US Intelligence Failures at Pearl Harbor

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was a shock to the Americans, but it was preceded by serious intelligence failures

日本偷袭珍珠港令美国人震惊，但在此之前却发生了严重的情报失误

Top Photo: View looking up "Battleship Row" on December 7, 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

顶部照片：1941 年 12 月 7 日，日本袭击珍珠港后，仰望“战舰排”的视图。

The battleship USS Arizona (BB-39) is in the center, burning furiously.

亚利桑那号战列舰 (BB-39) 位于中心，正在猛烈燃烧。

To the left of it are USS Tennessee (BB-43) and the sunken USS West Virginia (BB-48).

左边是田纳西号航空母舰 (BB-43) 和沉没的西弗吉尼亚号航空母舰 (BB-48)。

National Archives

国家档案馆

More than 2,400 American servicemembers and civilians were killed, and dozens of planes and ships destroyed or damaged in the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor.

1941 年 12 月 7 日，日本袭击了美国珍珠港海军基地，造成 2,400 多名美国军人和平民死亡，数十架飞机和船只被摧毁或损坏。

The attack, which decisively drew the United States into World War II, remains one of the worst intelligence failures in US history.

这次袭击决定性地将美国拖入第二次世界大战，仍然是美国历史上最严重的情报失败之一。

That failure was the result of several factors, including gaps in American officials’ knowledge about Japanese intentions and their inability to accurately assess signs of an impending attack based on information available to them at the time.

这次失败是多种因素造成的，包括美国官员对日本意图的了解存在差距，以及他们无法根据当时掌握的信息准确评估即将发生的袭击的迹象。

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was, in the words of historian Roberta Wohlstetter, “an attack presaged by a mass and variety of signals, which nonetheless achieved complete and overwhelming surprise.” 1

用历史学家罗伯塔·沃尔施泰特的话说，日本对珍珠港的袭击是“一次以大量、各种各样的信号预示的袭击，但却取得了彻底的、压倒性的出其不意”。 1

In the summer of 1940, American military analysts cracked a type of Japanese diplomatic code code-named PURPLE, giving American officials valuable insights into Japanese foreign policy.

1940 年夏天，美国军事分析家破解了一种代号为 PURPLE 的日本外交代号，为美国官员提供了了解日本外交政策的宝贵见解。

By late 1941, American military analysts had been intercepting and decrypting Japanese diplomatic messages for years as part of a program codenamed MAGIC—a success so closely guarded that the American public did not find out about it until after the war.

到 1941 年底，作为代号为“MAGIC”的计划的一部分，美国军事分析家多年来一直在拦截和解密日本外交信息，这一成功受到严格保护，以至于美国公众直到战后才发现这一消息。

But decrypting and translating those messages was a time-consuming process, and breaking Japan’s diplomatic code was not the same thing as breaking all relevant Japanese codes.

但解密和翻译这些信息是一个耗时的过程，而且破解日本的外交密码与破解所有相关的日本密码并不相同。

Unfortunately for American codebreakers, Japan’s army and navy used codes that differed not only from those used by the Foreign Ministry but were different from each other as well.

不幸的是，对于美国密码破译者来说，日本陆军和海军使用的密码不仅与外务省使用的密码不同，而且彼此之间也不同。

In both Washington and Hawaii, American analysts worked feverishly to break Japanese military codes, but by December 1941 there were still significant gaps in their knowledge.

在华盛顿和夏威夷，美国分析人员热衷于破译日本军事密码，但到 1941 年 12 月，他们的知识仍然存在重大差距。

Further complicating the Americans’ efforts to read Japanese military communications was the fact that the Imperial Japanese Navy changed its codes several times in the months leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

使美国人解读日本军事通讯的努力变得更加复杂的是，日本帝国海军在珍珠港袭击前的几个月内多次更改了代码。

Despite their struggles to break Japanese codes, American analysts were closely tracking Japanese naval activity.

尽管美国分析人士在破解日本密码方面遇到了困难，但他们仍在密切跟踪日本海军的活动。

In late November 1941, after Japan’s leaders made the decision to attack the United States, the task force sailing for Pearl Harbor did so under great secrecy.

1941 年 11 月下旬，在日本领导人做出进攻美国的决定后，前往珍珠港的特混舰队是在高度保密的情况下进行的。

Operating under strict radio silence, the Japanese fleet successfully concealed its position from the Americans.

日本舰队在严格的无线电静默下行动，成功地向美国人隐藏了自己的位置。

Aircraft are prepared for launch on the Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier Akagi to participate in the second wave of attacks on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

飞机准备在日本帝国海军赤城号航空母舰上起飞，参加对夏威夷珍珠港的第二波袭击。

December 7, 1941.

1941 年 12 月 7 日。

Wikimedia Commons

维基共享资源

Writing in 2010, political scientist Robert Jervis observed that “Intelligence is a game between hiders and finders, and the former usually have the easier job.” 2 This was especially true in the runup to the attack at Pearl Harbor.

政治学家罗伯特·杰维斯 (Robert Jervis) 在 2010 年撰文指出，“情报是隐藏者和发现者之间的游戏，而前者通常更容易完成任务。” 2 在珍珠港袭击前夕尤其如此。

At this critical moment, with the attack only days away, US Navy intelligence analysts at Pearl Harbor under Commander Joseph Rochefort reported to Admiral Husband E.

在距离袭击仅剩几天的关键时刻，约瑟夫·罗什福尔司令领导下的珍珠港美国海军情报分析员向海军上将赫斯本德·E·罗什报告了这一情况。

Kimmel, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, that they did not know the exact whereabouts of four Japanese aircraft carriers.

美国太平洋舰队司令金梅尔表示，他们不知道四艘日本航母的具体下落。

3

3

American military officials on the ground also missed the signs of an impending Japanese attack on the morning of December 7, 1941.

1941 年 12 月 7 日上午，地面上的美国军方官员也没有注意到日本即将发起进攻的迹象。

But besides their failures to collect vital intelligence on Japanese intentions and to accurately interpret information they did have, the Americans made an even greater blunder in failing to imagine that a devastating surprise attack on a heavily defended American naval base was a realistic possibility.

但除了未能收集有关日本意图的重要情报并准确解释他们所掌握的信息之外，美国人还犯了一个更大的错误，他们没有想象到对戒备森严的美国海军基地发动毁灭性的突然袭击是一种现实的可能性。

In early 1941, for instance, the American ambassador in Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a brief but disturbing message to his superiors in the State Department.

例如，1941 年初，美国驻日本大使约瑟夫·格鲁 (Joseph Grew) 向国务院上级发出了一条简短但令人不安的信息。

Grew reported that the Peruvian minister to Japan had told American diplomats that “the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities.” 4 But without adequate intelligence assets in Japan to investigate the report, and without an independent intelligence agency to collect and interpret intelligence reports from civilian and military sources, the warning went unheeded.

格鲁报道说，秘鲁驻日本部长告诉美国外交官，“日本军队计划，如果与美国发生麻烦，将利用其所有军事设施对珍珠港发动突然大规模袭击。” 4 但由于日本没有足够的情报资源来调查该报告，也没有独立的情报机构来收集和解释来自民间和军事来源的情报报告，因此该警告没有得到重视。

5

5

A navy photographer snapped this photograph of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, just as the USS Shaw exploded.

一名海军摄影师拍摄了这张 1941 年 12 月 7 日日本袭击夏威夷珍珠港的照片，当时肖号航空母舰爆炸。

The stern of the USS Nevada can be seen in the foreground.

前景中可以看到内华达号航空母舰的船尾。

National Archives (80-G-16871)

国家档案馆 (80-G-16871)

In the summer of 1946, after months of hearings and testimony, Congress released a massive report on the attack on Pearl Harbor, ending with 22 conclusions and recommendations that aimed to prevent such an attack from happening again.

1946 年夏天，经过数月的听证会和证词，国会发布了一份关于珍珠港袭击事件的大规模报告，最后提出了 22 条结论和建议，旨在防止此类袭击再次发生。

While many of them dealt with the very practical needs to coordinate intelligence activities and share information, the 10th conclusion had larger implications.

虽然其中许多结论涉及协调情报活动和共享信息的非常实际的需求，但第十个结论具有更大的含义。

“Had greater imagination and a keener awareness of the significance of intelligence existed,” the report’s authors wrote, “it is proper to suggest that someone should have concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack.” 6

该报告的作者写道：“如果有更大的想象力和对情报存在的重要性有更敏锐的认识，那么就应该得出珍珠港可能是日本攻击点的结论。” 6

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Americans redoubled their efforts to break Japanese naval codes.

珍珠港事件后，美国人加倍努力破译日本海军密码。

Led by Joseph Rochefort, who felt personally responsible for failing to detect the Japanese attack, Navy codebreakers in Hawaii worked night and day to identify Japan’s next moves.

约瑟夫·罗什福尔 (Joseph Rochefort) 认为自己对未能发现日本的袭击负有个人责任，在他的领导下，夏威夷的海军密码破译人员夜以继日地工作，以确定日本的下一步行动。

7 After months of work, they were able to break a key Japanese naval code known as JN-25.

7 经过几个月的工作，他们成功破解了日本海军的一个关键密码 JN-25。

Armed with the ability to now read some naval communications, Rochefort and his team concluded that the Japanese were planning a major attack on the American base at Midway Island.

罗什福尔和他的团队现在具备了阅读一些海军通讯的能力，他们得出的结论是，日本人正在计划对中途岛的美国基地发动大规模攻击。

This intelligence breakthrough was instrumental in the American victory at the Battle of Midway , in which US planes sank four Japanese aircraft carriers and halted Japan’s Pacific offensive.

这一情报突破对于美国在中途岛海战中的胜利发挥了重要作用，美国飞机击沉了四艘日本航空母舰并阻止了日本的太平洋攻势。

Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp.

Roberta Wohlstetter，《珍珠港事件：警告与决策》（加利福尼亚州斯坦福：斯坦福大学出版社，1962 年），第 14 页。

1.

1.

Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), pp.

罗伯特·杰维斯，《情报为何失败：伊朗革命和伊拉克战争的教训》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，2010 年），第 14 页。

2.

2.

Gordon W.

戈登·W.

Prange, with Donald M.

普兰奇，与唐纳德·M.

Goldstein and Katherine V.

戈尔茨坦和凯瑟琳 V.

Dillon, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), pp.

狄龙，《黎明时分，我们睡了：珍珠港不为人知的故事》（纽约：企鹅图书出版社，1981 年），第 173 页。

440.

440.

Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State, Tokyo, January 27, 1941, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Volume IV: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).

格鲁大使致国务卿，东京，1941 年 1 月 27 日，美国外交关系 (FRUS)，《外交文件》，1941 年，第四卷：远东（华盛顿特区：美国政府印刷局，1965 年）。

(URL: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v04/d11 ).

（网址：https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v04/d11）。

Accessed 9/12/2025.

访问日期：2025 年 9 月 12 日。

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), pp.

珍珠港袭击事件调查：珍珠港袭击事件调查联合委员会的报告（华盛顿特区：美国政府印刷局，1946 年），第 194 页。

259

第259章

Elliot Carlson, Joe Rochefort’s War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), pp.

埃利奥特·卡尔森，《乔·罗什福尔的战争：在中途岛智取山本的密码破译者的奥德赛》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：海军学院出版社，2011 年），第 14 页。

221.

221.

World War II was fought on battlefields all over the globe.

第二次世界大战是在全球各地的战场上进行的。

But it was also fought in the shadows—in covert operations that didn’t make the headlines, both at home and overseas.

但战争也是在暗处进行的——在国内和海外都没有成为头条新闻的秘密行动中。

In this series hosted by Museum Senior Historian Bradley W.

本系列由博物馆高级历史学家 Bradley W.

Hart, PhD, hear from expert historians and listen to the stories of the people who were there to uncover the secret World War II.

哈特博士听取了专家历史学家的意见，并聆听了那些在那里揭开第二次世界大战秘密的人们的故事。

Sean Scanlon is a World War II Military Historian at the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy.

肖恩·斯坎伦 (Sean Scanlon) 是珍妮·克雷格战争与民主研究所的二战军事历史学家。

The All-American Girls Professional Baseball League served as inspiration for young women across the country and opened the door further for women’s professional sports.

全美女子职业棒球联盟为全国年轻女性提供了灵感，并进一步为女子职业运动打开了大门。

Joseph R.

约瑟夫·R。

Beyrle's experience captures the initiative demanded of airborne soldiers, the brutality endured by prisoners of war, and the unlikely battlefield cooperation between American and Soviet soldiers during the final months of the war.

拜尔的经历体现了空降兵所需要的主动性、战俘所遭受的残酷以及战争最后几个月美国和苏联士兵之间不太可能的战场合作。

In the letter, Major Richard “Dick” Winters responded to Stephen Ambrose's request for his thoughts on the strain of command, the problems he faced during the war, and the living conditions his soldiers endured.

在信中，理查德·“迪克”·温特斯少校回应了斯蒂芬·安布罗斯关于他对指挥压力、他在战争期间面临的问题以及他的士兵所忍受的生活条件的看法的请求。

What emerged was also a concise explanation of Winters’s leadership philosophy.

随之而来的是对温特斯领导哲学的简洁解释。

At The National WWII Museum, remembering the anniversary of September 11 means remembering all those who perished that day and recognizing the many different stories they carried with them.

在国家二战博物馆，纪念 9 月 11 日的周年纪念意味着纪念那天所有遇难的人，并认识到他们所承载的许多不同的故事。

Upon its release, “Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition” quickly became very popular with wartime Americans.

《赞美主，传递弹药》一经推出，迅速受到战时美国人的欢迎。

During World War II, ship names often referenced earlier eras of American history.

第二次世界大战期间，舰艇名称经常引用美国历史的早期时期。

Today, the US Navy continues its efforts to memorialize the country’s origins by upholding naming traditions that hark back more than 160 years.

如今，美国海军继续努力维护 160 多年前的命名传统，以纪念国家的起源。

Initially, hell ships moved Allied POWs to areas where their labor was needed, such as the Japanese main islands and other recently conquered regions, but later, they also moved prisoners to prevent them from being liberated by advancing Allied forces.

最初，地狱船将盟军战俘转移到需要他们劳动力的地区，例如日本主岛和其他最近征服的地区，但后来，它们也转移囚犯，以防止他们被前进的盟军解放。

945 Magazine Street, New Orleans, LA 70130 info@nationalww2museum.org 504-528-1944

945 Magazine Street, 新奥尔良, LA 70130 info@nationalww2museum.org 504-528-1944