The Pentagon Doesn’t Need to Reinvent Supply Chain Transparency

As the United States seeks to rebuild its defense industrial base, Washington is scrambling to understand an industrial ecosystem that it no longer controls, nor largely understands.

当美国寻求重建其国防工业基础时，华盛顿正在努力了解一个它不再控制、也基本上不了解的工业生态系统。

China has been able to achieve strategic advantage against the United States through the targeted application of export controls and licensing requirements on specific materials at specific supply chain nodes.

通过对特定供应链节点的特定材料有针对性地实施出口管制和许可要求，中国已经能够获得针对美国的战略优势。

U.S. responses, by contrast, have largely been broader in scope and shallower in effect .

相比之下，美国的反应在很大程度上范围更广，效果更浅。

It is as though China is striking the supply chain with precision-guided munitions while the United States is still using dumb bombs.

这就好像中国正在用精确制导弹药打击供应链，而美国仍在使用哑弹。

Maintaining weapons stockpiles and a resilient force, let alone operationalizing surge capacity, will require a better understanding of where critical materials originate and how they can be scaled.

维持武器库存和一支有弹性的部队，更不用说发挥增援能力，都需要更好地了解关键材料的来源以及如何扩大规模。

The main driver of supply chain tracking within the government is the Department of Defense, which is the agency with the largest acquisition budget and a mandate from Congress to delve into its supply chains.

政府内部供应链跟踪的主要推动者是国防部，该机构拥有最大的采购预算，并获得国会的授权深入研究其供应链。

It has been said that “ nobody wants a responsibly mined missile ,” but the department is likely to find that using the expertise and experience of existing organizations ­— broad-based ones like the Responsible Business Alliance , industry-specific ones such as the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance or the Textile Exchange , and even government-run ones such as the Kimberley Process — is a good approach to implementing supply chain tracking in an affordable, efficient, and workable manner.

有人说，“没有人想要负责任地开采导弹”，但该部门可能会发现，利用现有组织的专业知识和经验——基础广泛的组织，如负责任的商业联盟，特定行业的组织，如负责任采矿保证计划或纺织品交易所，甚至政府运营的组织，如金伯利进程——是以负担得起、高效和可行的方式实施供应链跟踪的好方法。

Even when the goals of these organizations differ from U.S. national security goals, the methods they have developed to achieve measures of transparency, resiliency, and buy-in in complex, real-world supply chains will be important to informing a workable system for national security requirements.

即使这些组织的目标与美国的国家安全目标不同，他们为在复杂的现实世界供应链中实现透明度、弹性和支持措施而开发的方法对于为满足国家安全要求的可行系统提供信息也非常重要。

The United States is Adapting China’s internal incentives in supplying the United States with critical minerals have changed as China has further industrialized, and the Chinese government has been able to change its policies rapidly.

美国正在适应中国向美国供应关键矿产的内部动机随着中国进一步工业化而发生变化，而且中国政府能够迅速改变其政策。

Meanwhile, U.S. domestic incentives, statutes, and policies have been slower to change.

与此同时，美国国内激励措施、法规和政策的变化速度较慢。

From the 1970s through the 1990s, the overriding incentive for Chinese policymakers was to sell critical minerals to the West in order to build market share and drive onshoring of mineral processing and downstream technologies .

从 20 世纪 70 年代到 90 年代，中国决策者的首要动机是向西方出售关键矿产，以建立市场份额并推动矿产加工和下游技术的本土化。

Chinese industrial policy then changed to capture more downstream value-add manufacturing , reorienting around maintaining and growing its downstream capabilities.

随后，中国的产业政策发生了变化，以吸引更多下游增值制造业，围绕维持和发展其下游能力进行重新定位。

On the American side, the industrial incentive structure from the 1990s until roughly the immediate post-Covid 19 period was informed by principles such as lean manufacturing that emphasized low inventories and a priority on low-cost and responsive, not resilient, supply chains.

在美国方面，从 20 世纪 90 年代到大约 2019 冠状病毒病 (Covid 19) 后时期的工业激励结构都遵循精益制造等原则，强调低库存，优先考虑低成本和响应性而非弹性的供应链。

In the commercial sector, this was sometimes countered by activist networks and public relations concerns that drove efforts to build alternative supply chains .

在商业领域，这有时会受到激进网络和公共关系担忧的抵制，这些担忧推动了建立替代供应链的努力。

For companies that had the Pentagon as their major customer, however, activist efforts were less effective.

然而，对于以五角大楼为主要客户的公司来说，激进的努力效果较差。

Under pressure from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon continued driving for low-cost, market-first solutions even after China had begun demonstrating its capability to interrupt supply chains for rare earths for geopolitical reasons .

在伊拉克和阿富汗战争的压力下，即使中国已经开始展示其出于地缘政治原因中断稀土供应链的能力，五角大楼仍继续寻求低成本、市场优先的解决方案。

In the past few years, the U.S. government has accelerated efforts to identify dozens of key national security supply chains , with rare earths being the most visible.

过去几年，美国政府加紧努力，查明数十条关键的国家安全供应链，其中稀土最为明显。

Mostly driven by Congress, these supply chain tracking initiatives are an overlapping mess of reports and requirements that may improve national security but will take time and effort to implement.

这些供应链跟踪举措主要由国会推动，是一堆重叠的报告和要求，可能会改善国家安全，但需要时间和精力来实施。

Previous efforts, such as the Berry Amendment and 10 U.S.C.

之前的努力，例如贝里修正案和 10 U.S.C.

4872 , required supply chain tracing as a byproduct of source restrictions.

4872 ，要求供应链追踪作为来源限制的副产品。

The current round of U.S. government efforts began with Section 857 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 , a provision that required any contractor delivering any item containing a rare-earth permanent magnet to the Department of Defense to disclose “the provenance of the magnet.” Any contractor unable to disclose such provenance had 180 days after delivery to implement a supply chain tracking system.

本轮美国政府的努力始于《2023 财年国防授权法》第 857 条，该条款要求任何向国防部交付任何含有稀土永磁体的物品的承包商披露“磁体的来源”。任何无法披露此类来源的承包商都必须在交货后 180 天内实施供应链跟踪系统。

The section provided a standard of “commercially reasonable inquiry” and maintained visibility into dual-use supply chains.

该部分提供了“商业合理询问”的标准，并保持了军民两用供应链的可见性。

Section 856 of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act established a pilot program to map the whole supply chain for five selected weapon systems.

《2024 财年国防授权法》第 856 条制定了一项试点计划，绘制五种选定武器系统的整个供应链。

Section 849 of the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act provided for the incentivization of “each contractor of the Department of Defense to assess and monitor the entire supply chain of goods and services provided to the department,” with Section 833 of the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act further expanding the incentives for “supply chain illumination.”

《2025 财年国防授权法》第 849 条规定，激励“国防部的每个承包商评估和监控向该部门提供的整个商品和服务供应链”，《2026 财年国防授权法》第 833 条进一步扩大了“供应链照明”的激励措施。

Section 849 seems to reach the outer limits of what is achievable within the Department of Defense supply chain, but despite clear congressional authority, nothing has successfully made it through the regulatory process.

第 849 条似乎已经达到了国防部供应链内可实现的外部极限，但尽管国会有明确的授权，但尚未成功通过监管程序。

There remain serious questions about implementation, such as rights to data, how to require compliance from non-defense and foreign suppliers, and even what a commercially reasonable effort entails.

关于实施仍然存在严重的问题，例如数据权、如何要求非国防和外国供应商遵守，甚至需要什么商业上合理的努力。

The House used Section 1808 of its version of this year’s defense authorization act to direct the Pentagon to report on the progress it has made in reviewing some 30 different supply chain categories, including recommendations for action.

众议院利用今年国防授权法案第 1808 条指示五角大楼报告其在审查约 30 个不同供应链类别方面取得的进展，包括行动建议。

The 4872 issue highlights the need for proactive efforts by the Pentagon to engage with multiple levels of the supply chain and drive changes in contractor behavior.

4872 问题凸显了五角大楼需要积极主动地参与供应链的多个层面并推动承包商行为的改变。

4872 was first passed in 2018 , significantly modified in 2021 , and then given a final rulemaking in 2024 , yet some contractors have consistently agitated for waivers and delays in implementation rather than conducting the due diligence necessary to achieve compliance with the law before Jan.

4872号于2018年首次通过，2021年进行了重大修改，然后于2024年制定了最终规则，但一些承包商一直鼓动豁免和推迟实施，而不是在1月1日之前进行必要的尽职调查以实现遵守该法律。

1, 2027.

2027 年 1 月。

Strong leadership will be needed to implement future supply chain traceability initiatives, as even Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg has encountered .

实施未来的供应链追溯计划需要强有力的领导，就连国防部副部长史蒂夫·范伯格也遇到过这种情况。

Building a workable regulatory regime for a topic as wide as “supply chain security” is a difficult proposition, even in a monopsony environment.

即使在垄断环境中，为“供应链安全”这样广泛的主题建立可行的监管制度也是一个困难的提议。

The most prudent and efficient method would be building on the backs of efforts made by organizations other than the U.S. government over the past two decades.

最审慎和有效的方法是建立在美国政府以外的组织在过去二十年的努力的基础上。

Though these efforts had different, non-national security objectives , they generated a mass of literature and discussions that are useful to inform any supply chain tracking regime by identifying common problems and conflicts .

尽管这些努力具有不同的非国家安全目标，但它们产生了大量文献和讨论，这些文献和讨论有助于通过识别常见问题和冲突来为任何供应链跟踪制度提供信息。

One of the major criticisms of humanitarian supply chain tracking efforts is that they are naïve or ineffective at responding to political or geopolitical changes.

对人道主义供应链追踪工作的主要批评之一是，它们在应对政治或地缘政治变化方面幼稚或无效。

But the alternative view is that the narrow focus of these efforts has been a clever approach to build wider acceptance of, and integration into, their frameworks.

但另一种观点认为，这些努力的狭隘焦点是一种聪明的方法，可以让其框架得到更广泛的接受和整合。

The Kimberley Process had to be a government-oriented approach to get buy-in from Western African nation-states in the wake of the civil wars of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

在 20 世纪 90 年代末和 2000 年代初的内战之后，金伯利进程必须是一种以政府为导向的方法，以获得西非民族国家的支持。

A noted downside of this approach was that the presence of Russia, a major diamond exporter, as a nation-state participant effectively shielded it from sanction under the Kimberley Process after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

这种方法的一个值得注意的缺点是，主要钻石出口国俄罗斯作为民族国家参与者的存在，有效地使其免受 2022 年入侵乌克兰后金伯利进程的制裁。

However, the ability of affected stakeholders to then set up a separate process within a couple of years to address that oversight should be seen as a strength of the overall approach.

然而，受影响的利益相关者随后在几年内建立单独流程来解决监督问题的能力应被视为整体方法的优势。

Any new national security supply chain initiative will have to account for the limits and pushbacks that are going to occur, especially in the upstream reaches of the supply chain.

任何新的国家安全供应链计划都必须考虑到即将发生的限制和阻力，特别是在供应链的上游。

U.S.-based defense contractors and foreign miners will differ in the type and quantity of information that they will be willing to share.

美国国防承包商和外国矿工愿意分享的信息类型和数量有所不同。

U.S. national security goals may not always align with the goals of miners and processors.

美国的国家安全目标可能并不总是与矿工和加工商的目标一致。

For example, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act generated immediate action among companies doing business in the United States, but it also led other companies, especially in China, to leave the supply chain altogether.

例如，《维吾尔族强迫劳动预防法》促使在美国开展业务的公司立即采取行动，但它也导致其他公司，特别是中国的公司完全离开供应链。

On Aug.

八月。

5, 2026, following U.S. bans on 43 Chinese entities for violations of the Uyghur protection law, China retaliated by effectively banning domestic entities from cooperating with six specific U.S. supply chain tracking organizations .

2026 年 12 月 5 日，继美国因违反维吾尔族保护法而对 43 家中国实体实施禁令后，中国采取报复措施，有效禁止国内实体与 6 个特定的美国供应链追踪组织合作。

The six, most notably the Responsible Business Alliance, had been at the tip of the spear in building awareness of which companies in China were operating in violation of the Uyghur protection law.

这六家公司，其中最著名的是责任商业联盟，在提高人们对中国哪些公司违反维吾尔保护法的认识方面发挥了先锋作用。

The ban built upon several years of complementary internal regulations concerning supply chain efforts that maintain China’s production monopolies, while giving the Chinese government unparalleled information about how critical minerals are produced and traded.

该禁令建立在多年来有关维持中国生产垄断的供应链努力的补充性内部法规的基础上，同时为中国政府提供了有关关键矿产如何生产和交易的无与伦比的信息。

These imbalances in production and information allow the Chinese government to more nimbly target international trade policies and acquire intelligence for its own national security and business advantages .

这些生产和信息的不平衡使中国政府能够更灵活地制定国际贸易政策并获取情报，以维护其国家安全和商业优势。

For instance, the export controls imposed in April 2025 on rare earths and other critical minerals took the form of intrusive licensing requirements rather than outright bans.

例如，2025 年 4 月对稀土和其他关键矿物实施的出口管制采取了侵入性许可要求的形式，而不是彻底禁止。

Consumers of Chinese-made critical minerals have been forced to hand over significant amounts of proprietary information, ostensibly so that China can verify the end-use applications.

中国制造的关键矿物的消费者被迫交出大量专有信息，表面上是为了让中国能够验证最终用途应用。

In practice, this appears to be combined with data the Chinese government obtains from domestic and overseas producers to build actionable intelligence for commercial and geopolitical advantage .

在实践中，这似乎与中国政府从国内外生产商获得的数据相结合，为商业和地缘政治优势建立可操作的情报。

And by being a license rather than a ban, China can also see which foreign companies are willing to offer information in exchange for continued access to materials.

通过发放许可而非禁令，中国还可以了解哪些外国公司愿意提供信息以换取继续获取材料。

The Chinese government’s approach only works because of the dominant, near-monopoly position that China occupies in supplying many critical materials, from mined products to industrial components.

中国政府的做法之所以有效，是因为中国在从矿产品到工业零部件等许多关键材料的供应方面占据着主导、近乎垄断的地位。

The United States, by contrast, will not be able to demand compliance from producers and consumers in the same fashion outside of the downstream segments of national security supply chains.

相比之下，美国将无法以同样的方式要求国家安全供应链下游环节之外的生产商和消费者遵守规定。

If it wishes to get more buy-in to an alternative system, one that would encourage participation from nontraditional and small and medium enterprises, it will have to build a much more accessible and friendly supply chain tracking system that is flexible enough to accommodate the interests of companies in different industrial sectors, operating at different nodes of the supply chain, based in different geographic locations.

如果它希望获得更多人对替代系统的支持，即鼓励非传统企业和中小企业参与的系统，它就必须建立一个更容易访问和友好的供应链跟踪系统，该系统足够灵活，能够满足不同工业部门、在供应链不同节点、不同地理位置运营的公司的利益。

That points to an approach that is simple in requirements and agile in implementation.

这表明了一种需求简单、实施敏捷的方法。

Building flexible frameworks has not traditionally been a strength of the Department of Defense, but by strategically working with experienced organizations outside of the U.S. national security ecosystem, the United States could build a supply chain tracking system that is more attractive for suppliers and consumers to use than the restrictive Chinese licensing system.

建立灵活的框架传统上并不是国防部的强项，但通过与美国国家安全生态系统之外经验丰富的组织进行战略合作，美国可以建立一个比限制性的中国许可制度对供应商和消费者更有吸引力的供应链跟踪系统。

Flexibility does not mean having multiple offices within the Pentagon to compete with each other.

灵活性并不意味着五角大楼内有多个办公室相互竞争。

Recently, there have been efforts to build supply chain cells in program offices and even in major commands.

最近，在项目办公室甚至主要司令部都在努力建立供应链单元。

That approach likely leads to further fragmentation of understanding across the defense enterprise and multiplication of requirements for suppliers.

这种方法可能会导致整个国防企业的理解进一步分散，并对供应商的要求成倍增加。

The 2021 decision to elevate industrial base policy to an assistant secretary-level provided a senior-level office to coordinate the necessary efforts.

2021年决定将工业基础政策提升为助理秘书长级别，为协调必要的工作提供了一个高层办公室。

And Feinberg has made security of supply a headline issue, not least through the major equity and debt deals that the Pentagon has instituted in the last 18 months.

范伯格使供应安全成为头条新闻，尤其是通过五角大楼在过去 18 个月内发起的重大股权和债务交易。

But investments are insufficient on their own to stabilize a supply chain: Additional transparency and predictable supply and demand dynamics will be needed.

但投资本身不足以稳定供应链：需要更高的透明度和可预测的供需动态。

The existing industrial base policy framework is capable of providing both the government and its defense contractors with much of that information, but it demands full staffing and funding.

现有的工业基础政策框架能够为政府及其国防承包商提供大部分信息，但它需要充足的人员和资金。

Second, the Defense Department should supplement its efforts through the use of outside auditors.

其次，国防部应通过使用外部审计员来补充其努力。

Many companies, especially overseas, are going to be reluctant to hand data over to a U.S. government organization.

许多公司，尤其是海外公司，都不愿意将数据交给美国政府组织。

Allowing a reputable auditor to handle the data and certify basic information about sources and consumers at various nodes of the supply chain meets minimum transparency requirements and mitigates burdens on the U.S. government and prime contractors.

允许信誉良好的审计师处理数据并验证有关供应链各个节点的来源和消费者的基本信息，可以满足最低透明度要求，并减轻美国政府和主承包商的负担。

Finally, the resulting system needs to be simple enough to be used by thousands of stakeholders.

最后，最终的系统需要足够简单，以便可供数千名利益相关者使用。

The Pentagon cannot build a supply chain model based on requirements the way it does for a next-generation weapon system, where every office gets to add its own set of requirements.

五角大楼无法像下一代武器系统那样根据需求构建供应链模型，每个办公室都可以添加自己的一组需求。

End goals need to be tight and focused on defense priorities, while access to tools and methods should be diverse and expansive.

最终目标需要严格并专注于国防优先事项，同时工具和方法的获取应该多样化和广泛。

That is, defense supply chain goals should be limited to accurate identification of which companies handle critical materials, who oversees and owns those companies, and basic questions of whether supply chain activities comply with local and international standards for human and environmental rights.

也就是说，国防供应链的目标应仅限于准确识别哪些公司处理关键材料、谁监督和拥有这些公司，以及供应链活动是否符合当地和国际人权和环境权利标准的基本问题。

They should not expand to cover all of the environmental, social, and governance goals of international stakeholders.

它们不应扩展到涵盖国际利益相关者的所有环境、社会和治理目标。

At the same time, the Pentagon should incorporate many different tools — from onsite shipment fingerprinting to real-time specialty software to in-person audits — and allow the makers of those tools to demonstrate that they can achieve basic goals.

与此同时，五角大楼应该整合许多不同的工具——从现场货运指纹识别到实时专业软件再到现场审计——并允许这些工具的制造商证明他们可以实现基本目标。

The United States retains enough economic power that it likely could continue “dumb bombing” the supply chain by trying to divide global supply networks into neatly intelligible, defense-unique supply chains that provide near-perfect transparency to U.S. policymakers.

美国保留了足够的经济实力，它可能会继续对供应链进行“愚蠢轰炸”，试图将全球供应网络划分为清晰易懂的、国防独特的供应链，为美国决策者提供近乎完美的透明度。

But as the world continues to evolve, that leads to fewer, more fragile sources of supply and skyrocketing costs as the more commercially competitive producers will seek out more user-friendly supply chain paradigms.

但随着世界不断发展，随着更具商业竞争力的生产商将寻求更加用户友好的供应链范式，这会导致供应来源减少、更加脆弱和成本飙升。

Rather than “dumb,” legacy approaches to supply chain transparency, the Pentagon should work with experienced supply chain experts to develop a framework that is flexible, competitive, and cost-effective.

五角大楼应该与经验丰富的供应链专家合作，开发一个灵活、有竞争力和具有成本效益的框架，而不是“愚蠢”的传统供应链透明度方法。

The expertise is out there, though largely located in non-defense enterprises: The U.S. military should be humble enough to listen.

专业知识就在那里，尽管主要集中在非国防企业：美国军方应该谦虚地倾听。

Ryan Caldwell is the principal of De Stijl Consulting , where he provides advice on critical mineral supply chains to U.S. and allied companies.

瑞安·考德威尔 (Ryan Caldwell) 是风格派咨询公司 (De Stijl Consulting) 的负责人，他为美国及其盟国公司提供有关关键矿产供应链的建议。

He previously worked for 15 years as a lobbyist at J.A.

此前，他曾在 J.A. 担任说客 15 年。

Green & Company, where he focused on supply chain security initiatives such as 10 U.S.C.

Green & Company，他专注于供应链安全计划，例如 10 U.S.C.

§§4872-4873.

§§4872-4873。

He is a graduate of the University of Texas and Duke University School of Law.

他毕业于德克萨斯大学和杜克大学法学院。

***Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

***请注意，根据公司风格，岩石战争不会使用美国国防部的不同名称，除非美国国会根据法规更改该名称。