Building an Arsenal That Survives the Tenth Salvo
America faces a well-defined industrial base problem.
美国面临着一个明确的工业基础问题。
Whether it’s a hypothetical Taiwan invasion wargame run two dozen times , the current Iranian conflict , or the Russo-Ukrainian War, the same result repeats: Magazines of key weapons such as cruise missile systems and interceptors empty within days, weeks, or months, and the current industrial base takes years to replenish them.
无论是假设的台湾入侵战争游戏进行了两打,还是当前的伊朗冲突,还是俄罗斯-乌克兰战争,都会重复同样的结果:巡航导弹系统和拦截器等关键武器的弹药库在几天、几周或几个月内就空了,而当前的工业基地需要数年时间才能补充它们。
Part of that shortfall results from the analog way in which missile structures are designed, tooled, and sourced, which locks the entire supply chain into rigid, design-specific schedules.
造成这种短缺的部分原因是导弹结构的设计、加工和采购采用模拟方式,这将整个供应链锁定在严格的、特定于设计的时间表中。
The first salvo depends on platforms, positioning, and doctrine, all things controllable by militaries.
第一次齐射取决于平台、定位和条令,所有这些都由军队控制。
But the tenth salvo is an industrial one.
但第十次齐射是工业性的。
Future deterrence depends on an American industrial base that replenishes inventory at least as fast as expenditure, survives attack, regenerates capacity in weeks, and adapts weapons in days.
未来的威慑取决于美国的工业基础,其补充库存的速度至少与支出的速度一样快,能够在攻击中幸存下来,在几周内恢复能力,并在几天内调整武器。
As the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Adm.
作为美国太平洋司令部司令,海军上将。
Sam Paparo, put it to the Senate last year , “You can’t AI your way out of material deficiency.”
萨姆·帕帕罗(Sam Paparo)去年向参议院提出,“人工智能无法摆脱物质匮乏。”
The current approach to munitions production is insufficient.
目前的弹药生产方法还不够。
Primes have existing cost structures based on the requirements of weapons they’ve inherited with significant government-mandated overheads, bespoke supply chains, and certification requirements built into every part engineered and manufactured.
Prime 现有的成本结构基于他们所继承的武器的要求,以及政府规定的大量管理费用、定制供应链以及设计和制造的每个零件中内置的认证要求。
Even with expanded munitions orders, new suppliers, and new plants, manufacturing lead times for critical munitions still run two to four years .
即使扩大了弹药订单、新的供应商和新的工厂,关键弹药的制造周期仍然需要两到四年。
The United States needs a radically different approach to this missing middle, and with it, a new defense industrial architecture.
美国需要一种完全不同的方法来解决这个缺失的中间环节,并随之建立一个新的国防工业架构。
Those capabilities require a distributed, software-defined factory network, built to a government-owned standard, that decouples design from the factory equipment that manufactures and assembles its physical structures.
这些功能需要一个分布式、软件定义的工厂网络,该网络按照政府标准构建,将设计与制造和组装其物理结构的工厂设备分离。
Five actions must be taken to build that network: finishing qualification reform so certification travels with the design file; consolidating the structures catalog; unifying component strategy; scoring industrial capabilities in solicitations; and bringing allies inside the network.
建立该网络必须采取五项行动:完成资格改革,使认证随设计文件一起进行;整合结构目录;统一组件策略;对招标中的工业能力进行评分;并在网络内引入盟友。
As the founder of a company that operates such factories today, I have a direct commercial interest in the architecture described here.
作为当今经营此类工厂的公司的创始人,我对这里描述的架构有直接的商业利益。
That overlap is sharpest in the sections urging the government to own a standard, score industrial capacity and surge convertibility, and fund the network.
这种重叠在敦促政府拥有标准、评估工业产能和激增可兑换性以及为网络提供资金的部分中最为明显。
My argument, however, is that the network needs to be far more expansive, and that the government should own the standard and ensure no company is the sole provider.
然而,我的观点是,网络需要更加广泛,政府应该拥有该标准并确保没有公司是唯一的提供商。
Factories of the Future As we’ve seen in Ukraine and Iran , in a crisis against an adversary with deep-strike capabilities, massive munitions plants and single-source suppliers represent a focused target list.
未来的工厂 正如我们在乌克兰和伊朗所看到的,在针对具有深度打击能力的对手的危机中,大型军火工厂和单一来源供应商代表了重点目标清单。
The future will demand networked factories that can immediately shift production priorities when assets are destroyed, and whose entire digital product catalogs are available on demand.
未来将要求联网工厂能够在资产被毁坏时立即改变生产优先顺序,并且可以按需提供整个数字产品目录。
The weapons the United States needs on day 100 of a conflict may not be the weapons it needed on day one.
美国在冲突第 100 天所需的武器可能不是它在冲突第一天所需的武器。
Wartime adaptation adds momentum to the flywheel and scale benefits of a network rather than slowing them.
战时适应增加了网络飞轮的动力和规模效益,而不是减慢了它们的速度。
Battlefield-generated data signals demand and iteration requirements to the network in real time, allowing for faster feedback loops, even if nodes (factory locations) are struck.
战场生成的数据实时向网络发出需求和迭代要求,即使节点(工厂位置)受到攻击,也可以实现更快的反馈循环。
Network scaling generates multiple benefits: Each new node raises the value of every design in the catalog because it can be built by any node, and each new catalog entry raises the value of every node because every node can build it, alone or in combination with other qualified nodes.
网络扩展会产生多种好处:每个新节点都会提高目录中每个设计的价值,因为它可以由任何节点构建,每个新目录条目都会提高每个节点的价值,因为每个节点都可以单独或与其他合格节点结合构建它。
This can be done.
这是可以做到的。
Currently, for example, the same qualified part, additively-manufactured fuel nozzle tips, are already being printed across dozens of machines in a single GE plant , and the technology is being used for volume production .
例如,目前,相同的合格零件(增材制造的燃油喷嘴头)已经在 GE 一家工厂的数十台机器上进行打印,并且该技术正在用于批量生产。
The challenge is scaling it into a network without replicating the analog factory architecture of the past.
面临的挑战是将其扩展到网络中,而不复制过去的模拟工厂架构。
For one, this will necessitate design-agnostic factories.
其一,这将需要与设计无关的工厂。
Whether it’s automaking or munitions production, when capital equipment is hard-tooled to one design, the entire investment is a bet on demand for that one design.
无论是汽车制造还是军需品生产,当资本设备很难适应一种设计时,整个投资都是针对该一种设计的需求的赌注。
If that bet fails, invested capital is destroyed because it is non-fungible .
如果该赌注失败,投资的资本就会被销毁,因为它是不可替代的。
The defense industry is even more complicated than other manufacturing sectors because it is limited by monopsony demand: Program-cancellation risk makes primes rationally under-invest in capacity , leaving the government to fund facilities.
国防工业比其他制造业更加复杂,因为它受到垄断需求的限制:计划取消风险使主要产能投资不足,从而使政府为设施提供资金。
(So, design-dedicated missile lines are sized to peacetime minimum sustaining rates, surge requires new facilities, and design iteration stops the line.)
(因此,设计专用导弹生产线的规模是根据和平时期的最低维持率确定的,激增需要新的设施,并且设计迭代会停止生产线。)
A large node of design-agnostic machines avoids this problem as it is not a bet on one design.
与设计无关的机器的大型节点避免了这个问题,因为它不是对一种设计的赌注。
The same capital equipment produces any product in the catalog.
相同的资本设备可生产目录中的任何产品。
This network model is directly analogous to the network built around the semiconductor industry , albeit American-based and focused on mechanical structures.
这种网络模型直接类似于围绕半导体行业构建的网络,尽管是基于美国并专注于机械结构。
Additionally, design-agnostic equipment does not require time-consuming changes of tooling for weapons iteration.
此外,与设计无关的设备不需要为武器迭代而耗时地改变工具。
While Russia, for example, has demonstrated weapons iteration cycles of days or weeks, driven by battlefield feedback, these are largely component swaps on an unchanged airframe, and the iteration cycle extends significantly when hard tooling changes are required (such as the swap of warheads or propulsion systems).
例如,虽然俄罗斯已经展示了由战场反馈驱动的数天或数周的武器迭代周期,但这些主要是在未更改的机身上进行组件交换,并且当需要硬工具更改(例如弹头或推进系统的交换)时,迭代周期会显着延长。
Finally, using digital manufacturing tools produces more optimized structures and supply chains.
最后,使用数字制造工具可以产生更优化的结构和供应链。
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, using such a system, has achieved over 95 percent part consolidation on a small unmanned aircraft system aerostructure and tool-less robotic assembly in under 20 minutes, a capability it expects will enable near-theater ramp capacity.
通用原子航空系统公司使用此类系统,在 20 分钟内实现了小型无人机系统航空结构和无工具机器人装配超过 95% 的零件整合,预计这一能力将实现近战区坡道能力。
GE Aerospace consolidated 855 conventionally manufactured parts into 12 additive components in its Federal Aviation Administration-certified Catalyst turboprop .
GE 航空航天公司将 855 个传统制造的零件整合为美国联邦航空管理局认证的 Catalyst 涡轮螺旋桨发动机中的 12 个增材部件。
The supply chain collapses toward feedstock and a small subset of high-value components: energetics, seekers, and microelectronics.
供应链向原料和一小部分高价值组件崩溃:能源、导引头和微电子。
Such networked factories will produce critical components for munitions and related systems.
这种联网工厂将生产弹药和相关系统的关键部件。
With the exception of energetics and electronics, all of these components are either in digital production or going into it: integrated airframe and related structures (fuselage, strongback, fuel tanks, avionics tray, empennage and control surfaces), turbojets (unitized combustor, shaft, turbine wheel and inlet housing ), rocket motor (casings and nozzles) , warhead casings (ex-energetics), electronic attack and electronic warfare cradles and related launch canisters.
除了能量学和电子学之外,所有这些组件要么处于数字化生产中,要么进入数字化生产:集成机身和相关结构(机身、强背板、油箱、航空电子托盘、尾翼和控制面)、涡轮喷气发动机(组合式燃烧室、轴、涡轮叶轮和入口外壳)、火箭发动机(壳体和喷嘴)、弹头壳体(前能量学)、电子攻击和电子战支架以及相关发射罐。
The core of this network idea is that once a production process is certified, design files for mechanical structures can be sent to qualified factories across the United States and allied nations.
这一网络理念的核心是,一旦生产过程获得认证,机械结构的设计文件就可以发送到美国及其盟国的合格工厂。
These factories will operate functionally identical versioned machines and execute identical code to produce identical parts.
这些工厂将运行功能相同的版本机器并执行相同的代码来生产相同的零件。
That requires tight control of calibration, material lots, build parameters, post-processing, and in-process inspection, which has already been done for qualified jet engine and rocket engine parts .
这需要对校准、材料批次、构建参数、后处理和过程中检查进行严格控制,合格的喷气发动机和火箭发动机零件已经完成了这些工作。
Design improvements are treated like software updates, as once changed, every factory can produce new versions immediately.
设计改进就像软件更新一样,一旦改变,每个工厂都可以立即生产新版本。
The set of mechanical structures defines the boundary of the qualification standard.
这套机械结构定义了资格标准的边界。
Under the specification stack, an organic-industrial-base depot, a qualified print shop, a machining shop, an assembly-only node, and an end-to-end platform are all the same thing to the network — conforming nodes of different scopes.
在规范堆栈下,有机工业基地仓库、合格的印刷车间、机械加工车间、纯组装节点和端到端平台对于网络来说都是同一件事——不同范围的合格节点。
Under this model, companies offering a digital production system focus their efforts on the design, manufacturing, and assembly of missile system mechanical structures, while the prime is freed up to focus on its highest-value activities (analogous to Apple in the microelectronics sector ).
在这种模式下,提供数字化生产系统的公司将精力集中在导弹系统机械结构的设计、制造和组装上,而prime则可以腾出时间专注于其最高价值的活动(类似于微电子领域的苹果)。
The prime also completes final assembly of the round, and the government inspects and accepts.
总理也完成了该回合的最终组装,政府验收。
For a defense industrial base architecture to deliver the necessary regeneration rate and adaptive capability that survives attack, it must be founded on six capabilities: process-level certification; decoupling of factory equipment from design; functionally identical modular nodes; software-speed propagation and adaptability; fungibility of capacity; and dual-use by construction, so peacetime commercial volume funds wartime surge capacity.
对于国防工业基础架构来说,要提供必要的再生率和抵御攻击的自适应能力,它必须建立在六项能力的基础上:流程级认证;将工厂设备与设计脱钩;功能相同的模块化节点;软件速度传播和适应性;容量的可替代性;通过建设和两用,使平时商业量资金战时激增。
The government would have to compensate companies for displacing commercial production and pay for production of defense articles, but the government would not need to have invested in additional idle capacity, as traditional manufacturing would require, for surge.
政府必须补偿企业取代商业生产并支付国防物品的生产费用,但政府不需要像传统制造业那样投资额外的闲置产能来应对激增。
It also must be built to translatable and adaptable standards and processes.
它还必须按照可翻译和适应性强的标准和流程构建。
Owning the Standard To build these network capabilities into the defense industrial base, the government must own a standard, not pick a winner.
拥有标准 为了将这些网络能力构建到国防工业基础中,政府必须拥有一个标准,而不是挑选赢家。
By standard, I mean the formalization of the six capabilities above into a framework of process qualification (certifying once with certification traveling wherever nodes are deployed), interface conformance (node-agnostic catalog entries), and a requisite data and security baseline (the digital thread specified and defended like a weapons system).
按照标准,我的意思是将上述六种功能形式化为流程资格框架(无论节点部署在何处,只要进行一次认证即可进行认证)、接口一致性(与节点无关的目录条目)以及必要的数据和安全基线(像武器系统一样指定和保护的数字线程)。
The standard centers on the data package (the design file in its full, versioned form — i.e., the complete build recipe) and machine and process qualification.
该标准以数据包(完整版本形式的设计文件,即完整的构建配方)以及机器和工艺资格为中心。
Standardization of the data package requires that it be versioned as one object, including model, material specification, build parameters, assembly instructions, and inspection and acceptance criteria for the executable article.
数据包的标准化要求将其版本化为一个对象,包括模型、材料规格、构建参数、组装指令以及可执行项目的检查和验收标准。
Qualification certifies the machine-plus-process once, but the certification travels with the data package.
资质仅对机器加流程进行一次认证,但认证会随数据包一起传送。
Process qualification decouples chip design from physical fabrication.
工艺鉴定将芯片设计与物理制造分离。
In the semiconductor industry, the process design kit acts as a highly formalized, digital contract that abstracts the physical complexities of a fabrication plant into a standardized data package.
在半导体行业中,工艺设计套件充当高度正式化的数字合同,将制造工厂的物理复杂性抽象为标准化数据包。
In this network, qualification states what a node can produce.
在这个网络中,资格说明了节点可以产生什么。
The government must accept this part, from this node, today without re-qualifying.
政府今天必须从这个节点接受这部分,而无需重新资格审查。
Enforcing this standard separates design authority from production conformity, so contracting officers aren’t paralyzed by liability concerns.
执行该标准将设计权限与生产合规性分开,因此合同官员不会因责任问题而陷入瘫痪。
It defines the digital birth certificate: machine, process, and inspection provenance — replacing the resident inspector at a thousand distributed nodes.
它定义了数字出生证明:机器、流程和检查来源——取代了一千个分布式节点的常驻检查员。
Nadcap already conducts one master technical audit per facility for aerospace suppliers, with all primes accepting the result.
Nadcap 已经为航空航天供应商的每个设施进行了一项主要技术审核,所有主要公司都接受了结果。
Nodes also need conformity classes — definition of types of factories — that would include commercial-only, dual-use, and defense-cleared, and would be subject to different qualification requirements.
节点还需要符合性等级(工厂类型的定义),其中包括纯商业、双重用途和国防许可,并且需要遵守不同的资格要求。
Data-package classification levels would be mapped to node tiers, so controlled packages route only to cleared nodes while unclassified structural packages, which may still be controlled unclassified information subject to export controls, route with fewer restrictions depending on the tier.
数据包分类级别将映射到节点层,因此受控包仅路由到已清除的节点,而未分类的结构包(仍可能受出口控制的受控未分类信息)路由,根据层的限制较少。
Structuring arsenals and depots as network nodes would provide the modernization pathway for government-owned bases, strengthening the organic industrial base rather than threatening it.
将军火库和仓库建设为网络节点将为政府拥有的基地提供现代化道路,加强而不是威胁有机工业基础。
There is also an operational layer of the dual-use network — tasking, priority, and surge activation — that largely exists.
军民两用网络还存在一个基本存在的操作层——任务分配、优先级和激增激活。
The Defense Priorities and Allocations System would determine who gets capacity first.
国防优先和分配系统将决定谁首先获得能力。
A fair objection is that by shifting to a standard approach, the digital thread and the data package every node runs can become vulnerable.
一个公平的反对意见是,通过转向标准方法,每个节点运行的数字线程和数据包可能会变得脆弱。
But a data package can be escrowed, replicated, and patched network-wide in days, while it takes years to rebuild a destroyed plant.
但数据包可以在几天内在整个网络范围内托管、复制和修补,而重建被毁坏的工厂则需要数年时间。
Each part travels with its birth certificate, so a corrupted build would surface at the part itself.
每个部件都带有其出生证明,因此损坏的构建会在部件本身上浮现。
This asymmetry exists only if the digital thread is defended like a weapons system — as the semiconductor design layer already is.
只有当数字线程像武器系统一样受到保护时,这种不对称性才存在——就像半导体设计层已经做到的那样。
A flawed or tampered design file is a different risk, because parts would match the bad file: Guarding against it requires cryptographically signed design files and independent verification.
有缺陷或被篡改的设计文件是另一种风险,因为部件会与坏文件相匹配:防范它需要加密签名的设计文件和独立验证。
The qualification authority itself must be guarded against capture or paralysis.
资格认证机构本身必须谨防被俘获或瘫痪。
This is a specification plus qualification regime, and an integration effort.
这是一个规范加资格制度,也是一项集成工作。
Every element has working precedent in the commercial world, and the Pentagon and Congress have already taken initial steps.
每个要素在商业领域都有先例,五角大楼和国会已经采取了初步措施。
The problem is no longer to persuade the government to begin, but to finish the job.
问题不再是说服政府开始工作,而是完成工作。
First, the government must finish qualification reform.
首先,政府必须完成资质改革。
The constraint is the acceptance regime, built for fixed plants, which qualifies a specific part from a specific machine in a specific building.
约束是为固定工厂建立的验收制度,它对特定建筑物中特定机器的特定部件进行资格认证。
The Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act commits the Department of Defense to expedited acceptance and qualification of advanced manufacturing processes.
2025 财年国防授权法案要求国防部加快先进制造工艺的验收和鉴定。
However, practice needs to catch up to mandate.
然而,实践需要跟上指令的要求。
In March 2026, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard installed one of the first welded, additively manufactured metal parts aboard a nuclear submarine.
2026 年 3 月,朴茨茅斯海军造船厂在核潜艇上安装了首批焊接增材制造金属部件之一。
It is a single flange, qualified as one part, at one yard, for one boat, under a part-by-part model.
它是一个单一法兰,在一个船厂、一艘船、在一个零件模型下被认定为一个零件。
Lack of speed in implementation of additive manufacturing beyond this single part has led to criticism of the part-by-part qualification process by Navy officials and issuance of a new process-oriented regulation in August 2026.
除了这个单一零件之外,增材制造的实施速度不够快,导致海军官员对逐个零件的资格认证流程提出批评,并于 2026 年 8 月发布了新的面向流程的法规。
However, no department-wide instruction yet certifies the production system once and enables that certification to travel with the design file.
然而,目前还没有部门范围的指令对生产系统进行一次认证,并使该认证能够与设计文件一起传递。
Second, the Pentagon must consolidate the service branches’ structures catalogs.
其次,五角大楼必须整合各军种的结构目录。
The same authorization act created a statutory category of critical readiness items and directed digital production paths for them.
同一授权法案创建了关键准备项目的法定类别,并为其指定了数字生产路径。
What does not exist is the comprehensive institutional authority to decide what enters the catalog as priorities — the munitions that empty first, unmanned systems needed at volume, and the few hundred out-of-production parts driving the readiness crisis.
不存在的是全面的机构权威来决定哪些内容作为优先事项进入目录——首先清空的弹药、大量需要的无人系统,以及导致战备危机的数百个停产零件。
Third, the Defense Department must unify the component strategy.
第三,国防部必须统一组成部分战略。
With a digitized network, munitions bottlenecks are reduced to energetics, seekers, and microelectronics.
有了数字化网络,弹药瓶颈就减少到能量学、导引头和微电子学方面。
Because structures are built to match the supply of energetics and electronics, no excess structures inventory builds up, and upstream suppliers get certainty about demand.
由于结构的建造是为了匹配能源和电子产品的供应,因此不会积累过多的结构库存,并且上游供应商可以获得需求的确定性。
Two programs are underway: a $435 million contract is restoring domestic TNT production in Kentucky , and around $120 million in wartime production authority investments support adding a third domestic supplier of solid rocket motors .
两项计划正在进行中:一项价值 4.35 亿美元的合同正在恢复肯塔基州的国内 TNT 生产,而战时生产当局投资约 1.2 亿美元支持增加第三家国内固体火箭发动机供应商。
NATO members also launched jointly funded studies to qualify European suppliers for priority missile components.
北约成员国还发起了联合资助的研究,以确定欧洲优先导弹零部件供应商的资格。
But these efforts operate under separate authorities with no common deadline.
但这些努力由不同的机构负责,没有共同的最后期限。
There is not a dedicated national effort for seekers and microelectronics, components that most directly gate mass production.
国家并没有专门针对导引头和微电子器件以及最直接影响大规模生产的组件做出努力。
The lessons of Operation Warp Speed apply here : one concrete objective, one accountable manager, one deadline, allies inside the program from day one, and a willingness to buy outcomes rather than administer processes.
曲速行动的经验教训在这里适用:一个具体的目标、一名负责任的经理、一个截止日期、从第一天起就在项目内部建立盟友,以及愿意购买结果而不是管理流程。
Fourth, the Pentagon needs to directly score the elements of deterrence.
第四,五角大楼需要直接得分威慑要素。
Procurement buys units, but deterrence encompasses magazine depth, regeneration rate, surge convertibility, catalog production fungibility, and asset dispersal and survival.
采购购买单位,但威慑包括弹匣深度、再生率、激增可兑换性、目录生产可替代性以及资产分散和生存。
The Pentagon’s November 2025 acquisition strategy prioritizes wartime surge capacity and provides that affordable-mass awards be deliberately split among multiple vendors .
五角大楼 2025 年 11 月的采办战略优先考虑战时增援能力,并规定将负担得起的批量采购合同有意分配给多个供应商。
These actions are directionally correct but stop one step short.
这些行动方向正确,但还差一步。
Surge convertibility and reconstitution rate are rarely, if ever, weighted criteria on which proposals are scored and contracts won.
激增的可兑换性和重构率很少(如果有的话)是对提案进行评分和赢得合同的加权标准。
Until solicitations score and pay for them, no rational contractor will build a business on supplying them.
在招标完成并支付费用之前,任何理性的承包商都不会以提供这些产品为基础开展业务。
For example, the ability to supply energetics loadable into any family of additively manufactured warhead casings would be weighted for its production capacity across that family and its surge capacity.
例如,向任何增材制造弹头外壳系列提供可加载能量的能力将根据该系列的生产能力及其激增能力进行加权。
Fifth, while U.S. allies already participate in component supply and co-production, the next step is to make them full network partners.
第五,虽然美国盟友已经参与零部件供应和联合生产,但下一步是让它们成为全面的网络合作伙伴。
The NATO Engine is an alliance-wide initiative to expand defense production capacity by connecting defense and civilian manufacturing lines across the alliance.
北约引擎是一项全联盟范围内的举措,旨在通过连接整个联盟的国防和民用制造线来扩大国防生产能力。
This is a necessary bridge, not tenth-salvo deterrence.
这是一座必要的桥梁,而不是第十次齐射的威慑。
The United States needs a mutual qualification-acceptance agreement among allies that mirrors its domestic standard and includes them in its digital network.
美国需要盟国之间达成一项相互资格接受协议,反映其国内标准并将其纳入其数字网络。
While America’s core technology edge is its hyperscaling bits network, it now has the mature technology to create an analogous network for advanced manufacturing.
虽然美国的核心技术优势是其超大规模比特网络,但它现在拥有成熟的技术来为先进制造创建类似的网络。
That standard is something no adversary can destroy, and no one company should control.
这一标准是任何对手都无法破坏的,任何公司都不应控制。
It requires Congress to define a clear scope of responsibility and liability within the existing Pentagon organization and provide funding for staffing.
它要求国会在现有五角大楼组织内界定明确的责任和义务范围,并为人员配备提供资金。
Deterrence will rest on whether America’s magazines regenerate faster than they can be emptied.
威慑力将取决于美国弹药库的再生速度是否快于清空速度。
Kevin Czinger is the founder and executive chairman of Divergent Technologies, an American company that provides advanced engineering and manufacturing capacity for defense primes and automakers through an integrated platform combining AI-generative design, metal additive manufacturing, and automated robotic assembly.
Kevin Czinger 是 Divergent Technologies 的创始人兼执行董事长,该公司是一家美国公司,通过结合人工智能生成设计、金属增材制造和自动化机器人装配的集成平台,为国防企业和汽车制造商提供先进的工程和制造能力。
He served earlier as an enlisted infantry rifleman in the Marine Corps Reserves.
早些时候,他曾在海军陆战队预备役部队服役,担任步兵步兵。
The views expressed here are his own and are not intended to represent the views of any companies with which he is affiliated.
此处表达的观点仅代表他自己的观点,并不代表他所属的任何公司的观点。
***Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.
***请注意,根据公司风格,岩石战争不会使用美国国防部的不同名称,除非美国国会根据法规更改该名称。