634: Human Error in Volatile Situations - This American Life
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00:00 00:00 Transcript Share This American Life Life Partners How to Listen Episodes Recommended About Overview Staff Announcements Fellowships Jobs Music Make Radio On The Road FAQ Submissions Merch Contact Us Our Other Shows Merch Follow Us Life Partners Subscribe to our newsletter Full episode Toggle Audio and Transcript Sync Transcript | Episode #634 | December 22, 2017 634: Human Error in Volatile Situations Note: This American Life is produced for the ear and designed to be heard.
00:00 00:00 文字记录 分享此 美国生活 生活伙伴 如何收听 剧集 推荐 关于 概述 员工公告 奖学金 工作 音乐 在路上制作电台 常见问题解答 提交 商品 联系我们 我们的其他节目 商品 关注我们 生活伙伴 订阅我们的时事通讯 整集 切换音频和文字记录同步 文字记录 | 内容第 634 集 | 2017 年 12 月 22 日 634：动荡局势中的人为错误 注：《美国生活》是为耳朵而制作的，旨在让人们听到。
If you are able, we strongly encourage you to listen to the audio, which includes emotion and emphasis that's not on the page.
如果可以的话，我们强烈建议您收听音频，其中包括页面上没有的情感和重点。
Transcripts are generated using a combination of speech recognition software and human transcribers, and may contain errors.
文字记录是使用语音识别软件和人工转录员结合生成的，可能包含错误。
Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.
请在印刷版引用前检查相应的音频。
Prologue Ira Glass In November 1979, at the Nuclear Defense Command Headquarters inside Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, computer screens suddenly showed that Soviets had launched nuclear missiles, hundreds of them, a full-scale attack on the United States.
序言 艾拉·格拉斯 1979 年 11 月，在科罗拉多州夏延山内的核防御司令部，电脑屏幕上突然显示苏联发射了数百枚核导弹，对美国进行了全面攻击。
The military response was fast and dramatic.
军方的反应迅速而引人注目。
Crews responsible for launching our missiles were put on highest alert.
负责发射导弹的机组人员处于最高戒备状态。
Fighter jets took off.
战斗机起飞了。
Before the president was asked to decide whether to retaliate, one person, a watch commander, thought something was not right and threw on the brakes.
在总统被要求决定是否进行报复之前，一名值班指挥官认为有些事情不对劲并踩了刹车。
It was later discovered that a technician had accidentally put a training exercise into the computer simulating a full-scale attack.
后来发现，一名技术人员不小心将模拟全面攻击的训练练习放入了计算机中。
This kind of mistake, the technician who put the training exercise into the computer, is squarely in the category of human error.
这种错误，将训练练习放入计算机的技术人员，完全属于人为错误的范畴。
And human error mistakes are especially terrifying because you never can fully do away with them.
人为错误尤其可怕，因为你永远无法完全消除它们。
We are just prone to error.
我们只是容易犯错误。
Fortunately, most of us work jobs where the mistakes we make do not result in millions of people dead or anybody dead.
幸运的是，我们大多数人所犯的错误不会导致数百万人死亡或任何人死亡。
But if you work for the US military, even when we're not at war, you can be surrounded at your job by gear whose whole purpose is to kill people.
但如果你为美国军队工作，即使我们没有处于战争状态，你的工作场所也可能被旨在杀人的装备包围。
And so you can make mistakes on a scale the rest of us can't.
因此，你可能会犯下我们其他人无法犯的错误。
Today on our program, we have two stories like that.
今天我们的节目里有两个这样的故事。
In both of these stories, the slip-ups that people make are so small.
在这两个故事中，人们犯下的错误都非常小。
They're mistakes that, at most jobs, would mean nothing, mistakes maybe you've made yourself.
这些错误在大多数工作中毫无意义，也许是你自己犯的。
One involves missiles.
其中之一涉及导弹。
One involves ships.
其中之一涉及船舶。
From WBEZ Chicago, it's This American Life.
来自芝加哥 WBEZ 的《This American Life》。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Stay with us.
留在我们身边。
And we begin with act one.
我们从第一幕开始。
Act One, The Wrong Tool For The Job.
第一幕，错误的工具。
It's really easy for America's nuclear weapons to seem very abstract, right?
美国的核武器很容易显得很抽象，对吧？
We know they're out there.
我们知道他们就在那里。
But it's like-- I don't know.
但这就像——我不知道。
In our minds, I think we picture like they're sitting somewhere.
在我们的脑海中，我认为我们想象他们坐在某个地方。
The power's turned off.
电源已关闭。
They're parked in some missile silos, or airplane hangars, or something.
它们停在一些导弹发射井、飞机库或其他地方。
And they're there, dark until some terrible situation.
他们就在那里，一片漆黑，直到出现可怕的情况。
And then somebody enters secret codes.
然后有人输入密码。
And then the power goes on, and they rise from the Earth like something out of a Michael Bay movie.
然后电源继续供电，它们从地球升起，就像迈克尔·贝电影中的场景一样。
But, of course, reality is not like that at all.
但是，当然，现实根本不是这样的。
In real life, the country's nuclear weapons are thousands of high-tech, very complicated machines.
在现实生活中，该国的核武器是数以千计的高科技、非常复杂的机器。
And the lights are not out.
而且灯还没有灭。
Things are happening.
事情正在发生。
They need to be cleaned and taken care of and monitored by tons of people day and night, all the time.
它们需要大量人员日夜不间断地清洁、照顾和监控。
And things can go wrong.
事情可能会出错。
Joe Richman has this example.
乔·里奇曼有一个例子。
Back in September 1980, September 18, Jeff Plumb climbed into his pickup and headed toward the nuclear missile silo near a tiny town in Arkansas called Damascus.
时间回到 1980 年 9 月，即 9 月 18 日，杰夫·普拉姆 (Jeff Plumb) 爬进他的皮卡，前往阿肯色州一个名叫大马士革的小镇附近的核导弹发射井。
He was a 19-year-old missile technician, a new trainee, riding with another guy, David Powell, who was showing Plumb the ropes.
他是一名 19 岁的导弹技术员，也是一名新学员，和另一个人大卫·鲍威尔一起骑行，后者正在向他展示技巧。
David Powell was certified.
大卫·鲍威尔获得了认证。
He had done it over and over and over.
他已经一遍又一遍地这样做了。
For me, it was fairly new.
对我来说，这是相当新的。
It was the first time I was in training with David.
这是我第一次和大卫一起训练。
Plumb was a city kid from near Detroit.
普拉姆是一个来自底特律附近的城里孩子。
He remembers sitting in the truck that day watching the farms and fields fly by until eventually the truck slowed, pulled into a gravel road in the middle of nowhere, passed through some woods, and came to a fence.
他记得那天坐在卡车上，看着农场和田野飞驰而过，直到卡车最终放慢速度，驶入一条荒无人烟的碎石路，穿过一些树林，来到栅栏前。
There wasn't much to see, a concrete slab with a handful of radio antennas sticking up out of the ground.
没什么可看的，只有一块混凝土板，上面有一些无线电天线从地面上伸出来。
Under that concrete slab, though, was a 146-foot silo, like an inverted 14-story building.
然而，在那块混凝土板下面，有一个 146 英尺高的筒仓，就像一座倒置的 14 层建筑。
To get in was a sequence of gates, phones, secret codes, several super secure metal and concrete doors.
进入房间需要一系列大门、电话、密码、几扇超级安全的金属和混凝土门。
And then at the bottom of the stairs, you could go two directions.
然后到了楼梯底部，你可以往两个方向走。
Down one hall was the complex's three-story underground command center with all the communications equipment and computers and staff.
下一个大厅是该建筑群的三层地下指挥中心，配备了所有通信设备、计算机和工作人员。
A second hallway led to the missile silo.
第二条走廊通向导弹发射井。
I was in awe when I would walk into the silo.
当我走进筒仓时，我感到敬畏。
When you open up the silo door, and you walk in there and look at this-- and sometimes the lighting in there was just right to where it just loomed in the dark like it was a bullet in a chamber ready to go, you know.
当你打开筒仓门，走进去看看这个时——有时那里的灯光恰到好处，在黑暗中隐约可见，就像是子弹射进了一个房间，准备出发，你知道。
And it had this dark black warhead on top, pure destruction at the fingertips of a couple of men.
它的顶部有一个深黑色的弹头，几个人的指尖就能造成纯粹的破坏。
The missile in the silo that day, the one Jeff Plumb was describing, was called the Titan II.
杰夫·普拉姆描述的那天发射井里的导弹被称为泰坦二号。
At the time, the Titan II was the most powerful nuclear weapon in the American arsenal.
当时，泰坦二号是美国武库中最强大的核武器。
One of them, just one, could unleash the same power as all the bombs dropped in World War II, including the atomic bombs, times three-- all the bombs in World War II times three.
其中一颗，仅仅一颗，就可以释放出与二战中所有炸弹（包括原子弹）相同的威力三倍——二战中所有炸弹的三倍。
But besides being America's most powerful nuclear missiles, the Titan IIs were also some of the oldest.
但泰坦二号除了是美国最强大的核导弹之外，也是最古老的核导弹之一。
One especially dangerous and aging part of the Titan II missile was its fuel system.
泰坦二号导弹的一个特别危险且老化的部分是其燃料系统。
By 1980, most nuclear weapons had switched to solid fuel.
到 1980 年，大多数核武器已改用固体燃料。
But when the Titan II was developed in the 1960s, nuclear weapons used liquid fuel.
但在 20 世纪 60 年代研制泰坦二号时，核武器使用的是液体燃料。
Liquid fuel meant that we took a nuclear warhead, and we put it on top of two gigantic tanks and filled those tanks with incredibly volatile liquids.
液体燃料意味着我们将核弹头放在两个巨大的储罐顶部，并在这些储罐中填充极易挥发的液体。
One tank was rocket fuel.
一辆坦克是火箭燃料。
The other was something called oxidizer.
另一种是一种叫做氧化剂的东西。
Greg Devlin also worked on the Titan II missiles.
格雷格·德夫林还参与了泰坦 II 导弹的研究。
And if they ever meet-- typically, they were meant to meet inside the motor, and then it propels it where it's going.
如果它们相遇——通常，它们应该在电机内部相遇，然后电机将其推向目的地。
But if they ever meet anywhere before that, you'll instantly have an explosion and a fire.
但如果他们在此之前在任何地方相遇，就会立即发生爆炸和火灾。
So yes, it is a bomb sitting on a bomb.
所以，是的，这是一个炸弹上的炸弹。
But even if you didn't mix these fuels, they were extremely dangerous.
但即使你不混合这些燃料，它们也是极其危险的。
The oxidizer on its own was a Class A poison, the most toxic category for any chemical.
氧化剂本身是一种 A 级毒物，是所有化学品中毒性最强的一类。
It could ignite spontaneously if it touched leather, paper, cloth, wood.
如果接触皮革、纸张、布料、木材，它可能会自燃。
The fuel could ignite if it touched rust, or even if it didn't touch anything.
如果燃料接触到铁锈，或者即使没有接触到任何东西，燃料也会被点燃。
If there were enough fumes and you waved your hand too fast, it could explode.
如果烟雾足够多，而你挥手太快，它可能会爆炸。
So between burns, explosions, fire, between inhalation-- if you got it on your skin, it would turn to acid.
因此，在烧伤、爆炸、火灾、吸入之间——如果你把它弄到皮肤上，它就会变成酸。
We actually had a greater fear of the fuels on board than the warhead itself.
事实上，我们对船上的燃料比对弹头本身更害怕。
The teams that handled this hazardous stuff were called propellant transfer systems teams, or PTS teams.
处理这种危险物质的团队被称为推进剂传输系统团队或 PTS 团队。
Surprisingly young guys-- 18, 19, 20 years old-- they were known for partying hard, speeding, driving motorcycles.
令人惊讶的是，这些年轻人——18岁、19岁、20岁——以热衷派对、超速行驶、驾驶摩托车而闻名。
Sometimes they would do this thing where they would put missile fuel in a bucket.
有时他们会这样做，将导弹燃料放入桶中。
Then they would take a ping pong ball, fill it with oxidizer, and toss it in the bucket and watch it blow up, like Mad Max beer pong.
然后他们会拿一个乒乓球，装满氧化剂，然后把它扔进桶里，看着它爆炸，就像疯狂的麦克斯啤酒乒乓球一样。
These were the teams that David Powell was training Jeff Plumb to be a part of.
大卫·鲍威尔正在训练杰夫·普拉姆加入这些球队。
Here's Plumb.
这是普拉姆。
We could do anything.
我们可以做任何事情。
That was our mindset.
这就是我们的心态。
We were invincible, and nothing was going to stop us.
我们所向披靡，没有什么能够阻止我们。
You know, at 19, it just-- I didn't have any fear of things at that point in my life.
你知道，在 19 岁的时候，我对人生中的那个阶段的事情没有任何恐惧。
So we're in the silo.
所以我们在筒仓里。
Jeff Plumb and his trainer David Powell are ready to get to work on a job that was routine maintenance.
杰夫·普拉姆和他的教练大卫·鲍威尔准备开始进行日常维护工作。
One of the missile's fuel tanks was low on pressure.
导弹的一个油箱压力过低。
So the job was just to take off something called the dust cap, kind of like a gas cap but on a nuclear missile.
所以这项工作只是取下一个叫做防尘盖的东西，有点像核导弹上的油箱盖。
Then they'd have to pump in more liquid, and voila.
然后他们必须泵入更多液体，瞧。
That was it.
就是这样。
Except before they could start--
除了在他们开始之前——
They had a problem with not being able to get the hydraulic platform to come down.
他们遇到了无法让液压平台降下来的问题。
The hydraulic platform went up and down the side of the missile, like a platform for window washers on a highrise.
液压平台在导弹侧面上下移动，就像高层窗户清洗器的平台一样。
And it was broken.
它被打破了。
It's worth knowing these fuel tech jobs, PTS jobs, had actually gotten to be more and more of a grind around this time because the missiles were aging.
值得一提的是，由于导弹老化，这些燃料技术工作、PTS 工作实际上变得越来越辛苦。
Materials were outdated, dilapidated, deformed.
材料陈旧、破旧、变形。
Valves leaked.
阀门泄漏。
Pumps failed.
泵发生故障。
There was a lot of things wrong with the missile silo.
导弹发射井有很多问题。
So there was more work to do without more people to do it, which meant PTS guys like Powell and Plumb were increasingly overworked and burned out, hustling from one missile to another to patch them up, regularly pulling 12- and 14-hour days.
因此，如果没有更多的人来做，就有更多的工作要做，这意味着像鲍威尔和普拉姆这样的 PTS 人员越来越过度劳累和精疲力尽，他们从一枚导弹换到另一枚导弹来修补它们，每天工作 12 到 14 小时。
And now Plumb and Powell had to wait to do this routine maintenance job in the afternoon of a long day.
现在，普拉姆和鲍威尔不得不在漫长的一天下午等待完成这项例行维护工作。
We were very anxious to get this job completed.
我们非常渴望完成这项工作。
It was a Friday night.
那是一个星期五的晚上。
We were young, wanting to get back to hang out with our friends and drink beer, you know.
你知道，我们还年轻，想回去和朋友们一起出去玩，喝啤酒。
So I remember laying around up in the control center, just hanging out with these guys for hours.
所以我记得我躺在控制中心，和这些人待了几个小时。
Finally, they got word the hydraulic platform was up and running.
最后，他们得到消息液压平台已启动并运行。
So boom, green light.
所以繁荣，绿灯。
Plumb and Powell suited up in protective gear.
普拉姆和鲍威尔穿上防护装备。
Picture the guys who kidnapped E.T.
想象一下绑架 E.T. 的人
And they head down the hall towards the missile silo, ready for action.
他们沿着大厅走向导弹发射井，准备采取行动。
And as we were going down the long cable way, we realized we didn't have the torque wrench.
当我们沿着长索道走下去时，我们意识到我们没有扭矩扳手。
After hours of waiting, Plumb and Powell had left this crucial tool, the torque wrench, in their truck all the way up on the surface.
经过几个小时的等待，普拉姆和鲍威尔把这个重要的工具——扭矩扳手——留在了他们的卡车里，一直到了地面。
It was kind of like forgetting your cell phone in your house, if your house had a bunch of enormous concrete and metal doors and required a secret code to get in.
如果你的房子有一堆巨大的混凝土和金属门并且需要密码才能进入，这就有点像把手机忘在家里了。
It was a pain in the ass on a long, irritating day.
在漫长而烦人的一天里，这是一件令人痛苦的事情。
Jeff Plumb says personally he didn't know what to do.
杰夫·普拉姆（Jeff Plumb）个人表示，他不知道该怎么办。
He was just learning.
他只是在学习。
And the procedures, they were so meticulously laid out.
还有程序，他们都安排得如此细致。
You had to follow these detailed checklists.
您必须遵循这些详细的清单。
You needed the right tools.
您需要合适的工具。
The checklist was the Bible, you might want to say.
你可能想说，清单就是圣经。
And Air Force regulations required us to go through that checklist and follow everything step by step.
空军法规要求我们仔细检查清单并一步步遵循一切。
So Plumb's like, what do we do?
普拉姆说，我们该怎么办？
And he looked at David Powell.
他看着大卫·鲍威尔。
And Powell said, don't worry.
鲍威尔说，别担心。
For what they were about to do, there was actually another tool, not the official one.
对于他们要做的事情，实际上还有另一种工具，而不是官方的工具。
But he'd used it before, so forget the torque wrench.
但他以前用过它，所以忘记扭矩扳手吧。
It'll be fine.
会没事的。
So we grabbed this ratchet-- like you would pull out of your toolbox, but quite larger.
所以我们抓住了这个棘轮——就像你从工具箱里拉出来一样，但相当大。
If you can picture it, it was a monstrous thing because it was about three feet long.
如果你能想象它，那是一个巨大的东西，因为它大约有三英尺长。
It had about a three-foot long handle.
它有一个大约三英尺长的手柄。
And the socket weighed anywheres from five to eight pounds.
插座的重量从五到八磅不等。
It was a big socket.
那是一个大插座。
So it was a large piece of steel.
所以它是一块大钢。
Plumb looked at this wrench, like a three-foot Willy Wonka type wrench.
普拉姆看着这个扳手，就像一个三英尺的威利·旺卡式扳手。
And he wasn't so sure about it.
他对此不太确定。
And this giant socket wrench, besides being kind of the wrong tool, a huge, cumbersome wrong tool, it wasn't in the best shape.
这个巨大的套筒扳手，除了是一种错误的工具，一个巨大而笨重的错误工具之外，它的形状也不是最好的。
The two pieces of the wrench were supposed to click together, but they didn't.
扳手的两块本应卡合在一起，但实际上却没有。
So we had a problem at that point.
所以我们当时遇到了问题。
And so we improvised.
所以我们即兴发挥。
Here's what they did.
这就是他们所做的。
One guy held the socket over this thing they had to remove, the dust cap.
一个人把插座放在他们必须取下的东西上，防尘盖。
The second guy held the huge handle of the ratchet and turned.
第二个人握着棘轮的巨大手柄，转动起来。
Sure enough, the cap screwed right off.
果然，盖子直接拧下来了。
It worked, no problem.
它有效，没问题。
Great.
伟大的。
So Plumb hands the socket off to Powell.
因此普拉姆将插座交给了鲍威尔。
And I remember saying to him, you've got this, right?
我记得我对他说，你有这个，对吧？
You got-- you're OK?
你——你还好吗？
You got this?
你明白了吗？
And he said, yeah, I got it.
他说，是的，我明白了。
Let go of it.
放开它吧。
And so I remember releasing it.
所以我记得释放了它。
And I remember seeing it kind of just fall.
我记得看到它刚刚掉下来。
And it hit the platform, the socket did.
它击中了平台，插座也击中了。
And it bounced, and it went between the platform and the missile.
它弹了起来，进入了平台和导弹之间。
Just to make sure you're picturing this, Plumb and Powell were working way up in the silo, like window washers on the side of a nuclear missile, on a platform.
为了确保你能想象到这一点，普拉姆和鲍威尔在发射井的上方工作，就像核导弹侧面的窗户清洗器一样，在一个平台上。
Attached to the platform was this rubber bumper that was supposed to fit right up against the missile, so there was no gap for things to fall through.
连接到平台上的是一个橡胶缓冲器，它应该正好贴在导弹上，所以没有任何间隙可以让东西掉下来。
But as the Titan II facilities had aged, the rubber bumper didn't fit quite right.
但随着泰坦二号的设施老化，橡胶保险杠不太合适。
And so there was a small gap, a socket-sized gap.
所以有一个小间隙，一个插座大小的间隙。
It was like it bounced, and it landed perfectly in the gap, you know.
就像它弹了起来，然后完美地落在了缝隙中，你知道。
It was almost like-- it was like somebody playing Tiddlywinks or something.
就好像有人在玩 Tiddlywinks 之类的游戏。
You know how you would-- or one of those old drinking games where you bounce something and land it into the hole perfect.
你知道你会怎么做——或者是那些古老的饮酒游戏之一，你弹起一些东西并将其完美地落入洞中。
You know, it was just it bounced, and it was gone.
你知道，它只是弹了一下，然后就消失了。
I literally watched it fall.
我真的看着它掉下来。
We had dropped tools numerous times.
我们曾多次掉落工具。
It wasn't the first time that we ever dropped a tool and watched it fall.
这并不是我们第一次掉落工具并眼睁睁地看着它掉下来。
It was common.
这很常见。
It just happened that when this socket fell, it went down 70 feet, 80 feet, whatever it was there, and it bounced off the thrust ring that the missile sat on, just this big giant round ring.
碰巧的是，当这个插座掉落时，它会下降 70 英尺、80 英尺，不管它在那里，它会从导弹所在的推力环上弹回来，就是这个巨大的圆环。
And when it fell, it picked up maximum speed and hit the top of that thrust ring and just ricocheted into the side of the missile.
当它坠落时，它以最大速度撞到推力环的顶部，然后弹到导弹的侧面。
I heard it hit-- boom.
我听到它撞击——轰隆隆。
And the next thing you know, I just seen fuel spraying out.
接下来你知道的，我刚刚看到燃料喷出。
I just looked at it down there.
我只是在下面看了看。
I just looked in awe.
我只是敬畏地看着。
I just-- I couldn't believe what just happened.
我只是——我简直不敢相信刚刚发生的事情。
The only thing I remember saying to David was, this is not good.
我记得对大卫说的唯一一句话是，这不好。
This is not good.
这不好。
There's a hierarchy of not good.
有一个不好的层次结构。
And this kind of not good might be at the top.
而这种不好的可能就在上面。
This kind of not good was deadly, skin-melting, highly explosive rocket fuel spraying out of a 100-foot tall intercontinental ballistic missile.
这种不好的事情就是从 100 英尺高的洲际弹道导弹中喷出致命的、融化皮肤的高爆炸性火箭燃料。
On top of that missile sat the most powerful nuclear warhead in the United States of America.
该导弹顶部装有美国最强大的核弹头。
You know, we didn't know how to respond.
你知道，我们不知道如何回应。
We looked at it for-- I don't know-- at least a minute trying to figure out what we were going to do about it.
我们看了它——我不知道——至少一分钟，试图弄清楚我们要做什么。
And then he contacted the team chief and told him that we had a cloud of vapor emitting from the missile.
然后他联系了队长并告诉他我们的导弹散发出一团蒸汽。
On the other end of the radio was the missile complex's command center, a three-story underground bunker filled with monitoring equipment, control panels, and a team staffing all of it.
无线电的另一端是导弹综合体的指挥中心，这是一个三层的地下掩体，里面装满了监控设备、控制面板和一个配备所有人员的团队。
On that team was a guy named Allan Childers.
该团队中有一个名叫艾伦·奇尔德斯的人。
Unlike the PTS teams, Childers was an officer.
与 PTS 小组不同，奇尔德斯是一名军官。
And he didn't just know a few specifics or mechanics of the Titan II.
他不仅了解泰坦二号的一些细节或机制。
Allan Childers knew the missile inside and out.
艾伦·奇尔德斯对导弹了如指掌。
He'd spent six months studying it, reading a manual called the Dash-1 which laid out every piece of how the massive weapon worked.
他花了六个月的时间研究它，阅读了一本名为 Dash-1 的手册，其中详细介绍了这种大型武器的工作原理。
He and his crew spent most of their time using detailed checklists, going over all the missile systems one by one.
他和他的团队大部分时间都在使用详细的检查表，一一检查所有导弹系统。
Childers was standing behind a control panel when the call from Powell and Plumb came in.
当鲍威尔和普拉姆打来电话时，奇尔德斯正站在控制面板后面。
So the first thing we heard was that there was smoke in the launch duct.
所以我们听到的第一件事就是发射管道里冒烟。
And of course, the commander's going, what do you mean?
当然，指挥官要走了，这是什么意思？
What's going on?
这是怎么回事？
And then I heard him say, what do you mean smoke in the launch-- and he was going to say duct.
然后我听到他说，发射舱里冒烟是什么意思——他想说的是管道。
But I don't think he ever got the word duct out.
但我认为他从来没有说出管道这个词。
As soon as that happened, the lights started coming on.
事情一发生，灯就开始亮起来。
And it's a klaxon alarm.
这是一个高音警报器。
And it's just waaa real loud.
而且声音真的很大。
And all of the lights came on.
所有的灯都亮了。
So you're trained to punch the alarm off once it gets your attention, which it did, you turn the alarm off.
因此，你接受的训练是，一旦警报引起你的注意，你就将其关闭，事实确实如此，你将警报关闭。
Well, the alarm would turn off.
好吧，闹钟会关掉。
But it would immediately come back on again as another light came on, and another light came on.
但当另一盏灯亮起、另一盏灯亮起时，它会立即再次亮起。
And so these indicator lights were oxidizer in the launch duct, fuel vapors in the launch duct, fire in the launch duct.
因此，这些指示灯是发射管中的氧化剂、发射管中的燃料蒸气、发射管中的火。
Horns and klaxons were going off, sirens.
喇叭声、喇叭声、警报声响起。
Pretty much every light on the instrument panel, they were lit up.
仪表板上几乎所有的灯都亮了。
Just moments later, Plumb and Powell had made their way from the silo back to the command center.
不久之后，普拉姆和鲍威尔就从发射井回到了指挥中心。
When they got there, they found a huge scramble, everyone besides them trying to figure out what the problem was.
当他们到达那里时，他们发现一片混乱，除了他们之外的每个人都试图找出问题所在。
They were trying to figure out how to deal with all these problems.
他们试图找出如何解决所有这些问题。
They were resetting klaxons.
他们正在重置喇叭。
And they didn't know what was going on.
他们不知道发生了什么事。
It was chaos.
一片混乱。
Because they didn't know.
因为他们不知道。
To be clear, faced with the fuel gushing out of the missile and now the command center firing questions at them, Dave Powell made a choice.
需要明确的是，面对导弹中喷出的燃料以及指挥中心向他们提出的问题，戴夫·鲍威尔做出了选择。
It was the kind of choice you make when you're afraid of getting in trouble.
这是当你害怕遇到麻烦时做出的选择。
He played dumb.
他装傻了。
He told them there was smoke in the silo, but nothing about the hole they had punched in the missile.
他告诉他们发射井里有烟，但没有透露他们在导弹上打的洞的情况。
Jeff Plumb made his own version of that decision, which was to keep quiet and follow Powell's lead.
杰夫·普拉姆对此决定做出了自己的版本，那就是保持沉默并追随鲍威尔的领导。
That created a crucial knowledge gap in the room.
这在房间里造成了一个重要的知识差距。
On the other side of that gap, Allan Childers and the rest of the command staff were left to scramble desperately, frantic to figure out what was wrong.
在间隙的另一边，艾伦·奇尔德斯和其他指挥人员只能拼命地争先恐后，疯狂地找出问题所在。
All of that mattered because, if all the fuel leaked out, it's not like the missile would just sit there empty.
所有这些都很重要，因为如果所有燃料都泄漏出去，导弹就不会空着在那里。
The Titan II's fuel tanks were pressurized, like a tire.
泰坦二号的油箱是加压的，就像轮胎一样。
And if enough fuel leaked out, it would go flat.
如果有足够的燃料泄漏，它就会熄火。
Or in the missile's case, it would collapse under its own weight.
或者就导弹而言，它会在自身重量的作用下崩溃。
Enough oxidizer and fuel to carry a 330,000-pound missile across the ocean would smash together underneath a nuclear warhead.
足以携带 330,000 磅重的导弹穿越海洋的氧化剂和燃料会在核弹头下方粉碎在一起。
I just-- in my own mind, I pictured poking a hole in a pop can.
我只是——在我自己的脑海里，我想象着在易拉罐上戳一个洞。
And so all this pressure now is turning to a negative PSI-- which internally in my mind, I thought it's going to collapse.
因此，现在所有这些压力都变成了负 PSI——在我内心深处，我认为它会崩溃。
This tank is going to collapse in on itself.
这个坦克将会自行塌陷。
It's sucking itself in.
它正在把自己吸进去。
I was scared.
我很害怕。
I was really concerned that this thing could blow up any moment.
我真的很担心这东西随时都会爆炸。
So my concern was to get out of there.
所以我关心的是离开那里。
I didn't know the safety of that warhead.
我不知道那个弹头的安全性。
There were so many questions.
有很多问题。
How fast was the fuel leaking?
燃油泄漏的速度有多快？
When could the missile collapse?
导弹什么时候能崩溃？
Could the silo contain the explosion?
筒仓能控制住爆炸吗？
Could an explosion set off the nuclear warhead?
爆炸会引爆核弹头吗？
Minute by minute by minute, Plumb stood silent, unsure what to do.
普拉姆一分钟一分钟地站着，一言不发，不知道该怎么办。
So I just-- I kind of kept my mouth shut.
所以我只是——我闭嘴了。
You know, I didn't answer.
你知道，我没有回答。
David was the one answering the questions.
大卫是回答问题的人。
So they never told us what had happened.
所以他们从来没有告诉我们发生了什么。
With Plumb and Powell holding out, Allan Childers and the team in the command center was slowly running out of options.
由于普拉姆和鲍威尔的坚持，艾伦·奇尔德斯和指挥中心的团队慢慢地失去了选择。
We ran all of what we called our red tab checklist, our hazard checklist.
我们运行了所有所谓的红色标签清单，即危险清单。
And it didn't stop anything from happening.
这并没有阻止任何事情的发生。
All the indicator lights stayed on.
所有指示灯都亮着。
That's when the commander turned back to the team and said, what do you think it is?
就在这时，指挥官回头对队伍说，你们认为这是什么？
These indicators don't make any sense.
这些指标没有任何意义。
And this was a half-hour into it.
这已经是半个小时了。
They said, we don't know.
他们说，我们不知道。
We don't know what's going on out there.
我们不知道外面发生了什么。
All we saw was the smoke in the launch duct.
我们所看到的只是发射管道中的烟雾。
Eventually, a guy from the command center team, Rodney Holder, turned to Plumb and Powell.
最终，指挥中心团队的罗德尼·霍尔德向普拉姆和鲍威尔求助。
And Rodney asked them again, what happened?
罗德尼又问他们，发生了什么事？
What do you guys know that we don't know?
你们知道什么是我们不知道的？
And Airman Powell started crying.
空军飞行员鲍威尔开始哭泣。
And that's when the commander went-- he said, you need to tell us what is going on out there.
就在那时，指挥官走了——他说，你需要告诉我们外面发生了什么。
We cannot figure it out.
我们无法弄清楚。
And that's when, as he was crying, he basically said, I dropped a socket off the end of the wrench.
就在那时，当他哭泣时，他基本上说，我从扳手末端掉了一个套筒。
And it punched a hole in the side of the missile.
它在导弹的侧面打了一个洞。
And the commander just-- I could still picture his face.
指挥官只是——我仍然可以想象他的脸。
It just turned white.
它刚刚变白。
And he said, you need to tell the command post what you did because they're going to have questions.
他说，你需要告诉指挥所你做了什么，因为他们会提出疑问。
And I don't want to be relaying it.
我不想转发它。
So he handed him the phone.
于是就把手机递给了他。
He brought him over to the console.
他把他带到控制台前。
He said, I'm going to put Airman Powell on.
他说，我要让鲍威尔飞行员上场。
We have a serious emergency.
我们遇到了严重的紧急情况。
We just found out what's going on, and I want him to talk to you.
我们刚刚知道发生了什么事，我想让他和你谈谈。
And he put him on, and he told him.
他把他穿上，然后告诉了他。
I don't know how he got it out because he was crying so much, you know.
我不知道他是怎么把它说出来的，因为他哭得太厉害了，你知道。
I just remember everybody standing there watching, just dumbfounded.
我只记得每个人都站在那儿看着，目瞪口呆。
We're talking about a socket that was bigger than your fist punching a hole in the side of a missile.
我们谈论的是一个比你的拳头还大的插座，可以在导弹侧面打一个洞。
You couldn't patch it if you wanted to.
如果你想的话，你也无法修补它。
And by then, so much had drained out you couldn't even open up the door and lean inside without it eating up your suit.
到那时，已经有太多的东西被耗尽了，你甚至无法打开门并探身进去，以免它吞噬你的套装。
So you couldn't do anything about it by then.
所以到时候你已经无能为力了。
And then the commander got back on the phone.
然后指挥官又接通了电话。
And we were basically told to stand by.
我们基本上被告知要待命。
And we stood by.
我们站在一旁。
As news of what had happened traveled up the Air Force chain of command, everyone at the missile site was instructed to wait.
当发生的事情的消息传到空军指挥系统时，导弹基地的每个人都被要求等待。
To wait, of course, mind you, inside a nuclear missile complex teetering on the brink of a massive explosion.
当然，请注意，要在一个濒临大规模爆炸的核导弹综合设施内等待。
Just sit tight.
坐稳吧。
Quite a bit of time went by like that, couple of hours actually.
时间就这么过去了，实际上是几个小时。
One of the main questions was whether to keep the missile teams underground, try to somehow, somehow fix the leak.
主要问题之一是是否将导弹小组保留在地下，尝试以某种方式修复泄漏。
Or is it bound to blow up, and you should get everyone out, run like hell, and hope the nuclear warhead doesn't go off?
或者它一定会爆炸，你应该让所有人都出去，拼命奔跑，并希望核弹头不会爆炸？
Or maybe a surprising question, is the command center actually the safest place for them?
或者也许是一个令人惊讶的问题，指挥中心实际上是他们最安全的地方吗？
The launch control center, the control room, was supposed to survive a nuclear explosion.
发射控制中心、控制室应该能够在核爆炸中幸存下来。
Eventually, it was a colonel named John Moser back at the Air Force base in Little Rock who made the decision.
最终，是小石城空军基地一位名叫约翰·莫泽的上校做出了决定。
He knew the command center was designed to survive a nuclear attack, like a direct hit from a Russian nuclear missile.
他知道指挥中心的设计能够承受核攻击，例如俄罗斯核导弹的直接命中。
But how could he be sure?
但他怎么能确定呢？
Nothing like this had ever happened before.
以前从未发生过这样的事情。
They were off the map.
他们不在地图上。
For you giving the order, was it a clear call?
你下达的命令是明确的吗？
Or was it-- were you conflicted?
或者是——你有矛盾吗？
Were you unsure?
您不确定吗？
I was not unsure.
我并不不确定。
I was a straight up, clear order to evacuate because I didn't want people to be injured.
我收到了直接、明确的撤离命令，因为我不想让人们受伤。
We had no idea what was going to happen.
我们不知道会发生什么。
We've never had an explosion or a potential explosion like this.
我们从未发生过这样的爆炸或潜在的爆炸。
It's never happened before.
以前从未发生过这种情况。
And I gave the order to evacuate.
我下令撤离。
Allan Childers, back in the underground command center, disagreed with Moser's decision.
回到地下指挥中心的艾伦·奇尔德斯不同意莫泽的决定。
He argued.
他争辩道。
I didn't think it'd blow up.
我没想到它会爆炸。
And if it did blow up, I thought that the door and the complex would contain the explosion.
如果它真的爆炸了，我认为门和建筑群会控制住爆炸。
It was underground.
那是在地下。
It had this cap on it.
它上面有这个帽子。
I had two blast doors protecting me that were the size of bank vault doors.
我有两扇防爆门保护着我，它们的大小相当于银行金库的门。
And I was sitting in a facility that was designed to survive a detonation from a Russian nuclear weapon.
我坐在一处设施中，该设施的设计目的是为了在俄罗斯核武器爆炸中幸存下来。
So I thought we're safer down here than if we go up above.
所以我认为我们在下面比在上面更安全。
I guess I would think most people would be happy to get an order to say, get out of there.
我想大多数人都会很高兴收到命令说“离开那里”。
I felt devastated.
我感到很沮丧。
Yeah, I was devastated that I had to leave.
是的，我不得不离开，我感到很沮丧。
Even to this day, it bothers me that I had to leave.
直到今天，我仍然因为必须离开而感到困扰。
Never in the history of an active missile complex had you left the missile with a warhead on it, walked away from the site with the site still running.
在现役导弹综合体的历史上，从来没有你离开带有弹头的导弹，离开现场而现场仍在运行。
On principle, I didn't like it.
原则上，我不喜欢它。
The logic of it made no sense to me.
它的逻辑对我来说毫无意义。
I could not believe that we were leaving that complex.
我不敢相信我们要离开那个建筑群。
As in desperate shape as that site was, to leave that and not be able to tell people what was occurring out there in that launch duct-- even if we couldn't do anything, I felt like there was probably somebody was going to come up with something that we could do.
由于该站点处于绝望的状态，离开它并且无法告诉人们发射管道中发生了什么 - 即使我们无能为力，我觉得可能有人会想出一些我们可以做的事情。
And we would not be there to do it.
我们不会在那里做这件事。
Allan Childers made this case.
艾伦·奇尔德斯（Allan Childers）提出了这个案例。
He knew the Titan II missile inside and out.
他对泰坦二号导弹了如指掌。
He knew the dangers, what could happen.
他知道危险，知道可能发生什么。
He was staring at the United States on the brink of maybe setting off its most powerful nuclear missile right in the heart of the country.
他凝视着美国，美国可能会在该国的中心地带引爆其最强大的核导弹。
He clung to any hope to do something, anything to claw the situation back.
他抱有希望做点什么，做任何事情来挽回局面。
But Childers wasn't in charge.
但奇尔德斯并不负责。
And eventually orders came down, and Allan Childers and everyone else in the Damascus missile complex evacuated.
最终命令下达，艾伦·奇尔德斯和大马士革导弹基地的其他人都撤离了。
With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that from this point forward, at every point in this story when the Air Force made a decision, it arguably made the wrong decision.
事后看来，我们可以说，从现在开始，在这个故事中的每一个时刻，当空军做出决定时，它都可以说是做出了错误的决定。
Here, the Air Force ordered them to abandon post.
在这里，空军命令他们放弃岗位。
The order was to evacuate through the complex's escape hatch, which had never been used before.
命令是通过大楼的逃生舱口进行疏散，该逃生舱口以前从未使用过。
It was a narrow tunnel that led to a ladder, which took them several stories back up to the surface.
这是一条狭窄的隧道，通向一架梯子，梯子把他们带到了几层楼的地面上。
Greg Devlin was above ground with a bunch of backup teams from the Little Rock Air Force Base.
格雷格·德夫林（Greg Devlin）和一群来自小石城空军基地的后备小组在地面上。
It was really-- it was just really eerie that night.
那天晚上真的非常令人毛骨悚然。
You know, you saw smoke coming out of the vents over here.
你知道，你看到烟雾从这里的通风口冒出来。
You could get whiffs of fuel, hydrazine, which has like a fish type of an odor to it.
你可能会闻到燃料、联氨的味道，它有一种鱼的气味。
So you could smell that.
所以你可以闻到那个味道。
So it was a very hazy, eerie-looking scenario.
所以这是一个非常朦胧、怪异的场景。
And then with everyone on the surface, it seems the Air Force realized what Allan Childers had been arguing all along.
然后，随着地面上的每个人的出现，空军似乎意识到了艾伦·奇尔德斯一直以来争论的问题。
That the best shot at diffusing this crisis, the only way to know what was up in the silo, was to have people inside.
化解这场危机的最佳办法，也是了解筒仓内情况的唯一方法，就是让人们进入筒仓。
So you guessed it.
所以你猜对了。
They ordered two people to go back in.
他们命令两个人回去。
Again here, the Air Force zigged when it should have zagged.
空军再次在本该曲折的时候曲折前进。
The order was not to go in the open escape hatch which everyone had just come out of.
命令是不要进入大家刚刚出来的敞开的逃生舱口。
Instead, they told the folks on-site they should break in through the front doors of the missile complex.
相反，他们告诉现场的人们应该从导弹综合体的前门闯入。
With precious time ticking away, don't go through the back door, which is sitting wide open.
随着宝贵的时间流逝，不要从敞开的后门走。
No, break through the front door of one of the US military's most secure facilities.
不，冲破美军最安全设施之一的前门。
Or front doors is more like it-- huge, concrete, and secure metal doors-- using only these tools-- a crowbar, a hammer, a long screwdriver, a bolt cutter, and a hydraulic hand pump.
或者前门更像它——巨大的、混凝土的、安全的金属门——只使用这些工具——撬棍、锤子、长螺丝刀、断线钳和液压手动泵。
It's worth also mentioning had Allan Childers stayed in the command center like he wanted to, he could have opened all those doors with a push of a button.
还值得一提的是，如果艾伦·奇尔德斯如他所愿地留在指挥中心，他只需按一下按钮就可以打开所有这些门。
People on the site were frustrated and confused.
现场的人们感到沮丧和困惑。
But they followed orders and started burrowing back into the missile complex.
但他们遵照命令，开始钻回导弹基地。
The first two guys to go in were myself and Rex Hukle.
最先进去的两个人是我和雷克斯·哈克尔。
We suited up.
我们合身了。
Devlin and his partner strapped on oxygen tanks to wade through clouds of lethal rocket fuel.
德夫林和他的搭档绑上氧气瓶，涉过致命的火箭燃料云。
They broke through several doors.
他们冲破了几扇门。
And then after 30 minutes, a second two-person team went in to relieve them-- and not just any team.
30 分钟后，第二个两人小组进去接替他们——而且不是任何一个小组。
One of this duo was David Livingston.
大卫·利文斯顿就是这对二人组之一。
Livingston was a member of the PTS team.
利文斯顿是 PTS 团队的成员。
He was also David Powell's roommate, Powell who dropped the socket that started the whole thing.
他也是大卫·鲍威尔的室友，鲍威尔掉下了引发整个事件的插座。
Livingston was actually Powell's best friend.
利文斯顿实际上是鲍威尔最好的朋友。
They made it all the way to the blast lock door where there was a meter, a meter that took readings of fuel present in the air in the silo.
他们一路走到防爆门，那里有一个仪表，可以读取筒仓空气中燃料的读数。
And at 18,000 parts per million, it's explosion ready.
浓度为百万分之 18,000，已做好爆炸准备。
It's ready to explode.
它已经准备好爆炸了。
That's redlined.
那个是红线的。
That's pegged out.
那是挂出来的。
So when he called back and said, this thing's about to blow.
所以当他回电话说，这件事就要爆发了。
And the command center said, come back now.
指挥中心说，现在就回来。
So him and Dave Livingston traversed back up the flights of steps.
于是他和戴夫·利文斯顿走回楼梯。
They got just above ground.
他们就在地面之上。
And within 30 seconds, an explosion happened.
30秒内，发生了爆炸。
It was about 3 o'clock in the morning.
当时是凌晨三点左右。
And I was standing up listening to a conversation.
我站起来听着谈话。
And all of a sudden, I lost communications.
突然之间，我失去了联系。
This is Colonel John Moser again, who was 50 miles away at the Little Rock Air Force Base calling the shots.
这又是约翰·莫泽上校，他在 50 英里外的小石城空军基地发号施令。
The moment of the explosion, he was talking to people on the site, and the line went dead.
爆炸发生的那一刻，他正在现场与人们交谈，电话突然断了。
All you've ever read is when you have a nuclear explosion, you lose communications for some time.
你所读到的都是当发生核爆炸时，你会在一段时间内失去通讯。
And we lost the communications.
我们失去了通讯。
And I just had no idea if the blast wave was going to eventually hit Little Rock Air Force Base.
我只是不知道冲击波最终是否会袭击小石城空军基地。
I had no idea.
我不知道。
I had no idea what was going to happen.
我不知道会发生什么。
But I thought we lost the whole works out there, everybody.
但我想我们已经失去了所有的作品，大家。
And you know, I'm not a really religious guy.
你知道，我并不是一个真正有宗教信仰的人。
But I had to-- I almost dropped on my knees to say a quick prayer.
但我不得不——我差点跪下来快速祈祷。
While John Moser was at the Little Rock Air Force Base waiting for everything around him to be swept off the Earth by a nuclear explosion, Allan Childers was back at the Damascus missile site.
当约翰·莫泽在小石城空军基地等待他周围的一切被核爆炸从地球上冲走时，艾伦·柴尔德斯回到了大马士革导弹基地。
It's so hard to describe an explosion like that.
很难描述这样的爆炸。
The only thing you see is this huge-- I mean nighttime turned into day.
你唯一看到的就是这么大——我的意思是夜晚变成了白天。
It was unbelievable.
这太令人难以置信了。
Because it was so bright all of a sudden.
因为它突然变得如此明亮。
And I literally turned to one of the guys.
我真的转向其中一个人。
And I was feeling my chest.
我感觉到我的胸部。
And I said, it couldn't be a nuclear explosion because we're still here.
我说，这不可能是核爆炸，因为我们还在这里。
And that's what dawned on me.
这就是我突然意识到的。
We were still there.
我们还在那里。
Man.
男人。
Oh my gosh.
天哪。
I was standing at the fence.
我站在栅栏边。
And I was facing the silo when it exploded.
当筒仓爆炸时我正对着它。
Again, Greg Devlin, one of the guys on the first team to go back in and who was watching as the second team worked.
格雷格·德夫林（Greg Devlin）又回来了，他是第一支球队中返回的球员之一，他正在观看第二支球队的工作。
It was just a bang, the loud sound, and the concussion of wind.
只听一声巨响，巨响，还有风的震荡。
It was just-- it was like bang.
就像是——就像一声巨响。
It was like being in front of a-- picture yourself as nothing's there, but you just got hit by a Mack truck.
这就像站在一个——想象自己什么都没有的前面，但你刚刚被一辆麦克卡车撞了。
And all of a sudden, rocks started falling.
突然间，岩石开始掉落。
It was like rain falling.
就像下雨一样。
And it was all this gravel from the complex.
这些都是建筑群里的碎石。
And metal started falling out of the sky.
金属开始从天而降。
And everybody started to run.
每个人都开始奔跑。
The chunks of concrete that were landing everywhere were as-- I mean everywhere-- were as big as coffee tables.
到处都是的混凝土块——我是说到处都是——有咖啡桌那么大。
The real big ones were as big as pickup trucks and school buses and stuff like that.
真正的大的是皮卡车、校车之类的东西。
Those were everywhere.
这些到处都是。
You could hear them hitting the ground around me.
你可以听到他们敲击我周围的地面。
Man, it was like boom, boom, boom.
伙计，就像繁荣，繁荣，繁荣。
I got up immediately.
我立即起身。
I took off running.
我开始跑步。
I got five steps away, and a chunk of concrete hit the ground behind me as big as a-- bigger than a school bus.
我走了五步，一块混凝土落在我身后的地面上，有一辆校车那么大。
The trees were on fire.
树木着火了。
The grass was on fire.
草着火了。
The only light we had was fires.
我们唯一的光源就是火。
And you could see the shadows of just about everything because there was so much fire around there.
你几乎可以看到所有东西的影子，因为周围有太多的火。
It was like being in this forest fire without a forest being around you.
这就像身处一场森林大火中，周围却没有森林。
And then for just a second or two, it was this one point in time where there was no sound at all.
然后就那么一两秒，就在这个时间点上完全没有声音了。
It was like a total calm peace, kind of like the end of the world, for 10 seconds.
持续了 10 秒钟，就像完全平静的和平，有点像世界末日。
And then you heard all the screaming and crying and guys yelling, oh my god, I'm hurt.
然后你听到所有的尖叫声、哭泣声和人们大喊，天哪，我受伤了。
This is the CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite.
这是沃尔特·克朗凯特的哥伦比亚广播公司晚间新闻。
Good evening.
晚上好。
Modern age terror swept an area of rural Arkansas today when fuel exploded around a nuclear warhead in a missile silo.
今天，现代恐怖袭击了阿肯色州农村地区，导弹发射井中的核弹头周围发生燃料爆炸。
The incident began when officials say a workman dropped a wrench.
事件始于官员称一名工人掉落了一把扳手。
The morning after, everyone was trying to sort out what had happened-- the press, Air Force, local law enforcement, the public.
第二天早上，每个人都在试图弄清楚发生了什么——媒体、空军、当地执法部门、公众。
Simply put, the fuel exploded.
简而言之，燃料爆炸了。
The nuke didn't go off.
核弹没有爆炸。
The Air Force was keeping tight-lipped, refusing to confirm whether there had even been a nuclear warhead on site.
空军守口如瓶，拒绝证实现场是否有核弹头。
For the survivors, the injuries were extensive.
对于幸存者来说，伤势很严重。
Greg Devlin had burns on his face, neck, and back.
格雷格·德夫林的脸部、颈部和背部都有烧伤。
His skin was burned off his left hand.
他的左手皮肤被烧伤。
Others had extensive burns and broken bones.
其他人则有大面积烧伤和骨折。
One airman, David Livingston, was dead.
一名飞行员大卫·利文斯顿（David Livingston）死亡。
Remember Livingston was David Powell's roommate and best friend.
请记住，利文斯顿是大卫·鲍威尔的室友和最好的朋友。
Livingston was on the second team to go back in.
利文斯顿是第二支回归的球队。
And he was standing just outside the silo when it blew.
爆炸时他正站在筒仓外。
All that meant Powell had kind of dropped the socket into some huge Rube Goldberg machine of bad luck and indirectly killed his best friend.
所有这一切都意味着鲍威尔有点把插座掉进了鲁布·戈德堡的坏运气机器中，间接杀死了他最好的朋友。
At the missile site, the damage was staggering, a monument to just how dangerous the situation had been.
在导弹发射场，损失惨重，足以说明当时的情况有多么危险。
The missile silo's door, a 1.5 million-pound slab of concrete and steel, had blown off, spun like a Frisbee, and landed more than 500 feet away.
导弹发射井的门是一块重达 150 万磅的混凝土和钢板，被炸飞，像飞盘一样旋转，落在 500 多英尺外。
And then there was the biggest question.
然后是最大的问题。
Where was the nuclear warhead?
核弹头在哪里？
The warhead ended up about a quarter mile away, intact, in a ditch.
弹头完好无损地落在了大约四分之一英里外的沟渠中。
To me, that's amazing.
对我来说，这太棒了。
As for the question of whether the nuclear warhead could have gone off, the military would later say no, impossible.
至于核弹头是否会爆炸的问题，军方后来表示不会，不可能。
There were too many safety measures in place.
采取了太多的安全措施。
But lots of people who were familiar with nuclear weapons, who know them well, who worked on the Titan II, they say it absolutely could have.
但很多熟悉核武器、非常了解核武器、参与过泰坦二号工作的人都说，它绝对可以做到。
If the warhead had gone off, it's estimated the fallout could have reached more than 400 miles and killed people in Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Illinois, and Indiana.
如果弹头爆炸，估计其辐射范围可能达到 400 多英里，并导致阿肯色州、密苏里州、肯塔基州、伊利诺伊州和印第安纳州的人员死亡。
After Damascus, the Air Force officially blamed the incident on human error-- so Jeff Plumb and David Powell, who dropped the socket.
在大马士革事件发生后，空军正式将这一事件归咎于人为失误——杰夫·普拉姆和大卫·鲍威尔也是如此，他们掉落了插座。
That never sat well with many of the people who were there who worked at Damascus, including Jeff Plumb.
包括杰夫·普拉姆在内的许多在大马士革工作的人对此都不满意。
It wasn't uncommon for that to happen.
这种情况并不少见。
Every guy that worked in those silos I know dropped a wrench or a tool at some point in his career-- every guy.
我认识的每个在这些筒仓工作的人都在职业生涯的某个时刻丢掉了扳手或工具——每个人。
And if they tell you they didn't, they're lying.
如果他们告诉你他们没有，那他们就是在撒谎。
Because there was no way to get around that.
因为没有办法解决这个问题。
It just happened that one went the wrong way.
只是碰巧有人走错了路。
Plumb says the Air Force knew that.
普拉姆说空军知道这一点。
They knew then, and they know now.
他们当时知道，现在也知道。
That even when the stakes are nuclear weapons, human error is a factor.
即使赌注是核武器，人为错误也是一个因素。
After Damascus, workers were required to tie tools to their bodies.
大马士革之后，工人们被要求将工具绑在身上。
One solution to the problem of human error, the lanyard.
解决人为错误问题的一种方法是挂绳。
We should say we asked David Powell to talk about all this, but he didn't want to talk about it.
应该说，我们请大卫·鲍威尔谈论这一切，但他不想谈论。
We did learn that he only recently told his wife and family.
我们确实了解到他最近才告诉他的妻子和家人。
He'd kept it secret for years and years.
他多年来一直保守这个秘密。
Jeff Plumb says he thinks Powell really struggled with it, just like he did too.
杰夫·普拉姆说，他认为鲍威尔真的很挣扎，就像他自己一样。
After the incident, Jeff Plumb had an episode where he snapped, lost it, and started throwing beer bottles against the wall in a room at the Air Force base.
事件发生后，杰夫·普拉姆（Jeff Plumb）爆发了一次发作，他把手机丢了，然后开始把啤酒瓶扔到空军基地一个房间的墙上。
It was bad.
很糟糕。
The Air Force demoted him, and things went downhill from there.
空军把他降职了，事情从此开始走下坡路。
He was eventually discharged from the Air Force.
他最终从空军退伍。
Even now years later, he finds the accident hard to talk about.
即使多年后的今天，他仍然觉得那次事故很难谈论。
I'll tell the story.
我会讲这个故事。
And I'll begin to tell the story to someone, and then you just get caught up in it.
我会开始向某人讲述这个故事，然后你就会陷入其中。
You tell that story over-- I've told it I don't know how many times, you know, and relived it a few times.
你把那个故事讲一遍——我已经讲了不知道多少次了，你知道，并且重温了几次。
And I think I really have-- I think I've had enough, you know.
我想我真的——我想我已经受够了，你知道。
Yeah, just thinking back on it, it just wasn't a very good time in my life at that point.
是的，现在回想起来，那并不是我生命中的美好时光。
So I think I really don't want to tell the story anymore.
所以我想我真的不想再讲这个故事了。
So yeah, this will be the last time.
所以，是的，这将是最后一次。
Yeah.
是的。
This will be the last time.
这将是最后一次。
One of the remarkable things about Damascus is actually how unremarkable it was, how many accidents there have been like this one.
大马士革的非凡之处之一实际上是它是多么的不起眼，有多少像这样的事故。
When it comes to nuclear weapons, it's so easy to assume that everything is all taken care of, oversight is airtight, precautions and protocols are in place.
当谈到核武器时，人们很容易认为一切都已妥善处理，监督严密，预防措施和协议都已到位。
The stakes are so serious.
赌注是如此严重。
But the 70-year history of our nuclear weapons is littered with accidents like what happened in Arkansas.
但我们核武器 70 年的历史中充满了像阿肯色州发生的事故这样的事故。
An accident like Damascus could never happen again because our missiles no longer use liquid fuels.
像大马士革这样的事故永远不会再发生，因为我们的导弹不再使用液体燃料。
So that risk is gone.
这样风险就消失了。
But there are other risks.
但还存在其他风险。
There are new ones-- enemies hacking into missile systems over the internet, low morale and other personnel issues among the people who maintain and operate our nuclear arsenal, and aging facilities and technology.
还有新的问题——敌人通过互联网侵入导弹系统、维护和操作我们核武库的人员士气低落和其他人事问题，以及设施和技术老化。
I talked to half a dozen experts who are familiar with our nuclear weapons, from places like Yale, Berkeley, Harvard, and former military officials.
我与六位熟悉核武器的专家进行了交谈，他们来自耶鲁大学、伯克利分校、哈佛大学等地，还有前军方官员。
They worry about mishaps and accidents that most of us never consider with weapons most of us never think about.
他们担心我们大多数人从未考虑过的不幸和事故以及我们大多数人从未考虑过的武器。
All of them pointed out the accident at Damascus, no one saw that coming.
他们所有人都指出了大马士革发生的事故，但没有人预见到这一情况的发生。
There were supposed to be safeguards to prevent that from ever happening.
应该有保障措施来防止这种情况发生。
One military expert said, the kind of accident we should worry about is the kind that seems impossible, like what happened in Damascus.
一位军事专家表示，我们应该担心的事故是那种看起来不可能发生的事故，就像大马士革发生的事故一样。
Again, Greg Devlin.
再说一遍，格雷格·德夫林。
One dropped socket that A, should have let's just say not dropped; but B, should have never got past a platform; C, shouldn't have hit the thrust mount; D, shouldn't have hit the missile.
A 应该有一个掉落的插座，我们就说没有掉落；但是B，永远不应该越过一个平台； C、不应该撞到推力座； D，不应该击中导弹。
If it hit, it shouldn't have punctured a hole in it.
如果撞到的话，应该不会在上面刺出一个洞。
I mean there are so many things that shouldn't have happened, but one dropped socket wiped out an entire nuclear missile system.
我的意思是，有很多不应该发生的事情，但是一个掉下来的插座就毁掉了整个核导弹系统。
One dropped socket, nine-pound socket, took it all out.
一个掉下来的插座，九磅重的插座，把它全部拿掉了。
There's no one that thought that scenario out.
没有人想到这一场景。
A single dropped tool setting off the explosion of a nuclear missile.
一个掉落的工具引发了核导弹的爆炸。
Greg Devlin says he would have put the chance of that at zero.
格雷格·德夫林表示，他认为这种可能性为零。
Joe Richman is the founder of Radio Diaries.
乔·里奇曼是广播日记的创始人。
To make their podcast your next new podcast, you can find it at radiodiaries.org or wherever you get your podcasts.
要使他们的播客成为您的下一个新播客，您可以在 radiodiaries.org 或任何可以获得播客的地方找到它。
Eric Molinsky helped report this story.
埃里克·莫林斯基 (Eric Molinsky) 帮助报道了这个故事。
A special thanks to Eric Schlosser, who was a huge help to us and whose book on nuclear arms safety Command and Control covers this and other accidents like it.
特别感谢埃里克·施洛瑟（Eric Schlosser），他为我们提供了巨大帮助，他的关于核武器安全指挥与控制的书涵盖了这次事故和其他类似事故。
Eric pointed out to us that while the United States no longer uses liquid-fueled nuclear weapons, they are still in use in North Korea.
埃里克向我们指出，虽然美国不再使用液体燃料核武器，但朝鲜仍在使用。
Coming up, from mistakes in the past to mistakes in the present.
接下来，从过去的错误到现在的错误。
That's in a minute from Chicago Public Radio when our program continues.
芝加哥公共广播电台一分钟后我们的节目仍在继续。
It's This American Life.
这就是美国生活。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Each week on our program, we choose a theme and bring you different kinds of stories on that theme.
在我们的节目中，我们每周都会选择一个主题，并为您带来有关该主题的不同类型的故事。
Today's program, Human Error in Volatile Situations.
今天的节目，不稳定情况下的人为错误。
We've arrived at act two of our program.
我们已经进入了计划的第二幕。
Act Two, Erring Like a Sailor.
第二幕，像水手一样犯错。
In August, a Navy destroyer, the USS John McCain, collided with an oil tanker.
八月，一艘海军驱逐舰约翰·麦凯恩号与一艘油轮相撞。
10 sailors died.
10名水手死亡。
This is just two months after another destroyer, the USS Fitzgerald, crashed into a container ship, killing seven sailors.
就在两个月前，另一艘驱逐舰“菲茨杰拉德”号驱逐舰撞上一艘集装箱船，造成七名水手死亡。
After the McCain crash, rumors swirled around that somebody, Russia or China or North Korea, hacked into the ship's navigation systems, caused the crashes.
麦凯恩号坠机事件发生后，谣言四起，称俄罗斯、中国或朝鲜等人侵入了该船的导航系统，导致了坠机事件。
People said maybe hackers projected a fake GPS signal, so the ships didn't really know where they were.
人们说，也许黑客发射了虚假的 GPS 信号，因此船只并不真正知道自己在哪里。
Maybe the hacking rumors got so much traction because it just felt better to believe the collisions were caused by an enemy, rather than the truth.
也许黑客谣言之所以如此受关注，是因为相信碰撞是由敌人造成的，而不是真相，感觉更好。
After an investigation, it became clear we crashed the ships ourselves.
经过调查，很明显我们自己撞毁了船只。
It was human error.
这是人为错误。
Months ago, one of our producers, Stephanie Foo, started looking into these accidents and learned something about the Navy, an underlying reality about daily life for sailors the Navy has said played a role in these accidents.
几个月前，我们的制作人之一斯蒂芬妮·符（Stephanie Foo）开始调查这些事故，并了解了一些有关海军的信息，海军表示，海军水兵日常生活的基本现实在这些事故中发挥了作用。
And it honestly really surprised us.
老实说，这真的让我们感到惊讶。
Here's Stephanie.
这是斯蒂芬妮。
Ty is a sailor who served on a destroyer in the Pacific for four years, the USS John McCain.
泰是一名水手，曾在太平洋的约翰·麦凯恩号驱逐舰上服役四年。
He moved to another Navy job in 2016.
2016年，他调到另一份海军工作岗位。
He was friends with four of the 10 men who died on the McCain and really close to one guy in particular, Jacob Drake.
他与麦凯恩号遇难者中的 10 人中的 4 人是朋友，特别是与雅各布·德雷克 (Jacob Drake) 关系密切。
Because Ty's still in the Navy, he asked that we use a different name for him.
因为泰仍在海军服役，所以他要求我们为他使用不同的名字。
And we had an actor, Scott Shepherd, replace his voice.
我们请了一位演员斯科特·谢泼德来代替他的声音。
He was basically like a little chihuahua.
他基本上就像一只小吉娃娃。
This guy was probably 5'4" or 5'5".
这家伙可能身高 5 英尺 4 英寸或 5 英尺 5 英寸。
And then whenever we'd be roughhousing, and he'd punch me in the shoulder.
然后每当我们吵架时，他就会打我的肩膀。
And then I'd grab him around his shoulders, pick him up, and then put my other arm underneath his knees and just sandwich him up in the air.
然后我会抓住他的肩膀，把他抱起来，然后把我的另一只手臂放在他的膝盖下面，把他夹在空中。
So that was how we got to be really, really good friends.
就这样我们成为了非常非常好的朋友。
Jacob Drake was 21 when he died.
雅各布·德雷克去世时年仅 21 岁。
At first, Ty wondered if the hacking rumors were true.
起初，泰想知道黑客入侵的谣言是否属实。
But a few months ago, at one of the sailor's funerals, a group of guys who were on the McCain during the collision started talking.
但几个月前，在一名水手的葬礼上，碰撞期间麦凯恩号上的一群人开始交谈。
And Ty learned what happened up on the bridge that morning at 5:24 AM.
那天早上 5 点 24 分，Ty 得知了桥上发生的事情。
The sailors who were supposed to steer the ship didn't really know how to steer this particular destroyer and made a series of mistakes that caused the ship to drift portside right as it was approaching one of the most crowded waterways in the world, the Strait of Malacca.
应该驾驶这艘船的水手们并不真正知道如何驾驶这艘特殊的驱逐舰，并犯了一系列错误，导致这艘船在接近世界上最拥挤的水道之一——马六甲海峡时在左舷漂流。
It turned left into the the nose of an oil tanker.
它向左转进入一艘油轮的船头。
The tanker punctured a hole in the USS McCain's hull, which flooded the berthing and drowned his sleeping friends.
油轮在麦凯恩号航空母舰的船体上戳了一个洞，停泊处被淹没，淹死了他正在睡觉的朋友们。
When Ty found out the reason for the crash--
当泰发现坠机原因时——
I was [BLEEP] pissed.
我[BLEEP]很生气。
Operator error is what cost me four really good friends and 10 brothers total.
操作员的错误让我失去了四个真正的好朋友和十个兄弟。
It's a total waste.
这完全是浪费。
Like I don't know how else to describe that.
就像我不知道还能怎么形容。
We're taught from boot camp on attention to detail.
我们从新兵训练营就学到了对细节的关注。
That's what gets me the most because literally how small it was.
这就是最让我感动的，因为它确实很小。
The USS McCain was just one of six major accidents within the Navy's 7th Fleet this year.
麦凯恩号航空母舰只是今年海军第七舰队发生的六起重大事故之一。
The Fitzgerald is also in the 7th Fleet.
菲茨杰拉德号也在第七舰队中。
The most recent incident was the day before Thanksgiving when a Navy plane trying to land on an aircraft carrier crashed in the Pacific Ocean.
最近的一次事件是感恩节前一天，一架试图降落在航空母舰上的海军飞机在太平洋坠毁。
Three men were killed.
三名男子被杀。
Most years, there are just a handful of deaths on Navy ships, three or fewer.
大多数时候，海军舰艇上只有少数人死亡，三人或更少。
This year, there were 17.
今年有 17 个。
About a month after Ty went to that funeral, the Navy released a report that detailed the causes of both the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions.
泰参加葬礼大约一个月后，海军发布了一份报告，详细说明了菲茨杰拉德和麦凯恩相撞的原因。
The report verified the story Ty had heard.
该报告证实了泰所听到的故事。
It also described the panic of the sailors and how they struggled to save each other, pulling each other up ladders, using the Jaws of Life to extract trapped sailors from their crushed racks.
它还描述了水手们的恐慌，以及他们如何奋力拯救彼此，将彼此拉上梯子，使用生命之颚从压碎的架子上救出被困的水手。
The report includes scratchy, hand-drawn pictures of what the sailors saw as they tried to exit their racks, how the water was up to their necks.
该报告包括一些粗糙的手绘图片，显示了水手们试图离开架子时所看到的情况，以及水如何淹到他们的脖子。
It describes how afterward, when divers went into the berthings to retrieve the bodies, one body was found underneath a television and another inside a bathroom.
它描述了后来当潜水员进入停泊处打捞尸体时，在电视机下面发现了一具尸体，在浴室里发现了另一具尸体。
The report also concluded that a long list of errors led up to each crash.
该报告还得出结论，导致每次崩溃的原因都是一长串错误。
The crew wasn't properly trained.
船员没有经过适当的培训。
They used their radars incorrectly.
他们错误地使用了雷达。
Then there were the sailors who were on watch.
然后是值班的水手。
On the Fitzgerald, they looked out only one side of the ship, while ignoring the other.
在菲茨杰拉德号上，他们只看到船的一侧，而忽略了另一侧。
All these mistakes left some people wondering, why were the crews so unbelievably sloppy?
所有这些错误让一些人想知道，为什么工作人员如此马虎？
Rick Hoffman is a retired Navy captain and an expert on Navy collisions.
里克·霍夫曼（Rick Hoffman）是一名退役海军上尉，也是海军碰撞问题专家。
He spent five years of his career analyzing case studies of crashes to teach young officers about them.
他花了五年的职业生涯分析车祸案例，向年轻警官传授相关知识。
He pointed out in both the McCain and the Fitzgerald crashes, no one set off the collision alarm to warn the rest of the crew.
他指出，在麦凯恩号和菲茨杰拉德号坠机事件中，没有人触发碰撞警报来警告其他机组人员。
No one shouted, hey, there's a 700-foot ship heading our way.
没有人大喊，嘿，有一艘700英尺长的船正向我们驶来。
It shocked him.
这让他震惊。
There was no indication that the bridge was even aware that they were about to have a collision.
没有迹象表明大桥意识到他们即将发生碰撞。
They didn't sound the collision alarm.
他们没有拉响碰撞警报。
They didn't notify the crew.
他们没有通知船员。
They didn't tell the captain.
他们没有告诉船长。
And that's mind-boggling.
这真是令人难以置信。
That's mind-boggling.
这真是令人难以置信。
These people are looking out the window.
这些人正在看着窗外。
So you've got a sailor back there on a headset communicating with the bridge what he sees.
所以后面有一个水手戴着耳机与驾驶台交流他所看到的情况。
And why that kid wasn't screaming is a mystery to me.
为什么那个孩子没有尖叫对我来说是个谜。
I found some people who felt like they knew the answer to that mystery.
我发现有些人觉得自己知道这个谜团的答案。
Months before the Navy report on the crashes came out, I was on Reddit, where there's a community of people in the Navy.
在海军关于坠机事件的报告发布前几个月，我在 Reddit 上，那里有一个海军人员社区。
And I came across a long, impassioned discussion about the cause of the crashes.
我还发现了一场关于坠机原因的长时间而激烈的讨论。
It began with a single comment, quote, "I wonder if the watch were sleep deprived." And then posters just responded in droves-- about 1,000 posts of sailors and vets telling story after story about how little sleep they'd gotten during their time in the Navy.
它以一条评论开始，引用：“我想知道手表是否睡眠不足。”然后发帖者们纷纷做出回应——大约 1,000 个水手和退伍军人的帖子讲述了一个又一个故事，讲述他们在海军期间睡眠不足的情况。
Many people talked about averaging three to four hours of sleep per night, every night.
许多人谈到每天晚上平均每晚睡眠三到四个小时。
And that years afterward, long after they'd left the military, they still had trouble sleeping more than four hours a night, which sometimes led to issues with depression.
几年后，在他们离开军队很久之后，他们仍然很难每晚睡四个小时以上，这有时会导致抑郁症的问题。
Someone remembered being so tired that they reported the moon as an enemy contact.
有人记得当时太累了，以至于他们报告说月球是敌人的接触点。
One guy talked about cracking his head against a panel as he passed out from exhaustion onto it.
一名男子谈到他因精疲力尽而昏倒时，他的头撞到了一块面板上。
The commenters believed that these recent accidents weren't just caused by human error.
评论者认为，最近发生的这些事故不仅仅是人为失误造成的。
It was human error as a result of sleep deprivation.
这是由于睡眠不足而造成的人为错误。
It seemed crazy that giant, billion dollar ships could crash, that people could die because of something as simple as sleep.
价值数十亿美元的巨轮可能会坠毁，人们可能会因为睡眠这样简单的事情而死亡，这似乎很疯狂。
So I started calling people in the Navy or who are connected to the Navy, talking to them about this.
因此，我开始打电话给海军人员或与海军有联系的人，与他们讨论此事。
And over four months of reporting, the picture I got was staggering.
经过四个多月的报道，我得到的情况令人震惊。
Sleep deprivation seemed widespread.
睡眠不足似乎很普遍。
And there was this phrase people kept saying that sums up the Navy's attitude toward sleep.
人们经常挂在嘴边的一句话概括了海军对睡眠的态度。
You sleep when you're dead.
当你死了你就会睡觉。
Woman 2 It's like a sleep when you're dead stigma.
女人2 这就像你死了的耻辱后的睡眠。
You criticize somebody by telling them they're a rack hound, which means they sleep all the time.
你可以通过告诉某人他们是一个猎犬来批评他们，这意味着他们一直在睡觉。
You know, what are you?
你知道吗，你是什么？
Some kind of a weeny?
某种小东西？
You only been up for two days?
你才起来两天？
Come on.
快点。
What's wrong with you?
你这人怎么回事？
Suck it up.
把它吸起来。
You going to [BLEEP] cry about it?
你会为此[BLEEP]哭泣吗？
Yeah.
是的。
Wake up.
醒来吧。
Drink another cup of coffee.
再喝一杯咖啡。
In November, when the Navy released its public report about the McCain and Fitzgerald accidents, it confirmed that fatigue was one of the causes.
11月，当海军发布有关麦凯恩和菲茨杰拉德事故的公开报告时，证实疲劳是原因之一。
Mike Love is one of the sailors who posted on the Reddit thread.
迈克·洛夫 (Mike Love) 是在 Reddit 帖子上发帖的水手之一。
And as soon as he heard about the Fitzgerald crash, he thought--
当他听说菲茨杰拉德坠机事故时，他想——
It wasn't even-- to me, it was like, well, obviously that's what had happened.
对我来说，这甚至不是，嗯，显然这就是发生的事情。
It's that you're having a kid that's-- I don't know-- 19, 20 years old that you've been working 20 hours a day-- you're going to stand him out in the dark and tell him to look for stuff.
就是你有一个孩子——我不知道——19岁、20岁，而你每天工作20个小时——你要让他在黑暗中站出来，让他去找东西。
Like what do you think is going to happen?
就像你认为会发生什么？
He's going to [BLEEP] fall asleep.
他要[哔]睡着了。
Mike served from 2004 to 2008.
迈克于 2004 年至 2008 年任职。
This is a rare thing, but he explained that he would sometimes work 24-hour days-- so work a whole entire 24 hours, and then go straight on to the next 24 hours.
这是一件罕见的事情，但他解释说，他有时会一天工作 24 小时——所以工作整整 24 小时，然后直接进入下一个 24 小时。
And he told me a story that really sticks out in his memory.
他给我讲了一个让他印象深刻的故事。
He was stationed aboard a dock landing ship which-- well, all you need to know is that it's a bigass ship.
他驻扎在一艘船坞登陆舰上——好吧，你只需要知道这是一艘大型船。
And it was in the waters around Kuwait about 10 years ago.
大约10年前，它出现在科威特周围海域。
One night, he was doing rounds in a smaller boat, a patrol boat with five people in it.
一天晚上，他乘坐一艘较小的船巡视，这是一艘载有五个人的巡逻船。
And they were circling the bigass ship.
他们正在绕着那艘大船转。
The guy who was driving the patrol boat looked tired.
驾驶巡逻艇的家伙看上去很疲惫。
So Mike offered to take over.
于是迈克主动提出接手。
And I was like, man, you're looking pretty tired, you know.
我当时想，伙计，你看起来很累，你知道。
Do you mind if I step in?
你介意我介入吗？
He was like, thank you.
他说，谢谢。
I appreciate it.
我很感激。
It's been a long day.
这是漫长的一天。
I was like, yeah, I feel you.
我当时想，是的，我感觉到你了。
And as I was thinking about this, I was just kind of remembering, I wonder how long I had been awake.
当我思考这个问题时，我只是想起来，我想知道我醒了多久了。
And I remember questioning this.
我记得我曾质疑过这一点。
Yeah, that was-- I mean yeah, that would've been going on 72 hours right there.
是的，那是——我的意思是，那会持续 72 小时。
Jesus.
耶稣。
72 hours.
72小时。
Mike Love Yeah.
迈克·爱 是的。
And I put my headphones in.
然后我就戴上了耳机。
And I'll never forget.
我永远不会忘记。
It was playing Killswitch Engage.
它正在玩 Killswitch Engage。
And I was trying to keep myself up, you know, some heavy metal-- ba, ba, ba.
我试图让自己保持清醒，你知道，一些重金属——巴，巴，巴。
I remember the officer saying something into my ear.
我记得那位警官在我耳边说了些什么。
And he was like, yeah, you know, you don't need to swing it so close for the patrols.
他说，是的，你知道，你不需要把它摆得那么近以便巡逻。
We can take a little time.
我们可以花一点时间。
And I look up.
我抬起头。
I was like, OK, OK.
我当时想，好吧，好吧。
So he was driving around the bigger ship.
所以他驾驶着那艘更大的船。
And all of a sudden--
突然间——
And then I just remember hearing the engines kind of vvrrvv.
然后我只记得听到引擎的声音。
And I just hear like, Love, Love, Love.
我只听到这样的声音：爱，爱，爱。
And I was like, what?
我当时想，什么？
And I looked up.
我抬起头来。
And holy cow.
还有圣牛。
You know, swung full right.
你知道，完全向右摆动。
I was maybe-- maybe 60 meters from the side of the ship.
我大概距离船舷 60 米。
Heading full speed towards it.
全速向那里驶去。
He swerved away with just seconds to spare.
只剩几秒钟的时候，他突然转身离开。
It was very, very close.
非常非常接近。
You know, that would have easily, easily, easily killed us all.
你知道，那会很容易、很容易、很容易杀死我们所有人。
His shipmates started freaking out.
他的船员们开始惊慌失措。
And even then, Mike still couldn't keep his eyes open.
即便如此，迈克仍然无法睁开眼睛。
And I remember him saying like, are you kidding me?
我记得他说，你在开玩笑吗？
You're falling asleep as I'm talking?
我说话的时候你就睡着了？
And as he's yelling at me.
当他对我大喊大叫时。
And I was like, holy crap.
我当时想，天哪。
He's yelling in my ear, and I still am that tired that I had fallen asleep.
他在我耳边大喊大叫，而我仍然很累，睡着了。
This story was like a lot of stories on the Reddit thread-- fatigue-induced close calls.
这个故事就像 Reddit 帖子上的许多故事一样——疲劳导致的千钧一发。
And as Mike was telling me about this, he started describing what it felt like to be so sleep deprived.
当迈克告诉我这件事时，他开始描述睡眠不足的感觉。
And just the way he talked about it, I realized, oh, you know this feeling really well.
就在他谈论这件事的方式中，我意识到，哦，你非常了解这种感觉。
Like he'd been down that road so many times he'd come to recognize landmarks on the way.
就像他已经沿着那条路走过很多次一样，他逐渐认出了路上的地标。
When you hit a 24-hour mark or so, you're going to get your general tired.
当你达到 24 小时左右时，你的将军就会感到疲倦。
You hit that wall where you're like, oh man, I can barely keep my eyes open.
你撞到了那堵墙，你会想，天啊，我几乎睁不开眼睛。
And then once you come out of that, you start to suffer loss of motor skills, your finer motor skills, your ability to focus your eyes.
一旦你摆脱了这种状态，你就会开始丧失运动技能，你的精细运动技能，你的眼睛聚焦能力。
And then, for me anyway, it starts with the auditory hallucinations.
然后，无论如何，对我来说，一切都是从幻听开始的。
And then you'll get the visual hallucinations that will start at the corner of your eyes.
然后你会从眼角开始出现幻视。
Right in the shadows where your eyes kind of can't focus, your brain will be interpreting them as movement.
就在你的眼睛无法聚焦的阴影中，你的大脑会将它们解释为运动。
So as you hit day two or day three, you start to lose the ability to determine between wakefulness and sleep.
因此，当您进入第二天或第三天时，您开始失去区分清醒和睡眠的能力。
So you can be talking to someone and actually fall asleep with your eyes wide open.
因此，您可以在与某人交谈时睁大眼睛入睡。
And then the conversation will turn to complete gibberish.
然后谈话就会完全变成胡言乱语。
Like what are you talking about, dude?
就像你在说什么，伙计？
What did you just say?
你刚才说什么？
What do you mean?
你是什么意思？
I said this.
我这么说。
Scientists have studied this.
科学家对此进行了研究。
National Institutes of Health studies have given cognition tests to sleepy and drunk people.
美国国立卫生研究院的研究对困倦和醉酒的人进行了认知测试。
And they showed that being awake for 23 hours is equivalent to being well over the limit for driving drunk.
他们还表明，保持清醒 23 小时相当于远远超过醉酒驾驶的限度。
Reaction times for people awake that long were 200% worse than people who are well-rested.
清醒这么长时间的人的反应时间比休息良好的人差 200%。
Their hand-eye coordination was 30% worse.
他们的手眼协调能力下降了 30%。
On some tests, they made twice as many mistakes.
在某些测试中，他们犯的错误是原来的两倍。
You've got a whole ship of people driving drunk, and that's unacceptable.
有一整船人酒后驾车，这是不可接受的。
David Larter is a Navy vet, now a journalist for Defense News.
大卫·拉特 (David Larter) 是一名海军退伍军人，现在是《防务新闻》的记者。
And he's been thinking about the sleep issue and reporting on it for years.
多年来他一直在思考睡眠问题并进行报告。
A few months ago, Larter was on an NPR program, 1A, with a retired admiral, Terry McKnight, who took a very old school Navy tack on all this.
几个月前，拉特与退役海军上将特里·麦克奈特一起参加了 NPR 节目 1A，特里·麦克奈特在这一切方面采取了非常老式的海军策略。
He said basically sailors have to deliver no matter what.
他说基本上水手们无论如何都必须交付。
You're an adult.
你是一个成年人了。
You figure out when to sleep.
你弄清楚什么时候睡觉。
The Navy is not Carnival Cruise Lines.
海军不是嘉年华游轮公司。
This is hard work.
这是一项艰苦的工作。
People know that their watch-- they know when they're going to stand watch.
人们知道他们的手表——他们知道他们什么时候要站岗。
And they should take the opportunity to be well-rested before they get up there.
他们在上山之前应该趁机好好休息一下。
Larter told me that the Admiral's comment made him furious.
拉特告诉我，海军上将的评论让他非常愤怒。
He brought it up twice in our interview, fuming each time.
他在我们的采访中两次提到这个问题，每次都很生气。
And you need to make sure you're getting the proper amount of sleep so that blah, blah, blah.
而且你需要确保你有适当的睡眠时间，这样就可以了。
That it's on you.
就在你身上。
I'm sorry, Admiral.
对不起，上将。
It's not.
它不是。
It's on you.
就靠你了。
It's on you to set the conditions where that's not-- oh, well, I didn't sleep.
由你来设定条件，而不是——哦，好吧，我没有睡觉。
And that's a competition-- where you're not creating competition among people.
这就是一场竞争——你不会在人与人之间制造竞争。
Oh, I slept less than you.
哦，我睡得比你少。
Oh, you slept during the middle of the day.
哦，你中午睡觉了。
You're a dirtbag.
你就是个土包。
But that's the mentality.
但这就是心态。
That's the mentality that drives this [BLEEP].
这就是驱动这个[BLEEP]的心态。
It's, oh, this is a tough job.
这是，哦，这是一项艰巨的工作。
And sailors just need to man up.
水手们只需要振作起来。
And millennials these days are-- you know, they're soft.
如今的千禧一代——你知道，他们很软弱。
It's all garbage.
都是垃圾。
It's always been a bad idea.
这一直是个坏主意。
It's always been bad to not let people get enough sleep.
不让人们获得足够的睡眠总是很糟糕的。
People have told me that a lack of sleep is a problem in all branches of the military.
人们告诉我，睡眠不足是军队所有部门的一个问题。
But the Navy is the worst-- the workweeks of 100 hours or more, sleeping just a couple hours for days on end.
但海军是最差的——每周工作 100 个小时甚至更多，连续几天只睡几个小时。
I spoke to the Navy's lead researcher on sleep deprivation and its effects on sailors, Nita Shattuck, to see exactly how pervasive this was.
我采访了海军首席研究员妮塔·沙特克（Nita Shattuck），研究睡眠不足及其对水手的影响，以了解这种情况到底有多普遍。
Did I just find some isolated incidents, or was this everywhere?
我只是发现了一些孤立的事件，还是到处都有？
Dr. Shattuck's gone out with sailors in deployment and equipped them with essentially very expensive Fitbits to see how much sleep they get.
沙特克博士曾与部署中的水手一起外出，并为他们配备了非常昂贵的 Fitbit 设备，以了解他们的睡眠时间。
She told me that, on average, sailors get a little less than six hours of sleep a night, close to five hours a night when they're on deployment.
她告诉我，水手们平均每晚的睡眠时间略少于六个小时，而在执行任务时每晚的睡眠时间接近五个小时。
She said it's a huge problem, maybe bigger than the Navy would like to admit.
她说这是一个大问题，可能比海军愿意承认的还要严重。
The official report on the McCain and Fitzgerald accidents lists a bunch of reasons for the accidents, training and leadership failures, and only devotes two sentences to fatigue.
麦凯恩和菲茨杰拉德事故的官方报告列出了事故原因、训练和领导失败等一堆原因，只用了两句话来描述疲劳。
Shattuck thinks it's probably more significant than that.
沙特克认为这可能比这更重要。
You know, I completely acknowledge that-- when I look at things, my husband laughs at me.
你知道，我完全承认——当我看事情的时候，我丈夫会嘲笑我。
And he says, you think it's all about sleep.
他说，你认为这都是关于睡眠的。
But fatigue could be the major cause of a lot of this that's going on.
但疲劳可能是造成这种情况的主要原因。
So this report does not convince you otherwise?
那么这份报告不能让您信服吗？
Given the timing, given the circumstances that I'm aware of, I think that fatigue is still a big part of this story.
考虑到时间，考虑到我所了解的情况，我认为疲劳仍然是这个故事的一个重要组成部分。
The timing being both accidents happened during the graveyard shift, 1:30 AM and 5:24 AM.
两起事故发生的时间均是凌晨 1:30 和凌晨 5:24 值夜班期间。
I asked the Navy for details about how they knew the crews on the McCain and Fitzgerald were fatigued, how fatigued they were, and whether they could share the crew's schedules from the days before the accidents.
我向海军询问了他们如何知道麦凯恩号和菲茨杰拉德号上的船员疲劳的详细信息，他们有多疲劳，以及他们是否可以分享事故发生前几天船员的日程安排。
They said they could not share that.
他们说他们不能分享这一点。
But they did let me speak with Rear Admiral Jesse Wilson.
但他们确实让我与海军少将杰西·威尔逊交谈。
He's the leader of the Atlantic surface fleet.
他是大西洋水面舰队的领导者。
And he said, for instance on the Fitzgerald, it was clear the crew was overworked the day of the accident.
他说，例如在菲茨杰拉德号上，很明显船员在事故发生当天过度劳累。
The ship's routine was very busy that day.
那天船上的日常工作非常繁忙。
And there were indications that certain watch standards were not well-rested, including the commanding officer himself.
有迹象表明，某些值班标准没有得到充分休息，包括指挥官本人。
So more times than not, if one person on the team would have done something differently, would have said something differently, it could have changed the result of the entire event and, in this particular case, could have prevented a collision.
因此，很多时候，如果团队中的一个人做了不同的事情，说了不同的话，就可能会改变整个事件的结果，并且在这种特殊情况下，可能会避免碰撞。
Dr. Shattuck, the Navy sleep researcher, says one of the most problematic issues, and the thing that makes the Navy worse than all of the other branches, is that many sailors are on schedules that make them go to sleep at a different time every day-- which means one day bedtime might be 5:00 PM.
海军睡眠研究员沙特克博士表示，最成问题的问题之一，也是让海军比所有其他部门更糟糕的原因是，许多水手的作息时间安排使他们每天在不同的时间入睡，这意味着一天的就寝时间可能是下午 5:00。
The next, it might be 8:00 AM.
接下来，可能是上午 8:00。
Our bodies aren't built to do that, so sailors are constantly jet lagged.
我们的身体生来就无法做到这一点，所以水手们总是会时差反应。
So why has the Navy allowed it to happen?
那么为什么海军允许这种情况发生呢？
Well, in part out of necessity.
嗯，部分是出于必要。
The Navy is understaffed.
海军人手不足。
It's been steadily shrinking for decades.
几十年来它一直在稳步缩小。
And even though we have about the same operational demands as we have since the '90s, the number of ships available to do that work has decreased by half.
尽管我们的运营需求与 20 世纪 90 年代以来大致相同，但可用于执行这项工作的船舶数量却减少了一半。
And on those ships, 14,000 jobs are unfilled, about 10%.
这些船上有 14,000 个职位空缺，约占 10%。
The Navy has the money to make those hires.
海军有钱雇佣这些人。
But they're having trouble recruiting people.
但他们在招聘人员方面遇到了困难。
That means the sailors we do have are much busier.
这意味着我们现有的水手要忙得多。
They go out on longer deployments.
他们进行更长时间的部署。
And they wind up working longer hours.
他们最终工作时间更长。
Earlier this fall, Navy veteran and US senator John McCain expressed his concern about this at an armed services hearing about the collisions.
今年秋天早些时候，海军退伍军人、美国参议员约翰·麦凯恩在武装部队关于碰撞事件的听证会上表达了他对此的担忧。
McCain's father and grandfather, by the way, were both Navy admirals and both named John McCain.
顺便说一下，麦凯恩的父亲和祖父都是海军上将，都叫约翰·麦凯恩。
They're the ones the destroyer USS John McCain is named for.
约翰·麦凯恩号驱逐舰就是以它们命名的。
The senator said this to the chief of naval operations, Admiral John Richardson.
这位参议员向海军作战部长约翰·理查森海军上将说了这番话。
Admiral, is it true that some of our sailors are working 100-hour weeks?
提督，我们的一些水手每周工作 100 小时，这是真的吗？
Sir, I'll not deny that.
先生，我不会否认这一点。
The sailors are working very hard.
水手们工作非常努力。
We have been doing some work study-- sort of workday type of studies.
我们一直在做一些工作研究——一种工作日类型的研究。
OK.
好的。
But I'll just point out if we know that somebody's working a 100-hour workweek, I'm not sure we need a study.
但我只想指出，如果我们知道某人每周工作 100 小时，我不确定我们是否需要进行研究。
It's worth noting that all of the accidents this year have been in the 7th Fleet, the busiest fleet in the Navy.
值得注意的是，今年的所有事故都发生在海军最繁忙的舰队第七舰队。
They're in the Pacific and responsible for patrolling the waters around North Korea, Japan, and the South China Sea, all very tense, very high action areas right now.
他们在太平洋，负责在朝鲜、日本和南海周围海域巡逻，这些地区目前都是局势非常紧张、行动频繁的地区。
In the wake of the McCain and Fitzgerald deaths, the Navy took steps to fix the problem of fatigue.
麦凯恩和菲茨杰拉德去世后，海军采取措施解决疲劳问题。
In October, the Navy announced that it was going to start doing what Dr. Shattuck, the Navy sleep researcher, had been advocating for years.
十月，海军宣布将开始做海军睡眠研究员沙特克博士多年来一直倡导的事情。
Make it mandatory that sailors sleep at generally the same time every day.
强制水手每天在同一时间睡觉。
The Navy calls it implementing circadian rhythms.
海军称之为实施昼夜节律。
All large ships, like destroyers, should have implemented the new schedules this month.
所有大型船舶，例如驱逐舰，都应该在本月实施新的时间表。
Some smaller ships are expected to implement the policy this spring.
预计一些较小的船舶将在今年春季实施该政策。
I found a sailor on an assault ship that's been under circadian rhythms his entire deployment.
我发现一艘攻击舰上的一名水手在整个部署过程中都处于昼夜节律之下。
So according to the Navy, he should be getting enough sleep.
所以根据海军的说法，他应该有足够的睡眠。
But he told me that in practice, even though he gets to go to bed at the same time every day, he still works 16 hours each day and has just eight hours off.
但他告诉我，实际上，即使他每天在同一时间上床睡觉，他仍然每天工作16个小时，只有8个小时休息。
The only way he could possibly get a full eight hours of sleep is if he skipped showering, reading, or relaxing for a single minute and instead collapsed directly on his rack and started sleeping right after duty.
他想要睡足八小时的唯一方法就是跳过淋浴、阅读或放松一分钟，而是直接倒在架子上，下班后立即开始睡觉。
But of course, that's impossible.
但当然，这是不可能的。
When he lies down, he says, he isn't able to fall asleep immediately and often thinks about work for a couple hours before he can drift off.
他说，当他躺下时，他无法立即入睡，并且经常会在几个小时内思考工作，然后才能入睡。
He told me, quote, "If you're a human being in this system, you are OK with disrespecting your well-being every day."
他告诉我，引用的话，“如果你是这个系统中的一个人，你每天都可以不尊重自己的福祉。”
Brad Martin believes circadian rhythms are not going to fix the fatigue and accident problems in the 7th Fleet.
布拉德·马丁认为，昼夜节律并不能解决第七舰队的疲劳和事故问题。
He's a retired Navy surface warfare captain.
他是一名退役海军水面战上尉。
He held four commands during his 30 years in the service.
在 30 年的服役生涯中，他担任过四次指挥职务。
Now he's a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.
现在他是兰德公司的高级政策研究员。
That's going to be helpful.
这会有帮助的。
But I don't think just fixing that one thing is going to solve the whole problem.
但我认为仅仅解决一件事并不能解决整个问题。
He doesn't think the Navy can solve the problem without hiring and training people to fill the 14,000 vacancies it has on its ships.
他认为海军如果不雇佣和培训人员来填补舰艇上的 14,000 个职位空缺，就无法解决这个问题。
Ultimately, more people are going to have to be retained or brought in.
最终，更多的人将不得不被保留或引进。
Putting people through the training pipeline is a tens of millions of dollars type of problem.
让人们接受培训是一个耗资数千万美元的问题。
Yeah.
是的。
But then fixing the McCain and the Fitzgerald, those two ships alone is $800 million, so--
但如果修好麦凯恩号和菲茨杰拉德号，光是这两艘船就花费了 8 亿美元，所以——
That's a very good point.
这是一个很好的观点。
If we could have spent $70 million to try to get ensured that the manning on those ships was such that we could confidently say they are really ready to go out and operate, it would have been a lot cheaper.
如果我们能够花费 7000 万美元来确保这些船上的人员配置，让我们可以自信地说它们真的准备好出去运营，那么成本会便宜得多。
In the Navy, sleep is the canary in the coal mine.
在海军中，睡眠就像煤矿里的金丝雀。
Martin told me it's a warning of much deeper, systemic problems.
马丁告诉我，这是对更深层次的系统性问题的警告。
When the Navy puts on a three carrier show of strength off the Korean peninsula, or sends a destroyer to the South China Sea, the whole point is to project an image of American power.
当海军在朝鲜半岛举行三艘航母展示实力，或派出一艘驱逐舰前往南中国海时，其目的都是为了展示美国的实力形象。
But the reality is the Navy is trying to do too much with too little.
但现实是海军试图用太少的资源做太多的事情。
And behind those dangerous, powerful machines are sailors trying to stay awake at the controls.
在这些危险而强大的机器后面，水手们试图在控制装置上保持清醒。
Stephanie Foo is one of the producers of our show.
斯蒂芬妮·符（Stephanie Foo）是我们节目的制作人之一。
[MUSIC - "AN HONEST MISTAKE" BY THE BRAVERY]
[音乐-勇敢者的“诚实的错误”]
Our program was produced today by Dana Chivvis.
我们今天的节目由 Dana Chivvis 制作。
Our team includes Elna Baker, Elise Bergerson, Susan Burton, Ben Calhoun, Zoe Chace, Sean Cole, Hilary Elkins, Stephanie Foo, Chana Joffe-Walt, Michelle Harris, David Kestenbaum, Seth Lind, Jonathan Menjivar, B.A.
我们的团队包括 Elna Baker、Elise Bergerson、Susan Burton、Ben Calhoun、Zoe Chace、Sean Cole、Hilary Elkins、Stephanie Foo、Chana Joffe-Walt、Michelle Harris、David Kestenbaum、Seth Lind、Jonathan Menjivar、B.A.
Parker, Robyn Semien, Alissa Shipp, Lilly Sullivan, Christopher Swetala, Matt Tierney, and Diane Wu.
Parker、Robyn Semien、Alissa Shipp、Lilly Sullivan、Christopher Swetala、Matt Tierney 和 Diane Wu。
Our senior producer is Brian Reed.
我们的高级制片人是布莱恩·里德。
[ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS] Our website, thisamericanlife.org.
[致谢] 我们的网站 thisamericanlife.org。
This American Life is delivered to public radio stations by PRX, the Public Radio Exchange.
《美国生活》由公共广播电台 PRX 向公共广播电台播出。
Thanks as always to our program's co-founder, Mr. Torey Malatia.
一如既往地感谢我们计划的联合创始人 Torey Malatia 先生。
You know his Christmas present for me this year?
你知道今年他送给我的圣诞礼物吗？
I don't know.
我不知道。
It just-- it just seemed a little hostile.
只是——看起来有点敌意。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Back next week with more stories of This American Life.
下周我们将带来更多《美国生活》的故事。
This American Life This American Life is produced in collaboration with WBEZ Chicago and delivered to stations by PRX The Public Radio Exchange.
This American Life This American Life 与 WBEZ Chicago 合作制作，并由 PRX 公共广播电台传送到各电台。