536: The Secret Recordings of Carmen Segarra - This American Life

You are using an outdated browser.

您正在使用过时的浏览器。

Please upgrade your browser or activate Google Chrome Frame to improve your experience.

请升级您的浏览器或激活 Google Chrome 浏览器内嵌框架以改善您的体验。

Sign up for a free Life Partners trial, and you can watch the video “A Night of Stories and Improv.”

注册免费试用《Life Partners》，您可以观看视频“故事与即兴表演之夜”。

00:00 00:00 Transcript Share This American Life Life Partners How to Listen Episodes Recommended About Overview Staff Announcements Fellowships Jobs Music Make Radio On The Road FAQ Submissions Merch Contact Us Our Other Shows Merch Follow Us Life Partners Subscribe to our newsletter Full episode Toggle Audio and Transcript Sync Transcript | Episode #536 | September 26, 2014 536: The Secret Recordings of Carmen Segarra Note: This American Life is produced for the ear and designed to be heard.

00:00 00:00 文字记录 分享此 美国生活 生活伙伴 如何收听 剧集 推荐 关于 概述 员工公告 奖学金 工作 音乐 在路上制作电台 常见问题解答 提交 商品 联系我们 我们的其他节目 商品 关注我们 生活伙伴 订阅我们的时事通讯 整集 切换音频和文字记录同步 文字记录 | 内容第 536 集 | 2014 年 9 月 26 日 536：卡门·塞加拉 (Carmen Segarra) 的秘密录音 注：《美国生活》是为耳朵而制作的，旨在让人们听到。

If you are able, we strongly encourage you to listen to the audio, which includes emotion and emphasis that's not on the page.

如果可以的话，我们强烈建议您收听音频，其中包括页面上没有的情感和重点。

Transcripts are generated using a combination of speech recognition software and human transcribers, and may contain errors.

文字记录是使用语音识别软件和人工转录员结合生成的，可能包含错误。

Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.

请在印刷版引用前检查相应的音频。

Prologue Ira Glass Hey there, everybody.

序言 Ira Glass 大家好。

Today we have secret recordings taped inside one of the most powerful institutions in this country.

今天，我们在这个国家最强大的机构之一内录制了秘密录音。

It's a place that we pretty much almost never get a glimpse inside.

这是一个我们几乎从未见过内部的地方。

And they're revealing and in lots of ways very disturbing.

它们具有启发性，并且在很多方面都非常令人不安。

But to understand what they're about and why they're so interesting, you actually need a little context, so I need to take you back to the financial crisis.

但要了解它们的含义以及它们为何如此有趣，您实际上需要一些背景知识，因此我需要带您回到金融危机。

After the financial meltdown in 2008, there was a lot of attention and a lot of blame heaped on the one institution that was in a position to notice the problems that led to the meltdown and to do something about them before disaster hit.

2008 年金融危机之后，一家能够注意到导致金融危机的问题并在灾难发生之前采取行动的机构受到了广泛的关注和指责。

That institution is the Federal Reserve, the Fed, and in particular, its office in New York City, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

这个机构就是美联储，特别是它在纽约市的办公室，纽约联邦储备银行。

It's responsible for regulating the banks on Wall Street, which is to say some of the biggest banks in the world.

它负责监管华尔街的银行，即世界上一些最大的银行。

It's supposed to monitor what they do.

它应该监视他们的行为。

It's supposed to make sure that they don't break rules or take risks that could bring down the financial system.

它应该确保他们不会违反规则或承担可能导致金融体系崩溃的风险。

After they failed at that so spectacularly with the financial crisis, even people at the Fed admitted they should've done a better job.

在金融危机中他们在这方面惨遭失败后，就连美联储的人也承认他们本应该做得更好。

And to figure out how to do a better job, one of the things they did is they commissioned a report, a secret report that you and I were never supposed to see.

为了弄清楚如何做得更好，他们所做的一件事就是委托撰写一份报告，一份你我不应该看到的秘密报告。

Well it was supposed to be completely confidential.

嗯，这本来应该是完全保密的。

As you can probably gather from the tone, it is totally candid and highly self-critical.

从语气中你可能可以看出，这是完全坦诚且高度自我批评的。

This is David Beim, author of the secret report.

我是大卫·贝姆，秘密报告的作者。

These days, actually, anybody can read this confidential and candid report because a government commission released the report to the public.

如今，实际上，任何人都可以阅读这份机密而坦诚的报告，因为政府委员会向公众发布了该报告。

Some people at the Fed were actually surprised at that, but they got lucky.

美联储的一些人实际上对此感到惊讶，但他们很幸运。

Because the report had been released in a flood of hundreds of other documents, the press didn't really notice it.

由于该报告是与数百份其他文件一起发布的，因此媒体并没有真正注意到它。

Nobody paid attention to this report.

没有人关注这份报告。

The report was written back in 2009.

该报告写于 2009 年。

The president of the New York Fed, Bill Dudley, asked Beim to do an investigation.

纽约联邦储备银行行长比尔·达德利要求贝姆进行调查。

Beim, he had been a banker.

贝姆，他曾是一名银行家。

He was a finance professor from Columbia.

他是哥伦比亚大学的金融学教授。

And he had studied the New York Fed in the past.

他过去曾研究过纽约联储。

Dudley gave Beim a team of Fed managers, and they went around interviewing people at the New York Fed.

杜德利给了贝姆一个美联储经理团队，他们四处采访纽约联储的人员。

And what they found were a whole range of problems, all of them distressing to read about.

他们发现了一系列问题，所有这些问题读起来都令人痛苦。

They found deference to the banks.

他们尊重银行。

They found an unwillingness to take action, extreme passivity.

他们发现不愿意采取行动，极度被动。

And they found what experts call regulatory capture.

他们发现了专家所说的“监管捕获”。

Regulatory capture is when a regulator gets too cozy with the company that he's supposed to be monitoring.

监管捕获是指监管者与他应该监控的公司过于亲密。

He's like a watchdog who licks the face of an intruder and plays catch with the intruder instead of barking at him.

他就像一只看门狗，会舔入侵者的脸并与入侵者玩接球游戏，而不是对他吠叫。

Beim says that people inside the Fed told him, yeah, capture was an issue for them.

贝姆说，美联储内部的人告诉他，是的，俘虏对他们来说是一个问题。

In fact, I have one footnote where one of the senior officers said that he had been only working at the Fed for three weeks on a particular account when, quote, "I saw the capture set in."

事实上，我有一个脚注，其中一位高级官员说，他在美联储的一个特定账户上只工作了三周，当时引用了“我看到捕获开始了”。

Keep in mind, Beim says this senior officer, he wasn't making an observation about somebody else.

请记住，贝姆说这位高级官员，他并不是在观察别人。

He was talking about himself succumbing to capture and his team.

他正在谈论自己和他的团队被俘虏的情况。

And this idea that somebody in the Fed could become captured so quickly, this was such an unsettling thought that even in this secret, highly confidential, totally candid report, Beim says--

美联储的某个人可能会如此迅速地被捕，这是一个令人不安的想法，即使在这份秘密、高度机密、完全坦诚的报告中，贝姆说——

Some of the most senior officers in the Fed wanted that footnote taken out, and we didn't take it out, but there were some people embarrassed by it.

美联储的一些最高级官员希望删除该脚注，我们没有删除它，但有些人对此感到尴尬。

Beim's report lays out recommendations for how the New York Fed could become more effective.

贝姆的报告就纽约联储如何提高效率提出了建议。

And one of his recommendations was to hire a new kind of employee-- outspoken, unafraid, somebody who would not get captured.

他的建议之一是雇用一种新型员工——直言不讳、无所畏惧、不会被抓获的人。

And after that, the Fed did go on a hiring spree.

此后，美联储确实继续大肆招聘。

It needed more examiners because Congress gave the Fed more responsibilities in the wake of the crisis.

它需要更多的审查员，因为国会在危机发生后赋予了美联储更多的责任。

And one of the people they hired was a lawyer named Carmen Segarra.

他们聘请的其中一个人是一位名叫卡门·塞加拉（Carmen Segarra）的律师。

And whether they meant to or not, with Carmen Segarra, they got the kind of employee Beim said they needed-- confident, independent-minded.

无论他们是否有意，与卡门·塞加拉一起，他们得到了贝姆所说的他们需要的那种员工——自信、思想独立。

For over 10 years, she'd worked for big banks in the private sector, Citigroup, MBNA.

十多年来，她曾在私营部门的大型银行、花旗集团、MBNA 工作。

But starting at the Fed after the financial crisis, she was idealistic.

但从金融危机后进入美联储开始，她就充满了理想主义。

Having seen so many of my friends that work in different divisions of banks, but also that work in all sorts of other industries, you know, teachers, police officers, getting laid off and suffering the consequences of the crisis, I felt like I had the correct skill set to be able to go into a place like the Fed and actually contribute and make a difference.

看到我的很多朋友在银行的不同部门工作，但也在各种其他行业工作，你知道，老师，警察，被解雇并遭受危机的后果，我觉得我拥有正确的技能，能够进入像美联储这样的地方，真正做出贡献并发挥作用。

Which brings us to the secret recordings.

这给我们带来了秘密录音。

For over 100 years, the Fed has done everything it could to keep its behind the scenes interactions with banks from being seen by the public.

一百多年来，美联储竭尽全力不让公众看到其与银行的幕后互动。

But what Carmen Segarra witnessed going on at the Fed was so alarming, she started secretly making recordings of what she experienced as a bank examiner, recordings that raised serious questions about whether the Fed has changed enough since 2008 to protect us from another financial disaster.

但卡门·塞加拉 (Carmen Segarra) 在美联储目睹的事情是如此令人震惊，她开始秘密录制自己作为银行审查员的经历，这些录音引发了人们的严重质疑：自 2008 年以来，美联储是否已经做出了足够的改变，足以保护我们免受另一场金融灾难的影响。

This is a spoiler, but just to put it out there, things went very badly for Carmen Segarra at her new job.

这是一个剧透，但顺便说一句，卡门·塞加拉 (Carmen Segarra) 在她的新工作中情况非常糟糕。

She's currently suing the Fed over this.

她目前正在就此起诉美联储。

So what you're going to hear today is a dispute between an employee and her bosses, though of course, what we're interested in is not the he said, she said of all that, but in what her secret recordings show us about how the Fed works.

所以你今天要听到的是一名员工和她的老板之间的争执，当然，我们感兴趣的不是他所说的、她所说的一切，而是她的秘密录音向我们展示的美联储如何运作。

Throughout this hour, you're going to hear her recordings of what she saw at the Fed, and you're also going to hear more from David Beim's 2009 report, which lays out the way that the Fed should be operating.

在这一小时中，您将听到她在美联储所见所闻的录音，您还将听到大卫·贝姆 (David Beim) 2009 年报告的更多内容，该报告阐述了美联储应该运作的方式。

He explained the changes the Fed needed to make.

他解释了美联储需要做出的改变。

With Carmen's tapes, we get to see if they actually made those changes, and it is not reassuring.

通过卡门的录音带，我们可以看到他们是否真的做出了这些改变，但这并不令人放心。

From WBEZ Chicago, it's This American Life.

来自芝加哥 WBEZ 的《This American Life》。

I'm Ira Glass.

我是艾拉·格拉斯。

Stay with us.

留在我们身边。

We produced today's program in collaboration with our colleagues at ProPublica.

我们与 ProPublica 的同事合作制作了今天的节目。

Investigative reporter Jake Bernstein takes it from here.

调查记者杰克·伯恩斯坦 (Jake Bernstein) 从这里摘录。

A little footnote before we begin for policy nerds-- we know that officially in the context that we have today, the Federal Reserve is not properly called a regulator.

在我们开始为政策迷提供一点脚注之前，我们知道，在我们今天的正式背景下，美联储并不适合被称为监管者。

It's called a supervisor.

这就是所谓的监督者。

We're using the word regulator throughout this hour because it's easier for us normal people to understand.

我们整个小时都在使用调节器这个词，因为它对我们普通人来说更容易理解。

OK, here's Jake.

好的，这是杰克。

Here's a little known fact about being a bank examiner.

以下是关于成为银行审查员的鲜为人知的事实。

You actually spend your days working inside the banks you're examining, like you have a desk there and your own phone.

实际上，您每天都在您正在检查的银行内工作，就像您在那里有一张桌子和自己的电话一样。

At some of the biggest banks, examiners even have half a floor reserved just for them to constantly track what the bank is doing.

在一些最大的银行，审查员甚至预留了半个楼层专门供他们不断跟踪银行的运作情况。

And in the past, many of those Fed examiners inside the banks had been generalists.

过去，银行内部的许多美联储审查员都是多面手。

If they needed an expert in liquidity risk or market risk or whatever, they had to call one in from Fed HQ.

如果他们需要流动性风险或市场风险或其他方面的专家，他们必须从美联储总部请来一位专家。

But one of the reforms after the financial crisis was to hire lots of experts and station them inside the banks too.

但金融危机后的改革之一是聘请大量专家并将他们派驻到银行内部。

Carmen Segarra was one of these experts.

卡门·塞加拉 (Carmen Segarra) 就是这些专家之一。

Her expertise was helping big banks with the procedures and systems they need to comply with the many rules and regulations they face here and overseas.

她的专业知识是帮助大型银行制定所需的程序和系统，以遵守他们在国内外面临的许多规则和法规。

She'd done it for over a decade.

她已经这样做了十多年了。

Like any good overachiever, she speaks four languages-- French, Italian, Spanish, English.

像任何优秀的优等生一样，她会说四种语言——法语、意大利语、西班牙语和英语。

She's currently learning Dutch.

她目前正在学习荷兰语。

She has degrees from Harvard, Cornell, and Columbia, and studied international law at the Sorbonne.

她拥有哈佛大学、康奈尔大学和哥伦比亚大学的学位，并在索邦大学学习国际法。

When Carmen showed up at the Fed for her first day at the end of October, 2011, she didn't know which bank she was going to be assigned to.

2011 年 10 月底，当卡门第一天出现在美联储时，她不知道自己将被分配到哪家银行。

Then she bumped into her supervisor.

然后她碰到了她的主管。

He said, do you know where you're going?

他说，你知道你要去哪里吗？

And I said, no. He said, you're going to Goldman.

我说，不。他说，你要去高盛。

And my thought was, uh-oh.

我的想法是，呃哦。

Goldman being, of course, Goldman Sachs.

高盛当然是高盛。

The look on his face was like he was very much looking for my reaction.

他脸上的表情就好像他很想看看我的反应。

And when I-- I think after so many years of practicing law, when you see someone that is just looking to see what your reaction is going to be, my first instinct is, let me make sure that I don't give a reaction, which is very difficult because I have a very expressive face.

当我——我想在从事法律多年之后，当你看到有人只是想看看你的反应时，我的第一直觉是，让我确保我不会做出反应，这是非常困难的，因为我有一张非常富有表现力的脸。

I know this is a radio show, so you guys, you know, you can't see that.

我知道这是一个广播节目，所以你们看不到。

We can vouch.

我们可以担保。

We're looking at it.

我们正在研究它。

You do have an expressive face.

你确实有一张富有表情的脸。

That was Brian Reed, by the way, the This American Life producer working with me on this story.

顺便说一句，他就是《美国生活》的制片人布莱恩·里德（Brian Reed），他和我一起制作了这个故事。

You'll hear him in some of these interviews.

你会在其中一些采访中听到他的声音。

When Carmen embedded at Goldman Sachs, it was probably the firm that, for Americans, most symbolized what was wrong with Wall Street, deservedly or not.

当卡门加入高盛时，对于美国人来说，这家公司可能最能象征华尔街的问题，无论其是否应得。

In 2010, the year before she started, the SEC hit it with one of the biggest fines in history at the time, more than half a billion dollars for misleading investors in a deal right before the financial crisis.

2010 年，也就是她入职的前一年，美国证券交易委员会因在金融危机前夕的一项交易中误导投资者而对其处以当时历史上最大的罚款之一，罚款金额超过 5 亿美元。

That same year, Goldman executives were hauled before Congress and berated for contributing to the collapse of the economy.

同年，高盛高管被带到国会，并因造成经济崩溃而受到谴责。

One popular view of Goldman was captured in this mild little metaphor from a Rolling Stone article, which compared the firm to, quote, "a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money."

《滚石》杂志的一篇文章中的一个温和的小隐喻体现了对高盛的一种流行看法，该文章将高盛比作“一只巨大的吸血乌贼，包裹着人类的脸，无情地将其血漏斗塞进任何闻起来像金钱的东西中”。

So Carmen was part of this new wave of experts examiners.

因此，卡门是新一波专家审查员中的一员。

And soon after she arrived, she says her bosses started asking the team if they were getting any opposition from the old guard, the generalists at the Fed who'd been working there for years.

她说，她到达后不久，她的老板们就开始询问团队，是否遭到了那些在美联储工作多年的老派人士的反对。

Many of these old guard examiners had a jargony and confusing sounding job title you'll hear now and then as we talk about this.

当我们谈论这个问题时，你会时不时地听到这些老派审查员中的许多人都有一个行话和听起来令人困惑的头衔。

They were called business line specialists.

他们被称为业务线专家。

Carmen says it didn't take long before she did start to notice pushback from the old guard.

卡门说，没过多久，她就开始注意到保守派的抵制。

For instance, at one meeting, she says-- and this is documented in the minutes from the meeting-- a senior executive from Goldman was talking about all sorts of things and mentioned that Goldman's view was that once clients were wealthy enough, certain consumer laws didn't apply to them.

例如，她说，在一次会议上——会议记录中有记录——高盛的一位高管谈论了各种各样的事情，并提到高盛的观点是，一旦客户足够富有，某些消费者法就不再适用于他们。

I was shocked.

我很震惊。

A senior compliance officer from Goldman Sachs saying something like that is a natural red flag.

高盛的一位高级合规官说类似的话是一个自然的危险信号。

I mean, you definitely want to take a look at what it is that they're doing there.

我的意思是，你肯定想看看他们在那里做什么。

Maybe Goldman was doing nothing wrong, but this is a big part of a bank examiner's job, to follow up on leads like this.

也许高盛并没有做错什么，但跟踪此类线索是银行审查员工作的重要组成部分。

And after that meeting, Carmen sat down with examiners who'd been there, from the Fed, but also from the FDIC and the New York State banking authority.

会议结束后，卡门与出席会议的审查人员进行了座谈，其中包括来自美联储、联邦存款保险公司和纽约州银行管理局的审查人员。

Carmen told them she wanted to follow up on that comment, and then a Fed examiner piped up.

卡门告诉他们，她想跟进这一评论，然后一位美联储审查员大声说道。

This colleague at the Fed basically said, you know, oh, that point?

美联储的这位同事基本上是说，哦，那一点你知道吗？

Oh, you didn't hear that.

哦，你没听到。

And I looked over at the New York bank examiner and the FDIC bank examiner, and we sort of looked at each other, and we said, yes, we did.

我看了看纽约银行审查员和联邦存款保险公司银行审查员，我们互相看了看，然后我们说，是的，我们做到了。

We did hear that.

我们确实听到了。

One of the other people in this conversation confirmed this for me.

这次谈话中的其他人向我证实了这一点。

The Fed examiner responded, well, he-- the Goldman executive-- he didn't mean it.

美联储审查员回答说，好吧，他——高盛高管——他不是这个意思。

You know, I was floored.

你知道，我很震惊。

It was the moment when I realized, oh, so this is what pushback looks like.

就在那一刻我意识到，哦，这就是阻力的样子。

Carmen says this wasn't an isolated incident.

卡门说这不是一个孤立的事件。

In December, not even two months into her job, a business line specialist came to Carmen and told her that her minutes from a key meeting with Goldman executives were wrong, that people didn't say some of the things Carmen noted in the minutes.

12月，在她上任还不到两个月的时候，一位业务线专家找到卡门，告诉她，她与高盛高管的一次重要会议的会议纪要是错误的，人们没有说出卡门在会议记录中指出的一些事情。

The business line specialist wanted her to change them.

业务线专家希望她改变它们。

Carmen didn't.

卡门没有。

That same day, Carmen was called into the office of a guy named Mike Silva.

同一天，卡门被叫到一个名叫迈克·席尔瓦的人的办公室。

Silva had worked at the Fed for almost 20 years.

席尔瓦已在美联储工作近 20 年。

He was now the senior Fed official stationed inside Goldman.

他现在是高盛内部的美联储高级官员。

What Mike Silva said to Carmen made her very uncomfortable.

迈克·席尔瓦对卡门说的话让她很不舒服。

She scribbled notes as he talked to her.

当他和她说话时，她记下了笔记。

I mean, even looking at my own meeting minutes, I see the handwriting is like nervous handwriting.

我的意思是，即使看我自己的会议纪要，我也发现笔迹就像紧张的笔迹。

It's like you can tell.

好像你能看出来。

He started off by talking about he wanted to give me some mentoring feedback.

他首先谈到他想给我一些指导反馈。

And then he started about talking about the importance of credibility, and he said, you know, credibility at the Fed is about subtleties and about perceptions as opposed to reality.

然后他开始谈论可信度的重要性，他说，你知道，美联储的可信度取决于微妙之处和与现实相反的看法。

What does that even mean?

这到底意味着什么？

Carmen Segarra I found it to be completely incredible for somebody to tell me that credibility is about perception as opposed to reality.

Carmen Segarra 我发现有人告诉我可信度是关于感知而不是现实，这完全令人难以置信。

I mean, I come from the world of legal and compliance.

我的意思是，我来自法律和合规领域。

We deal with hard evidence.

我们处理确凿的证据。

It's like we don't deal with perceptions.

就好像我们不处理看法一样。

What else did he say?

他还说了什么？

Carmen Segarra It was interesting because he said, you know, the Fed takes most seriously those employees which are the most quiet ones, and that it was important, essentially, that I understand this because otherwise I would be frozen out.

卡门·塞加拉（Carmen Segarra）这很有趣，因为他说，你知道，美联储最重视那些最安静的员工，从本质上讲，我了解这一点很重要，否则我会被排除在外。

Mike Silva would go on to play a big part in Carmen's tenure at the Fed.

迈克·席尔瓦将在卡门的美联储任期内继续发挥重要作用。

We reached out to him several times, but he didn't want to take part in this story because of the fact that Carmen's suing, because there's a regulation that makes the Fed's dealing with Goldman confidential.

我们多次联系他，但他不想参与这个故事，因为卡门正在起诉，因为有一项规定要求美联储与高盛的交易保密。

So it's impossible to know his side of this.

所以不可能知道他的立场。

Carmen says she was so shaken by these incidents-- someone telling her she didn't hear something she knew she heard, another colleague asking to alter minutes that Carmen believed were accurate, and then the Fed's top guy at Goldman telling her that perceptions are more important than reality.

卡门说，她对这些事件感到非常震惊——有人告诉她，她没有听到她知道自己听到的东西，另一位同事要求更改卡门认为准确的会议记录，然后高盛的美联储高层告诉她，看法比现实更重要。

She says it was like reality itself was being questioned at the Fed.

她说，这就像现实本身在美联储受到质疑。

She realized she wanted a clear record of what was really happening in case there were ever any disputes about it.

她意识到她需要清楚地记录到底发生了什么，以防出现任何争议。

So she went to the spy store, bought a tiny audio recorder, put it on her key chain, and started switching it on secretly at important meetings.

于是，她去了间谍商店，买了一台微型录音机，把它挂在钥匙链上，并开始在重要会议上秘密打开它。

This is one of the first recordings she made.

这是她最早录制的录音之一。

It's with her supervisor.

是和她的主管一起的。

His name is Jonathan Kim.

他的名字叫乔纳森·金。

She's talking to him about the meeting that she had with Mike Silva and how upset she was by what he told her.

她正在和他谈论她与迈克·席尔瓦的会面，以及他告诉她的事情让她感到多么不安。

Credibility at the Fed is about subtleties, perceptions as opposed to reality.

美联储的可信度取决于微妙之处和与现实相反的看法。

Kim had done Carmen's job before her and told her he'd experienced opposition from the same people.

金在她之前完成了卡门的工作，并告诉她他也遭到了同样人的反对。

Kim's advice was to be patient.

金的建议是要有耐心。

The Fed was trying to change, and moving the Fed, he said in an unfortunate metaphor, was slow, like moving the Titanic.

美联储正在试图改变，他用一个不幸的比喻说，改变美联储的速度很慢，就像改变泰坦尼克号一样。

Meanwhile, in those early months, Carmen started looking at one deal that had caught the attention of the Fed's team at Goldman.

与此同时，在最初的几个月里，卡门开始考虑一项引起了高盛美联储团队注意的交易。

It's a deal that gave her a chance to really see the Fed in action, to see what the Fed did when faced with a situation where Goldman had done something regulators thought was questionable.

这笔交易让她有机会真正看到美联储的行动，看看美联储在面对高盛所做的事情被监管机构认为有问题的情况时做了什么。

Carmen remembers the moment she first learned about the deal.

卡门还记得她第一次得知这笔交易的那一刻。

Friday, January 6, at 3:54 PM, we get an email from Goldman sort of alerting us to this transaction that they're planning to close.

1 月 6 日星期五下午 3:54，我们收到一封来自高盛的电子邮件，提醒我们他们计划完成这项交易。

The email said that Goldman wanted to notify the Fed about a fast moving negotiation between it and a large Spanish bank.

该电子邮件称，高盛希望通知美联储其与一家西班牙大型银行之间正在进行的快速谈判。

The Spanish bank has operations all over the world.

这家西班牙银行的业务遍及世界各地。

It's called Banco Santander.

它的名字叫桑坦德银行。

Santander and Goldman both declined to comment about the deal for our story.

桑坦德银行和高盛均拒绝就我们报道的交易发表评论。

This email raised questions for Carmen.

这封电子邮件向卡门提出了一些问题。

First of all, an alert like this was unusual.

首先，这样的警报并不寻常。

Goldman had employees conducting deals all over the world every day and hardly ever wrote emails to the Fed about them.

高盛的员工每天都在世界各地进行交易，但几乎从未给美联储写过有关这些交易的电子邮件。

And then there was the timing, late in the afternoon on Friday, January 6th, a date which may not mean anything to you, but Carmen knew that it was Three Kings Day, one of the biggest national holidays in Spain.

然后是时间，1 月 6 日星期五下午晚些时候，这个日期对你来说可能没有任何意义，但卡门知道那是三王节，西班牙最大的全国性节日之一。

My first reaction was why are we getting this email?

我的第一反应是我们为什么会收到这封电子邮件？

And then my second thought was Banco Santander closing a deal on the equivalent of Christmas Eve in Spain?

然后我的第二个想法是桑坦德银行在相当于西班牙平安夜的时间达成交易？

That's interesting.

那很有意思。

So we get back to work after the weekend and Mike Silva is quite upset about this transaction.

所以周末后我们就回去工作了，迈克·席尔瓦对这笔交易感到非常不安。

Mike Silva, remember, was the Fed's top official inside Goldman, the one who talked to Carmen about perceptions verse reality.

请记住，迈克·席尔瓦 (Mike Silva) 是高盛内部美联储的最高官员，他与卡门谈论了看法与现实的关系。

It's helpful to know a bit about Mike Silva before you hear how the Fed reacted to this deal.

在了解美联储对这笔交易的反应之前，了解一下迈克·席尔瓦是有帮助的。

From everything we can tell, he seems like a regulator who's trying to do a good job.

从我们所知的一切来看，他似乎是一位努力做好工作的监管者。

In the tapes, Silva talks about the Fed's duty to serve the public.

在录音中，席尔瓦谈到了美联储服务公众的责任。

He'd been in the Navy, volunteered with disabled Veterans, and he'd gone to Iraq after the invasion to help get the country's national bank on its feet.

他曾在海军服役，为残疾退伍军人做志愿者，在入侵后他还前往伊拉克，帮助该国的国家银行重新站稳脚跟。

And at a staff meeting once, he told his employees a story from the darkest days of the financial crisis about what motivated him as a regulator.

在一次员工会议上，他向员工讲述了金融危机最黑暗时期的故事，讲述了他作为监管者的动力。

I have to tell you, that night that the reserve fund broke the buck and we got that word--

我必须告诉你，那天晚上，储备基金跌破了，我们得到了这样的消息——

It was a moment when it looked like the financial system was going to come crashing down.

那是一个金融体系看起来即将崩溃的时刻。

Big firms were frantically calling the Fed, terrified that economic Armageddon had arrived.

大公司疯狂地给美联储打电话，担心经济末日即将到来。

When this happened, Silva was chief of staff for Tim Geithner, who at the time was president of the New York Fed.

当这件事发生时，席尔瓦是蒂姆·盖特纳(Tim Geithner)的幕僚长，而盖特纳当时是纽约联储行长。

And when I realized that nobody had any idea how to respond that, I went into the bathroom and threw up, because I realized this is it.

当我意识到没有人知道如何回应时，我走进浴室吐了，因为我意识到就是这样。

It's just this small group of people and right now, at this moment, we have no clue.

只是这一小群人，而现在，此时此刻，我们毫无头绪。

I never want to get close to that moment again.

我再也不想接近那一刻了。

Silva told the staff that this was a very powerful experience that still influenced his thinking, and you could hear that in the recordings after the unusual deal came down late that Friday afternoon involving the overseas bank, Banco Santander.

席尔瓦告诉工作人员，这是一次非常有力的经历，至今仍影响着他的思维，你可以在周五下午晚些时候涉及海外银行桑坦德银行的不寻常交易达成后的录音中听到这一点。

What upset Mike Silva about it was that it seemed like the entire purpose of the transaction was for Goldman Sachs to help Banco Santander appear healthier than it actually was.

令迈克·席尔瓦感到不安的是，高盛此次交易的全部目的似乎是帮助桑坦德银行看起来比实际情况更健康。

All banks have to keep some capital on hand.

所有银行都必须保留一些手头资本。

The more deals and loans they do, the more capital they have to keep around as a safety cushion in case things go bad.

他们进行的交易和贷款越多，他们必须保留的资本就越多，作为万一情况恶化时的安全缓冲。

Santander was under pressure from its own regulators back in Europe to hold more capital.

桑坦德银行面临来自欧洲监管机构的压力，要求其持有更多资本。

And this deal with Goldman Sachs helped solve the problem for Santander, not by giving Santander more capital, but by taking stuff off their books and putting it on to Goldman's books.

与高盛的这项交易帮助解决了桑坦德银行的问题，不是给桑坦德银行更多的资本，而是把他们的账上的东西转移到高盛的账上。

Having less stuff meant Santander needed less capital.

拥有更少的东西意味着桑坦德银行需要更少的资金。

Mission accomplished.

任务完成了。

One Fed employee likened it to Goldman getting paid to hold on to a briefcase.

一位美联储员工将其比作高盛因持有公文包而获得报酬。

And as best as they could tell, Goldman was paid a lot, at least $40 million, with the potential to make hundreds of millions in the end.

据他们所知，高盛的薪酬很高，至少有 4000 万美元，最终有可能赚到数亿美元。

Mike Silva referred to the deal this way.

迈克席尔瓦这样提到这笔交易。

It's pretty apparent when you think this thing through that it's basically window dressing that's designed to help Banco Santander artificially enhance its capital.

当你仔细思考这件事时，你会发现这基本上是为了帮助桑坦德银行人为地增强其资本而设计的门面。

To be clear, the deal appeared to be perfectly legal.

需要明确的是，这笔交易似乎完全合法。

Silva knew that.

席尔瓦知道这一点。

But still, he wondered, did they want banks doing these sorts of transactions in the future?

但他仍然想知道，他们是否希望银行将来进行此类交易？

If this kind of deal took off and became more popular, could it be a problem?

如果这种交易开始流行并变得更受欢迎，这会是一个问题吗？

And in a sense, this is what you'd hope a Fed manager would be doing in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

从某种意义上说，这就是你希望美联储经理在金融危机之后所做的事情。

Mike Silva learned about this new kind of deal that had come into the world, one with potential risks that they didn't fully understand yet, and he set his team to work scrutinizing it.

迈克·席尔瓦了解到这种新的交易已经出现，其中存在他们尚未完全理解的潜在风险，他让他的团队开始仔细研究它。

Carmen and the others began to pore over documents for this complex transaction, which had tentacles in Brazil, Spain, the US, and the Middle East.

卡门和其他人开始仔细研究这项复杂交易的文件，该交易的触角遍及巴西、西班牙、美国和中东。

And one of the things that caught Carmen's eye was a short paragraph that the banks had written into the agreement.

引起卡门注意的是银行在协议中写入的一小段内容。

It said that Goldman had to notify the Fed about the Santander deal and obtain a, quote, "no objection." In other words, it looked like Goldman was required to get the Fed to officially sign off on the deal before it could close, maybe because Goldman and Santander worried that regulators might find this new kind of transaction hard to swallow.

据称，高盛必须将桑坦德银行的交易通知美联储，并获得“不反对”的答复。换句话说，看起来高盛需要让美联储正式签署该交易才能完成，也许是因为高盛和桑坦德银行担心监管机构可能会发现这种新型交易难以接受。

But now the two banks had closed the deal.

但现在两家银行已经完成了交易。

Did Goldman satisfy that part of the contract?

高盛履行了合同的这一部分吗？

Here's what Mike Silva had to say about it.

以下是迈克·席尔瓦对此的看法。

The one thing I know as a lawyer that they never got from me was a no objection.

作为一名律师，我知道他们从未从我这里得到的一件事就是不反对。

Oh, OK.

哦，好吧。

So you literally have to say, I do not object?

所以你实际上必须说，我不反对？

Yeah, I have to-- giving them some sort of--

是的，我必须——给他们某种——

And by not reponding-- Woman 2 And to Carmen's point--

不回应——女人2 对于卡门的观点——

The fact that Goldman didn't get the approval from the Fed didn't endanger the financial system or Goldman itself.

高盛没有获得美联储批准的事实并没有危及金融体系或高盛本身。

It's a small thing.

这是一件小事。

But later, if the deal ever went bad, it would look like the Fed had approved it.

但后来，如果这笔交易出现问题，看起来美联储就会批准它。

It's right there in the paperwork.

它就在文书工作中。

They could get dragged into the mess.

他们可能会被拖入混乱之中。

The Fed team called a big meeting with Goldman executives to question them about the Santander deal.

美联储团队与高盛高管召开了一次大型会议，向他们询问桑坦德银行交易的情况。

Before they went in, they held a prep session, and Silva told Carmen and the team this was one of the things he wanted to ask Goldman about.

在他们进去之前，他们举行了一次准备会议，席尔瓦告诉卡门和团队，这是他想询问高盛的事情之一。

I never gave you a no objection.

我从来没有给过你不反对的意见。

What happened?

发生了什么？

So that'll be interesting.

所以这会很有趣。

He was excited about it, and he was the one who wanted to ask that particular question.

他对此感到很兴奋，而且他就是那个想问这个特定问题的人。

He sort of said, can I be the one who asks it?

他好像在说，我可以是那个问这个问题的人吗？

And I said, sure.

我说，当然。

So Mike Silva was rallying his team.

因此，迈克·席尔瓦正在召集他的团队。

Goldman had embarked on this new kind of deal, and there was a lot of interest in it from different parts of the Fed, he said.

他表示，高盛已经开始实施这种新的交易，美联储的不同部门对此都表现出了浓厚的兴趣。

They needed to understand it better, and he wanted Goldman to know that the Fed was paying close attention.

他们需要更好地理解这一点，他希望高盛知道美联储正在密切关注。

My own personal thinking right now is that we're looking at a transaction that's legal, but shady.

我个人现在的想法是，我们正在考虑一项合法但不正当的交易​​。

I want to put a big shot across their bow on that.

我想在这一点上对他们进行重击。

Poking at it, maybe we find something even shadier than we already know.

探究它，也许我们会发现一些比我们已知的更阴暗的东西。

So let's poke at this thing.

那么让我们来看看这个东西。

Let's poke at it with our usual poker faces.

让我们用平常的扑克脸来探讨一下吧。

I'd like these guys to come away from this meeting confused as to what we think about it.

我希望这些人在结束这次会议时对我们的想法感到困惑。

I want to keep them nervous.

我想让他们保持紧张。

Does that make sense?

这有道理吗？

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah, it does.

是的，确实如此。

Jake Bernstein People are amped.

杰克·伯恩斯坦 人们兴奋不已。

They're excited about this.

他们对此感到兴奋。

Yeah, his team was definitely excited.

是的，他的团队肯定很兴奋。

They thought, oh, we're definitely going to do something here.

他们想，哦，我们肯定会在这里做点什么。

It felt like this was-- this was action for them, you know?

感觉这就是——这就是他们的行动，你知道吗？

Let's regulate.

我们来调节吧。

Carmen Segarra Yeah, let's regulate.

Carmen Segarra 是的，让我们规范一下。

This is fun.

这很有趣。

Carmen Segarra Yeah, well I think that he's going to have a lot of fun--

卡门·塞加拉（Carmen Segarra）是的，我想他会玩得很开心——

This is what Carmen and her colleagues said to each other as they marched over to the conference room where the Goldman executives awaited them.

这是卡门和她的同事在走向高盛高管等待他们的会议室时互相说道的。

They dialed up more people on the phone.

他们拨通了更多人的电话。

And the meeting began.

会议开始了。

And this, this is something we never get to hear-- Federal Reserve examiners going mano a mano with a bank.

这是我们从来没有听到过的事情——美联储审查员与银行进行对峙。

Goldman executives kicked it off with a summary about the Santander deal, and the examiners started asking questions, some of them specific and technical, others quite broad, touching on the big issue Mike Silva had raised about whether banks should be doing deals like this at all.

高盛高管首先对桑坦德银行交易进行了总结，审查员开始提出问题，其中一些是具体的和技术性的，另一些则相当广泛，涉及迈克·席尔瓦提出的关于银行是否应该进行此类交易的重大问题。

30 minutes went by.

30分钟过去了。

And were there any similar transactions?

还有类似的交易吗？

45 minutes.

45分钟。

Man What risks do you see to Goldman?

男士，您认为高盛面临哪些风险？

And still, Mike Silva had not hit Goldman with a question he'd been so eager to ask about the requirement that Goldman was supposed to get the Fed to OK the deal before it went through.

尽管如此，迈克·席尔瓦并没有向高盛提出一个他一直急于询问的问题，即高盛应该在交易通过之前让美联储批准该交易。

In their presentation, Goldman executives had briefly brought it up on their own.

在他们的演讲中，高盛高管自己简短地提出了这个问题。

They claimed the clause didn't actually require them to get Fed approval.

他们声称该条款实际上并不要求他们获得美联储的批准。

It just seemed that way.

看起来就是这样。

Silva wasn't satisfied.

席尔瓦并不满意。

Finally, after more than an hour, he went for it.

一个多小时后，他终于如愿以偿了。

It's the only time in the whole meeting he brings it up.

这是整个会议中他唯一一次提起这件事。

We play it now not because this is an important piece of financial policy, but to give you a chance to hear what it sounds like, at least on this one day, when the top Fed official on site at Goldman Sachs questions Goldman Sachs.

我们现在播放它并不是因为这是一项重要的金融政策，而是为了让您有机会听到它听起来是什么样的，至少在这一天，当高盛现场的美联储高级官员向高盛提问时。

Just to button up one point.

只是为了扣上一分。

I know the term sheet called for a notice to your regulator.

我知道条款清单要求向监管机构发出通知。

The original term sheet also called for expression of non-objection.

最初的投资意向书还要求表达不反对意见。

Sounds like that dropped out at some point, or?

听起来好像在某个时候就退出了，或者？

That's everything he says on the topic in this meeting.

这就是他在这次会议上就该主题所说的一切。

Here it is again.

又来了。

Sounds like that dropped out at some point, or?

听起来好像在某个时候就被淘汰了，或者？

That's it?

就是这样？

That's him poking Goldman on this?

那是他在拿这件事来刺激高盛？

Yeah.

是的。

That's what-- you know, that's what passes for poking.

这就是——你知道，这就是所谓的“戳”。

That's what passes for poking at the Fed.

这就是所谓的对美联储的攻击。

I mean, I can't imagine that making them very nervous.

我的意思是，我无法想象这会让他们感到非常紧张。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

It's just not the way that I would have asked it.

这不是我问的方式。

In that moment, Carmen says, she saw clearly that when some of her colleagues talked about holding Goldman to account, they meant something very different than what she thought it should mean.

卡门说，在那一刻，她清楚地看到，当她的一些同事谈论追究高盛的责任时，他们的意思与她认为的含义截然不同。

You acknowledge that these are facts, you know?

你承认这些都是事实，知道吗？

Fact, this was required.

事实上，这是必需的。

Fact, I didn't give it.

事实上，我没有给。

And then you ask, what are the consequences?

然后你问，后果是什么？

After the meeting, the Fed team went back to their floor, and Mike Silva called a de-brief.

会议结束后，美联储团队回到自己的楼层，迈克·席尔瓦召开了汇报会。

Why don't we just have a quick pow-wow right here?

我们为什么不在这里快速进行一次哇？

This was just the regulators, nobody from Goldman, so they could be frank.

这只是监管机构，而不是高盛的人，所以他们可以坦率地说。

So Carmen was puzzled when one of her colleagues said how impressed he was with Goldman.

因此，当卡门的一位同事说他对高盛印象深刻时，她感到很困惑。

I would just say that from a process perspective, I think there's a lot to be said for the thoroughness of the process that they engaged in.

我只想说，从流程的角度来看，我认为他们所从事的流程的彻底性有很多值得说的。

This surprised Carmen because it seemed premature.

这让卡门感到惊讶，因为这似乎为时过早。

They were only at the beginning of their fact finding.

他们的事实调查才刚刚开始。

They'd requested documents and minutes of meetings that Goldman still had to give them.

他们要求高盛提供文件和会议记录。

They were federal regulators.

他们是联邦监管者。

Their job was to ask questions and demand answers.

他们的工作是提出问题并要求答案。

And yet, these colleagues sounded almost apologetic about it.

然而，这些同事听起来几乎对此表示歉意。

I would add to his comments in that I think we don't want to discourage Goldman from disclosing these types of things in the future.

我想补充一下他的评论，我认为我们不想阻止高盛将来披露此类事情。

And therefore, maybe some comment that says, don't mistake our inquisitiveness and our desire to understand more about the marketplace in general as a criticism of you as a firm, necessarily.

因此，也许有些评论说，不要将我们的好奇心和我们想要更多地了解整个市场的愿望误认为是对你们公司的批评，这是必然的。

Like--

就像——

Well I've been very clear with them on that.

嗯，我已经和他们说得很清楚了。

I don't want to hit them on the bat with a head and then they're going to say, screw it.

我不想用头打他们的球棒，然后他们就会说，管它呢。

We're doing this again.

我们又这样做了。

We're not going to disclose it again.

我们不会再透露它。

We don't need to.

我们不需要。

Wait a second.

等一下。

You guys are the Federal Reserve.

你们是美联储。

Doesn't Goldman have to give you what you ask for?

难道高盛不需要满足你的要求吗？

Absolutely.

绝对地。

Jake Bernstein So where is he coming from?

杰克·伯恩斯坦 那么他来自哪里？

A place of fear.

一个充满恐惧的地方。

Jake Bernstein Fear of ticking off Goldman, though Carmen couldn't imagine why anyone at the Fed would be afraid.

杰克·伯恩斯坦 (Jake Bernstein) 担心得罪高盛，但卡门无法想象为什么美联储有人会害怕。

The Fed has both the power to get the information and the ability to punish the bank if it chooses to withhold it.

美联储既有权力获取信息，也有能力惩罚银行（如果银行选择扣留信息）。

And some of these powers involve criminal action, so there's no reason to be afraid.

其中一些权力涉及刑事诉讼，因此没有理由害怕。

Did you get the sense that other people around you were taken aback by that comment at the time, or did that seem like not such a strange comment for someone to make?

你是否感觉到你周围的其他人当时对这个评论感到惊讶，或者对于某人来说这似乎并不是一个奇怪的评论？

No, I think business line specialists were very much in agreement with that comment.

不，我认为业务线专家非常同意这一评论。

Don't mistake our inquisitiveness and our desire to understand more about the marketplace in general as a criticism of you as a firm, necessarily.

不要将我们的好奇心和更多地了解整个市场的愿望误认为是对你们公司的批评。

I mean, they were all sort of afraid of Goldman and I think they were a little bit confused as to who they were working for.

我的意思是，他们都有点害怕高盛，而且我认为他们对于自己为谁工作有点困惑。

What I was sort of seeing and experiencing was this level of deference to the banks, this level of fear, and just not really showing a lot of interest in putting two and two together.

我所看到和经历的是对银行的这种程度的尊重，这种程度的恐惧，并且没有真正表现出对将两个和两个放在一起的很大兴趣。

It's not like we would walk out of a meeting and they would be like, oh my god, when they said that, what did that mean?

这不像我们离开会议时他们会说，天哪，当他们这么说时，这是什么意思？

Let's go research it.

我们去研究一下吧。

It was like, oh well, next meeting.

就像，哦，好吧，下次会议。

I mean, the obvious question from what you're describing is, is that regulatory capture?

我的意思是，从你所描述的内容中显而易见的问题是，这是监管捕获吗？

You know, if that isn't, I don't know what is.

你知道，如果那不是，我不知道什么是。

Regulatory capture-- again, it's when a regulator gets too cozy with the banks they're regulating.

监管捕获——同样，当监管者与他们所监管的银行过于融洽时。

It was one of the problems David Beim spotted at the New York Fed in 2009 when he wrote his secret report for them about what the Fed needed to fix after the financial crisis.

这是大卫·贝姆 (David Beim) 2009 年在纽约联储发现的问题之一，当时他为纽约联储撰写了关于美联储在金融危机后需要解决的问题的秘密报告。

Remember that report from the beginning of the show?

还记得节目一开始的报道吗？

Beim found that one of the causes of regulatory capture at the Fed was simple.

贝姆发现美联储监管捕获的原因之一很简单。

Examiners see bank employees every day at work.

审查员每天都会看到银行员工的工作情况。

It's just human nature to try to get along with them.

尝试与他们相处只是人类的本性。

And many examiners feel that the easiest way to get information is by cultivating a friendly relationship, being non-confrontational.

许多审查员认为，获取信息最简单的方法是培养友好的关系，避免对抗。

Beim says it's tricky walking the line between being friendly and being captured.

贝姆说，在友好和被俘之间徘徊是很棘手的。

I spoke with one former Fed examiner who said he and his coworkers used to joke about one of their Fed colleagues deserving an employee of the month award-- not from the Fed, but from the bank they regulated.

我与一位前美联储审查员交谈，他说他和他的同事曾经开玩笑说他们的一位美联储同事应该获​​得本月最佳雇员奖——不是来自美联储，而是来自他们监管的银行。

And employees at the Fed do go to work for banks.

美联储的员工确实去银行工作。

A quick internet search reveals at least seven former Fed bank examiners who now work at Goldman.

快速的互联网搜索显示，至少有七名前美联储银行审查员现在在高盛工作。

They include the colleague who, according to Carmen, asked her to change her meeting notes.

据卡门说，其中包括要求她更改会议记录的同事。

As Beim and his team spoke to Fed employees about what went wrong leading up to the financial crisis, one problem in particular arose again and again, and that problem was the Fed's culture.

当贝姆和他的团队与美联储员工谈论导致金融危机的问题时，一个问题特别反复出现，这个问题就是美联储的文化。

That's the epiphany of Beim's report.

这就是贝姆报告的顿悟。

It was that basic, culture.

这就是基本的文化。

He was surprised.

他很惊讶。

Yeah, I was.

是的，我是。

I was interested that what started out looking like a financial discussion was going to turn into a cultural discussion, what the culture expected of people, and what the culture induced people to do.

我感兴趣的是，一开始看起来像是金融讨论的事情将变成文化讨论，文化对人们的期望是什么，以及文化引导人们做什么。

For instance, there was a kind of fear Beim writes about in his report.

例如，贝姆在他的报告中提到了一种恐惧。

Not fear of the banks, like Carmen was just talking about, but fear inside the Fed itself.

不是对银行的恐惧，就像卡门刚才所说的那样，而是对美联储本身的恐惧。

Fed employees told Beim's team they were afraid of contradicting their bosses, afraid of saying what they really thought, afraid of having views that were too different from what everyone else had.

美联储员工告诉贝姆的团队，他们害怕与老板相矛盾，害怕说出自己的真实想法，害怕持有与其他人截然不同的观点。

Beim lists these fears in his report.

贝姆在他的报告中列出了这些担忧。

So I could just read the fear of speaking up list of quotations.

所以我只能读到对说出引文列表的恐惧。

And it goes like this-- don't want to be too far outside from where management is thinking.

事情是这样的——不想脱离管理层的思考太远。

The organization does not encourage thinking outside the box.

该组织不鼓励跳出框框思考。

After you get shot down a couple of times, you tend not to go there anymore.

当你被击落几次后，你就不会再去那里了。

Until I know what my boss thinks, I don't want to tell you.

在我知道老板的想法之前，我不想告诉你。

According to Beim's report, this culture of fear paralyzed the Fed in the years leading up to the financial crisis and prevented it from taking action.

根据贝姆的报告，这种恐惧文化在金融危机爆发前的几年里使美联储陷入瘫痪，并阻止其采取行动。

It's not that the Fed regulators didn't notice the problems accumulating in the financial system that eventually brought it down.

美联储监管机构并不是没有注意到金融体系中积累的问题最终导致其崩溃。

They were aware of those problems coming.

他们意识到这些问题即将到来。

There were lengthy presentations on subjects like that within the organization.

组织内部有关于此类主题的长篇演讲。

It's just that none of those meetings ever ended with anyone saying, and therefore, let's take the following steps right now.

只是这些会议都没有以任何人的发言结束，因此，让我们现在采取以下步骤。

I mean they're just-- there are meetings without a clear agenda.

我的意思是他们只是——有些会议没有明确的议程。

There are meetings without clear objectives.

有些会议没有明确的目标。

Carmen was used to the private sector, where she says meetings ended with specific action items.

卡门习惯了私营部门，她说会议以具体的行动项目结束。

People knew what they were supposed to do.

人们知道他们应该做什么。

None of that happens at the Fed.

这些在美联储都不会发生。

It's like the information is discussed, and then it just ends up in a vacuum, floating on air, not acted upon.

就好像信息被讨论过，然后它就只是在真空中结束，漂浮在空气中，而不是被采取行动。

And the mere act of having this meeting, for them, is almost like akin to having done something about it.

对于他们来说，召开这次会议的行为几乎就像是为此做了一些事情。

Take the issue in the Santander deal that was most important to Mike Silva, the question of whether Goldman should be doing these new kinds of deals, deals whose whole purpose was to make foreign banks look better to their regulators.

以对迈克·席尔瓦来说最重要的桑坦德银行交易中的问题为例，即高盛是否应该进行这些新型交易的问题，这些交易的全部目的是让外国银行在监管机构面前看起来更好。

As months passed, you could hear on Carmen's recordings the team debating what to do about it, what action they should take.

几个月过去了，你可以在卡门的录音中听到团队讨论如何应对、应该采取什么行动。

As best as we can tell, the most forceful action they consider is a letter to Goldman, and not even a stern letter, necessarily.

据我们所知，他们认为最有力的行动是给高盛的一封信，甚至不一定是一封严厉的信。

The simple fact of a letter, one guy says, will send the message they need.

一个人说，一封信的简单事实就能传达他们需要的信息。

The only downside risk is that they choose to ignore us.

唯一的负面风险是他们选择忽视我们。

We're not obligating them to do anything, necessarily.

我们不一定要求他们做任何事情。

He says Goldman generally takes these letters seriously, but banks do ignore them sometimes.

他表示，高盛通常会认真对待这些信件，但银行有时会忽略它们。

We don't know if the Fed ever sent the letter, but even if they never did, Mike Silva said they'd already accomplished something important.

我们不知道美联储是否曾发出过这封信，但即使他们从未发出过，迈克·席尔瓦表示他们已经完成了一些重要的事情。

They'd brought up the deal in conversations with Goldman and held that meeting you heard.

他们在与高盛的谈话中提到了这笔交易，并召开了你听到的那次会议。

At minimum, we made them think.

至少，我们让他们思考。

I guarantee they'll think twice about the next one because by putting them through their paces and having that large Fed crowd come in, and you know, we fussed at them pretty good.

我保证他们会对下一个政策三思而后行，因为通过让他们完成他们的步伐并让大批美联储群众进来，你知道，我们对他们非常大惊小怪。

In case you didn't hear that, Silva said, "I guarantee they'll think twice about the next one.

如果你没有听到的话，席尔瓦说：“我保证他们会在下一场比赛中三思而后行。

We fussed at them pretty good."

我们对他们非常大惊小怪。”

Jake Bernstein from ProPublica.

ProPublica 的杰克·伯恩斯坦。

Coming up, everything you're hearing, we ran all this by the Fed.

接下来，你所听到的一切，都是我们由美联储主导的。

Their response when our program continues.

当我们的计划继续进行时，他们的反应。

It's This American Life.

这就是美国生活。

I'm Ira Glass.

我是艾拉·格拉斯。

Today on our program, we're hearing never before heard recordings made secretly by a bank examiner named Carmen Segarra at the New York Fed.

今天，在我们的节目中，我们听到了纽约联邦储备银行一位名叫卡门·塞加拉 (Carmen Segarra) 的银行审查员秘密录制的前所未有的录音。

They give an unprecedented look inside is very secretive, very powerful, very important financial regulator.

他们给人前所未有的印象，里面是非常隐秘、非常强大、非常重要的金融监管机构。

A note, we have done the normal kinds of editing to these recordings for pacing and clarity that we do to any recordings on our program.

请注意，我们对这些录音进行了正常的编辑，以保证节奏和清晰度，就像我们对节目中的任何录音所做的那样。

Again, here's investigative reporter Jake Bernstein.

调查记者杰克·伯恩斯坦再次报道。

We first approached the New York Fed to request an interview in July.

我们于 7 月份首次联系纽约联储，请求接受采访。

They declined.

他们拒绝了。

We then told him we had Carmen's secret recordings and invited them to comment on the sections we're using here on the radio.

然后我们告诉他我们有卡门的秘密录音，并邀请他们对我们在广播中使用的部分发表评论。

They declined to comment, but two Fed officials came to This American Life's office to listen and take notes.

他们拒绝发表评论，但两名美联储官员来到 This American Life 的办公室聆听并做笔记。

We sent them 13 pages of questions.

我们向他们发送了 13 页的问题。

They sent us a two page statement.

他们给我们发了一份两页的声明。

It begins, "the New York Fed categorically rejects the allegations being made about the integrity of its supervision of financial institutions."

文章开头写道，“纽约联储断然拒绝对其金融机构监管诚信的指控。”

Unlike the Beim report, their statement acknowledges no problems at the Fed.

与贝姆报告不同的是，他们的声明承认美联储不存在任何问题。

They say that in 2011, they began implementing some of Beim's recommendations, and they list a few.

他们说，2011 年，他们开始实施 Beim 的一些建议，并列出了一些建议。

But that list doesn't include any of the recommendations Beim made about the central problem he saw, the problem of the Fed's culture-- the fear of speaking up and the deference to the banks.

但这份清单并不包括贝姆针对他所看到的核心问题提出的任何建议，即美联储的文化问题——害怕发声和尊重银行。

We asked many questions about this.

对此我们提出了很多问题。

The Fed didn't respond to those directly, but did say in its statement, quote, "examiners are encouraged to speak up and escalate any concerns they may have regarding the New York Fed or the institutions that we supervise."

美联储没有直接回应这些问题，但在其声明中表示，“鼓励审查员大声说出并升级他们对纽约联储或我们监管的机构的任何担忧。”

They point out that the Fed has lots of ways, quote, "to help ensure that its employees freely express their views and concerns, including the Ethics Office, employee hotline, and internal ombudsman." We asked questions about regulatory capture.

他们指出，美联储有很多方法“帮助确保员工自由表达自己的观点和担忧，包括道德办公室、员工热线和内部监察员”。我们询问了有关监管捕获的问题。

Again, the Fed didn't respond directly, but said they ensured examiner independence by regularly rotating people from bank to bank.

美联储再次没有直接回应，但表示他们通过定期轮换人员来确保审查员的独立性。

David Beim writes in his report that when it comes to hiring bank examiners, the Fed, quote, "should be willing to take chances on individuals with the confidence to speak their convictions, even at the risk of getting somewhat disruptive personalities." Beim says they should be like the kid who cries out that the emperor has no clothes.

大卫·贝姆（David Beim）在报告中写道，在聘用银行审查员时，美联储“应该愿意在那些有信心说出自己信念的人身上冒险，即使冒着可能会出现一些破坏性人物的风险。”贝姆说他们应该像那个哭着说皇帝没穿衣服的孩子一样。

He's the only one who dares say it because he doesn't have ordinary social instincts.

他是唯一敢这么说的人，因为他没有普通的社交本能。

He doesn't act politely.

他行事不礼貌。

And somebody he like that-- or a number of people like that-- have to be employed by organizations that want to be able to catch a big systemic problem brewing.

他喜欢的人——或者很多这样的人——必须受雇于那些希望能够发现正在酝酿的重大系统性问题的组织。

They're willing to say what they think is right, even if people don't like them as a result.

他们愿意说出自己认为正确的话，即使结果人们不喜欢他们。

They don't care.

他们不在乎。

Apparently, Carmen's style of examining did make her a disruptive personality to some Fed employees.

显然，卡门的审查风格确实使她成为一些美联储员工的破坏性人格。

You can hear her in the recordings, when she feels she has the facts, speaking critically of Goldman.

当她觉得自己掌握了事实时，你可以在录音中听到她对高盛的批评。

I feel bad, but having worked on the international regulatory setup at more than one bank in my life, I can really tell you that in comparison to their peers, they are behind.

我感觉很糟糕，但我一生中曾在不止一家银行从事过国际监管机构的工作，我真的可以告诉你，与同行相比，他们落后了。

And it's not by a little.

而且还不是一点点。

It's by a lot.

已经很多了。

And it's a real problem and it's really obvious.

这是一个真正的问题，而且非常明显。

Carmen was also vocal with her bosses and coworkers about the shortcomings she saw in the Fed's management.

卡门还向她的老板和同事直言不讳地讲述了她在美联储管理中看到的缺点。

She complained that managers were not settling disputes between the new wave of experts like Carmen and other examiners.

她抱怨说，管理人员没有解决像卡门这样的新一波专家和其他审查员之间的争端。

Again and again in the tapes, Carmen asks her managers to intervene.

在录音中，卡门一次又一次要求她的经理进行干预。

I think that management needs to do a better job of managing those people.

我认为管理层需要更好地管理这些人。

But not much changed.

但变化不大。

And then, on a Tuesday in late February, Carmen went in for her weekly meeting with her supervisor, Jonathan Kim.

然后，在二月底的一个星期二，卡门参加了与她的主管乔纳森·金 (Jonathan Kim) 的每周例会。

For a while, it was like any other meeting.

有一段时间，这就像任何其他会议一样。

They talked about examinations and things like that.

他们谈论了考试之类的事情。

But then about an hour into the conversation, Kim surprised Carmen by switching the subject to her job performance.

但谈话进行了大约一个小时后，金将话题转向了她的工作表现，这让卡门感到惊讶。

I want to manage your sort of career and expectations, right?

我想管理你的职业和期望，对吗？

I want you to be successful.

我希望你成功。

There's information that's coming in.

有信息传来。

There's opinions that are coming in.

有意见正在进来。

Kim tells her she does a good job of looking at issues, identifying problems, figuring out what to do next, in short, the duties of a bank examiner.

金告诉她，她在观察问题、发现问题、弄清楚下一步该做什么方面做得很好，简而言之，就是银行审查员的职责。

But then he goes on.

但他接着说下去。

I'm never questioning about sort of the knowledge base or the assessments or those things, right?

我从不质疑某种知识库或评估或那些事情，对吗？

It's really about how you are perceived, right?

这实际上与你如何被看待有关，对吧？

And so if there's more of a general sort of feedback that says, OK, it's not only one person, it's not only two persons who are perceiving that you're-- you have more sharper elbows or that you're sort of breaking eggs.

因此，如果有更多的一般性反馈说，好吧，不仅仅是一个人，也不仅仅是两个人认为你——你的肘部更锋利，或者你有点打破鸡蛋。

And obviously, I don't know what the right word is.

显然，我不知道正确的词是什么。

Kim wouldn't tell Carmen who the complaints came from, but she assumed it was the old guard, the business line specialists.

金不会告诉卡门这些投诉来自谁，但她认为是保守派，即业务线专家。

Kim told Carmen she needed to approach things differently.

金告诉卡门，她需要以不同的方式处理事情。

She needed to be more-- to use Kim's word-- relational.

用金的话来说，她需要更多的关系。

And I think the messages come back to me saying that you really need to make these changes quickly in order for you to be successful--

我认为我收到的信息是，你确实需要迅速做出这些改变，才能取得成功——

Not fired?

没有被解雇？

Jonathan Kim --successful as part of the team.

乔纳森·金（Jonathan Kim）——作为团队的一员取得了成功。

Not fired, basically?

基本上没有被解雇？

Jonathan Kim Well, I don't even want to get there because-- and here's why.

乔纳森·金（Jonathan Kim）：好吧，我什至不想去那里，因为——原因如下。

Well, I think that it would be unfair to fire me when I am, at the end of the day, doing a good job.

好吧，我认为当我最终表现出色时解雇我是不公平的。

Look, I'm here to change sort of that definition of what a good job is, right?

听着，我来这里是为了改变什么是好工作的定义，对吗？

Couple of things--

有几件事——

I can see it a mile away.

我在一英里外就能看到它。

Jonathan Kim Couple of things that I would suggest, have a sense of humility, because a lot of the things that you say-- and this is the way you're coming across, I think I know you well enough that that's not what you're saying, right?

乔纳森·金（Jonathan Kim）：我建议您保持谦虚的态度，因为您所说的很多事情 - 这就是您遇到的方式，我想我足够了解您，这不是您所说的，对吗？

But if I were to be a new person, I would say, Carmen, you're very arrogant.

但如果我是一个新人，我会说，卡门，你太傲慢了。

We asked Carmen how much of this she thought might have to do with her being a woman and a minority, and she says it's hard to say how much of a factor it was.

我们问卡门，她认为这与她作为女性和少数族裔的身份有多大关系，她说很难说这有多大影响。

She says it's impossible for her to know if things would have played out differently if she were a guy.

她说她不可能知道如果她是一个男人，事情的发展是否会有所不同。

We reached out to Jonathan Kim, but he didn't respond, so we couldn't talk to him about this meeting.

我们联系了 Jonathan Kim，但他没有回复，因此我们无法与他谈论这次会议。

But we did listen to 46 hours of recordings of Carmen at her job, which Carmen says is everything she ever recorded.

但我们确实在工作时听了卡门 46 小时的录音，卡门说这是她录制的所有录音。

It's a grab bag of different kinds of meetings.

这是不同类型会议的集合。

And there are key meetings that, for one reason or another, she says she didn't record.

有些重要会议，出于某种原因，她说她没有记录。

Carmen pre-approved the selections we're using in this story, though there was nothing we wanted to use that she said we couldn't.

卡门预先批准了我们在这个故事中使用的选择，尽管没有什么是我们想要使用但她说我们不能使用的。

Listening to Carmen's recordings, you can sometimes hear her do the things that Jonathan Kim is talking about.

听卡门的录音，有时你可以听到她做乔纳森·金正在谈论的事情。

He talks about sharper elbows, breaking eggs.

他谈到了更锋利的肘部、打破鸡蛋。

There are times when Carmen cuts people off, including her bosses, times when she sounds riled up or brusque.

有时，卡门会打断别人的谈话，包括她的老板，有时她的声音听起来很愤怒或粗鲁。

It's clear that the friction she's running into from other Fed employees is real.

显然，她遇到的来自其他美联储员工的摩擦是真实存在的。

Her managers acknowledge it.

她的经理们也承认这一点。

And there's a recording of Fed experts like her who work inside other banks where they gripe about facing the same pushback.

还有一段录音，记录了像她这样在其他银行工作的美联储专家，他们抱怨面临同样的阻力。

But Carmen's the kind of person who doesn't let it slide.

但卡门是那种不会让它溜走的人。

She complains about her colleagues a lot, though she's never unprofessional.

她经常抱怨她的同事，但她从来都不是不专业的。

One of Carmen's colleagues while she was at the Fed told me Carmen did ask direct questions, sometimes embarrassingly direct.

卡门在美联储任职期间的一位同事告诉我，卡门确实会直接提出问题，有时直接得令人尴尬。

But this person said they were all questions that needed to be asked and that Carmen was, quote, "a breath of fresh air." I also spoke to three people who worked with Carmen at jobs she'd had before the Fed, and none of them remembered Carmen behaving unprofessionally, disrespectfully, or arrogantly.

但此人表示，这些都是需要提出的问题，卡门是“一股新鲜空气”。我还采访了卡门在美联储任职期间与她共事的三个人，他们都不记得卡门的行为不专业、不尊重或傲慢。

Before we go back to this meeting with Jonathan Kim, I just want to read you something.

在我们回到与乔纳森·金的会面之前，我想读一些东西给你们。

This is from David Beim's report from page 22.

这是来自 David Beim 第 22 页的报告。

He writes that the only way bank regulators can be effective at spotting the next financial crisis is if the Fed's culture, quote, "opens up and encourages people to speak up more." According to Beim, this all depends on managers.

他写道，银行监管机构要想有效地发现下一次金融危机，唯一的办法就是美联储的文化“开放并鼓励人们更多地发声”。贝姆认为，这一切都取决于管理者。

Quote, "They need to encourage dissent rather than stifle it." Quote, "This is a cultural issue of the greatest importance," end quote.

引用：“他们需要鼓励异议，而不是压制它。”引用，“这是一个最重要的文化问题，”引用结束。

And yet, more than 2 and 1/2 years after David Beim personally handed these prescriptions to the president of the New York Fed, in this meeting with Carmen Segarra, Jonathan Kim said this.

然而，在大卫·贝姆 (David Beim) 亲自将这些处方交给纽约联储行长 2 又 1/2 年后，在与卡门·塞加拉 (Carmen Segarra) 的这次会面中，乔纳森·金 (Jonathan Kim) 说了这番话。

So what I would ask you to think about a little bit more is nothing so conclusory.

所以我想请你多思考一下，这并不是什么结论性的事情。

Like this is it.

就这样吧。

They're definitely going in that direction, right?

他们肯定会朝那个方向发展，对吗？

And you use the word definitely a lot too.

而且你也确实经常使用这个词。

It's like if you use that, then you want to have a consensus view of definitely, not only your view.

就好像如果你使用它，那么你肯定想要达成共识，而不仅仅是你的观点。

There are a handful of behaviors that Beim singles out as being particularly destructive to the Fed's mission, and one is consensus.

贝姆指出了一些对美联储使命特别具有破坏性的行为，其中之一就是共识。

On page nine, he notes that consensus is usually a healthy goal that leads to better decisions.

在第九页，他指出共识通常是一个健康的目标，可以带来更好的决策。

But then he goes on, quote, "achieving consensus has costs.

但他接着说道，“达成共识是有代价的。

One is delay.

一是拖延。

Ideas get vetted to death.

想法会被彻底审查。

Consensus leadership is seen by some as a way to deflect accountability.

一些人认为共识领导是转移责任的一种方式。

Building consensus can result in a whittling down of issues or a smoothing of exam findings so that only the most black and white issues will be taken forward as concerns with the bank.

建立共识可以减少问题或平滑检查结果，以便只有最黑白分明的问题才会被银行关注。

Compromise often results in less forceful language and demands on the banks involved." Again, that was 2009.

妥协通常会导致对相关银行的语言和要求减弱。”再说一遍，那是2009年。

Here's Jonathan Kim in 2012.

这是 2012 年的乔纳森·金 (Jonathan Kim)。

So a lot of it is consensus building, right?

所以很多都是在建立共识，对吧？

Hey, you know, what do you think?

嘿，你知道吗，你觉得怎么样？

Oh, OK.

哦，好吧。

That's a good thought.

这是个好主意。

It's a possibility, right?

这是有可能的，对吧？

At this point, Carmen had been at the Fed less than four months-- four months since she had walked through the doors of the country's most powerful financial regulator, excited to join an institution dedicated to safeguarding the financial system.

此时，卡门在美联储任职还不到四个月——四个月前，她走进了这个国家最强大的金融监管机构的大门，很高兴能加入一个致力于维护金融体系的机构。

It was not working out like she'd hoped.

事情并没有像她希望的那样进行。

And what was jarring to Carmen was the Fed had the authority it needed to be a good regulator, but it chose not to exercise that authority.

让卡门感到不安的是，美联储拥有成为良好监管者所需的权力，但它选择不行使这一权力。

I mean, it's almost like a giant afraid of its own power.

我的意思是，它几乎就像一个害怕自己力量的巨人。

She doesn't think the Fed should transform itself into a domineering schoolmarm for the financial system, badgering the banks over every little infraction.

她认为美联储不应该把自己变成金融体系中专横的女校长，对银行的每一个小违规行为都纠缠不休。

I think it would have been just as scary if I had gone in there and found an aggressive Fed that was really mean and sort of trying to nit pick.

我想，如果我走进去，发现一个咄咄逼人、非常刻薄、有点挑剔的美联储，那也会同样可怕。

I think that all that power sort of being abused, that's a very scary thing.

我认为所有这些权力都被滥用，这是一件非常可怕的事情。

But when you find the opposite, the absence of exercise of power, the absence of the exercise of responsibility, then you are just like, this is a problem because you've been made the overarching regulator and the country is looking to you to make things better after the crisis.

但当你发现相反的情况时，没有行使权力，没有履行责任，那么你就会想，这是一个问题，因为你已经成为总体监管者，国家希望你在危机后让事情变得更好。

And if you can't do it, then we need to talk about who can.

如果你做不到，那么我们需要讨论谁可以。

Carmen's reluctance to obediently join the consensus at the Fed led to a showdown between her and her bosses.

卡门不愿顺从地加入美联储的共识，导致了她和老板之间的摊牌。

The issue was an aspect of Goldman Sachs's business that had earned it lots of scorn, conflicts of interest.

这个问题是高盛业务的一个方面，它为它赢得了很多蔑视和利益冲突。

There were fireworks on display in Delaware Chancery Court.

特拉华州衡平法院举行烟花表演。

This is a Bloomberg report from March 2012.

这是彭博社 2012 年 3 月的报道。

--when Judge Leo Strine rebuked investment banking firm Goldman Sachs for the way it handled a potential conflict of interest in advising natural gas pipeline operator El Paso.

——利奥·斯特林法官斥责投资银行公司高盛在为天然气管道运营商埃尔帕索提供咨询时处理潜在利益冲突的方式。

The entire episode has led to a re-evaluation of how investment banking firms should handle conflicts of interest.

整个事件导致人们重新评估投资银行公司应如何处理利益冲突。

This is one of several deals around the time when Carmen was at the Fed that put Goldman in the news for having conflicts of interest.

这是卡门在美联储任职期间使高盛因存在利益冲突而成为新闻焦点的几笔交易之一。

In this deal, Goldman was getting paid to advise one company, an energy firm called El Paso, as El Paso was being purchased by another company, Kinder Morgan.

在这笔交易中，高盛获得报酬，为一家名为埃尔帕索的能源公司提供咨询服务，而埃尔帕索正被另一家公司金德摩根收购。

The conflict was this.

冲突是这样的。

Goldman owned a large stake in Kinder Morgan.

高盛拥有金德摩根的大量股份。

Some shareholders are extremely angry that Goldman stands basically on both sides of this transaction.

一些股东对高盛在此次交易中基本上站在双方立场感到极为愤怒。

They're up for a $20 million fee for advising El Paso, and at the same time, the firm has a $4 billion stake in purchaser Kinder Morgan.

他们准备支付 2000 万美元的埃尔帕索咨询费，同时该公司还拥有买家 Kinder Morgan 价值 40 亿美元的股份。

Just to clarify, Kinder Morgan wanted to buy El Paso as cheaply as possible.

需要澄清的是，金德摩根希望以尽可能便宜的价格收购埃尔帕索。

This would make tons of money for Goldman, since it had a large investment in Kinder Morgan.

这将为高盛带来大量资金，因为它对金德摩根进行了大量投资。

Meanwhile, El Paso, which wanted to be bought for as much as possible, of course, was paying millions to Goldman for advice on the sale, hence Goldman's conflict.

与此同时，埃尔帕索当然希望以尽可能高的价格被收购，因此向高盛支付了数百万美元以寻求出售建议，这就是高盛之间的冲突。

As if that wasn't enough, it eventually came out that the lead Goldman banker advising El Paso had a personal stake in Kinder Morgan worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.

似乎这还不够，最终有消息称，为埃尔帕索提供咨询服务的高盛首席银行家拥有金德摩根价值数十万美元的个人股份。

Carmen says this deal and others like it led to one of the first assignments her bosses gave her when she started at the Fed-- to examine how Goldman handled, or failed to handle, conflicts of interest.

卡门表示，这笔交易和其他类似交易导致了她在美联储任职时老板交给她的第一项任务——检查高盛如何处理或未能处理利益冲突。

One of the Fed's guidelines is that banks of Goldman's size and complexity need to have a conflicts of interest policy that applies to everyone at the firm.

美联储的指导方针之一是，像高盛这样规模和复杂性的银行需要制定适用于公司每个人的利益冲突政策。

The Fed has criteria for what such a policy should look like.

美联储对于此类政策应该是什么样子有标准。

Carmen was familiar with this.

卡门对此很熟悉。

She'd worked for years at banks that had policy, she says, and she'd helped put policies, including conflicts of interest policies, into action.

她说，她在有政策的银行工作了多年，她帮助将政策（包括利益冲突政策）付诸实施。

So what Carmen found when she looked into whether Goldman had a conflict of interest policy was shocking to her.

因此，当卡门调查高盛是否存在利益冲突政策时，她的发现令她震惊。

They really didn't have a firm-wide conflicts of interest policy.

他们确实没有全公司范围的利益冲突政策。

They didn't have anything close to being adequate on that score.

他们在这方面还没有达到足够的水平。

For instance, one thing Carmen looked into was something you'd think would be a basic building block of a good policy, a definition of the thing the policy is about.

例如，卡门研究的一件事是你认为是良好政策的基本组成部分的东西，即政策所涉及事物的定义。

Do you have it in the policy the definition of a conflict of interest and what that is and what that means?

您的保单中是否包含利益冲突的定义以及利益冲突的定义及其含义？

During her examination, Carmen asked Goldman's head of conflicts if their policy had a definition of what a conflict is.

在检查过程中，卡门询问高盛冲突负责人，他们的政策是否对冲突有定义。

And Goldman's head of conflicts answered--

高盛冲突负责人回答说：

That's right.

没错。

According to the person in charge of evaluating conflicts of interest at Goldman Sachs, the firm's policy did not have a definition of what constituted a conflict.

据高盛负责评估利益冲突的人士透露，该公司的政策并没有对什么构成冲突做出定义。

This was just one detail in a stack of evidence Carmen collected showing that Goldman Sachs lacked a proper policy.

这只是卡门收集的一堆证据中的一个细节，这些证据表明高盛缺乏适当的政策。

There was the meeting in November, where Fed examiners asked Goldman for the conflicts of interest policy, and Goldman told them one didn't exist.

在11月份的一次会议上，美联储审查员向高盛询问利益冲突政策，高盛告诉他们不存在这一政策。

According to the meeting minutes, one Goldman executive said, quote, "It's probably more than one document.

根据会议纪要，一位高盛高管表示：“这可能不仅仅是一份文件。

There's no one policy, per se."

本身没有一项政策。”

Goldman eventually gave Carmen these documents.

高盛最终给了卡门这些文件。

We've reviewed them ourselves.

我们已经亲自审查过它们。

They're policies for individual divisions at Goldman.

它们是高盛各个部门的政策。

The documents clearly state that two of Goldman's six divisions had no conflict of interest policies for the period she was examining.

文件明确指出，在她审查期间，高盛的六个部门中有两个部门没有利益冲突政策。

Another division's policy, Goldman acknowledged, wasn't complete.

高盛承认，另一个部门的政策并不完整。

For the three divisions that did have complete policies, Carmen says, they weren't up to snuff.

卡门说，对于确实拥有完整政策的三个部门来说，他们并没有达到要求。

They didn't meet the Fed's criteria.

他们不符合美联储的标准。

In other words, Goldman had no firm-wide policy at that time.

换句话说，高盛当时没有全公司范围的政策。

Carmen worked on this examination for nearly seven months.

卡门为这项检查工作了近七个月。

She has records showing that there were at least 15 meetings where conflicts of interest were covered.

她的记录显示，至少有 15 次会议涉及利益冲突。

Her supervisors attended many of them, and she believed they were on board with her conclusion, until one day they weren't.

她的主管参加了其中的许多会议，她相信他们同意她的结论，直到有一天他们不同意。

It was a Friday in May, 2012.

那是 2012 年 5 月的一个星期五。

Carmen says a colleague came up to her very upset.

卡门说，一位同事非常沮丧地来找她。

He'd been in a meeting that morning with the Fed team at Goldman that Carmen had missed.

那天早上他正在参加高盛美联储团队的会议，卡门没有参加。

The Fed's top guy at Goldman, Mike Silva, had said that Goldman didn't have a conflict of interest policy, which Silva himself confirmed later in an email that we've seen.

高盛的美联储高层迈克席尔瓦曾表示，高盛没有利益冲突政策，席尔瓦本人后来在我们看到的一封电子邮件中证实了这一点。

And another examiner had challenged him and said they did.

另一位考官向他提出质疑，并说他们做到了。

After the meeting, according to Carmen's colleague--

会后，据卡门的同事说——

Mike seemed to be sort of backtracking and saying well, you know, that he was considering adopting the view that Goldman had a conflicts of interest policy.

迈克似乎有点反悔了，他说，你知道，他正在考虑接受高盛制定了利益冲突政策的观点。

And I could not believe what I had heard because it's so many months, so many meetings, and just so much evidence.

我简直不敢相信我所听到的，因为已经过去了这么多个月，开了这么多会议，还有这么多证据。

So when Carmen heard that Silva was about to change his view, she immediately wrote him and Jonathan Kim an email.

因此，当卡门听说席尔瓦要改变看法时，她立即给他和乔纳森·金写了一封电子邮件。

Goldman Sachs does not have a firm-wide conflict of interest policy, she reminded them.

她提醒他们，高盛没有全公司范围的利益冲突政策。

And she and her legal and compliance team were actually preparing a formal finding about it to issue to the bank.

她和她的法律与合规团队实际上正在准备一份正式的调查结果，以便向银行发布。

A formal finding in this world is the Fed using its regulatory power to force the bank to do something-- in this case, get together a policy that met the Fed's guideline.

这个世界上的一个正式发现是，美联储利用其监管权力迫使银行采取某些行动——在这种情况下，就是制定一项符合美联储指导方针的政策。

Silva and Kim both wrote back saying that she was getting ahead of herself.

席尔瓦和金都回信说她有些言过其实了。

Her conclusions still had to be vetted.

她的结论仍有待审查。

Considering the more than a dozen meetings they'd already had on the topic, the hundreds of pages of documents she'd amassed, and Goldman executives' own statements on the subject, Carmen was stunned at what she was reading.

考虑到他们已经就这个话题召开了十几次会议，她收集了数百页的文件，以及高盛高管自己关于这个话题的声明，卡门对她所读到的内容感到震惊。

Are you serious?

你是认真的？

I mean, it's like this has been vetted to death at this point.

我的意思是，这就像现在已经被审查到死亡一样。

What do you mean?

你是什​​么意思？

What remains to be-- how many times do you have to ask and in how many different ways do you have to ask Goldman these questions before you are convinced that the answer that you're consistently getting is, in fact, the truth?

剩下的事情是——在你确信你一直得到的答案实际上是事实之前，你必须问高盛多少次、以多少种不同的方式问高盛这些问题？

In his email to Carmen, Silva said, quote, "In the light of your repeated and quite adamant assertions that Goldman has no written conflicts of interest policy, you can understand why I was surprised to find a conflicts of interest section in Goldman's code of conduct," end quote.

席尔瓦在给卡门的电子邮件中说道：“鉴于您一再坚决地声称高盛没有书面的利益冲突政策，您可以理解为什么我对高盛行为准则中的利益冲突部分感到惊讶。”

We've seen this conflicts of interest section.

我们已经看到了利益冲突部分。

It's just a few paragraphs long and very general.

它只有几段长，而且非常笼统。

Carmen says it didn't come close to meeting all the Fed's criteria for a policy.

卡门表示，它还没有接近满足美联储的所有政策标准。

We showed it to two experts, former Fed examiners familiar with the Fed's guidance on this issue.

我们向两位专家展示了它，他们是熟悉美联储在这个问题上的指导的前美联储审查员。

They both said it wouldn't qualify as a policy.

他们都表示这不符合政策的资格。

One said it looked more like a vision-type statement.

有人说它看起来更像是一种愿景型声明。

Silva also cited a report Goldman had released talking about how it was improving its conflicts policy-- also not a policy, Carmen says.

席尔瓦还引用了高盛发布的一份报告，谈论其如何改进其冲突政策——但卡门表示，这并不是一项政策。

She'd seen that document, and the document itself explained that it was a report on what Goldman needed to do to improve.

她看过那份文件，文件本身解释说，这是一份关于高盛需要采取哪些改进措施的报告。

It doesn't claim to be a policy itself.

它并不声称自己是一项政策。

We reached out to Goldman Sachs with 10 pages of detailed questions.

我们联系了高盛，提出了 10 页的详细问题。

Goldman replied with a three paragraph statement.

高盛回复了一份三段声明。

In it, they point out that Carmen Segarra had unsuccessfully interviewed for jobs at Goldman three years in a row.

他们在其中指出，卡门·塞加拉（Carmen Segarra）连续三年未能成功面试高盛的工作。

Carmen says this is true, and that she interviewed at a bunch of banks multiple times.

卡门说这是真的，而且她多次面试过多家银行。

In our questions, we asked point blank whether Goldman had a firm-wide conflict of interest policy for the period Carmen was examining.

在我们的问题中，我们直截了当地询问高盛在卡门审查的时期是否有全公司范围的利益冲突政策。

Goldman doesn't answer that question, but says instead, quote, "Goldman Sachs has long had a comprehensive approach for addressing potential conflicts." And quote, "a quick Google search shows publicly available Goldman Sachs documents outlining the management of conflicts.

高盛没有回答这个问题，而是说，“高盛长期以来一直有解决潜在冲突的综合方法。”并引用，“谷歌快速搜索显示公开的高盛文件概述了冲突管理。

Ms. Segarra's supervisors made that same discovery." Then the statement goes on to quote from the Mike Silva email I just told you about.

塞加拉女士的主管也发现了同样的情况。”然后声明继续引用我刚才告诉过你的迈克席尔瓦电子邮件。

Before Carmen could respond to Mike Silva's email, she was summoned to his office by his deputy.

卡门还没来得及回复迈克·席尔瓦的电子邮件，她就被迈克·席尔瓦的副手叫到了他的办公室。

She made an excuse to grab something from her desk and flicked on her recorder.

她借口从桌上拿了一样东西，然后打开了录音机。

Silva and his deputy motioned her to a small table, and Silva got straight to the point.

席尔瓦和他的副手示意她到一张小桌子旁，席尔瓦开门见山。

Mike Silva sort of said, you have to come off the view that Goldman doesn't have any kind of conflicts of interest policy.

迈克·席尔瓦（Mike Silva）说过，你必须摆脱高盛没有任何利益冲突政策的观点。

Carmen, you have to come off the view that Goldman doesn't have any kind of conflict of interest policy.

卡门，你必须摆脱高盛没有任何利益冲突政策的观点。

We can say they have to improve it--

我们可以说他们必须改进它——

The recording is muddy.

录音很混乱。

Silva says, "We can say they have to improve it.

席尔瓦说：“我们可以说他们必须改进它。

Maybe they have to improve it a lot." Then he says, "But we're losing credibility saying they don't have one at all." Silva tells Carmen this isn't just coming from him, that lawyers, presumably the Fed's lawyers, say her conclusion's not valid.

也许他们必须大力改进。”然后他说，“但是说他们根本没有这样的说法，我们正在失去可信度。”席尔瓦告诉卡门，这不仅仅是他的说法，律师（可能是美联储的律师）也表示她的结论无效。

To claim that Goldman doesn't have a policy, he says, is, quote, "patently wrong." What Carmen does in this meeting is exactly what David Beim called her Fed examiners to do.

他表示，声称高盛没有政策的说法“显然是错误的”。卡门在这次会议上所做的正是大卫·贝姆 (David Beim) 呼吁美联储审查员所做的事情。

She stands by her convictions, stands by her expert opinion.

她坚持自己的信念，坚持她的专家意见。

She stands up to her boss, even as he tells her she's wrong.

她勇敢地面对老板，即使他告诉她她错了。

Carmen, I don't understand why your fixation on whether they do or don't have a policy.

卡门，我不明白你为什么执着于他们是否有政策。

He says he doesn't understand her fixation about whether Goldman has a policy or not.

他说他不理解她对高盛是否有政策的执着。

Why can't we just say they have basic pieces of a policy, but they have to dramatically improve it?

为什么我们不能只说他们已经有了政策的基本部分，而必须大幅改进呢？

He asks, why can't we just say they have basic pieces of a policy, but they have to dramatically improve it?

他问道，为什么我们不能只说他们已经有了政策的基本部分，而必须大幅改进呢？

Carmen suggests two ways to handle their disagreement.

卡门提出了两种方法来处理他们的分歧。

She can meet with anybody at the Fed who doesn't see this the way she does, and walk them through the evidence.

她可以会见美联储任何与她观点不同的人，并向他们介绍证据。

Or, she tells Silva, she can formally submit her findings and conclusions, and they can override them.

或者，她告诉席尔瓦，她可以正式提交她的发现和结论，他们可以推翻它们。

They're her bosses, after all.

毕竟他们是她的老板。

She says she knows she's the low person on the totem pole.

她说她知道自己是图腾柱上地位最低的人。

We have no idea why Silva didn't go for that, why he needed his underling to agree.

我们不知道为什么席尔瓦不这么做，为什么他需要他的下属同意。

Carmen speculates that if she submitted her conclusions, it would create a formal record that her bosses didn't want.

卡门推测，如果她提交结论，就会形成一份她的老板不想要的正式记录。

And if some day Goldman had other conflicts of interest problems, and there was some sort of congressional or outside investigation, it could make the Fed look bad.

如果有一天高盛出现其他利益冲突问题，并且出现某种国会或外部调查，这可能会让美联储看起来很糟糕。

In the meeting, Silva will not let it go.

会议上，席尔瓦不会善罢甘休。

He asks her over and over to change her conclusion, repeating at least seven times some version of, why do you have to say they don't have a policy?

他一遍又一遍地要求她改变结论，并重复至少七次“为什么你必须说他们没有政策？”的说法。

Why do we have to say they don't have a policy?

为什么我们必须说他们没有政策？

They have one.

他们有一个。

We can say it's a miserable one.

可以说，这是一件很悲惨的事情。

Silva and Carmen go back and forth.

席尔瓦和卡门来回走动。

Finally, after more than 30 minutes of this, Silva asks one last time.

终于，过了三十多分钟，席尔瓦最后一次问道。

Can you tell me again, why do you have to say there's not a policy?

你能再告诉我一次吗，为什么你非得说没有政策？

Can you tell me again, why do you have to say there's not a policy?

你能再告诉我一次吗，为什么你非得说没有政策？

Why can't you just say there's a very poor policy?

为什么不能直接说政策很差？

Carmen says she was desperate to get out of that office.

卡门说她非常想离开那间办公室。

She relented.

她态度软化了。

OK.

好的。

I can work with you on that.

我可以和你一起解决这个问题。

I hear your plea.

我听到你的恳求。

I hear your plea.

我听到你的恳求。

OK, I can work with you on that, she says.

好的，我可以和你一起解决这个问题，她说。

I hear your plea.

我听到你的恳求。

I hear your plea.

我听到你的恳求。

I can say it's a poor policy.

我可以说这是一个糟糕的政策。

Only she doesn't stop there.

只是她并没有就此止步。

She can't help herself.

她无法自拔。

Between you and me and these four walls--

在你我和这四堵墙之间——

Between you and me and these four walls, she says.

在你我和这四堵墙之间，她说。

I will work with you.

我会和你一起工作。

Jake Bernstein I will work with you, she says.

杰克·伯恩斯坦，我会和你一起工作，她说。

I will say they have a very poor policy.

我会说他们的政策非常糟糕。

But professionally, I cannot agree.

但从专业角度来说，我不能同意。

At this point, you can hear the life drain out of Silva's voice.

此时，你可以听到席尔瓦的声音中充满了生命的气息。

He wearily tells her that he doesn't want to put her in a position where she has to say something she doesn't agree with.

他疲倦地告诉她，他不想让她陷入不得不说出她不同意的话的境地。

The conversation is over.

谈话结束了。

Thanks for coming in.

谢谢你进来。

Jake Bernstein All right, Silva says, thanks for coming in.

杰克·伯恩斯坦 好吧，席尔瓦说，谢谢你过来。

In 2009, David Beim wrote in his report on how the New York Fed must change to prevent the next financial crisis, quote, "Because so many seem to fear contradicting their bosses, senior managers must now repeatedly tell subordinates that they have a duty to speak up, even if that contradicts the boss.

2009年，大卫·贝姆（David Beim）在关于纽约联储必须如何改变以防止下一次金融危机的报告中写道，“因为很多人似乎害怕与他们的老板相矛盾，所以高级管理人员现在必须反复告诉下属，他们有责任大声疾呼，即使这与老板相矛盾。

Evaluation of employees at year end might include specific categories, like willingness to speak up, willingness to contradict me." Mike Silva was actually part of the team that worked with Beim to come up with these recommendations.

年底对员工的评价可能包括特定的类别，比如愿意说出来、愿意反驳我。”迈克·席尔瓦实际上是与贝姆合作提出这些建议的团队的一员。

The following week, he had Carmen in for a meeting, and he fired her.

接下来的一周，他邀请卡门参加一个会议，然后解雇了她。

In a two page statement the Fed sent us last week, they say Carmen's concerns about the conflict of interest policy were, quote, "taken seriously and escalated by senior members of the team while she was inside Goldman Sachs." We asked a number of questions about consensus at the Fed and this is the closest thing they say in response.

在美联储上周发给我们的一份长达两页的声明中，他们表示，卡门对利益冲突政策的担忧“在高盛内部期间得到了团队高级成员的认真对待和升级”。我们就美联储的共识提出了一些问题，这是他们给出的最接近的回应。

Quote, "Because of the potential impact of our decisions and actions, we review our determinations very thoroughly.

引用：“由于我们的决定和行动的潜在影响，我们非常彻底地审查我们的决定。

To vet ideas and conclusions, we have developed a multi-step checks and balances review process, in which the supervisory team and its lead supervisor play a key role."

为了审查想法和结论，我们制定了多步骤的制衡审查流程，其中监督团队及其首席主管发挥着关键作用。”

It's been almost 2 and 1/2 years since Carmen was fired.

卡门被解雇已经快 2 又 1/2 年了。

Last December, Mike Silva left the Fed.

去年 12 月，迈克·席尔瓦 (Mike Silva) 离开美联储。

He now works for GE Capital.

他现在就职于通用电气金融公司。

Jonathan Kim is still at the Fed.

乔纳森·金 (Jonathan Kim) 仍在美联储任职。

As for Carmen, in October, 2013, she sued the New York Fed as well as Mike Silva and Jonathan Kim for wrongful termination.

至于卡门，2013 年 10 月，她起诉纽约联邦储备银行以及迈克·席尔瓦和乔纳森·金，指控其不当解雇。

She claims she was fired for simply performing her duties as a bank examiner.

她声称自己被解雇只是因为履行了银行审查员的职责。

She sued for monetary damages, and for her job back.

她提起诉讼，要求赔偿金钱损失，并要求恢复工作。

In the statement the Fed sent us last week they say, quote, "The decision to terminate Ms. Segarra's employment with the New York Fed was based entirely on performance grounds, not because she raised concerns as a member of an examination team about any institution." In the spring, a judge threw Carmen's suit out, saying the law Carmen sued the Fed under did not apply in this case.

美联储在上周发给我们的声明中表示，“终止塞加拉女士在纽约联储的雇佣关系的决定完全是基于绩效原因，而不是因为她作为审查小组的成员对任何机构提出了担忧。”今年春天，法官驳回了卡门的诉讼，称卡门起诉美联储所依据的法律不适用于本案。

Carmen is going to appeal.

卡门将提出上诉。

I've done interviews with other former Fed employees, and they all say there are competent, conscientious people working at the Fed.

我采访过其他前美联储雇员，他们都说美联储有能力强、尽职尽责的人。

Carmen agrees with that, and on her recordings, we heard people like that.

卡门同意这一点，在她的录音中，我们听到了这样的人。

And in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Fed has tried to fix some things.

金融危机发生后，美联储试图解决一些问题。

In its statement to us, it says it's always trying to improve.

在给我们的声明中，它表示一直在努力改进。

People who work with banks told us that the Fed and other regulators have gotten tougher recently, but culture is insidious.

与银行合作的人士告诉我们，美联储和其他监管机构最近变得更加严厉，但文化是阴险的。

It's tough to change.

很难改变。

Employees who work at the Fed as recently as last year told me they witnessed some of the same cultural problems David Beim documented and Carmen Segarra encountered, the same deference to the banks, and a lack of inquisitiveness and mismanagement.

去年在美联储工作的员工告诉我，他们目睹了大卫·贝姆（David Beim）和卡门·塞加拉（Carmen Segarra）遇到的一些相同的文化问题，同样对银行的尊重，以及缺乏好奇心和管理不善。

We don't know if the culture at the New York Fed is improving.

我们不知道纽约联储的文化是否正在改善。

And because it's such a secretive place, we probably won't know unless someone comes out with more secret recordings, or Congress forces them to answer some questions, or there's another financial crisis.

因为这是一个如此秘密的地方，我们可能不会知道，除非有人拿出更多秘密录音，或者国会强迫他们回答一些问题，或者出现另一场金融危机。

Jake Bernstein.

杰克·伯恩斯坦.

His online version of this story is at propublica.org.

他的这个故事的在线版本位于 propublica.org。

At our website, we'll be posting the questions that we sent to the Fed and to Goldman Sachs as well as their full responses.

在我们的网站上，我们将发布向美联储和高盛发送的问题以及他们的完整答复。

That's at thisamericanlife.org.

这是在 thisamericanlife.org。

Our story was produced today by Brian Reed, who also did research and reporting on the story.

我们的故事今天由布莱恩·里德制作，他也对这个故事进行了研究和报道。

Our show is produced with help from Alex Blumberg, Ben Calhoun, Stephanie Foo, Chana Joffee-Walt, Sarah Koenig, Miki Meek, Jonathan Menjivar, Robyn Semien, Alissa Shipp, and Nancy Updike.

我们的节目是在 Alex Blumberg、Ben Calhoun、Stephanie Foo、Chana Joffee-Walt、Sarah Koenig、Miki Meek、Jonathan Menjivar、Robyn Semien、Alissa Shipp 和 Nancy Updike 的帮助下制作的。

Our Senior Producer is Julie Snyder, production help from J.P.

我们的高级制片人是 Julie Snyder，J.P. 的制作帮助。

Dukes.

公爵们。

Seth Lind is our Operations Director.

Seth Lind 是我们的运营总监。

Emily Condon's our Production Manager.

艾米丽·康登 (Emily Condon) 是我们的生产经理。

Elise Bergerson's our office manager.

埃莉斯·伯格森是我们的办公室经理。

Adrianne Mathiowetz runs our website.

阿德琳娜·马修韦茨 (Adrianne Mathiowetz) 负责运营我们的网站。

Our partner's at ProPublica-- Tom Detzel, Steve Engelberg, Robin Fields, Dick Tofel, Abby Nearing, and Nicole Collins Bronzan.

我们在 ProPublica 的合作伙伴是 Tom Detzel、Steve Engelberg、Robin Fields、Dick Tofel、Abby Neing 和 Nicole Collins Bronzan。

Thanks today to Rob Rosenthal, Mark Phillips, and Lou Teti.

今天感谢罗布·罗森塔尔、马克·菲利普斯和卢·泰蒂。

Research help today from Christopher Swetala, music help from Damien Graef.

今天的研究由 Christopher Swetala 提供帮助，音乐由 Damien Graef 提供帮助。

This American Life is delivered to public radio stations by PRX, the Public Radio Exchange.

《美国生活》由公共广播电台 PRX 向公共广播电台播出。

Thanks, as always, to our program's cofounder, Mr. Torey Malatia.

一如既往地感谢我们项目的联合创始人 Torey Malatia 先生。

Whenever he and I need to get a cab together, Torey always says, you know, the best way to get the cab is to walk into the middle of the street, stand directly in the cab's path.

每当他和我需要一起叫出租车时，托里总是说，你知道，叫出租车的最好方法是走到街道中间，直接站在出租车的路径上。

They will totally see us and come to a halt.

他们会完全看到我们并停下来。

The only downside risk is that they choose to ignore us.

唯一的负面风险是他们选择忽视我们。

I'm Ira Glass, back next week with more stories of This American Life.

我是艾拉·格拉斯，下周回来，带来更多《美国生活》的故事。

This American Life This American Life is produced in collaboration with WBEZ Chicago and delivered to stations by PRX The Public Radio Exchange.

This American Life This American Life 与 WBEZ Chicago 合作制作，并由 PRX 公共广播电台传送到各电台。