The Mecca Pact and Pakistan’s Bid to Become Indispensable
For most of its history, Pakistan’s geopolitical value has risen and fallen with other countries’ emergencies.
在其历史的大部分时间里，巴基斯坦的地缘政治价值随着其他国家的紧急情况而起伏。
The Mecca Pact may be its most serious attempt yet to break that cycle.
《麦加条约》可能是迄今为止打破这一循环的最认真的尝试。
On Aug.
八月。
31, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey established a secretariat in Saudi Arabia for the Mecca Defence Agreement.
31日，巴基斯坦、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其在沙特阿拉伯设立了麦加防御协定秘书处。
The first secretary-general comes from Pakistan for a three-year term.
第一任秘书长来自巴基斯坦，任期三年。
The agreement builds on the Saudi-Pakistani agreement signed in September 2025, locking a decades-old informal security arrangement into a mutual defense pact.
该协议建立在 2025 年 9 月签署的沙特与巴基斯坦协议的基础上，将已有数十年历史的非正式安全安排锁定在共同防御协议中。
Turkey’s inclusion in August 2026 transformed it into a NATO-style collective security arrangement .
土耳其于 2026 年 8 月加入，使其成为北约式的集体安全安排。
The three states also outlined cooperation in air defense, drones, electronic warfare, and joint defense production.
这三个国家还概述了防空、无人机、电子战和联合防御生产方面的合作。
The pact thus represents more than a new alliance: connecting Saudi financial resources and Gulf influence, Turkish defense industrial capacity and NATO experience, and Pakistan’s large military, nuclear status, and longstanding regional security ties.
因此，该协议代表的不仅仅是一个新的联盟：将沙特的财政资源和海湾影响力、土耳其的国防工业能力和北约经验，以及巴基斯坦强大的军事、核地位和长期的地区安全关系联系起来。
While institution-building is still at an early stage, it appears to support Pakistan’s pursuit of durable strategic leverage in the region.
尽管机构建设仍处于早期阶段，但它似乎支持巴基斯坦在该地区追求持久的战略影响力。
Its first test came within weeks.
几周内就进行了第一次测试。
On Oct.
十月号
5, the pact’s collective-defense commitments were activated amid escalating Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia.
2月5日，随着胡塞武装对沙特阿拉伯的导弹和无人机袭击不断升级，该协议的集体防御承诺被激活。
A senior Pakistani military official has also mentioned that Pakistani jets are used in strikes against the Houthis.
巴基斯坦一名高级军事官员也提到，巴基斯坦战机被用来打击胡塞武装。
If confirmed, this would mark a reversal of Pakistan’s refusal to join the Yemen war in 2015.
如果得到证实，这将标志着巴基斯坦拒绝参加2015年也门战争的态度发生了逆转。
The pact may face credibility gaps from limited interoperability and divergent threat perceptions.
该协议可能因有限的互操作性和不同的威胁认知而面临可信度差距。
However, in middle-power contexts, complementary expertise and a division of labor can be equally important for credibility.
然而，在中等实力的背景下，互补的专业知识和分工对于可信度来说同样重要。
Rapid institutionalization can also help address weaknesses by defusing the risks of alliance entrapment and competing regional blocs.
快速制度化还可以通过化解联盟陷入困境和区域集团竞争的风险来帮助解决弱点。
Establishing a permanent secretariat is an important first step.
建立常设秘书处是重要的第一步。
While institutionalization can enhance the pact’s credibility, it also helps advance Pakistan’s longstanding ambition to anchor itself in a vital standing regional security architecture, giving the agreement a substantive foundation beyond political symbolism.
虽然制度化可以提高该协议的可信度，但它也有助于推进巴基斯坦将自身纳入重要的常设区域安全架构的长期雄心，为该协议提供了超越政治象征意义的实质性基础。
Pakistan has benefited from U.S. policies in the Middle East and South Asia, especially during recent conflicts and geopolitical realignments.
巴基斯坦受益于美国在中东和南亚的政策，特别是在最近的冲突和地缘政治调整期间。
The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis renewed Washington’s strategic attention to Pakistan, as the United States got directly involved in ceasefire efforts and President Donald Trump subsequently hosted Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, at the White House.
2025 年 5 月的印巴危机重新引发了华盛顿对巴基斯坦的战略关注，美国直接参与了停火努力，唐纳德·特朗普总统随后在白宫接待了巴基斯坦陆军参谋长阿西姆·穆尼尔元帅。
The war with Iran has widened that opening, given Pakistan’s unique relationships with both Washington and Tehran.
鉴于巴基斯坦与华盛顿和德黑兰的独特关系，与伊朗的战争扩大了这一机会。
Islamabad has emerged as a key intermediary between the two sides and played a crucial role in the preliminary ceasefire and negotiating framework in June 2026.
伊斯兰堡已成为双方之间的关键调解人，并在 2026 年 6 月达成的初步停火和谈判框架中发挥了关键作用。
Moreover, Iranian attacks on Gulf states , Israeli attacks on Qatar , and disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz have increased demand among Gulf states for additional deterrence and military cooperation, making Pakistan’s longstanding security relationships in the region more valuable.
此外，伊朗对海湾国家的袭击、以色列对卡塔尔的袭击以及霍尔木兹海峡能源流动的中断增加了海湾国家对额外威慑和军事合作的需求，使巴基斯坦在该地区的长期安全关系变得更有价值。
Islamabad has tried to convert this attention into economic benefits, including a request for $10 billion in U.S.-backed exchange stabilization support.
伊斯兰堡试图将这种关注转化为经济利益，包括请求美国提供 100 亿美元的汇率稳定支持。
While this underscores Pakistan’s continuing economic vulnerability and external dependence, that very weakness also gives it stronger incentives to cultivate long-term bargaining leverage from comparative advantage in military capabilities.
虽然这突显了巴基斯坦持续的经济脆弱性和外部依赖，但这种弱点也使其更有动力利用军事能力的比较优势培养长期讨价还价的筹码。
What Pakistan intends to buy with this newfound vitality remains to be seen.
巴基斯坦打算凭借这种新的活力购买什么还有待观察。
Pakistan is now seeking to translate its recent diplomatic access and military role into institutions and relationships that can survive them.
巴基斯坦现在正在寻求将其最近的外交访问和军事作用转化为能够幸存的机构和关系。
Instead of short-term material gains , Islamabad is investing in standing defense commitments, mutual consultation, and defense-industrial cooperation to retain a pivotal place in regional security after a shift either in Washington’s attention or in Gulf countries’ threat perception.
伊斯兰堡不再追求短期物质利益，而是投资于长期防务承诺、相互磋商和国防工业合作，以在华盛顿的注意力或海湾国家的威胁认知发生转变后保持其在地区安全中的关键地位。
Whether the country succeeds will depend on how the agreements and the institutional foundation supporting them can generate continuous and meaningful cooperation in the long run.
国家能否成功将取决于协议和支持协议的制度基础如何能够产生持续且有意义的长期合作。
Pakistan has carried periodic geopolitical weight when major powers needed its engagement.
当大国需要参与时，巴基斯坦会周期性地发挥地缘政治影响力。
The United States relied on Islamabad to broker the 1971 U.S.-Chinese rapprochement , fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, back the “Global War on Terror,” and — most recently — manage tensions with Iran .
美国依靠伊斯兰堡促成 1971 年美中和解、在阿富汗与苏联作战、支持“全球反恐战争”，以及最近管理与伊朗的紧张关系。
Pakistan utilized these strategic windows to access resources and weapons and raise its international standing.
巴基斯坦利用这些战略窗口获取资源和武器并提高其国际地位。
However, that leverage languished once the crises passed.
然而，一旦危机过去，这种杠杆作用就会减弱。
Islamabad is trying to break that cycle and place itself as an indispensable hub in the region’s long-term security architecture.
伊斯兰堡正试图打破这一循环，并将自己定位为该地区长期安全架构中不可或缺的枢纽。
This cycle has deep roots.
这个循环有着很深的根源。
During the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan became the crucial link for American and Saudi support to the Afghan mujahedeen , gaining enormous resources and strategic importance.
苏阿战争期间，巴基斯坦成为美国和沙特支持阿富汗圣战者的重要纽带，获得了巨大的资源和战略重要性。
After the Soviet withdrawal, U.S. assistance fell sharply as Washington’s focus shifted toward Pakistan’s nuclear program.
苏联撤军后，随着华盛顿的重点转向巴基斯坦核计划，美国的援助急剧下降。
Following 9/11, Pakistan again became central to U.S. operations in Afghanistan and received substantial security and economic benefits.
9/11 事件后，巴基斯坦再次成为美国在阿富汗行动的核心，并获得了巨大的安全和经济利益。
However, the partnership remained largely transactional, and as mistrust deepened and the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s place in Washington’s strategic calculus faded.
然而，这种伙伴关系在很大程度上仍然是交易性的，随着不信任的加深和美国从阿富汗撤军，巴基斯坦在华盛顿战略考量中的地位逐渐减弱。
The current opening is broader because it is not driven by one conflict or one patron.
当前的开放范围更为广泛，因为它不是由一种冲突或某个赞助人驱动的。
Pakistan has found fresh room to maneuver at the intersection of several developments, including uncertainty about U.S. security commitments in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s search for increased deterrence , Turkey’s effort to expand its defense-industrial and political reach, and Washington’s need for intermediaries who can communicate with Tehran.
巴基斯坦在多项事态发展的交叉点上找到了新的回旋余地，包括美国在海湾地区安全承诺的不确定性、沙特阿拉伯寻求增强威慑力、土耳其扩大其国防工业和政治影响力的努力，以及华盛顿需要能够与德黑兰沟通的中间人。
The Iran war has made these trends more visible, especially as missile and drone attacks across the Gulf and disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have reinforced interests in regional security arrangements.
伊朗战争使这些趋势更加明显，特别是在海湾地区的导弹和无人机袭击以及霍尔木兹海峡航运中断增强了人们对区域安全安排的兴趣的情况下。
Turkey’s expanding defense industry has also made Ankara a major supplier of drones, armored systems, and joint production opportunities.
土耳其不断扩张的国防工业也使安卡拉成为无人机、装甲系统和联合生产机会的主要供应商。
While both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are important to this emerging dynamic, Pakistan occupies a different niche, making it a natural leader in this process.
虽然沙特阿拉伯和土耳其对这一新兴动态都很重要，但巴基斯坦占据着不同的地位，使其成为这一进程中天然的领导者。
The country has been involved in a crucial mediation role with Iran, including efforts to restart the U.S.-Iran talks, while maintaining close ties with all regional and major power actors.
该国一直在与伊朗之间发挥重要的调解作用，包括努力重启美伊谈判，同时与所有地区和主要大国保持密切关系。
It was able to keep the relationship with Tehran functional as well, despite deepening its security partnership with Riyadh.
尽管深化了与利雅得的安全伙伴关系，但它也能够保持与德黑兰的关系。
This demonstrates diplomatic assets that Pakistan now possesses and their usefulness to actors that have difficulty talking to one another.
这表明巴基斯坦现在拥有的外交资产及其对于难以相互交谈的行为体的有用性。
This unusually rich access gives Pakistan an opportunity to seal a more permanent place in the emerging regional security order.
这种异常丰富的准入使巴基斯坦有机会在新兴的地区安全秩序中占据更永久的地位。
The Saudi-Pakistani defense relationship has a long history.
沙特和巴基斯坦的防务关系有着悠久的历史。
Pakistani troops served in the country in the 1970s and 1980s, and the two militaries have maintained ties for decades.
巴基斯坦军队于 20 世纪 70 年代和 1980 年代在该国服役，数十年来两国军队一直保持着联系。
The 1982 protocol provided an earlier framework for military cooperation.
1982 年的议定书为军事合作提供了早期的框架。
Pakistani forces also helped protect Saudi territory during the 1990 to 1991 Gulf crisis.
1990年至1991年海湾危机期间，巴基斯坦军队还帮助保护了沙特领土。
In turn, Riyadh repeatedly provided Islamabad with oil facilities, loans, and financial support during economic distress.
反过来，利雅得在经济困难期间多次向伊斯兰堡提供石油设施、贷款和金融支持。
Although Saudi financing gives Riyadh leverage over Islamabad, Pakistan’s ability to supply military personnel, training, and air defense helps offset that asymmetry.
尽管沙特的融资使利雅得对伊斯兰堡具有影响力，但巴基斯坦提供军事人员、训练和防空的能力有助于抵消这种不对称。
On Sept.
九月。
17, 2025, they formalized the relationship by signing the defense agreement, although many of its operational details remain undisclosed.
2025 年 12 月 17 日，他们通过签署防务协议正式确立了这种关系，尽管其许多操作细节仍未披露。
Its nuclear implications have generated wide speculation since neither side has announced a Pakistani nuclear guarantee.
由于双方都没有宣布巴基斯坦的核保证，其核影响引起了广泛的猜测。
However, the ambiguity can allow Riyadh to signal a hedge against the Iranian nuclear program without an explicit arrangement and Islamabad to accrue returns without accepting a defined obligation.
然而，这种模糊性可能会让利雅得在没有明确安排的情况下发出针对伊朗核计划的信号，而伊斯兰堡则在不接受明确义务的情况下获得回报。
The nuclear question also looks different after the United States signed a Section 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the Saudi government on July 22.
7月22日美国与沙特政府签署第123条款民用核合作协议后，核问题也显得有所不同。
This may indicate greater U.S. flexibility toward Saudi nuclear ambitions to counterbalance the risk of an Iranian nuclear breakout.
这可能表明美国对沙特的核野心有更大的灵活性，以平衡伊朗核爆发的风险。
The agreement’s conventional significance is also substantial, as it gives a durable expression to ad hoc arrangements and extends peacetime cooperation to wartime commitments.
该协议的常规意义也很重大，因为它为临时安排提供了持久的体现，并将和平时期的合作延伸到战时的承诺。
Pakistan’s key motivation is to leverage its conventional military strength to compensate for its economic vulnerability, while deepening ties with major Middle Eastern partners.
巴基斯坦的主要动机是利用其常规军事实力来弥补其经济脆弱性，同时深化与中东主要伙伴的关系。
The country has long monetized military capacity abroad, including through U.N.
该国长期以来一直将海外军事能力货币化，包括通过联合国。
peacekeeping, but in this case it seeks to turn military power into a standing role in regional security.
维持和平，但在这种情况下，它寻求将军事力量转变为地区安全中的常设角色。
Saudi Arabia adds money, political weight, and a central position in Gulf security.
沙特阿拉伯增加了资金、政治影响力以及在海湾安全中的核心地位。
Pakistan and Turkey already cooperate on naval platforms and conduct combined exercises.
巴基斯坦和土耳其已经在海军平台上进行合作并进行联合演习。
Turkey brings capabilities Pakistan and Saudi Arabia lack, including a large and experienced NATO military and growing expertise in drones, naval platforms, electronic warfare, and missile-related technologies.
土耳其带来了巴基斯坦和沙特阿拉伯所缺乏的能力，包括庞大且经验丰富的北约军队以及在无人机、海军平台、电子战和导弹相关技术方面不断增长的专业知识。
Pakistan has deployed a substantial combat-capable force to Saudi Arabia — roughly 8,000 troops, about 16 JF-17 fighter jets, two drone squadrons, and a Chinese-made HQ-9 air-defense system.
巴基斯坦已向沙特阿拉伯部署了一支具备战斗能力的大量部队，包括大约 8000 名士兵、大约 16 架 JF-17 战斗机、两个无人机中队和一个中国制造的 HQ-9 防空系统。
The total could rise up to 80,000 if Riyadh invokes the full scope of the agreement.
如果利雅得援引该协议的全部范围，总数可能会增加至 80,000 人。
On October 5, the three states formally moved to the “practical implementation ” of their collective-defense commitments, authorizing measures to provide agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment to the Kingdom.
10月5日，这三个国家正式开始“实际履行”其集体防御承诺，授权采取措施提供商定的军事力量和能力，并确保其向沙特快速部署。
Two days later, Pakistan Air Force jets were reportedly taking part in strikes to degrade Houthi missile and drone threats.
两天后，据报道，巴基斯坦空军喷气式飞机参加了打击胡塞武装导弹和无人机威胁的行动。
Islamabad denied the claim and said only that Pakistani forces were in the kingdom in “ multiple capabilities .” Turkey has also agreed to send technical and defensive support to help Saudi Arabia fight the Houthis.
伊斯兰堡否认了这一说法，仅表示巴基斯坦军队在沙特境内具有“多种能力”。土耳其还同意提供技术和防御支持，帮助沙特阿拉伯打击胡塞武装。
The progression to an activated deployment and support mechanism shows that the pact is evolving from a political commitment into a credible regional military architecture.
启动部署和支持机制的进展表明，该协议正在从政治承诺演变为可信的地区军事架构。
Pakistan has a strong incentive to turn this trend into a standing, broader security architecture in which its role becomes both central and lasting.
巴基斯坦有强烈的动机将这一趋势转变为一个长期的、更广泛的安全架构，使巴基斯坦的作用变得既核心又持久。
The Aug.
八月。
31 decision to create a secretariat matters for that reason.
31 决定设立秘书处正是出于这个原因。
Rotating leadership and a fixed seat can allow the organization to outlast the signatory governments’ immediate priorities.
轮换领导层和固定席位可以使该组织比签署国政府的当前优先事项更持久。
A standing secretariat lowers the transaction costs of each subsequent round of cooperation and of planning cycles that would otherwise require fresh political authorization.
常设秘书处可以降低后续每轮合作和规划周期的交易成本，否则需要新的政治授权。
It also creates constituencies inside each defense establishment whose professional interests are tied to the arrangement’s continuation.
它还在每个国防机构内部创建了选区，其专业利益与该安排的延续息息相关。
Its longer-term significance, however, will depend on whether the secretariat continues to remain active and functional, combined planning and exercises take place without fresh authorization from all three capitals, and defense cooperation leads to concrete contracts and combined production.
然而，其长期意义将取决于秘书处是否继续保持活跃和职能，联合规划和演习是否在没有三个首都新授权的情况下进行，以及国防合作是否会产生具体合同和联合生产。
The pact faces concerns over credibility gaps in interoperability and threat perception, or over the “all-patrons, all-clients paradox.” In a major power–protégé relationship, interoperability and a shared threat perception are canonical measures of credibility and alliance commitments.
该协议面临着对互操作性和威胁感知方面的可信度差距或“所有赞助人、所有客户悖论”的担忧。在大国与受保护者关系中，互操作性和共同的威胁认知是衡量可信度和联盟承诺的标准标准。
However, among middle powers, particularly in a South-South context, the equation can be different.
然而，在中等国家之间，特别是在南南合作的背景下，情况可能有所不同。
As confidence in vertical extended deterrence by a major-power patron declines, and in the absence of the full-spectrum capabilities of any single middle power, the value of a defense pact may lie primarily in complementary capabilities and a division of labor .
随着对大国赞助人的纵向延伸威慑的信心下降，并且在任何单一中等强国缺乏全方位能力的情况下，防务条约的价值可能主要在于互补能力和分工。
Such arrangements may not be effective in every conflict, but by expanding the pool of joint resources and filling gaps in one another’s capabilities, they can help strengthen collective deterrence.
这种安排可能并非在每次冲突中都有效，但通过扩大联合资源池并填补彼此的能力差距，它们可以帮助加强集体威慑。
Through institutionalization and regularized exchanges, interoperability may improve over time, while convergence in threat perceptions may also gradually increase.
通过制度化和正规化的交流，互操作性可能会随着时间的推移而得到改善，而威胁认知的趋同性也可能会逐渐增强。
A discouraging fact is that the past regional record has been poor.
一个令人沮丧的事实是，过去的地区记录一直很差。
The Arab League’s 1950 Joint Defence Treaty , the Peninsula Shield Force , and the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition failed to produce durable multilateral capacity or impact.
阿拉伯联盟 1950 年联合防御条约、半岛盾卫部队和伊斯兰军事反恐联盟未能产生持久的多边能力或影响。
What distinguishes the Mecca pact, however, is that it is neither driven by a single conflict — such as the Arab-Israeli conflict shaping the Arab League’s collective defense arrangements — nor crowded by competing Arab powers with conflicting regional interests.
然而，麦加协议的独特之处在于，它既不是由单一冲突驱动的——例如影响阿拉伯联盟集体防御安排的阿以冲突——也不是由区域利益冲突的阿拉伯大国相互竞争所造成的。
Pakistan’s role as a form of informal leader and interlocutor can be particularly important in this context.
在此背景下，巴基斯坦作为非正式领导人和对话者的角色尤为重要。
Pakistan’s history with Saudi Arabia does not indicate automatic alignment.
巴基斯坦与沙特阿拉伯的历史并不意味着自动结盟。
In 2015, Pakistan declined to join the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, despite Saudi request and economic support.
2015年，尽管沙特提出要求并提供经济支持，巴基斯坦仍拒绝加入沙特领导的对也门的干预行动。
The pact, however, has changed that dynamic.
然而，该协议改变了这种动态。
In 2026, Islamabad sent combat-ready forces and assets to Saudi Arabia while simultaneously serving as the principal mediator between Washington and Tehran and easing Iranian trade through overland routes across their shared border.
2026年，伊斯兰堡向沙特阿拉伯派遣了做好战斗准备的部队和资产，同时充当华盛顿和德黑兰之间的主要调解人，并通过跨越共同边界的陆路路线缓解伊朗贸易。
American critics questioned Pakistan’s suitability as a mediator after reports of Pakistan sheltering Iranian military aircraft.
在有报道称巴基斯坦庇护伊朗军机后，美国批评者质疑巴基斯坦是否适合充当调解人。
Pakistan’s relationship with Iran is also constrained by domestic sectarian sensitivities and a need to avoid being pulled too deeply into Gulf rivalries.
巴基斯坦与伊朗的关系也受到国内宗派敏感性和避免陷入海湾竞争的必要性的限制。
The new agreement does not erase these constraints, and it does not need to.
新协议并没有、也不需要消除这些限制。
The pact can produce a calibrated behavior by Pakistan, with a force present enough to satisfy the commitment and postured conservatively enough to avoid upsetting the Iranian relationship.
该协议可以让巴基斯坦调整自己的行为，拥有足够的力量来履行承诺，并采取足够保守的姿态，以避免扰乱伊朗关系。
Reports of Pakistani involvement in airstrikes in Yemen, followed by officials describing the role as defensive and affirming no deployment of ground forces, and a public denial of involvement in the strikes, all suggest what a calibrated response may look like.
有关巴基斯坦参与也门空袭的报道，随后官员将其角色描述为防御性并确认不部署地面部队，以及公开否认参与空袭，所有这些都表明了经过调整的反应可能是什么样子。
The durability of the arrangement may depend on retaining that flexibility for Pakistan.
这一安排的持久性可能取决于为巴基斯坦保留这种灵活性。
There can be additional constraints.
可能还有其他限制。
The attack-on-one-attack-on-all formula can be difficult to interpret in an Indian-Pakistani contingency, where Riyadh faces strong incentives for restraint given its economic and strategic ties with New Delhi.
在印巴突发事件中，以一攻全的模式可能很难解释，鉴于利雅得与新德里的经济和战略关系，利雅得面临着强烈的克制动机。
However, the pact does not require members to enter a war automatically or at a similar scale.
然而，该协议并不要求成员国自动或以类似规模参战。
If Pakistan requests assistance, the possibility of Saudi or Turkish support could complicate Indian calculations.
如果巴基斯坦请求援助，沙特或土耳其支持的可能性可能会让印度的算计变得复杂。
The support could take forms short of direct combat, including arms, air defense, intelligence, logistics, training, or diplomatic coordination.
支持可以采取非直接战斗的形式，包括武器、防空、情报、后勤、训练或外交协调。
Nevertheless, an India-Pakistan war would be a hard test.
尽管如此，印巴战争将是一次严峻的考验。
Even if Riyadh and Ankara avoid direct fighting, the pact would still matter if it could generate meaningful military, logistical, intelligence, or diplomatic support.
即使利雅得和安卡拉避免直接战斗，如果该协议能够产生有意义的军事、后勤、情报或外交支持，它仍然很重要。
In their absence, the claim that Pakistan had secured a durable strategic position would be much weaker.
如果没有他们，关于巴基斯坦已获得持久战略地位的说法就会显得苍白无力。
Ankara’s participation also raises unresolved questions about how NATO obligations and restrictions on American defense technology would intersect with trilateral defense cooperation.
安卡拉的参与还引发了一些悬而未决的问题，即北约对美国国防技术的义务和限制将如何与三边国防合作相交叉。
The constraint is more relevant to joint defense production.
该限制与联合防御生产更相关。
Turkey’s defense industry is integrated with NATO and continues to use U.S.-origin technology in important systems.
土耳其国防工业与北约一体化，并继续在重要系统中使用美国技术。
U.S. export control rules generally require authorization before controlled defense articles or technical data can be retransferred to third parties, limiting technologies Ankara can share.
美国出口管制规则通常需要获得授权才能将受控国防物品或技术数据重新转让给第三方，这限制了安卡拉可以共享的技术。
This may force trilateral production to rely on domestically developed components, or cooperation may take place in systems over which Turkey and Pakistan possess greater control.
这可能迫使三边生产依赖于国内开发的组件，或者可能在土耳其和巴基斯坦拥有更大控制权的系统中进行合作。
The pact has produced reactions from surrounding powers.
该协议引起了周边国家的反应。
An Iranian parliamentarian warned two days after the signing that an attack originating from the territory of any of the three would draw a response without qualification.
签署两天后，一名伊朗议员警告称，来自三国任何一方境内的袭击将招致无条件回应。
However, these constraints narrow the range of cooperation the pact can realistically institutionalize, but they do not render the arrangement ineffective.
然而，这些限制缩小了该协议实际上可以制度化的合作范围，但并不会使该安排无效。
They would matter less if the arrangement works as a framework for sustained security cooperation.
如果这一安排能够成为持续安全合作的框架，那么这些问题就不那么重要了。
For Pakistan, its value lies in institutionalizing a broader role in supplying military personnel, supporting training and defense production, contributing to collective deterrence, and serving as an intermediary across competing regional relationships.
对于巴基斯坦来说，其价值在于将其在提供军事人员、支持培训和国防生产、促进集体威慑以及充当区域竞争关系中的中介等方面发挥更广泛的作用制度化。
This move is partly Pakistan’s answer to India’s strategic outreach and influence.
此举在一定程度上是巴基斯坦对印度战略外展和影响力的回应。
Islamabad cannot match India’s economic weight or growing partnerships across the Gulf, Africa, and Asia.
伊斯兰堡无法与印度的经济实力或海湾、非洲和亚洲日益增长的伙伴关系相媲美。
Pakistan, however, can offer something that many stakeholders in the Middle East would highly value.
然而，巴基斯坦可以提供中东许多利益相关者高度重视的东西。
It has a nuclear-armed military that Gulf governments know well, and it can open channels to Washington, Beijing, Riyadh, Tehran, and Ankara simultaneously.
它拥有海湾国家政府熟知的核武器军队，并且可以同时向华盛顿、北京、利雅得、德黑兰和安卡拉开放渠道。
While U.S. security guarantees still matter, they carry less certainty than before.
尽管美国的安全保证仍然很重要，但其确定性不如以前。
Pakistan is positioning itself to fill that space as an additional supplier to governments and leverage that centrality in its competition with India.
巴基斯坦正在将自己定位为作为政府的额外供应商来填补这一空间，并在与印度的竞争中利用这一中心地位。
This is a clever approach to asymmetry instead of trying to compete with India everywhere.
这是一种解决不对称的聪明方法，而不是试图到处与印度竞争。
India’s relations with the Gulf have expanded beyond energy cooperation.
印度与海湾地区的关系已经超出了能源合作的范围。
India participates in a Strategic Partnership Council with Saudi Arabia, a strategic dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor .
印度参加了与沙特阿拉伯的战略伙伴关系委员会、与海湾合作委员会的战略对话以及印度-中东-欧洲经济走廊。
Its ties with the United Arab Emirates have expanded into investment, technology, logistics, and defense cooperation .
它与阿拉伯联合酋长国的关系已扩展到投资、技术、物流和国防合作领域。
These relationships rest on the scale of India’s economy, market, diaspora, and growing international weight, which Pakistan cannot reproduce.
这些关系依赖于印度的经济规模、市场、侨民和日益增长的国际影响力，而巴基斯坦无法复制这些。
Pakistan’s strategy thus concentrates on comparative assets it can leverage.
因此，巴基斯坦的战略集中于它可以利用的比较资产。
Security is a domain in which it offers battle-tested capabilities valuable to the Gulf states.
在安全领域，它提供了对海湾国家有价值的经过战斗考验的能力。
Pakistan’s operational performance against India during the 2025 confrontation generated acclaim , bringing its tactical capabilities into international focus .
巴基斯坦在 2025 年对抗印度的作战表现赢得了赞誉，使其战术能力成为国际关注的焦点。
It is better positioned in the Gulf to train forces, provide officers and advisers, participate in exercises, contribute to air and missile defense coordination, cooperate on defense production, and serve as a mediator with several powers at once.
它在海湾地区的地位更好，可以训练部队、提供军官和顾问、参加演习、促进空中和导弹防御协调、国防生产合作以及同时充当多个权力的调解人。
India is an important reference point for any Pakistani long-term strategy.
印度是巴基斯坦任何长期战略的重要参考点。
New Delhi will closely assess the expansion of Pakistani military reach in important regions.
新德里将密切评估巴基斯坦在重要地区的军事影响力扩张。
Saudi Arabia and Turkey have their own substantial relationships with India and strong incentives to preserve them.
沙特阿拉伯和土耳其与印度有着密切的关系，并且有强烈的动机去维护这些关系。
While signing the agreement with Pakistan in 2025, Saudi officials emphasized that Riyadh also intended to continue developing its relationship with New Delhi.
在2025年与巴基斯坦签署协议的同时，沙特官员强调，利雅得还打算继续发展与新德里的关系。
Pakistan’s objective can thus be limited to ensuring that India’s expanding economic and diplomatic influence does not leave Pakistan without options and strategically peripheral to the Gulf.
因此，巴基斯坦的目标只能是确保印度不断扩大的经济和外交影响力不会让巴基斯坦别无选择，并在战略上处于海湾地区的边缘。
The pact’s significance for the United States is not trivial.
该协议对美国来说意义重大。
U.S. governments prefer partners to share the burden of managing their own security.
美国政府更希望合作伙伴分担管理自身安全的负担。
A network of allies and non-NATO partners for strengthening deterrence, expanding air and maritime capability, and redistributing security burdens could serve that objective.
旨在加强威慑、扩大空中和海上能力以及重新分配安全负担的盟国和非北约伙伴网络可以实现这一目标。
Pakistan and Turkey both have long experience operating American systems and working with Western armed forces, although they have diversified their partnerships.
巴基斯坦和土耳其都拥有操作美国系统以及与西方武装部队合作的长期经验，尽管它们的合作伙伴关系已经多元化。
Saudi Arabia remains deeply tied to U.S. weapons, training, and security cooperation.
沙特阿拉伯仍然与美国的武器、训练和安全合作有着密切的联系。
None has an interest in replacing the United States with a different security order.
没有人有兴趣用不同的安全秩序取代美国。
From that standpoint, the pact does not offer an alternative to the U.S.-led security arrangement.
从这个角度来看，该协议并没有提供美国主导的安全安排的替代方案。
It would function as an additional layer within it, allowing regional states to arrange capabilities that Washington is reluctant to supply.
它将作为其中的一个附加层，允许地区国家安排华盛顿不愿提供的能力。
If the reports of Pakistani aircrafts taking part in air strikes in Yemen are accurate, then Pakistan would be taking on a mission that U.S. forces carried out themselves in 2024 and 2025.
如果有关巴基斯坦飞机参与也门空袭的报道准确的话，那么巴基斯坦将承担美军在 2024 年和 2025 年亲自执行的任务。
However, burden-sharing can change the strategic autonomy of partner states.
然而，负担分担可以改变伙伴国的战略自主权。
The network that can supplement American power offers its members more room to maneuver without Washington.
这个可以补充美国实力的网络为其成员提供了在没有华盛顿的情况下更大的回旋余地。
Combined defense production can reduce dependence on U.S. suppliers.
联合国防生产可以减少对美国供应商的依赖。
New mechanisms for political coordination can allow regional powers to prioritize policies without Washington’s involvement.
新的政治协调机制可以让地区大国在没有华盛顿参与的情况下确定政策的优先顺序。
Pakistan’s relationships with China and Iran mean that the value it offers to U.S. partners is partly derived from its nonexclusive alignment with the United States.
巴基斯坦与中国和伊朗的关系意味着它为美国合作伙伴提供的价值部分源自其与美国的非排他性结盟。
For Washington, its partners may increasingly coordinate more independently, but that coordination should be compatible with U.S. interests in continued access, interoperability, technology protection, and escalation management.
对于华盛顿来说，其合作伙伴可能会越来越独立地进行协调，但这种协调应该符合美国在持续访问、互操作性、技术保护和升级管理方面的利益。
The emerging regional security network built around Pakistan could remain embedded in an order that Washington can still largely shape.
围绕巴基斯坦建立的新兴区域安全网络可能仍然嵌入华盛顿仍能在很大程度上塑造的秩序中。
But such arrangements remain favorable to U.S. interests only if Washington actively tends to them.
但只有在华盛顿积极支持的情况下，这种安排才仍然有利于美国的利益。
By doing so, the United States could gain an additional and less expensive layer of regional deterrence.
通过这样做，美国可以获得额外的、成本更低的区域威慑层。
If it dismisses these arrangements or mistakes them for a strategic break with Washington, Islamabad will have strong incentives to offer the same strategic value elsewhere.
如果伊斯兰堡驳回这些安排或将其误认为是与华盛顿的战略决裂，那么伊斯兰堡将有强烈的动机在其他地方提供同样的战略价值。
There are other eager buyers, and the recent institutionalization with Pakistan at its center makes its offer more competitive.
还有其他急切的买家，最近以巴基斯坦为中心的制度化使其报价更具竞争力。
That is Pakistan’s current moment.
这就是巴基斯坦当前的时刻。
It is still learning how to use temporary geopolitical demand to build relationships and institutions that outlast the demand.
它仍在学习如何利用临时的地缘政治需求来建立比需求更持久的关系和机构。
For Pakistan, the test of the Mecca pact will be whether it can secure a durable central place in Gulf security planning after the ongoing crises subside.
对于巴基斯坦来说，麦加协议的考验将是在持续的危机平息后，它能否在海湾安全规划中获得持久的核心地位。
For the United States, the test will be whether it can accommodate a greater autonomy of its allies and partners in the Middle East and South Asia, while continuing to shape the regional order in which that autonomy develops and is exercised.
对美国来说，考验将是它能否给予其在中东和南亚的盟友和伙伴更大的自主权，同时继续塑造发展和行使自主权的地区秩序。
Muhib Rahman is a postdoctoral fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania and an incoming assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University.
Muhib Rahman 是宾夕法尼亚大学 Perry World House 的博士后研究员，也是美利坚大学国际服务学院的助理教授。
His scholarly work and public-facing works have appeared across a wide range of academic journals and media outlets.
他的学术著作和面向公众的作品出现在各种学术期刊和媒体上。
Nazmus Sakib is a lecturer at the University of Kentucky.
纳兹穆斯·萨基布 (Nazmus Sakib) 是肯塔基大学的讲师。
His research and commentary have appeared in numerous scholarly journals and press platforms.
他的研究和评论出现在众多学术期刊和新闻平台上。