Pressure, the D-Day Weather Forecast Story
With bad weather and the limitations of meteorological technology at the time, General Dwight D.
由于恶劣的天气和当时气象技术的限制，德怀特·D.
Eisenhower had to determine when to launch the cross-channel invasion and begin Operation Overlord.
艾森豪威尔必须确定何时发动跨海峡入侵并开始霸王行动。
Pressure tells the story of the Allied weather forecast leading to the invasion of Normandy.
《压力》讲述了盟军天气预报导致诺曼底入侵的故事。
Top Photo: Brendan Fraser stars as General Dwight D.
热门照片：布兰登·弗雷泽 (Brendan Fraser) 饰演德怀特·D·将军 (General Dwight D.
Eisenhower in director Anthony Maras's Pressure , a Focus Features release.
艾森豪威尔在安东尼·马拉斯导演的《压力》中，由焦点电影公司发行。
Credit: Courtesy of Focus Features / STUDIOCANAL © 2026 All Rights Reserved.
图片来源：Focus Features / STUDIOCANAL © 2026 保留所有权利。
Americans love a good WWII movie.
美国人喜欢好看的二战电影。
Saving Private Ryan , The Thin Red Line , Flags of Our Fathers , Letters from Iwo Jima , Midway —these are just some of the more recent Hollywood treatments.
《拯救大兵瑞恩》、《细细的红线》、《父辈的旗帜》、《硫磺岛来信》、《中途岛》——这些只是好莱坞最近拍摄的一些影片。
For many moviegoers, such films often create narratives that set a precedent for public memory.
对于许多电影观众来说，此类电影常常创造出为公众记忆树立先例的叙事。
Whether fictional or nonfictional, accurate or inaccurate, these depictions establish a storyline that often supplants factual, historical events.
无论是虚构的还是非虚构的，准确的还是不准确的，这些描述所建立的故事情节往往取代了事实的历史事件。
Certainly, directors and writers need to take some artistic license and historical shortcuts for entertainment value.
当然，导演和编剧需要采取一些艺术许可和历史捷径来获得娱乐价值。
But errors—intentional or unintentional—along with manufactured drama often distort the more interesting and complex story.
但有意或无意的错误以及人为的戏剧往往会扭曲更有趣、更复杂的故事。
The next big WWII movie coming out is Pressure , scheduled for release in May 2026.
下一部即将上映的二战大片是《压力》，计划于 2026 年 5 月上映。
Directed by Anthony Maras and starring Brendan Fraser as Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D.
由安东尼·马拉斯执导，布兰登·弗雷泽主演，饰演盟军最高指挥官德怀特·D·肯尼迪将军。
Eisenhower, the film tells the story of the Allied weather forecast leading to the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944.
艾森豪威尔，这部电影讲述了盟军天气预报导致1944年6月6日入侵诺曼底的故事。
With bad weather and the limitations of meteorological technology at the time, Ike had to determine when to launch the cross-channel invasion and begin Operation Overlord.
由于恶劣的天气和当时气象技术的限制，艾克必须确定何时发起跨海峡入侵，开始霸王行动。
Fraser’s co-star, Andrew Scott, plays Royal Air Force (RAF) Group Captain James Stagg.
弗雷泽的搭档安德鲁·斯科特饰演英国皇家空军 (RAF) 上尉詹姆斯·斯塔格。
Stagg served as Eisenhower’s staff meteorologist and was responsible for determining and reporting forecasted weather conditions in and around the invasion area.
斯塔格担任艾森豪威尔的气象学家，负责确定和报告入侵地区及其周围的天气预报。
Pressure , like other films, will set a popular historical narrative.
与其他电影一样，《压力》将设定一个流行的历史叙事。
But, before its release, some background and context on Eisenhower’s decision might help inform the audience of this complex and layered story.
但是，在发布之前，有关艾森豪威尔决定的一些背景和背景可能有助于让观众了解这个复杂而层次分明的故事。
Brendan Fraser as General Dwight D.
布兰登·弗雷泽 饰 General Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Andrew Scott as Captain James Stagg in director Anthony Maras's Pressure , a Focus Features release.
艾森豪威尔和安德鲁·斯科特在焦点影业发行的安东尼·马拉斯导演的《压力》中饰演詹姆斯·斯塔格上尉。
Credit: Alex Bailey / Focus Features / STUDIOCANAL © 2026 All Rights Reserved.
图片来源：Alex Bailey / Focus Features / STUDIOCANAL © 2026 保留所有权利。
Amphibious assaults are complex operations.
两栖攻击是一项复杂的行动。
They require military forces to operate jointly in all three domains: air, land, and sea.
它们要求军队在空中、陆地和海上这三个领域联合行动。
But each service had its own requirements for Operation Overlord.
但每个军种对霸王行动都有自己的要求。
Of significant concern were the naval conditions needed for ship-to-shore movement.
值得关注的是船到岸移动所需的海军条件。
Landing craft coming ashore with men, materiel, and supplies had several elements to consider, including the sea state, breaking surf, beach composition, and shore gradient.
载着人员、物资和补给品登陆的登陆艇需要考虑几个因素，包括海况、巨浪、海滩构成和海岸坡度。
Larger naval ships providing support fire and logistics had similar concerns as environmental conditions also affect their operations.
提供火力和后勤支持的大型海军舰艇也有类似的担忧，因为环境条件也会影响其行动。
Likewise, aviation assets required good visibility and acceptable cloud ceilings, with winds conducive to both airborne landings and air support.
同样，航空资产需要良好的能见度和可接受的云顶，以及有利于机载着陆和空中支援的风。
For the ground forces, they hoped to avoid heavy downpours hampering traffic once ashore.
对于地面部队来说，他们希望避免上岸后大雨阻碍交通。
In addition to these meteorological and hydrographic concerns, for the Normandy invasion, ambient moonlight and tides were also a factor.
除了这些气象和水文问题之外，对于诺曼底入侵来说，周围的月光和潮汐也是一个因素。
Wanting illumination to assist in the predawn operations, planners sought dates with a full moon.
规划者希望有光照来协助黎明前的行动，因此寻找满月的日期。
Bright “moon shine” aided pilots carrying paratroopers in identifying selected landing zones while helping airborne soldiers avoid trees and other obstacles during their descent.
明亮的“月光”帮助携带伞兵的飞行员识别选定的着陆区域，同时帮助空降士兵在下降过程中避开树木和其他障碍物。
The moonlight also assisted troops embarking on landing craft in the early morning at sea and in the organization of assault waves heading ashore.
月光还帮助部队在清晨登上海上登陆艇以及组织上岸的突击波。
Finally, it helped illuminate enemy positions for both naval and air pre-landing fires.
最后，它有助于照亮敌人的阵地，以便进行海上和空中的登陆前火力攻击。
For the assault, planners also wanted to land while coastal tides were at low ebb.
对于这次袭击，规划者还希望在沿海潮汐处于低潮时登陆。
Such conditions exposed German beach obstacles, allowing assaulting troops to locate, evade, or destroy the hedgehogs, tetrahedrons, Belgian Gates, and other shoreline defenses.
这种情况暴露了德国海滩的障碍，使突击部队能够定位、躲避或摧毁刺猬、四面体、比利时门和其他海岸线防御设施。
While this increased the risk for soldiers crossing the open and exposed beach line, the benefits outweighed the risks.
虽然这增加了士兵穿越开阔和暴露的海滩线的风险，但好处大于风险。
Given these parameters, the 150,000 men, 11,000 aircraft, and over 6,000 vessels comprising the landing force had only a few dates that fit these two naturally occurring conditions.
鉴于这些参数，组成登陆部队的 150,000 名人员、11,000 架飞机和 6,000 多艘船只只有几个日期符合这两种自然发生的条件。
Along the Normandy coast, only a small window on June 5–7 provided such environments.
在诺曼底海岸，只有 6 月 5 日至 7 日的一个小窗口提供了这样的环境。
US troops assault Omaha Beach during the D-Day landings.
美军在诺曼底登陆期间袭击奥马哈海滩。
Normandy, France.
法国诺曼底。
June 6, 1944.
1944 年 6 月 6 日。
© Robert Capa © International Center of Photography | Magnum Photos
© 罗伯特·卡帕 © 国际摄影中心 |马格南照片
With those calendar dates, planners also required two to three days of mild weather allowing simultaneous air, naval, and land operations.
根据这些日历日期，规划者还需要两到三天的温和天气，以便同时进行空中、海上和陆地行动。
At the time, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) planners hoped for what they referred to as “quiet weather.” While each service has specific meteorological requirements, “quiet weather” included winds between 7 and 10 knots on the coast and 13 and18 knots at sea, and cloud cover no more than 30 percent below 8,000 feet, with visibility greater than three miles.
当时，盟军远征军最高司令部（SHAEF）的规划者希望出现他们所说的“安静天气”。虽然每项服务都有特定的气象要求，但“安静天气”包括海岸风速为 7 至 10 节，海上风速为 13 至 18 节，8,000 英尺以下云层覆盖率不超过 30%，能见度大于 3 英里。
The question facing Eisenhower was: Would the small June 5–7 window meet these weather conditions?
艾森豪威尔面临的问题是：6 月 5 日至 7 日的小窗口能否满足这些天气条件？
This question fell to Stagg, but answering it required a weather forecast approximately 36 to 48 hours in advance of the execution order.
这个问题落在了斯塔格身上，但回答这个问题需要在执行命令之前大约 36 到 48 小时进行天气预报。
Forecasting during this era, however, was difficult.
然而，在这个时代进行预测是很困难的。
Weather fronts in the Atlantic generally travel from west to east.
大西洋的锋面通常从西向东移动。
Given this pattern, predicting weather along coastal France required an understanding of the conditions over North America, the Atlantic, Greenland, and the British Isles.
鉴于这种模式，预测法国沿海的天气需要了解北美、大西洋、格陵兰岛和不列颠群岛的情况。
At a time before satellites, weather radar, and computer simulations, meteorologists could rely only on various scheduled (or unscheduled) observations from established weather stations, ships at sea, or aircraft reports.
在卫星、气象雷达和计算机模拟出现之前，气象学家只能依赖来自已建立的气象站、海上船只或飞机报告的各种计划（或计划外）观测。
From these observations, meteorologists at the time created subjective forecasts, but there was no real way to determine weather conditions 48 to 72 hours out—although some claimed they could.
当时的气象学家根据这些观测结果做出了主观预测，但没有真正的方法来确定 48 至 72 小时后的天气状况——尽管有些人声称可以。
Almost a century before, in 1854, the British first established the Meteorological Office, known as the Met Office.
大约一个世纪前的 1854 年，英国首先成立了气象局，称为气象局 (Met Office)。
By 1859, it began reporting weather for mariners, and, during World War I, the Met Office provided comparable services to the nascent Royal Flying Corps.
到 1859 年，它开始为水手报告天气，第一次世界大战期间，英国气象局为新生的皇家飞行队提供了类似的服务。
In World War II, the Met Office and RAF joined forces with civilian observers to support military operations.
在第二次世界大战中，英国气象局和英国皇家空军与民间观察员联手支持军事行动。
Starting in 1940, the Met Office’s central forecasting and communications office was located at Dunstable Downs, 35 miles northwest of London.
从 1940 年开始，英国气象局的中央预报和通讯办公室位于伦敦西北 35 英里的邓斯特布尔唐斯 (Dunstable Downs)。
With a staff of nearly 10,000 people, it maintained a series of weather stations with various capabilities to help determine forecasts during the conflict.
它拥有近 10,000 名员工，维护着一系列具有各种功能的气象站，以帮助确定冲突期间的预报。
Some 500 stations in the British Isles, including Ireland, made hourly reports: Observers sent their updates via teleprinter to the main office at Dunstable, where the information was used to produce forecasts and plot weather maps.
包括爱尔兰在内的不列颠群岛的大约 500 个气象站每小时发布一次报告：观察员通过电传打印机将最新情况发送到邓斯特布尔的总办公室，在那里，这些信息用于生成预报和绘制天气图。
When the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) arrived in the United Kingdom, it also brought its own meteorological services.
当美国陆军空军（USAAF）抵达英国时，也带来了自己的气象服务。
In 1944, a central forecasting office codenamed “Widewing” was established under the US Strategic Air Forces.
1944年，美国战略空军下设代号“Widewing”的中央预报办公室。
Headed by Colonel Donald Yates, Widewing shared responsibility with the British Admiralty and the Met Office in preparing forecasts for the (SHAEF) and the Overlord effort.
在唐纳德·耶茨 (Donald Yates) 上校的领导下，Widewing 与英国海军部和英国气象局共同负责为 (SHAEF) 和霸王计划准备预报。
As a result, Stagg had support from three separate meteorological services at his disposal.
因此，斯塔格得到了三个独立气象部门的支持。
But this was not necessarily an asset.
但这不一定是资产。
SHAEF had integrated British and American command structures, with a US general as the Supreme Allied Commander and staff sections led by British officers with American deputies.
最高统帅部整合了英国和美国的指挥结构，由一名美国将军担任盟军最高指挥官，参谋部门由英国军官和美国副手领导。
Although the two countries were allies, disagreement over doctrines, methodologies, and strategies often created tensions.
尽管两国是盟友，但在理论、方法和战略上的分歧经常造成紧张局势。
Understanding that diplomacy, tact, and the ability to work in a stressful environment was required, in November 1943 Met Office director Dr. Nelson Johnson nominated Stagg as SHAEF’s chief meteorologist.
1943 年 11 月，英国气象局局长纳尔逊·约翰逊 (Nelson Johnson) 博士认识到需要外交、机智和在压力环境下工作的能力，因此任命斯塔格为 SHAEF 的首席气象学家。
Eventually, SHAEF’s meteorological office reflected the larger integrated arrangement, with Stagg as the lead and Yates serving as deputy.
最终，SHAEF的气象办公室体现了更大的综合安排，斯塔格担任领导，耶茨担任副职。
Royal Air Force Group Captain James Stagg.
皇家空军大队队长詹姆斯·斯塔格。
Despite having no formal military training, he was named Chief Meteorologist at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
尽管没有接受过正式的军事训练，他还是被任命为盟军远征军最高司令部的首席气象学家。
Imperial War Museums
帝国战争博物馆
Born in 1900 and described as a “dour but canny Scot,” Stagg studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.
斯塔格出生于 1900 年，被称为“严肃但精明的苏格兰人”，他在爱丁堡大学学习数学和哲学。
Participating in the 1932 British Polar Expedition of Arctic Canda, he gained his appreciation of the meteorology community despite having no formal training in the disciple.
1932年参加英国北极加拿大极地探险时，尽管没有接受过正式的弟子培训，但他还是获得了气象界的赞赏。
After he received a doctorate in science in 1936, Stagg worked in the Air Ministry weather office and was eventually appointed superintendent of the Kew Observatory.
1936 年获得科学博士学位后，斯塔格在空军部气象办公室工作，最终被任命为邱园天文台台长。
By spring 1944, he was commissioned as a Group Captain in the RAF Volunteer Reserve, authorized to wear the uniform, which removed the stigma of being a civilian in the SHAEF Headquarters.
1944 年春，他被任命为英国皇家空军志愿预备队的上尉，有权穿着制服，这消除了作为最高统帅部队总部平民的耻辱。
US Army Air Force General Donald Yates.
美国陆军空军上将唐纳德·耶茨。
As a Colonel, he headed the American Widewing meteorological office in the United Kingdom.
作为上校，他领导了位于英国的美国 Widewing 气象办公室。
US Air Force Photo
美国空军照片
Serving together at SHAEF, Stagg and Yates established a friendly, cordial, professional relationship.
斯塔格和耶茨在 SHAEF 一起工作时建立了友好、诚恳、专业的关系。
Despite their amiable personal relationship, their respective national meteorological services did not share the same sentiments, as each followed differing schools of thought regarding forecasting.
尽管他们的个人关系和睦，但他们各自的国家气象部门却没有相同的观点，因为每个人在预测方面都遵循不同的思想流派。
Even upon his appointment, Stagg began wondering, “Is it really the case that I shall have to make my forecasts fit with those of several other teams of forecasters?” The competing methodologies along with organizational animosities would make Stagg’s job even harder.
即使在被任命后，斯塔格也开始怀疑：“我真的必须让我的预测与其他几个预测团队的预测相一致吗？”相互竞争的方法论以及组织上的敌意将使斯塔格的工作变得更加困难。
Yates joined the SHAEF staff while still in charge of the American Widewing office.
耶茨加入了 SHAEF 工作人员，同时仍负责美国 Widewing 办公室。
Located at Bushy Park southwest of central London, his fellow Americans subscribed to the “Analogue Method” of forecasting.
位于伦敦市中心西南部的布希公园，他的美国同胞们赞同“模拟方法”的预测。
Advocated by Lieutenant Colonel Irving Krick, this method utilized current observations and compared them with previous surface weather patterns.
这种方法由欧文·克里克中校倡导，利用当前的观测结果并将其与之前的地表天气模式进行比较。
Prior to the war, Krick gained the trust of USAAF Chief of Staff General H.
战前，克里克赢得了美国空军参谋长 H.
H.
H.
Arnold and leveraged his patronage.
阿诺德并利用了他的赞助。
Using historical charts, he would find one that matched current conditions and assumed the weather would follow the previous pattern.
使用历史图表，他会找到一个符合当前条件的图表，并假设天气会遵循之前的模式。
They claimed this method to be accurate for up to five days, with an arrogant Krick even going so far as to claim he could accurately forecast weeks in advance.
他们声称这种方法的准确度长达五天，傲慢的克里克甚至声称他可以提前几周准确预测。
While confident in his methodology, Krick failed to include upper atmosphere circulation patterns that often drive surface weather conditions.
尽管克里克对自己的方法充满信心，但他未能将高层大气环流模式纳入其中，而高层大气环流模式通常会驱动地表天气状况。
Alternatively, the Met’s Dunstable office included veteran meteorologists C.
另外，大都会邓斯特布尔办公室包括资深气象学家 C.
K.
K.
M.
M。
Douglas, a WWI pilot, and Norwegian Sverre Petterssen, who served as head of the Meteorological Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
第一次世界大战飞行员道格拉斯和曾任麻省理工学院气象系主任的挪威人斯维尔·佩特森。
These men advocated the “Bergen School,” which was a more three-dimensional approach.
这些人提倡“卑尔根学派”，这是一种更加三维的方法。
It included upper air reports from the newly discovered jet streams and made connections to surface conditions and forecasts.
它包括新发现的急流的高空报告，并与地面状况和预报建立了联系。
This method required RAF weather aircraft to report on conditions at low, medium, and high altitudes while flying routes stretching from Gibraltar to Norway.
这种方法要求英国皇家空军的气象飞机在从直布罗陀到挪威的航线上报告低、中和高海拔的情况。
Even with these reconnaissance flights and reports, Douglas believed that forecasts after 48 hours were mere speculation.
即使有了这些侦察飞行和报告，道格拉斯仍然认为 48 小时后的预测只是猜测。
He went on further to quip, “It is just not possible to make regular forecasts for five or six days ahead that can have any real value for military operations or any other purpose …
他进一步打趣道：“不可能对未来五六天进行定期预测，这对军事行动或任何其他目的具有任何实际价值......
at least in this country.” In addition to the divergence in method between the Americans and the British, personal animosity between the self-promoting Krick and Met Office staff made the two offices even less willing to accept each other’s conclusions.
至少在这个国家是这样。”除了美国人和英国人在方法上的分歧之外，自吹自擂的克里克和英国气象局工作人员之间的个人仇恨也使得两个部门更不愿意接受对方的结论。
Complicating the differences in meteorological approach, neither office had the most accurate or timely weather data.
两个办公室都没有最准确或最及时的天气数据，这使得气象方法的差异变得更加复杂。
Reports and observations from both ships and planes in the Atlantic were often sporadic, late, or had to be decoded (leading to errors).
来自大西洋的船只和飞机的报告和观察结果往往是零星的、延迟的，或者必须解码（导致错误）。
Once these observations were collected, weather charts were then hastily drawn by hand and prone to error or personal interpretation.
一旦收集到这些观测结果，天气图表就会被匆忙地手工绘制，并且很容易出现错误或个人解释。
Developing specific forecasts from such unreliable or subjective sources was obviously a problem.
从这种不可靠或主观的来源制定具体的预测显然是一个问题。
In addition, each organization used its own charts for interpretation.
此外，每个组织都使用自己的图表进行解释。
As a result, members of the collective group were using their own charts instead of one agreed upon depiction.
结果，集体成员使用他们自己的图表，而不是商定的描述。
Eisenhower moved SHAEF from Norfolk House in London to Southwick House in Portsmouth on May 29, with Stagg also relocating.
艾森豪威尔于 5 月 29 日将最高统帅部从伦敦的诺福克宫迁至朴茨茅斯的绍斯威克宫，斯塔格也随之搬迁。
However, at the new location, the Group Captain had neither his own meteorological office or staff.
然而，在新地点，大队长既没有自己的气象办公室，也没有工作人员。
Both Stagg and Yates had to rely on British Admiral Bertram Ramsey’s weather personnel, charts, and workspaces located in a Nissen hut behind the estate building.
斯塔格和耶茨都必须依赖英国海军上将伯特伦·拉姆齐的气象人员、图表和位于庄园大楼后面尼森小屋的工作空间。
With no staff of their own, they commandeered a secretary from Widewing until they could secure a one from the Woman’s Auxiliary Air Force.
由于没有自己的工作人员，他们从 Widewing 征用了一名秘书，直到他们从女子辅助空军那里找到了一名秘书。
Hardly a well-staffed or equipped office given its importance.
鉴于其重要性，几乎没有一个人员配备齐全或设备齐全的办公室。
With the small June window of opportunity for the invasion, Eisenhower needed to believe that he could trust his meteorologists.
由于六月的入侵机会很小，艾森豪威尔需要相信他可以信任他的气象学家。
Before SHAEF moved to Portsmouth, Stagg’s office was adjacent to Ike’s war room, and the men frequently chatted about the weather.
在 SHAEF 搬到朴茨茅斯之前，斯塔格的办公室毗邻艾克的作战室，人们经常谈论天气。
Additionally, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Bedel Smith, directed Stagg to start preparing weather forecasts each Monday, then compared them with actual conditions as the week unfolded, with Thursday as the targeted D-Day.
此外，艾森豪威尔的参谋长贝德尔·史密斯中将指示斯塔格开始每周一准备天气预报，然后将其与本周的实际情况进行比较，周四为目标诺曼底登陆日。
From this, SHAEF hoped to deduce the accuracy of his meteorological staff.
SHAEF 希望由此推断其气象人员的准确性。
To assist in this endeavor, and in addition to Widewing and the Met Office, Stagg also conferred with the Royal Navy Admiralty along with other air and naval meteorologists.
为了协助这项工作，除了 Widewing 和英国气象局之外，斯塔格还与皇家海军海军部以及其他空中和海军气象学家进行了协商。
These various parties conferred on Sunday nights, with Stagg hoping to gain a consensus.
这些各方在周日晚上进行了磋商，斯塔格希望能够达成共识。
Unfortunately for the SHAEF meteorologists, such agreement rarely, if ever, happened.
不幸的是，对于 SHAEF 气象学家来说，这样的协议很少（如果有的话）发生。
Eventually, the May landing date had to be pushed back one month due to a lack of landing craft.
最终，由于缺乏登陆艇，五月登陆日期不得不推迟一个月。
The target date was now tentatively set for June 5, with the next possible window on June 19-21.
目前目标日期暂定为 6 月 5 日，下一个可能的窗口期为 6 月 19 日至 21 日。
Although the later date did not have a full moon, the tidal conditions remained suitable.
虽然后来没有满月，但潮汐条件仍然合适。
However, if the “quiet weather” required during the first window failed to materialize, the coiled spring that was the invasion force would have to idle at staging areas for weeks, risking the discovery of the Overlord plan.
然而，如果第一个窗口期间所需的“安静天气”未能实现，作为入侵部队的螺旋弹簧将不得不在集结地闲置数周，从而冒着被发现霸王计划的风险。
The weather during May was largely fine and clear, but as the month ended, it worsened.
五月的天气基本上晴朗，但随着月底，天气变得更糟。
Weather forecasts occurred twice daily at Southwick House, and those scheduled for early June were crucial.
Southwick House 每天都会发布两次天气预报，其中六月初的天气预报至关重要。
On June 1, the Americans predicted a ridge of high pressure building northwards from the Azores for several days and eventually covering the landing beaches.
6月1日，美国人预测一道高压脊将从亚速尔群岛向北形成，持续数天，并最终覆盖登陆海滩。
They predicted clear weather and light winds but forecasted deteriorating conditions beginning the 3rd and 4th, with the ridge reestablishing itself afterward.
他们预计天气晴朗，微风，但预计从 3 日和 4 日开始，情况会恶化，之后山脊会自行恢复。
The Americans at Widewing concluded that the invasion should begin as scheduled on June 5.
Widewing 的美国人得出的结论是，入侵应该如期于 6 月 5 日开始。
However, British analysts at Dunstable saw an anti-cyclone over Greenland forcing cold air south.
然而，英国邓斯特布尔的分析人士发现，格陵兰岛上空的反气旋迫使冷空气南下。
The upper air charts showed a thermal gradient tracking eastward to Scotland.
高空图显示热梯度向东延伸至苏格兰。
With this movement, Douglas and Petterssen predicted a large depression with accompanying bad weather, producing heavy winds and low clouds over the invasion beaches on June 5.
道格拉斯和佩特森预测，随着这一运动，6 月 5 日，入侵海滩上空将出现大气压，并伴随恶劣天气，产生强风和低云。
These diverging forecasts put Stagg and Yates in the difficult position of having to reconcile conflicting reports from their respective meteorological offices.
这些不同的预测使斯塔格和耶茨陷入了困境，必须协调各自气象局相互矛盾的报告。
For Yates, it was especially difficult, as siding with Dunstable meant he was rejecting his own Widewing forecasters.
对于耶茨来说，这尤其困难，因为站在邓斯特布尔一边意味着他拒绝自己的宽翼预测。
Stagg, too, felt the pressure, with the lead planner for Overlord, General Freddie Morgan, commenting to the Group Captain, “Good luck Stagg, may all your depressions be nice little ones; but remember we’ll string you up from the nearest lamp post if you don’t read the omens right.”
斯塔格也感受到了压力，“霸主”的首席策划者弗雷迪·摩根将军向大队长评论道：“祝你好运，斯塔格，愿你所有的抑郁症都变成美好的小事；但请记住，如果你没有正确解读预兆，我们会把你从最近的灯柱上吊起来。”
On June 3, the high pressure over the Azores drifted westward, and the depression over Scotland moved south with a cold front causing winds to build over the English Channel.
6月3日，亚速尔群岛上空的高压向西漂移，苏格兰上空的低压带冷锋向南移动，导致英吉利海峡上空风力增强。
This produced the lowest depression ever recorded over Britian at that time of year, with pressure falling to 976.8 millibars.
这使得英国在一年中的这个时候有记录以来最低的气压，气压降至 976.8 毫巴。
Eventually, both Stagg and Yates were swayed by Dunstable’s argument and determined Widewing’s predictions were suspect.
最终，斯塔格和耶茨都被邓斯特布尔的论点所动摇，并认为威德温的预测是可疑的。
At the 9:30 p.m.
晚上 9:30
meeting, Stagg reported to Ike that the approaching conditions would produce 10/10 (100 percent) cloud cover, a ceiling at times of only 500 feet, winds from 13 to 30 mph with gusts up to 39, rain squalls accompanied by heavy showers, and fog both at sea and in coastal areas.
会议期间，斯塔格向艾克报告，即将到来的天气情况将产生 10/10（100%）的云量，有时云层高度仅为 500 英尺，风速为 13 至 30 英里/小时，阵风高达 39 级，伴有暴雨的暴雨，以及海上和沿海地区的大雾。
Weather conditions such as these would adversely and severely affect airborne operations, ship-to-shore movement, close air support, and a host of other essential functions.
诸如此类的天气条件将对空中作战、舰岸移动、近距离空中支援以及许多其他基本功能产生不利和严重的影响。
Paratroopers would be scattered over a large area, assuming they could even safely make it to the ground.
伞兵将分散在大片区域，假设他们甚至可以安全到达地面。
Many of the landing craft heading ashore would capsize or be swamped in the rough seas, or land way off mark.
许多上岸的登陆艇都会在波涛汹涌的大海中倾覆或被淹没，或者偏离目标着陆。
Lastly, fighter and bomber support aircraft would be unable help the ground forces ashore and under the low overcast and fog.
最后，战斗机和轰炸机支援机将无法帮助地面部队上岸以及在低云和大雾下。
Stagg reported the front would eventually cross over the invasion beaches on June 5.
斯塔格报道称，前线最终将于 6 月 5 日越过入侵海滩。
He and Yates eventually left the room to wait outside.
他和耶茨最终离开房间在外面等候。
After an hour, at 10:15 p.m., Eisenhower’s Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Major General Harold Bull, announced the decision to delay the operation on a day-to-day basis.
一个小时后，晚上 10 点 15 分，艾森豪威尔的助理参谋长 G-3 哈罗德·布尔少将宣布推迟日常行动的决定。
While some ships would sortie that tonight, another meeting was scheduled early the next morning.
虽然有些船只今晚会出动，但第二天一早又安排了另一次会议。
Despite forecasting bad weather for the assault, as Stagg exited Southwick House, the skies above were clear and the wind was still, with a quiet falling upon the grounds.
尽管预计袭击天气不佳，但当斯塔格离开绍斯威克庄园时，头顶的天空晴朗，风也静止，地面上一片安静。
Helping Stagg with his forecast was an observation from a postmistress in the village of Blacksod, Ireland.
爱尔兰布莱克索德村一位邮政局长的观察为斯塔格的预测提供了帮助。
Some 520 miles north of Normandy and living on the island’s west coast, 21-year-old Maureen Flavin’s duties included taking weather observations at the local post office and then reporting them to the Met Office.
21 岁的 Maureen Flavin 生活在诺曼底以北约 520 英里处，居住在该岛的西海岸，她的职责包括在当地邮局进行天气观测，然后向气象局报告。
While Ireland was neutral during the war, it continued providing weather data to Dunstable.
虽然爱尔兰在战争期间保持中立，但它继续向邓斯特布尔提供天气数据。
At 1:00 a.m.
凌晨 1:00
on her birthday, June 3, Flavin reported steadily increasing wind and rain with an accompanying pressure drop, signaling the approach of bad weather.
6 月 3 日是她的生日，弗拉文报告说，风雨不断增加，气压也随之下降，这预示着恶劣天气即将来临。
After her initial report, Met Office staffers asked her again later that next morning to confirm the observations that eventually led to Stagg’s report.
在她初次报告后，气象局工作人员第二天早上再次询问她，以确认最终导致斯塔格报告的观察结果。
After conferring with Widewing, Dunstable, and other offices throughout the late night and early morning, Stagg and Yates again entered the library of Southwick House.
在深夜和清晨与威德温、邓斯特布尔和其他办公室商讨之后，斯塔格和耶茨再次进入了绍斯威克学院的图书馆。
Briefing SHAEF leadership at 4:15 a.m., the Group Captain reiterated much of the same from his earlier briefing only hours earlier, claiming very little had changed.
凌晨 4 点 15 分，这位大队长向最高统帅部队领导层通报情况，重申了几小时前通报中的大部分内容，并声称几乎没有什么变化。
Putting great stock in the ability of air support to increase the chances of success, Eisenhower concluded that they needed to postpone.
艾森豪威尔非常看重空中支援的能力，以增加成功的机会，因此得出结论，他们需要推迟。
After asking for dissenting voices, the Supreme Allied Commander received none, then instructed his Chief of Staff to inform the Combined Chiefs that he was calling for a postponement for one day and to recall the ships that had already begun sailing.
在询问了不同意见后，盟军最高指挥官没有得到任何反对意见，然后指示他的参谋长通知联合参谋长，他要求推迟一天并召回已经开始航行的船只。
With time before the next set of observations were to arrive, both men finally grabbed a little bit of sleep as the sun shone brightly upon their tent.
距离下一组观测到来还有一段时间，当阳光明亮地照在他们的帐篷上时，两人终于睡了一会儿。
But, as the day passed, the weather around Portsmouth began to turn for the worse.
但是，随着时间的推移，朴茨茅斯周围的天气开始变得更糟。
While local weather became gloomier, patterns in the Atlantic promised a possible interval of better weather in the objective area.
虽然当地天气变得更加阴沉，但大西洋的模式预示着目标地区可能会出现一段较好的天气。
Later that same day, at the 9:30 p.m.
当天晚些时候，晚上 9 点 30 分。
meeting with Eisenhower, Stagg and Yates reported a marked change in the weather.
与艾森豪威尔、斯塔格和耶茨的会面报告了天气的显着变化。
While the recent weather was more indicative of the mid-winter period, Stagg forecasted that wind speeds would drop to 13 to 24 mph and 8 to 18 mph along the French coast, clouds breaking to a 5/10 (50 percent) overcast with a ceiling of 2,500 to 3,000 feet.
虽然最近的天气更像是仲冬时期，但斯塔格预测法国海岸的风速将降至 13 至 24 英里/小时和 8 至 18 英里/小时，云层将变为 5/10（50%）阴，最高高度为 2,500 至 3,000 英尺。
While certainly better, the conditions remained marginal.
虽然情况确实有所好转，但条件仍然很有限。
Struggling with the new information, Ike faced a dilemma, asking, “Just how long can you keep this operation on the end of a limb and let it hang there?”
面对新的信息，艾克陷入了困境，他问道：“你能把这个手术放在肢体末端并让它挂在那里多久？”
After their report, Stagg and Yates left the room as Eisenhower turned to his commanders asking for their assessment.
报告结束后，斯塔格和耶茨离开了房间，艾森豪威尔转向他的指挥官询问他们的评估。
While his subordinates were split, he eventually concluded: “I’m quite positive the order must be given.” When he emerged from the room, he gave a provisional order for the slower ships of the invasion fleet to launch.
虽然他的下属意见不一，但他最终得出结论：“我确信必须下达命令。”当他从房间里出来时，他下达了临时命令，让入侵舰队中速度较慢的船只出发。
Turning to Stagg, the Supreme Commander quipped, “Well, Stagg, we’re putting it on again; for heaven’s sake hold the weather to what you told us and don’t bring any more bad news.” However, Eisenhower still called for an update at 4:30 a.m.
最高指挥官转向斯塔格，打趣道：“好吧，斯塔格，我们又把它穿上了；看在上帝的份上，让天气保持在你告诉我们的样子，不要再带来任何坏消息了。”然而，艾森豪威尔仍然在凌晨 4 点 30 分呼吁更新情况。
the next day.
第二天。
The low-pressure system Stagg and others had been watching in the Atlantic slowed, and a possible 36-hour window of fair weather emerged.
斯塔格和其他人一直在大西洋观察的低压系统放缓了，可能出现 36 小时的晴朗天气窗口。
Waking from a fitful sleep at 3:30 a.m.
凌晨 3 点 30 分从断断续续的睡眠中醒来。
June 5, Eisenhower again made his way to Southwick House.
6月5日，艾森豪威尔再次前往绍斯威克宫。
At 4:15 a.m., as hard rain pelted the windows and stiff winds howled, he again listened to Stagg’s report.
凌晨4点15分，大雨打在窗户上，狂风呼啸，他再次聆听斯塔格的汇报。
Like the previous night’s predictions, Stagg forecasted the weather would indeed hold for a few days and that Tuesday’s conditions would include patches of overcast less than 5/10, a cloud base at 2,000 feet, with winds around 15 to 18 mph.
与前一天晚上的预测一样，斯塔格预测这种天气确实会持续几天，周二的天气情况将包括小于 5/10 的阴天，云底高度为 2,000 英尺，风速约为 15 至 18 英里/小时。
The days following would hold much the same weather.
接下来的几天天气基本相同。
Upon completion of his briefing, the meteorologists were again dismissed and waited outside.
简报结束后，气象学家再次解散并在外面等待。
The Met’s forecasting map for June 4, 1944, that helped Stagg make his forecast report to Eisenhower that evening.
大都会博物馆 1944 年 6 月 4 日的预报地图帮助斯塔格在当晚向艾森豪威尔提交了预报报告。
(UK National Meteorological Library and Archive)
（英国国家气象图书馆和档案馆）
Accounts differ on what Eisenhower’s actual words were that morning.
对于艾森豪威尔那天早上的实际言论，各方说法不一。
Whether he said, “Well, we’ll go!,” “OK, let ’er rip,” “OK boys, we will go,” or “OK, we’ll go ahead,” the verbiage does not matter.
无论他是说“好吧，我们走吧！”、“好吧，让我们撕裂吧”、“好吧，孩子们，我们走吧”，还是“好吧，我们走吧”，措辞并不重要。
Despite contradicting inputs from his staff and commanders, suspect weather patterns, and a myriad of other concerns, Eisenhower, and Eisenhower alone, made the decision to launch the Allied assault.
尽管他的参谋和指挥官的意见相互矛盾、天气模式可疑以及无数其他担忧，艾森豪威尔和艾森豪威尔一人还是决定发动盟军进攻。
A decision long in coming had finally arrived.
一个期待已久的决定终于到来了。
Later that morning around 9:00 a.m., Stagg called General Bull and confirmed his earlier forecast.
当天上午 9:00 左右，斯塔格给布尔将军打电话，确认了他之前的预测。
Stagg went on to reassure the G-3 that the decision to delay was correct, with Bull reporting:
斯塔格继续向三国集团保证推迟的决定是正确的，布尔报告说：
“…the possible feeling of the commanders that the decision to reference Monday’s postponement might not have been a sound one…[Stagg] called attention to the well-established fact that the rain and clouds which was over here [Southwick House] last night has been over the OVERLORD area with a 10/10s cloud last night continuing probably up to 9:00 AM, which presented a situation unacceptable to our air and airborne plans.
“……指挥官们可能认为，参考周一推迟的决定可能不是一个合理的决定……[斯塔格]提请注意一个公认的事实，即昨晚这里[Southwick House]的雨和云已经覆盖了 OVERLORD 地区，昨晚 10/10 的云可能持续到上午 9:00，这对我们的空中和机载计划来说是不可接受的。
Monday definitely would have been highly unsatisfactory.”
周一肯定会非常令人不满意。”
Despite this observation and the resulting weather, Widewing and Krick continued to argue their case, claiming their assessments were correct.
尽管有这一观察结果和由此产生的天气，Widewing 和 Krick 仍继续争论他们的观点，声称他们的评估是正确的。
Amazingly, they continued this claim for decades.
令人惊讶的是，他们几十年来一直坚持这种说法。
Reports from the naval task force approaching Utah beach revealed a partly cloudy sky, ceiling of 2,000 to 3,000 feet, visibility of 7 to 8 miles, west winds at 18 to 25 mph, with a moderately choppy sea with 3- to 4-foot waves.
接近犹他海滩的海军特遣部队的报告显示，天空部分多云，高度为 2,000 至 3,000 英尺，能见度为 7 至 8 英里，西风时速 18 至 25 英里，海面波涛汹涌，波浪高 3 至 4 英尺。
With paratroopers already landing, at H-Hour, the sky turned 9/10 covered, but with a ceiling above 10,000 feet with scattered clouds at 1,200 feet.
随着伞兵已经着陆，H 小时，天空变成了 9/10 覆盖，但天花板在 10,000 英尺以上，1,200 英尺处有零散的云层。
Visibility was 8 miles, 18 mph winds, and 3- to 4-foot waves.
能见度为 8 英里，风速 18 英里/小时，波浪高 3 至 4 英尺。
While not optimal, it was good enough.
虽然不是最佳的，但已经足够好了。
The weather on June 7 proved less desirable, but by that point, Allied troops were already ashore.
6 月 7 日的天气不太理想，但此时盟军已经上岸。
While the situation was still tenuous, over 130,000 men landed that first day.
尽管形势依然严峻，但第一天就有超过 130,000 人登陆。
If Eisenhower ordered another delay, the next launch window was June 17-18.
如果艾森豪威尔下令再次推迟，则下一次发射窗口是 6 月 17 日至 18 日。
Unbeknown to all at the time, a severe storm in the English Channel arrived June 19-21, a storm so powerful that it wrecked one of the two Allied artificial “Mulberry” harbors.
当时所有人都不知道，6 月 19 日至 21 日，英吉利海峡遭遇了一场严重风暴，这场风暴的威力如此之大，以至于摧毁了盟军两个人工“桑树”港口之一。
Had they waited for that second window and been hit by the storm, the operation may have well been a failure.
如果他们等待第二个窗口并遭到暴风雨袭击，那么这次行动很可能会失败。
Additionally, given tidal and moonlight requirements, the next launch window would not occur until August.
此外，考虑到潮汐和月光要求，下一次发射窗口要到八月才会出现。
Such a two-month delay would give the Germans more time to discover Allied intentions and strengthen their beach defenses.
这样两个月的延迟将使德国人有更多时间发现盟军的意图并加强他们的海滩防御。
Given these considerations, Eisenhower wrote Stagg weeks later after learning of the storm of June 19-21: “I thank the gods of war we went when we did.”
考虑到这些因素，艾森豪威尔在得知 6 月 19 日至 21 日的风暴几周后写信给斯塔格：“我感谢战神，我们当时就去了。”
Stagg’s weather report of June, 21, 1944.
斯塔格 1944 年 6 月 21 日的天气预报。
The highlighted area is where Eisenhower scribbled his reference to the “gods of war.” (UK National Meteorological Library and Archive)
突出显示的区域是艾森豪威尔潦草地写下“战争之神”的地方。 （英国国家气象图书馆和档案馆）
While the Normandy landings eventually proved successful, Stagg faced a difficult task given the technology available, a lack of dedicated staff, having to use often imprecise or subjective data, differing opinions from other meteorologists and weather offices, along with other internal frictions.
虽然诺曼底登陆最终被证明是成功的，但斯塔格面临着一项艰巨的任务，因为现有技术、缺乏专门的工作人员、不得不使用经常不精确或主观的数据、与其他气象学家和气象办公室的不同意见以及其他内部摩擦。
Stagg’s path in developing his forecasts was a difficult one.
斯塔格制定预测的道路是艰难的。
Despite all these challenges, in the end, he got it right.
尽管面临所有这些挑战，最终他还是做对了。
John Curatola is the Samuel Zemurray Stone Senior Historian at the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy.
约翰·库拉托拉 (John Curatola) 是珍妮·克雷格战争与民主研究所塞缪尔·泽默里·斯通 (Samuel Zemurray Stone) 的高级历史学家。
Twenty-five-year-old US Navy Carpenter’s Mate Second Class William R.
25 岁的美国海军木匠二等兵 William R.
Burns of Raleigh, North Carolina, has been accounted for more than 80 years after his death.
北卡罗来纳州罗利市的伯恩斯去世 80 多年后才被查明。
Louis M.
路易斯·M。
Prevost, the father of newly elected Pope Leo XIV, participated in the landings in Normandy and Southern France during World War II.
普雷沃斯特是新当选的教皇利奥十四世的父亲，二战期间参加了诺曼底和法国南部的登陆。
Within 48 hours of the amphibious assault, over 130,000 GIs and some 17,000 vehicles came ashore.
两栖攻击发生后 48 小时内，超过 130,000 名美国士兵和约 17,000 辆车辆上岸。
With more troops and equipment arriving daily, the amount of supplies required to support this force grew exponentially.
随着越来越多的部队和装备每天抵达，支持这支部队所需的物资数量呈指数级增长。
A look at the personal objects American soldiers collected during the D-Day landings, revealing how everyday items became lasting symbols of war, survival, and memory.
看看美国士兵在诺曼底登陆期间收集的个人物品，揭示日常物品如何成为战争、生存和记忆的持久象征。
Early on the morning of June 6, 1944, photojournalist Robert Capa landed with American troops on Omaha Beach.
1944 年 6 月 6 日清晨，摄影记者罗伯特·卡帕 (Robert Capa) 与美军一起登陆奥马哈海滩。
Before the day was through, he had taken some of the most famous combat photographs of World War II.
在这一天结束之前，他拍摄了一些二战中最著名的战斗照片。
During World War II, American fighter pilots coped with the dangers of combat through dark humor and evocative aircraft nicknames like “Live Bait” and “Flak Bait,” reflecting their bravery, their gallows wit, and the intensity of their experiences.
第二次世界大战期间，美国战斗机飞行员通过黑色幽默和令人回味的飞机绰号（如“活诱饵”和“高射炮诱饵”）应对战斗的危险，反映了他们的勇敢、机智和经历的强度。
From the hedgerows of Normandy across the rivers of northern France and into the dense forests of the Hürtgen and the Ardennes, Royal Air Force (RAF) and US Army Air Forces (USAAF) aircraft cleared the way for the advance of the Allied ground armies.
英国皇家空军 (RAF) 和美国陆军航空队 (USAAF) 的飞机从诺曼底的树篱出发，穿过法国北部的河流，进入许尔特根和阿登的茂密森林，为盟军地面部队的前进扫清了道路。
The Douglas C-47 became the mainstay for airborne drops and were used in this role extensively for Operations Overlord, Dragoon, Market Garden, and Varsity.
道格拉斯 C-47 成为空降的中流砥柱，并在霸王行动、龙骑兵行动、市场花园行动和大学行动中广泛使用。
945 Magazine Street, New Orleans, LA 70130 info@nationalww2museum.org 504-528-1944
945 Magazine Street, 新奥尔良, LA 70130 info@nationalww2museum.org 504-528-1944