China’s Military Expansion in Southeast Asia Masks a More Complicated Reality

The Chinese Ministry of Defense’s announcement of a “joint support and training center” at an airport in Ban Keun, Laos, on Sept.

9月27日，中国国防部宣布在老挝班根机场设立“联合保障训练中心”。

29 drew attention to the People’s Liberation Army’s growing footprint in Southeast Asia.

29 日提请人们关注中国人民解放军在东南亚日益增长的足迹。

Although China does not call it a “base” and said it’s “not targeted at any third party,” it is China’s first publicly acknowledged overseas military facility centered on airpower.

尽管中国不称其为“基地”，并称其“不针对任何第三方”，但这是中国第一个公开承认的以空中力量为中心的海外军事设施。

Ban Keun joins Djibouti and Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base as nodes in a burgeoning network of overseas Chinese security infrastructure.

班根与吉布提和柬埔寨云朗海军基地一起，成为新兴的中国海外安全基础设施网络中的节点。

Concern is understandable.

担忧是可以理解的。

While smaller than China’s base in Djibouti, satellite imagery reveals eight light attack aircraft and support vehicles on a 2,000-meter runway that is currently under construction.

虽然比中国在吉布提的基地要小，但卫星图像显示目前正在建设的 2000 米跑道上有八架轻型攻击机和支援车辆。

Although insufficient to support long-range bombers, the facility likely benefits China’s logistics and intelligence capabilities, diversifies Southeast Asian base access beyond Cambodia, and ties Laos into its arms sales network.

尽管不足以支持远程轰炸机，但该设施可能有利于中国的后勤和情报能力，使柬埔寨以外的东南亚基地多样化，并将老挝纳入其武器销售网络。

The joint center could eventually enhance the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s power projection across mainland Southeast Asia, potentially affecting U.S. forces operating in the eastern Indian Ocean.

该联合中心最终可能会增强中国人民解放军空军在东南亚大陆的力量投射，从而可能影响在东印度洋作战的美军。

For Vietnam , this development deepens its sense of siege .

对于越南来说，这一事态发展加深了其围困感。

The reflex among many policymakers in Washington after each rumored or announced Chinese military facility overseas is to interpret it through the lens of U.S.-Chinese competition.

每次传言或宣布中国在海外建立军事设施后，华盛顿许多政策制定者的反应都是从美中竞争的角度来解读。

In Cambodia’s case with Ream, Washington imposed sanctions as punishment.

在柬埔寨云云案中，华盛顿实施了制裁作为惩罚。

Yet, this reflex misunderstands the nuanced interests driving regional partners to work with China — and how to counter it.

然而，这种本能反应误解了推动地区伙伴与中国合作的微妙利益，以及如何应对这种利益。

While the aviation facility in Laos demonstrates Beijing’s growing security presence in Southeast Asia, alignment is driven by diverse threat perceptions, notably regime security and intra-ASEAN concerns, rather than U.S.-China Cold War dynamics.

虽然老挝的航空设施表明北京在东南亚日益增强的安全存在，但联盟是由不同的威胁认知驱动的，特别是政权安全和东盟内部的担忧，而不是美中冷战动态。

Regional governments continue to hedge, leaving an opening for the United States to compete effectively with Beijing.

地区政府继续对冲，为美国与北京有效竞争留下了机会。

Compared to U.S. regional security engagement, China’s presence is less extensive but growing.

与美国的地区安全参与相比，中国的存在虽然不那么广泛，但仍在不断增长。

China continues to militarize South China Sea land features.

中国继续将南海岛礁军事化。

In mainland Southeast Asia, the Laos airfield joins the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, which opened in 2025 — officially under Cambodian control — and houses a rotating naval deployment .

在东南亚大陆，老挝机场与柬埔寨云朗海军基地相连，该基地于 2025 年启用，正式由柬埔寨控制，并轮流部署海军。

Cambodia , Laos, and Thailand stand out for the depth of military-to-military relationships with Beijing, while Indonesia , Malaysia and Thailand have recently established 2+2 dialogues with China, involving foreign and defense ministers from both countries.

柬埔寨、老挝和泰国因与北京的军事关系深厚而引人注目，而印度尼西亚、马来西亚和泰国最近与中国建立了2+2对话，两国外交部长和国防部长都有参与。

Arms sales are also a growth area for Beijing .

军售也是北京的一个增长领域。

Indonesia expects the delivery of J-10 fighter jets , while Beijing surpassed the United States as Bangkok’s primary supplier.

印度尼西亚预计将交付歼10战斗机，而北京则超过美国成为曼谷的主要供应商。

However, China’s strongest comparative advantage over the United States is its regime security provision.

然而，中国相对于美国最强大的比较优势是其政权安全保障。

The Global Security Initiative, one of four foreign policy cooperation frameworks promoted by Beijing, promises internal security assistance to its authoritarian partners, boosting state capacity while advancing its preferred governance norms.

全球安全倡议是北京推动的四个外交政策合作框架之一，承诺向其威权伙伴提供内部安全援助，增强国家能力，同时推进其首选的治理规范。

Cambodia , Laos , Myanmar’s junta , and Vietnam have all formally signed on.

柬埔寨、老挝、缅甸军政府和越南均已正式签署。

Although Bangkok remains outside the framework, internal security and police cooperation (particularly targeting scam centers in Myanmar ) mirror the Thai military’s warm relations with the People’s Liberation Army.

尽管曼谷仍处于框架之外，但内部安全和警察合作（特别是针对缅甸的诈骗中心）反映了泰国军方与中国人民解放军的友好关系。

Given the Chinese Communist Party’s holistic security conception equating party rule with national security, internal security arrangements often bleed over into external military cooperation.

鉴于中国共产党将党的统治与国家安全等同起来的整体安全观，内部安全安排常常渗透到外部军事合作中。

Notably, Beijing upgraded its 2+2 security dialogues with Cambodia , Laos , and Vietnam to 3+3 in 2026 by including the internal security ministries.

值得注意的是，北京在2026年将与柬埔寨、老挝和越南的2+2安全对话升级为3+3，其中包括国内安全部。

For each of these regimes, China’s internal security provision is critical, as Beijing can export its substantial know-how in high-tech surveillance and paramilitary policing .

对于这些政权中的每一个来说，中国的内部安全保障都至关重要，因为北京可以输出其在高科技监视和准军事警务方面的大量专业知识。

In Vietnam’s case, the internal security cooperation addresses some of the paradox in its approach to China: despite threatening Vietnam’s South China Sea claims, China likely won’t overthrow the Communist Party of Vietnam, but a revolution could.

就越南而言，内部安全合作解决了其对待中国的一些悖论：尽管威胁到越南的南海主权主张，但中国可能不会推翻越南共产党，但革命可以。

Viewed through the lens of U.S.-Chinese competition, one could assume that China’s growing security presence in Southeast Asia comes at Washington’s expense.

从美中竞争的角度来看，人们可能会认为中国在东南亚日益增强的安全存在是以华盛顿为代价的。

The United States is distracted and underinvested in Southeast Asia, and China’s deepening security ties augment its unassailable economic predominance .

美国在东南亚的注意力分散且投资不足，而中国不断深化的安全关系增强了其无可争议的经济优势。

Singaporean think tank ISEAS’ annual survey of ASEAN elites found in 2026 that a majority would side with Beijing if forced to make a choice in alignment.

新加坡智库东南亚研究所在 2026 年对东盟精英进行的年度调查发现，如果被迫做出一致选择，大多数人会站在北京一边。

Yet, the geopolitical landscape in Southeast Asia remains in flux, and alignments are multifaceted and ultimately transitory due to the region’s complex web of threat perceptions, including vis-à-vis China.

然而，东南亚的地缘政治格局仍在不断变化，由于该地区复杂的威胁认知网络（包括针对中国的威胁认知），结盟是多方面的，并且最终是短暂的。

Indeed, ISEAS’ 2025 survey found that a majority would side with the United States — perhaps due to renewed South China Sea tensions.

事实上，东南亚研究所 2025 年的调查发现，大多数人会站在美国一边——或许是因为南海紧张局势再次出现。

In 2024 , China led at 50.5 percent after a U.S. lead in prior years , likely as a result of U.S. support for Israel .

2024 年，中国领先美国 50.5%，而前几年美国领先，这可能是美国对以色列支持的结果。

Rather than representing durable shifts in regional alignment, the survey instead reflects in-the-moment reactions to specific events.

该调查并没有代表区域协调的持久变化，而是反映了对特定事件的即时反应。

Indeed, diving into other areas of the survey, such as which geopolitical events rank as top concerns for ASEAN governments, one finds little consensus on the perceived threats that drive alignment.

事实上，深入研究调查的其他领域，例如哪些地缘政治事件被列为东盟各国政府最关心的问题，人们发现对于推动结盟的感知威胁几乎没有达成共识。

The region’s diverse and shifting threat perceptions, not great-power competition, do more to explain the incentives to forge closer security ties to China.

该地区多样化且不断变化的威胁认知，而不是大国竞争，更能解释与中国建立更紧密安全关系的动机。

Despite the bloc’s self-proclaimed role in reducing state-to-state conflict since the Cold War, some ASEAN states fear each other more than China or the United States, while also seeing Beijing as a friend in some respects (internal security) and a foe in others (maritime disputes).

尽管东盟自称在冷战以来减少国家间冲突方面发挥了作用，但一些东盟国家对彼此的恐惧程度超过了中国或美国，同时在某些方面（内部安全）将北京视为朋友，在其他方面（海上争端）将北京视为敌人。

Southeast Asian governments do not evaluate China and the United States solely through the lens of great-power competition.

东南亚各国政府不会仅仅从大国竞争的角度来评价中美。

Instead, their behavior reflects shifting calculations of external threat, internal regime security, and intraregional rivalries.

相反，他们的行为反映了对外部威胁、内部政权安全和区域内竞争的不断变化的考虑。

Landlocked Laos, as a fellow communist government, seems a natural partner for China, as it does not see Beijing as a direct security threat.

内陆老挝作为一个共产主义政府，似乎是中国的天然合作伙伴，因为它不认为北京构成直接的安全威胁。

Air force training and support boost Laos’ own capabilities, while ensuring Chinese economic assistance, despite the clear risks of dependence .

尽管存在明显的依赖风险，但空军训练和支持增强了老挝自身的能力，同时确保了中国的经济援助。

If it can position itself as China’s preferred client, then it stands to benefit.

如果它能够将自己定位为中国的首选客户，那么它就会受益。

Although often derided in Washington as a “ Chinese puppet state ,” Cambodia’s regional security environment is more dangerous than Laos’.

尽管经常被华盛顿嘲笑为“中国傀儡国家”，但柬埔寨的地区安全环境比老挝更危险。

In addition to regime security considerations , part of the strategic calculus driving outreach to Beijing is to hedge against the potential security threats from its neighbors, Vietnam and Thailand.

除了政权安全方面的考虑之外，推动与北京接触的部分战略考虑是防范来自邻国越南和泰国的潜在安全威胁。

In 2025, disputes over land along their border sparked a short but sharp armed conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, which ended in a fragile ceasefire .

2025年，两国边境土地纠纷引发了柬埔寨和泰国之间短暂但激烈的武装冲突，最终以脆弱的停火告终。

Still-simmering Thai-Cambodian tensions underscore the risk of renewed war, incentivizing Phnom Penh to hope that security ties to China can offset relative weakness vis-à-vis its historic rivals or, at the very least, keep Beijing engaged as a friendly mediator.

泰国和柬埔寨之间持续发酵的紧张局势凸显了重新爆发战争的风险，促使金边希望与中国的安全关系能够抵消其相对于历史对手的相对弱点，或者至少让北京作为友好的调解者参与其中。

This impulse — along with distrust of complete dependence upon Beijing — has spurred Phnom Penh to renew ties with the United States under the Trump administration, which is less concerned about human rights than past U.S. presidencies.

这种冲动，加上对完全依赖北京的不信任，促使金边在特朗普政府领导下恢复与美国的关系，特朗普政府不像过去的美国总统那样关心人权。

After a 10-year hiatus, Washington and Phnom Penh plan to relaunch joint military exercises in 2027.

中断十年后，华盛顿和金边计划于 2027 年重新启动联合军事演习。

Cambodia welcomed a U.S. Navy visit to Ream Naval Base earlier this year, presenting the base as under its control, not China’s.

柬埔寨欢迎美国海军今年早些时候访问云朗海军基地，并表示该基地处于柬埔寨的控制之下，而不是中国的控制之下。

Simultaneously, Cambodia continues to pursue security ties with other powers, notably Japan .

与此同时，柬埔寨继续寻求与其他国家，特别是日本的安全关系。

Despite Thai elites seeing China as the preferred partner, Thailand is in a similarly complex position.

尽管泰国精英将中国视为首选合作伙伴，但泰国的处境同样复杂。

That Chinese weapons in Cambodian hands ended up deployed on the battlefield became a sore point.

柬埔寨手中的中国武器最终部署在战场上成为了一个痛点。

In some cases, China’s behavior has generated concerns about its political influence.

在某些情况下，中国的行为引发了对其政治影响力的担忧。

During a 2025 joint crackdown on scam centers, a senior Chinese official personally oversaw the repatriation of Chinese detainees from Myanmar through Thailand, prompting debate about the extent of China’s involvement in sensitive security and law enforcement matters on Thai territory along the Myanmar border.

在2025年联合打击诈骗中心期间，一名中国高级官员亲自监督了从缅甸经泰国遣返中国被拘留者的情况，引发了关于中国在多大程度上参与缅甸边境泰国领土敏感安全和执法事务的争论。

The official later apologized for the “misunderstanding” of China’s rapid actions that generated the perception it does not respect Thai sovereignty.

该官员后来为对中国迅速行动的“误解”表示歉意，因为这些行动让人认为中国不尊重泰国主权。

Importantly, Thailand has not jettisoned its defense ties with the United States, even if the alliance is weaker than in past decades .

重要的是，泰国并没有放弃与美国的防务关系，即使这种联盟比过去几十年弱。

U.S.-Thai military exercise Cobra Gold remains the largest in Southeast Asia, and the two sides have expressed the intent to sign a new joint vision statement by the end of 2026.

美泰“金色眼镜蛇”军演仍是东南亚规模最大的军演，双方已表示有意在 2026 年底前签署新的联合愿景声明。

Vietnam, meanwhile, demonstrates that analysis predicated on external security alone misses a key element: regime security.

与此同时，越南表明，仅基于外部安全的分析忽略了一个关键因素：政权安全。

Vietnam, as Laos’ closest partner , will not rest easy with the announcement of a People’s Liberation Army Air Force presence to its west.

越南作为老挝最亲密的伙伴，不会因为宣布在老挝西部部署解放军空军而高枕无忧。

Hemmed in by China’s island-building in the South China Sea and Beijing’s close ties to Cambodia , Hanoi is deeply concerned, having fought a war with its northern neighbor in 1979 and clashed at sea since.

由于中国在南海的岛屿建设以及北京与柬埔寨的密切关系，河内深感担忧，该国曾于 1979 年与其北方邻国发生战争，此后又发生海上冲突。

That security anxiety drives the U.S.-Vietnam rapprochement of recent decades and keeps Vietnam close to Russia .

这种安全焦虑推动了美越近几十年来的和解，并使越南与俄罗斯保持密切关系。

Yet, in a reminder that few relationships within ASEAN are one-dimensional, Vietnamese-Lao bilateral ties have seemingly suffered little or no damage over the air force facility, while Hanoi’s Communist Party-to-Party relations with Beijing have deepened in recent years.

然而，东盟内部很少有关系是一维的，越南与老挝的双边关系似乎因空军设施而几乎没有受到任何损害，而河内与北京的党际关系近年来不断加深。

Communist Party of Vietnam General Secretary To Lam is fundamentally pragmatic in his hedging.

越南共产党总书记苏林的对冲本质上是务实的。

In the external security realm, where China presents a challenge, this manifests as outreach to the United States.

在外部安全领域，中国构成挑战，这表现为向美国伸出援手。

But, from the perspective of regime security, where Washington’s occasional focus on human rights and democracy can constitute a threat of its own, Vietnam sees benefits to close cooperation with China on internal security .

但是，从政权安全的角度来看，华盛顿偶尔关注人权和民主可能对其本身构成威胁，而越南则看到了与中国在内部安全方面密切合作的好处。

Like Cambodia, Vietnam in 2026 elevated its 2+2 dialogue with China to a 3+3 format including internal security .

与柬埔寨一样，越南将于2026年将与中国的2+2对话提升为包括内部安全在内的3+3形式。

The United States and China are in competition in Southeast Asia , but that has not resulted in the rigid bloc alignments associated with a Cold War.

美国和中国在东南亚展开竞争，但这并没有导致冷战时期的僵化集团结盟。

Instead, the multilayered and shifting security relationships and threat perceptions between states like Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam point to a mixed landscape where no one great power predominates.

相反，柬埔寨、老挝、泰国和越南等国家之间多层次且不断变化的安全关系和威胁认知表明，没有任何一个大国能够占据主导地位。

Instead, ASEAN capitals actively diversify relationships with Europe , Japan , the Middle East , Russia , and South Korea as alternatives to China and the United States.

相反，东盟国家积极发展与欧洲、日本、中东、俄罗斯和韩国的关系，以取代中国和美国。

The takeaway for Washington’s policymakers from the People’s Liberation Army’s expansion into Laos should therefore be to double down on regional engagement, not reject Vientiane and other close partners of Beijing.

因此，华盛顿政策制定者从中国人民解放军向老挝扩张中得到的收获应该是加大区域参与力度，而不是拒绝万象和北京的其他密切伙伴。

However, Washington faces two policy challenges in Southeast Asia: democracy and human rights promotion alienate governments in the region, and its great power competition lens washes out distinctions in threat perceptions across states.

然而，华盛顿在东南亚面临两大政策挑战：民主和人权促进疏远了该地区各国政府，其大国竞争视角消除了各国对威胁认知的差异。

China’s regime security advantage is harder to address given the importance of values to U.S. foreign policy.

鉴于价值观对美国外交政策的重要性，中国政权的安全优势更难解决。

The Biden administration’s framing of “democracies versus autocracies” alienated many in Southeast Asia.

拜登政府的“民主与独裁”框架疏远了东南亚许多人。

President Trump’s relative deemphasis of values has since facilitated renewal with Cambodia and Thailand, but it has also gradually engaged the Myanmar junta with no obvious benefit for U.S. national interests given Naypyidaw’s untrustworthiness and incapacity to deliver .

此后，特朗普总统对价值观的相对淡化促进了与柬埔寨和泰国的更新，但也逐渐与缅甸军政府接触，鉴于内比都的不可信和无能力，这对美国的国家利益没有明显的好处。

Going forward, it is difficult to see Washington abandoning its values, and not all regimes are worth engaging.

展望未来，华盛顿很难放弃其价值观，而且并非所有政权都值得参与。

Competing with China’s surveillance package is not realistic for a democracy, and an independent civil society , seen as “color revolution,” accounts for the threat perception in governments like Hanoi.

对于民主国家来说，与中国的监控计划竞争是不现实的，而被视为“颜色革命”的独立公民社会是河内等政府对威胁的感知的原因。

There are also governments, notably the Myanmar junta, where the scale of violence and repression is too large for engagement to be justified, especially while a still potent resistance movement more amenable to U.S. national and values interests contests regime consolidation.

还有一些政府，特别是缅甸军政府，其暴力和镇压规模太大，以至于没有理由参与其中，尤其是在一个更服从美国国家和价值观利益的仍然强大的抵抗运动挑战政权巩固的情况下。

Even if it can alleviate some aspects of threat — like deemphasizing “democracies versus autocracies” rhetoric — Washington must accept that it cannot compete pound for pound with China on regime security.

即使它可以减轻某些方面的威胁——比如不再强调“民主与独裁”的言论——华盛顿也必须承认，它无法在政权安全方面与中国进行同等程度的竞争。

Yet, its values can bring benefits too, notably transparency and trust.

然而，它的价值观也可以带来好处，特别是透明度和信任。

The corollary is that regional democracies like the Philippines distrust China, as do the populations and elites in many of its close partners.

其必然结果是，像菲律宾这样的地区民主国家不信任中国，其许多密切伙伴的民众和精英也不信任中国。

For example, ISEAS found that 90.6 percent of Thai respondents expressed concern about China’s influence.

例如，东南亚研究中心发现，90.6%的泰国受访者对中国的影响力表示担忧。

The United States can still beat China in external security and do more to understand regional threat perceptions, including internal ones.

美国仍然可以在外部安全方面击败中国，并采取更多措施来了解地区威胁认知，包括内部威胁认知。

To better manage threat perception, Washington should tailor its policies to each state’s interests while remaining grounded in a careful strategic assessment of what it aims to achieve compared to the risks of alienation.

为了更好地管理威胁认知，华盛顿应该根据每个国家的利益调整其政策，同时坚持对自己的目标与疏远风险进行仔细的战略评估。

For instance, sanctions on Cambodia elevated regime security anxieties and incentivized outreach to China but did little to support Cambodian opposition on the ground or change Phnom Penh.

例如，对柬埔寨的制裁加剧了政权的安全担忧，并刺激了与中国的接触，但对支持柬埔寨当地的反对派或改变金边几乎没有帮助。

The Trump administration’s easing of sanctions is instead likely to pull Cambodia back toward a more balanced position than ineffective targeted sanctions.

相反，特朗普政府放松制裁可能会让柬埔寨回到比无效的定向制裁更加平衡的立场。

Understanding the external security environment can be an additional force multiplier.

了解外部安全环境可以成为额外的力量倍增器。

Given Phnom Penh’s fear of Vietnam and Thailand, Washington should position itself as a more trustworthy and responsive mediator than the Trump administration, and China did during the Thai-Cambodia border war of 2025, which was more symbolism than substantive peacemaking.

鉴于金边对越南和泰国的恐惧，华盛顿应该将自己定位为比特朗普政府更值得信赖、反应更积极的调解者，中国在 2025 年泰柬边境战争中就是这么做的，这场战争更多的是象征意义，而不是实质性的和平缔造。

For Laos, its biggest challenge remains low state capacity and economic development, particularly its immense debt burden with Beijing.

对于老挝来说，其最大的挑战仍然是国家能力和经济发展水平低下，特别是其对北京的巨额债务负担。

There, traditional development assistance at expanded levels could win goodwill and chip away at China’s dominance.

在那里，扩大水平的传统发展援助可能会赢得善意并削弱中国的主导地位。

Although it lacks external security threats, Vientiane would value capacity-building and training, particularly law enforcement, to better tackle the criminal syndicates on its territory.

尽管没有外部安全威胁，但万象重视能力建设和培训，特别是执法能力，以更好地打击其领土上的犯罪集团。

The goal here is not alignment with the United States but simply to provide security options beyond China’s offerings.

这里的目标不是与美国结盟，而只是提供中国提供之外的安全选择。

With Bangkok, its military-monarchy elites see Beijing as the preferred partner for economic growth and stability, and the alliance is unlikely to return to the closeness of prior decades.

对于曼谷来说，其军事君主精英将北京视为经济增长和稳定的首选合作伙伴，而且该联盟不太可能恢复到前几十年的亲密关系。

Yet, Washington should continue to foster defense ties, while accelerating alternative avenues of cooperation, notably countering transnational crime.

然而，华盛顿应该继续促进防务关系，同时加速其他合作途径，特别是打击跨国犯罪。

Growing concerns have emerged in Thai society about the impact of Myanmar’s scam centers and pollution , and the Chinese crackdown that caused debate over Thai sovereignty in 2025 is a reminder of China’s occasional heavy-handedness.

泰国社会对缅甸诈骗中心和污染的影响日益担忧，而中国在 2025 年发起的镇压行动引发了有关泰国主权的争论，这提醒人们注意中国偶尔的高压手段。

Critically, the United States has recently committed resources to regional law enforcement cooperation with Thailand.

至关重要的是，美国最近承诺将资源用于与泰国的区域执法合作。

Expanding these offerings and emphasizing the trust and accountability only a fellow democracy can provide presents an alternative to China’s internal security provisions.

扩大这些服务并强调只有民主国家才能提供的信任和责任，为中国的内部安全规定提供了替代方案。

Finally, with Vietnam, the U.S. relationship continues to deepen , but challenges, like trade policy , still exist.

最后，美国与越南的关系继续深化，但贸易政策等挑战仍然存在。

There is also little the United States can do to compete with China on internal security given Vietnam’s party-to-party ties.

鉴于越南的党际关系，美国在内部安全方面也无能为力与中国竞争。

More fundamentally, uncertainty remains about U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific, along with some distrust due to Washington’s discomfort with Vietnam’s purchase of Russian weapons .

更根本的是，美国对印度-太平洋地区的承诺仍然存在不确定性，而且由于华盛顿对越南购买俄罗斯武器感到不安，还存在一些不信任。

But, given Vietnam’s exposed external security position, the United States has an opportunity to do more to reassure Hanoi.

但是，鉴于越南暴露的外部安全地位，美国有机会采取更多措施来安抚河内。

Vietnam’s two most important external security providers, the United States and Russia, are both distracted and mutually opposed, causing some consternation.

越南最重要的两个外部安全提供者美国和俄罗斯都心不在焉且相互对立，引起了一些恐慌。

Moscow’s Ukraine quagmire undermines it in Southeast Asia’s arms market , while its growing ties to China cast doubt on its reliability in a South China Sea clash.

莫斯科的乌克兰泥潭削弱了它在东南亚军火市场的地位，而它与中国日益密切的关系则让人对其在南海冲突中的可靠性产生怀疑。

As such, accelerating the pace of U.S. arms sale approvals should be the priority, while Washington should understand Hanoi’s acute security threat and refrain from threatening to punish it over its Moscow ties.

因此，加快美国军售审批步伐应该是当务之急，而华盛顿也应该了解河内面临的严重安全威胁，不要因与莫斯科的关系而威胁要惩罚河内。

In the South China Sea, although Vietnam adopts a quieter strategy than the Philippines, U.S. demonstrations of resolve in supporting Manila go a long way — and show the limits of Moscow’s backing .

在南中国海，尽管越南采取了比菲律宾更为安静的战略，但美国表现出的支持马尼拉的决心大有帮助，并且显示了莫斯科支持的局限性。

These actions could eventually position Washington as the more trusted partner.

这些行动最终可能使华盛顿成为更值得信赖的合作伙伴。

On the whole, Southeast Asian states may distrust the United States, but no government in the region wants Washington gone.

总体而言，东南亚国家可能不信任美国，但该地区没有哪个政府希望华盛顿下台。

While realistic assumptions are necessary about how far hedging states can move away from China and toward the United States, Washington needs to devote more resources and institutional attention to Southeast Asia’s complex security and threat landscape.

虽然对冲国家能够在多大程度上远离中国转向美国有必要做出现实的假设，但华盛顿需要对东南亚复杂的安全和威胁格局投入更多的资源和机构关注。

A broad brush risks abdicating the initiative to China, but a tailored approach can better counterbalance Beijing.

笼统的做法可能会导致主动权让给中国，但量身定制的方法可以更好地制衡北京。

Lucas Myers is the assistant director of the China and U.S. Program at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy and a nonresident visiting scholar with the George Washington University’s Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

卢卡斯·迈尔斯 (Lucas Myers) 是马里兰大学公共政策学院中美项目助理主任，也是乔治华盛顿大学西古尔亚洲研究中心的非常驻访问学者。