府都不会为了商业利益而进行或故意支持通过网络盗窃知识产权。
Independent cybersecurity researchers reported a marked decline in intrusions attributed to China-based groups beginning in mid-2014, even before the agreement.
独立网络安全研究人员报告称，从 2014 年中期开始，甚至在协议签署之前，中国组织发起的入侵明显下降。
But the improvement proved difficult to sustain as enforcement remained uncertain and the broader relationship deteriorated.
但事实证明，这种改善难以持续，因为执行情况仍然不确定，而且更广泛的关系恶化。
The episode suggests that restraint in any policy area becomes durable only when a commitment defines the prohibited behavior, establishes a baseline and reliable means of assessing compliance, requires regular review, and specifies proportionate consequences for violations without allowing one dispute to destroy the entire arrangement.
这一事件表明，只有当承诺定义了禁止的行为、建立了评估合规性的基线和可靠方法、需要定期审查并规定了违规行为的相应后果且不允许任何争议破坏整个安排时，任何政策领域的限制才变得持久。
The goal is not to make cheating impossible.
我们的目标并不是让作弊成为不可能。
It’s to make noncompliance visible enough that reciprocal restraint remains politically defensible.
这是为了让不遵守行为足够明显，以便相互克制在政治上仍然站得住脚。
In this entire process, verification would vary by issue.
在整个过程中，验证会因问题而异。
U.S. and allied surveillance, commercial satellite imagery, ship and aircraft tracking, and agreed exercise notifications can reveal military behavior around Taiwan.
美国和盟国的监视、商业卫星图像、船只和飞机跟踪以及商定的演习通知可以揭示台湾周围的军事行为。
Published regulations, licensing data, customs data, and company experience can track export controls and critical-mineral restrictions.
已发布的法规、许可数据、海关数据和公司经验可以跟踪出口管制和关键矿产限制。
Because responsibility for cyber violations is harder to establish, initial arrangements should focus on incident consultation, protection of clearly defined categories of infrastructure, and patterns of behavior, rather than unverifiable prohibitions.
由于网络违规的责任较难确定，因此最初的安排应侧重于事件咨询、保护明确定义的基础设施类别和行为模式，而不是无法核实的禁令。
These verifications can have a preceding 12-month baseline, involve a sustained level of compliance across successive review periods, and and draw on a U.S. interagency assessment on the American side, ideally involving American allies.
这些验证可以有一个提前 12 个月的基线，涉及连续审查期间的持续合规水平，并借鉴美国方面的美国机构间评估，最好包括美国盟友。
Such a process should also exist on the Chinese side.
中方也应该有这样的过程。
As confidence develops and tensions abate, both governments should eventually reach parallel, independently adopted restraints limiting particularly destabilizing military capabilities, including certain intermediate-range missile deployments, offensive antisatellite systems, large concentrations of missile forces opposite Taiwan, and U.S. defense assistance to the island.
随着信心的增强和紧张局势的缓和，两国政府最终应该并行、独立地采取限制措施，限制特别会破坏稳定的军事能力，包括某些中程导弹部署、进攻性反卫星系统、在台湾对面部署大量导弹部队以及美国对台湾的防务援助。
As always, American adjustments should occur only as Chinese restraint becomes substantial and verifiable.
一如既往，只有当中国的克制变得实质性且可验证时，美国才会做出调整。
A bilateral economic security agreement should define restricted technologies, specify a process of consultation before major restrictions, and codify regular reviews of export controls, sanctions, tariffs, investment screening, and critical-mineral policies.
双边经济安全协议应定义受限制的技术，规定重大限制之前的磋商程序，并将对出口管制、制裁、关税、投资审查和关键矿产政策的定期审查编入法典。
Each action should specify its objective, criteria for success, and conditions for lifting or escalating controls.
每项行动都应明确其目标、成功标准以及解除或升级控制的条件。
As suggested above, formal cyber and AI agreements should take place at this stage, establishing reliable consultation mechanisms and protections against attacks on nuclear command-and-control and critical civilian infrastructure.
如上所述，应在现阶段达成正式的网络和人工智能协议，建立可靠的协商机制并保护核指挥与控制和关键民用基础设施免遭攻击。
The two nations should also restore mutually beneficial scientific, educational, and technological exchanges and protect them from short-term political fluctuations.
两国还应恢复互利的科学、教育和技术交流，并保护它们免受短期政治波动的影响。
In all of the above stages, close consultation with America’s allies and key partners should occur to the extent possible, including Taiwan.
在上述所有阶段，都应尽可能与美国的盟友和主要伙伴进行密切磋商，其中包括台湾。
Washington should explain the need to move from open-ended strategic competition to a stability-centered, mutually beneficial relationship requiring clear agreements and understandings with Beijing, based in part on concessions and accommodations.
华盛顿应该解释从开放式战略竞争转向以稳定为中心的互利关系的必要性，这种关系需要与北京达成明确的协议和谅解，部分基于让步和通融。
Washington should make it clear that these agreements would not undermine the security of other countries.
华盛顿应该明确表示，这些协议不会损害其他国家的安全。
Indeed, a stable bilateral relationship of mutual benefit would bolster region-wide security.
事实上，稳定、互利的双边关系将有利于整个地区的安全。
Washington must also consult Congress from the outset and at each stage along the way.
华盛顿还必须从一开始以及在此过程中的每个阶段咨询国会。
The executive branch could initiate the military-safety trial period under existing authority , but later measures — especially adjustments involving congressionally mandated economic restrictions or U.S. arms policy toward Taiwan — should not occur solely through executive action.
行政部门可以根据现有权力启动军事安全试验期，但后续措施——尤其是涉及国会授权的经济限制或美国对台武器政策的调整——不应仅通过行政行动来实施。
Early and consistent consultation would make subsequent steps more politically defensible and durable, reducing the risk that commitments would collapse with a change of administration.
尽早进行持续的磋商将使后续步骤在政治上更具防御性和持久性，从而降低承诺因政府更迭而崩溃的风险。
Agreements on reciprocal military restraint regarding Taiwan could appear to violate the Six Assurances and the Taiwan Relations Act .
针对台湾的相互军事克制协议可能会违反《六项保证》和《台湾关系法》。
While the Taiwan Relations Act is a law, the Six Assurances are legally non-binding policy commitments.
虽然《与台湾关系法》是法律，但“六项保证”是不具有法律约束力的政策承诺。
Neither rule out voluntary U.S.-Chinese understandings to reduce military tensions.
两者都不排除美中自愿达成谅解以缓解军事紧张局势。
That said, adjustments in arms assistance must meet the act’s requirements.
也就是说，武器援助的调整必须符合该法案的要求。
The act requires defense articles and services sufficient to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability, with their nature and quantity determined by the president and Congress “based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan.” It also requires review of those needs by U.S. military authorities.
该法案要求提供足以维持台湾自卫能力的国防物品和服务，其性质和数量由总统和国会“完全根据他们对台湾需求的判断”决定。它还要求美国军事当局审查这些需求。
Following this wording, verified reductions in the Chinese threat through the above-outlined mutual tension reduction process could lower Taiwan’s defense requirements and thus justify independently determined adjustments in U.S. assistance.
按照这一措辞，通过上述相互紧张局势缓和进程证实中国威胁的减少可能会降低台湾的防御需求，从而证明美国独立决定的援助调整是合理的。
The Six Assurances state that the United States “ Has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.” This wording does not literally prohibit future understandings.
六项保证指出，美国“未同意与中国就对台军售问题进行磋商”。这种措辞并不从字面上禁止未来的理解。
Moreover, the accompanying 1982 cables also contemplated reductions in arms sales conditioned on continued Chinese peaceful behavior, with Taiwan’s defense needs remaining the U.S. benchmark.
此外，随附的 1982 年电报还考虑以中国持续的和平行为为条件减少武器销售，而台湾的国防需求仍然是美国的基准。
Any adjustment should therefore be an independent, reversible American response to verified Chinese restraint, without instituting prior consultations with Beijing over specific arms sales or granting it control over Taiwan’s defenses.
因此，任何调整都应该是美国对中国经核实的克制做出的独立、可逆的反应，而无需就具体武器销售或授予其对台湾防御的控制权与北京进行事先磋商。
Constructive strategic stability is not a call to blindly trust Beijing, abandon deterrence, or accept a Chinese sphere of influence.
建设性战略稳定并不是呼吁盲目信任北京、放弃威慑或接受中国的势力范围。
It is an attempt to embed competition and deterrence within a stability-centered political framework and test whether limited reassurance can produce reciprocal restraint and enduring agreements.
它试图将竞争和威慑嵌入到以稳定为中心的政治框架中，并测试有限的保证是否能够产生相互克制和持久的协议。
If China refuses meaningful reciprocity, the United States loses little from low-cost, reversible measures and gains evidence about Beijing’s intentions.
如果中国拒绝有意义的互惠，美国从低成本、可逆的措施中不会损失什么，并获得有关北京意图的证据。
If China responds, both gain a basis for larger steps.
如果中国做出回应，双方都将获得采取更大步骤的基础。
Building constructive strategic stability will require sustained political leadership in both countries and, to the fullest extent possible, support from U.S. allies.
建立建设性的战略稳定需要两国持续的政治领导，并需要美国盟友的最大程度的支持。
Neither Washington nor Beijing can create a stable relationship unilaterally.
华盛顿和北京都无法单方面建立稳定的关系。
Each must demonstrate through repeated behavior that it can defend its own vital interests while recognizing that the other possesses legitimate interests that require accommodation.
每一方都必须通过反复的行为证明，它可以捍卫自己的切身利益，同时认识到对方拥有需要妥协的合法利益。
The choice is therefore not whether the United States will compete with China.
因此，选择的不是美国是否会与中国竞争。
Competition is unavoidable.
竞争是不可避免的。
The choice is whether that competition becomes an increasingly self-sustaining struggle for predominance or operates within a broader political strategy designed to produce a stable, beneficial peace over the long term.
选择是竞争是成为一场日益自我维持的争夺主导地位的斗争，还是在旨在产生长期稳定、有益和平的更广泛的政治战略中运作。
That distinction could determine far more than who wins the next round of U.S.-Chinese competition.
这种区别可能远远超出谁能赢得下一轮中美竞争的影响。
It could determine whether the world’s two most powerful countries learn to live with one another at all.
它可能决定世界上两个最强大的国家是否学会彼此共处。
Michael D.
迈克尔·D.
Swaine is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
斯温是昆西负责任治国研究所的高级研究员。
Formerly a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-Chinese relations, and East Asian international relations.
斯温曾任卡内基国际和平基金会和兰德公司的高级研究员，是中国国防和外交政策、美中关系以及东亚国际关系方面的专家。
His work has focused on Sino-American crisis management and the Taiwan issue.
他的工作重点是中美危机管理和台湾问题。
He has authored and edited more than a dozen books and monographs as well as many journal articles and book chapters in these areas.
他撰写和编辑了十几本书籍和专着以及这些领域的许多期刊文章和书籍章节。
Swaine directs security-related projects with Chinese partners and advises the U.S. government on Asian security issues.
斯维恩与中国合作伙伴共同指导安全相关项目，并就亚洲安全问题向美国政府提供建议。
He received his M.A.
他获得了文学硕士学位。
and Ph.D. in government from Harvard University.
和博士学位。哈佛大学政府学博士。