405: Inside Job - This American Life
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00:00 00:00 Transcript Share This American Life Life Partners How to Listen Episodes Recommended About Overview Staff Announcements Fellowships Jobs Music Make Radio On The Road FAQ Submissions Merch Contact Us Our Other Shows Merch Follow Us Life Partners Subscribe to our newsletter Full episode Toggle Audio and Transcript Sync Transcript | Episode #405 | April 9, 2010 405: Inside Job Note: This American Life is produced for the ear and designed to be heard.
00:00 00:00 文字记录 分享此 美国生活 生活伙伴 如何收听 剧集 推荐 关于 概述 员工公告 奖学金 工作 音乐 在路上制作电台 常见问题解答 提交 商品 联系我们 我们的其他节目 商品 关注我们 生活伙伴 订阅我们的时事通讯 整集 切换音频和文字记录同步 文字记录 | 内容第 405 集 | 2010 年 4 月 9 日 405：内部工作注释：《This American Life》是为耳朵而制作的，旨在让人们听到。
If you are able, we strongly encourage you to listen to the audio, which includes emotion and emphasis that's not on the page.
如果可以的话，我们强烈建议您收听音频，其中包括页面上没有的情感和重点。
Transcripts are generated using a combination of speech recognition software and human transcribers, and may contain errors.
文字记录是使用语音识别软件和人工转录员结合生成的，可能包含错误。
Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.
请在印刷版引用前检查相应的音频。
Prologue Ira Glass A friend of mine ran her own small business.
序言 Ira Glass 我的一位朋友经营着自己的小生意。
It was just her and this guy, the bookkeeper.
只有她和这个簿记员。
And she loved the bookkeeper.
她很喜欢簿记员。
The bookkeeper did the billing.
簿记员负责记账。
He kept the accounts.
他保留了账目。
He saw that vendors were paid on time.
他看到供应商按时付款。
He did basically all the stuff that, to my friend, was just kind of drudgery.
他基本上做了所有对我朋友来说只是苦差事的事情。
She used to say that she didn't know what she would do without him.
她常说，如果没有他，她不知道自己会怎样。
They were really close.
他们真的很亲密。
So it was this great setup for years.
所以多年来一直是这个伟大的设置。
And then one day, the bookkeeper disappeared with her money.
然后有一天，簿记员带着她的钱失踪了。
Classic inside job.
经典的内部工作。
Perfect one.
完美的一个。
The bookkeeper knew everything.
簿记员什么都知道。
My friend totally trusted him.
我的朋友完全信任他。
And sometimes I wondered, was the idea of using what he knew and taking the money like this little bug in his brain eating away at him for years.
有时我想知道，利用他所知道的东西并拿走这笔钱，就像他大脑中的小虫子多年来不断蚕食他一样。
Once he figured out that he could take the money, was it hard for him not to take the money?
一旦他知道自己可以拿钱，那么不拿钱就很难了吗？
Well, today on our radio show, we have two stories of people who get inside.
好吧，今天在我们的广播节目中，我们有两个关于进入里面的人的故事。
They get inside some system.
他们进入某个系统。
They truly understand the system.
他们真正了解这个系统。
And then they have to figure out what to do with their insider knowledge.
然后他们必须弄清楚如何利用他们的内幕知识。
One of the stories is this incredible tale of money guys on the make right when the housing market was starting to collapse.
其中一个故事是关于在房地产市场开始崩溃时赚钱的人的令人难以置信的故事。
The other is this story of cops and robbers, drug busts and drug users playing a cat and mouse game.
另一个是警察与强盗、缉毒行动以及吸毒者玩猫捉老鼠的故事。
From WBEZ Chicago, it's This American Life distributed by Public Radio International.
这是来自芝加哥 WBEZ 的《This American Life》，由国际公共广播电台发行。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Stay with us.
留在我们身边。
Act One, Eat My Shorts.
第一幕，吃我的短裤。
Something you hear from a lot of people on Wall Street, this crisis that we're going through now, nobody saw it coming.
你从华尔街很多人那里听到的，我们现在正在经历的这场危机，没有人预见到它的到来。
Nobody saw this coming.
没有人预见到这一切的到来。
Ira Glass See what I mean?
艾拉·格拉斯 明白我的意思吗？
This is Angelo Mozilo, the former CEO of the failed mortgage lender Countrywide on Australia Broadcasting.
我是安杰洛·莫齐洛 (Angelo Mozilo)，他是澳大利亚广播公司倒闭的抵押贷款机构 Countrywide 的前首席执行官。
S&P and Moody's didn't see it coming.
标准普尔和穆迪没有预见到这种情况的发生。
Bear Stearns certainly didn't see it coming.
贝尔斯登当然没有预见到这一点。
Merrill Lynch didn't see it coming.
美林证券没有预见到它的到来。
Nobody saw this coming.
没有人预见到这一切的到来。
Brian Moynihan, head of Bank of America, told a congressional hearing he didn't either.
美国银行行长布莱恩·莫伊尼汉(Brian Moynihan)在国会听证会上表示，他也没有这么做。
No one involved in the housing system, lenders, rating agencies, investors, insurers, consumers, regulators, and policy makers foresaw a dramatic and rapid depreciation in home prices.
住房系统的参与者、贷款人、评级机构、投资者、保险公司、消费者、监管机构和政策制定者都没有预见到房价会急剧而迅速地贬值。
Even Robert Rubin, former treasury secretary, former chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup's Board of Directors said just this week--
就连前财政部长、前花旗集团董事会执行委员会主席罗伯特·鲁宾也在本周表示——
Almost all of us, including me, who were involved in the financial system, that is to say, financial firms, regulators, rating agencies, analysts, and commentators, missed the powerful combination of factors that led to this crisis and the serious possibility of a massive crisis.
包括我在内的几乎所有参与金融体系的人，即金融公司、监管机构、评级机构、分析师和评论员，都错过了导致这场危机的强大因素组合以及发生大规模危机的严重可能性。
The recent collapse of the financial system has been described as a 100-year flood, a perfect storm, a force of nature.
最近金融体系的崩溃被描述为一场百年一遇的洪水、一场完美的风暴、一种自然的力量。
And it is so frustrating to hear it described that way, as something that happened to Wall Street instead of something that Wall Street brought on itself.
听到这样的描述真是令人沮丧，因为它是发生在华尔街的事情，而不是华尔街自己造成的。
At the height of the boom, Wall Street was doing such strange, dangerous things, bankers and brokers all over the country were giving huge mortgages to people who could not afford to pay them back.
在繁荣的鼎盛时期，华尔街正在做如此奇怪、危险的事情，全国各地的银行家和经纪人都向无力偿还贷款的人们提供巨额抵押贷款。
Investors were then buying and selling these terrible mortgages to each other as if they were worth something.
然后，投资者互相买卖这些糟糕的抵押贷款，就好像它们有价值一样。
Banks convinced analysts to rate this stuff as completely safe.
银行说服分析师将这些东西评为完全安全。
And then they believed their own lousy ratings.
然后他们相信自己糟糕的收视率。
They believed their own hype.
他们相信自己的炒作。
And really, nobody suspected this could all come crashing down?
真的，没有人怀疑这一切会崩溃吗？
Here on our radio show, we have never believed that this was true.
在我们的广播节目中，我们从来不相信这是真的。
We've never believed this idea that nobody knew.
我们从来不相信这个没人知道的想法。
That really, we're all to blame because all of us, from homeowners to investment bankers, all got caught in this irrational exuberance in the housing bubble.
这确实是我们所有人的错，因为我们所有人，从房主到投资银行家，都陷入了房地产泡沫的非理性繁荣之中。
We didn't believe it.
我们不相信。
After two years of reporting on this crisis, we felt pretty sure that not only must there be some people on Wall Street who figured out what would happen, there must have been people who helped bring on the crisis, who fed the fire, and who figured out ways to profit from that.
经过两年对这场危机的报道，我们非常确信，华尔街不仅一定有人知道会发生什么，而且一定有人帮助引发了这场危机，助长了这场危机，并找到了从中获利的方法。
And so we wanted to find some of those people.
所以我们想找到其中一些人。
To do that, we and our regular team of crack economics reporters at Planet Money asked the investigative reporting outfit ProPublica to join up with us.
为此，我们和 Planet Money 的资深经济记者常规团队邀请调查报道机构 ProPublica 与我们合作。
ProPublica spent seven months conducting dozens of interviews, pouring over thousands of pages of financial documents.
ProPublica 花了七个月的时间进行了数十次采访，翻阅了数千页的财务文件。
And they uncovered some things no one has ever heard before in all the reporting that's been done on the crisis.
他们发现了一些在所有有关这场危机的报道中从未听说过的事情。
And today, with their help, we bring you this story of people at one company and their associates who took home hundreds of millions of dollars in personal income while, at the same time, helping to worsen the crisis that taxpayers, that you and I, will be paying off for years to come.
今天，在他们的帮助下，我们为您带来这样一个故事：一家公司的员工及其同事将数亿美元的个人收入带回家，同时，您和我的纳税人将在未来几年内偿还这场危机，从而加剧这场危机。
Here's Alex Blumberg with the reporting team from ProPublica, Jake Bernstein and Jesse Eisinger, to bring you the story of this inside job.
Alex Blumberg 与 ProPublica 的报道团队 Jake Bernstein 和 Jesse Eisinger 将为您带来这个内部工作的故事。
This inside job takes place deep in the heart of Wall Street financial engineering.
这项内部工作发生在华尔街金融工程的核心深处。
It's full of intrigue and genius and questionable behavior.
它充满了阴谋、天才和可疑的行为。
And it resembles, in ways that will eventually be revealed, the plot of a Mel Brooks musical.
从最终揭晓的角度来看，它与梅尔·布鲁克斯音乐剧的情节相似。
But it begins far from Wall Street, on the shores of Lake Michigan in Chicago, where a man named Alec Litowitz was starting a new hedge fund.
但它的起点远离华尔街，在芝加哥的密歇根湖畔，一位名叫亚历克·利托维茨的人正在那里创办一家新的对冲基金。
We'll get to what exactly a hedge fund is in a minute.
我们很快就会了解对冲基金到底是什么。
First though, here's Jake Bernstein from ProPublica with the hedge fund's name.
首先，来自 ProPublica 的 Jake Bernstein 介绍了该对冲基金的名字。
Magnetar.
磁星。
And that's because Litowitz, the guy who started Magnetar, is a big astronomy buff.
这是因为 Magnetar 的创始人利托维茨是一位天文学爱好者。
A magnetar is kind of like a black hole.
磁星有点像黑洞。
It's a star that's burned out.
这是一颗被烧毁的星星。
And it is the most magnetic force in the universe.
而且它是宇宙中最强的磁力。
You may not have noticed, but that was the other half of the ProPublica duo entering the conversation, Jesse Eisinger.
您可能没有注意到，进入对话的是 ProPublica 二人组的另一半，杰西·艾辛格 (Jesse Eisinger)。
And they have a marketing spiel.
他们有大量的营销演讲。
They say that this firm is going to attract the best employees, the best investors.
他们说这家公司将吸引最好的员工、最好的投资者。
We're going to have the highest returns.
我们将获得最高的回报。
And they give t-shirts to people that say, "Very bright.
他们向人们赠送 T 恤，上面写着：“非常聪明。
Very magnetic." And sometimes employees would joke that they're named after a black hole.
很有磁性。”有时员工会开玩笑说他们是以黑洞命名的。
But for the most part, they start out with these high ambitions and excitement, and they're really enthusiastic about it.
但在大多数情况下，他们一开始就怀有远大的抱负和兴奋，并且对此充满热情。
So what do hedge funds do anyway?
那么对冲基金到底做什么呢？
Well basically, they gather a bunch of money from investors, and they try to get that money to grow using whatever strategy they think will make them and their investors rich.
基本上，他们从投资者那里收集了一大笔钱，然后他们试图使用任何他们认为能让他们和他们的投资者致富的策略来让这些钱增长。
Magnetar decided that one of the ways it was going to make money was by investing in a corner of the financial markets we've heard a lot about lately, securities made of subprime mortgages, and was going to go for one of the more esoteric of these securities, collateralized debt obligations or CDOs.
Magnetar 决定，其赚钱的方式之一是投资于我们最近经常听说的金融市场的一个角落，即由次级抵押贷款构成的证券，并且将投资其中一种更为深奥的证券，即债务抵押债券或 CDO。
Such are the times that we live in that CDOs have appeared on more than one episode of This American Life lately.
在我们生活的这个时代，CDO 最近不止一集出现在《美国生活》中。
CDOs have the distinction of being the single most toxic financial instruments of the financial crisis.
CDO 是金融危机中毒性最强的金融工具。
The instruments that did more damage to the world's financial system than any other single instrument out there.
这些工具对世界金融体系造成的损害比任何其他单一工具都要大。
And what you need to know about a CDO to understand this story is pretty simple.
要理解这个故事，您需要了解 CDO 的知识非常简单。
A CDO, at least the kind Magnetar was interested in, is a financial security that's made up of dozens of bonds.
CDO，至少是 Magnetar 感兴趣的那种，是一种由数十种债券组成的金融证券。
And each bond is itself made up of hundreds of individual mortgages and not safe mortgages.
每张债券本身都由数百笔个人抵押贷款而非安全抵押贷款组成。
These were pretty risky ones to borrowers with poor credit.
对于信用较差的借款人来说，这些风险相当大。
Now Alec Litowitz, who was only 38 when he started Magnetar, had already amassed a personal fortune in finance.
现在，亚历克·利托维茨 (Alec Litowitz) 在创办 Magnetar 时年仅 38 岁，已经在金融领域积累了个人财富。
This allowed him and his wife to take a couple of years kicking around Europe, collecting antiques for a big house they were building on the shores of Lake Michigan.
这让他和他的妻子花了几年时间游历欧洲，为他们在密歇根湖畔建造的一栋大房子收集古董。
And during the time they were away, CDOs were becoming the hot, new thing on Wall Street.
在他们离开期间，CDO 逐渐成为华尔街的热门新事物。
A record number were on their way to being sold in 2005, which would shatter the previous record set in 2004.
2005 年的销售量即将打破 2004 年创下的纪录。
But by the time Alec Litowitz was back and had his new hedge fund up and running at the end of 2005, things were starting to change in the CDO world.
但当亚历克·利托维茨 (Alec Litowitz) 于 2005 年底回归并建立并运行他的新对冲基金时，CDO 领域的情况开始发生变化。
We talked to a guy named Bill Tomljanovic a guy on Wall Street who put together CDOs.
我们采访了一位名叫 Bill Tomljanovic 的华尔街人士，他负责组建 CDO。
He said that at the end of 2005, people on Wall Street were starting to worry about the housing market.
他说，2005年底，华尔街人士开始担心房地产市场。
Unfortunately, since Bill is in finance, he doesn't say it like that.
不幸的是，由于比尔从事金融工作，他不会那样说。
He says it like this--
他是这样说的——
In 2005, the summer, spreads on RMBS collateral started expanding.
2005 年夏季，RMBS 抵押品的利差开始扩大。
And that is banker-speak for people started to worry about the housing market?
这是银行家对人们开始担心房地产市场的说法吗？
Yes, ah yes.
是啊是啊。
Alex Blumberg Now what Bill is saying here, which sounds really boring, it is huge.
亚历克斯·布隆伯格（Alex Blumberg） 现在比尔在这里所说的话，听起来很无聊，但意义重大。
It means that part of our theory, the theory that got us into this story in the first place, was correct.
这意味着我们的部分理论，即最初让我们进入这个故事的理论，是正确的。
There was a group of people on Wall Street who are not like most people in America.
华尔街有一群人与大多数美国人不同。
They were not caught by surprise.
他们并不感到意外。
In 2005, two full years before the collapse of the major subprime lenders like New Century and Countrywide, three full years before the failure of Lehman Brothers and AIG and the big government bailout, a lot of people on Wall Street were looking at housing prices around the country and seeing signs that things were not well.
2005年，距离New Century和Countrywide等主要次级贷款机构倒闭整整两年，距离雷曼兄弟和AIG倒闭以及政府大规模救助的整整三年，华尔街的很多人都在关注全国各地的房价，并看到了情况不佳的迹象。
Las Vegas had an overheated market.
拉斯维加斯市场过热。
Certain sectors of California were looking very aggressive in terms of real estate valuation.
加州的某些行业在房地产估值方面看起来非常激进。
Was it enough-- Was the bubble ready to burst?
泡沫已经准备好破裂了吗？
You could see this uncertainty showing up in bond prices in 2005, long before everything crashed.
早在一切崩溃之前，你就可以在 2005 年的债券价格中看到这种不确定性。
The anxiety is right there in the interest rate numbers.
焦虑就体现在利率数据上。
Some of the people on Wall Street who buy bonds that are made up of hundreds of home mortgages were starting to demand more interest for their investment, saying essentially, we'll buy this bond, but you have to pay us more because it's looking riskier to us.
华尔街上一些购买由数百项住房抵押贷款组成的债券的人开始要求他们的投资获得更多利息，他们基本上说，我们将购买这种债券，但你必须向我们支付更多费用，因为它对我们来说风险更大。
Which is just another way of saying, we're worried.
这只是另一种说法，我们很担心。
And because of this, people like Bill Tomljanovic were thinking that the good times might be coming to an end in the CDO world.
正因为如此，像 Bill Tomljanovic 这样的人认为 CDO 世界的好时光可能即将结束。
The level of difficulty to replicate the business plan of '05 in '06 was pretty-- I mean, everyone was worried, how are we going to keep volume up, make the same amount of money for the firm?
在 06 年复制 05 年的商业计划的难度相当大 - 我的意思是，每个人都担心，我们如何保持销量，为公司赚同样多的钱？
How are we going to recreate this in '06 because it was such a great year in '05.
我们将如何在 06 年重现这一点，因为 05 年真是伟大的一年。
So here's all these people on Wall Street in late 2005 thinking, the CDO business might be slowing down, housing might be cooling off, things might be returning to normal.
因此，2005 年末华尔街的所有这些人都在想，CDO 业务可能会放缓，房地产市场可能会降温，一切可能会恢复正常。
And then in walks Magnetar.
然后磁星走了过来。
Magnetar spends the first quarter of '06 talking to as many people as possible in the CDO business, really understanding it, interviewing people, getting a good sort of lay of the land.
Magnetar 在 06 年第一季度与 CDO 行业中尽可能多的人交谈，真正了解它，采访人们，了解情况。
And then, they put out the word that they want to buy equity.
然后，他们宣布要购买股权。
OK.
好的。
Equity.
公平。
A quick word of explanation.
简短的解释一下。
Every CDO was divided into layers.
每个 CDO 都分为几层。
A layer at the top that was considered the safest, the layers below that, which were considered semi-safe, and then the bottom layer, which was considered the riskiest.
顶部的层被认为是最安全的，下面的层被认为是半安全的，然后是底层，被认为是最危险的。
Of course, after the crash, we learned that no part of the CDO was safe.
当然，事故发生后，我们了解到 CDO 的任何部分都不安全。
Every part of most subprime CDOs is now worthless.
大多数次级抵押贷款债券的每一部分现在都毫无价值。
But back in 2005 and 2006, they were still making these distinctions.
但早在 2005 年和 2006 年，他们仍在做出这些区分。
So the part at the bottom, that riskiest part, that was called the equity tranche.
因此，底部的部分，也就是风险最高的部分，被称为股权部分。
Tranche is just Wall Street lingo for layer.
Tranche 只是华尔街术语，意为“层”。
The equity tranche, the equity layer paid a lot more interest than the top layers, the idea being, if you bought that risky equity, you got paid for that risk.
股权部分，股权层比顶层支付更多的利息，这个想法是，如果你购买了风险股权，你就会为该风险获得报酬。
But still, it was the riskiest part of a CDO that was made up of risky bonds backed by risky mortgages.
但它仍然是由风险抵押贷款支持的风险债券组成的 CDO 中风险最高的部分。
It was not an easy sell.
这并不是一件容易的事情。
Here's Bill Tomljanovic.
请听比尔·汤姆贾诺维奇的报道。
The equity was the toughest part when the business-- early 2000s either analyzing--
2000 年代初，当企业进行分析时，股权是最困难的部分——
Finding somebody to take the riskiest portion.
找人来承担最危险的部分。
Riskiest portion.
最危险的部分。
Jesse Eisinger That was the hardest part to find?
Jesse Eisinger 那是最难找到的部分吗？
It was very difficult, yes.
是的，这非常困难。
Alex Blumberg So here we are in early 2006.
Alex Blumberg 现在是 2006 年初。
CDO managers and investment banks are thinking the CDO party is ending.
CDO 经理和投资银行认为 CDO 派对即将结束。
And in comes this hedge fund saying not only do they want to buy CDOs, but--
这家对冲基金表示，他们不仅想购买 CDO，而且——
They want to buy that lowest tranche, that lowest piece of the CDO.
他们想购买最低的部分，即 CDO 中最低的部分。
The one that was hardest to place.
最难定位的一个。
And they want to buy lots and lots and lots of it.
他们想购买很多很多。
As one banker said to us, it was like a miracle.
正如一位银行家对我们所说，这就像一个奇迹。
Suddenly, this big equity buyer shows up.
突然，这个大股权买家出现了。
In other words, it seemed like Wall Street felt it had found its sucker.
换句话说，华尔街似乎觉得自己找到了自己的傻瓜。
An article in Business Week later wondered if Magnetar was poised to get "shredded." Magnetar's entrance into the CDO market in 2006 had a huge impact though.
《商业周刊》后来的一篇文章质疑 Magnetar 是否准备被“粉碎”。 Magnetar 在 2006 年进入 CDO 市场产生了巨大的影响。
If they were willing to buy the equity piece, it became easier for Wall Street banks to make the CDO.
如果他们愿意购买股权，华尔街银行就更容易发行 CDO。
Buyers were easier to find for the parts that were less risky.
风险较小的零件更容易找到买家。
Magnetar, as the equity buyer, was often called the sponsor of the CDOs in which it bought the equity since, without Magnetar, the CDO probably wouldn't have gotten made in the first place.
Magnetar 作为股权买家，通常被称为其购买股权的 CDO 的发起人，因为如果没有 Magnetar，CDO 可能一开始就不会诞生。
Magnetar's entry into the market helped the CDO business, which insiders worried was petering out in 2005, roar back to life.
Magnetar 进入市场帮助 CDO 业务重新焕发活力，内部人士曾担心该业务在 2005 年逐渐消失。
2006 ended up being even bigger than 2005.
2006 年的规模甚至比 2005 年还要大。
In fact, it became the best year in CDO history.
事实上，这是 CDO 历史上最好的一年。
A lot of CDO deals got done, and a lot of that had to do with Magnetar.
许多 CDO 交易都已完成，其中很多都与 Magnetar 有关。
Their pace of production was extraordinary by any estimation.
无论怎么评价，他们的生产速度都是非凡的。
In a year's time, from the middle of '06 to the middle of '07, they do 28 deals worth an estimated $40 billion.
从 06 年中期到 07 年中期，一年的时间里，他们完成了 28 笔交易，价值估计达 400 亿美元。
Just to put that in perspective, that's about a third to a half of this corner of the subprime CDO market that they were operating in.
从长远来看，这大约占他们所经营的次级 CDO 市场这一角落的三分之一到一半。
And for one hedge fund to account for that much was very rare.
一只对冲基金能占如此大的份额是非常罕见的。
In fact, we ran this by Bill Tomljanovic, the CDO manager.
事实上，我们是由 CDO 经理 Bill Tomljanovic 负责的。
He was familiar with Magnetar, but he didn't know how many deals they'd been a part of.
他对 Magnetar 很熟悉，但不知道他们参与了多少笔交易。
And when we ran that number by him, he was pretty impressed.
当我们向他查询这个数字时，他印象深刻。
That's a lot of deals.
这是很多交易。
That's a lot of deals.
这是很多交易。
Is that enough to sort of be an influence in the market?
这足以对市场产生影响吗？
Now most insiders who knew Magnetar would not have described them as suckers.
现在，大多数了解 Magnetar 的内部人士都不会说他们是傻瓜。
In fact, every single person that Jake and Jesse and I have talked to about Magnetar uses the same word to describe them, smart.
事实上，我和杰克、杰西谈论过 Magnetar 的每一个人都用同一个词来形容他们：聪明。
Sometimes they'll say, really smart.
有时他们会说，真聪明。
And yet, here they were going on this huge spending spree, buying the riskiest parts of these financial products that were all backed by a housing market insiders were starting to view with more and more suspicion.
然而，他们在这里进行了大规模的支出狂潮，购买了这些金融产品中风险最高的部分，而这些产品都是由房地产市场内部人士开始持越来越怀疑的态度支持的。
And that caused a lot of people to wonder, why?
这引起了很多人的疑问，为什么呢？
People puzzled it out.
人们百思不得其解。
And they talked about it.
他们谈论了这件事。
And they tried to figure out, well, what's the strategy here?
他们试图弄清楚，这里的策略是什么？
Why would they like such risky stuff?
为什么他们会喜欢这种有风险的东西？
And then they figured it out.
然后他们想通了。
As one CDO manager said to us, "At a certain point, we were in on the joke." The joke being that Magnetar was also betting against the very CDOs that it was creating.
正如一位 CDO 经理对我们所说的那样：“在某个时刻，我们陷入了这个笑话。”笑话是 Magnetar 也在做空它正在创建的 CDO。
So how do you bet against a CDO?
那么如何做空 CDO 呢？
You don't need to go to Vegas.
你不需要去维加斯。
You don't even need to leave Wall Street.
你甚至不需要离开华尔街。
There's another type of financial product that Wall Street had created.
华尔街还创造了另一种类型的金融产品。
It's called a credit default swap.
这就是所谓的信用违约掉期。
You may have heard that term before as well.
您以前可能也听说过这个词。
A credit default swap can be used to bet that some part of a CDO will fail.
信用违约掉期可用于押注 CDO 的某些部分将会失败。
And the way it works, you pick a CDO that you think might fail, and then you pay some Wall Street firm a little bit of money a few times a year.
它的运作方式是，你选择一个你认为可能会失败的 CDO，然后你每年几次向一些华尔街公司支付一点钱。
If the CDO does fine, the Wall Street firm keeps your money.
如果 CDO 表现良好，华尔街公司就会保留你的钱。
But if it fails, the Wall Street firm pays you the entire value of the part of the CDO that you're betting against, a massive amount of money.
但如果失败了，华尔街公司就会向你支付你所押注的 CDO 部分的全部价值，即一大笔钱。
The theory on the street was Magnetar didn't care in the long term whether the equity it was buying survived.
市场上的理论是，从长远来看，Magnetar 并不关心它所购买的股权是否能够幸存。
They made the equity investment mainly as a catalyst for the creation of the rest of the CDO.
他们进行股权投资主要是作为创建其余 CDO 的催化剂。
Magnetar would cause these CDOs to be created by buying this tiny equity portion, which was typically just 5% or 6% of the value of the entire CDO.
Magnetar 将通过购买这一微小的股权部分来创建这些 CDO，该股权部分通常仅占整个 CDO 价值的 5% 或 6%。
And then, they'd place a bet, take out a credit default swap on one of the larger sections above.
然后，他们会下注，对上述较大部分之一进行信用违约掉期。
They also placed bets against other, similar CDOs out there.
他们还对其他类似的 CDO 进行了押注。
So the theory among many of the people Jake and Jesse interviewed-- and I should emphasize, Magnetar disputes this theory-- but the theory was, say the equity portion cost Magnetar $10 million to buy, but the entire CDO itself is a hundred times that, $1 billion or even $2 billion.
因此，杰克和杰西采访的许多人的理论——我应该强调，Magnetar 对此理论提出了异议——但理论是，假设 Magnetar 购买股权部分花费了 1000 万美元，但整个 CDO 本身是这个数字的一百倍，10 亿美元甚至 20 亿美元。
If one of the upper sections of the CDO goes bust, and Magnetar is betting against it, they stood to make a lot more than $10 million, potentially hundreds of millions of dollars.
如果 CDO 的上层部分之一破产，并且 Magnetar 做空，他们将赚到超过 1000 万美元，甚至可能达到数亿美元。
It was such a brilliant idea, soon others got in on the act.
这是一个绝妙的主意，很快其他人也纷纷效仿。
This strategy was being employed by some hedge funds, but Magnetar was the biggest.
一些对冲基金正在采用这种策略，但 Magnetar 是最大的。
They did it the most.
他们做得最多。
They put the most money toward it.
他们为此投入了最多的钱。
And in fact, on Wall Street, it became known-- according to the people we've talked to-- as the Magnetar trade.
事实上，根据我们采访过的人的说法，在华尔街，这种交易被称为 Magnetar 交易。
OK.
好的。
Here's another piece of jargon.
这是另一个行话。
The strategy of betting that something will go down in value, in the language of Wall Street, it's called shorting or taking a short position.
押注某物价值会下跌的策略，用华尔街的语言来说，称为做空或空头头寸。
And there were a handful of other hedge funds out there shorting housing-related securities like CDOs.
还有一些其他对冲基金做空抵押贷款证券等与住房相关的证券。
A new book by author Michael Lewis, The Big Short, tells several of their stories.
作家迈克尔·刘易斯的新书《大空头》讲述了他们的几个故事。
And generally, there's nothing wrong with shorting.
一般来说，做空并没有什么问题。
In fact, many people argue that shorting, which happens millions and millions of times a day, every single day on Wall Street, is actually a good thing because it keeps prices more tethered to reality.
事实上，许多人认为，华尔街每天都会发生数百万次的做空实际上是一件好事，因为它使价格更加贴近现实。
It's harder for a mania to develop if people who have a dim view of things can bet on that view.
如果对事物持有悲观观点的人能够押注于这种观点，那么狂热就更难发展。
But the Magnetar trade was not shorting in the traditional sense, betting against something which already exists.
但磁星交易并不是传统意义上的做空，而是做空已经存在的东西。
The Magnetar trade was betting against something Magnetar itself helped create, which is the exact opposite of what you want shorting to do.
Magnetar 交易是在做空 Magnetar 本身帮助创造的东西，这与你想要做空的目的完全相反。
In traditional shorting, by betting, essentially, that certain things out there are crappy and overvalued, you are helping to rid the world of those crappy, overvalued things.
在传统的做空中，本质上，通过押注某些东西是蹩脚的和被高估的，你正在帮助世界摆脱那些蹩脚的、被高估的东西。
But a lot of people thought that what Magnetar was doing was bringing crappy, overvalued things into the world in order to bet against them.
但很多人认为 Magnetar 所做的就是将蹩脚的、被高估的东西带入世界，以便与它们做空。
We talked to Jon Pickhardt, a lawyer whose firm is suing an investment bank that helped set up some of the deals with Magnetar and with other hedge funds that were doing what Magnetar was doing.
我们采访了律师乔恩·皮克哈特 (Jon Pickhardt)，他的公司正在起诉一家投资银行，该银行帮助与 Magnetar 以及其他从事 Magnetar 业务的对冲基金达成了一些交易。
Yeah, a number of the hedge funds, they were simultaneously entering into significant short positions with respect to the CDO or its collateral.
是的，许多对冲基金同时建立了 CDO 或其抵押品的大量空头头寸。
In other words, were they being basically built to fail?
换句话说，它们基本上就是为了失败而建造的吗？
In some cases, yes.
在某些情况下，是的。
Jesse Eisinger In trying to come up with an accurate metaphor, have you ever seen The Producers ?
杰西·艾辛格（Jesse Eisinger）试图想出一个准确的比喻，你看过《制片人》吗？
Yes.
是的。
Jesse Eisinger So in the plot of The Producers, there's a scene where he hires an accountant, and he says, where he's sort of murmuring to himself, and he's like, hm, you could almost make more money if the play fails than if it succeeds.
杰西·艾辛格：所以在《制片人》的情节中，有一个场景，他雇用了一名会计师，他说，他有点自言自语，他说，嗯，如果这部剧失败，你几乎可以赚到比成功更多的钱。
Carry the 3, divided by 4-- amazing!
将 3 除以 4——太棒了！
It's absolutely amazing, but under the right circumstances, a producer could make more money with a flop than he could with a hit.
这绝对是令人惊奇的，但在适当的情况下，制片人通过失败赚到的钱比通过热门赚到的钱还要多。
It feels very similar.
感觉很相似。
Is it?
是吗？
Jon Pickhardt Well, from the hedge fund standpoint, that clearly was the case.
乔恩·皮克哈特（Jon Pickhardt） 嗯，从对冲基金的角度来看，情况显然就是这样。
Clearly, they would benefit more if the CDO ultimately failed.
显然，如果 CDO 最终失败，他们会受益更多。
Don't you see Bloom?
你没看到布鲁姆吗？
Darling Bloom, glorious Bloom.
亲爱的布鲁姆，光荣的布鲁姆。
It's so simple.
就是这么简单。
Step one, we find the worst play ever written.
第一步，我们找到有史以来最糟糕的剧本。
Step two, we hire the worst director in town.
第二步，我们聘请了镇上最差的导演。
Step three, I raise $2 million.
第三步，我筹集200万美元。
Two?
二？
Max Bialystock Yes, one for me, one for you.
Max Bialystock 是的，一份给我，一份给你。
Step four, we hire the worst actors in New York and open on Broadway.
第四步，我们聘请纽约最差的演员并在百老汇上演。
And before you can say step five, we close on Broadway, take our $2 million and go to Rio.
在你说出第五步之前，我们关闭了百老汇，带着 200 万美元前往里约。
Oh, ye of little faith.
哦，你们这些小信的人。
Alex Blumberg Jake and Jesse have had several conversations with Magnetar, and they say, what they were doing was nothing like what Nathan Lane is singing about here.
Alex Blumberg Jake 和 Jesse 与 Magnetar 进行过几次对话，他们说，他们所做的与 Nathan Lane 在这里唱的完全不同。
Magnetar says, "We didn't have an opinion on whether the housing market would crash or soar.
Magnetar 表示：“我们对房地产市场是否会崩溃或飙升没有意见。
We weren't hoping the CDOs would fail.
我们并不希望 CDO 会失败。
We weren't betting against them.
我们并没有与他们打赌。
We were simply hedging ourselves."
我们只是在对冲自己。”
Now this is something you hear a lot on Wall Street, the great hedge versus bet debate.
现在，这是你在华尔街经常听到的事情，即对冲与下注的激烈辩论。
A hedge is like insurance.
对冲就像保险。
If you're making an investment in something like a house, you expect the house to stay standing, you expect to live in it, but something could happen.
如果您投资房屋之类的东西，您希望房子保持原状，您希望居住在里面，但有些事情可能会发生。
It could catch fire or get swept away by a tornado or fall into a sinkhole.
它可能会着火、被龙卷风卷走或掉入天坑。
So you buy insurance.
所以你买保险。
In other words, you hedge.
换句话说，你进行对冲。
You pay a little bit a year in case those things happen.
你每年需要支付一点钱，以防这些事情发生。
But that doesn't mean you're betting that they will.
但这并不意味着你打赌他们会这么做。
And in fact, hedge funds originally got their name because, in the early days of hedge funds, they hedged all kinds of bets.
事实上，对冲基金最初之所以得名，是因为在对冲基金的早期，它们对冲各种赌注。
And that is exactly what Magnetar said it was doing, being a classic hedge fund.
这正是 Magnetar 所说的，作为一家典型的对冲基金正在做的事情。
By buying credit defaults swaps on the CDOs it was helping create, it was simply protecting itself if something unforeseen happened to them.
通过购买它所帮助创建的 CDO 的信用违约掉期，它只是在发生不可预见的事情时保护自己。
The problem with figuring out whether it's a bet or a hedge, is that the action of betting and the action of hedging look exactly the same.
弄清楚这是下注还是对冲的问题在于，下注的动作和对冲的动作看起来完全相同。
The only difference is intent.
唯一的区别是意图。
But there are some clues to look for that help figure out intent.
但寻找一些线索有助于弄清楚意图。
For example, is the size of the bet against the investment bigger than the investment itself?
例如，对投资的押注规模是否大于投资本身？
Are they taking out a million dollar insurance policy on a hundred thousand dollar house?
他们是否为十万美元的房子购买了百万美元的保险？
So in Magnetar's case, it would be interesting to see how many bets did they make on which CDOs for how much money.
因此，在 Magnetar 的案例中，看看他们在哪些 CDO 上下了多少注，投入了多少钱，将会很有趣。
Unfortunately, none of this information is public.
不幸的是，这些信息都不是公开的。
Still in the case of the Magnetar deals, there is some evidence that the play was expected to flop.
就 Magnetar 交易而言，有一些证据表明该交易预计会失败。
To understand this evidence, you have to know a little bit about how a CDO gets marketed and sold.
要理解这一证据，您必须了解一些 CDO 的营销和销售方式。
OK.
好的。
So first, you have the investors.
所以首先，你有投资者。
This can be anyone who wanted buy a layer of a CDO, could be a hedge fund like Magnetar, a pension fund, an insurance company.
这可以是任何想要购买一层 CDO 的人，可以是像 Magnetar 这样的对冲基金、养老基金、保险公司。
They're the buyer.
他们是买家。
Then you have the seller.
然后你就有了卖家。
That was the Wall Street bank.
那是华尔街银行。
They were the ones who went out and found the investors, said, "Hey, we're putting together this CDO.
他们是那些出去找到投资者的人，他们说：“嘿，我们正在组建这个 CDO。
Would you like to buy a piece of it?"
你想买一块吗？”
And in the CDO business, there was often a third party, the CDO manager.
在 CDO 业务中，经常存在第三方，即 CDO 经理。
The CDO manager is the one person in this transaction who has what's called fiduciary duty.
CDO 经理是这笔交易中负有所谓信托责任的人。
They're there to make sure that investors aren't being ripped off, that the game is played honestly.
他们的职责是确保投资者不会被欺骗，并确保游戏是诚实进行的。
The CDO manager was sort of like the referee.
CDO 经理有点像裁判。
He would be the entity that stood between the investors and the bank.
他将成为投资者和银行之间的实体。
The CDO manager had one other very important function.
CDO 经理还有另一项非常重要的职能。
The CDO manager picked the assets that went into the CDO.
CDO 经理挑选了进入 CDO 的资产。
OK.
好的。
Assets.
资产。
Remember, CDOs are a bunch of mortgage-backed loans bunched together.
请记住，CDO 是一堆抵押贷款支持的贷款。
These mortgage-backed loans, in Wall Street parlance, were called the CDO's assets.
用华尔街的话说，这些抵押贷款支持的贷款被称为 CDO 的资产。
They were also called the collateral.
它们也被称为抵押品。
It's basically the stuff that goes in to making the CDOs.
这基本上就是制作 CDO 的材料。
The CDO manager picked that stuff.
CDO 经理选择了这个东西。
Again, here's Jake and Jesse.
杰克和杰西又来了。
So we interviewed a lot a bankers and CDO managers and others in the business, and they told us something interesting.
因此，我们采访了很多银行家、CDO 经理和其他业内人士，他们告诉我们一些有趣的事情。
They said that Magnetar was frequently pushing for riskier assets to be put into the CDOs.
他们表示，Magnetar 经常推动将风险较高的资产放入 CDO。
All right.
好的。
I'm going to play that last bit again because that is key.
我将再次演奏最后一点，因为这是关键。
They said that Magnetar was frequently pushing for riskier assets to be put into the CDOs.
他们表示，Magnetar 经常推动将风险较高的资产放入 CDO。
In other words, Magnetar was targeting the referees, the CDO managers.
换句话说，Magnetar 的目标是裁判、CDO 经理。
Jake and Jesse have compiled seven different cases where Magnetar actively tried to influence the CDO managers to get them to put riskier assets into their CDOs.
Jake 和 Jesse 整理了七个不同的案例，Magnetar 积极尝试影响 CDO 经理，让他们将风险较高的资产放入 CDO。
For example, in Magnetar's very first deal to put together a CDO--
例如，在 Magnetar 的第一笔 CDO 交易中——
We spoke to a person who was involved in the deal.
我们采访了一位参与该交易的人士。
And right away, it became clear to the CDO manager, according to this person, that Magnetar wanted influence.
据该人士称，CDO 经理很快就清楚地意识到 Magnetar 想要影响力。
They would ask for specific bonds to buy.
他们会要求购买特定的债券。
They'd say, would you consider these bonds?
他们会说，你会考虑这些债券吗？
And according to this person that we talked to, they said, let's just say that we didn't think their suggestions made a lot of sense.
据我们采访的这位人士说，他们说，我们认为他们的建议没有多大意义。
You are understanding this right.
你理解这一点是对的。
The CDO manager was confused because the investor, Magnetar, was putting pressure on him to put riskier assets into the CDO that that very same investor was buying.
CDO 经理感到困惑，因为投资者 Magnetar 向他施加压力，要求他将风险较高的资产放入该投资者正在购买的 CDO 中。
And this happened over and over with Magnetar CDOs.
这种情况在 Magnetar CDO 身上一次又一次地发生。
There was another banker involved in the creation of another Magnetar CDO who described a "back and forth fight" between Magnetar and the CDO manager over the quality of the assets, again, with Magnetar pushing for riskier ones.
另一位参与创建另一家 Magnetar CDO 的银行家描述了 Magnetar 和 CDO 经理之间关于资产质量的“来来回回的斗争”，同样，Magnetar 力推风险更高的资产。
And there was another deal where the fight took place over email, which Jake and Jesse got copies of.
还有另一项交易是通过电子邮件进行的，杰克和杰西收到了该交易的副本。
In an email that one Magnetar person wrote in September of 2006 said, "The original portfolio target spreadsheet that I have had a strangely low spread target.
一位 Magnetar 人士在 2006 年 9 月写的一封电子邮件中表示：“我最初的投资组合目标电子表格的利差目标出奇的低。
That, of course, would not at all be beneficial to us.
当然，这对我们来说根本没有好处。
I've attached the target portfolio that I would like for this deal with target spreads." So basically, in the email, they're saying, these are the kinds of assets we want, and this is how risky we want it to be.
我已附上我希望这笔交易的目标投资组合和目标利差。”所以基本上，他们在电子邮件中说，这些是我们想要的资产，这就是我们希望它具有的风险程度。
Well, the CDO manager was not terribly excited about this.
嗯，CDO 经理对此并不太兴奋。
And he sent an email back rather forcefully saying, "We will not assemble a portfolio we are not proud of and feel strongly about in the name of a spread target." And so the two sides drifted apart and the CDO was never consummated in part because of the CDO manager's concern about Magnetar's need for riskier assets.
他回了一封电子邮件，相当有力地说，“我们不会以传播目标的名义组建一个我们不引以为傲和强烈感觉的投资组合。”因此，双方渐行渐远，CDO 从未完成，部分原因是 CDO 经理担心 Magnetar 需要风险较高的资产。
And finally, there was a meeting Jesse and Jake had over lunch with a former banker, who worked on one of Magnetar's CDOs.
最后，杰西和杰克在午餐时与一位曾在 Magnetar 的 CDO 工作的前银行家进行了一次会面。
He lost his job soon after.
不久之后他就失业了。
At lunch, they showed this banker the list of unusually risky assets that were in the CDO that he'd helped put together with Magnetar.
午餐时，他们向这位银行家展示了他与 Magnetar 帮助整理的 CDO 中的异常风险资产清单。
And he looked at it.
他看着它。
And he went down the list.
他顺着名单往下走。
And he said, "Yeah, they asked for this one, and they got it.
他说：“是的，他们想要这个，他们得到了。
They asked for this one, and they got it.
他们要求这个，他们得到了。
They asked for this one, and it went in." And then he said, "After looking at this, I deserved to lose my job."
他们要了这个，然后就进去了。”然后他说：“看了这个，我就活该丢掉工作。”
There are other clues as well that Magnetar was trying to produce a flop.
还有其他线索表明 Magnetar 试图制造失败。
Magnetar's CDOs, in an independent analysis commissioned by ProPublica, went bad faster than other, similar CDOs.
ProPublica 委托进行的一项独立分析显示，Magnetar 的 CDO 比其他类似的 CDO 变坏的速度更快。
And then, of course, there's this.
当然，还有这个。
For a company that came in at the height of the housing mania, invested in the riskiest parts of the dodgiest subprime-related CDOs out there, CDOs which got completely wiped out in the crash-- a crash which started just months after it finished making its last purchase-- Magnetar sure did make a lot of money.
对于一家在房地产狂热最严重时期进入市场、投资于最危险的次贷相关 CDO 中最危险部分的公司来说，这些 CDO 在崩盘中完全被消灭了——这场崩盘是在它完成最后一次购买后几个月开始的——Magnetar 确实赚了很多钱。
2007 was a very profitable year for Magnetar.
2007 年对于 Magnetar 来说是非常有利可图的一年。
We know that one of their funds, the constellation fund-- which presumably had some of the profits from their CDO business-- was up 76%.
我们知道他们的一只基金——星座基金——大概从他们的 CDO 业务中获得了一些利润——上涨了 76%。
And we know that the firm Magnetar grew rapidly during this period.
我们知道 Magnetar 公司在此期间迅速发展。
When Litowitz, its founder, Alec Litowitz, started Magnetar in 2005, he had $1.7 billion under management.
利托维茨 (Alec Litowitz) 的创始人亚历克·利托维茨 (Alec Litowitz) 于 2005 年创立 Magnetar，当时他管理着 17 亿美元的资产。
And by the end of 2007, he had $8 billion.
到2007年底，他的资产已达80亿美元。
Almost $8.
差不多8美元。
Jake Bernstein Almost $8 billion.
杰克·伯恩斯坦 (Jake Bernstein) 近 80 亿美元。
So within the span of almost three years, he'd increased the amount of money under management by $6 billion.
因此，在近三年的时间里，他管理的资金量增加了 60 亿美元。
Right.
正确的。
And while some of that, I'm sure, was new investors, some of that was also profit from the business that they were doing.
我确信，虽然其中一些是新投资者，但其中一些也是他们所做业务的利润。
If Magnetar was making a lot of money on these CDOs, there was another group that wasn't.
如果说 Magnetar 在这些 CDO 上赚了很多钱，那么还有另一个团体却没有赚到很多钱。
And that was the group of people who were buying the top-rated portions of these CDOs that Magnetar was sponsoring and then betting against.
这群人购买了 Magnetar 赞助的这些 CDO 中评级最高的部分，然后做空。
There was a group of mutual funds in Tennessee that lost a bunch of money on Magnetar CDOs.
田纳西州有一群共同基金在 Magnetar CDO 上损失了大量资金。
There was a regional bank in Ohio.
俄亥俄州有一家地区银行。
A Lutheran fraternal organization in Minnesota.
明尼苏达州的一个路德兄弟会组织。
But surprisingly, the biggest purchasers of Magnetar CDOs, we now know, were the very same investment banks that put these CDOs together in the first place.
但令人惊讶的是，我们现在知道，Magnetar CDO 的最大买家正是最初将这些 CDO 放在一起的投资银行。
That's right.
这是正确的。
The banks were making these CDOs and essentially selling them to themselves.
银行正在制造这些 CDO，并且本质上是把它们卖给自己。
For example, one CDO deal that Jake and Jesse have managed to learn a lot about, a CDO that Magnetar put together with J.P.
例如，Jake 和 Jesse 已经对一项 CDO 交易有了很多了解，这是 Magnetar 与 J.P. 合作的一项 CDO。
Morgan.
摩根.
Magnetar bought the equity portion of the deal for around $10 million.
Magnetar 以约 1000 万美元购买了该交易的股权部分。
J.P.
J.P.
Morgan bought the top portion for almost 100 times that, nearly $1 billion, which was strange because some of the bankers at J.P.
摩根以近 100 倍的价格购买了其中的最高部分，即近 10 亿美元，这很奇怪，因为 J.P. 的一些银行家认为这很奇怪。
Morgan knew that Magnetar had selected especially risky assets to go into the CDO and that Magnetar had placed a bet against the middle portion of the CDO.
摩根知道 Magnetar 选择了风险特别高的资产来购买 CDO，并且 Magnetar 对 CDO 的中间部分进行了押注。
But they went ahead and put the deal together and then bought the biggest piece of it without hedging themselves either because they convinced themselves it still wasn't that risky or because they just didn't give a damn about the risk or some combination of the two.
但他们继续进行交易，然后购买了其中最大的一块，而没有对自己进行对冲，要么是因为他们说服自己这仍然没有那么风险，要么是因为他们根本不在乎风险或两者的结合。
What they were certain about was how much money they'd make in fees.
他们确定的是他们能从费用中赚多少钱。
J.P.
J.P.
Morgan made, we understand, $20 million in fees for the bank, but--
据我们了解，摩根向银行收取了 2000 万美元的费用，但是——
Probably about half of which was distributed in bonuses to the bankers who worked on it.
其中大约一半可能是作为奖金分配给参与该项目的银行家的。
Yeah, roughly.
是的，大约。
Jake Bernstein Generally.
杰克·伯恩斯坦 一般而言。
Generally.
一般来说。
Jake Bernstein And yet the bank retained the top-rated, safest portion of the deal.
杰克·伯恩斯坦 然而，银行保留了交易中评价最高、最安全的部分。
That eventually got wiped out and they took about an $880 million loss on the deal according to people we've spoken to.
据我们采访过的人士透露，这笔交易最终被抵消了，他们在这笔交易中损失了约 8.8 亿美元。
We talked to one banker in this world who did CDO business.
我们采访了一位从事 CDO 业务的银行家。
And he described what had happened as a success.
他称所发生的事情是成功的。
We were sort of taken aback by this because most of these CDOs failed, and the banks ended up saddled with huge losses, which the taxpayers will be paying off for a long time to come.
我们对此感到有些惊讶，因为大多数 CDO 都失败了，银行最终承担了巨大的损失，而纳税人将在未来很长一段时间内偿还这些损失。
And so we asked, "How could this be a success?" And he said, "Well, the bankers did very well.
所以我们问：“这怎么可能成功呢？”他说：“嗯，银行家做得很好。
Their bottom lines, their bank accounts are still quite full.
他们的底线是，他们的银行账户仍然很满。
They might not be at those banks anymore, but they're doing all right." So in the eyes of individual actors, this was not a complete and total debacle.
他们可能不再在那些银行了，但他们过得还不错。”所以在个别演员看来，这并不是一场彻底的彻底崩溃。
This is an important thing to understand.
这是一件需要理解的重要事情。
Bankers made money even when they were buying things that eventually blew up the bank.
银行家即使在购买最终导致银行崩溃的东西时也能赚钱。
We talked to another CDO manager, Jim Finkel, who said that for every CDO that a bank put together, it got a fee, usually 1% or 2% of the overall value of the CDO.
我们采访了另一位 CDO 经理吉姆·芬克尔 (Jim Finkel)，他表示银行每发行一张 CDO，都会收取一定的费用，通常是 CDO 总价值的 1% 或 2%。
And remember, CDOs were often worth a billion dollars or more.
请记住，CDO 的价值通常为 10 亿美元或更多。
1% of a billion?
十亿的百分之一？
That's $10 million.
那是 1000 万美元。
And the bank earned this fee the minute it finished putting the CDO together, not 7 or 10 years later when the CDO was supposed to finish paying off.
银行在完成 CDO 的那一刻就赚取了这笔费用，而不是在 CDO 应该完成还款的 7 或 10 年后。
Every deal would get 1% or 2% fee so let's just keep doing billions of dollars of deals, and that'll rack up the tens and twenties millions of dollars in fees.
每笔交易都会收取 1% 或 2% 的费用，所以让我们继续进行数十亿美元的交易，这将增加数千万、2000 万美元的费用。
I think Merrill Lynch made $700 million in CDO fees in 2006.
我认为美林证券 2006 年的 CDO 费用为 7 亿美元。
I mean, that's just an enormous amount of money.
我的意思是，这只是一笔巨款。
How many people is that going to inside Merrill Lynch?
美林内部有多少人？
That was going to somewhere between 50 and 80 people.
目标人数在 50 到 80 人之间。
That's a lot per person.
每个人就很多了。
That's a lot per person.
每个人就很多了。
That whole $700 million was not going to their personal pockets, right?
这七亿美元不会落入他们的个人口袋吧？
The firm probably created a bonus pool of, say, $100 to $150 million out of that.
该公司可能会从中创建一个 100 至 1.5 亿美元的奖金池。
But still, you're talking about the head of the group probably walked home with $10-plus million, $15 million.
但尽管如此，你说的是该集团的负责人可能带着 10 多万美元、1500 万美元走回家。
This situation, where the individual bankers made money whether or not the investments they sold collapsed, should be added to the list of causes of the financial crisis that we're still living out.
无论银行家出售的投资是否崩溃，个别银行家都能赚钱，这种情况应该被添加到我们仍然生活在其中的金融危机的原因清单中。
It helps explain why the crisis was as big as it was.
它有助于解释为什么危机如此严重。
And it also helps explain the answer to the question, wait, why were the CDO managers and investment banks so eager to help Magnetar do this in the first place?
这也有助于解释这个问题的答案，等等，为什么 CDO 经理和投资银行首先如此渴望帮助 Magnetar 做到这一点？
I think this is where we have a rousing defense of Magnetar.
我认为这就是我们对 Magnetar 进行令人振奋的辩护的地方。
I mean, essentially Magnetar was doing right by its investors.
我的意思是，本质上 Magnetar 的投资者做得对。
They found a weakness in the Wall Street machine, and they exploited it.
他们发现了华尔街机器的弱点，并加以利用。
But there were other actors in this drama.
但这部剧还有其他演员。
Those other actors were the CDO managers and investment banks that put these deals together.
其他参与者是促成这些交易的 CDO 经理和投资银行。
The ones that Jake and Jesse have spoken to, they knew what Magnetar was doing.
杰克和杰西交谈过的人都知道磁星在做什么。
They knew that Magnetar was asking for riskier and riskier assets to go into the deal.
他们知道 Magnetar 要求提供风险越来越大的资产来参与交易。
And they knew that they were placing bets against other parts of the CDOs that they were helping to spawn.
他们知道，他们正在对他们帮助催生的 CDO 的其他部分进行押注。
And yet, this information wasn't in any of the documents that were available to the Lutherans in Minnesota or the banks in Ohio or the mutual funds in Tennessee or any of the other investors out there, who were buying the other parts of the CDOs that Magnetar was sponsoring.
然而，明尼苏达州的路德会、俄亥俄州的银行、田纳西州的共同基金或任何其他投资者所获得的任何文件中都没有这些信息，这些投资者正在购买 Magnetar 赞助的 CDO 的其他部分。
When you look at it this way, if the investment banks and CDO managers had been doing their jobs, actually explaining to their investors what was behind these CDOs, well, the Magnetar trade might not have been possible.
当你这样看时，如果投资银行和 CDO 经理一直在做好自己的工作，实际上向投资者解释这些 CDO 背后的原因，那么 Magnetar 交易可能就不可能实现。
So if the investment bank came to an investor and said, we have got an investment for you.
因此，如果投资银行找到投资者并说，我们已经为您提供了一项投资。
A hedge fund actually asked us to create it, and they asked us to put riskier assets into the deal, and, oh, by the way, they're betting against it.
一家对冲基金实际上要求我们创建它，他们要求我们将风险较高的资产投入到交易中，哦，顺便说一句，他们正在做空它。
Would you like to buy it?
你想买吗？
And the answer is going to be obvious.
答案是显而易见的。
They're not going to do it.
他们不会这么做的。
The role of Magnetar, both as equity investor and in their bets against the very CDOs they helped create, were not disclosed in any way to investors in the written documents about the deals.
Magnetar 的角色，无论是作为股权投资者，还是对他们帮助创建的 CDO 进行押注，都没有在有关交易的书面文件中以任何方式向投资者披露。
Not the marketing material, not the prospectuses, not in the hundreds of pages that an investor could get to see information about the deal was it disclosed that it was, in fact, Magnetar who had helped create the deal and who bet against it.
营销材料、招股说明书、投资者可以看到的数百页有关该交易的信息都没有披露，实际上是 Magnetar 帮助创建了该交易并对其进行了空头押注。
There is an argument to be made that the fact that investment banks and CDO managers weren't disclosing this information might present securities law violations.
有人认为，投资银行和 CDO 经理没有披露这些信息可能会违反证券法。
It might be worth looking into anyway, if you were, say, I don't know, the Securities and Exchange Commission.
无论如何，如果你是，比如说，我不知道，证券交易委员会，这可能值得研究。
Did the banks represent this thing that they're selling fairly and accurately and disclose or tell the investors all the material information?
银行是否公平、准确地描述了他们正在出售的东西，并披露或告诉了投资者所有重要信息？
And the question revolves around this concept in the securities law of materiality, which is extremely difficult to define.
而问题就围绕着证券重要性法中这个极其难以定义的概念。
And the materiality issue is just basically what is material, what do the investors need to know, and what do they not need to know basically?
而重要性问题基本上就是什么是实质性的，投资者需要知道什么，以及他们基本上不需要知道什么？
Like what is material for them to know?
比如他们需要知道什么？
Exactly.
确切地。
Jake Bernstein Right.
杰克·伯恩斯坦 对。
To make their decision on whether they want to invest or not.
做出是否要投资的决定。
In the conversations that you've had with the people on Wall Street and the people in the CDO managers and the people from Magnetar and everybody who you've talked to on the inside, was there ever outrage expressed?
在您与华尔街人士、CDO 经理人员、Magnetar 人员以及所有与您交谈过的内部人士的对话中，是否有人表达过愤怒？
Did anybody ever say to you, man, what those guys were doing, that was questionable, or that seemed wrong, or that seemed ethically dubious, or anything like that?
有没有人对你说过，那些人在做什么，这是有问题的，或者看起来是错误的，或者在道德上似乎是可疑的，或者类似的事情？
The answer is yes.
答案是肯定的。
But I think within Wall Street, there's a sense that Magnetar was a predator, a shark, if you will, and that you don't blame the predator for hunting the prey.
但我认为在华尔街，有一种感觉，磁星是一个掠食者，一条鲨鱼，如果你愿意的话，你不会责怪掠食者捕猎猎物。
That's what predators do.
这就是掠食者所做的。
But I recall one banker, who we spoke to, who said, "When Magnetar arrived on the scene, we all should have gone running.
但我记得我们采访过的一位银行家说：“当 Magnetar 到达现场时，我们都应该逃跑。
We all should have taken off."
我们都应该起飞。”
Yeah, yeah, he said, "We should have run for the hills, everyone, all of us in America."
是的，是的，他说，“我们每个人，我们所有美国人都应该跑到山上去。”
What he saw was that Magnetar had figured out how dysfunctional the system had become and was going to exploit that dysfunction.
他看到的是 Magnetar 已经发现了系统功能失调的程度，并将利用这种功能失调。
And that it should have been a sign to everybody that there was something wrong.
这应该向每个人发出一个信号，表明出了问题。
There was something wrong with the way Wall Street was operating.
华尔街的运作方式出了问题。
Even if what was happening here wasn't illegal, it had profound consequences for the financial system, the taxpayers, and the global economy.
即使这里发生的事情并不违法，它也会对金融体系、纳税人和全球经济产生深远的影响。
If the CDO market had been allowed to cool off at the end of 2005, as market insiders thought it might, the financial crisis almost certainly would not have been as bad as it was.
如果 CDO 市场能够像市场内部人士所认为的那样在 2005 年底降温，那么金融危机几乎肯定不会像现在这样严重。
Magnetar, by entering the market when it did, by catalyzing the volume of production that it did, extended the mania and exacerbated the crash.
Magnetar 在进入市场时，通过催化其生产量，延长了狂热并加剧了崩盘。
Of the 24 Magnetar CDOs that ProPublica was able to track down, 23 of them are nearly worthless today.
ProPublica 能够追踪到的 24 家 Magnetar CDO 中，有 23 家如今几乎一文不值。
In total, nearly $40 billion evaporated.
总共蒸发了近 400 亿美元。
A good portion of that $40 billion was held by the banks, no doubt part of the hole the taxpayers had to cover when we bailed out the financial system.
这 400 亿美元中很大一部分由银行持有，毫无疑问，这是我们救助金融体系时纳税人必须填补的部分漏洞。
The Magnetar trade also had a direct impact on the housing market all over the country.
Magnetar交易也对全国各地的房地产市场产生了直接影响。
If the CDO business had gone down, as people were predicting in 2005, home mortgages would've been less available in 2006 and 2007 for people buying houses in California and Florida.
如果像人们在 2005 年预测的那样，CDO 业务下降，那么在 2006 年和 2007 年，对于在加利福尼亚州和佛罗里达州购房的人们来说，获得住房抵押贷款的机会就会减少。
There would have been less money out there looking for riskier and riskier mortgages to stuff into mortgage-backed securities to feed the CDOs that Magnetar was helping to create.
寻找风险越来越大的抵押贷款以塞入抵押贷款支持证券以供 Magnetar 帮助创建的 CDO 的资金将会减少。
There would have been, in short, fewer people in houses they couldn't afford then and fewer people facing foreclosure today.
简而言之，当时买不起房子的人会更少，而今天面临丧失抵押品赎回权的人也会更少。
People making short-term decisions for their own short-term profit added to the pain we're all going through now.
人们为了自己的短期利益而做出短期决定，这加剧了我们现在正在经历的痛苦。
Fortunes were made on CDO desks all over Wall Street in 2006 and 2007.
2006 年和 2007 年，华尔街各地的 CDO 柜台都发了大财。
Some of the banks where those fortunes were made may be gone, but the people who made them and the fortunes themselves remain.
一些创造这些财富的银行可能已经消失，但创造这些财富的人和财富本身仍然存在。
According to a magazine which tracks hedge fund pay, Alec Litowitz, the head of Magnetar, personally took home an estimated $280 million in 2007.
据追踪对冲基金薪酬的杂志称，Magnetar 的负责人亚历克·利托维茨 (Alec Litowitz) 2007 年个人收入估计为 2.8 亿美元。
Magnetar declined to comment on that figure.
Magnetar 拒绝对此数字发表评论。
Unlike some of the Wall Street banks with whom the fund worked, Magnetar is still open for business and still looking for ways to make its clients money.
与该基金合作的一些华尔街银行不同，Magnetar 仍然营业，并且仍在寻找为客户赚钱的方法。
Alex Blumberg, who's part of our Planet Money team.
Alex Blumberg，我们 Planet Money 团队的一员。
Planet Money is a co-production between our program and NPR News.
《金钱星球》是我们的节目与 NPR 新闻联合制作的节目。
This story was done as a collaboration with ProPublica and the reporters Jake Bernstein and Jesse Eisinger.
这个故事是与 ProPublica 以及记者 Jake Bernstein 和 Jesse Eisinger 合作完成的。
A statement from Magnetar and its full response to our questions, emails between a CDO manager and Magnetar, a timeline of the deals, analysis, lots of documents, a more detailed version of this story are all at ProPublica's website propublica.org.
Magnetar 的声明及其对我们问题的完整答复、CDO 经理与 Magnetar 之间的电子邮件、交易时间表、分析、大量文件以及该故事的更详细版本都可以在 ProPublica 的网站 propublica.org 上找到。
By the way, just this week, the former CEO of Citigroup, Charles Prince, testified before the financial crisis inquiry commission about CDOs.
顺便说一句，就在本周，花旗集团前首席执行官查尔斯·普林斯 (Charles Prince) 在金融危机调查委员会就 CDO 问题作证。
Citigroup did several CDO deals with Magnetar.
花旗集团与 Magnetar 进行了多项 CDO 交易。
The names of those deals, Cetus 2 and 4, Octans 3, Lacerta, each of these deals was over $1 billion.
这些交易的名称是 Cetus 2 和 4、Octans 3、Lacerta，每笔交易都超过 10 亿美元。
Now they're almost worthless, of course.
当然，现在它们几乎一文不值了。
Charles Prince told the commission that CDOs made up most of the losses at Citigroup.
查尔斯·普林斯 (Charles Prince) 告诉委员会，CDO 弥补了花旗集团的大部分损失。
He said, these were the losses, CDOs, that required the government to bail out the bank even though at the time, he said, everyone believed they were totally safe investments.
他说，这些损失是 CDO 的损失，需要政府救助银行，尽管当时每个人都认为它们是完全安全的投资。
Citi bought the best parts of the CDOs, what Prince called--
花旗购买了 CDO 中最好的部分，普林斯称之为——
--super senior tranches of CDOs that carried the lowest possible risk of default.
——超高级债务抵押债券，其违约风险可能最低。
It bears emphasis that Citi was by no means alone in this view, and that everyone, including our risk managers, government regulators, other banks, and CDO structurers, all believed that these securities held virtually no risk.
需要强调的是，花旗绝不是唯一持这种观点的人，每个人，包括我们的风险经理、政府监管机构、其他银行和 CDO 结构者，都认为这些证券几乎不存在风险。
Prince emphasized that even the Citibank employees who made the decisions to keep these CDOs on the books had no reason to suspect that they might go bad.
Prince 强调，即使是决定将这些 CDO 保留在账簿上的花旗银行员工也没有理由怀疑它们可能会变质。
In other words, no one saw it coming.
换句话说，没有人预见到它的到来。
[MUSIC - "BET AGAINST THE AMERICAN DREAM"]
[音乐-“赌注反对美国梦”]
Step one, we write a check for $10 million, hand the check to a Wall Street bank and ask them to make us a CDO.
第一步，我们开出一张 1000 万美元的支票，将支票交给一家华尔街银行，并要求他们为我们提供 CDO。
Step two, they create the CDO using risky stuff, very risky stuff, extremely risky stuff.
第二步，他们使用有风险的东西、非常危险的东西、极其危险的东西创建 CDO。
Step three, other investors commit hundreds of millions of dollars to the CDO.
第三步，其他投资者向 CDO 投入数亿美元。
Step four, we bet against the CDO using a credit default swap.
第四步，我们使用信用违约掉期做空 CDO。
Step five, the housing market crashes, the CDO's value drops to 0, our bet pays off, and we make hundreds of millions of dollars.
第五步，房地产市场崩溃，CDO 的价值跌至 0，我们的赌注获得回报，我们赚了数亿美元。
And before you can say, step six, we're rich.
在你说第六步之前，我们已经富有了。
We're gonna bet against the American dream.
我们将与美国梦打赌。
We're gonna be on the winning team.
我们将成为获胜的队伍。
Purchase risky debt on a massive scale, then place a bet that the debt will fail.
大规模购买高风险债务，然后押注债务将失败。
Hundreds of millions for Magnetar, the economy collapsing like a dying star.
Magnetar 损失数亿美元，经济像垂死的恒星一样崩溃。
No one will know 'til it's on NPR.
在 NPR 上播出之前，没有人会知道。
And who cares?
谁在乎呢？
It's time to hit the town.
是时候进城了。
This sucker could go down.
这个混蛋可能会堕落。
The housing market's losing steam.
房地产市场正在失去动力。
And all we gotta do to make our dreams come true, is bet against the American dream.
为了实现我们的梦想，我们要做的就是反对美国梦。
John Treacy Eagan and Christian Borle on vocals.
约翰·特里西·伊根 (John Treacy Eagan) 和克里斯蒂安·博尔 (Christian Borle) 担任主唱。
"Bet Against The American Dream," the music and lyrics were written for our show by Robert Lopez, produced by music supervisor Steven Oremus.
“赌注反对美国梦”的音乐和歌词是由罗伯特·洛佩兹为我们的节目创作的，由音乐总监史蒂文·奥雷穆斯制作。
The orchestrator was Bruce Coughlin.
策划者是布鲁斯·考夫林。
To see a video of these amazing Broadway performers recording the song, go to Planet Money's website npr.org/money.
要观看这些令人惊叹的百老汇表演者录制歌曲的视频，请访问 Planet Money 的网站 npr.org/money。
Coming up, what cops know about cops.
接下来，警察了解警察。
That's in a minute from Chicago Public Radio and Public Radio International when our program continues.
一分钟后，芝加哥公共广播电台和国际公共广播电台将继续我们的节目。
It's This American Life .
这就是美国生活。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Each week on our program, of course, we choose a theme, bring you reporting, interviews, songs, anything we can think of on that theme.
当然，我们的节目每周都会选择一个主题，为您带来报道、采访、歌曲以及我们能想到的有关该主题的任何内容。
Today's show, Inside Job.
今天的节目是《内部工作》。
We've arrived at Act Two of our show.
我们已经到了节目的第二幕了。
Act Two, Taking A Big Pink Eraser To The Thin Blue Line.
第二幕，用一个大的粉红色橡皮擦到细蓝线上。
You may have heard of these self-produced DVDs called Never Get Busted Again.
您可能听说过这些自制的 DVD，名为《Never Get Busted Again》。
In them, there's a guy named Barry Cooper who shows small-time pot growers how to avoid trouble with the police.
其中有一个名叫巴里·库珀的人，他向小型盆栽种植者展示如何避免与警察发生麻烦。
For example, how to handle yourself when a cop stops you on the highway with his drug-sniffing dog.
例如，当警察带着他的缉毒犬在高速公路上拦住你时，你该如何应对。
It's a good idea to carry a cat in your car if you're going to have a couple of marijuana cigarettes.
如果您想吸几支大麻烟，最好在车里养一只猫。
This confuses the dog, where his drive is channeled to chasing these things instead of looking for the marijuana.
这让狗感到困惑，它的动力被用来追逐这些东西，而不是寻找大麻。
He also explains how to grow pot without getting caught indoors or out, how to spot undercovers and informants, how to handle knock and talks and rap and taps-- that's when a cop tries to talk his way into your house.
他还解释了如何在室内或室外种植大麻而不被抓到，如何识别卧底和线人，如何应对敲门声、谈话声、说唱声和敲击声——当警察试图通过谈话进入你的房子时。
If you hear a knock at your door and, upon investigating, you notice it's the police, if your door is not locked, go ahead and lock it right then.
如果你听到有人敲门，经过调查，你发现是警察来的，如果你的门没有锁，那就立即锁上。
I don't open the door for police.
我不会给警察开门。
That's Barry demonstrating how you should yell through the window at the officer.
巴里正在示范如何透过窗户对警官大喊大叫。
All this advice could really only come from a consummate insider.
所有这些建议实际上只能来自完美的内部人士。
And Barry Cooper is one.
巴里·库珀就是其中之一。
He's a former narcotics cop and a dirty narcotics cop at that.
他是一名前缉毒警察，而且是一名肮脏的缉毒警察。
And recently he has moved on from the DVDs to a new venture, again, drawing on his experience in law enforcement.
最近，他再次利用自己在执法方面的经验，从 DVD 转向新的事业。
Michael May tells the story from Austin.
迈克尔·梅讲述了奥斯汀的故事。
I've watched videos taken from the dashboard camera on Barry Cooper's squad car in the mid-'90s.
我看过 90 年代中期 Barry Cooper 警车上的仪表板摄像头拍摄的视频。
Back then, he had short, cropped hair, cop mustache.
那时，他留着短发，留着警察小胡子。
He liked to lean into a suspect with a smirk that said, I know you're lying.
他喜欢靠在嫌疑人身上，傻笑着说，我知道你在撒谎。
OK.
好的。
Where's the marijuana at?
大麻在哪里？
Man I ain't got none.
伙计，我什么也没有。
These two ladies in here been smoking weed too?
这里的两位女士也吸过大麻吗？
No. Michael May Barry was a member of the Permian Basin Drug Task Force, a west Texas unit that became notorious for using unscrupulous tactics in the war on drugs.
迈克尔·梅·巴里 (Michael May Barry) 是二叠纪盆地毒品特别工作组的成员，该工作组是德克萨斯州西部的一个单位，因在毒品战争中使用不择手段的手段而臭名昭著。
It was eventually shut down by the FBI in the late '90s.
它最终在 90 年代末被 FBI 关闭。
But to Barry, it was a great assignment.
但对巴里来说，这是一项伟大的任务。
He learned all the ways to bend the law to rack up, harass, and chase down suspects.
他学会了各种违法犯罪的方法来陷害、骚扰和追捕嫌疑人。
Barry was in his early 20s, and he says, the thing he loved most about being a cop was the adrenaline rush.
巴里 20 岁出头，他说，作为一名警察，他最喜欢的就是肾上腺素激增的感觉。
One of his favorite things to do was to pull people over on the highway, and then, just for kicks, incite a chase.
他最喜欢做的事情之一就是在高速公路上把人拦下来，然后为了好玩，煽动一场追逐。
How?
如何？
They taught us in the academy that once we found drugs on somebody to handcuff them immediately.
他们在学院里教我们，一旦发现某人身上有毒品，就立即给他戴上手铐。
Instead of doing that, I would look at the suspect and say, "Hmm, well, some crack cocaine I found in your pocket.
我不会这样做，而是看着嫌疑人说：“嗯，好吧，我在你口袋里发现了一些强效可卡因。
You're under arrest for a felony.
你因重罪被捕。
You're going to go to prison for life." Whether he was or not, he didn't know that.
你将被判终身监禁。”不管他是不是，他都不知道。
And I would just turn around and walk to the patrol car to get my paperwork ready and to radio it in, giving that suspect time to run.
我会转身走到巡逻车旁，准备好我的文件并用无线电发送出去，给嫌疑人逃跑的时间。
And they often did.
他们经常这样做。
And then the foot chase would be on, and then the fight would ensue, and that would get my adrenaline fix.
然后脚步追逐就会开始，然后战斗就会随之而来，这会让我的肾上腺素激增。
I was one of the biggest [BLEEP] you'd ever want to meet in a drug deal.
我是你在毒品交易中最想见到的[BLEEP]之一。
A lot of what I was doing was doing illegal searches, such as making my dog false alert or saying, I had an informant to raid a house when I never did.
我所做的很多事情都是非法搜查，比如让我的狗发出虚假警报，或者说，我有线人突袭了一所房子，但我从未这样做过。
And we would raid a house.
我们会袭击一座房子。
It's called using a ghost informant.
这就是所谓的利用幽灵线人。
Or conducting illegal searches on citizens to seize narcotics.
或者对公民进行非法搜查以查获毒品。
It also includes stealing money.
其中还包括偷钱。
I never planted drugs, but I often threatened to to scare citizens into becoming my informant.
我从来没有种植毒品，但我经常威胁要恐吓公民成为我的线人。
Barry served eight years on the force, but after getting caught doing an overzealous search of a black man's underwear looking for drugs, his department was sued in a federal civil rights case.
巴里在警队服役了八年，但在因过度热心搜查黑人内衣寻找毒品而被捕后，他的部门在联邦民权案件中被起诉。
They settled, but Barry left the force anyway, frustrated and angry that his superiors didn't defend him.
他们和解了，但巴里还是离开了部队，他对上级没有保护他感到沮丧和愤怒。
He bounced around for a few years after that, opening several used car lots, founding a church, even starting a cage fighting business.
此后他又活了几年，开设了几家二手车停车场，建立了一座教堂，甚至开始了笼斗生意。
But it was his next step that truly changed his life when he fell in love with his current wife, Candi, and began smoking the substance he'd spent years arresting people for.
但真正改变他生活的下一步是他爱上了现任妻子坎迪，并开始吸食他多年来用来逮捕人的毒品。
I spent the next year literally in her bedroom, her and I growing close together, talking and smoking pot.
接下来的一年，我几乎是在她的卧室里度过的，我和她的关系越来越亲密，一边聊天一边抽烟。
I'd never eaten a pizza in bed in my life until then.
在那之前我从来没有在床上吃过披萨。
We would order pizza and smoke marijuana.
我们会点披萨并吸大麻。
And the first thing I did was laugh and laugh and laugh and laugh.
我做的第一件事就是笑啊笑啊笑啊笑。
And I just couldn't believe the joy I was feeling.
我简直不敢相信我所感受到的喜悦。
That would turn into crying.
那会变成哭泣。
And she knew I had a lot of guilt.
她知道我有很多愧疚。
I'd start talking to her about how bad I felt about the stuff I did to people for this marijuana that I was enjoying and that was healing me.
我会开始和她谈论我对人们为我所享受的大麻所做的事情感到多么难过，大麻正在治愈我。
So she was smart enough to help me get through those flashbacks.
所以她足够聪明，帮助我度过了那些回忆。
And she'd tell me, "That was rotten what you did, Barry, but you were doing what you thought was right.
她会告诉我，“巴里，你所做的事情很糟糕，但你正在做你认为正确的事情。
And the important thing is now, humans can change, and people will forgive you."
现在重要的是，人类可以改变，人们会原谅你。”
Barry wanted to atone.
巴里想要赎罪。
So this is when he created the Never Get Busted DVDs.
这就是他制作《Never Get Busted》DVD 的时候。
In three years, he says, he sold over 50,000.
他说，三年内他卖出了超过 50,000 件。
Today, Barry had long hair, a goatee, hoop earrings, and a pin-up girl tattooed on his neck.
今天，巴里留着长发，留着山羊胡子，戴着圈形耳环，脖子上纹着一个海报女郎的纹身。
He smiles a lot and cries easily and says, "I love you" as a casual greeting, part redneck, part hippie, part ex-cop.
他经常微笑，很容易哭，并以一种随意的问候语说“我爱你”，一半是乡下人，一半是嬉皮士，一半是前警察。
When I introduced him to my wife, she told me she felt like she'd just walked into a Coen brothers movie.
当我把他介绍给我的妻子时，她告诉我，她感觉自己就像走进了科恩兄弟的电影。
And Barry's next big idea was like something straight out of one of those movies.
巴里的下一个伟大想法就像是直接来自其中一部电影的东西。
He decided he wanted to do more than just help potheads.
他决定他想做的不仅仅是帮助瘾君子。
He wanted to expose and punish the cops that put them in prison.
他想揭露并惩罚那些把他们关进监狱的警察。
Barry says, the war on drugs has warped the priorities of law enforcement.
巴里说，禁毒战争扭曲了执法部门的优先事项。
Small-town police fund their own salaries by seizing cash and property in drug raids.
小镇警察通过在缉毒行动中没收现金和财产来维持自己的工资。
Incredibly, they don't even have to charge someone with a crime to keep the stuff.
令人难以置信的是，他们甚至不需要指控某人犯罪就可以保留这些东西。
And he says, that's given cops a reason to routinely bend the law to bust people.
他说，这给了警察经常违法抓人的理由。
Which brings us to Barry's latest great idea.
这给我们带来了巴里最新的好主意。
It involves chases and traps and suspicious props and anonymous tips and TV.
它涉及追逐、陷阱、可疑道具、匿名举报和电视。
Barry would set up elaborate stings to catch cops in the act of breaking the law.
巴里会精心策划诱捕警察的违法行为。
And he'd film it for a reality TV show he wanted to create called KopBusters, spelled with a K.
他将其拍摄为他想要制作的真人秀节目《KopBusters》（拼写为 K）。
Every year, thousands of innocent people are sent to prison, many because of corrupt cops.
每年都有数千名无辜者被送进监狱，其中许多人是因为腐败的警察。
Do you have a search warrant?
你有搜查令吗？
Michael May This is the KopBusters trailer.
迈克尔·梅 这是《KopBusters》的预告片。
Barry put it together to shop his idea around to TV networks.
巴里将其整合在一起，将他的想法传播到电视网络上。
And in 2008, Barry decides to test his premise by stinging cops in Odessa, where he once worked on the task force.
2008 年，巴里决定通过刺伤敖德萨的警察来测试他的前提，他曾在那里工作过。
He believed that cops were corrupt there and had a plan to prove it.
他相信那里的警察腐败，并计划证明这一点。
And Barry also had a secret weapon, an unlikely benefactor, one with deep pockets.
巴里还有一个秘密武器，一个不太可能的恩人，一个财力雄厚的人。
His name was Raymond Madden, and he was a conservative middle-aged businessman.
他的名字叫雷蒙德·马登，是一位保守的中年商人。
For most of his life, Raymond trusted the police and voted tough on crime.
雷蒙德一生中的大部分时间都信任警察，并对犯罪采取强硬态度。
Then his daughter, Yolanda, was arrested for having an ounce of meth and sentenced to eight years in prison.
随后，他的女儿尤兰达因吸食一盎司冰毒而被捕，并被判处八年监禁。
Madden was convinced the police had planted the drugs on her.
马登确信警察在她身上植入了毒品。
A police informant even testified at her trial that he'd framed her.
一名警方线人甚至在她的审判中作证说他陷害了她。
Madden spent years trying to get activists and reporters interested in the case to no avail.
马登花了数年时间试图让活动人士和记者对此案感兴趣，但没有成功。
Then he came across Barry Cooper on the internet.
然后他在互联网上遇到了巴里·库珀。
The first thing I got of Barry was his videos.
我对巴里的第一印象是他的视频。
And I thought, "What a nut job this guy is." But I was desperate.
我想：“这家伙真是个疯子。”但我很绝望。
So you're talking about a father who's desperate.
所以你说的是一个绝望的父亲。
I mean, I was running out of options.
我的意思是，我已经没有选择了。
Barry knew a lot of the players in this deal because he had been involved in the Odessa scene.
巴里认识这笔交易中的很多球员，因为他曾参与过敖德萨的场景。
And he had a knowledge that I didn't have.
他拥有我所没有的知识。
He knew how cops think.
他知道警察的想法。
I didn't.
我没有。
That's where I always kept making my mistakes is I went up to people thinking they were going to be honest.
这就是我总是犯错误的地方，我去找人们以为他们会诚实。
But he knew how they thought.
但他知道他们的想法。
And so I kind of think of Barry as like some of these-- I call them blue-haired biddies of [?
所以我觉得巴里就像其中的一些人——我称他们为[？
Baptist, ?] they're blue-haired-- that used to smoke and don't smoke.
浸信会，？]他们是蓝头发的——以前抽烟，现在不抽烟。
My gosh, there's nothing worse than a reformed smoker to be around.
天哪，没有什么比改过自新的烟民身边更糟糕的了。
You know?
你知道？
Or a reformed drunk.
或者是改过自新的酒鬼。
Well, Barry was a reformed cop.
好吧，巴里是一名改过自新的警察。
And my gosh, there's probably nothing more sanctimonious.
天哪，可能没有什么比道貌岸然的了。
Barry told Raymond he couldn't get Yolanda out of prison, but he could embarrass the police and get the press to look into her case.
巴里告诉雷蒙德，他无法让约兰达出狱，但他可以让警方难堪，并让媒体调查她的案件。
His plan went like this: set up a fake marijuana grow house and get the Odessa police to raid it illegally.
他的计划是这样的：建立一个假的大麻种植屋，并让敖德萨警察对其进行非法搜查。
Inside, he put a single grow light over a couple of Christmas trees, Barry's idea of a punch line.
在里面，他在几棵圣诞树上放了一盏生长灯，这是巴里的妙语。
He'd invite local media along to catch the police looking like fools when they busted in.
他会邀请当地媒体一起来捕捉警察闯入时看起来像傻子的样子。
Raymond spent over $30,000 setting this all up.
雷蒙德花费了超过 30,000 美元来完成这一切。
Barry rented a house, wired it with four cameras, bought laptops to watch the video streaming live, hired a crew and a lawyer and put them all up in hotels while they set the trap.
巴里租了一间房子，安装了四个摄像头，购买了笔记本电脑来观看直播视频，聘请了一名工作人员和一名律师，并在设置陷阱时将他们全部安置在酒店。
To bait the police, Barry's crew sends an anonymous letter to a local church, promising a house full of pot plants and $19,000 in drug money.
为了引诱警方，巴里的团队向当地一家教堂发送了一封匿名信，承诺提供一屋子的盆栽植物和 19,000 美元的贩毒资金。
An anonymous tip alone is not enough for a search warrant.
仅凭匿名举报不足以获得搜查令。
Barry was hoping they'd search the house illegally, while, of course, he filmed everything.
巴里希望他们非法搜查房子，当然，他拍摄了一切。
So the letter goes out to the church.
于是这封信就寄到了教会。
Oh yeah, it also mentions the money is going to be gone by the next day.
哦，是的，它还提到钱第二天就会消失。
14 hours later--
14小时后——
[UNINTELLIGIBLE] Back up.
[无法理解] 备份。
Zoom out.
缩小。
Zoom out.
缩小。
And here come the cops.
警察来了。
Michael May Barry and his team are sitting in the hotel room watching the scene on computers when the cops burst in the back door of the house with guns drawn.
迈克尔·梅·巴里和他的团队正坐在酒店房间里通过电脑观看现场，这时警察拔枪冲进了房子的后门。
They're in.
他们进来了。
They're in.
他们进来了。
Barry Cooper They're raiding it.
巴里·库珀：他们正在袭击它。
The police walk in the living room and stand in front of a poster Barry has hung on the wall.
警察走进客厅，站在巴里挂在墙上的海报前。
It tells them they're on KopBusters.
它告诉他们他们正在观看《KopBusters》。
They lower their guns.
他们放下枪。
One says, "We've been set up, huh?"
有人说：“我们已经被陷害了，是吧？”
Let's go.
我们走吧。
Michael May Barry jumps in the car to go confront the cops before they leave.
迈克尔·梅·巴里 (Michael May Barry) 跳进车里，在警察离开前与他们对峙。
He's clearly high on adrenaline at this point just like the old days.
他现在的肾上腺素显然很高，就像以前一样。
He jumps out of his car.
他跳下车。
Hey, I'm Barry Cooper with KopBusters.
嘿，我是 KopBusters 的巴里·库珀。
Why are you in my house?
你为什么在我家？
Barry runs into the street wearing a bright red t-shirt with the words "Free Yolanda" printed on it.
巴里穿着一件印有“Free Yolanda”字样的鲜红色T恤跑到街上。
He starts hollering at the police.
他开始对警察大喊大叫。
They tell him if he doesn't get on the sidewalk, they're going to arrest him.
他们告诉他，如果他不走上人行道，他们就会逮捕他。
Y'all planted drugs on Yolanda, and she's in prison because of it.
你们给尤兰达安下了毒品，她因此入狱。
That's giving people a hassle.
这就给人们带来了麻烦。
Sir, you've been warned.
先生，我们已警告过您。
You've been warned.
你已被警告过。
I'm glad that--
我很高兴——
You've been warned.
你已被警告过。
Policeman You've been warned.
警察 你已被警告过。
You've been warned.
你已被警告过。
Policeman You're blocking the roadway.
警察，你挡住了道路。
You can go to jail for it.
你可能会因此入狱。
Video cameras, plants masquerading as drugs, and a message are what police found while serving a search warrant today.
警方今天在执行搜查令时发现了摄像机、伪装成毒品的植物和一条信息。
Barry had invited the local TV news to film the raid, and people got the point.
巴里邀请当地电视新闻拍摄这次袭击，人们明白了这一点。
Folks in west Texas didn't like the fact that cops busted in on a home on such flimsy evidence.
德克萨斯州西部的人们不喜欢警察凭着如此薄弱的证据闯入一户人家。
And the police alienated even more residents when they threatened to subpoena the local paper, The Odessa American, to get the names of people posting anti-police comments on the newspaper's website.
当警察威胁要传唤当地报纸《敖德萨美国人报》以获取在该报网站上发表反警察评论的人的姓名时，警察疏远了更多的居民。
The reality show team out of Austin has been setting up the fake drug den for six months.
奥斯汀的真人秀团队已经建立假药窝六个月了。
But why all the trouble?
但为什么这么麻烦呢？
Raymond got the publicity he was after.
雷蒙德得到了他想要的知名度。
A quarter million people watched the raid on YouTube.
有 25 万人在 YouTube 上观看了此次突袭行动。
Newspapers started covering the Yolanda case.
报纸开始报道尤兰达案。
A year later, a judge released Yolanda from prison on the grounds that the prosecution had withheld documents.
一年后，法官以检方扣押文件为由将约兰达释放出狱。
She's now awaiting retrial.
她现在正在等待重审。
For their part, the Odessa police department released a statement saying, the raid was a waste of law enforcement time and taxpayer money.
敖德萨警察局发表声明称，这次突袭是浪费执法时间和纳税人的钱。
The police threatened to charge Barry for staging the sting, but they never did.
警方威胁要指控巴里策划诱捕，但他们从未这样做。
After Odessa, Barry went looking for more dirty cops to bust.
离开敖德萨后，巴里开始寻找更多肮脏的警察来抓捕。
Without Raymond's money to spend, these were pretty low-budget affairs.
没有雷蒙德的钱可以花，这些都是相当低预算的事情。
Barry dressed up a duffel bag to look like something a drug dealer would tote around, including a crack pipe and $45 in cash, hoping cops would find it and take the money.
巴里把一个行李袋打扮得像毒贩随身携带的东西，里面装着一根裂纹烟斗和 45 美元现金，希望警察能找到它并拿走钱。
He did the sting three times.
他蜇了三下。
Then the police struck back.
随后警方进行了反击。
Five days after Barry posted a video on YouTube of a cop in Williamson County finding the $45 in the bag and pocketing it, Williamson County police arrested Barry.
巴里在 YouTube 上发布了威廉姆森县一名警察在包里发现 45 美元并将其装进口袋的视频，五天后，威廉姆森县警方逮捕了巴里。
And they did something police almost never do.
他们做了警察几乎从未做过的事情。
They raided his home on a misdemeanor charge.
他们以轻罪罪搜查了他的家。
The charge was false report to a peace officer for a phone call made to police about one of the duffel bags.
该指控是向一名治安官员就其中一个行李袋的电话向警方进行虚假举报。
Barry's wife, Candi, his 14-year-old daughter, and 8-year-old stepson were home during the raid.
突袭期间，巴里的妻子坎迪、14 岁的女儿和 8 岁的继子都在家。
Barry was in handcuffs, but he still knew how police think.
巴里戴着手铐，但他仍然知道警察的想法。
So he was sure he knew what this was all about.
所以他确信他知道这一切是怎么回事。
And I explained to them, after they had pointed those guns at my wife and then walked me into the house, I said, "Before any of you mother [BLEEP] are going to search any bit of my house, you're going to have to listen to me." And one of them tried to quiet me down.
我向他们解释说，在他们用枪指着我的妻子，然后带我走进房子后，我说，“在你们任何一个母亲[BLEEP]要搜查我房子的任何地方之前，你们必须听我的。”其中一人试图让我安静下来。
I said, "Mother [BLEEP], are you kidding me?
我说：“妈妈[BLEEP]，你在开玩笑吗？
This is a misdemeanor raid.
这是一次轻罪袭击。
I'm in handcuffs.
我戴着手铐。
I'm going to have my moment, or I'm not cooperating." So they stood down.
我要抓住时机，否则我不会合作。”于是他们就站了下来。
And I went one by one, shaming every one of them, female officers and male officers, explaining to them that we were non-violent, that this was activism, that we know this is retaliation.
我一一去羞辱他们每一个人，无论是女警官还是男警官，向他们解释我们是非暴力的，这是激进主义，我们知道这是报复。
The police included narcotics officers who obviously hoped to find drugs in the house.
警察中包括缉毒警官，他们显然希望在房子里找到毒品。
They found a little pot, only enough for a misdemeanor possession charge.
他们发现了一个小罐子，只够支付轻罪持有罪名。
The police also referred Barry and Candi to Child Protective Services, charging that they were providing their teenage daughter with pot.
警方还将巴里和坎迪转介给儿童保护服务机构，指控他们向十几岁的女儿提供大麻。
After a visit, CPS dismissed the case.
查访后，CPS 驳回了此案。
But the investigation took its toll.
但调查造成了损失。
Two weeks ago, Zach, Barry's 8-year-old stepson, visited his father for spring break and still hasn't been returned to Candi and Barry.
两周前，巴里 8 岁的继子扎克去看望他的父亲过春假，但仍然没有回到坎迪和巴里身边。
Zach's father heard about the raid and filed for custody.
扎克的父亲听说了这次突袭并申请拘留。
Here's Barry.
这是巴里。
Our son being taken from us was so hard that, for the safety of my family, we decided that we're not going to do any more cop stings.
我们的儿子被从我们身边带走是如此的痛苦，为了我家人的安全，我们决定不再进行警察刺杀。
You know, I was expecting-- I never would have done those bag drops, if I would have known it would have led to this.
你知道，我原以为——如果我知道会导致这样的结果，我绝不会做那些行李托运的事情。
KopBusters was over.
KopBusters 结束了。
Barry had thought his first-hand knowledge of the system would keep him a step ahead.
巴里原以为他对该系统的第一手了解将使他领先一步。
But the cops didn't need an elaborate ruse to sting Barry.
但警察不需要精心设计的诡计来蜇巴里。
They didn't need to plan for months and set a trap and get it all on video.
他们不需要花费数月的时间进行计划并设置陷阱并将这一切都记录在视频中。
They just needed a reason to come bursting in the front door.
他们只是需要一个冲进前门的理由。
Michael May is the culture editor at The Texas Observer, whose website, texasobserver.org, is linking to all of the YouTube videos of Barry's police raids.
迈克尔·梅 (Michael May) 是《德克萨斯观察家报》的文化编辑，其网站 texasobserver.org 提供了有关巴里警方突袭的所有 YouTube 视频的链接。
[MUSIC - "GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS" BY CAMPER VAN BEETHOVEN]
[音乐 - 坎珀·范·贝多芬的《好人与坏人》]
Our program was produced today by Jane Feltes, with Alex Blumberg, Ben Calhoun, Sarah Koenig, Lisa Pollak, Robyn Semien, Alissa Shipp and Nancy Updike.
今天我们的节目由 Jane Feltes 与 Alex Blumberg、Ben Calhoun、Sarah Koenig、Lisa Pollak、Robyn Semien、Alissa Shipp 和 Nancy Updike 共同制作。
Our senior producer is Julie Snyder.
我们的高级制片人是朱莉·斯奈德。
Production help from Brian Reed.
布莱恩·里德 (Brian Reed) 提供制作帮助。
Seth Lind is our production manager.
塞思·林德 (Seth Lind) 是我们的生产经理。
Emily Condon is our office manager.
艾米丽·康登 (Emily Condon) 是我们的办公室经理。
[ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS] Our website thisamericanlife.org, where you can listen to any of our shows for absolutely free.
[致谢] 我们的网站 thisamericanlife.org，您可以在其中完全免费收听我们的任何节目。
And this week, you can get your own free MP3 of our original Broadway number "Bet Against The American Dream" and, of course, sheet music for any high school drama departments who want to do their own production of today's show.
本周，您可以获得我们原创百老汇曲目“赌注反对美国梦”的免费 MP3，当然，还有适合任何想要自己制作今天的节目的高中戏剧系的乐谱。
Musicians in our original Broadway number, Mark Hummel, Randy Cohen, Dave Phillips, Sean McDaniel, Dave Mann, Charles Pillow, Dave Riekenberg, Tony Kadleck, Bud Burridge, and Randy Andos.
我们原创百老汇音乐剧中的音乐家包括马克·胡梅尔 (Mark Hummel)、兰迪·科恩 (Randy Cohen)、戴夫·菲利普斯 (Dave Phillips)、肖恩·麦克丹尼尔 (Sean McDaniel)、戴夫·曼 (Dave Mann)、查尔斯·皮洛 (Charles Pillow)、戴夫·里肯伯格 (Dave Riekenberg)、托尼·卡德莱克 (Tony Kadleck)、巴德·布里奇 (Bud Burridge) 和兰迪·安多斯 (Randy Andos)。
Studio engineer for this song John Kilgore.
这首歌的录音室工程师 John Kilgore。
Music contractor Michael Keller.
音乐承包商迈克尔·凯勒。
Copyist Karl Mansfield.
抄写员卡尔·曼斯菲尔德。
This American Life is distributed by Public Radio International.
《美国生活》由国际公共广播电台发行。
WBEZ management oversight for our program by our boss, Mr. Torey Malatia.
我们的老板 Torey Malatia 先生对我们的项目进行 WBEZ 管理监督。
When we ran out of doughnuts and bagels on staff doughnut day this week, he made such a moving speech.
当我们在本周的员工甜甜圈日用完甜甜圈和百吉饼时，他发表了如此感人的演讲。
Almost all of us, including me, missed the powerful combination of factors that led to this crisis and the serious possibility of a massive crisis.
包括我在内的几乎所有人都错过了导致这场危机的强大因素组合以及发生大规模危机的严重可能性。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Back next week with more stories of This American Life.
下周我们将带来更多《美国生活》的故事。
[MUSIC - "GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS" BY CAMPER VAN BEETHOVEN]
[音乐 - 坎珀·范·贝多芬的《好人与坏人》]
This American Life is produced in collaboration with WBEZ Chicago and delivered to stations by PRX The Public Radio Exchange.
《This American Life》与 WBEZ Chicago 合作制作，并由 PRX 公共广播电台传送到各电台。