382: The Watchmen - This American Life
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00:00 00:00 Transcript Share This American Life Life Partners How to Listen Episodes Recommended About Overview Staff Announcements Fellowships Jobs Music Make Radio On The Road FAQ Submissions Merch Contact Us Our Other Shows Merch Follow Us Life Partners Subscribe to our newsletter Full episode Toggle Audio and Transcript Sync Transcript | Episode #382 | June 5, 2009 382: The Watchmen Note: This American Life is produced for the ear and designed to be heard.
00:00 00:00 文字记录 分享此 美国生活 生活伙伴 如何收听 剧集 推荐 关于 概述 员工公告 奖学金 工作 音乐 在路上制作电台 常见问题解答 提交 商品 联系我们 我们的其他节目 商品 关注我们 生活伙伴 订阅我们的时事通讯 整集 切换音频和文字记录同步 文字记录 | 内容第 382 集 | 2009 年 6 月 5 日 382：《守望者》 注：《美国生活》是为耳朵而制作的，旨在让人们听到。
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如果可以的话，我们强烈建议您收听音频，其中包括页面上没有的情感和重点。
Transcripts are generated using a combination of speech recognition software and human transcribers, and may contain errors.
文字记录是使用语音识别软件和人工转录员结合生成的，可能包含错误。
Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.
请在印刷版引用前检查相应的音频。
Prologue Ira Glass Previously on This American Life.
序言艾拉·格拉斯之前的《美国生活》。
No income, no asset loans, that's a liar's loan.
没有收入，没有资产贷款，那就是骗子贷款。
We are telling you to lie to us, effectively.
我们告诉你要有效地对我们撒谎。
I wouldn't have loaned me the money, and nobody that I know would have loaned me the money.
我不会借钱给我，我认识的人也不会借钱给我。
This is where we have to talk about Alan Greenspan, right?
这就是我们必须谈论艾伦·格林斯潘的地方，对吧？
Yeah, we have to.
是的，我们必须这样做。
Man 3 The balance sheets of these banks is, as far as we know, a huge lie.
Man 3 据我们所知，这些银行的资产负债表是一个巨大的谎言。
Over the last year, we've brought you many stories explaining exactly how the economy collapsed.
去年，我们为您带来了许多故事，准确解释了经济是如何崩溃的。
We've heard about mortgage-backed securities and derivatives and bank balance sheets.
我们听说过抵押贷款支持证券和衍生品以及银行资产负债表。
And today, looking for a little ray of hope about our country's economic plight, we turn to the past.
今天，为了寻找我们国家经济困境的一线希望，我们回顾过去。
He was an amazing courtroom lawyer.
他是一位出色的法庭律师。
He was relentless.
他是无情的。
He would not allow witnesses to duck and dodge.
他不允许目击者躲避。
And he had a nearly photographic memory.
他的记忆力近乎过目不忘。
His staff would marvel that he would read a briefing memo once and he would remember every name, every fact, every figure.
他的员工会惊奇地发现，他只要读一次简报，就能记住每一个名字、每一个事实、每一个数字。
This is Michael Perino, a law professor who's writing a book about Ferdinand Pecora.
我是迈克尔·佩里诺，一位法学教授，正在写一本关于费迪南德·佩科拉的书。
Pecora was the lead attorney in the hearings of the Senate Banking Committee back in the 1930s.
佩科拉是 20 世纪 30 年代参议院银行委员会听证会的首席律师。
And when Pecora got that job, he turned the hearings from an unimportant and not terribly useful exercise into a real investigation of Wall Street and the causes of the 1929 stock market collapse and The Great Depression.
当佩科拉得到这份工作后，他将听证会从一项不重要且不太有用的活动变成了对华尔街以及 1929 年股市崩盘和大萧条原因的真正调查。
Pecora was a former district attorney, and he did this very, very well.
佩科拉曾是一名地区检察官，他在这方面做得非常非常好。
He created outrage, and it was that anger and that frustration at Wall Street that created the political environment in which Congress had to pass the first federal securities legislation, had to pass new banking regulation, had to create the FDIC and federal insurance for bank deposits.
他引起了愤怒，正是对华尔街的愤怒和沮丧创造了一种政治环境，在这种环境中，国会必须通过第一个联邦证券立法，必须通过新的银行业监管，必须建立联邦存款保险公司和银行存款联邦保险。
Even Roosevelt drew a direct causal line between the wrongdoing that Pecora uncovered and his ability to push through legislation in that first 100 days of his administration, passage of so much legislation so quickly.
就连罗斯福也将佩科拉发现的不当行为与他在执政的头 100 天推动立法的能力（如此之快地通过了如此多的立法）联系起来。
Did they go into the hearings looking for bad guys, or did they go into the hearings looking to come up with an analysis of here's what went wrong and here's what we've got to fix and to have a kind of a teaching moment for the country?
他们参加听证会是为了寻找坏人，还是希望对问题出在哪里以及我们必须解决什么问题进行分析，并为国家提供一种教育时刻？
It's a good question.
这是一个好问题。
Pecora described his job as trying to make what was going on in Wall Street, very complex and arcane transactions, he wanted to make them into common sense, to take these very complex transactions and really turn them into very simple morality tales of right and wrong.
佩科拉将他的工作描述为试图将华尔街正在发生的事情变得非常复杂和神秘的交易，他想让它们成为常识，把这些非常复杂的交易真正变成非常简单的道德故事。
One of the famous morality tales from the hearings, Pecora put Charles Mitchell into the witness chair.
作为听证会上著名的道德故事之一，佩科拉让查尔斯·米切尔担任证人。
Mitchell was the head of National City Bank, which is an institution that we know today just as Citibank.
米切尔是国家城市银行的负责人，该银行是我们今天所知的花旗银行。
And Pecora asked him about some bonds that his bank sold, bonds that had been issued by Latin American countries.
佩科拉向他询问了他的银行出售的一些债券，这些债券是由拉丁美洲国家发行的。
The bank's own internal documents showed that the bank thought that maybe these bonds were no good.
该银行自己的内部文件显示，该银行认为这些债券可能不好。
Their internal memos all said these securities present huge risk.
他们的内部备忘录都表示这些证券存在巨大风险。
There's great possibilities that these things are never going to get repaid.
这些事情很可能永远不会得到回报。
And National City never told any of that stuff to the investors.
而纳欣诺城从未向投资者透露过任何此类内容。
And when Pecora asked Mitchell about it, he seemed surprised.
当佩科拉向米切尔询问此事时，他似乎很惊讶。
He said, why would the investors want to know anything about that?
他说，为什么投资者想知道这件事呢？
And that led directly to the passage of the first federal securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933, which required exactly that kind of disclosure when securities are sold to the public.
这直接导致了第一部联邦证券法——1933 年《证券法》的通过，该法要求在向公众出售证券时进行此类披露。
And there's also a show trial aspect to this, right?
这也有一个表演审判的方面，对吧？
Like, it wasn't all substantive seriousness.
就像，这并不都是实质性的严肃性。
Can you talk about that other part?
你能谈谈其他部分吗？
Yes.
是的。
There were times when it descended into the absurd.
有时它会变得荒谬。
During the hearings involving J.P.
在涉及 J.P. 的听证会上
Morgan, this was the media event of the day.
摩根，这是当天的媒体事件。
They brought special telegraph lines into the capital so that reporters could get their stories out quickly.
他们将特殊的电报线路引入首都，以便记者能够快速报道他们的报道。
In the committee room, Chairman Fletcher swears in J.P.
在委员会会议室，弗莱彻主席宣誓就职。
Morgan, who explains the function of private bankers.
摩根解释了私人银行家的职能。
This is one of the few times that flash photography or filming was allowed in the hearing room, and it led to the most famous photograph of the hearing, which came after a senator complained that all the media that had turned out to see J.P.
这是听证会室内允许使用闪光灯摄影或摄像的少数几次之一，它导致了最著名的听证会照片，这张照片是在一位参议员抱怨所有媒体都来观看 J.P. 听证会之后拍摄的。
Morgan had turned the proceedings into a circus.
摩根把整个过程变成了一场马戏表演。
Well, one of the promoters for Ringling Brothers Circus picked up on this comment, and he showed up the next day in the hearing room with a woman named Lea Graff, who was one of the circus midgets for Ringling Brothers.
好吧，林林兄弟马戏团的一位发起人注意到了这一评论，第二天他和一位名叫莉·格拉夫的女士一起出现在听证室，她是林林兄弟马戏团的侏儒之一。
And he had the idea that what he termed the shortest woman in the world should sit on the lap of the world's richest man.
他的想法是，他所谓的世界上最矮的女人应该坐在世界首富的腿上。
And so there was Lea Graff sitting on the lap of J.P.
于是，Lea Graff 就坐在 J.P. 的腿上。
Morgan.
摩根.
Reading these hearings, do you think we should do this now?
阅读这些听证会，您认为我们现在应该这样做吗？
You know, there's talk of doing it now.
你知道，现在有人谈论这样做。
And my concern is how it's done.
我关心的是它是如何完成的。
What I don't want to see is some hearings that are just the show without the substance.
我不想看到的是一些听证会只是作秀，没有实质内容。
And do you feel like that's what we've gotten so far?
你觉得这就是我们到目前为止所得到的吗？
So far, I think that's what we've gotten.
到目前为止，我认为这就是我们所得到的。
So, basically, they call these executives, they yell at them about executive compensation.
所以，基本上，他们给这些高管打电话，对他们大喊大叫，讨论高管薪酬问题。
Exactly.
确切地。
Just do a little public humiliation, and I think that doesn't do anybody any good.
只是做一点公开羞辱，我认为这对任何人都没有任何好处。
We talked about this for a while.
我们讨论了一会儿这个问题。
I told Michael Perino that I was surprised that President Obama, for all of his communication skills, hasn't really presented the public with a real analysis of what went wrong on Wall Street.
我告诉迈克尔·佩里诺，令我感到惊讶的是，尽管奥巴马总统拥有出色的沟通技巧，但他却没有真正向公众提供对华尔街问题的真实分析。
The most the president usually says is that the problem is that the stuff that people did on Wall Street that got us into this mess was all perfectly legal.
总统经常说的最多的是，问题在于，人们在华尔街所做的让我们陷入困境的事情都是完全合法的。
Well, sitting in on this interview with me was NPR's Economics Correspondent Adam Davidson, who appears on our program all the time reporting on these issues, who has actually been looking into what kind of hearings Congress might hold on the banking crisis.
嗯，坐在我采访中的是 NPR 经济记者 Adam Davidson，他一直在我们的节目中报道这些问题，实际上他一直在研究国会可能就银行业危机举行什么样的听证会。
I talked to someone in Congress today, who asked that I not say who it was, but this person said that they don't want the Pecora hearings as a model.
我今天与国会中的某人交谈，他要求我不要透露是谁，但此人说他们不希望佩科拉听证会成为典范。
They see the 9/11 Commission as a model.
他们将 9/11 委员会视为典范。
And basically, this person who works in Congress for Congresspeople said we don't trust Congresspeople.
基本上，这个在国会为国会议员工作的人说我们不信任国会议员。
If you have hearings inside Congress, it's going to be--
如果你在国会内部举行听证会，将会是——
A circus.
马戏团。
Adam Davidson Democrats versus Republicans.
亚当·戴维森民主党与共和党。
It's going to be ugly.
会很丑。
If it's outside of Congress, that's your only shot.
如果是在国会之外，那是你唯一的机会。
And I think the other issue that is in a lot of people's minds, quite frankly, is look at all the money that's coming from the financial services industry that flows into Congress, particularly into the committees that would actually hold these hearings.
坦率地说，我认为很多人心中的另一个问题是关注来自金融服务行业流入国会的所有资金，特别是流入实际举行这些听证会的委员会的资金。
Are these really the people that we want to have?
这些人真的是我们想要的人吗？
Maybe an independent commission is a better way to go than just having a Senate committee do the hearings.
也许独立委员会是比仅仅让参议院委员会进行听证会更好的方法。
So you're saying America needs an independent group of people not paid by banks and lobbyists, not partisan.
所以你是说美国需要一个独立的群体，他们的报酬不是由银行和游说者支付，也不是党派之争。
Open-minded, fearless investigators.
思想开放、无所畏惧的调查员。
I think the fewer conflicts we have on that committee, the better.
我认为我们在该委员会中的冲突越少越好。
I think this is a job for us.
我认为这对我们来说是一份工作。
Ira Glass Well, until our government's hearings get going, if they ever get going, we today would like to make our own modest contribution, our own mini-hearing, because we do not want to wait.
艾拉·格拉斯：好吧，在我们政府的听证会开始之前，如果真的开始的话，我们今天愿意做出我们自己的微薄贡献，我们自己的小型听证会，因为我们不想等待。
Our hearing will not last 17 months.
我们的听证会不会持续 17 个月。
We don't have subpoena power to force the most powerful people on Wall Street to come before us and testify, but we do have a question for our hearing, and it's this.
我们没有传票权来迫使华尔街最有权势的人到我们面前作证，但我们确实有一个听证会问题，就是这个。
There were regulators and there were watchdogs who were supposed to be overseeing the banks and the finance industry to make sure that things wouldn't blow up like they have.
有监管者和监督者，他们应该监督银行和金融业，以确保事情不会像现在这样发生。
Clearly something went wrong.
显然出了什么问题。
And we ask today, where were the watchmen?
今天我们要问，守望者在哪里？
And so, I call this program to order.
因此，我将此程序称为“订购”。
From WBEZ Chicago, it is This American Life, distributed by Public Radio International.
这是来自芝加哥 WBEZ 的《This American Life》，由国际公共广播电台发行。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Our hearing today, in two parts, we have one investigator who looked at government watchmen, and one who looked at the watchmen in the private industry who were supposed to verify the safety of these financial instruments that collapsed.
我们今天的听证会分为两部分，一名调查员负责调查政府监察员，另一名调查员负责调查私营行业的监察员，这些监察员本应验证这些崩溃的金融工具的安全性。
Stay with us.
留在我们身边。
OK, settle down.
好吧，安定下来。
Order.
命令。
Our first investigator we sent out with this assignment.
我们派出第一位调查员执行这项任务。
We asked her to take one financial institution that really screwed up and tell us what was the deal with their regulators.
我们请她举出一家真正搞砸了的金融机构，并告诉我们他们与监管机构的交易情况如何。
Where were the government officials who were supposed to be overseeing that institution?
应该监督该机构的政府官员在哪里？
Well, AIG seemed like a good institution to pick.
嗯，AIG 似乎是一个不错的选择。
The government has now committed $170 billion-- that's billion with a b-- into that company, which dwarfs the bailouts of GM, Citibank, and Bank of America.
政府现已向该公司承诺投入 1700 亿美元（即 10 亿美元），这让通用汽车、花旗银行和美国银行的救助相形见绌。
Our intrepid investigator, reporter Chana Joffe-Walt, first set out to answer what seems like a very simple question, which government regulator was supposed to be regulating AIG?
我们勇敢的调查员、记者查纳·乔菲-沃尔特 (Chana Joffe-Walt) 首先着手回答一个看似非常简单的问题：哪个政府监管机构应该监管 AIG？
You and I, we read about the collapse of AIG on a Tuesday morning in the newspaper, but Eric Dinallo got a personal phone call Friday night.
你和我，周二早上在报纸上读到了美国国际集团倒闭的消息，但埃里克·迪纳洛周五晚上接到了一个私人电话。
Dinallo's the insurance regulator for New York State, and it was AIG's chief financial officer on his cellphone.
迪纳洛是纽约州的保险监管机构，他的手机上显示的是 AIG 的首席财务官。
Eric, we need to discuss a liquidity problem.
埃里克，我们需要讨论流动性问题。
I was in our family car driving to our cabin in Putnam County.
我开着家用车前往普特南县的小屋。
When I heard the amounts, the enormity of it, I was shocked.
当我听到这个数字，其规模之大时，我感到震惊。
What numbers did you hear that shocked you?
你听到了哪些令你震惊的数字？
Well, pretty quickly we started hearing numbers in the $40 billion range.
嗯，很快我们就开始听到 400 亿美元范围内的数字。
This was just even over the phone Friday night.
这甚至是周五晚上通过电话进行的。
Saturday morning, Dinallo heads into AIG.
周六早上，迪纳洛前往 AIG。
At the door, put the BlackBerry away, Sir, please.
在门口，请把黑莓手机收起来，先生。
He does, and enters this conference room.
他照做了，然后进入了这个会议室。
There's no space at the table.
桌子上已经没有空位了。
AIG executives, Wall Street CEOs, bankers, advisers, treasury people, they're all there sitting next to a bunch of snacks no one has touched.
美国国际集团的高管、华尔街的首席执行官、银行家、顾问、财务人员，他们都坐在一堆没人碰过的零食旁边。
AIG needs cash, and no one in the room is offering it up.
美国国际集团需要现金，但房间里没有人愿意提供现金。
Dinallo looks at his deputy, Hampton Finer.
迪纳洛看着他的副手汉普顿·费纳。
Finer looks around the room.
更仔细地环顾房间。
I think what we thought to ourselves is this is the nightmare of-- this is every insurance supervisor's nightmare.
我认为我们对自己的想法是，这是每个保险主管的噩梦。
And you were shocked by that?
你对此感到震惊吗？
Hampton Finer Very shocked, yeah.
汉普顿·芬纳 非常震惊，是的。
AIG's collapse was shocking to you and me, sure.
当然，AIG 的倒闭让你我都感到震惊。
It was shocking to people who held AIG insurance policies.
这对于持有 AIG 保单的人来说是令人震惊的。
OK.
好的。
But these guys, Eric Dinallo and Hampton Finer, they are regulators, regulators, New York State insurance regulators, guys who talk about AIG in their morning meetings, guys who go out to AIG companies and do examinations, hold conferences about AIG quarterly reports.
但是这些人，埃里克·迪纳洛和汉普顿·费纳，他们是监管者，监管者，纽约州保险监管者，在早间会议上谈论 AIG 的人，到 AIG 公司进行检查的人，召开有关 AIG 季度报告的会议的人。
These are exactly the guys you hope will not be surprised when the enormous insurance giant based in New York calls its regulator and says we have no money.
当这家总部位于纽约的巨大保险巨头打电话给监管机构并说我们没有钱时，你希望这些人不会感到惊讶。
I asked Superintendent Dinallo about that.
我向迪纳洛警长询问了此事。
You're the New York insurance regulator, doesn't that make you the guy in charge?
你是纽约保险监管机构，这难道不让你成为负责人吗？
We're the regulator for the domestic insurance companies that are domesticated in New York, but the other side was AIG Financial Products Division, that really was the part of the company that caused the taxpayer to have to put up the hundreds of billions of dollars that everyone is appropriately upset about.
我们是纽约本土保险公司的监管者，但另一边是AIG金融产品部门，这确实是公司的一部分，导致纳税人不得不缴纳数千亿美元，每个人都对此感到不舒服。
So the healthy part, your part.
所以健康的部分，就是你的部分。
That bad part, not your part.
那个糟糕的部分，不是你的部分。
Well, yes.
嗯，是的。
That's sort of a simple way of putting it, yeah.
这是一种简单的表达方式，是的。
I think it was based in Connecticut-- Greenwich, I think-- and also in London.
我认为它的总部设在康涅狄格州——我想是格林威治——以及伦敦。
A couple minutes of Google and some secretaries and the next day I'm asking Commissioner Thomas Sullivan the same question.
谷歌和一些秘书几分钟后，第二天我向托马斯·沙利文专员提出了同样的问题。
You're the insurance regulator of Connecticut.
您是康涅狄格州的保险监管机构。
And AIG, huge insurance company, has their financial products group, which was the division that was dealing in all these exotic derivatives, they had an office in Connecticut.
美国国际集团（AIG）是一家大型保险公司，拥有自己的金融产品部门，该部门负责处理所有这些奇异的衍生品，他们在康涅狄格州设有办事处。
So aren't you responsible?
那你就没有责任吗？
No. Financial products is not an insurance company.
不，金融产品不是保险公司。
AIG--
美国国际集团--
Well, AIG the holding company is not an insurance company.
嗯，控股公司 AIG 不是保险公司。
Next, I called London.
接下来，我给伦敦打了电话。
I called other places where AIG had big offices: Japan, China.
我给 AIG 设有大型办事处的其他地方打了电话：日本、中国。
I called France.
我给法国打了电话。
AIG Financial Products had a subsidiary in France.
AIG Financial Products 在法国设有子公司。
I am Corrine Dromer, and I am deputy director of communications.
我是 Corrine Dromer，我是通讯副总监。
D-R-O-M-E-R.
D-R-O-M-E-R。
Chana Joffe-Walt Great, OK.
查纳·乔夫-沃尔特 太好了，好的。
Oh, remember I just asked if I could record our conversation?
哦，记得我刚刚问我是否可以录制我们的谈话？
You can record, of course, but it's really off the record.
当然，你可以录音，但实际上是不录音的。
OK, anyway, Dromer just proceeded to tell me in, I have to say, the most snooty way possible, obviously the subsidiary was regulated by the French regulator, but the subsidiary didn't mess up the global economy, Financial Products did, and Financial Products is a US company.
好吧，无论如何，Dromer 继续告诉我，我不得不说，以最傲慢的方式可能，显然该子公司受到法国监管机构的监管，但该子公司并没有扰乱全球经济，而 Financial Products 却扰乱了全球经济，而 Financial Products 是一家美国公司。
France, not responsible for American mess-ups.
法国不对美国的混乱负责。
AIG has approximately 400 regulators in 150 countries and all 50 states.
AIG 在 150 个国家和全部 50 个州拥有大约 400 个监管机构。
I think I called 35 of them.
我想我给其中 35 个打了电话。
Do you know how hard it is to get a regulator to even talk to you, to even say the words, not my fault?
你知道要让监管者与你交谈，甚至说出这些话，而不是我的错，是多么困难吗？
Which, by the way, is what every single one of them told me.
顺便说一下，他们每个人都是这么告诉我的。
It sounds crazy, right?
听起来很疯狂，对吧？
And unsatisfying and frustrating and confusing.
并且令人不满意、令人沮丧和困惑。
But also, unfortunately, mostly legit.
但不幸的是，大部分都是合法的。
AIG was this enormous company, gigantic international operations, $1 trillion in assets.
AIG 是一家庞大的公司，拥有庞大的国际业务和 1 万亿美元的资产。
Those 400 regulators, they were each handed a small chunk of the monster.
那 400 名监管者，每人都分到了一小块怪物。
I asked Eric Dinallo, the New York insurance regulator, about that.
我就此问题询问了纽约保险监管机构埃里克·迪纳洛(Eric Dinallo)。
What percentage of AIG would you say that you were responsible for looking after?
您认为您负责照顾的 AIG 的比例是多少？
I'd have to check.
我得检查一下。
I don't know the exact percentage of the Property and Life Divisions put together internationally, so I don't want to speculate.
我不知道国际上财产和人寿部门的确切百分比，所以我不想猜测。
Can we find out?
我们能找出答案吗？
Eric Dinallo Yeah, yeah, we can do that.
埃里克·迪纳洛（Eric Dinallo）是的，是的，我们可以做到。
Thanks.
谢谢。
This took 18 minutes, four men in suits, one computer, two cell phones, and I'm not sure how many calculators, to figure out what portion of AIG this one office is in charge of.
四名西装革履的男子、一台电脑、两部手机，以及我不确定有多少台计算器，花了 18 分钟才弄清楚这一办公室负责 AIG 的哪一部分。
Here's just a little piece of all that.
这只是其中的一小部分。
Is that OK?
可以吗？
Yeah?
是的？
Did the numbers add up about the same?
这些数字加起来大致相同吗？
What did you get?
你得到了什么？
What?
什么？
And then he started banging-- and then the reporter's going to say, and then he started banging his head on the wall.
然后他开始敲打——然后记者会说，然后他开始用头撞墙。
He did bang his head on the wall.
他确实把头撞到了墙上。
And then--
然后——
I think on an assets basis, it would be somewhere between 7% and 10%.
我认为以资产为基础，这个比例应该在 7% 到 10% 之间。
Does that mean that Connecticut has 5% and Missouri has 3% and--
这是否意味着康涅狄格州有 5%，密苏里州有 3%，而且——
Oh, I'm sure.
哦，我确定。
Chana Joffe-Walt --Alabama has 4%?
Chana Joffe-Walt——阿拉巴马州有 4%？
Yeah, I'm sure if you went through and did an analysis, it would definitely be segmented similarly, actually globally.
是的，我确信如果您进行了分析，那么肯定会进行类似的细分，实际上是全球性的。
And that means that all of those states have their own individual regulators, all those countries have their own individual regulators, maybe the regions have regulators.
这意味着所有这些州都有自己的单独监管机构，所有这些国家都有自己的单独监管机构，也许各个地区都有监管机构。
Yes, that's our system.
是的，这就是我们的系统。
Chana Joffe-Walt In other words, Eric Dinallo is great at property and life and car and death insurance in New York State.
Chana Joffe-Walt 换句话说，Eric Dinallo 非常擅长纽约州的财产保险、人寿保险、汽车保险和死亡保险。
He is not-- no offense, Dinallo-- a star at airplane leasing, insurance in Bangladesh, real estate in Tokyo.
他不是——无意冒犯，迪纳洛——飞机租赁、孟加拉国保险和东京房地产领域的明星。
So Dinallo focuses in on his one thing.
所以迪纳洛专注于他的一件事。
He's given 7% to 10% of AIG, and he says, I regulated my 7% to 10% very well, thank you.
他给了AIG的7%到10%，他说，我把我的7%到10%控制得很好，谢谢。
The problem was that all these regulators with their 5% here and 3% over here, it didn't all add up to 100% of the company.
问题是，所有这些监管机构在这里占 5%，在这里占 3%，加起来并不等于公司 100%。
There were a few percentage points missing, parts of the company that nobody had specific jurisdiction over.
有几个百分点缺失，公司的某些部分没有人拥有具体的管辖权。
And that right there became the story of what went wrong with AIG.
这就是 AIG 问题的故事。
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress:
美联储主席本·伯南克告诉国会：
AIG exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system.
美国国际集团利用了监管体系中的巨大漏洞。
There was no oversight of the Financial Products Division.
金融产品部门不受监管。
The Financial Products Division was the part of the company that bought and sold derivatives, which, as you may have heard, were the complicated financial instruments that nearly sunk AIG.
金融产品部门是该公司负责买卖衍生品的部门，正如您可能听说过的那样，衍生品是一种复杂的金融工具，差点导致 AIG 沉没。
And Bernanke was saying no one was regulating that part of the company.
伯南克表示没有人在监管公司的这一部分。
And for months, that story stuck.
几个月来，这个故事一直流传至今。
And then one day, Donald Kohn, also with the Fed, he's telling that story.
然后有一天，同样在美联储工作的唐纳德·科恩 (Donald Kohn) 讲述了这个故事。
He's in a Congressional hearing, and he's going on about how, unfortunately, no one was watching that part of the company and no one was watching over the whole thing, the whole of AIG.
他正在参加国会听证会，他正在讲述不幸的是，没有人在关注公司的这一部分，也没有人在关注整个事情，整个 AIG。
Senators dutifully asking follow-ups, and then they get interrupted.
参议员们尽职尽责地询问后续情况，然后他们就被打断了。
A hunched man peeking over his glasses says, um, we were, we were in charge, we screwed up.
一个驼背的男人透过眼镜偷看说，嗯，我们是，我们负责，我们搞砸了。
Yeah.
是的。
Scott Polakoff It's time for OTS to raise their hand and say, we have some responsibility and accountability here.
Scott Polakoff 现在是 OTS 举手表示的时候了，我们在这里负有一些责任和义务。
This entity was deemed a savings and loan holding company.
该实体被视为储蓄和贷款控股公司。
We were deemed an acceptable regulator for both US domestic and international operations.
我们被认为是美国国内和国际业务可接受的监管机构。
There it was, Scott Polakoff, interim director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS, saying, blame us.
OTS 储蓄监管办公室临时主任斯科特·波拉科夫 (Scott Polakoff) 说，这就是我们的错。
Thrifts are the same as savings and loans.
储蓄与储蓄和贷款相同。
They're a type of bank.
他们是一种银行。
And the OTS regulates thrifts and holding companies that own thrifts.
OTS 监管储蓄机构和拥有储蓄机构的控股公司。
And what Scott Polakoff was saying here is, we were the thrift regulator and we were the regulator for the whole company, what's called the lead regulator, for all of AIG.
斯科特·波拉科夫 (Scott Polakoff) 在这里所说的是，我们是储蓄机构的监管者，我们是整个公司的监管者，也就是整个 AIG 的所谓的主要监管者。
We were supposed to fill in all those gaps.
我们应该填补所有这些空白。
At this moment, you can tell, watching the hearing, that congressmen, they're kind of taken aback.
此时此刻，通过观看听证会，你可以看出国会议员们有点吃惊。
They actually seem sort of incredulous.
他们实际上看起来有点难以置信。
Senator Mel Martinez leans in.
参议员梅尔·马丁内斯靠过来。
Mr. Polakoff, I wanted to-- Director Polakoff-- wanted to ask you, I was struck by your acknowledgement that perhaps you are the regulator that we've been looking for.
波拉科夫先生，我想——波拉科夫主任——想问你，你承认也许你就是我们一直在寻找的监管者，这让我很震惊。
I think that we had assumed that there wasn't one.
我认为我们已经假设没有这样的人了。
Polakoff says, yes, I'm the one, sir.
波拉科夫说，是的，我就是那个人，先生。
And Senator Jeb Hensarling from Texas, in a hearing two weeks later, he asks Polakoff, wait, did you say that?
来自德克萨斯州的参议员杰布·亨萨林 (Jeb Hensarling) 在两周后的听证会上问波拉科夫，等等，你是这么说的吗？
I believe I heard, in an earlier answer to one of the questions, I believe I heard you say that OTS in 2004 should have stopped the book of business that I think you were alluding to, the CDS and the AIG securities lending commitments.
我相信我在早些时候对其中一个问题的回答中听到您说，2004 年的 OTS 应该停止我认为您提到的业务，即 CDS 和 AIG 证券借贷承诺。
Did I understand you correctly?
我对你的理解正确吗？
Yes, sir.
是的，先生。
Senator Jeb Hensarling So, if you said you should have stopped it in 2004, that implies you could have stopped it in 2004.
参议员 Jeb Hensarling 所以，如果你说你应该在 2004 年停止它，那就意味着你可以在 2004 年停止它。
Is that correct?
这是正确的吗？
Yes, sir.
是的，先生。
Chana Joffe-Walt Senator Hensarling then says, so it wasn't that you didn't have the authority, it wasn't a lack of resources, it wasn't a lack of experience, you just flat made a mistake?
Chana Joffe-Walt参议员Hensarling接着说道，所以不是你没有权力，不是缺乏资源，也不是缺乏经验，你只是犯了一个错误？
Polakoff says, once again, yes, sir.
波拉科夫再次说道，是的，先生。
So, here's this guy standing up and saying, yes, me, I'm the one you've been looking for.
所以，这个人站起来说，是的，我，我就是你一直在寻找的人。
And everyone kind of goes, you?
每个人都会去，你呢？
Who are you?
你是谁？
I'm guessing you've never heard of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
我猜你从来没有听说过储蓄监督办公室。
The OTS is the smallest federal bank regulator, and it's the youngest, 20 years old.
OTS是最小的联邦银行监管机构，也是最年轻的，只有20岁。
I did call the OTS several times.
我确实给OTS打过几次电话。
No one talked to me about AIG.
没有人跟我谈论 AIG。
The press guy told me, we've testified before Congress twice, we're not going to go beyond that.
新闻界人士告诉我，我们已经在国会作证两次了，我们不会再做更多的事情了。
So then I started calling the regulation expert people, like Patricia McCoy.
于是我开始给监管专家打电话，比如帕特里夏·麦考伊（Patricia McCoy）。
She's a law professor at the University of Connecticut, someone who in her free time sits down with a pen and paper and does bank autopsies.
她是康涅狄格大学的法学教授，闲暇时会拿着纸和笔坐下来进行银行尸检。
She'll research failed institutions, look at what went wrong.
她会研究失败的机构，看看哪里出了问题。
You know, for fun.
你知道，为了好玩。
So one night, McCoy's making this graph of major bank failures from '07 and '08.
一天晚上，麦考伊制作了这张 07 年和 08 年主要银行倒闭的图表。
It was late at night.
已经是深夜了。
I tend to work late at night.
我经常工作到深夜。
I had filled in the asset sizes, and then I had to do a little research to see who the regulators were.
我填写了资产规模，然后我必须做一些研究，看看监管者是谁。
And when I started typing in OTS, OTS, OTS, I went, what happened at this agency?
当我开始输入 OTS、OTS、OTS 时，我想，这个机构发生了什么？
It's been flying under the radar and we didn't notice.
它一直在雷达下飞行，我们没有注意到。
Which institutions were you seeing and writing OTS in next to them?
您看到了哪些机构并在它们旁边写了 OTS？
IndyMac, Washington Mutual, Downey Savings and Loan, NetBank.
印地麦克银行、华盛顿互助银行、唐尼储蓄贷款银行、NetBank。
You might recognize some of those names.
您可能认识其中一些名字。
For instance, IndyMac, the most expensive bank failure of this crisis, regulated by the OTS.
例如，IndyMac 是这场危机中损失最惨重的银行，受 OTS 监管。
Second most expensive, Bank United, regulated by the OTS.
第二贵的是 Bank United，受 OTS 监管。
The largest bank ever to fail, Washington Mutual, OTS.
有史以来最大的倒闭银行：华盛顿互惠银行 (Washington Mutual)，OTS。
Other OTS claims to fame, Countrywide and AIG.
其他知名的 OTS 包括 Countrywide 和 AIG。
The reputation of Office of Thrift Supervision was that it was the weakest and the laxest and it was, indeed, outright friendly to the worst of the non-prime lending.
储蓄监管办公室的名声是它是最弱和最宽松的，而且它确实对最糟糕的非优质贷款完全友好。
This is William Black.
这是威廉·布莱克。
He's professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.
他是密苏里大学堪萨斯城分校的教授。
And he used to work as a lawyer for the Office of Thrift Supervision back in the early '90s.
上世纪九十年代初，他曾在储蓄监管办公室担任律师。
Black says the idea that the OTS could ever go up against AIG, the world's largest insurance company, well--
布莱克表示，OTS 可能会与世界上最大的保险公司 AIG 抗衡——
No contest.
没有比赛。
It's like the super heavyweight of the world going up against the 65-pound, 13-year-old class weakling.
这就像世界超重量级选手对抗体重 65 磅、13 岁的弱者。
That was the OTS.
那就是OTS。
You think about how institutions get their regulators, and you just think, they must get assigned one, right?
你想想机构如何获得监管者，你就会想，他们必须被指派一位监管者，对吧？
It's like, you get assigned a boss, someone tells you who your regulator is.
这就像，你被分配了一个老板，有人告诉你谁是你的监管者。
No, if you're a national bank, you have four choices.
不，如果您是一家国家银行，您有四种选择。
And maybe you knew this already, but this seemed insane to me.
也许你已经知道这一点，但这对我来说似乎很疯狂。
Financial institutions, they choose their regulators.
金融机构，他们选择监管机构。
They go regulator shopping.
他们去监管机构购物。
And when AIG was regulator shopping, the OTS looked pretty good.
当 AIG 向监管机构采购时，OTS 看起来相当不错。
The OTS was actually created because another regulator really messed up, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
OTS 实际上是因为另一个监管机构——联邦住房贷款银行委员会——搞砸了而创建的。
It used to regulate savings and loans until the savings and loan crisis in the late '80s, at which point Congress abolished it and created the OTS.
它曾经用于监管储蓄和贷款，直到 80 年代末发生储蓄和贷款危机，此时国会废除了它并创建了 OTS。
And I talked to several people who worked for that predecessor agency, The Bank Board, and they described that, on that day, the day the OTS was created, they left the office, these agency employees, and they walked across the street to a hotel.
我和几位在该前身机构银行董事会工作的人交谈过，他们描述说，在 OTS 创建的那一天，他们离开了办公室，这些机构的员工，步行穿过街道去了一家酒店。
They turned on the TV, and they sat and watched the first President Bush stand up at a podium and declare, never again will America allow any insured institution to operate without enough money.
他们打开电视，坐下来看着第一任布什总统站在讲台上宣布，美国再也不会允许任何受保机构在没有足够资金的情况下运作。
And then the agency employees watched as the president trashed their agency.
然后，该机构的员工就眼睁睁地看着总统毁掉了他们的机构。
The press conference ended, they turned off the TV, left the hotel, crossed the street, and went back to work.
发布会结束，他们关掉电视，离开酒店，穿过马路，回去工作。
Pretty soon, someone came by and changed the sign, the Office of Thrift Supervision.
很快，就有人过来换了牌子：储蓄监管办公室。
So there was this newborn savings and loan regulator, and for a while it did try to change its ways.
于是就有了这个新生的储蓄和贷款监管机构，有一段时间它确实试图改变自己的方式。
A new administration brought in new management, but the OTS was in a tough spot.
新一届政府带来了新的管理层，但 OTS 陷入了困境。
Savings and loans were dropping like flies, and this was a problem for the OTS, a serious problem, because-- and this brings us to an even more insane fact about the way our system of regulation works-- federal bank regulators, they're paid by the banks, the people they're supposed to be regulating.
储蓄和贷款像苍蝇一样下降，这对 OTS 来说是一个问题，一个严重的问题，因为——这让我们看到了关于我们的监管体系运作方式的一个更加疯狂的事实——联邦银行监管机构，他们的报酬是由银行支付的，而银行是他们应该监管的人。
They don't get a government budget.
他们没有得到政府预算。
The more banks they regulate, the more money they have.
他们监管的银行越多，他们拥有的钱就越多。
So, if you're the thrift regulator, and hundreds of thrifts just drop dead, that's a problem for you.
所以，如果你是储蓄机构的监管者，而数百家储蓄机构倒闭了，这对你来说就是一个问题。
The OTS was losing revenue and losing revenue, and it was shrinking its staff.
OTS 的收入不断流失，并且正在裁员。
So the staff feared that they would lose their jobs.
因此，员工们担心自己会失业。
And of course, the bosses feared, why do they need an agency if there are fewer and fewer institutions?
当然，老板们担心，如果机构越来越少，他们为什么还需要一个机构呢？
So they were desperate to try to get banks to convert so they'd be regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Office of Thrift Supervision would get the revenue and be able to stay in business.
因此，他们迫切希望银行进行转型，以便受到储蓄监管办公室的监管，而储蓄监管办公室将获得收入并能够继续经营。
Now, the OTS couldn't hold a press conference and say, hello, we're having a going-out-of-business sale.
现在，OTS 不能召开新闻发布会并说，你好，我们正在进行停业销售。
We'll be the laxest regulator in town.
我们将成为城里最宽松的监管者。
Come on down, sign up.
下来吧，报名。
No, instead they went to industry meetings.
不，相反，他们去参加了行业会议。
They talked about the services they offered, how you could do more things.
他们谈论了他们提供的服务，以及如何做更多的事情。
And they did make sure to show up at other kinds of press conferences, make their presence known.
他们确实确保出现在其他类型的新闻发布会上，让人们知道他们的存在。
Like, this one time a bunch of federal regulators were getting together to announce a campaign to ease regulation, cut through red tape, and James Gilleran, the head of the Office of Thrift Supervision, he shows up for the photo op.
比如，有一次，一群联邦监管机构齐聚一堂，宣布开展一项放松监管、消除繁文缛节的运动，储蓄监管办公室主任詹姆斯·吉勒兰 (James Gilleran) 出现在合影中。
Gilleran, just by the way, did not return calls, so Patricia McCoy and William Black, they paint the picture.
顺便说一句，吉勒兰没有回电话，所以帕特里夏·麦考伊和威廉·布莱克，他们描绘了这幅画。
They were essentially standing in a horseshoe.
他们基本上站在马蹄铁上。
Behind them is a banner that announces the new regulatory relief campaign.
他们身后是一面横幅，宣布新的监管救济活动。
And they're all grinning broadly and poised over a stack of the federal regulations to demonstrate their intention to cut through all the federal regulations.
他们都咧着嘴笑，在一堆联邦法规面前摆好姿势，以表明他们打算突破所有联邦法规。
The other official regulators showed up at the press conference with garden shears, and each of them is holding up their instrument ready to clip.
其他官方监管人员也带着园艺剪刀出现在新闻发布会上，每个人都举着自己的工具准备剪草。
Very picturesque.
非常风景如画。
Gilleran showed up with a chainsaw.
吉勒兰带着电锯出现了。
Companies got the message.
公司得到了这个消息。
In 2000, General Motors bought a thrift.
2000年，通用汽车公司收购了一家储蓄机构。
Next year, so did GE.
明年，通用电气也是如此。
A few years after that, H&R Block had a thrift.
几年后，H&R Block 开设了一家储蓄机构。
And in 2000, a large insurance conglomerate called AIG opened a small savings and loan in Delaware.
2000 年，一家名为 AIG 的大型保险集团在特拉华州开设了一家小额储蓄和贷款公司。
It was 1/1000 of AIG's total balance sheet, but that meant AIG could get OTS as its lead regulator, overseeing its entire business.
它占 AIG 总资产负债表的 1/1000，但这意味着 AIG 可以让 OTS 作为其主要监管机构，监督其整个业务。
All of it.
所有这一切。
The holding company regulator, the international regulator.
控股公司监管机构，国际监管机构。
Calling up the world's regulators and asking, which one of you screwed up with AIG?
打电话给世界各地的监管机构并询问，你们当中哪一位把 AIG 搞砸了？
Extremely frustrating.
非常令人沮丧。
But talking to people about the OTS, I've got to say it's pretty satisfying hearing, man, they screwed up.
但当我和人们谈论 OTS 时，我不得不说，这真是令人满足，伙计，他们搞砸了。
Finally, it's clear-cut, simple answer, easy villain, great.
最后，这是一个明确、简单的答案，轻松的小人，很棒。
Should have stopped there.
应该停在那里。
I don't care who was the regulator.
我不在乎谁是监管者。
I don't think they would have caught this.
我不认为他们会发现这一点。
And I hope we don't get diverted to that side show.
我希望我们不会被转移到那个余兴表演上。
It's getting diverted to side shows that unfortunately doesn't solve things.
不幸的是，它被转移到了副业节目中，但这并不能解决问题。
This is Mike Roster.
这是迈克·罗斯特。
He's a veteran regulation lawyer, and he says, sure, you can dump on the OTS if you want, but spread out your anger a little.
他是一位经验丰富的监管律师，他说，当然，如果你愿意，你可以向 OTS 倾诉，但要稍微分散你的愤怒。
First of all, save some for Congress.
首先，为国会留一些。
Back in December of 2000, Congress passed legislation that made it incredibly hard to regulate the exact part of AIG that caused all the problems.
早在 2000 年 12 月，国会就通过了立法，这使得监管 AIG 造成所有问题的具体部分变得异常困难。
It was this law called the Commodity Futures Modernization Act.
这部法律被称为《商品期货现代化法案》。
And it said, certain kinds of derivatives-- those complicated financial instruments at the heart of AIG's problems-- cannot be regulated by the federal agencies that typically watch over that kind of thing.
报告称，某些类型的衍生品——这些复杂的金融工具是美国国际集团问题的核心——不能受到通常负责此类事务的联邦机构的监管。
Let me just repeat that.
让我重复一遍。
In 2000, Congress decided federal regulators could not regulate the thing that got AIG into trouble.
2000 年，国会决定联邦监管机构不能对导致 AIG 陷入困境的事情进行监管。
President Clinton signed that act into law.
克林顿总统签署该法案成为法律。
In retrospect, it seems crazy, but at the time derivatives were still a pretty small market.
回想起来，这似乎很疯狂，但当时衍生品市场仍然很小。
Politicians just didn't see the risk, which means, in the end, that even if the OTS had really, really wanted to regulate the hell out of AIG, in theory, as the lead overarching regulator, they could do it, but they would have had to step in and do things that were really the specialized job of this other federal agency, a job Congress had just barred that agency from doing.
政客们只是没有看到风险，这意味着，最终，即使 OTS 真的非常想彻底监管 AIG，理论上，作为主要监管机构，他们也可以做到，但他们必须介入并做一些真正属于另一个联邦机构的专门工作的事情，而国会刚刚禁止该机构做这项工作。
And Roster says, don't use up all your anger on Congress either.
罗斯特说，也不要把你所有的愤怒都花在国会身上。
How about all those other firms that did deals with AIG?
那些与 AIG 有过交易的其他公司又如何呢？
All firms with regulators, by the way, who thought everything looked great.
顺便说一句，所有有监管机构的公司都认为一切看起来都很好。
And they thought everything looked great at AIG, not because the OTS was doing such a bang-up job regulating.
他们认为 AIG 的一切看起来都很棒，并不是因为 OTS 的监管工作做得如此出色。
No one, Roster says, was paying any attention to the OTS.
罗斯特说，没有人关注 OTS。
No, no. The reality is no. If you're doing trades with AIG, if you're buying billions of dollars of insurance from them, you're not looking at the OTS.
不，不。事实是否定的。如果您与 AIG 进行交易，如果您从他们那里购买了数十亿美元的保险，那么您就不会考虑 OTS。
You're actually looking at the Standard & Poor's and Moody's ratings.
您实际上正在查看标准普尔和穆迪的评级。
There is AIG getting a Triple A rating, and those are very smart people at the rating agencies.
美国国际集团 (AIG) 获得了 3A 评级，评级机构中的这些人都是非常聪明的人。
So, if you want to know which regulator to blame AIG on, it's not the state insurance regulators, or London, definitely not France, the Office of Thrift Supervision officially takes the blame, but then we can also point the finger at Congress and the rating agencies.
所以，如果你想知道该归咎于哪个监管机构，AIG 不是国家保险监管机构，也不是伦敦，绝对不是法国，储蓄监管办公室正式承担责任，但我们也可以将矛头指向国会和评级机构。
The rating agencies, now, they were supposed to be looking at each and every bond, each and every derivative, to make sure it was safe.
现在，评级机构应该关注每一种债券、每一种衍生品，以确保其安全。
The rating agencies are a whole other can of worms, and one we will open in just a minute.
评级机构是另一堆蠕虫，我们将在一分钟内打开它。
Well, I couldn't have said that better myself.
嗯，我自己说得再好不过了。
Thank you, Chana Jaffe-Walt.
谢谢你，查纳·贾菲-沃尔特。
We have can openers at the ready and worms ready for the close-up.
我们已经准备好了开罐器和蠕虫以供特写。
And by worms I don't mean to disparage anybody in our nation's financial industry.
我所说的蠕虫并不是要贬低我们国家金融业中的任何人。
That's in a minute from Chicago Public Radio and Public Radio International when our program continues.
一分钟后，芝加哥公共广播电台和国际公共广播电台将继续我们的节目。
This American Life.
这美国生活。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Come to order.
前来订购。
Come to order, please.
请前来订购。
Well, we in our program are hungry for the kind of hearings that they had back in the 1930s after the stock market crash, where investigator Ferdinand Pecora made complicated Wall Street shenanigans understandable to everybody.
好吧，我们节目中的人渴望参加 1930 年代股市崩盘后举行的听证会，调查员费迪南德·佩科拉 (Ferdinand Pecora) 在那里让每个人都能理解复杂的华尔街恶作剧。
And so, because we don't have those yet, we are holding our own hearings today, right now.
因此，因为我们还没有这些，所以我们今天就现在举行自己的听证会。
And we turn our attention now in these hearings to the credit ratings agencies.
我们现在将听证会的注意力转向信用评级机构。
When all those financial instruments that brought down our economy, the mortgage-backed securities, the derivatives, all that stuff, were originally issued, three rating agencies, Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch, gave many of those things their top rating of Triple A, meaning very low risk, as safe as can be.
当所有那些拖垮我们经济的金融工具、抵押贷款支持证券、衍生品以及所有这些东西最初发行时，三个评级机构，标准普尔、穆迪和惠誉，给其中许多东西最高评级为 3A，这意味着风险非常低，尽可能安全。
Because of the great ratings, trillions of dollars went into those financial instruments and into the housing market, creating a big bubble, of course.
由于评级很高，数万亿美元进入了这些金融工具和房地产市场，当然，造成了巨大的泡沫。
And of course, the ratings did not turn out to be correct.
当然，评级结果并不正确。
Standard & Poor's, for example, has downgraded roughly half, half, of its triple As, some way down to almost its lowest level, the Triple C.
例如，标准普尔已将其三A评级的大约一半、一半下调至几乎最低水平，即三C评级。
The rating agencies just had one job to do, assess how risky these things were.
评级机构只有一项工作要做，评估这些事情的风险有多大。
That seems pretty clear.
这看起来很清楚。
On that job, they failed.
在那项工作上，他们失败了。
So should they take a lot of blame for the global financial crisis?
那么他们应该为全球金融危机承担很多责任吗？
Well, our hearing continues.
好吧，我们的听证会仍在继续。
Here's Alex Blumberg and David Kestenbaum.
请听 Alex Blumberg 和 David Kestenbaum 的报道。
Pretty much anyone who issues a bond gets a rating from the rating agencies.
几乎任何发行债券的人都会得到评级机构的评级。
Companies, cities, even entire countries get rated.
公司、城市、甚至整个国家都会受到评级。
Standard & Poor's gives IBM an A+.
标准普尔给予 IBM A+ 评级。
The Saint Louis County School District R-9 gets a double A-.
圣路易斯县学区 R-9 获得双 A-。
Argentina, B-.
阿根廷，B-。
There's this old book, Moody's Analysis of Investments, Steam Railroads, 1917.
有一本老书，穆迪投资分析，蒸汽铁路，1917 年。
Adirondack Railroad?
阿迪朗达克铁路？
Triple A rating.
三A评级。
Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad?
阿伯丁和石斑鱼铁路？
Stay away from that one.
远离那个人。
They got a B.
他们得了B。
So for something like 100 years, this is what the rating agencies have done, tried to answer one simple and critical question, if I lend someone money, buy one of their bonds, am I going to get my money back?
因此，大约一百年来，这就是评级机构所做的事情，试图回答一个简单而关键的问题，如果我借钱给某人，购买他们的一张债券，我能拿回我的钱吗？
But in the early 1980s, a different kind of bond came along.
但在 20 世纪 80 年代初，出现了一种不同类型的债券。
Today they go by many names, mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations.
如今，它们有很多名称：抵押贷款支持证券、债务抵押债券。
They all fall under the broad heading of structured finance, which is basically that thing you've heard a lot about.
它们都属于结构性融资的广义标题，这基本上是您经常听说的事情。
Thousands of loans or mortgages pooled together in bundles and then sold as bonds.
数以千计的贷款或抵押贷款捆绑在一起，然后作为债券出售。
And their numbers grew.
他们的人数不断增加。
Over the last decade, Wall Street created trillions of dollars of these bonds.
在过去的十年里，华尔街创造了数万亿美元的此类债券。
And the rating agencies rated them.
评级机构对它们进行了评级。
Frank Raiter worked for one of these agencies, Standard & Poor's, in the Structured Finance Division.
弗兰克·雷特 (Frank Raiter) 在这些机构之一——标准普尔公司的结构性融资部门工作。
We were the fastest-growing, most profitable group within Standard & Poor's for a while, at least in 2005, 2004-2005.
有一段时间，我们是标准普尔内部增长最快、利润最高的集团，至少在 2005 年、2004-2005 年是这样。
These days, Frank Raiter lives far away from Wall Street.
如今，弗兰克·雷特住在远离华尔街的地方。
In fact, he's out of cellphone reach entirely.
事实上，他完全超出了手机的联系范围。
He's clearing himself a little farm in rural Virginia.
他正在弗吉尼亚州乡村清理一座小农场。
He does have an office, but it's got a turtle in it.
他确实有一间办公室，但里面有一只乌龟。
And the reason I wanted to talk to him is that Frank Raiter was at Standard & Poor's at the very beginning, when the structured finance products were really taking off.
我想和他谈话的原因是 Frank Raiter 一开始就在标准普尔工作，当时结构性金融产品才真正起飞。
And he was on the team people that had to figure out the best way to give them letter grades.
他是团队中的一员，必须找出给他们字母评分的最佳方法。
So let's say you had a mortgage-backed security.
假设您有抵押贷款支持证券。
It's made up of, like, 5,000 or so mortgages.
它由大约 5,000 项抵押贷款组成。
Basically, you have to estimate how safe each of those 5,000 people is, how likely they are to default.
基本上，你必须估计这 5,000 人中每个人的安全程度以及他们违约的可能性有多大。
Raiter says when he first started working at Standard & Poor's, they had databases on all kinds of borrowers, ones with good credit, bad credit.
雷特说，当他刚开始在标准普尔工作时，他们拥有各种借款人的数据库，包括信用良好和信用不良的借款人。
And to figure out how likely the borrower is to default, they hired a company, a math company.
为了弄清楚借款人违约的可能性有多大，他们聘请了一家公司，一家数学公司。
And the math company made them a computer model based on an actual equation.
数学公司根据实际方程为他们制作了一个计算机模型。
It's used in codebreaking and encryption and areas like that.
它用于密码破译和加密等领域。
There was an actual equation.
有一个实际的方程。
There is an actual equation.
有一个实际的方程。
Oh yeah.
哦，是的。
There's an actual econometric equation.
有一个实际的计量经济学方程。
Oh yeah.
哦，是的。
David Kestenbaum What'd it look like?
大卫·凯斯滕鲍姆 它是什么样子的？
So, for the first five years or so that Frank was with Standard & Poor's, things went pretty well, he says.
因此，弗兰克在标准普尔工作的头五年左右，一切进展顺利，他说。
They were taking their historical data about borrower behavior, feeding it into the model, and using the results to issue their ratings.
他们获取有关借款人行为的历史数据，将其输入模型，并使用结果来发布评级。
But then, in the early 2000s, as we've heard, banks started issuing mortgages to people who wouldn't have gotten them before, people with bad credit scores, putting no money down and not saying what kind of job they had.
但后来，正如我们所知，在 2000 年代初，银行开始向以前无法获得抵押贷款的人、信用评分不佳的人发放抵押贷款，他们不存任何钱，也不透露他们从事什么工作。
There wasn't much history on how this kind of borrower would behave.
关于这种借款人的行为方式的历史记录并不多。
The equation couldn't really handle them, and that worried Frank.
这个方程无法真正处理它们，这让弗兰克很担心。
He says they had to basically guess at the default probabilities, put magic numbers into the model.
他说，他们基本上必须猜测默认概率，将幻数放入模型中。
Raiter says the only way that seemed OK to him was if they started collecting data on these new borrowers to see how they performed over time, so they'd have some real historical data to put into the equation.
雷特说，他认为唯一可行的方法是，他们开始收集这些新借款人的数据，看看他们随着时间的推移表现如何，这样他们就有了一些真实的历史数据可以放入方程式中。
But when he went to his bosses saying, we need a new model, we need to collect more data, this is the answer he got.
但当他去找老板说，我们需要一个新模型，我们需要收集更多数据时，这就是他得到的答案。
You've got 94% market share.
你已经拥有 94% 的市场份额。
You're not going to get any more if we build a new model.
如果我们建立一个新模型，你将不会得到更多。
To them it was just a tool, and we were making a lot of money with it, so why change it?
对他们来说，这只是一个工具，我们用它赚了很多钱，那为什么要改变它呢？
Did they say that to you specifically in conversations, look, we have 94% market share, like, why do we need a better model?
他们是否在谈话中专门对你说过，你看，我们拥有 94% 的市场份额，比如，为什么我们需要更好的模型？
Yeah.
是的。
That was a conversation that I had on several occasions.
这是我多次进行过的谈话。
They should have just said, you know what?
他们应该直接说，你知道吗？
We don't have enough information about this new product to ascribe a rating to it, but they couldn't do that.
我们没有足够的有关此新产品的信息来对其进行评级，但他们无法做到这一点。
This brings us to witness number 2, Jim Finkel.
这让我们看到了第二个证人，吉姆·芬克尔。
He works at a company called Dynamic Credit, and some of you might remember him from an earlier This American Life episode, The Giant Pool of Money.
他在一家名为 Dynamic Credit 的公司工作，你们中的一些人可能还记得他在《美国生活》早期剧集《巨额资金池》中的形象。
He was the guy putting together some of these structured finance deals that the rating agencies were rating.
他负责整理一些评级机构正在评级的结构性融资交易。
He was with Wall Street.
他在华尔街。
And he says what a lot of people say: one reason the rating agencies didn't just say no, put the brakes on everything, it would have cost them money.
他说了很多人说的话：评级机构不只是说不、对一切踩刹车的原因之一是，这会让他们损失金钱。
The rating agencies get paid by the Wall Street investment banks who are creating and selling the bonds.
评级机构从发行和销售债券的华尔街投资银行那里获得报酬。
If a rating agency said to one of them, I'm not going to rate this newfangled bond of yours, I don't have enough information, Wall Street had an answer, a very persuasive one.
如果一家评级机构对其中一个人说，我不会对你们这种新型债券进行评级，我没有足够的信息，华尔街有一个答案，一个非常有说服力的答案。
Wall Street said, hey, if you don't, the guy across the street will, and we'll give him all the business.
华尔街说，嘿，如果你不这样做，街对面的人就会这样做，我们会把所有的生意都给他。
And they played the rating agencies off one another and the rating agencies were basically facing, are we ready to give up 40% of our revenues because we're saying we're not ready to rate this kind of new product?
他们互相欺骗评级机构，而评级机构基本上面临着这样的问题：我们是否准备好放弃 40% 的收入，因为我们说我们还没有准备好对这种新产品进行评级？
It would have been financial suicide for them.
这对他们来说无异于经济自杀。
Does it mean they get rid of their rules altogether?
这是否意味着他们完全摆脱了规则？
No. But does it mean they might make compromises here or there?
不。但这是否意味着他们可能会在这里或那里做出妥协？
Maybe.
或许。
Felicia Grumet, like Jim Finkel, worked on Wall Street, at Bear Stearns.
费利西亚·格鲁梅特（Felicia Grumet）和吉姆·芬克尔（Jim Finkel）一样，都曾在华尔街的贝尔斯登公司工作。
We'll call her witness 2A.
我们称她为证人 2A。
She also created these bonds, and she explained how she would try and get the rating she wanted from the rating agencies.
她还创建了这些债券，并解释了她将如何尝试从评级机构获得她想要的评级。
For instance, sometimes she'd have a new type of deal she needed to get rated.
例如，有时她需要一种新类型的交易来获得评级。
The rating agencies didn't have a set methodology for rating something new like this, and so her team would propose a structure to try to get as much of the deal Triple A as possible.
评级机构没有一套固定的方法来对这样的新事物进行评级，因此她的团队会提出一个结构，以尽可能多地获得 3A 的交易。
In some ways, we were part of developing the methodology with them because we'd be trying to argue you should look at it this way or that way.
在某些方面，我们是与他们一起开发方法的一部分，因为我们试图说服你应该这样或那样地看待它。
And they would go off on their end and their committees or whatever, and they would come back to us and say, well, this is our expected levels of Triple A and other bonds in the structure.
他们会在他们的末端和他们的委员会或其他什么地方发脾气，然后他们会回来告诉我们，好吧，这是我们对 3A 和结构中其他债券的预期水平。
And we might say, well, that doesn't work, you have to go back to the drawing board, so to speak.
我们可能会说，好吧，这行不通，可以这么说，你必须回到绘图板。
We need more Triple A.
我们需要更多的 TripA。
Felicia Grumet Did it happen that specifically?
Felicia Grumet 是不是特别发生过这种事？
I don't know.
我不知道。
But that was part of it.
但这是其中的一部分。
That was part of it.
这是其中的一部分。
Felicia and I had talked for a long time, and so said that eking the most out of every deal, scouring the rules for every loophole, that was just what you did.
费利西亚和我谈了很长时间，所以说，从每笔交易中获得最大收益，搜寻规则中的每一个漏洞，这就是你所做的。
That was everyone's job on Wall Street.
这是华尔街每个人的工作。
It makes me feel really bad, so actually it's very hard for me to acknowledge.
这让我感觉很糟糕，所以实际上我很难承认。
Yeah.
是的。
Felicia Grumet I knew I was doing things to get around the rules.
Felicia Grumet 我知道我正在做一些事情来规避规则。
And I wasn't proud of it, but I did it anyway.
我并不为此感到自豪，但我还是这么做了。
When a lot of these securities were being rated Triple A, did you think, there's no way that's Triple A?
当很多此类证券被评为 3A 级时，您是否认为这不可能是 3A 级？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
Alex Blumberg Again, Structured Finance Manager Jim Finkel.
Alex Blumberg 又是结构性融资经理 Jim Finkel。
There were ratings that we saw that made no sense to us.
我们看到一些评级对我们来说毫无意义。
We knew the rating agency models and metrics, and we could replicate them ourselves, and we couldn't make sense of what they were doing.
我们知道评级机构的模型和指标，我们可以自己复制它们，但我们无法理解他们在做什么。
Did they rate your stuff higher than you thought it should have been rated?
他们对你的东西的评价是否比你想象的要高？
I think we marveled at the ratings that all these CDO products got.
我认为我们对所有这些 CDO 产品获得的评级感到惊讶。
It was very hard to say that we didn't enjoy the fact that we could get a rating.
很难说我们不喜欢能够获得评级。
And to be honest with you, that in and of itself probably prevented us from asking ourselves the very difficult question of was that rating just or not.
老实说，这本身可能阻止我们问自己一个非常困难的问题：评级是否公正。
OK, Dave, we just have one final witness for the prosecution.
好的，戴夫，我们只剩下最后一名控方证人了。
She comes from the one corner of this whole thing that we haven't heard from: the investor.
她来自整个事件中我们从未听说过的一个角落：投资者。
Mabel Yu, yeah.
梅布尔·于，是的。
She worked at Vanguard, which manages $400 billion in bond investments.
她曾在 Vanguard 工作，该公司管理着 4000 亿美元的债券投资。
And every time a new structured finance deal came out, these deals, with their Triple A bonds, would land on her desk and on the desks of hundreds of people like her.
每当新的结构性融资交易出现时，这些交易及其 3A 债券都会落在她的办公桌上，以及数百个像她一样的人的办公桌上。
And those deals looked great to a lot of investors, but they did not look great to Mabel Yu.
这些交易对很多投资者来说看起来很棒，但对 Mabel Yu 来说却不太好。
I got names of the rating agencies analysts, and I asked them lots of questions.
我得到了评级机构分析师的名字，并向他们提出了很多问题。
In the beginning, the questions would be 15 minutes to half an hour, but then it turned into hours and many hours for me to understand the risk profile of the deal.
一开始，问问题的时间是 15 分钟到半小时，但后来我花了好几个小时来了解交易的风险状况。
And what did they say to you?
他们对你说了什么？
Mabel Yu I asked them, OK, Triple A is supposed to be minimum risk.
Mabel Yu 我问他们，好吧，Triple A 应该是风险最小的。
What Triple A really means is, even if things go bad simultaneously, at the same time, our investors would still be protected.
Triple A的真正含义是，即使事情同时变坏，我们的投资者仍然会受到保护。
That means if the economy goes down, if the housing prices go down, if the interest rates go up, if all of those things happen at the same time, what would happen to our investment?
这意味着如果经济衰退，如果房价下跌，如果利率上升，如果所有这些事情同时发生，我们的投资会发生什么？
And I could not get a straight answer.
我无法得到直接的答案。
Did they say, look, you worry too much, we have a lot of smart people working on this?
他们是否说，看，你担心太多了，我们有很多聪明的人在研究这个？
Many, many, many, many times.
很多很多很多很多次。
I felt so dumb many, many times.
很多很多次我都觉得自己很愚蠢。
Yep.
是的。
And they asked me, in many ways, they asked me, don't worry about it.
他们问我，在很多方面，他们问我，别担心。
Have a life.
有一个生活。
Instead of staying up so late and preparing all those hours of questions for them, just go and enjoy my life.
与其熬夜为他们准备好几个小时的问题，不如去享受我的生活。
I worry too much.
我担心太多了。
Almost every day.
几乎每天。
Almost every day?
几乎每天？
Mabel Yu Yes, yes, yes.
于美宝 是的，是的，是的。
If you look back, what was the thing that was missed?
如果你回头看，你错过了什么？
And here, at long last, is the defendant, or at least an employee of the defendant, Tom Warrack.
终于，被告，或者至少是被告汤姆·沃拉克（Tom Warrack）的雇员来了。
He actually used to work for Frank Raiter, the guy on the farm.
他实际上曾经为弗兰克·雷特（Frank Raiter）工作，他是农场里的人。
With the turtle.
与乌龟。
Warrack has been at Standard and Poor's for over 15 years.
Warrack 已在标准普尔工作超过 15 年。
He's helped rate hundreds of mortgage-backed securities.
他帮助对数百种抵押贷款支持证券进行了评级。
And we asked him about Frank Raiter's concerns, that mortgages were being given out to a new type of borrower with low credit scores and little documentation.
我们向他询问了弗兰克·雷特（Frank Raiter）的担忧，即抵押贷款正在发放给信用评分低且文件很少的新型借款人。
Never before in the history of the country, dating back to The Great Depression, have we had the type of nationwide declines in home prices and the associated default levels.
自大萧条以来，美国历史上从未出现过全国范围内房价和相关违约水平下降的情况。
I mean, there are people who would say these were loans given out to people who didn't even have to prove they had jobs.
我的意思是，有人会说这些贷款是发放给那些甚至不需要证明自己有工作的人的。
We had no data on how these loans were going to perform.
我们没有关于这些贷款将如何运作的数据。
How could you rate these things?
你如何评价这些事情？
It's important to understand, the riskier we believed the loan was, the more loss reserves needed to be incorporated into the transaction for us to rate a transaction Triple A.
重要的是要理解，我们认为贷款的风险越大，交易中需要纳入的损失准备金就越多，以便我们将交易评级为 3A。
But there are people who would say you had no data to know what the real risk of those people defaulting was.
但有人会说，你没有数据来了解这些人违约的真正风险是什么。
How could you go and rate something where you didn't have any data on how these loans were going to perform?
如果您没有任何有关这些贷款的表现的数据，您怎么能去对某些东西进行评级呢？
Well, we had lots of data.
嗯，我们有很多数据。
We had years' worth of data as to as to how borrowers perform over time.
我们拥有多年关于借款人随时间表现如何的数据。
For these loans?
为了这些贷款？
For people who didn't have to prove they had a job?
对于那些不需要证明自己有工作的人？
You had lots of data for that?
你有很多这方面的数据吗？
Through our analytical process, we're able to develop assumptions around what we believe the future will be like for these particular borrowers.
通过我们的分析过程，我们能够对这些特定借款人的未来发展做出假设。
Let's examine that last sentence.
让我们看一下最后一句话。
We are able to develop assumptions around what the future will be like for these particular borrowers.
我们能够对这些特定借款人的未来做出假设。
I think that's one frustration many people have.
我认为这是很多人都有的挫败感之一。
Those are not the words people are looking for.
这些不是人们正在寻找的词。
The words people are looking for are these, I'm sorry, we were wrong.
人们正在寻找的词是这些，对不起，我们错了。
Moody's declined our request for interviews, but the president of Standard & Poor's, Deven Sharma, did agree to speak with us.
穆迪拒绝了我们的采访请求，但标准普尔总裁德文·夏尔马 (Deven Sharma) 同意与我们交谈。
Here's the closest he came to admitting that his company screwed up.
这是他最接近承认他的公司搞砸了的一次。
Some of our mortgage-related securities experienced more severe downgrades than we have historically experienced, and that's been a disappointment.
我们的一些抵押贷款相关证券经历了比历史上更严重的降级，这令人失望。
I think, honestly, as a listener out there, this is the thing that is frustrating is that I've heard this a lot, that nobody could have seen this coming, nobody could have seen this coming.
老实说，我认为，作为一名听众，令人沮丧的是，我已经听过很多次了，没有人能预见到这种情况的发生，没有人能预见到这种情况的发生。
More than anybody else, that is your job.
这比任何人都重要，这就是你的工作。
Right?
正确的？
It's the investment bank's jobs to say, this is going to be great.
投资银行的工作就是说，这会很棒。
It's your job to say, you know what?
你的工作就是说，你知道吗？
Here's how things could go bad.
这就是事情可能会变得糟糕的原因。
Our analysts are really smart people, and they too observed that there was too much of a bubble and we needed to do something about it.
我们的分析师都是非常聪明的人，他们也观察到泡沫太多，我们需要对此采取一些措施。
And they made changes to our methodology and criteria starting in 2006.
他们从 2006 年开始改变了我们的方法和标准。
Now, hindsight, it's like they didn't make enough of a severe change as we have now experienced.
现在，事后看来，他们似乎没有像我们现在经历的那样做出足够的重大改变。
But it's not that they missed it.
但这并不是说他们错过了。
They missed the severity of it.
他们忽略了事情的严重性。
Some of you may detect the delicate verbal parsing of a man who, before our 20-minute interview, had probably undergone many hours of legal counseling.
你们中的一些人可能会察觉到一个在我们 20 分钟的采访之前可能已经接受了多个小时的法律咨询的人的微妙的言语解析。
The credit rating agencies are of course being sued, and they don't want to say anything that can be used against them in court.
信用评级机构当然被起诉，他们不想说出任何可以在法庭上对他们不利的言论。
And, apparently, listen, we really screwed up, we're very sorry, can be used against you in court.
而且，显然，听着，我们真的搞砸了，我们非常抱歉，可以在法庭上用来对付你。
As a result, we'd ask a question, and we'd get a talking point in response.
因此，我们会提出一个问题，然后我们会得到一个谈话要点作为回应。
And so, we find ourselves in a strange position.
因此，我们发现自己处于一个奇怪的境地。
We've had so many conversations over beer, over coffee, over the phone, with former and current rating agency employees who didn't wish to go on tape.
我们在啤酒、咖啡、电话中与评级机构的前任和现任员工进行了很多对话，但他们都不愿意录音。
We've read articles, we've sat through panel discussions, and we think we can explain their point of view more clearly than any of their official spokespeople.
我们阅读了文章，参加了小组讨论，我们认为我们可以比他们的任何官方发言人更清楚地解释他们的观点。
Well, we're going to try.
好吧，我们会尝试一下。
So, Alex, you want to be the rating agency, I'll be the pitbull reporter?
那么，亚历克斯，你想成为评级机构，我将成为斗牛犬记者？
All right, bring it on, man.
好吧，来吧，伙计。
David Kestenbaum All right.
大卫·凯斯滕鲍姆 好吧。
Where to start?
从哪里开始？
How about this?
这个怎么样？
Look, when you rate something Triple A, it's supposed to be safe, it's supposed to be really safe, it's supposed to be so safe that the rating really shouldn't change, and yet nearly half, 1/2 of the securities you rated Triple A during the bubble, they've been downgraded.
听着，当你给某样东西评级为 3A 时，它应该是安全的，它应该是非常安全的，它应该非常安全，以至于评级真的不应该改变，但在泡沫期间，你评级为 3A 的证券中近一半、1/2 已经被降级了。
Explain that.
解释一下。
OK, those letter grades, the Triple A's and Triple B's, those are just our best estimate.
好的，这些字母等级，A 级和 B 级，这些只是我们的最佳估计。
They're not a buy or sell recommendation.
它们不是买入或卖出建议。
Investors just weren't using our ratings properly.
投资者只是没有正确使用我们的评级。
They should have been more like Mabel Yu, asking more questions.
他们应该更像Mabel Yu，提出更多问题。
They should have come up with their own conclusions.
他们应该得出自己的结论。
And besides, it's smart to change the ratings.
此外，改变评级是明智之举。
The economy has fallen off a cliff.
经济已经跌落悬崖。
You want me to make sure my ratings never go down?
你想让我确保我的评分永远不会下降吗？
Fine, I'll rate everything Triple C.
好吧，我会给所有东西评级为 Triple C。
Oh, and by the way, we publish all our models on the internet.
哦，顺便说一下，我们在互联网上发布了所有模型。
You can see how we came up with a rating all along if you wanted to.
如果您愿意，您可以了解我们是如何得出评级的。
Yeah, but what about the fact that you were paid by the people whose securities you were rating?
是的，但是如果你的报酬是由你所评级的证券的人支付的，那又如何呢？
Sir, the notion that someone could buy a rating from us?
先生，有人可以从我们这里购买评级的想法吗？
You offend me.
你冒犯我了。
Look, someone has to pay us.
听着，有人得付钱给我们。
It's either the issuers or the buyers.
要么是发行人，要么是买家。
There are conflicts of interest either way.
无论哪种方式都存在利益冲突。
We know that and we deal with it.
我们知道这一点并且我们会处理它。
The vast majority of our ratings held up.
我们的绝大多数评级都维持不变。
We rate trillions of dollars of all kinds of bonds.
我们对数万亿美元的各类债券进行评级。
Most of them have behaved exactly as we expected them to.
他们中的大多数人的行为完全符合我们的预期。
Mortgage-related bonds are a small part of what we do.
抵押贷款相关债券只是我们业务的一小部分。
And anyway, it's totally unfair to put all of this on us.
不管怎样，把这一切都归咎于我们是完全不公平的。
Wall Street and mortgage lenders lied to us.
华尔街和抵押贷款机构对我们撒了谎。
Investors got lazy and bought the stuff without doing their own due diligence.
投资者变得懒惰，在没有进行尽职调查的情况下购买了这些东西。
You want to know what I think?
你想知道我的想法吗？
I think we are a convenient scapegoat, and we're being used by you and everybody else to avoid examining their own mistakes.
我认为我们是一个方便的替罪羊，我们被你和其他人利用来避免检查自己的错误。
Are you done?
你完成了吗？
Alex Blumberg Yeah, it actually felt good to get that off my chest.
亚历克斯·布隆伯格（Alex Blumberg）是的，把这件事从心里说出来实际上感觉很好。
I'm back now.
我现在回来了。
OK, because there's something else we need to talk about, which is the back story.
好吧，因为我们还有其他事情要谈，那就是背景故事。
Right, the back story.
对了，后面的故事。
How did these companies go from publishing their little railroad guides in 1917 to being at the center of a global financial meltdown?
这些公司是如何从 1917 年出版小铁路指南到成为全球金融危机中心的？
To find the answer, we went to talk to a professor at NYU named Larry White.
为了找到答案，我们采访了纽约大学一位名叫拉里·怀特（Larry White）的教授。
And when we say professor, we mean the whole package: gray, slightly unkempt hair, a novelty tie featuring NASDAQ ticker symbols.
当我们说教授时，我们指的是整个包裹：灰色、略显蓬乱的头发，一条带有纳斯达克股票符号的新颖领带。
And in one of the many books in his office, Larry White is sure is the name of the one man who planted the seeds of our current crisis.
And in one of the many books in his office, Larry White is sure is the name of the one man who planted the seeds of our current crisis.
Ah, the comptroller, ah, da-da, da-da, da-da, da-da.
啊，审计长，啊，哒哒，哒哒，哒哒，哒哒。
Comptroller of the Currency .
货币监理署。
Is this Gene White's book?
这是吉恩·怀特的书吗？
J.F.T O'Connor, comptroller '33 to '38.
J.F.T O'Connor，审计员 '33 至 '38。
He's your man, J.F.T O'Connor.
他是你的人，J.F.T O'Connor。
He's your man.
他是你的男人。
Our man, J.F.T.
我们的人，J.F.T.
O'Connor, was Franklin Delano Roosevelt's comptroller of the currency at the height of The Great Depression.
奥康纳是富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福在大萧条最严重时期的货币审计长。
During The Depression, it was O'Connor's job to fix the banking system.
During The Depression, it was O'Connor's job to fix the banking system.
And he did what seemed like a totally reasonable and prudent thing, to try to keep the banks from taking too many risks.
他做了看起来完全合理和谨慎的事情，试图阻止银行承担太多风险。
In 1936, the comptroller of the currency tells the banks that they cannot hold bonds that are below investment grade.
1936 年，货币主计长告诉银行，他们不能持有低于投资级别的债券。
Investment grade as determined by whom?
投资等级由谁决定？
By a handful of rating agencies.
由少数评级机构评定。
Perfectly good reasoning, certainly a sensible goal, but what it did was send us down this road of vesting the judgments of these handful of rating agencies with the force of law.
非常好的推理，当然是一个明智的目标，但它所做的却让我们走上了一条赋予这些少数评级机构的判断以法律效力的道路。
This, says Professor White, was a pivotal moment, because now the rating agencies' little letter grades took on a very special meaning.
怀特教授说，这是一个关键时刻，因为现在评级机构的小字母等级具有非常特殊的含义。
Whereas before the tool was just a tool for investors to use, now the rating became a requirement.
以前该工具只是投资者使用的工具，而现在评级已成为一项要求。
And things didn't just end there.
而事情并没有就此结束。
In 1975, the SEC, The Securities and Exchange Commission, passed a rule saying, financial institutions couldn't rely on the ratings of just any rating agency, but only on specially designated ones.
1975年，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）通过一项规定，金融机构不能随意依赖任何评级机构的评级，而只能依赖专门指定的评级机构。
For many years, that meant just three: Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch.
多年来，这意味着只有三个：穆迪、标准普尔和惠誉。
States jumped on the bandwagon and started requiring ratings for pension fund investments and for insurance companies.
各州也纷纷效仿，开始要求对养老基金投资和保险公司进行评级。
Even the financial industry got involved and wrote ratings requirements into its own deals.
Even the financial industry got involved and wrote ratings requirements into its own deals.
And so, these three companies and their letter grades became the foundation for trillions of dollars of investments.
因此，这三个公司及其字母等级成为数万亿美元投资的基础。
It was as if, without fully realizing it, the world had wired the global economy with explosives, and the ratings were the fuse.
就好像，在没有完全意识到的情况下，世界已经给全球经济安上了炸药，而收视率就是导火索。
And then, on July 10, 2007, the first fuses got lit.
And then, on July 10, 2007, the first fuses got lit.
Moody's saw the light and downgraded hundreds of subprime bonds.
穆迪看到了曙光，下调了数百只次级债券的评级。
Standard & Poor's said it would too.
标准普尔也表示会这样做。
In a press release issued not very long ago, Moody's says it has downgraded 399 residential mortgage-backed securities, placed an additional 32 under review for possible downgrade.
在不久前发布的一份新闻稿中，穆迪表示已下调了 399 种住宅抵押贷款支持证券的评级，另外还对另外 32 种可能下调的证券进行了审查。
These were all originally--
这些原本都是——
As it was happening on TV, it didn't seem like that big a deal.
As it was happening on TV, it didn't seem like that big a deal.
This, after all, was the summer of '07.
毕竟，这是07年的夏天。
The Dow was near its all-time high.
道指接近历史高点。
The recession had not yet begun.
经济衰退尚未开始。
This announcement by Moody's got a mention in the business section of the New York Times , but the front page featured the headline, "Can't Sell Your Home?
穆迪的这一声明在《纽约时报》商业版上得到了提及，但头版的标题是“卖不掉你的房子？
Maybe it's Priced Too Low."
也许是价格太低了。”
Jerry Fons was inside Moody's at the time.
杰里·冯斯当时在穆迪公司内部。
Really, internally, it was not much hay was made of it.
Really, internally, it was not much hay was made of it.
They tried to say, well, the model shows these are a little weak, and so we see now there's some deterioration here, so we're going to lower them.
他们试图说，模型显示这些有点弱，所以我们现在看到这里有一些恶化，所以我们要降低它们。
It was done very matter of factly.
事实上，这是非常重要的。
But what they couldn't see is that the wheels were really coming off big time.
But what they couldn't see is that the wheels were really coming off big time.
I do kind of remember what I call the chainsaw massacre.
I do kind of remember what I call the chainsaw massacre.
Jim Finkel, as you can hear, saw the downgrades a little differently.
Jim Finkel, as you can hear, saw the downgrades a little differently.
Finkel, remember, is the Wall Street structured finance guy.
请记住，芬克尔是华尔街的结构性融资专家。
He'd spent the last few years creating and managing and investing his own money in CDOs, which were made up of lots of bonds, many of which were now being downgraded.
在过去的几年里，他用自己的钱创建、管理和投资 CDO，这些 CDO 由大量债券组成，其中许多债券现在正在被降级。
He could see things were going to spread.
他可以预见事情将会蔓延。
And watching those ratings downgrades, Jim said the room was silent, the phones weren't ringing, everyone was watching the same thing.
And watching those ratings downgrades, Jim said the room was silent, the phones weren't ringing, everyone was watching the same thing.
I remember it being a hot summer day.
我记得那是一个炎热的夏天。
I remember sitting in the office, watching the screens and watching the way the screens work, the individual securities being downgraded come over line by line.
我记得坐在办公室里，看着屏幕，看着屏幕的工作方式，被降级的个别证券逐行出现。
You forgot how many securities there were out there, let alone how many could get downgraded all in one day.
You forgot how many securities there were out there, let alone how many could get downgraded all in one day.
And it was just wave after wave after wave of bad information, and it's like body blows.
And it was just wave after wave after wave of bad information, and it's like body blows.
I just felt hollow and helpless.
我只是感到空虚和无助。
And it was actually quite hard to absorb the implications.
And it was actually quite hard to absorb the implications.
We knew there was an implication to it, but we actually were having a hard time conceptualizing the magnitude of the implication of those ratings, and how systemic this would roll out to be.
我们知道它有一定的影响，但实际上我们很难概念化这些评级的影响程度，以及它的系统性。
So the world sharking under your feet wasn't really quite the metaphor I'd use.
所以你脚下的世界并不是我所用的比喻。
It was more some kind of whispering death wind blowing through the room.
It was more some kind of whispering death wind blowing through the room.
Over the next year and a half, that death wind grew louder.
接下来的一年半里，死亡之风愈演愈烈。
Those first downgrades were followed by more downgrades of higher and higher rated bonds.
Those first downgrades were followed by more downgrades of higher and higher rated bonds.
And remember, a lot of financial institutions were required by law to hold bonds that were above a certain rating.
请记住，法律要求许多金融机构持有高于特定评级的债券。
Now they had to sell, and because they were all selling at the same time, prices dropped.
Now they had to sell, and because they were all selling at the same time, prices dropped.
These dropping prices destabilized the banks which held these bonds: Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers.
价格下跌破坏了持有这些债券的银行的稳定：花旗银行、美林银行、雷曼兄弟银行。
Eventually it made its way to AIG.
最终它进入了 AIG。
We're back, everybody.
我们回来了，大家。
We have more news, of course, on AIG.
当然，我们还有更多关于 AIG 的新闻。
Moody's has now downgraded AIG as well.
穆迪现在也下调了 AIG 的评级。
Want to give you the details there.
想给你那里的详细信息。
Those downgrades will have the effect of triggering certain things for AIG that will force--
这些降级将会触发 AIG 的某些事件，从而迫使——
Ratings have gained a power that they really didn't want to have.
收视率获得了他们真正不想拥有的力量。
Jerry Fons, the former manager at Moody's.
杰里·冯斯 (Jerry Fons)，穆迪公司前经理。
Whether or not you really are a Single A, if Moody's says you are, you are.
Whether or not you really are a Single A, if Moody's says you are, you are.
And as soon as they downgrade you, you're going to be bankrupt.
一旦他们降级你，你就会破产。
And so, basically, the ratings agencies, you guys were given all this power that all of a sudden you didn't even, in the beginning, you didn't even know that you were-- it sort of came later.
所以，基本上，评级机构，你们被赋予了所有这些权力，突然之间，你们甚至没有，一开始，你们甚至不知道自己是——这是后来才出现的。
You started the ratings, and then all of a sudden your rating has this market force, that if you change it, it's much more than just changing the rating on a single company.
你开始评级，然后突然间你的评级具有这种市场力量，如果你改变它，它不仅仅是改变单个公司的评级。
The whole system collapses, basically.
整个系统基本上崩溃了。
That's right.
这是正确的。
What could be done in the future?
未来可以做什么？
I think we have to rethink the whole business from ground up.
I think we have to rethink the whole business from ground up.
I think it's broken.
我认为它坏了。
I think the way people have relied on ratings has contributed to their downfall.
我认为人们依赖收视率的方式导致了他们的垮台。
We've just got to move away from this dependence on two or three big companies to do all your work for you.
我们必须摆脱对两三个大公司为您完成所有工作的依赖。
The rating agencies on their own certainly didn't cause all our economic problems.
The rating agencies on their own certainly didn't cause all our economic problems.
There's plenty of blame to go around for that.
对此有很多指责。
But on the way up, they helped inflate the housing bubble.
但在上涨过程中，它们助长了房地产泡沫。
And on the way down, they were sometimes the ones holding the pin to pop it.
在下降的过程中，有时他们是拿着别针将其弹出的人。
There are all kinds of proposals on the table for how, in Jerry Fons' word, to rethink the whole business.
用杰里·冯斯的话说，关于如何重新思考整个行业，有各种各样的建议摆在桌面上。
One idea is that bonds should get a kind of skeptical second opinion from a rating agency paid by investors.
One idea is that bonds should get a kind of skeptical second opinion from a rating agency paid by investors.
Another would set up a system to reward agencies that get their ratings right.
另一种方法是建立一个系统来奖励评级正确的机构。
Another idea, get ratings out of regulations completely.
Another idea, get ratings out of regulations completely.
The two biggest rating agencies, by the way, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, would be fine with that, would be willing to give up their special legal status.
顺便说一句，最大的两家评级机构穆迪和标准普尔对此表示同意，愿意放弃其特殊的法律地位。
The world may see them as watchmen, the people who could have stopped this global crisis, but they don't see themselves that way, or at least they don't want to anymore.
世界可能将他们视为守望者，他们本可以阻止这场全球危机，但他们并不这样看待自己，或者至少他们不想再这样做。
It's nice to get all the business.
能获得所有业务真是太好了。
It's not so nice to get all the blame.
受到所有指责并不好。
Alex Blumberg is one of the producers of our show.
亚历克斯·布隆伯格是我们节目的制片人之一。
David Kestenbaum is a correspondent for NPR News.
大卫·凯斯滕鲍姆 (David Kestenbaum) 是 NPR 新闻的记者。
And if you like what you heard today, David and Alex and Chana actually, in fact, do a blog and a thrice-weekly podcast that is a co-production between our program and NPR News called Planet Money.
如果你喜欢今天听到的内容，事实上，大卫、亚历克斯和查纳实际上制作了一个博客和每周三次的播客，这是我们的节目和 NPR 新闻联合制作的，名为 Planet Money。
www.npr.org/money.
www.npr.org/money。
[ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS] This American Life is distributed by Public Radio International.
[致谢]《美国生活》由国际公共广播电台发行。
[FUNDING CREDITS] And WBEZ management oversight for our program by our boss, Mr. Torey Malatia, who just got back from his vacation in Greece.
[资金来源] 我们的老板 Torey Malatia 先生刚刚从希腊度假回来，WBEZ 管理层对我们的项目进行了监督。
He had trouble getting around.
他行动不便。
He says the signage was really weird.
他说标牌真的很奇怪。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Back next week with more stories of This American Life.
下周我们将带来更多《美国生活》的故事。
This American Life is produced in collaboration with WBEZ Chicago and delivered to stations by PRX The Public Radio Exchange.
《This American Life》与 WBEZ Chicago 合作制作，并由 PRX 公共广播电台传送到各电台。