561: NUMMI (2015) - This American Life

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00:00 00:00 Transcript Share This American Life Life Partners How to Listen Episodes Recommended About Overview Staff Announcements Fellowships Jobs Music Make Radio On The Road FAQ Submissions Merch Contact Us Our Other Shows Merch Follow Us Life Partners Subscribe to our newsletter Full episode Toggle Audio and Transcript Sync Transcript | Episode #561 | July 17, 2015 561: NUMMI (2015) Note: This American Life is produced for the ear and designed to be heard.

00:00 00:00 文字记录 分享此 美国生活 生活伙伴 如何收听 剧集 推荐 关于 概述 员工公告 奖学金 工作 音乐 在路上制作电台 常见问题解答 提交 商品 联系我们 我们的其他节目 商品 关注我们 生活伙伴 订阅我们的时事通讯 整集 切换音频和文字记录同步 文字记录 | 内容第 561 集 | 2015 年 7 月 17 日 561：NUMMI (2015) 注：《This American Life》是为耳朵而生，旨在让人们听到。

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Transcripts are generated using a combination of speech recognition software and human transcribers, and may contain errors.

文字记录是使用语音识别软件和人工转录员结合生成的，可能包含错误。

Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.

请在印刷版引用前检查相应的音频。

Prologue Ira Glass Today, we have this story for you about cars-- American cars.

序言 Ira Glass 今天，我们为您带来这个关于汽车的故事——美国汽车。

And like a lot of stories about American cars, this one is more tragedy than comedy, although there is some comedy in there, too.

就像许多关于美国汽车的故事一样，这个故事更多的是悲剧而不是喜剧，尽管其中也有一些喜剧。

The good news, of course, about American cars is that American cars are getting better, especially in the last few years.

当然，关于美国汽车的好消息是美国汽车正在变得越来越好，尤其是在过去几年。

You've probably heard that.

你可能听说过。

Well, at Ford, the Ford Fusion-- Consumer Reports named it a better car than the Toyota Camry and Honda Accord a few years ago.

嗯，在福特，福特Fusion——《消费者报告》几年前称其为比丰田凯美瑞和本田雅阁更好的汽车。

I think that was a major turning point.

我认为这是一个重大转折点。

Michelle Krebs has been covering the auto industry for 35 years.

米歇尔·克雷布斯 (Michelle Krebs) 从事汽车行业报道已有 35 年。

She's now at autotrader.com.

她现在在 autotrader.com。

She says the reason American cars finally improved--

她说美国汽车最终改进的原因是——

I think when you're on the brink of possible extinction, it wakes people up, and they started changing things.

我认为当你处于可能灭绝的边缘时，它会唤醒人们，他们开始改变一切。

But that's what it took.

但这就是它所需要的。

I mean, that's why Ford came out with the Ford Fusion.

我的意思是，这就是福特推出福特Fusion的原因。

They spent $23 billion-- borrowed $23 billion, because they were almost out of business.

他们花了 230 亿美元——借了 230 亿美元，因为他们几乎破产了。

So basically, it's deathbed conversions.

所以基本上，这是临终前的转变。

That's a good way to describe it.

这是一个很好的描述方式。

They decided, we have got to bet the ranch on building great cars that people really want to buy.

他们决定，我们必须把整个牧场都押在制造人们真正想买的优质汽车上。

They're still not all the way there yet.

他们还没有完全到达那里。

I mean, I think that's the simple fact of the matter.

我的意思是，我认为这就是事情的简单事实。

There's been progress, but it's been spotty.

取得了进展，但进展参差不齐。

How spotty?

有多参差不齐？

When Consumer Reports rated the top 10 most reliable car brands this year, only one was American.

当《消费者报告》今年评选出十大最值得信赖的汽车品牌时，只有一个是美国品牌。

9 were foreign.

9名是外国人。

4 of the top 5, no surprise, were Japanese-- Toyota, Honda, Mazda, and Lexus.

毫不奇怪，前 5 名中的 4 个是日本企业——丰田、本田、马自达和雷克萨斯。

Why are most American cars still not as good as foreign cars?

为什么大多数美国车还是不如外国车？

Why is it still taking Detroit so long to learn this lesson?

为什么底特律花了这么长时间才吸取教训？

It's not like this reliability problem just snuck up on them, right?

这个可靠性问题不会突然出现在他们身上，对吗？

General Motors, the biggest American car maker, started losing market share 50 years ago.

美国最大的汽车制造商通用汽车 50 年前就开始失去市场份额。

Back in the 1960s, GM sold over half the cars in the United States, and then that number just slid lower and lower and lower for decades, until now, it's 18% of all cars sold in the US.

早在 20 世纪 60 年代，通用汽车就在美国销售了一半以上的汽车，然后这个数字在几十年里不断下滑，直到现在，它占美国销售的所有汽车的 18%。

Today's program came out of a question that we had here at the radio show.

今天的节目源于我们在广播节目中提出的一个问题。

We genuinely did not understand why American car makers waited until they were nearly extinct-- two of them bankrupt, one of them nearly bankrupt.

我们实在不明白为什么美国的汽车制造商要等到几乎灭绝的时候才出现——其中两家破产了，一家几乎破产了。

Why didn't they get on the ball and start making reliable cars that could compete with the Japanese decades ago?

为什么他们不立即行动起来，开始制造可以与几十年前的日本汽车竞争的可靠汽车呢？

It seemed like, OK, you're running a business.

看起来，好吧，你正在经营一家企业。

You're losing sales in such a huge way.

你的销售损失如此巨大。

Why wouldn't you change?

你为什么不改变？

It really made no sense.

这确实没有意义。

And we looked around for an explanation, and we learned about this one car factory in California.

我们四处寻找解释，并了解了加利福尼亚州的一家汽车工厂。

Here.

这里。

What happened at this factory not only illustrates some very interesting answers to that question, it captures a lot of what went wrong in the American car business in the last 35 years.

这家工厂发生的事情不仅说明了这个问题的一些非常有趣的答案，而且还反映了过去 35 年美国汽车行业出现的许多问题。

This is a plant in Fremont, California, called NUMMI.

这是一家位于加利福尼亚州弗里蒙特的工厂，名为 NUMMI。

NUMMI stands for New United Motor Manufacturing Incorporated.

NUMMI 代表新联合汽车制造公司。

A modern car plant, by the way, sounds a lot like a casino.

顺便说一句，现代汽车工厂听起来很像赌场。

The automated gear plays these little songs to let you know that it's running.

自动齿轮会播放这些小歌曲，让您知道它正在运行。

Driverless robotic carts glide up and down the aisles like R2D2 delivering doors and other parts.

无人驾驶机器人推车像 R2D2 一样在过道上来回滑动，运送门和其他零件。

Their song is supposed to warn you that they're coming.

他们的歌应该是警告你他们来了。

The story of this particular factory is actually a famous story among car people.

这家工厂的故事，其实是汽车界的一个家喻户晓的故事。

It's taught at business schools.

它在商学院教授。

NUMMI was opened in 1984 by GM and Toyota together.

NUMMI 由通用汽车和丰田于 1984 年共同开设。

The two companies decided that this would be a place that they would build cars with each other.

两家公司决定在这里共同制造汽车。

And if it seems strange to you that two competitors would do this, it seemed strange at the time, also.

如果你觉得两个竞争对手会这样做很奇怪，那么当时也很奇怪。

A headline in Car and Driver about the partnership read, "Hell Freezes Over." But both companies had their reasons.

《汽车与司机》杂志关于此次合作的标题是“地狱结冰”。但这两家公司都有自己的理由。

We'll get to those.

我们会解决这些问题的。

At NUMMI, Toyota showed GM all of its secrets.

在 NUMMI 上，丰田向通用汽车展示了它的所有秘密。

Showed it exactly how it made some of the best-built, most reliable cars in the world back then.

准确地展示了它是如何制造出当时世界上最好、最可靠的一些汽车的。

GM, at the time, hoped to take these lessons from NUMMI and carry them into all their other plants, all over the country and over the world.

当时，通用汽车希望从 NUMMI 汲取这些经验教训，并将其推广到全国乃至世界各地的所有其他工厂。

That was the 1980s.

那是 20 世纪 80 年代。

And then, well, you know, it didn't go well.

然后，嗯，你知道，进展并不顺利。

GM was one of the car makers who went bankrupt.

通用汽车是破产的汽车制造商之一。

US taxpayers, you and I, we bailed them out for $50 billion.

美国纳税人，你和我，我们用 500 亿美元救助了他们。

And NUMMI closed.

NUMMI 关闭了。

This GM plant that seemed like it might be able to teach American car makers how to catch up to their competitors-- it stopped making cars for GM.

这家通用汽车工厂似乎能够教会美国汽车制造商如何赶上竞争对手，但它不再为通用汽车生产汽车。

The sounds that you're hearing right now-- they were recorded in 2010, in the last months before GM shuttered the place, on April Fools' Day that year.

你现在听到的声音——它们是在 2010 年录制的，当时是通用汽车关闭该工厂之前的最后几个月，即当年的愚人节。

Back then, we put together this story that we're about to play for you today.

当时，我们整理了今天要为您播放的这个故事。

For a few months before NUMMI closed, Frank Langfitt, who at the time was NPR's automotive correspondent, and one of our producers, Brian Reed, travelled around the country talking to GM workers and managers about what had happened at NUMMI.

在 NUMMI 关闭前的几个月里，时任 NPR 汽车记者的弗兰克·朗菲特 (Frank Langfitt) 和我们的制作人之一布莱恩·里德 (Brian Reed) 走遍全国，与通用汽车的员工和经理谈论 NUMMI 发生的事情。

General Motors and the UAW-- they are secretive cultures.

通用汽车和美国汽车工人联合会——它们是秘密文化。

But as you're going to hear, people were blunt when they talked to Frank about this.

但正如你将听到的，人们在与弗兰克谈论此事时直言不讳。

They were blunt in a way that you rarely hear with auto executives and UAW reps when they're being interviewed by the press.

他们的直言不讳是你在汽车业高管和美国汽车工人联合会代表接受媒体采访时很少听到的。

Act One of our show is going to be about the rise of NUMMI.

我们节目的第一幕将讲述 NUMMI 的崛起。

Act Two is where we get the answer to our question-- what prevented GM from learning from NUMMI for so many years?

第二幕是我们问题的答案——是什么阻止了 GM 这么多年向 NUMMI 学习？

For WBEZ Chicago, it's This American Life.

对于 WBEZ 芝加哥来说，就是《This American Life》。

I'm Ira Glass.

我是艾拉·格拉斯。

Our show today produced with our colleagues at NPR News.

我们今天的节目与 NPR 新闻的同事一起制作。

And now it is my pleasure to turn the story over to Frank Langfitt.

现在我很高兴将这个故事交给弗兰克·朗菲特。

When NUMMI was conceived, General Motors was far and away the world's largest car company.

当 NUMMI 诞生时，通用汽车无疑是世界上最大的汽车公司。

Its US market share was seven times that of Toyota.

其美国市场份额是丰田的七倍。

But each company had a problem that the other company could help them solve.

但每家公司都有一个其他公司可以帮助他们解决的问题。

On GM's side, the problem was small cars.

在通用汽车方面，问题出在小型汽车上。

Under government emission guidelines, General Motors had to build them, but they always lost money for GM, and they were lousy quality.

根据政府的排放指导方针，通用汽车必须建造它们，但它们总是让通用汽车赔钱，而且质量很差。

So Toyota suggested a joint venture that offered two things.

因此，丰田建议成立一家合资企业，该合资企业可以提供两种服务。

First, Toyota would build a quality small car for GM-- one that would finally turn a profit.

首先，丰田将为通用汽车制造一款优质小型汽车——一款最终能够盈利的汽车。

And the second thing was, we have this thing called the Toyota production system, and it produces the quality you see.

第二件事是，我们有一个叫做丰田生产系统的东西，它生产出你所看到的质量。

We could teach you the Toyota production system.

我们可以教您丰田生产系统。

Jeffrey Liker is a professor of industrial engineering at the University of Michigan.

杰弗里·莱克 (Jeffrey Liker) 是密歇根大学工业工程教授。

He's been studying Japanese auto manufacturing, including NUMMI, since the 1980s, and wrote a book about it called The Toyota Way .

自 20 世纪 80 年代以来，他一直在研究日本汽车制造，包括 NUMMI，并写了一本关于它的书，名为《丰田之路》。

He says even though Toyota was offering GM something quite remarkable-- to teach a competitor its secrets, to show them exactly how Toyota achieved such phenomenal reliability-- GM wasn't that interested.

他说，尽管丰田为通用汽车提供了一些非常了不起的东西——向竞争对手传授其秘密，向他们展示丰田如何实现如此惊人的可靠性——但通用汽车并没有那么感兴趣。

Some people in GM, I think, had some foresight to realize this is important.

我认为，通用汽车公司的一些人很有先见之明，意识到这一点很重要。

I think for many of the senior leaders, it was more, OK, well, maybe I'll learn something, maybe I won't, but it won't hurt.

我认为对于许多高级领导者来说，更多的是，好吧，好吧，也许我会学到一些东西，也许我不会，但这不会有什么坏处。

Why wouldn't they be really interested in the Toyota production system?

为什么他们对丰田生产系统不真正感兴趣？

Because at that point, wasn't Toyota building higher quality cars?

因为在那时，丰田不是在生产更高质量的汽车吗？

Toyota was building higher quality cars.

丰田正在制造更高质量的汽车。

I'm not sure it was 100% accepted at that time by senior management that Japanese quality was really better.

我不确定当时的高级管理层是否 100% 接受日本质量真的更好。

Why?

为什么？

Jeffrey Liker I think there was pride and defensiveness.

杰弗里·莱克（Jeffrey Liker）我认为有自豪感和防御性。

I'm proud because I'm the biggest automaker in the world.

我很自豪，因为我是世界上最大的汽车制造商。

I've been the best.

我已经是最好的了

I've dominated the market.

我已经统治了市场。

You can't teach me anything, you little Japanese company.

你不能教我任何东西，你这个日本小公司。

I'm John Shook.

我是约翰·舒克。

Toyota and Toyota City was completely Japanese when I joined them.

当我加入丰田和丰田城时，他们完全是日本人。

I was the first non-Japanese to join them as a regular employee in Toyota City.

我是丰田市第一个作为正式员工加入他们的非日本人。

John Shook moved to Japan in the early 1980s because of his fascination with Japanese management techniques.

由于对日本管理技术的着迷，约翰·舒克 (John Shook) 在 20 世纪 80 年代初移居日本。

He read books about them back home in east Tennessee.

他在田纳西州东部的家乡读了有关他们的书籍。

And he decided to fly halfway around the globe, learn to speak the language, and hunt for a job with the biggest Japanese company that would have him.

他决定飞越半个地球，学习说这种语言，并在能够雇用他的最大的日本公司寻找一份工作。

Toyota hired him to train American workers in the joint venture.

丰田聘请他来培训合资企业的美国工人。

Now, here was the problem that pushed Toyota into the deal.

现在，正是这个问题促使丰田加入了这项交易。

They needed to learn how to build cars in America.

他们需要学习如何在美国制造汽车。

For years, the Japanese had been winning away customers from Detroit-- so many that now the US Congress was threatening to restrict car imports.

多年来，日本人一直在从底特律赢得客户，数量如此之多，以至于现在美国国会威胁要限制汽车进口。

Toyota could avoid that by making cars in the US.

丰田可以通过在美国生产汽车来避免这种情况。

But they wanted a partner.

但他们想要一个合作伙伴。

Here's John Shook.

请听约翰·舒克的报道。

Toyota was looking specifically for things they could learn.

丰田专门寻找他们可以学习的东西。

How can we work with American workers?

我们如何与美国工人合作？

How can we make sure that our management system can work in North America?

如何确保我们的管理体系能够在北美发挥作用？

And they'd been pretty happy just producing in Toyota City, doing a very good job.

他们很高兴在丰田市生产，做得非常好。

And the idea of actually taking their system and producing outside of Toyota City was scary to them.

实际上采用他们的系统并在丰田市以外进行生产的想法对他们来说是可怕的。

Toyota was right to be scared.

丰田的担心是有道理的。

Compared to Japan, where auto workers and management worked together, labor relations in America were more like war.

与汽车工人和管理层合作的日本相比，美国的劳资关系更像是战争。

And at the GM plant in Fremont, it felt at times like hand to hand combat.

在弗里蒙特的通用汽车工厂，有时感觉就像是肉搏战。

A former running back from the University of Arkansas named Bruce Lee ran the western region for the United Auto Workers, and was in charge of the Fremont Union Local 1364.

阿肯色大学的前跑卫李小龙负责美国汽车工人联合会的西部地区工作，并负责弗里蒙特联盟当地 1364 组织。

Now, normally, somebody like Bruce Lee is supposed to defend his union members no matter what, but even he says they were awful.

现在，通常情况下，像李小龙这样的人无论如何都应该捍卫他的工会成员，但就连他也说他们很糟糕。

It was considered the worst workforce in the automobile industry in the United States.

他们被认为是美国汽车行业最差的劳动力。

And it was a reputation that was well-earned.

这是来之不易的声誉。

Everything was a fight.

一切都是一场战斗。

They spent more time on grievances and on things like that than they did on producing cars.

他们花在抱怨和类似事情上的时间比生产汽车的时间还要多。

They had strikes all the time.

他们一直在罢工。

It was just chaos constantly.

这只是不断的混乱。

The Fremont, California plant for General Motors was bad by GM standards.

按照通用汽车公司的标准，通用汽车公司位于加利福尼亚州弗里蒙特的工厂很糟糕。

And GM's average was bad by Toyota standards.

按照丰田的标准，通用汽车的平均水平很差。

So this is the worst among the bad, mediocre plants in GM.

所以这是通用汽车公司最差、最平庸的工厂中最差的一个。

Again, that's Jeffrey Liker, who has interviewed workers and management at Fremont for his research.

杰弗里·莱克（Jeffrey Liker）再次为他的研究采访了弗里蒙特的工人和管理层。

One of the expressions was, you can buy anything you want in the GM plant in Fremont.

其中一种说法是，你可以在弗里蒙特的通用汽车工厂购买任何你想要的东西。

If you want sex, if you want drugs, if you want alcohol, it's there.

如果你想要性，如果你想要毒品，如果你想要酒精，它就在那里。

During breaks, during lunchtime, if you want to gamble illegally-- any illegal activity was available for the asking within that plant.

休息时、午餐时，如果你想非法赌博——任何非法活动都可以在那个工厂内询问。

Sounds like prison.

听起来像监狱。

Jeffrey Liker Actually, the analogy to prison is a good analogy, because the workers were stuck there because they could not find anything close to that level of job and pay and benefits at their level of education and skill.

事实上，用监狱来比喻是一个很好的比喻，因为工人们被困在那里，因为他们找不到任何与他们的教育和技能水平相近的工作、工资和福利。

So they were trapped there.

所以他们就被困在那里了。

And they also felt like we have a job for life, and the union will always protect us.

他们还觉得我们有一份终生的工作，工会会永远保护我们。

So we're stuck here, and it's long term.

所以我们被困在这里，而且是长期的。

And then all these illegal things crop up, so we can entertain ourselves while we're stuck here.

然后所有这些非法的事情突然出现，所以我们可以在被困在这里的时候自娱自乐。

A lot of booze on the line.

大量的酒就行了。

I mean, it was just amazing.

我的意思是，这太棒了。

And as long as you did your job, they really didn't care.

只要你做好你的工作，他们真的不在乎。

What kind of booze?

什么样的酒？

What were people drinking?

人们喝什么？

Whiskey, gin.

威士忌、杜松子酒。

Frank Langfitt That's Rick Madrid.

弗兰克·朗菲特 那是里克·马德里。

He began working at the plant in 1955.

他于 1955 年开始在工厂工作。

He mounted tires on Chevy trucks.

他在雪佛兰卡车上安装轮胎。

When I was mounting tires, we'd drink.

当我安装轮胎时，我们会喝酒。

I'd bring a thermos of screwdrivers with me.

我会带一个装有螺丝刀的热水瓶。

But I never was into drugs.

但我从来不吸毒。

I wasn't that fortunate.

我就没那么幸运了。

Peter Ross There was a guy in here, he would be selling pot.

彼得·罗斯 这里有一个人，他会卖大麻。

Peter Ross repaired machinery on the assembly line at GM.

彼得·罗斯在通用汽车的装配线上修理机器。

I'd be walking through the plant with my tools and my radio, and you see a big cloud of smoke.

我带着工具和收音机走过工厂，你会看到一大团烟雾。

You don't want to inhale it.

你不想吸入它。

You'd get a contact high.

你会得到一个高接触。

If you're wondering how people kept their jobs, well, back then, the UAW was still quite powerful.

如果你想知道人们是如何保住工作的，那么，当时美国汽车工人联合会仍然相当强大。

Under the union contract, it was almost impossible to fire anybody.

根据工会合同，解雇任何人几乎是不可能的。

And if management ticked off the union, workers could just shut the plant down in minutes.

如果管理层激怒了工会，工人们可以在几分钟内关闭工厂。

With that sort of leverage, absenteeism became absurd.

有了这种影响力，缺勤就变得荒谬了。

On a normal day, one out of five workers just didn't show up.

正常的一天，五分之一的工人没有出现。

It was even worse on Mondays.

周一情况更糟。

Billy Haggerty worked in hood and fender assembly.

比利·哈格蒂（Billy Haggerty）负责引擎盖和挡泥板的组装工作。

He says so few workers showed up some mornings, management couldn't start the line.

他说，有些早上来的工人太少，管理层无法启动生产线。

They brought a lot of people off the street to fill in when they didn't have enough people.

当人手不够的时候，他们从街上带了很多人来填补。

Who would they find?

他们会找到谁？

Billy Haggerty Go right across the street to the bar and grab people out of there and bring them in.

比利·哈格蒂（Billy Haggerty） 直接去街对面的酒吧，把人从那里抓出来并带进来。

Workers filed grievances, formal complaints against management, over all kinds of things.

工人们就各种各样的事情提出申诉，正式投诉管理层。

Someone who isn't your boss asks you to clean something up?

非你老板的人要求你清理一些东西？

Hit them with a grievance.

委屈地打击他们。

A manager steps in to do a job that isn't his?

经理介入去做不属于他的工作？

Grievance.

委屈。

The strategy was simple.

策略很简单。

Pile up grievances, real or imagined, by the thousands, then use them to squeeze money or concessions out of management.

积累成千上万的不满，无论是真实的还是想象的，然后利用它们从管理层中榨取金钱或让步。

And Fremont workers struck back at their bosses in other ways.

弗里蒙特的工人还以其他方式反击他们的老板。

They'd intentionally screw up the vehicles, put Coke bottles or loose bolts inside the door panels so they'd rattle and annoy the customer.

他们故意把车辆搞砸，把可乐瓶或松动的螺栓放在门板内，这样它们就会发出嘎嘎声，惹恼顾客。

They'd scratch cars.

他们会刮伤汽车。

Richard Aguilar inspected vehicles at the plant.

理查德·阿吉拉尔在工厂检查车辆。

He saw one guy do something even worse.

他看到一个人做了更糟糕的事情。

He left some loose bolts on this front suspension.

他在前悬架上留下了一些松动的螺栓。

That was dangerous.

那很危险。

I went and told the assistant manager right away.

我立即去告诉助理经理。

They went out there, and they checked it, and there were like 400 cars he'd done that too.

他们出去检查了，大约有 400 辆汽车他也这么做了。

He was mad because they had suspended him for drinking.

他很生气，因为他们因他酗酒而停职。

By 1982, GM had had enough, and put the Fremont factory out of its misery.

到 1982 年，通用汽车已经受够了，让弗里蒙特工厂摆脱了困境。

The company laid off thousands of workers and closed the plant.

该公司解雇了数千名工人并关闭了工厂。

The next year, when GM and Toyota began planning to reopen the plant for the joint venture, there was one thing neither company wanted to do-- hire the same union leaders who'd battled management and overseen GM's worst workforce.

第二年，当通用汽车和丰田开始计划为合资企业重新开设工厂时，两家公司都不愿意做一件事——雇用那些曾与管理层斗争并监督通用汽车最差员工的工会领导人。

Then the UAW's Bruce Lee sat down with Chairman Eiji Toyoda.

随后美国汽车工人联合会的李小龙与主席丰田英二坐下来。

And one of the first things I said is, I've got to hire the first 50 people.

我说的第一件事就是，我必须雇用前 50 名员工。

So who did you hire?

那么你雇用了谁？

Bruce Lee The same leadership that was in the union before.

李小龙 与之前在工会中的领导层相同。

Why?

为什么？

I thought you would try to get rid of them.

我以为你会尝试摆脱它们。

No, no, because I believed that it was the system that made it bad, not the people.

不，不，因为我相信是制度造成了这种情况，而不是人。

GM was against it, but incredibly, Toyota agreed.

通用汽车反对，但令人难以置信的是，丰田同意了。

Toyota execs believed their system would turn bad workers into good ones.

丰田高管相信他们的系统可以把坏工人变成好工人。

Then Lee had to sell the plan to the rank and file.

然后李不得不向普通民众推销这个计划。

He held a meeting and told union members that Fremont would now be a Japanese style plant.

他召开了一次会议，告诉工会成员，弗里蒙特现在将成为一家日式工厂。

Old seniority rules wouldn't apply.

旧的资历规则不再适用。

Life at the plant would be totally different.

工厂的生活将会完全不同。

The workers hated all this.

工人们痛恨这一切。

They didn't want anything changed.

他们不希望有任何改变。

They wanted the plant to open exactly how it was when General Motors had it.

他们希望工厂按照通用汽车公司建时的样子开业。

Bad cars and all?

坏车等等？

Bruce Lee That's what they wanted.

李小龙 这就是他们想要的。

They even hung Lee in effigy.

他们甚至还给李悬挂了肖像。

But Lee had something very powerful on his side.

但李身边有一些非常强大的东西。

Most of the workers desperately needed jobs.

大多数工人迫切需要工作。

And Lee had them.

李拥有它们。

When NUMMI opened, over 85% of the workforce were old hands from GM Fremont.

当 NUMMI 开业时，超过 85% 的员工都是通用汽车弗里蒙特公司的老员工。

But to prepare them for that moment, in the spring of 1984, Toyota started flying them to Japan in groups of 30 to begin learning the Toyota system for making cars.

但为了让他们做好准备，1984 年春天，丰田开始将他们以 30 人为一组飞往日本，开始学习丰田汽车制造系统。

Well, when the NUMMI workers first came to Japan, me, as well as certainly my Japanese bosses, had heard all these horrible things about the American worker, about the American union.

好吧，当 NUMMI 工人第一次来到日本时，我，当然还有我的日本老板，都听说过所有这些关于美国工人、关于美国工会的可怕事情。

As the one American working in Toyota City, John Shook helped design this training.

作为在丰田市工作的美国人，约翰·舒克 (John Shook) 帮助设计了这项培训。

And we had certainly heard all these stories about the workforce there at the Fremont plant, and it was our job to show them a new and very different way of working.

我们当然听说过有关弗里蒙特工厂员工的所有这些故事，我们的工作就是向他们展示一种全新的、截然不同的工作方式。

What would they do?

他们会做什么？

How would they respond to this?

他们对此有何反应？

How would they react?

他们会如何反应？

And no one knew.

没有人知道。

I didn't know.

我不知道。

So everyone was very, very nervous.

所以大家都非常非常紧张。

I was kind of apprehensive about what I was going to see when I arrived in Japan.

当我到达日本时，我对自己将要看到的东西感到有点担心。

On one of those planes was Earl Ferguson.

其中一架飞机上坐着厄尔·弗格森。

He'd been working for GM since 1964.

他自 1964 年以来一直为通用汽车工作。

Whether they were going to accept us or not, you know?

他们是否会接受我们，你知道吗？

How they were going to react when the Americans landed in Tokyo.

当美国人登陆东京时，他们将如何反应。

Everything was so new to us, you know?

一切对我们来说都是那么新鲜，你知道吗？

This was just a totally new experience.

这真是一次全新的体验。

So I will never forget.

所以我永远不会忘记。

Frank Langfitt Again, John Shook.

弗兰克·朗菲特 又是约翰·舒克。

Taking a bus, a large bus, with my small group of Japanese colleagues to pick up the first group of trainees arriving from Fremont.

和我的一小群日本同事一起乘坐公共汽车，一辆大型公共汽车，去接第一批从弗里蒙特抵达的学员。

Television cameras were there, because this was big news in Japan at that time.

电视摄像机在那里，因为这在当时的日本是个大新闻。

And as they got off the plane, we had signs welcoming them.

当他们下了飞机时，我们举起了欢迎他们的标语。

News media was everywhere.

新闻媒体无处不在。

We were signing autographs and taking pictures with all the young kids.

我们与所有的孩子们签名并合影。

Totally new experience.

全新的体验。

Most of them had never been out of the United States before, and none of them, certainly, had ever been to Japan.

他们中的大多数人以前从未离开过美国，当然也没有人去过日本。

My name is Les Myers.

我的名字是莱斯·迈尔斯。

I've worked at General Motors for 25 years.

我在通用汽车公司工作了 25 年。

My hobbies are fishing and bowling.

我的爱好是钓鱼和打保龄球。

My name is Masaaki Tsuchihashi.

我的名字是土桥正明。

My hobby is softball.

我的爱好是垒球。

The narrator in this Japanese public television program points out that the American worker is nine years older than his Toyota trainer.

日本公共电视节目的解说员指出，这名美国工人比他的丰田教练员大九岁。

He also notes for his Japanese viewers that the Americans are so much larger than the Japanese, they waste a second or two more each time they get in and out of the vehicles they're building, which makes them 10% to 15% less productive than their Asian counterparts.

他还向日本观众指出，美国人比日本人大得多，他们每次进出他们正在建造的车辆时都会多浪费一两秒钟，这使得他们的生产力比亚洲同行低 10% 到 15%。

The key to the Toyota production system was a principle so basic it sounds like an empty management slogan.

丰田生产系统的关键是一条基本原则，听起来就像一句空洞的管理口号。

Teamwork.

团队合作。

Back home in Fremont, GM supervisors ordered around large groups of workers.

回到弗里蒙特的家乡，通用汽车的主管命令大批工人围观。

At the Takaoka plant, people were divided into teams of just four or five, switched jobs every few hours to relieve the monotony, and a team leader would step in to help whenever anything went wrong.

在高冈工厂，人们被分成四五个人的小组，每隔几个小时就换工作以缓解单调，一旦出现问题，小组长就会介入提供帮助。

Again, Professor Jeffrey Liker and Toyota's John Shook.

再次是 Jeffrey Liker 教授和丰田公司的 John Shook。

And they spent about two weeks, and they worked in a Toyota plant.

他们在丰田工厂工作了大约两周。

Hooked up at the hip with a counterpart in the Corolla plant, someone who did the exact same job you'd be doing back in Fremont.

与卡罗拉工厂的一位同事密切合作，他的工作与你在弗里蒙特所做的工作完全相同。

And they start to do the job, and they were pretty proud, because they were building cars back in the United States.

他们开始做这项工作，他们非常自豪，因为他们在美国制造汽车。

And they wanted to show they could do it within the time allotted, and they would usually get behind, and they would struggle, and they would try to catch up.

他们想证明他们可以在规定的时间内做到这一点，但他们通常会落后，他们会挣扎，他们会努力赶上。

And at some point, somebody would come over and say, do you want me to help?

在某些时候，有人会走过来说，你需要我帮忙吗？

And that was a revelation, because nobody in the GM plant would ever ask to help.

这是一个启示，因为通用汽车工厂里没有人会寻求帮助。

They would come and yell at you because you got behind.

他们会过来对你大喊大叫，因为你落后了。

Really, we wanted to give them a chance to see and experience a different way of doing things.

确实，我们想让他们有机会看到和体验不同的做事方式。

We wanted them to see the culture there, the way people worked together to solve problems.

我们希望他们看到那里的文化，以及人们共同解决问题的方式。

Then, the biggest surprise was if, when they had those problems, afterwards, somebody would come up to them and say, what are your ideas for improvement so we don't have that problem again?

然后，最大的惊喜是，当他们遇到这些问题时，之后，有人会过来问他们，你有什么改进的想法，这样我们就不会再遇到这个问题了？

So they'd make suggestions for a different kind of tool that would be better for the job, or a different place for bolts and parts to sit that would be easier to reach.

因此，他们会建议使用一种更适合这项工作的不同类型的工具，或者选择一个更容易够到的螺栓和零件的不同位置。

They couldn't believe that responsiveness.

他们不敢相信这种反应能力。

I can't remember any time in my working life where anybody asked for my ideas to solve the problem.

我不记得在我的工作生涯中任何时候有人征求我的想法来解决问题。

And they literally want to know.

他们确实想知道。

And when I tell them, they listen, and then suddenly they disappear, and somebody comes back with the tool that I just described.

当我告诉他们时，他们会听，然后突然他们消失了，有人带着我刚才描述的工具回来了。

It's built, and they say try this.

它已经建成了，他们说试试这个。

Under the Toyota system, everyone's expected to be looking for ways to improve the production process all the time, to make the workers' job easier and more efficient, to shave extra steps and extra seconds off each worker's job.

在丰田体系下，每个人都希望一直寻找改进生产流程的方法，使工人的工作更轻松、更高效，减少每个工人工作中的额外步骤和时间。

To spot defects in the cars and the causes of those defects.

发现汽车的缺陷以及这些缺陷的原因。

This is the Japanese concept of kaizen, continuous improvement.

这就是日本的kaizen（改善）理念，持续改进。

When a worker makes a suggestion that saves money, he gets a bonus of a few hundred dollars or so.

当工人提出省钱的建议时，他会得到几百美元左右的奖金。

And if you look around the Toyota plant, you can see the result of all those improvements.

如果你环顾一下丰田工厂，你就能看到所有这些改进的结果。

Hanging shelves that travel along with the car and the worker, carrying the parts and bolts they need within easy reach.

与汽车和工人一起移动的悬挂架，将他们需要的零件和螺栓放在触手可及的地方。

Special cushions they throw into the car frames when they have to kneel inside.

当他们不得不跪在车内时，他们会将特殊的垫子扔进车架中。

Workers' tasks have been streamlined to the fewest possible steps, each step timed down to the second.

工人的任务已被简化为尽可能少的步骤，每个步骤的时间都缩短到秒。

Two seconds to pick up a bolt and put it on.

两秒钟拿起一个螺栓并将其安装上。

Two seconds to take a gun and tighten it down.

两秒钟拿枪并拧紧。

Billy Haggerty learned the Japanese system two decades into his tenure at GM Fremont.

比利·哈格蒂在弗里蒙特通用汽车公司任职二十年后，就了解了日本的体系。

Everything was timed out.

一切都超时了。

Such and such takes such and such long to do.

如此这般需要如此如此的时间才能完成。

That's the way you did it.

你就是这样做的。

At General Motors, you could be running in circles for whatever you were doing, and that's the way it is.

在通用汽车公司，无论你在做什么，你都可能会原地踏步，事实就是这样。

You lose time.

你会失去时间。

A car a minute don't seem like it's moving that fast, but when you don't get it, you're in the hole.

一分钟一辆车看起来并没有开得那么快，但当你没有意识到这一点时，你就陷入困境了。

There's nobody to pull you out at General Motors, so you're going to let something go.

在通用汽车公司没有人可以把你拉出来，所以你会放弃一些东西。

All those mistakes added up at a GM plant, and the results were littered around the lots outside.

所有这些错误都在通用汽车工厂里累积起来，结果散落在外面的地块上。

Hundreds of misassembled cars.

数百辆错误组装的汽车。

Cars that came off the line missing parts, cars that needed to be fixed before they could be shipped out to the dealers.

下线的汽车缺少零件，需要修理才能运往经销商。

In a Toyota plant, there was nothing like this.

在丰田工厂里，没有这样的事情。

Why did a GM plant produce so many screwed up cars?

为什么通用汽车工厂生产出这么多破烂的汽车？

One cardinal rule that everybody in the company knew.

公司每个人都知道的一条基本规则。

The line could never stop.

队伍永远无法停止。

Never stop the line.

永远不要停止这条线。

Again, Billy Haggerty, Jeffrey Liker, Rick Madrid, and Bruce Lee.

再次是比利·哈格蒂、杰弗里·莱克、里克·马德里和李小龙。

Someone have a heart attack, kick him out of the way, keep that line running.

有人心脏病发作，把他踢开，让线路继续运转。

It was a basic sin.

这是一种基本的罪过。

You're violating the Ten Commandments.

你违反了十诫。

You just don't see the line stop.

你只是看不到线路停止。

I saw a guy fall in the pit, and they didn't stop the line.

我看到一个人掉进坑里，他们没有停下来。

You saw a problem, you stopped that line, you were fired.

你发现了问题，你停止了这条线，你就被解雇了。

A long time GM manager named Ernie Schaefer explained why.

一位名叫厄尼·谢弗（Ernie Schaefer）的长期担任通用汽车经理的人解释了原因。

Because the theory was, they'll stop it all the time.

因为理论上来说，他们会一直阻止它。

They don't want to work, you know?

他们不想工作，你知道吗？

They want to sit and play cards or whatever.

他们想坐下来打牌什么的。

That was a free break for them if the line stopped, so you wouldn't give them the ability to stop the line.

如果队列停止，这对他们来说是一次自由休息，所以你不会给他们停止队列的能力。

John Shook, the American who helped Toyota design its training program, says this all goes back to the first assembly line created by Henry Ford.

帮助丰田设计培训计划的美国人约翰·舒克 (John Shook) 表示，这一切都可以追溯到亨利·福特 (Henry Ford) 创建的第一条装配线。

What Henry Ford had basically designed was a system that he wanted the people on the floor to simply get the volume out.

亨利·福特基本上设计的是一个系统，他希望现场的人们能够简单地发出音量。

Get the product out the door.

把产品拿出来。

And someone later will worry about the quality.

稍后有人会担心质量。

If we have to repair it, we'll repair it.

如果我们必须修复它，我们就会修复它。

So one of the most fundamental things that Toyota did was take that and turn it on its head.

因此，丰田所做的最基本的事情之一就是彻底改变这一点。

So now we tell the plant floor, don't you worry about the production volume.

所以现在我们告诉工厂车间，你们不用担心产量的问题。

You worry about quality.

你担心质量。

The last thing we want is to have a lot of defects flowing down the line that we have to repair later.

我们最不想看到的就是生产线上出现大量缺陷，而我们必须稍后进行修复。

Toyota's philosophy was quality, not quantity.

丰田的理念是质量，而不是数量。

In his old GM job, Billy Haggerty put on hoods and fenders and saw lots of mistakes go right down the line.

比利·哈格蒂（Billy Haggerty）在担任通用汽车之前的工作中，安装了引擎盖和挡泥板，并看到了很多错误。

So we had Monte Carlos with Regal front ends and vice versas, and they would just stick it on, run it out to the yard, and then change.

所以我们有带有Regal前端的蒙特卡洛斯，反之亦然，他们只是把它粘上，把它跑到院子里，然后换。

Half Regals and half-- [LAUGHTER].

一半是富豪，一半是——[笑声]。

So those things would go out the door, into the yard, and be fixed out there.

所以这些东西会走出门，进入院子，然后在那里修复。

I did a lot of overtime in the yard, changing things back.

我在院子里加班了很多，把东西改回来。

Workers told me they saw cars with engines put in backwards, cars without steering wheels or breaks.

工人们告诉我，他们看到了发动机向后安装的汽车，以及没有方向盘或刹车的汽车。

Some were so messed up they wouldn't start, and had to be towed off the line.

有些太乱了，无法启动，不得不被拖下线。

Fixing them piled on more costs, and sometimes, taking them apart and putting them back together, workers damaged them even more.

修理它们会增加更多的成本，有时，将它们拆开再重新组装起来，工人们会造成更大的损坏。

On the floor of the NUMMI plant in Fremont, Earl Ferguson showed me Toyota's solution to all this.

在弗里蒙特 NUMMI 工厂的地板上，Earl Ferguson 向我展示了丰田针对这一切的解决方案。

It's a thin nylon rope that hangs on hooks along the assembly line, which became a symbol of everything that was different about the Japanese way of making cars-- the andon cord.

这是一根细尼龙绳，挂在装配线上的钩子上，它成为日本汽车制造方式所有不同之处的象征——安灯绳。

These cords hanging down, that's the andon cord.

这些垂下来的绳子，就是安灯绳。

That will stop the line.

这样线路就会停止。

If he pulls the andon cord, then this light's going to come on right here.

如果他拉动安灯绳，那么这里的灯就会亮起。

Then it'll show up on the screen that this location is down.

然后屏幕上会显示该位置已关闭。

It also plays a surprisingly cheerful little song.

它还播放一首令人惊讶的欢快小曲。

Workers in each area can pick the tune.

每个区域的工作人员都可以选择曲调。

You hear it all the time in a Toyota plant.

在丰田工厂里你总能听到这种声音。

The first pull doesn't stop the line.

第一次拉动不会停止生产线。

It summons team leaders to the location.

它将团队领导召集到该位置。

They try to correct the problem, and usually, they can do it quickly without stopping production.

他们尝试纠正问题，通常可以在不停止生产的情况下快速完成。

But if they fail, the line stops.

但如果他们失败了，队伍就会停止。

Then they'll correct the problem.

然后他们会纠正这个问题。

Then they can pull the andon cord again, and the line will start.

然后他们可以再次拉动安灯绳，线路就会启动。

Now, when was the first time you ever pulled an andon cord?

现在，您第一次拉安灯绳是什么时候？

1984.

1984年。

Frank Langfitt Where did you do it?

弗兰克·朗菲特 你在哪里做的？

In Japan.

在日本。

Frank Langfitt Were you at all nervous, because you'd been taught for so many years never to stop the line?

弗兰克·朗菲特（Frank Langfitt）：你是否感到紧张，因为多年来你一直被教导永远不要停下来？

What got me was the fact that they had a cross bolt, and they stopped the line to repair it.

让我震惊的是他们有一个十字螺栓，他们停下来修理它。

That's Rick Madrid, the worker who brought a thermos full of vodka and OJ to work every day at GM.

这就是里克·马德里，这位每天在通用汽车上班都会带着装满伏特加和橙汁的保温瓶的工人。

What he saw in Japan was a kind of a bolt-- a cross bolt-- that they'd put in wrong.

他在日本看到的是一种螺栓——十字螺栓——但他们安装错了。

And they stopped the line and repaired it, which is take the bolt out, ream the hole, put the bolt back in, instead of sending it on and putting all the other junk on top of it so you have to take it off and repair it.

他们停止了生产线并对其进行了修复，即取出螺栓，扩孔，将螺栓放回原位，而不是将其发送出去并将所有其他垃圾放在上面，这样您就必须将其取下并修复。

And whoever puts it back isn't skilled in putting trim back, so they're going to mess up.

不管谁把它放回去，都不擅长把装饰放回去，所以他们会把事情搞砸的。

That impression, I said, gee, that makes sense.

我说，这个印象，哎呀，这是有道理的。

Fix it now so you don't have to go through all this stuff.

立即修复它，这样您就不必经历所有这些事情。

That's when it dawned on me that we can do it.

就在那时我意识到我们可以做到。

One bolt.

一颗螺栓。

One bolt changed my attitude.

一颗螺栓改变了我的态度。

I think that there was a combination of feelings.

我认为这是多种感受的结合。

One feeling was, wow, this is different.

一种感觉是，哇，这不一样。

Again, that's industrial engineering professor Jeffrey Liker.

这又是工业工程教授 Jeffrey Liker。

Another feeling was of embarrassment.

另一种感觉是尴尬。

We've been in this industry for how many years?

我们从事这个行业多少年了？

My whole adult life.

我整个成年生活。

We're Americans.

我们是美国人。

We're supposed to be the best, most important country in the world, and we can't build a quality car.

我们应该是世界上最好、最重要的国家，但我们却无法制造出高质量的汽车。

And these Japanese are doing it.

这些日本人正在这样做。

And there was a sense of hurt pride.

还有一种自尊心受到伤害的感觉。

Well, it was kind of-- you become a little bit ashamed, because why couldn't we do that?

嗯，这有点——你会感到有点羞愧，因为我们为什么不能这样做呢？

Again, Earl Ferguson.

再说一遍，厄尔·弗格森。

Earl Ferguson You know, I think most of it was pride after that.

厄尔·弗格森 你知道，我认为在那之后大部分都是骄傲。

We wanted to be able to compete with what I saw in Japan.

我们希望能够与我在日本看到的情况竞争。

I said, I know we can do what they can do.

我说，我知道他们能做的我们也能做。

Only two weeks later, when that first group left to go back to Fremont--

仅仅两周后，当第一批人离开返回弗里蒙特时——

Toyota trainer, John Shook.

丰田教练约翰·舒克。

John Shook We had a party, of course.

约翰·舒克 当然，我们举办了一个聚会。

A sushi party.

寿司派对。

And this was years ago, before sushi was as it is now.

这是很多年前的事了，寿司还没有像现在这样。

It was a rare thing, of course.

当然，这是一件罕见的事情。

And people were crying on both sides.

两边的人都在哭泣。

You had union workers, grizzled old folks that had worked on the plant floor for 30 years, and they were hugging their Japanese counterparts, just absolutely in tears.

这里有工会工人、在工厂工作了 30 年、头发花白的老人，他们拥抱着日本同事，泪流满面。

There's actually footage of this, though we don't know if it's the first group of Americans.

实际上有这样的镜头，尽管我们不知道这是否是第一批美国人。

The US workers are in kimonos with the Toyota name on them, and they hand their neck ties to the Japanese and hug.

美国工人穿着印有丰田名字的和服，他们将领带递给日本人并拥抱。

One man is crying.

一名男子在哭泣。

[SPEAKING JAPANESE] Frank Langfitt One of the Americans says, in Japanese, "Thanks to you all, we now feel confident for our success." John Shook.

[说日语] 弗兰克·朗菲特 (Frank Langfitt) 一位美国人用日语说：“感谢你们大家，我们现在对我们的成功充满信心。”约翰·舒克.

And it might sound flowery to say 25 years later, but they had such a powerful, emotional experience of learning a new way of working-- a way that people could actually work together collaboratively as a team.

25 年后说起来可能听起来很华丽，但他们在学习一种新的工作方式方面获得了如此强大、情感丰富的体验——一种人们实际上可以作为团队协作的方式。

We knew it wasn't going to be easy.

我们知道这并不容易。

There were a lot of hurdles to overcome.

有很多障碍需要克服。

But there was no question in anyone's mind that this was going to work.

但毫无疑问，任何人都认为这会奏效。

But if it was going to work, it would mean a radically different relationship between workers and management-- one where the managers trusted the workers to let them pull the andon cord and stop the line.

但如果它能奏效，就意味着工人和管理层之间存在一种截然不同的关系——经理们相信工人可以让他们拉动安灯绳并停止生产线。

One where the workers trusted their bosses enough to ask for help when there were problems.

工人们足够信任他们的老板，在出现问题时会寻求帮助。

With teamwork, we can do it all.

通过团队合作，我们可以做到这一切。

Now let's hold up your hands and together, with teamwork, we can do it all!

现在，让我们举起双手，齐心协力，团队合作，我们一定能做到！

December 1984, the first car rolled off the assembly line in Fremont-- a yellow Chevy Nova.

1984年12月，第一辆汽车在弗里蒙特下线——一辆黄色的雪佛兰Nova。

UAW rep Joel Smith was one of the speakers.

UAW 代表乔尔·史密斯是发言人之一。

Mr. Toyoda, staff, and fellow UAW members, today is a historic one.

丰田先生、工作人员以及 UAW 的其他成员，今天是历史性的一天。

The first car.

第一辆车。

But we're also on the threshold of a new adventure and relationship between labor and management.

但我们也正处于劳资关系新冒险的开端。

For too long, the American worker has been maligned, criticized, called bad names, for building lousy products, poor quality American worker.

长期以来，美国工人因生产劣质产品和素质低劣的美国工人而受到诽谤、批评、骂名。

At New United Motor, we will build a quality car, and we will only build a quality car.

在新联合汽车，我们将打造优质汽车，我们只会打造优质汽车。

And Mr. Toyoda, if you would please deliver this challenge to our friends in Japan-- we intend to build the best quality car in the world.

丰田先生，请您向我们在日本的朋友们传达这一挑战——我们打算制造世界上最优质的汽车。

Thank you.

谢谢。

They hit the ground running.

他们立即行动起来。

It didn't take a year, two years to get quality in that product.

没用一年、两年的时间就获得了该产品的质量。

Again, the UAW's Bruce Lee.

再次是美国汽车工人联合会的李小龙。

Bruce Lee Oh, I was so proud of them, you can't believe.

李小龙哦，我为他们感到骄傲，你简直不敢相信。

The fact that they did it didn't surprise me that much, but how quickly they did it did.

他们这样做的事实并没有让我感到惊讶，但他们这样做的速度有多快让我感到惊讶。

It was amazing.

太棒了。

Here were these same people who before, I mean, were-- hell, they'd go out of their way to make life miserable for General Motors particularly.

这些人以前，我的意思是，他们会不遗余力地让通用汽车公司的生活变得更加悲惨。

And, you know, they were old, they were fat, because that was not a young workforce that we brought in here.

而且，你知道，他们又老又胖，因为我们引进的不是年轻的劳动力。

The numbers coming out of the NUMMI plant were astonishing.

NUMMI 工厂的产量令人震惊。

Again, here's Jeffrey Liker.

杰弗里·莱克（Jeffrey Liker）再次报道。

The best measure they use is how many defects are there per 100 vehicles.

他们使用的最佳衡量标准是每 100 辆车中有多少缺陷。

And it was one of the best in America.

这是美国最好的之一。

And it was the same for the Toyota cars that were made in California as the Corollas that were coming from Japan, right from the beginning.

对于在加利福尼亚州制造的丰田汽车和来自日本的卡罗拉来说，从一开始就是如此。

Maryann Keller, a long time car analyst, devotes a chapter to NUMMI in her book about the rise and fall of GM, Rude Awakening .

玛丽安·凯勒 (Maryann Keller) 是一位资深汽车分析师，她在她关于通用汽车公司兴衰的书《粗鲁的觉醒》中用了一章专门讨论 NUMMI。

After just three months, she says, the cars coming off the line were getting near perfect quality ratings.

她说，仅仅三个月后，下线的汽车就达到了接近完美的质量评级。

And just as important for GM were the cost savings.

对于通用汽车来说同样重要的是节省成本。

One study suggested, remarkably, it would probably take 50% more workers under the old system to build the same car.

值得注意的是，一项研究表明，在旧制度下，制造同样的汽车可能需要多 50% 的工人。

Grievances and absenteeism plummeted, and lots of workers preferred the NUMMI teamwork system to the old combative one at GM.

不满情绪和缺勤率大幅下降，许多员工更喜欢 NUMMI 团队合作系统，而不是通用汽车旧有的好斗系统。

Several told us they enjoyed coming to work for the first time.

一些人告诉我们，他们很高兴第一次来上班。

I didn't want to tell people I worked at the Chevy truck plant, because a lot of people had a lot of problems with them.

我不想告诉人们我在雪佛兰卡车工厂工作，因为很多人对他们有很多问题。

That's Rick Madrid, who spent 17 years at the old Fremont plant building Chevy trucks.

这就是里克·马德里 (Rick Madrid)，他在旧弗里蒙特工厂生产雪佛兰卡车长达 17 年。

He was ashamed of that vehicle.

他对那辆车感到羞耻。

At NUMMI, making the Nova, he felt differently.

在 NUMMI 制造 Nova 时，他有不同的感受。

Oh, I had a stack of these postcards.

哦，我有一叠这样的明信片。

And I would just drive around.

我就开车到处转转。

If I'd see a Nova parked, I would put one of these under the windshield wiper.

如果我看到停着一辆 Nova，我会把其中一个放在挡风玻璃雨刷器下面。

Of course, it had my name, my address on it, and your opinion of the Nova?

当然，上面有我的名字、我的地址，还有你对 Nova 的看法？

And just basically, they'd drop me a line, and a lot of people did this.

基本上，他们会给我留言，很多人都这样做了。

And what did they say?

他们说什么？

Rick Madrid Some said they really liked it-- a quality car.

里克·马德里 有些人说他们真的很喜欢它——一辆优质汽车。

A good car.

一辆好车。

Another worker told me he'd go to the Chevy dealership to stare at the Novas.

另一位工人告诉我，他会去雪佛兰经销店看看 Novas。

He didn't tell anyone he built them, or that he worked at NUMMI.

他没有告诉任何人他建造了它们，也没有告诉任何人他在 NUMMI 工作。

He just liked seeing what the cars looked like, sitting there on the lot.

他只是喜欢看看停在停车场上的汽车是什么样子。

That's NPR's Frank Langfitt.

那是 NPR 的弗兰克·朗菲特。

Coming up, so there's this great way of making cars.

接下来，就有了这种制造汽车的好方法。

GM is using it in California, and not only are the cars more reliable, they're cheaper to make.

通用汽车正在加利福尼亚州使用它，这些汽车不仅更可靠，而且制造成本更低。

Seems like a no brainer for GM.

对于通用汽车来说，这似乎是理所当然的事情。

Start putting this way of producing cars into their other factories everywhere, and declare victory.

开始将这种生产汽车的方式推广到他们各地的其他工厂，并宣告胜利。

Why they didn't do that, why what happened at NUMMI stayed at NUMMI for so long-- that's in a minute, from Chicago Public Radio, when our program continues.

为什么他们不这样做，为什么 NUMMI 发生的事情在 NUMMI 停留了这么久——这是芝加哥公共广播电台的一分钟后我们的节目继续进行的内容。

It's This American Life.

这就是美国生活。

I'm Ira Glass.

我是艾拉·格拉斯。

If you're just tuning in, we're in the middle of a story about a car plant in Fremont, California called NUMMI.

如果您刚刚收听，我们正在讲述一个关于加利福尼亚州弗里蒙特一家名为 NUMMI 的汽车工厂的故事。

We now turn to the question, why was it so hard for GM to replicate NUMMI elsewhere in the company?

我们现在转向这个问题，为什么通用汽车在公司其他地方复制 NUMMI 如此困难？

Why didn't this idea spread decades ago?

为什么这个想法在几十年前没有传播开来？

In the first half of our story, we heard a lot from workers who were on the factory floor.

在故事的前半部分，我们听到了很多来自工厂车间工人的声音。

In this half of the story, the action moves to their bosses-- the supervisors at GM-- who had a chance to turn the company around with what they learned at NUMMI.

在故事的后半部分，行动转移到了他们的老板（通用汽车的主管）身上，他们有机会利用在 NUMMI 学到的知识来扭转公司的局面。

Again, here's NPR's Frank Langfitt.

再次请听 NPR 的 Frank Langfitt 的报道。

GM had gotten the first thing it wanted out of NUMMI-- a high quality small car.

通用汽车从 NUMMI 得到了它想要的第一件事——一款高品质的小型汽车。

Now the question was, how could it spread the lessons of NUMMI throughout the rest of the company?

现在的问题是，如何将 NUMMI 的经验教训传播到公司的其他部门？

To do that, it set up a special liaison office.

为此，它设立了一个特别联络处。

Managers were flown in for tours and to work the assembly line for a few days to learn the team concept.

经理们乘飞机前来参观，并在装配线上工作了几天，以了解团队理念。

And from the beginning, GM executives sent 16 of their rising stars to help start NUMMI, with the idea that later, they'd come home and change the company.

从一开始，通用汽车高管就派出了 16 名后起之秀来帮助创办 NUMMI，他们的想法是，稍后他们会回家并改变公司。

Two Wall Street Journal reporters later dubbed them the NUMMI commandos.

两名《华尔街日报》记者后来称他们为 NUMMI 突击队。

One of the 16 was Mark Hogan.

马克·霍根（Mark Hogan）就是这 16 人之一。

He says the top brass understood NUMMI's game changing potential, that a Toyota style plant squeezed many more cars out of far fewer workers.

他说，高层管理人员了解 NUMMI 改变游戏规则的潜力，丰田式的工厂可以用少得多的工人挤出更多的汽车。

If General Motors was able to take its many manufacturing facilities and implement that production system, it meant billions to General Motors in the bottom line.

如果通用汽车能够利用其许多制造设施并实施该生产系统，这对通用汽车意味着数十亿美元的利润。

We were ready.

我们准备好了。

We were fired, and we had the mental condition that says, we're going to do this.

我们被解雇了，我们的精神状况告诉我们，我们要做这件事。

We're going to change the world.

我们要改变世界。

That's Steve Bera, another commando.

那是史蒂夫·贝拉，另一位突击队员。

He says once NUMMI was up and running, he and the other 15 waited to be deployed elsewhere for the next phase of their mission.

他说，一旦 NUMMI 启动并运行，他和其他 15 人就等待部署到其他地方执行下一阶段的任务。

But the company didn't seem to know what to do with them.

但该公司似乎不知道如何处理它们。

Instead of coming back to the 16 of us and saying, there's some secret sauce here.

不要回到我们 16 个人面前说，这里有一些秘密武器。

What is it?

它是什么？

How can we use this to our advantage?

我们如何利用这一点来发挥我们的优势？

No one ever asked us that question.

从来没有人问过我们这个问题。

Why didn't they do that?

他们为什么不这样做？

Steve Bera It was never part of a master plan.

史蒂夫·贝拉（Steve Bera） 这从来都不是总体规划的一部分。

And if there was a master plan, none of us ever saw it.

即使有一个总体规划，我们也从未见过。

Frustrated, Bera quit after just two years at NUMMI.

贝拉 (Bera) 在 NUMMI 工作仅两年后就感到沮丧并辞职了。

With no master plan from Detroit, the first real attempt to do NUMMI again came from a factory manager, 400 miles south of Fremont, at a plant in Van Nuys.

由于底特律还没有制定总体规划，第一个真正尝试再次实施 NUMMI 的人来自弗里蒙特以南 400 英里范奈斯一家工厂的一位工厂经理。

The factory was facing a possible shutdown.

该工厂可能面临关闭。

Its manager, a guy named Ernie Schaefer, had visited NUMMI, and he thought maybe he could save his plant if he adopted the Japanese system.

该公司的经理 Ernie Schaefer 曾访问过 NUMMI，他认为如果采用日本系统，也许可以拯救他的工厂。

But he didn't have all the advantages Fremont had.

但他并不具备弗里蒙特所拥有的所有优势。

This time, Toyota wasn't a partner in the experiment.

这一次，丰田没有成为实验的合作伙伴。

GM had to transform Van Nuys on its own.

通用汽车必须自行改造范奈斯。

Ernie Schaefer knew it was going to be tough.

厄尼·谢弗知道这会很艰难。

The thing that I think kept us moving forward is we had no alternative.

我认为让我们继续前进的原因是我们别无选择。

I mean, it was pretty well known that if we didn't successfully implement this philosophy in Van Nuys, we weren't going to be around.

我的意思是，众所周知，如果我们没有在范奈斯成功地实施这一理念，我们就不会存在。

Van Nuys made Firebirds and Camaros, and its reputation wasn't much better than GM Fremont's had been-- defective cars coming off the line, battles with the union, sabotage.

范奈斯生产了火鸟和科迈罗，但其声誉并不比通用汽车弗里蒙特好多少——有缺陷的汽车下线、与工会发生冲突、破坏活动。

So Ernie Schaefer enlisted the same UAW leader who got the union on board at NUMMI, Bruce Lee, to help him win over the Van Nuys workforce.

因此，厄尼·谢弗 (Ernie Schaefer) 招募了曾在 NUMMI 加入工会的 UAW 领导人李小龙 (Bruce Lee)，帮助他赢得范奈斯 (Van Nuys) 员工的支持。

They shut down the plant for two weeks to train everyone in team concept and quality control.

他们将工厂关闭了两周，对每个人进行团队理念和质量控制方面的培训。

For this workforce, there were no trips to Japan, no tearful sushi parties.

对于这些员工来说，没有去日本旅行，没有泪流满面的寿司派对。

And from the start, workers were skeptical.

从一开始，工人们就持怀疑态度。

The lack of receptiveness to change was so deep.

对改变的接受能力是如此之深。

Larry Spiegel was another NUMMI commando.

拉里·斯皮格尔 (Larry Spiegel) 是另一名 NUMMI 突击队员。

He moved down to Van Nuys to help launch the Japanese system there.

他搬到了范奈斯，帮助在那里启动日本系统。

There were too many people convinced that they didn't need to have to change.

有太多人相信他们不需要改变。

Hadn't General Motors threatened to close the plant?

通用汽车不是威胁要关闭工厂吗？

They didn't believe them.

他们不相信他们。

Frank Langfitt Why?

弗兰克·朗菲特 为什么？

This was one of the biggest differences between Fremont and Van Nuys.

这是弗里蒙特和范奈斯之间最大的区别之一。

Van Nuys hadn't been shut down.

范奈斯并没有被关闭。

Turns out it's a lot easier to get workers to change if they've lost their jobs, and then you offer them back.

事实证明，如果员工失业了，那么让他们做出改变，然后再让他们回来会容易得多。

Without that, many union members just saw the Toyota system as a threat.

如果没有这一点，许多工会成员只会将丰田系统视为威胁。

And they had a point.

他们说得有道理。

Under the Japanese system, Van Nuys stood to lose a fourth of its workforce, because the more efficient a plant becomes, the fewer workers it needs.

在日本的体制下，范奈斯将失去四分之一的劳动力，因为工厂效率越高，需要的工人就越少。

And just as bad, the team concept hurt their seniority rights.

同样糟糕的是，团队理念损害了他们的资历权利。

This had been a problem for union members back at NUMMI also.

对于 NUMMI 的工会成员来说，这也是一个问题。

Your seniority is what you work for.

你的资历就是你工作的目的。

To me, that's what a union's about.

对我来说，这就是工会的意义。

Seniority.

资历。

Richard Aguilar worked at NUMMI, and to him, seniority was just another way of saying fairness.

Richard Aguilar 在 NUMMI 工作，对他来说，资历只是公平的另一种表达方式。

He waited 15 years to get enough seniority for the job he'd always wanted in the plant.

他等了 15 年才获得足够的资历，胜任他一直想在工厂工作的职位。

Under the new system, management could just hire someone off the street for that job.

在新系统下，管理层可以雇佣外地人员来完成这项工作。

The whole idea of seniority placing you into one great job for years was impossible under the team concept.

在团队理念下，凭资历让你在一份伟大的工作中工作多年的想法是不可能的。

Workers had to learn every job on their team and take turns doing those jobs.

工人们必须学习团队中的每一项工作，并轮流做这些工作。

And the team concept, it sounds good.

还有团队理念，听起来不错。

I mean, team player sounds good, but it pit worker against worker.

我的意思是，团队合作者听起来不错，但它让工人与工人之间产生矛盾。

It really does.

确实如此。

This was the other thing Richard hated about the Japanese system.

这是理查德讨厌日本制度的另一件事。

The whole point of a union, its most basic principle, was to protect you from management.

工会的全部意​​义，其最基本的原则，就是保护你免受管理。

But once people were working in teams, Richard says union members started doing things for management that just seemed wrong.

但理查德说，一旦人们在团队中工作，工会成员就开始为管理层做一些看似错误的事情。

People now snitched on each other.

人们现在互相告密。

You know, they'd point fingers.

你知道，他们会指手画脚。

Oh, he's not doing this job right, you know, or she's not doing the job right.

哦，你知道，他没有做好这项工作，或者她没有做好这项工作。

And they would even keep track of stuff they'd missed, because that's what the company puts on them-- that the only way you can protect your job, you have to keep the team strong.

他们甚至会记录他们错过的事情，因为这就是公司对他们的要求——唯一能保住你工作的方法，你必须保持团队的强大。

So there's a weak link, you've got to get rid of that weak link.

所以存在一个薄弱环节，你必须消除那个薄弱环节。

And I would go tell them, you can't do that.

我会去告诉他们，你不能这样做。

You can't build a case for management against a union member.

你不能针对工会成员提出管理层的诉讼。

It made me angry and disappointed that the union had gotten so backwards that they'd forgotten what a union meant-- taking care of each other.

让我感到愤怒和失望的是，工会已经如此落后，以至于他们忘记了工会的含义——互相照顾。

At Van Nuys, it wasn't just union members who resisted the Japanese system.

在范奈斯，抵制日本制度的不仅仅是工会成员。

Managers were against it too.

经理们也反对。

Like the union members, they didn't want change.

和工会成员一样，他们不希望改变。

There were things they liked about the old system.

他们喜欢旧系统的某些方面。

It gave them privileges and perks they'd now be losing.

它给了他们现在正在失去的特权和福利。

For instance, some managers opposed the idea of stopping the assembly line, because their bonuses depended on the number of cars that rolled off the line.

例如，一些经理反对停止装配线的想法，因为他们的奖金取决于下线的汽车数量。

Never mind how many defects they had.

别管他们有多少缺陷。

And now that workers and managers were supposed to be a team, executives and workers would share the same cafeteria and same parking lot, as equals.

现在，工人和经理应该是一个团队，高管和工人将平等地共享同一个自助餐厅和同一个停车场。

Managers at NUMMI didn't have a problem with that, but the managers at Van Nuys?

NUMMI 的经理对此没有意见，但 Van Nuys 的经理呢？

They rioted.

他们骚乱了。

Frank Langfitt The UAW's Bruce Lee remembers getting a phone call from plant supervisor Ernie Schaefer about his managers.

Frank Langfitt UAW 的 Bruce Lee 记得接到工厂主管 Ernie Schaefer 的电话，询问他的经理。

They basically told Ernie, you do that and we're out of here.

他们基本上告诉厄尼，你这么做了，我们就离开这里。

We're going to quit en masse.

我们要集体退出。

Because Ernie called me, and he said, Bruce, I can't do it.

因为厄尼打电话给我，他说，布鲁斯，我做不到。

I can't do those things.

我不能做那些事。

I said, just think about it.

我说，你想想吧。

That's a nothing.

那是一无所有。

So they have to walk 20 yards more.

所以他们必须多走20码。

I said, isn't that foolish that some grown man would come up and tell you, I'm going to quit if I can't have this parking place right here?

我说，有些成年人会过来告诉你，如果我不能在这里拥有这个停车位，我就辞职，这不是很愚蠢吗？

So people fought the new system from both sides.

因此，人们从两方面与新制度作斗争。

Managers gave Ernie grief, and a dissident faction sprang up in the local union, which elected a staunch opponent of the Japanese system as their chairman.

经理们给厄尼带来了悲伤，当地工会中出现了一个持不同政见的派系，该派系选举了一位坚决反对日本制度的人作为他们的主席。

And as if that all wasn't enough, Ernie Schaefer ran into another obstacle.

似乎这一切还不够，厄尼·谢弗遇到了另一个障碍。

Workers could only build cars as good as the parts they were given.

工人们只能制造出与他们所获得的零件一样好的汽车。

At NUMMI, many of the parts came from Japan and were really good.

在 NUMMI，许多零件都来自日本，而且非常好。

At Van Nuys, it was totally different.

在范奈斯，情况完全不同。

That was perhaps one of our biggest failures in that an isolated plant can't do this by itself.

这也许是我们最大的失败之一，因为孤立的植物无法独自做到这一点。

The team concept stressed continuous improvement.

团队理念强调持续改进。

If a team got a shipment of parts that didn't fit, they'd alert their bosses, who'd then go to the suppliers to fix the problem.

如果一个团队收到一批不合适的零件，他们会通知老板，然后老板会去找供应商解决问题。

Sometimes they'd realize the problem was in the part's design, and Toyota engineers would go back to the drawing board and remake the part to address the problem workers were having on the assembly line.

有时他们会意识到问题出在零件的设计上，丰田工程师会回到绘图板并重新制造零件，以解决工人在装配线上遇到的问题。

All the departments in the company worked together.

公司各部门通力合作。

But Ernie's suppliers had never operated in a system like that.

但厄尼的供应商从未在这样的系统中运作过。

If he asked for fixes, they blew him off.

如果他要求修复，他们就会拒绝他。

And if he called Detroit and asked them to redesign a part that wasn't working, they'd ask him, why was he so special?

如果他打电话给底特律并要求他们重新设计一个不起作用的部件，他们会问他，为什么他如此特别？

They didn't have to change it for any other plant.

他们不需要为任何其他植物改变它。

Why should they change it for him?

他们为什么要为他改变呢？

You had asked the question earlier, what's different when you walk into the NUMMI plant?

您之前问过这个问题，当您走进 NUMMI 工厂时，有什么不同？

Well, you can see a lot of things different.

嗯，你可以看到很多不同的东西。

But the one thing you don't see is the system that supports the NUMMI plant.

但您看不到的一件事是支持 NUMMI 工厂的系统。

I don't think at that time, anybody understood the large nature of this system.

我认为当时没有人理解这个系统的本质。

General Motors was a kind of throw it over the wall organization.

通用汽车公司是一种“翻墙”组织。

You know, each department-- we were very compartmentalized, and you'd design that vehicle, and you'd throw it over the wall to the manufacturing guys.

你知道，每个部门——我们都非常划分，你设计那辆车，然后把它扔给制造人员。

And if something didn't work, or was impossible to assemble, that was their problem.

如果有什么东西不起作用，或者无法组装，那就是他们的问题。

And they had to deal with it.

他们必须处理这个问题。

And, I mean, you're in there.

而且，我的意思是，你就在那里。

You've kind of put your heart and soul into making this whole team concept work.

你已经全心全意地让整个团队的概念发挥作用。

And now you're the messenger that has to go out and say, look, guys, even though this is the way the system's supposed to work, and these are my issues, I'm not going to be able to solve them, and you're going to have to deal with it.

现在你是信使，必须出去说，看，伙计们，即使这是系统应该工作的方式，这些是我的问题，我无法解决它们，而你将不得不处理它。

And it was destructive.

这是破坏性的。

It was detrimental.

这是有害的。

I mean, no question about it.

我的意思是，毫无疑问。

Schaefer says when he realized how much of the Japanese system happened off the factory floor, it answered something that had never quite made sense to him.

谢弗说，当他意识到日本系统中有多少是在工厂车间之外发生的时，它回答了一些他从未完全理解的问题。

Why had Toyota been so open with GM in showing its operations?

为什么丰田如此公开地向通用汽车展示其运营情况？

You know, they never prohibited us from walking through the plant, understanding, even asking questions of some of their key people.

你知道，他们从来没有禁止我们走进工厂、了解情况，甚至向他们的一些关键人员提问。

You know, I've often puzzled over that-- why they did that.

你知道，我经常对此感到困惑——他们为什么这么做。

And I think they recognized we were asking all the wrong questions.

我认为他们认识到我们问了所有错误的问题。

We didn't understand this bigger picture thing.

我们不明白这个更大的图景。

All of our questions were focused on the floor, you know?

我们所有的问题都集中在地板上，你知道吗？

The assembly plant.

组装厂。

What's happening on the line.

线上发生了什么事。

That's not the real issue.

这不是真正的问题。

The issue is, how do you support that system with all the other functions that have to take place in the organization?

问题是，您如何通过组织中必须执行的所有其他功能来支持该系统？

Quality at Van Nuys didn't improve, and in 1992, GM shut the plant down for good, leaving 2,600 people without jobs.

范奈斯的质量没有提高，通用汽车于 1992 年永久关闭了该工厂，导致 2,600 人失业。

This is what the NUMMI commandos were up against.

这就是 NUMMI 突击队所面临的挑战。

Entrenched, defensive bureaucracies and workers many of the places they turned.

根深蒂固的、防御性的官僚机构和工人在他们转向的许多地方。

They were not only trying to change the biggest corporation in the world.

他们不仅试图改变世界上最大的公司。

They were trying to change a corporation that had been essentially a collection of individual car companies-- Cadillac, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, Buick-- each with its own design team, own leadership, and its own way of doing things.

他们试图改变一家本质上是由多家汽车公司——凯迪拉克、奥兹莫比尔、庞蒂亚克、别克——组成的公司，每家公司都有自己的设计团队、自己的领导层和自己的做事方式。

It's a whole new process, a whole different process, than the one they had grown up with.

这是一个全新的过程，一个与他们成长过程中完全不同的过程。

And it was a huge threat.

这是一个巨大的威胁。

Dick Fuller was another commando.

迪克·富勒是另一名突击队员。

He ran the information technology division at NUMMI, which used some of the same streamlining concepts employed on the factory floor.

他负责管理 NUMMI 的信息技术部门，该部门使用了一些与工厂车间相同的精简概念。

He says when GM managers visited NUMMI, instead of trying to figure out how they could benefit from the system, some of them attacked it.

他说，当通用汽车经理访问 NUMMI 时，他们中的一些人并没有试图弄清楚如何从该系统中受益，而是对其进行了攻击。

Fuller remembers one IT manager who visited from a plant on the East Coast.

Fuller 记得一位 IT 经理曾从东海岸的一家工厂参观过。

And when he came back, he wrote a report, which, if I put a title on it, would say, won't work here.

当他回来时，他写了一份报告，如果我给它加上一个标题，我会说，它在这里不起作用。

And I think part of that was a threat to him.

我认为这部分是对他的威胁。

It was a threat to him to see that it was working so well.

看到它运作得这么好，这对他来说是一种威胁。

Do you think this guy looked at this and said, well, if this works here, and they try to spread it, I'll lose my job?

你认为这个人看到这个后会说，好吧，如果这在这里有效，并且他们试图传播它，我会失去工作吗？

Well, I don't think he was going to lose his job, but he'd probably have to give up half his staff, you know?

嗯，我不认为他会失去工作，但他可能不得不放弃一半的员工，你知道吗？

So that's power.

这就是力量。

It's people that's power in General Motors.

在通用汽车，人就是力量。

Getting all these mini empires to embrace the kinds of radical changes that happened at NUMMI would have taken an almost Stalinesque leadership from above-- a combination of charisma and fury in the corner office.

要让所有这些迷你帝国接受 NUMMI 所发生的彻底变革，需要几乎斯大林式的自上而下的领导——角落办公室的魅力和愤怒的结合。

And NUMMI commando Mark Hogan says no one at GM fit that bill.

NUMMI 突击队员马克·霍根 (Mark Hogan) 表示，通用汽车公司没有人符合这一要求。

I was very convinced that we had to change, and we had to change rapidly.

我非常确信我们必须改变，而且必须迅速改变。

And I think all of us that were NUMMI alums, so to speak, were frustrated at the lack of urgency.

我认为我们所有 NUMMI 校友都因缺乏紧迫感而感到沮丧。

Did you have those kinds of conversations with people in the '80s back in Detroit?

您是否与 80 年代底特律的人们进行过此类对话？

I did.

我做到了。

Frank Langfitt What would people say to you?

弗兰克·朗菲特 人们会对你说什么？

Yeah.

是的。

I think there still wasn't a recognition that the formidability of the competition, particularly from Toyota-- I think a lot of people were in denial, or just not willing to recognize it.

我认为人们仍然没有认识到竞争的激烈性，特别是来自丰田的竞争——我认为很多人都在否认，或者只是不愿意承认这一点。

And even though GM had gone from 50% market share in the early '70s to mid-30s, it was gradual over time, and there wasn't the sense of reaction or urgency that other companies that lost that much market share might have felt.

尽管通用汽车的市场份额从 20 世纪 70 年代初的 50% 上升到了 30 年代中期，但随着时间的推移，它是渐进的，并且没有其他失去如此多市场份额的公司可能感受到的反应或紧迫感。

Those exact numbers?

那些确切的数字？

GM went from 47% of the US market in the mid-1970s to 35% a decade later.

通用汽车在美国市场的份额从 20 世纪 70 年代中期的 47% 上升到十年后的 35%。

One reason car execs were in denial was Detroit's insular culture.

汽车业高管否认的原因之一是底特律的孤立文化。

Yes, unions and management were always at each other's throats, and yes, GM and its suppliers had a destructive relationship that seemed to almost discourage quality.

是的，工会和管理层总是互相争斗，是的，通用汽车及其供应商之间存在着一种破坏性的关系，这似乎几乎阻碍了质量。

But everyone had settled into comfortable roles in this dysfunctional system and learned to live with it.

但每个人都在这个功能失调的系统中找到了舒适的角色，并学会了忍受它。

And in the late 1980s, with their market share in freefall, Jeffrey Liker says they were more apt to blame others than themselves.

杰弗里·莱克 (Jeffrey Liker) 表示，在 20 世纪 80 年代末，随着他们的市场份额直线下降，他们更容易责怪别人而不是自己。

I worked with all the big three, at the time, automakers, and it was common in all three automakers.

我与当时的三大汽车制造商都合作过，这在所有三大汽车制造商中都很常见。

They all believed that if the consumers think we have quality problems, it's because Consumer Reports is misleading them, and they're biased toward Toyota.

他们都认为，如果消费者认为我们有质量问题，那是因为《消费者报告》误导了他们，他们对丰田有偏见。

They all believed that Consumer Reports was against them-- that there was somewhat of a myth of Japanese quality.

他们都认为《消费者报告》对他们不利——认为日本品质存在某种神话。

If all of that wasn't enough to stymie attempts to learn from NUMMI, GM was distracted by other projects-- massive projects.

如果所有这些还不足以阻碍向 NUMMI 学习的尝试，那么通用汽车就被其他项目——大型项目——分散了注意力。

It bought Ross Perot's company, Electronic Data Systems.

它收购了罗斯·佩罗的公司电子数据系统公司。

It bought Hughes Aircraft for $5 billion.

它以 50 亿美元收购了休斯飞机公司。

It decided the future was robotics.

它决定未来是机器人技术。

It decided the future was a massive, costly reorganization.

它决定未来将是一次大规模、成本高昂的重组。

It started Saturn, which produced cars that were better marketed than they were built.

它创办了土星公司，该公司生产的汽车营销效果比制造出来的要好。

Then came the 1991 recession.

然后是 1991 年的经济衰退。

Car sales slumped.

汽车销量大幅下滑。

Again, Mark Hogan.

又是马克·霍根。

It was really its first significant wake up call.

这确实是它第一次重要的警钟。

GM, unfortunately, had a massive loss in 1992.

不幸的是，通用汽车在 1992 年遭受了巨额亏损。

General Motors lost more than $20 billion.

通用汽车损失超过200亿美元。

So I think at that point in time, there was a complete rethinking of the way we ran the company-- that things had to change, and they had to change fast.

所以我认为在那个时候，我们对公司的运营方式进行了彻底的重新思考——事情必须改变，而且必须快速改变。

It was the largest loss in American corporate history to that time-- $23.5 billion.

这是当时美国企业历史上最大的亏损——235 亿美元。

GM's board of directors responded with what the press called a boardroom bloodbath, purging a long list of managers.

通用汽车董事会的回应被媒体称为“董事会大屠杀”，清除了一长串经理。

Jack Smith took over as CEO.

杰克·史密斯接任首席执行官。

He was the executive who led the negotiations with Toyota to create NUMMI.

他是领导与丰田谈判创建 NUMMI 的高管。

He saw NUMMI as a way forward for GM.

他认为 NUMMI 是通用汽车前进的道路。

Mark Hogan and some of the other commandos felt they finally had a champion.

马克·霍根和其他一些突击队员觉得他们终于有了一个冠军。

Jack Smith was installed, and started to rapidly implement the Toyota production system into General Motors.

杰克·史密斯上任后，开始将丰田生产体系迅速引入通用汽车公司。

Rapidly by GM standards, which wasn't nearly rapidly enough.

按照通用汽车公司的标准，速度很快，但还不够快。

Jack Smith declined to talk to me for this story, but he told a reporter a few years ago, "I just wish it had happened a lot faster than it did." Pick your nautical cliche.

杰克·史密斯拒绝就这个故事与我交谈，但他几年前告诉记者，“我只是希望事情发生得比实际发生得快得多。”选择你的航海陈词滥调。

Reforming General Motors was like turning around a battleship, one manager said.

一位经理表示，改革通用汽车就像调转一艘战舰。

Another compared it to steering the Titanic with a canoe paddle.

另一个人将其比作用独木舟桨驾驶泰坦尼克号。

Jeffrey Liker says the cultural gap between NUMMI and the rest of GM was so vast that even with clear marching orders to change, some of the people running the company didn't know where to begin.

杰弗里·莱克 (Jeffrey Liker) 表示，NUMMI 与通用汽车其他部门之间的文化差距如此之大，以至于即使有明确的变革命令，公司的一些管理人员也不知道从哪里开始。

There was no vocabulary, even, to explain it.

甚至没有词汇来解释它。

I remember one of the GM managers was ordered from a very senior level-- it came from a vice president-- to make a GM plant look like NUMMI.

我记得一位通用汽车经理接到了一位非常高层的命令——来自一位副总裁——让通用汽车工厂看起来像 NUMMI。

And he said, I want you to go there with cameras and take a picture of every square inch.

他说，我希望你带着相机去那里，拍下每一寸土地。

And whatever you take a picture of, I want it to look like that in our plant.

无论你拍什么照片，我都希望它看起来像我们工厂里的那样。

There should be no excuse for why we're different than NUMMI, why our quality is lower, why our productivity isn't as high, because you're going to copy everything you see.

没有任何理由可以解释为什么我们与 NUMMI 不同、为什么我们的质量较低、为什么我们的生产力不那么高，因为您将复制您看到的所有内容。

Immediately, this guy knew that was crazy.

立刻，这家伙就知道这太疯狂了。

We can't copy employee motivation.

我们无法复制员工的积极性。

We can't copy good relationships between the union and management.

我们无法复制工会与管理层之间的良好关系。

That's not something you can copy, and you can't even take a photograph of it.

那不是你可以复制的东西，你甚至不能给它拍照。

The first round of changes put andon cords and Japanese-style inventory control into the GM plants, but there was no change in the culture.

第一轮变革将安灯线和日式库存控制引入通用汽车工厂，但文化没有改变。

Workers and managers continued their old antagonistic ways.

工人和管理者继续他们古老的对立方式。

In some of the factories where they installed the andon cord, workers got yelled at when they pulled it.

在一些安装安灯绳的工厂里，工人们拉扯安灯绳时会遭到呵斥。

A few plants even cut the cords down.

一些植物甚至剪断了电线。

So the second round of changes included some team concepts.

所以第二轮的改变包括了一些团队概念。

They put together a book explaining how each plant should run and the reasoning behind it.

他们整理了一本书，解释每个工厂应该如何运行及其背后的原因。

Jeff Weller was one of the people dispatched in the 1990s to convert the company plant by plant.

杰夫·韦勒 (Jeff Weller) 是 20 世纪 90 年代被派去逐个改造公司工厂的人员之一。

Weller says some factory managers were receptive, but in the sprawling, decentralized system, the plant manager was still king, and ran the factory the way he wanted.

韦勒说，一些工厂经理很乐意接受，但在庞大的分散系统中，工厂经理仍然是国王，并按照他想要的方式管理工厂。

We had some tough goes in some of our facilities, where we spent more time trying to convince the plant leadership versus actually going on and doing the implementation.

我们在一些工厂遇到了一些困难，我们花了更多的时间试图说服工厂领导层，而不是实际进行实施。

I would say, I was asked in one plant to leave, because they were not interested in what I had to sell.

我想说，一家工厂要求我离开，因为他们对我要卖的东西不感兴趣。

How did he actually ask you to leave?

他实际上是如何要求你离开的？

What did he say?

他说什么？

And what did you do?

你做了什么？

Jeff Weller I left, because, you know, I was in his home, so to speak.

杰夫·韦勒（Jeff Weller）我离开了，因为，你知道，可以这么说，我在他家里。

His territory.

他的领地。

His plant.

他的植物。

Now, whatever happened to that plant manager who asked you to leave?

现在，那个让你离开的厂长怎么样了？

This may sound like a naive question, but why didn't the CEO pick up the phone and say, you're fired?

这听起来可能是一个天真的问题，但为什么首席执行官不拿起电话说，你被解雇了？

Well, it's a big company, and I'm not sure that, you know-- it doesn't work that way.

嗯，这是一家大公司，我不确定，你知道——它不是那样运作的。

Lots of people in GM still didn't see the need to change.

通用汽车公司的许多人仍然认为没有必要做出改变。

By the late 1990s, the company was posting huge profits selling trucks and SUVs, which made the loss in market share seem less urgent.

到 20 世纪 90 年代末，该公司在卡车和 SUV 销售方面获得了巨额利润，这使得市场份额的损失似乎不再那么紧迫。

To make real progress, managers had to leave the United States.

为了取得真正的进步，管理人员必须离开美国。

One overhauled GM Germany.

一辆大修德国通用汽车。

Mark Hogan took over GM Brazil in 1994 to enact NUMMI principles there.

马克·霍根 (Mark Hogan) 于 1994 年接管通用汽车巴西公司，并在那​​里制定了 NUMMI 原则。

In Brazil, he had a big, unionized workforce, but he could avoid GM's bureaucracy, its supplier network, and the United Auto Workers.

在巴西，他拥有一支庞大的工会劳动力队伍，但他可以避开通用汽车的官僚机构、供应商网络和汽车工人联合会。

How long did it take you to implement the lessons of NUMMI in Brazil?

您在巴西实施 NUMMI 的经验教训花了多长时间？

It took us about 18 to 24 months, which at the time, I was quite impatient about.

我们花了大约18到24个月的时间，当时我对此很不耐烦。

I mean, I wanted it faster.

我的意思是，我想要更快。

And what did that mean for the bottom line for GM?

这对通用汽车的利润意味着什么？

Well, in that time frame, particularly '94 through '97, GM Brazil was one of the most profitable entities within GM.

嗯，在那个时期，特别是 94 年到 97 年，通用汽车巴西公司是通用汽车公司内最赚钱的实体之一。

But in America, everyone I talked to said it took about a decade and a half after NUMMI for change to even begin to take hold at GM.

但在美国，与我交谈过的每个人都表示，在 NUMMI 实施之后大约十五年之后，通用汽车才开始发生变革。

By the year 2000, GM finally started to see a generational transformation.

到 2000 年，通用汽车终于开始进行代际转型。

Jeffrey Liker says so many managers had come through NUMMI for training for a day or a week or a year.

Jeffrey Liker 表示，许多经理都通过 NUMMI 接受了一天、一周或一年的培训。

Over time, you start to get 10 people, 20 people, 100 people, 300 people.

随着时间的推移，你开始有 10 人、20 人、100 人、300 人。

And you now have a critical mass of people in GM who've all been in NUMMI.

现在，通用汽车公司拥有大量曾在 NUMMI 工作过的人员。

They've lived it.

他们已经经历过了。

Now they're managing people and teaching them what they learned.

现在他们正在管理人员并向他们传授所学到的知识。

And it snowballs, and suddenly, the world is different at GM, and nobody can even tell you exactly why.

它就像滚雪球一样越滚越大，突然之间，通用汽车的世界就变得不同了，甚至没有人能确切地告诉你为什么。

By the early 2000s, GM had developed a production model with the UAW based on Japanese principles that would go into all of its plants.

到 2000 年代初，通用汽车与 UAW 共同开发了一种基于日本原则的生产模式，该模式将应用于其所有工厂。

It was called the Global Manufacturing System.

它被称为全球制造系统。

And although GM quality still lags behind the imports, it's improved a lot.

虽然转基因的质量仍然落后于进口，但已经提高了很多。

Again, Jeffrey Liker.

又是杰弗里·莱克。

If you look carefully at the quality of a GM product, and you look with a fine tooth comb, with a magnifying glass, you're going to see a level of quality that you didn't see 15 years ago.

如果你用细齿梳子和放大镜仔细观察转基因产品的质量，你会看到 15 年前看不到的质量水平。

You want to show me for a sec?

你想给我看一下吗？

Do you mind?

你介意吗？

There's one right here.

这里就有一个。

I did my interview with Jeffrey Liker at the 2010 Detroit Auto Show, and we walked over to the GM exhibit, to the Cadillac SRX, which is a small SUV.

我在 2010 年底特律车展上接受了 Jeffrey Liker 的采访，然后我们走到了通用汽车的展厅，看到了凯迪拉克 SRX，这是一款小型 SUV。

Jeffrey pointed to the gap between the doors and the car frame, which is supposed to be uniform.

杰弗里指着车门和车架之间的间隙，这应该是均匀的。

And if we look down here, it looks really good, right?

如果我们往下看，它看起来真的很好，对吧？

The gap is about the same between the front and the back door.

前门和后门之间的间隙大致相同。

The surface is very smooth and very uniform.

表面非常光滑且非常均匀。

And 15 years ago, what would that have looked like?

15 年前，那会是什么样子？

You would see maybe at the top, it would be more narrow than at the bottom.

你可能会看到顶部比底部更窄。

If you look inside the car, and you open the glove box, it falls very gradually down the way it's supposed to.

如果你看一下车内，然后打开手套箱，它就会按照预期的方式逐渐下降。

You close it-- I barely have to touch it, and it closes tightly.

你关上它——我几乎不用碰它，它就关得很紧。

Precision in all these details makes for a better-looking, more reliable car, where things work like they're supposed to.

所有这些细节的精确性造就了一辆更美观、更可靠的汽车，并且一切都按照预期进行。

But this improvement didn't come soon enough.

但这种改进来得不够快。

Some cars and some plants improved less quickly than others.

一些汽车和一些工厂的改进速度慢于其他工厂。

And while GM was getting better, so were its competitors, leaving it still near the back of the pack.

尽管通用汽车正在变得更好，但它的竞争对手也在进步，使其仍然处于落后地位。

Well, one of the ironies of GM was that in the moment it went bankrupt, it was probably a better company than it had ever been.

嗯，通用汽车的讽刺之一是，在它破产的那一刻，它可能是一家比以往任何时候都更好的公司。

That's James Womack, co-author of a seminal book comparing the Toyota and GM production systems, The Machine That Changed the World.

这就是詹姆斯·沃马克（James Womack），他是一本比较丰田和通用汽车生产系统的开创性著作《改变世界的机器》的合著者。

In the factories, they had really dramatically closed the productivity gap that they had had for many, many years.

在工厂里，他们确实极大地缩小了多年来存在的生产力差距。

And on the new products, they have much better quality.

而在新产品上，它们的质量要好得多。

So the company that failed was actually doing better than it had ever done.

因此，失败的公司实际上比以往任何时候都做得更好。

But it was too late, and that's really sort of hard to forgive-- that if you take 30 years to figure it out, chances are you're going to get run over.

但为时已晚，这真的很难原谅——如果你花了 30 年才弄清楚，你很可能会被碾压。

And they got run over.

他们被碾了。

In the end, what did them in was the 2008 recession.

最终，他们陷入了2008年的经济衰退。

It destroyed the car market.

它摧毁了汽车市场。

The next year, General Motors became the largest industrial bankruptcy in US history.

第二年，通用汽车成为美国历史上最大的工业破产案。

Its bailout cost taxpayers more than $50 billion.

其救助花费了纳税人超过 500 亿美元。

I asked Mark Hogan, the NUMMI commando who went on to run GM's small car division in North America, if GM had adopted NUMMI earlier, could it have really changed all that?

我问 Mark Hogan，这位 NUMMI 突击队员，后来负责通用汽车在北美的小型汽车部门，如果通用汽车更早采用 NUMMI，它真的能改变这一切吗？

Definitely.

确实。

I think if General Motors had moved in the late '80s to implement the system across the board, it may very well have saved GM from going into bankruptcy.

我认为，如果通用汽车公司在 80 年代末全面实施该系统，很可能会让通用汽车免于破产。

Explain that.

解释一下。

Mark Hogan Well, I just think the productivity and the quality changes that come with that would have been so profound that this ever increasing loss of market share would have been stopped.

马克·霍根（Mark Hogan）：嗯，我只是认为随之而来的生产力和质量变化将是如此深刻，以至于市场份额不断扩大的损失将会被阻止。

Well, I think they'd have been building a higher quality product.

嗯，我认为他们会开发出更高质量的产品。

Again, the UAW's Bruce Lee.

再次是美国汽车工人联合会的李小龙。

Bruce Lee You know, they sold junk for a while.

李小龙 你知道，他们有一段时间卖垃圾。

Just any kind of piece of crap they could roll out there, they did.

他们可以在那里推出任何类型的垃圾，他们都这么做了。

And they paid a tremendous price for it.

他们为此付出了巨大的代价。

And even when they turned the corner in quality, people didn't trust them.

即使他们在质量上扭转了局面，人们也不信任他们。

They'd say, well, gee, they're building a good car now.

他们会说，好吧，天哪，他们现在正在制造一辆好车。

Why aren't they buying them?

他们为什么不买呢？

Because they don't trust them.

因为他们不信任他们。

But had they adopted and embraced the team concept in an honest way, they were going to do this, I think it might have dramatically changed what happened in the American auto industry.

但如果他们以诚实的方式采用和接受团队概念，他们就会这样做，我认为这可能会极大地改变美国汽车行业发生的事情。

There's no question in my mind.

我心里没有任何疑问。

Of course, quality and reliability weren't the only problems that brought GM down.

当然，质量和可靠性并不是导致通用汽车倒闭的唯一问题。

Executives made other big mistakes.

高管们还犯了其他重大错误。

Over the years, General Motors negotiated contracts with the UAW with such generous health care coverage that by 2007, it amounted to more than $1,600 for each vehicle GM produced in North America.

多年来，通用汽车与 UAW 谈判签订的合同中包含非常慷慨的医疗保险，到 2007 年，通用汽车在北美生产的每辆汽车的医疗保险费用已超过 1,600 美元。

And initially, some GM executives dismissed hybrid cars like the Prius as a publicity stunt.

最初，通用汽车的一些高管将普锐斯等混合动力汽车视为一种宣传噱头。

Instead, they bet the company on SUVs and trucks, only to see sales crash when gas hit $4.00 a gallon.

相反，他们将公司押注于 SUV 和卡车，但当汽油价格跌至每加仑 4 美元时，销量却大幅下滑。

Over the last decade, as GM became more like Toyota, Toyota became a little bit like GM.

在过去的十年里，随着通用汽车变得越来越像丰田，丰田也变得有点像通用汽车。

In 2008, it took over the title from GM of the world's largest automaker.

2008年，它从通用汽车手中接过了全球最大汽车制造商的头衔。

But Toyota executives now say the company did this by making one of GM's old mistakes-- stressing quantity over quality.

但丰田高管现在表示，该公司之所以能做到这一点，是因为犯了通用汽车的一个老错误——强调数量而不是质量。

Akio Toyoda is the company CEO.

丰田章男担任公司首席执行官。

He's the grandson of the founder, and cut his teeth at NUMMI.

他是创始人的孙子，并在 NUMMI 起步。

At a congressional hearing in 2010 about Toyota's sudden acceleration problems, he said the company's fatal mistake was growing too fast.

在2010年关于丰田突然加速问题的国会听证会上，他表示该公司的致命错误是增长速度太快。

We pursued growth over the speed at which we are able to develop our people and our organization, and I am deeply sorry for any accident that Toyota drivers have experienced.

我们追求的增长速度超过了我们能够发展我们的员工和我们的组织的速度，对于丰田司机所经历的任何事故，我深感抱歉。

It was 15 years before GM took the lessons of NUMMI seriously, and it spent the next 10 years slowly implementing what it learned.

15 年后，通用汽车才认真吸取 NUMMI 的教训，并在接下来的 10 年里慢慢实施所学到的东西。

And all the time, the NUMMI plant kept pumping out vehicles-- 6,000 a week on average, two shifts a day.

自始至终，NUMMI 工厂都在不断生产车辆——平均每周生产 6,000 辆，每天两班制。

Toyota got what it wanted out of the deal.

丰田从这笔交易中得到了它想要的东西。

A year after starting NUMMI, it began opening other factories around the US, using what it had learned in Fremont.

NUMMI 成立一年后，它利用在弗里蒙特学到的经验，开始在美国各地开设其他工厂。

GM and Toyota continued to run NUMMI together until 2009, when GM went bankrupt and pulled out, leaving Toyota to run the plant alone.

通用汽车和丰田继续共同运营 NUMMI，直到 2009 年通用汽车破产并退出，留下丰田独自运营该工厂。

Toyota decided to shut the factory down.

丰田决定关闭工厂。

It was their only unionized plant in the United States.

这是他们在美国唯一一家有工会的工厂。

In April 2010, NUMMI produced its very last car-- a Corolla.

2010 年 4 月，NUMMI 生产了最后一款汽车——卡罗拉。

4,500 people lost their jobs.

4,500 人失业。

This is the first factory Toyota has shut down since it was founded 73 years ago.

这是丰田成立73年来关闭的第一家工厂。

Toyota's not perfect.

丰田并不完美。

GM is not perfect.

GM并不完美。

But I think anyone who touched NUMMI will never forget it.

但我想任何接触过NUMMI的人都不会忘记它。

One last time, that's John Shook, the first American Toyota hired for NUMMI.

最后一次是约翰·舒克 (John Shook)，他是第一个为 NUMMI 雇用的美国丰田公司。

It does represent something that was special at a point in time.

它确实代表了某个时间点上的特殊事物。

It was a laboratory.

那是一个实验室。

My learning curve-- it wasn't just a curve.

我的学习曲线——它不仅仅是一条曲线。

It was a 90 degree right angle.

这是一个90度的直角。

I loved every minute of it.

我喜欢它的每一分钟。

And almost everyone I think you'll talk to who worked on NUMMI will say the same thing.

我认为几乎每个在 NUMMI 工作过的人都会说同样的话。

I'm so fortunate that I ended my career in the auto industry at NUMMI.

我很幸运，我在 NUMMI 结束了我在汽车行业的职业生涯。

Rick Madrid retired from the assembly line in 1992.

里克·马德里于 1992 年从装配线退休。

I just hate to see the plant close.

我只是讨厌看到工厂关闭。

Oh, that just hurts me.

哦，那只是伤害了我。

End of an era.

一个时代的结束。

It changed my life from being depressed, bored, and like my son said, changed my attitude.

它改变了我的生活，让我不再沮丧、无聊，而且就像我儿子说的，改变了我的态度。

It changed me all for the better.

它让我一切变得更好。

I really hate to see it go.

我真的不想看到它消失。

I look at cars, and I see a lot of the cars that we built.

我看汽车，看到很多我们制造的汽车。

That's Billy Haggerty, who ended up putting in 18 years at NUMMI without a vacation day.

这就是比利·哈格蒂 (Billy Haggerty)，他在 NUMMI 工作了 18 年，没有休假。

He says just the other day he saw one.

他说就在前几天他看到了一个。

But I just seen-- what was it?

但我刚刚看到——那是什么？

An '86, '87 Corolla pull in right around the corner here.

一辆 86 年、87 年的卡罗拉就停在拐角处。

I was heading for the bank.

我正要去银行。

And I just looked at it and said, boy, that one's old.

我只是看着它，然后说，天啊，那个已经很旧了。

And I looked down, and it was a Corolla.

我低头一看，那是一辆卡罗拉。

I know we built it right there.

我知道我们就在那里建造的。

So it's still running.

所以它仍然在运行。

It's still kicking.

它还在踢。

It feels good.

感觉很好。

This is also NUMMI's legacy.

这也是 NUMMI 的遗产。

In the end, it's not just a symbol for so many things that went wrong with GM.

归根结底，这不仅仅是通用汽车公司许多问题的象征。

It's also a really good car plant.

这也是一个非常好的汽车厂。

One that turned out nearly 8 million high-quality cars and trucks.

其中生产了近 800 万辆高质量的汽车和卡车。

Frank Langfitt.

弗兰克·朗菲特.

When we first ran this story back in 2010, Frank was NPR's automotive correspondent.

2010 年，当我们第一次报道这个故事时，弗兰克是 NPR 的汽车记者。

He's now their international correspondent based in Shanghai.

他现在是他们驻上海的国际记者。

Since 2010, the NUMMI plant in Fremont has become symbolic of what's happening in the American car industry in a different way.

自 2010 年以来，位于弗里蒙特的 NUMMI 工厂以不同的方式成为美国汽车行业正在发生的事情的象征。

It's now where they make the Tesla.

现在这里是他们制造特斯拉的地方。

[MUSIC - "TOYOTA COROLLA," THE TURN UPS]

[音乐-“丰田卡罗拉”的转变]

Frank Langfitt's story about NUMMI was produced by me and Brian Reed.

Frank Langfitt 关于 NUMMI 的故事由我和 Brian Reed 制作。

NPR's Uri Berliner helped us edit it.

NPR 的 Uri Berliner 帮助我们编辑了它。

Our show today was produced by Lisa Pollak, with Alex Blumberg, Jane Feltes, Sarah Koenig, Robyn Semien, Alyssa Shipp, and Nancy Updike.

我们今天的节目由 Lisa Pollak 制作，与 Alex Blumberg、Jane Feltes、Sarah Koenig、Robyn Semien、Alyssa Shipp 和 Nancy Updike 一起制作。

Our senior producer for today's show is Julie Snyder.

我们今天节目的高级制片人是朱莉·斯奈德。

Production help from Simon Adler and Lilly Sullivan.

西蒙·阿德勒和莉莉·沙利文为制作提供帮助。

Seth Lind is our operations director.

塞思·林德 (Seth Lind) 是我们的运营总监。

Emily Condon's our production manager.

艾米丽·康登是我们的生产经理。

Elise Bergerson's our business manager.

埃莉斯·伯格森是我们的业务经理。

Kimberly Henderson is our office coordinator.

Kimberly Henderson 是我们的办公室协调员。

Old Japanese TV footage in today's show comes from NHK in Tokyo.

今天节目中的日本旧电视片段来自东京 NHK。

Thanks to [INAUDIBLE], who translated it for us.

感谢[听不清]，他为我们翻译了它。

[ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS] Since we first broadcast this story in 2010, a number of the people who Frank interviewed have since died, including Rick Madrid, the guy who would go around putting postcards in the windshields of old Chevy Novas.

[鸣谢] 自从我们在 2010 年首次播出这个故事以来，弗兰克采访过的一些人已经去世，其中包括里克·马德里 (Rick Maddrid)，他经常在旧雪佛兰 Novas 的挡风玻璃上贴明信片。

Our website, www.thisamericanlife.org.

我们的网站：www.thisamericanlife.org。

This American Life is delivered to public radio stations by PRX, the Public Radio Exchange.

《美国生活》由公共广播电台 PRX 向公共广播电台播出。

Since we first broadcast this story in 2010, a number of the people who Frank interviewed have since died, including Rick Madrid the guy who would go around putting postcards in the windshields of old Chevy Novas.

自从我们在 2010 年首次播出这个故事以来，弗兰克采访过的许多人都已经去世，其中包括里克·马德里（Rick Madrid），他经常在旧雪佛兰 Novas 的挡风玻璃上贴明信片。

This American Life is delivered to public radio stations by PRX, the Public Radio Exchange.

《美国生活》由公共广播电台 PRX 向公共广播电台播出。

Support for This American Life comes from Nest.

对《This American Life》的支持来自 Nest。

The new Nest Protect.

新的巢保护。

Smoke and carbon monoxide alarm speaks up to tell where the danger is, and it sends out a mobile alert in case nobody's home.

烟雾和一氧化碳警报器会发出声音告知危险所在，并在无人在家时发出移动警报。

Nest Protect is available at nest.com.

Nest Protect 可在 Nest.com 上购买。

And from Lagunitas Brewing Company, committed to keeping the pub in public radio by offering curious ales and lagers for those who appreciate hearing and telling great stories.

来自 Lagunitas Brewing Company 的公司致力于通过为那些喜欢聆听和讲述精彩故事的人们提供好奇的啤酒和啤酒，让酒吧继续出现在公共广播中。

Learn more at lagunitas.com

了解更多信息，请访问 lagunitas.com

And from Hulu, now offering full access to Showtime, including current and past seasons of original series, movies, and more, all without commercials.

Hulu 现在提供对 Showtime 的完整访问，包括当前和过去几季的原创剧集、电影等，全部没有广告。

Learn more about Showtime access and a one month trial at hulu.com.

请访问 hulu.com 了解有关 Showtime 访问和一个月试用的更多信息。

Thanks, as always, to our program's co-founder, Mr. Torey Malatia.

一如既往地感谢我们项目的联合创始人 Torey Malatia 先生。

You know, I overheard him in the hallway, telling somebody how surprised he was about the quality of our programs this past year.

你知道，我在走廊里无意中听到他告诉别人他对我们去年的项目质量感到多么惊讶。

Because that was not a young workforce.

因为那不是年轻的劳动力。

And, you know, they were old.

而且，你知道，他们都老了。

They were fat.

他们很胖。

I'm Ira Glass.

我是艾拉·格拉斯。

Back next week with more stories of This American Life.

下周我们将带来更多《美国生活》的故事。

This American Life is produced in collaboration with WBEZ Chicago and delivered to stations by PRX The Public Radio Exchange.

《This American Life》与 WBEZ Chicago 合作制作，并由 PRX 公共广播电台传送到各电台。