333: The Center for Lessons Learned - This American Life
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00:00 00:00 Transcript Share This American Life Life Partners How to Listen Episodes Recommended About Overview Staff Announcements Fellowships Jobs Music Make Radio On The Road FAQ Submissions Merch Contact Us Our Other Shows Merch Follow Us Life Partners Subscribe to our newsletter Full episode Toggle Audio and Transcript Sync Transcript | Episode #333 | May 25, 2007 333: The Center for Lessons Learned Note: This American Life is produced for the ear and designed to be heard.
00:00 00:00 文字记录 分享此 美国生活 生活伙伴 如何收听 剧集 推荐 关于 概述 员工公告 奖学金 工作 音乐 在路上制作电台 常见问题解答 提交 商品 联系我们 我们的其他节目 商品 关注我们 生活伙伴 订阅我们的时事通讯 整集 切换音频和文字记录同步 文字记录 | 内容第 333 集 | 2007 年 5 月 25 日 333：经验教训中心 注：《美国生活》是为耳朵而制作的，旨在让人们听到。
If you are able, we strongly encourage you to listen to the audio, which includes emotion and emphasis that's not on the page.
如果可以的话，我们强烈建议您收听音频，其中包括页面上没有的情感和重点。
Transcripts are generated using a combination of speech recognition software and human transcribers, and may contain errors.
文字记录是使用语音识别软件和人工转录员结合生成的，可能包含错误。
Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.
请在印刷版引用前检查相应的音频。
Prologue Ira Glass OK America, there's a phone number that you can call in Kansas, and when they pick up the phone, they say--.
序言 Ira Glass 好吧，美国，你可以在堪萨斯州拨打一个电话号码，当他们拿起电话时，他们会说——。
Good afternoon, Center for Army Lessons Learned.
下午好，陆军经验教训中心。
May I help you?
我可以帮你吗？
The Center for Army Lessons Learned.
陆军经验教训中心。
The first time you hear that name, it's hard to believe that it's real, and not one of those places like the Hogwarts School, that it would be so amazing to believe that it existed.
当你第一次听到这个名字时，很难相信它是真实的，而且不是像霍格沃茨学校这样的地方，相信它的存在真是太神奇了。
But of course, it never could exist.
但当然，它永远不可能存在。
I guess you would say we collect lessons learned.
我想你会说我们收集经验教训。
Lessons that the units are learning in combat, lessons that are being learned in training, and also in experimentation.
部队在战斗中吸取的教训、在训练中吸取的教训以及在实验中吸取的教训。
And we are kind of the connective tissue, then, to distill those lessons, and then get them out to the people that need them; to transfer knowledge faster than our enemy.
那么，我们就像结缔组织一样，提取这些教训，然后将它们传递给需要它们的人；比我们的敌人更快地传播知识。
It is a 200 person operation to do all this.
完成这一切需要 200 人的行动。
And this is a pretty new thing for the Army.
这对陆军来说是一个相当新的事情。
The center has only been around since the mid 1980s, and didn't really get cooking until the first Gulf War.
该中心从 20 世纪 80 年代中期才开始存在，直到第一次海湾战争才真正开始做饭。
One way they get their information, they embed researchers with units all over the world, including combat units in Iraq, for six months or a year at a time, to report from the field about the latest innovations-- what works, what doesn't work.
他们获取信息的一种方式是，将研究人员安插到世界各地的部队，包括伊拉克的作战部队，每次为期六个月或一年，从现场报告最新的创新——哪些有效，哪些无效。
And then, to get those lessons out, the center puts out reports and handbooks.
然后，为了吸取这些教训，该中心发布了报告和手册。
There's this massive website for soldiers to download all this stuff.
有一个巨大的网站供士兵下载所有这些东西。
And if that weren't enough, there's a reference desk.
如果这还不够，还有一个咨询台。
This is a place where, if the soldier doesn't have the information, or the commander doesn't have the information, he can call my folks here and request the specific information that he needs.
在这里，如果士兵没有信息，或者指挥官没有信息，他可以给我的人打电话，要求提供他需要的具体信息。
And then our guys will get it out to them, if they're deployed within 24 hours.
如果他们在 24 小时内部署完毕，我们的人员就会将其交给他们。
Right now, we're answering just about 500 warriors a month.
目前，我们每个月只回复大约 500 名战士。
Craig Hayes runs the desk that answers these requests for information, which are almost all over email.
克雷格·海耶斯（Craig Hayes）负责回答这些信息请求，这些信息请求几乎都是通过电子邮件发送的。
He's officially a civilian, a retired lieutenant colonel, and a veteran of the current war in Iraq.
他的正式身份是一名平民，一名退役中校，也是当前伊拉克战争的一名老兵。
He is the very first person who's ever had a full time job answering these inquiries.
他是第一个全职回答这些问题的人。
It's amazing what kind of questions the warriors will come up with.
勇士们会提出什么样的问题真是令人惊奇。
It could be current convoy operations, traffic control points.
它可能是当前的车队运营、交通控制点。
It could be how many spaces between letters on an official document.
它可能是官方文档上字母之间的空格数。
It could be the surge.
这可能是激增。
So now we're getting more questions on what we got to do to deploy.
所以现在我们收到了更多关于我们需要做什么来部署的问题。
What kind of insurgency tactics, training Iraqi police, getting Sunni and Shiite in your area to get along better.
什么样的叛乱策略，训练伊拉克警察，让你所在地区的逊尼派和什叶派相处得更好。
When it comes to a lot of these things, Colonel Mains says, the questions that the center gets pretty much amount to--.
梅因上校说，当谈到很多这样的事情时，该中心收到的问题几乎都是——。
What's the latest?
最新消息是什么？
What's the state of the art?
目前的技术水平如何？
What has worked in the past, and what were the pitfalls?
过去哪些方法有效，有哪些陷阱？
Well, it was a much more informal process.
嗯，这是一个更加非正式的过程。
If you go back to World War II, Slam Marshall did a lot of studies, particularly in the Pacific, but there was a big delay.
如果你回到第二次世界大战，斯拉姆·马歇尔做了很多研究，特别是在太平洋地区，但有很大的延迟。
He went around, and he collected his information, and then he had to come back and compile it in a report.
他到处走走，收集信息，然后必须回来将其汇编成报告。
And then that report has got to be sent paper copy back out to the units that would need it.
然后必须将该报告的纸质副本发送回需要它的单位。
I mean, this morning, I've already answered four or five questions already.
我的意思是，今天早上，我已经回答了四五个问题。
This morning you've answered four or five questions already?
今天早上你已经回答了四五个问题了吗？
What were those about?
那些是关于什么的？
What's causing vehicles to roll over, I guess, was one.
我猜，造成车辆翻车的原因之一。
That's Lane Rolf, who works the reference desk answering questions.
那是莱恩·罗尔夫 (Lane Rolf)，他在咨询台回答问题。
He says that back when he was in Baghdad as military police, he was a company commander, he could have used some of the information that he now gives out every day in his job, like how to recognize improvised explosive devices, IEDs, something his unit had to learn on the fly.
他说，当他在巴格达担任宪兵时，他是一名连长，他本可以使用他现在每天在工作中提供的一些信息，比如如何识别简易爆炸装置，简易爆炸装置，这是他的部队必须在飞行中学习的东西。
Though other questions he gets, he never would have needed help with.
尽管他遇到了其他问题，但他永远不需要帮助。
A friend of mine-- I'll also do a lot of informal questions.
我的一个朋友——我也会做很多非正式的问题。
A friend of mine's over their right now in a unit.
我的一个朋友现在住在一个单位。
There are some MWR questions that we can answer just to help soldiers stay current over there.
我们可以回答一些 MWR 问题，以帮助士兵了解当地情况。
What's MWR?
什么是MWR？
Lane Rolf Morale, welfare, and recreation.
莱恩·罗尔夫 (Lane Rolf) 士气、福利和娱乐。
He wanted to know how the Oklahoma Sooners did in the draft, and how the Big 12 is going to do this year in football.
他想知道俄克拉荷马快车道队在选秀中的表现如何，以及 Big 12 今年的橄榄球赛表现如何。
He wanted to know because he's out of touch.
他想知道，因为他失去了联系。
So that would be a morale question right there?
那么这将是一个士气问题吗？
Yes.
是的。
Ira Glass He remembers one email that he got from a military policeman, a young sergeant who was heading over to Iraq for the first time.
艾拉·格拉斯（Ira Glass） 他记得一封来自一名宪兵的电子邮件，这名宪兵是一名年轻的中士，第一次前往伊拉克。
He was worried because he had never had to lead a squad before.
他很担心，因为他以前从来没有带过一个小队。
He wanted to know how to train them better so everybody would come back alive.
他想知道如何更好地训练他们，这样每个人都能活着回来。
I called him right away, because we don't necessarily just have to respond by email.
我立即给他打电话，因为我们不一定只需要通过电子邮件回复。
I said, hey Sergeant, there's a reason why you're a leader now.
我说，嘿，中士，你现在成为领导者是有原因的。
Don't doubt what you know, first of all.
首先不要怀疑你所知道的。
I need to know where you're going, and I can provide you with a whole bunch of information derived from last units coming back.
我需要知道你要去哪里，我可以为你提供从最后回来的部队中获得的大量信息。
And he said, holy cow sir, this is exactly what I need.
他说，天哪，先生，这正是我所需要的。
This will help me sleep at night.
这将帮助我晚上睡觉。
I know that I'm going to help my guys.
我知道我会帮助我的伙计们。
And that right there really touched my heart.
那真的触动了我的心。
And I had to go outside and have a cup of coffee.
我不得不出去喝杯咖啡。
And like, you know what?
就像，你知道吗？
This is exactly why I want this job.
这正是我想要这份工作的原因。
Every day I feel like I help another soldier.
每一天我都感觉自己在帮助另一个士兵。
I fought to come over to get this job.
我努力争取得到这份工作。
You did?
你做到了吗？
Lane Rolf There was a lot of other people fighting for this job.
Lane Rolf 还有很多人在争夺这份工作。
Talking to guys at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, it's hard not to feel kind of hopeful.
在与陆军经验教训中心的人员交谈时，我们很难不感到充满希望。
It's the US Army at its best: smart, practical, can-do.
这是美国陆军的最佳状态：聪明、务实、能干。
And today on our show, during this war in Iraq that drags out for month after month, longer than our involvement in World War II, longer than the Civil War, we wanted to feel a little hopeful for a change, and talk about what's been learned, and try to understand why there's certain lessons that we're taking so long to learn.
今天在我们的节目中，在这场旷日持久的伊拉克战争中，比我们卷入第二次世界大战的时间还要长，比内战的时间还要长，我们希望对改变抱有一点希望，并谈论我们学到的东西，并试图理解为什么我们需要这么长时间才能学到某些教训。
From Chicago Public Radio, it's This American Life , distributed by Public Radio international.
这是来自芝加哥公共广播电台的《This American Life》，由国际公共广播电台发行。
I'm Ira Glass.
我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Our show today for this Memorial Day weekend, The Center For Lessons Learned.
我们今天在阵亡将士纪念日周末的节目“经验教训中心”。
Our show in three acts, including Scott Carrier in Salt Lake City on lessons for civilians in this war.
我们的演出分为三幕，其中包括斯科特·卡里尔在盐湖城为平民在这场战争中提供的教训。
And Washington Post reporter Thomas Ricks, the author of Fiasco , in Baghdad, who says there's a whole different sensibility in the air in the Green Zone these days, where Americans seem to have learned some lessons.
驻巴格达的《华盛顿邮报》记者、《惨败》一书的作者托马斯·里克斯表示，如今绿区的空气中弥漫着一种完全不同的感觉，美国人似乎已经从中吸取了一些教训。
Stay with us.
留在我们身边。
Act one, Cassandra.
第一幕，卡桑德拉。
Everybody knows that we occupied Germany after World War II, but you might not know that we occupied part of Germany after World War I.
大家都知道我们在二战后占领了德国，但你可能不知道我们在第一次世界大战后占领了德国的一部分。
And two interesting things happened.
发生了两件有趣的事情。
One, it did not go so well.
第一，进展不太顺利。
And two, the soldiers involved took very good notes.
第二，参与其中的士兵做了很好的笔记。
In fact, there's a four volume report on that occupation, hand typed, complete with typos, in which one Colonel Erwin L.
事实上，有一份关于该占领的四卷报告，是手写的，有拼写错误，其中一位上校欧文·L·
Hunt summed up what happened this way: quote, "The American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1 million civilians, whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty."
亨特这样总结了所发生的事情：“美国占领军缺乏训练和组织来指导近百万平民的命运，而战争的命运将这些平民置于其暂时的主权之下。”
So when World War II happened, military planners did not want to botch another occupation in the same exact country, and they returned to this report to understand what went wrong.
因此，当第二次世界大战发生时，军事规划者不想在同一个国家搞砸另一次占领，他们回到这份报告来了解出了什么问题。
And the occupation after World War II went very differently, not only the Marshall Plan for the rebuilding of Europe, but there was an entire infrastructure of schools, and classes, and training devoted to getting Americans, American military, prepared to occupy and rebuild another country.
二战后的占领则截然不同，不仅有重建欧洲的马歇尔计划，还有一整套学校、课程和培训基础设施，致力于让美国人、美国军队做好占领和重建另一个国家的准备。
Which is to say, we learned from our mistake.
也就是说，我们从错误中吸取了教训。
We figured out how to occupy and rebuild a country after a war.
我们弄清楚了如何在战后占领和重建一个国家。
Well, Nancy Updike has this story about one man's quest to make America remember that particular lesson.
南希·厄普代克（Nancy Updike）讲了一个关于一个人努力让美国记住这一教训的故事。
I want to read to you from page 42 of this booklet that came out in January of 2003.
我想向您朗读这本 2003 年 1 月出版的小册子第 42 页的内容。
That's two months before we invaded Iraq.
那是我们入侵伊拉克前两个月。
Here's what it says.
这就是它所说的。
"The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious.
“美国赢得伊拉克战争并失去伊拉克和平的可能性是真实而严重的。
Thinking about the war now and the occupation later is not an acceptable solution.
现在考虑战争和后来的占领并不是一个可以接受的解决方案。
Without an overwhelming effort to prepare for occupation, the United States may find itself in a radically different world over the next few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow, of new problems of America's own making."
如果不做出压倒性的努力来为占领做好准备，美国可能会发现自己在未来几年中处于一个截然不同的世界，在这个世界中，萨达姆·侯赛因的威胁似乎只是美国自己制造的新问题的苍白阴影。”
That paragraph is only one of this report's many predictions, observations, and warnings that have made a guy named Conrad Crane famous in certain circles as a man who should have been listened to.
该段落只是这份报告的众多预测、观察和警告之一，这些预测、观察和警告使一个名叫康拉德·克兰的人在某些圈子里成为了一个应该被倾听的人。
The report is called "Reconstructing Iraq." It was commissioned by the Army in the run-up to the Iraq War.
该报告名为“重建伊拉克”。它是在伊拉克战争前夕由陆军委托建造的。
They wanted a guide for what to do after the fighting ended, how to occupy, stabilize, and reconstruct a country, based on previous wars, and on Iraq's specific challenges.
他们希望根据以往的战争以及伊拉克的具体挑战，找到一份关于战斗结束后该做什么、如何占领、稳定和重建一个国家的指南。
And the booklet ends with a detailed nine page chart listing what would need to get done, who should do it, everything from securing the borders, the banking system, the museums, to dealing with sewage and medical waste.
小册子最后有一张详细的九页图表，列出了需要做什么、谁应该做，从保护边境、银行系统、博物馆到处理污水和医疗废物的一切。
Crane co-wrote the booklet.
克雷恩与人共同撰写了这本小册子。
He's a historian, a 26 year Army veteran, and director of the Army's archives at the US Army War College, the Military History Institute.
他是一位历史学家，拥有 26 年的陆军经验，也是美国陆军战争学院军事历史研究所陆军档案室主任。
And seven years ago, in 2000, before he became known for having written this booklet, Crane was just one more historian with pale hair, glasses, and a head full of ideas, and a problem that is not uncommon among idea people.
七年前，即 2000 年，在克莱恩因撰写这本小册子而出名之前，他只是一位历史学家，头发苍白，戴着眼镜，脑子里充满了想法，而这个问题在想法人士中并不罕见。
People would kind of treat me like a humorous eccentric, like a salesman for some commodity that they didn't really want.
人们会把我当作一个幽默的怪人，就像一个他们并不真正想要的商品的推销员。
The unwanted commodity that Crane was pushing was an idea he'd been trying to get the military to take seriously for years.
克莱恩多年来一直试图让军方认真对待这种不需要的商品。
It started like this.
事情是这样开始的。
Crane had been studying the aftermath of US military involvements big and small, going back more than 100 years.
克莱恩一直在研究美国大大小小的军事介入的后果，其历史可以追溯到 100 多年前。
Nation building in Germany and Japan, the toppling of Noriega in Panama, our long occupation of the Philippines, humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, even reconstruction efforts in the South after the Civil War.
德国和日本的国家建设，巴拿马诺列加的倒台，我们对菲律宾的长期占领，海地、波斯尼亚、索马里的人道主义和维和努力，甚至内战后南方的重建工作。
And what Crane found was that after major combat ends, there are always a whole bunch of unglamorous, bigger than expected, absolutely crucial tasks that the military is often the only one around to do; tasks that can mean the difference between stability and chaos.
克兰发现，在重大战斗结束后，总会有一大堆乏味的、比预期更大的、绝对关键的任务，而军队往往是唯一能做的任务；这些任务可能意味着稳定与混乱之间的区别。
And Crane's idea was this: that the military needed to become much better prepared to take on everything that happens after major combat ends in a given war or conflict, the so-called--.
克兰的想法是这样的：军队需要做好更好的准备，以应对特定战争或冲突中的重大战斗结束后发生的一切，即所谓的——。
Messy aftermath.
乱七八糟的后果。
Post-conflict operations, the stability operations, reconstructions, occupations.
冲突后行动、稳定行动、重建、占领。
The point was that the wars are won in the way that peace is established, really.
关键是，战争实际上是通过建立和平的方式赢得的。
To say that now, wars are won or lost in the way that peace is established, is to state the obvious.
现在说，战争的输赢取决于建立和平的方式，这是显而易见的。
We wouldn't still be in Iraq or Afghanistan if it weren't true.
如果不是真的，我们就不会还在伊拉克或阿富汗了。
But before Iraq and Afghanistan, before 9/11, Crane's notion that the military should devote a lot more thought, money, and manpower to post-war planning was an idea that could not get traction.
但在伊拉克和阿富汗事件之前，在9/11之前，克兰关于军队应该投入更多的思想、金钱和人力进行战后规划的想法并没有得到重视。
It was one small, unpopular corner of the never-ending debate about military strategy and doctrine.
这是关于军事战略和学说的永无止境的争论中一个不受欢迎的小角落。
After we invaded two countries and toppled two governments, suddenly rebuilding and stabilizing a postwar country became arguably the most urgent job, not just for our national security, but also for the security of large chunks of the rest of the world.
在我们入侵两个国家并推翻两个政府之后，战后国家的重建和稳定突然成为最紧迫的工作，这不仅是为了我们的国家安全，也是为了世界其他大部分地区的安全。
But back in the fall of 2002, a half year before the invasion of Iraq, Crane and a Middle East expert named Andrew Terrill started cranking out that booklet I read from earlier, "Reconstructing Iraq." They did it in three months, working like crazy, and getting input from other civilian and military experts from the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Joint Forces Command, the Army.
但早在 2002 年秋天，即入侵伊拉克前半年，克兰和一位名叫安德鲁·特里尔的中东专家开始编写我之前读过的那本小册子，《重建伊拉克》。他们在三个月内完成了这项工作，疯狂地工作，并听取了来自国防部、国务院、联合部队司令部和陆军的其他民事和军事专家的意见。
We had a great sense of urgency.
我们有很大的紧迫感。
We wanted to get it out as fast as we could.
我们想尽快把它拿出来。
We expected it was going to have a major impact.
我们预计这将产生重大影响。
We knew the Army staff at the time was interested in it.
我们知道当时的陆军参谋人员对此很感兴趣。
We were sending stuff constantly to the planners in the theater.
我们不断地向剧院的策划者发送东西。
And we got some good input from the planners in the theater as well.
我们也从剧院的策划者那里得到了一些很好的意见。
It was only later, a few months we get in the middle of 2003 where we started to get a sense that, boy, I wish we'd been listened to more than we were.
直到后来，几个月后，即 2003 年中期，我们才开始感觉到，天啊，我希望我们的意见能够得到更多的倾听。
Reading this booklet four years into the war, it feels like Crane and Terrill came from the future and traveled back in time to January, 2003 to try and warn us.
战争进入四年后，阅读这本小册子，感觉就像克兰和特里尔来自未来，穿越回到 2003 年 1 月，试图警告我们。
Page 24, "Even under free elections, differences within Iraqi society may be further exacerbated." Page 34, "Unlike a variety of other dictatorships, many Iraqi citizens have access to firearms.
第24页，“即使在自由选举的情况下，伊拉克社会内部的分歧也可能进一步加剧。”第 34 页，“与其他各种独裁政权不同，许多伊拉克公民可以获得枪支。
These weapons can become a problem following the war." Page 32, "To tear apart the Iraqi army in the war's aftermath could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces for unity within the society.
这些武器可能会在战后成为一个问题。”第 32 页，“在战后分裂伊拉克军队可能会导致社会内唯一的团结力量之一遭到毁灭。
Breaking up large elements of the army also raises the possibility that demobilized soldiers could affiliate with ethnic or tribal militias."
解散大量军队还增加了复员士兵加入民族或部落民兵的可能性。”
Page 40, "If the United States assumes control of Iraq, it will assume control of a badly battered economy." Page 38, "After the first year, the possibility of a serious uprising may increase, should severe disillusionment set in, and Iraqis begin to draw parallels between US actions and historical examples of Western imperialism." Page 35, "Having entered into Iraq, the United States will find itself unable to leave rapidly, despite the many pressures to do so."
第 40 页，“如果美国控制了伊拉克，它将控制遭受重创的经济。”第38页，“第一年之后，如果出现严重的幻灭，伊拉克人开始将美国的行动与西方帝国主义的历史例子相提并论，那么发生严重起义的可能性可能会增加。”第35页，“进入伊拉克后，美国将发现自己无法迅速离开，尽管面临诸多压力。”
So if we had this booklet, why weren't we better prepared for what to do after President Bush declared--.
因此，如果我们有这本小册子，为什么我们不为布什总统宣布后要做的事情做好更好的准备呢？
Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.
伊拉克的主要战斗行动已经结束。
In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.
在伊拉克战争中，美国和我们的盟友取得了胜利。
[APPLAUSE]
[掌声]
Well, one thing that Crane found about previous wars is that the Pentagon, that is the military and its civilian leadership, has a sort of amnesia about these post-conflict stability operations.
克莱恩在以往的战争中发现的一件事是，五角大楼，即军队及其文职领导层，对这些冲突后的稳定行动有一种失忆症。
The military doesn't like to do them, so they often don't prepare to do them, or they underprepare.
军队不喜欢这样做，所以他们经常不准备这样做，或者准备不足。
The Gulf War is a perfect example.
海湾战争就是一个完美的例子。
We were so focused on winning the war, that we got surprised at the end of the war by how much there was to do in Kuwait.
我们如此专注于赢得战争，以至于战争结束时我们对科威特还有这么多事情要做，感到惊讶。
And believe it or not, there was a lot to do.
不管你相信与否，还有很多事情要做。
According to the Army, tiny Kuwait ended up being the largest civil military reconstruction effort the US had undertaken since World War II.
据陆军称，小小的科威特成为了美国自二战以来最大规模的民用军事重建项目。
But in the run-up to the war, Crane found, all those post-conflict tasks were treated, as one US commander put it, like quote, "a dripping bag of manure."
但克兰发现，在战争前夕，所有这些冲突后任务都被视为“一袋滴水的粪便”，正如一位美国指挥官所说的那样。
That's from John Yeosock, who commanded the 3rd Army in the first Gulf War.
这是第一次海湾战争中指挥第 3 集团军的约翰·约索克 (John Yeosock) 说的。
And he talked about his experiences going into his staff when they get ready to go on the operation, he asked questions about how are we taking care of prisoners of war?
当他的工作人员准备好进行行动时，他谈到了他与他们接触的经历，他问了一些关于我们如何照顾战俘的问题？
How are we taking care of refugees?
我们如何照顾难民？
And people hadn't kind of thought about that stuff.
人们并没有考虑过这些事情。
And he said, it was a dripping bag of manure that nobody wanted to handle.
他说，这是一袋滴着水的粪便，没有人愿意处理。
Because the assumption was somebody else was going to do this.
因为假设其他人会这样做。
The UN or--
联合国或——
That's right.
没错。
The UN's going to take care of this, or the Iraqis themselves are.
联合国会解决这个问题，或者伊拉克人自己会解决这个问题。
Or the Red Cross will do it.
或者红十字会会做。
But he said, no, we've got to be prepared to do this.
但他说，不，我们必须做好准备这样做。
I'm John Yeosock.
我是约翰·约索克。
I commanded the US, UK, and French Army ground forces during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
我在“沙漠盾牌”和“沙漠风暴”期间指挥过美国、英国和法国陆军地面部队。
I've been retired now for a dozen years.
我现在已经退休十几年了。
And probably my worst feelings about that whole war is that so many things went so well, so quickly.
也许我对整场战争最糟糕的感觉是，很多事情进展得这么顺利、这么快。
Because no one was left with an understanding of really what it takes to get it done.
因为没有人真正了解如何才能完成这件事。
Getting it done for Lieutenant General Yeosock did not just mean coordinating battles.
对约索克中将来说，完成这件事不仅仅意味着协调战斗。
No, after this short, seemingly easy war was officially over, Kuwait was in shambles.
不，在这场短暂的、看似轻松的战争正式结束之后，科威特却陷入了混乱。
The Kuwaiti government and a lot of its workforce had fled.
科威特政府和许多劳动力已经逃离。
Iraq had been occupying the country for months.
伊拉克占领该国已有数月之久。
There were landmines to clear, a port to dredge, oil wells on fire, and a lot of just plain destruction of buildings and infrastructure, plus tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees and prisoners of war.
地雷需要清除，港口需要疏浚，油井着火，大量建筑物和基础设施遭到破坏，还有数以万计的伊拉克难民和战俘。
Not to mention all the things we're now familiar with, because they didn't get done in the Iraq War: getting electricity and water back to normal, policing the streets, a thousand issues.
更不用说我们现在熟悉的所有事情了，因为它们在伊拉克战争中没有完成：使电力和水恢复正常，维持街道治安，一千个问题。
Made my head hurt always, because I could not think of everything.
让我的头总是很痛，因为我无法想到一切。
You live your whole life learning how to dominate an enemy, and all that kind of stuff.
你一生都在学习如何控制敌人，以及诸如此类的事情。
Who likes to be in charge of ensuring that diapers are available for these displaced civilians?
谁愿意负责确保这些流离失所的平民能够获得尿布？
But as a human being, you understand that, well by golly, you just do it.
但作为一个人，你明白，天哪，你就这么做。
Of course, civilian agencies do a lot of this postwar work too.
当然，民间机构也做了很多战后工作。
But sometimes it's not safe for large numbers of civilians to come in, even after major combat is over.
但有时，即使在重大战斗结束后，大量平民进入也不安全。
Remember the UN compound getting bombed in Iraq?
还记得联合国在伊拉克的驻地遭到轰炸吗？
The military is used to operating in the midst of chaos, so they end up handling a lot of nonmilitary tasks when major combat ends, whether they prepare for them or not.
军队习惯于在混乱中行动，所以在重大战斗结束后，无论是否做好准备，他们最终都会处理大量非军事任务。
After the first Gulf War, which we won in 100 hours on the ground, the Department of Defense spent a year rebuilding Kuwait.
我们在地面上用了 100 小时赢得了第一次海湾战争，之后，国防部花了一年时间重建科威特。
Desert Storm was such an overwhelming success, in terms of measures like time, casualties, et cetera, that because so many of these things went so smoothly, I think just too many people didn't understand that things like this had to be done.
就时间、伤亡等指标而言，“沙漠风暴”取得了巨大的成功，因为其中许多事情进展得如此顺利，我认为太多人不明白必须要做这样的事情。
It was probably one of the worst lessons we took away.
这可能是我们学到的最糟糕的教训之一。
Here's Crane again, talking about the first Gulf War.
克兰又来了，谈论第一次海湾战争。
The stuff that happened afterwards just was not-- didn't get any notice.
后来发生的事情并没有引起任何注意。
And it wasn't studied and it should have been.
它没有被研究，但它应该被研究。
There's a military saying that defeat is an army's best teacher.
军事上有句话：失败是军队最好的老师。
An unspoken corollary is that success is often not the best teacher.
一个不言而喻的推论是，成功往往不是最好的老师。
And because the aftermath of the first Gulf War wasn't studied and absorbed, the lesson that many in the military and civilian leadership took away from that war is that if we wanted to, we could do a better kind of war, quick and decisive.
由于第一次海湾战争的后果没有得到研究和吸收，许多军事和文职领导层从这场战争中得到的教训是，如果我们愿意，我们可以发动一场更好的战争，快速而果断。
That's what the current war in Iraq was supposed to be, as was Afghanistan.
这就是当前伊拉克战争应该发生的情况，阿富汗战争也是如此。
It was part of the revolution former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was pushing in the Pentagon: fewer soldiers, more high tech gear, no nation building.
这是前国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德在五角大楼推动的革命的一部分：更少的士兵，更多的高科技装备，没有国家建设。
It seems crazy to think about this now, but after Baghdad fell, the plan was to get most of our troops out of Iraq by the end of 2003.
现在想起来似乎很疯狂，但巴格达陷落后，我们的计划是在 2003 年底前将大部分军队撤出伊拉克。
Crane is one of dozens of people inside and outside the military who tried to push for more troops for Iraq, not because we'd need them to win the war, but because we wouldn't be able to stabilize the country without them.
克雷恩是军方内外数十名试图为伊拉克增兵的人之一，不是因为我们需要他们来赢得战争，而是因为没有他们我们就无法稳定国家。
So whatever happened to Crane and Terrill's booklet, the one that foresaw a lot of the problems we've had in Iraq, and offered a plan for how to prevent them?
那么，无论克兰和特里尔的小册子发生了什么，这本预见了我们在伊拉克遇到的许多问题并提供了如何预防这些问题的计划的小册子呢？
We got our study out in the end of January.
我们在一月底完成了我们的研究。
And one of the ironies of it is almost exactly the time we finished the study, is the time that the-- the main reason we had done the study kind of disappeared.
具有讽刺意味的是，几乎就在我们完成这项研究的时间，我们完成这项研究的主要原因消失了。
On January 20, 2003, two months before the invasion, the White House decided to switch gears.
2003 年 1 月 20 日，即入侵前两个月，白宫决定改变策略。
The Army would not take charge of the occupation after the war.
战后陆军不会负责占领。
Instead, that would be done by a newly formed civilian body, what would later become the Coalition Provisional Authority.
相反，这将由一个新成立的民事机构来完成，该机构后来成为联军临时权力机构。
And with that announcement, Crane and Terrill's booklet, months of work, was dropped from the planning process for the war.
随着这一消息的发布，克兰和特里尔花费数月时间编写的小册子被从战争规划过程中删除。
And they weren't the only ones.
他们并不是唯一的人。
In the months leading up to the invasion, other detailed plans and warnings about the coming occupation were also being ignored or shut out, including efforts by the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, the Marine Corps, the National Defense University, the Rand Corporation, the Council on Foreign Relations.
在入侵前的几个月里，其他有关即将到来的占领的详细计划和警告也被忽视或排除，包括国务院、美国国际开发署、海军陆战队、国防大学、兰德公司、外交关系委员会的努力。
One of the tragedies of Iraq is that so many people did try to plan for the post-major combat phase.
伊拉克的悲剧之一是，很多人确实试图为重大战斗后阶段做好计划。
But the civilian leadership at the Pentagon resisted suggestions that the occupation might be long and complicated and require nation building.
但五角大楼的文职领导层拒绝接受有关占领可能长期、复杂、需要国家建设的说法。
So almost none of that planning, not Crane and Terrill's, not any of the others, was put into action when it might have mattered.
因此，几乎没有一个计划（克兰和特里尔的计划，以及其他任何人的计划）在可能重要的时候付诸实施。
Anything we've worked on, the main payback is going to be that it's going to be valuable to people in the field, and we're going to save lives.
我们所做的任何事情，主要的回报将是它对现场的人们有价值，并且我们将拯救生命。
And I think we really felt that about the study, that's this was something that people in important places are going to be able to make real use of this.
我认为我们真的认为这项研究是重要地方的人们将能够真正利用它的东西。
Instead of seeing people in important places make use of his research, Crane had the opposite experience.
克莱恩并没有看到重要地方的人们利用他的研究成果，而是得到了相反的经历。
He had to watch while one thing after another that he and Terrill had hoped to prevent came to pass.
他必须眼睁睁地看着他和特里尔希望阻止的一件又一件事情发生。
I kept asking him, didn't that drive you crazy?
我一直问他，这没有让你发疯吗？
But he wouldn't take the bait.
但他不肯上钩。
He's a former soldier and historian, not much given to public acts of gloating or hand wringing.
他曾是一名士兵和历史学家，不太喜欢在公开场合表现得幸灾乐祸或束手无策。
The one time he did show real frustration, in the form of a sharp sigh, was when I asked him about the moment in 2003 when he'd heard the Iraqi army had been disbanded, something he and Terrill had strongly warned against in the booklet, saying that sending home men with guns was a bad idea, that they might turn the guns on us.
他第一次真正表现出沮丧，以一声尖锐的叹息，是在我问他2003年听说伊拉克军队被解散的那一刻时，他和特里尔在小册子中强烈警告不要这样做，说把持枪的人送回家是一个坏主意，他们可能会把枪口对准我们。
So here comes that sigh.
于是叹息就来了。
I had [SIGH]-- I was actually in communication by email with a couple of colonels who were working on how to kind of reform the Iraqi army.
我[叹息]——我实际上是通过电子邮件与几位上校进行交流，他们正在研究如何改革伊拉克军队。
And I got to admit that I was really surprised, as were these colonels, shocked is probably too mild a term.
我必须承认我真的很惊讶，就像这些上校一样，“震惊”这个词可能太温和了。
Basically, I read it in the newspaper like everybody else.
基本上，我和其他人一样在报纸上读到了它。
I was here at the War College, just reading the paper, and boom, there it was.
我当时在战争学院，正在读报纸，然后突然发现它就在那里。
And many people have pointed to that as maybe the greatest single mistake in our post-major combat operations actions.
许多人指出，这可能是我们重大战斗行动后最大的单一错误。
But we just had no inroads into the decision making process.
但我们只是没有介入决策过程。
You look at it with disappointment.
你失望地看着它。
You wish it'd gone different.
你希望情况有所不同。
And you hope that it was the right decision.
你希望这是正确的决定。
You hope to be wrong?
你希望是错的吗？
Conrad Crane The way I explain to people when they say, well gee, how come they didn't listen to you?
康拉德·克兰（Conrad Crane）：当人们说“天哪，他们怎么不听你的”时，我向他们解释的方式就是这样。
There are a lot of competing truths out there.
那里有很多相互竞争的事实。
I understand why very high level decision makers went the route they did, based on other truths.
我理解为什么高层决策者基于其他事实而采取他们所做的路线。
We have a very pessimistic view of Iraq, which in the end, I think turned out to be the right one.
我们对伊拉克抱有非常悲观的看法，但最终我认为这种看法是正确的。
But we're just a bunch of observers at the Army War College.
但我们只是陆军战争学院的一群观察员。
We did not have the prestige some of the other agencies had that were producing much more rosy scenarios of what was going to happen.
我们没有其他一些机构所拥有的威望，无法对即将发生的事情产生更加乐观的情景。
But we did all we could do.
但我们已经尽力了。
We did more than we could do, if you look at some of the back channel routes we took to send this thing around.
如果你看看我们用来发送这件事的一些秘密渠道，我们所做的超出了我们所能做的。
I read the report all in one sitting, and I was preparing to come over to Iraq.
我一口气看完了报告，正准备去伊拉克。
In fact, I was frustrated in my inability to get over here sooner.
事实上，我因无法早点到达这里而感到沮丧。
Colonel H.R.
H.R. 上校
McMaster was one of the people Crane gave the booklet to on his own initiative, through back channels.
麦克马斯特是克兰主动通过秘密渠道赠送这本小册子的人之一。
He got it to him in April, 2003, one month into the war.
他是在 2003 年 4 月战争爆发一个月后收到的。
McMaster went on to pull off one of the astounding feats of the war.
麦克马斯特继续完成了战争中令人震惊的壮举之一。
He figured out a strategy in a place called Tal Afar to do what we've been finding mostly impossible elsewhere in Iraq: defeating a fierce insurgency.
他在一个叫塔尔阿法尔的地方制定了一项战略，以完成我们在伊拉克其他地方几乎不可能完成的任务：击败激烈的叛乱分子。
I called him in Baghdad.
我给在巴格达的他打了电话。
Doctor Crane said that you told him you handed out the booklet when you got to Iraq.
克莱恩医生说你告诉他你到达伊拉克时分发了这本小册子。
You handed out his booklet like Hari Krishna literature.
你分发了他的小册子，就像 Hari Krishna 文学一样。
Is that true?
这是真的吗？
Yes, it is true.
是的，确实如此。
Well, I had an in with Conrad Crane, so I asked him to send me a box of them, essentially, and loaded up every spare space in my luggage with the published monograph.
嗯，我和康拉德·克兰 (Conrad Crane) 聊过，所以我请他寄给我一盒，基本上，并在我行李箱的每个空余空间里都装满了出版的专着。
About how many?
大约有多少？
Colonel H.r.
H.r. 上校
Mcmaster Gosh, I think about 50.
麦克马斯特天哪，我想大约有 50 个。
50?
50？
Colonel H.r.
H.r. 上校
Mcmaster Right.
麦克马斯特 对。
And then Doctor Crane sent me some more also, once I had a mailing address where I was based in [?
然后克兰医生又给我发了一些，一旦我有了我所在的邮寄地址[？
Gutter ?] at the time.
排水沟？]当时。
I don't even know the highest ranking person who read this.
我什至不认识读过这篇文章的最高级别的人。
I mean, without naming any names, how high up were you able to get this booklet?
我的意思是，在不点名的情况下，你是在多高的职位上拿到这本小册子的？
I probably can't-- it probably just wouldn't be appropriate for me to answer that.
我可能不能——我可能不适合回答这个问题。
Right.
正确的。
As things were unfolding, and you had this booklet, this information on your mind, did you wish that more people had read it?
随着事情的发展，您脑海中浮现出这本小册子和这些信息，您是否希望更多的人阅读它？
Gosh, I probably shouldn't comment on that one too much either.
天哪，我可能也不应该对此发表太多评论。
These days, McMaster splits his time between a London think tank and Iraq, where he's part of the team assembled by the top commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, to redesign US strategy in the country.
如今，麦克马斯特的时间往返于伦敦一家智库和伊拉克之间，他是伊拉克最高指挥官戴维·彼得雷乌斯将军组建的团队的一员，负责重新设计美国在该国的战略。
But when McMaster first arrived in Baghdad, Crane and Terrill's booklet helped him grasp the scope of what he was facing.
但当麦克马斯特第一次抵达巴格达时，克兰和特里尔的小册子帮助他了解了他所面临的情况。
And then, like Crane had done, he went on a history binge.
然后，就像克莱恩所做的那样，他开始了历史狂欢。
A scholar at West Point went to the library at Columbia University, and pulled out a lot of books that were published by the British in the 1920s, photocopied the pages, scanned them in, and sent them to us on email.
西点军校的一位学者到哥伦比亚大学图书馆，翻出了很多20世纪20年代英国人出版的书籍，复印、扫描进去，通过电子邮件发给我们。
The pages had a breakdown of the tribes in the area where he and his soldiers were fighting.
这些页面详细介绍了他和他的士兵作战地区的部落。
He also brought in an officer with a degree in Middle East history to serve with his regiment for two months.
他还聘请了一名拥有中东历史学位的军官在他的团中服役两个月。
He reached out to other scholars, talked to Iraqis, all of which seems smart and straightforward.
他向其他学者伸出援手，与伊拉克人交谈，所有这些看起来都是聪明而直截了当的。
Why not look back and learn?
为什么不回顾过去并学习呢？
The way McMaster and Crane saw it, we were facing tasks in Iraq we had faced before: counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction.
在麦克马斯特和克雷恩看来，我们在伊拉克面临着以前曾面临过的任务：平叛、稳定局势和重建。
We knew how to do these things.
我们知道如何做这些事情。
But until well into the Iraq war, looking back was out of fashion among the people running the Pentagon.
但直到伊拉克战争爆发之前，回顾过去在五角大楼的管理人员中已经不流行了。
All through the 1990s and right up through 2003, the Defense Department was so focused on propelling itself into the future, that in the process, lessons from the past got ignored, and some tried and true, old school, boots on the ground soldiering just got eliminated.
从整个 90 年代到 2003 年，国防部都如此专注于推动自己走向未来，以至于在这个过程中，过去的教训被忽视了，一些经过考验的、老派的地面士兵就被淘汰了。
We wrote out of our doctrine in the 1990s reconnaissance, finding out about the enemy, discovering the intentions of the enemy through questioning the population, through forcing the enemy to react with a reconnaissance force that could also fight for information.
我们在20世纪90年代的侦察中写下了我们的条令，通过询问民众来了解敌人，发现敌人的意图，通过迫使敌人用一支也可以为信息而战的侦察部队做出反应。
We also wrote out security operations, because we decided that we're not going to be surprised anymore.
我们还写出了安全操作，因为我们决定不再感到惊讶。
And this was a time where many people were sort of filled with a hubris about American technological superiority.
在那个时代，许多人都对美国的技术优势感到傲慢。
There are two faith based arguments out there.
有两种基于信仰的论点。
Here's Crane again.
克兰又来了。
Conrad Crane The one is that, I guess you'd call it the historians who say that nothing is new.
康拉德·克兰（Conrad Crane）：我想你会称其为“没有什么新鲜事的历史学家”。
Everything is based in the past, and if you understand the past, then you're prepared for the future.
一切都基于过去，如果你了解过去，那么你就为未来做好了准备。
Then there's the, I guess you'd call them the technocrats, who say no, no, no, technology has changed everything.
然后是，我想你会称他们为技术官僚，他们说不，不，不，技术改变了一切。
It's all brand new.
一切都是全新的。
The past is irrelevant.
过去是无关紧要的。
And it's always been a problem for any generals trying to predict what the future's going to be like, how much is new and how much is old?
对于任何试图预测未来会是什么样子的将军来说，这始终是一个问题，有多少是新的，有多少是旧的？
Nobody ever gets it right.
没有人能做对。
Sir Michael Howard, the famous British military historian, he says nobody ever gets it right.
英国著名军事历史学家迈克尔·霍华德爵士说，没有人能正确理解这一点。
The question is, how can you make sure that you're not so wrong that you can't make up for your mistakes?
问题是，你怎样才能确保自己没有错到无法弥补的地步呢？
You were saying before that in all of the competing truths and reports that were circulating before the war started, that you guys somehow didn't have as much muscle or prestige as other reports or truths that were circulating.
你之前说过，在战争开始前流传的所有相互竞争的真相和报告中，你们不知何故没有像其他流传的报告或真相那样有实力或威望。
Do you feel like the fact that you were so prescient in this report, do you feel like you have a little more muscle now?
是不是感觉自己在这份报告中如此有先见之明，是不是感觉自己现在更有底气了呢？
That people will listen to you?
人们会听你的吗？
I get invited a lot more conferences, to give a lot more presentations.
我被邀请参加更多的会议，做更多的演讲。
Not really.
并不真地。
Andy Terrill was one of the people working with the Iraq Study Group.
安迪·特里尔是伊拉克研究小组的工作人员之一。
I've been asked to do a lot of work with people on developing scenarios, stability ops.
我被要求与人们一起做很多关于开发场景、稳定性操作的工作。
Got drawn into the development of counterinsurgency doctrine for the Army and the Marine Corps.
参与了陆军和海军陆战队反叛乱理论的发展。
Everybody is thinking about this stuff now.
现在大家都在思考这个问题。
It's very encouraging.
这非常令人鼓舞。
But the question I get every time I do a presentation on counterinsurgency, and this new impetus on irregular warfare, and all these things we've talked about is, after Iraq, will we still be interested in it?
但每次我做关于反叛乱的演讲，以及非正规战争的新动力，以及我们谈论的所有这些事情时，我都会遇到的问题是，在伊拉克战争之后，我们还会对它感兴趣吗？
Or is there are going to be this reaction again, like post-Vietnam, where we're all going to try to pull back in our shell?
或者是否会再次出现这种反应，就像越南战争后那样，我们都会试图缩回自己的壳里？
What do you think?
你怎么认为？
Conrad Crane I think that the best answer to that was one that was given by David Kilcullen.
康拉德·克兰 (Conrad Crane) 我认为对此问题的最佳答案是大卫·基尔卡伦 (David Kilcullen) 给出的答案。
He's a counterinsurgency expert who's now advising Petraeus.
他是一位反叛乱专家，现在为彼得雷乌斯提供建议。
That's the one.
就是这个。
And he said basically, you know, our enemies are going to make us fight these kind of wars until we get them right.
他基本上说，你知道，我们的敌人会让我们打这类战争，直到我们把它们做好为止。
And that's the future we face; these very messy wars that play to our weaknesses, not to our strengths.
这就是我们面临的未来；这些非常混乱的战争利用了我们的弱点，而不是我们的优势。
I don't think we're going to be able to pull back and ignore these kind of things.
我不认为我们能够退缩并忽视此类事情。
That story from Nancy Updike, one of the producers of our show.
这个故事来自我们节目的制片人之一南希·厄普代克。
Coming up, the sober discussion ends and the yelling begins.
接下来，清醒的讨论结束，大喊大叫开始。
That's in a minute, from Chicago Public Radio and Public Radio International when our program continues.
稍后，芝加哥公共广播电台和国际公共广播电台将继续我们的节目。
It's This American Life, I'm Ira Glass.
这就是美国生活，我是艾拉·格拉斯。
Each week on our show, of course, we choose a theme, bring you a variety of different kinds of stories on that theme.
当然，我们的节目每周都会选择一个主题，为您带来有关该主题的各种不同类型的故事。
Today's program for this Memorial Day weekend, The Center For Lessons Learned.
今天的阵亡将士纪念日周末节目是经验教训中心。
We have stories from Iraq, what we've learned, what we did not learn in time.
我们有来自伊拉克的故事，我们学到了什么，我们没有及时学到什么。
We began our show today talking to people at the Army's Center for Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
我们今天开始我们的节目，与堪萨斯州莱文沃斯堡陆军经验教训中心的人们交谈。
And the men at the reference desk there say that their most popular item these days is this 79 page booklet called "A Soldiers' Handbook: The First 100 Days." Colonel Steven Maines, who runs the center, says the whole reason for this booklet comes out of something that they found in the research.
咨询台的工作人员说，最近他们最受欢迎的物品是这本 79 页的小册子，名为《士兵手册：前 100 天》。该中心的负责人史蒂文·梅因斯上校表示，编写这本小册子的全部原因来自于他们在研究中发现的一些东西。
We did some statistical analysis, and showed that the first 100 days is really the most dangerous part of a deployment.
我们做了一些统计分析，结果表明前 100 天确实是部署中最危险的部分。
Most of the casualties happen in the first 100 days.
大多数伤亡发生在最初的 100 天内。
So based on that, we said let's transfer that information.
因此，基于此，我们说让我们转移该信息。
Things that the guy knows at day 250, let's transfer that information to the soldier before he deploys.
该人在第 250 天知道的事情，让我们在士兵部署之前将该信息传输给他。
So to figure this out, they surveyed soldiers who were in Iraq.
为了弄清楚这一点，他们对伊拉克的士兵进行了调查。
How did they survive?
他们是如何生存的？
What were the factors that led to their comrades getting killed?
到底是什么因素导致了他们的战友被杀呢？
And then they put together this handbook.
然后他们整理了这本手册。
I have one here.
我这里有一个。
One of the biggest things that got people killed in the first 100 days, soldiers told the center, was just complacency; not properly preparing for patrols, losing focus.
士兵们告诉该中心，在最初的 100 天内导致人员死亡的最大原因之一就是自满。没有适当准备巡逻，失去焦点。
Going on patrols at the same time every day, or along the same route, or with the same stops, so the enemy would be able to pick up a routine.
每天在同一时间、或沿同一路线、或在同一站点进行巡逻，这样敌人就能够掌握规律。
This book reviews all kinds of practical things like what to do if you're ambushed, how to deal with a sniper.
这本书回顾了各种实用的事情，比如如果你遭到伏击该怎么办，如何对付狙击手。
There are procedures that were invented in Iraq on what to do if a bomb stops you in the road.
伊拉克发明了一些程序，告诉你如果炸弹阻止你在路上该怎么办。
They have names like the five to five drill.
他们的名字就像五到五钻。
Here's the five Cs.
这是五个 C。
In fact, fully half of this booklet is about IEDs, improvised explosive devices, with page after page here of different kinds of IEDs.
事实上，这本小册子的一半内容都是关于简易爆炸装置（简易爆炸装置），其中一页又一页介绍了不同类型的简易爆炸装置。
And then they have these photos of detonators, the detonators which include the most mundane, household stuff, like for example, the little push button thing on your key chain that unlocks your car door.
然后他们有这些雷管的照片，雷管包括最普通的家用物品，例如钥匙链上用于解锁车门的小按钮。
Milt Hileman is a senior military analyst.
米尔特·希勒曼是一名高级军事分析家。
He was the lead analyst for the information in this booklet.
他是这本小册子中信息的首席分析师。
One of the things overall that the handbook's trying to impress upon soldiers is this is a very sophisticated enemy, very intent on killing you and killing your buddies.
总体而言，该手册试图给士兵留下深刻印象的一件事是，这是一个非常老练的敌人，非常想要杀死你和你的战友。
He's a smart guy.
他是个聪明人。
He watches what we do.
他观察我们的所作所为。
He learns from us, and we got to be just as smart about looking at what he does and learning from what he does.
他向我们学习，我们也必须同样聪明地观察他所做的事情并从他所做的事情中学习。
Down on page seven, there's a list of be alert for--.
在第七页下面，有一个要警惕的列表——。
Mm-hmm.
嗯嗯。
Ira Glass I should say to our audience that we've agreed to let you vet which of this material we're going to put over the radio.
艾拉·格拉斯（Ira Glass）：我应该对我们的听众说，我们已经同意让你们审查我们将在广播中播放哪些材料。
Yeah.
是的。
Ira Glass One of the things that shows up a couple of times in the book that you tell people to be alert for is people videotaping ordinary activities.
艾拉·格拉斯（Ira Glass）：书中多次出现的你告诉人们要警惕的事情之一是人们对日常活动进行录像。
Correct.
正确的。
Ira Glass Explain that one.
艾拉·格拉斯（Ira Glass）解释一下那个。
Why is that one in there?
为什么那个人在里面？
Information operation is a big tool of the insurgency.
信息作战是叛乱分子的一大工具。
And they videotape their successful attacks as a way of propaganda and recruiting.
他们还将成功的袭击录像作为宣传和招募的一种方式。
So it takes a cameraman in the right place to observe what's going on.
因此，摄影师需要在正确的位置观察正在发生的事情。
There's another section in here.
这里还有另外一个部分。
If you'd be willing, I'd like to ask you just to read.
如果你愿意的话，我想请你读一下。
Go to page 45.
转到第 45 页。
These are tips on how to face the injured and dead.
这些是如何面对伤者和死者的提示。
Can I just ask you to just read it?
我可以请你读一下吗？
Let me just read one paragraph here.
让我在这里读一段话。
"You may be struck with combinations of pity, horror, repulsion, and anger at the senselessness or the malice of an event.
“对于一件毫无意义或恶意的事件，你可能会感到怜悯、恐惧、厌恶和愤怒。
You may feel guilty for failing to prevent it, or surviving it.
你可能会因为未能阻止它或幸存下来而感到内疚。
These reactions are all normal, part of being human.
这些反应都是正常的，是人类的一部分。
You may blame yourself or the USA.
你可能会责怪自己或美国。
It hurts.
很痛。
Keep in mind that these feelings are honorable and confirm your humanity.
请记住，这些感觉是值得尊敬的，并证实了你的人性。
At times, however, you may feel emotionally numb.
然而，有时您可能会感到情绪麻木。
Whatever you feel, remember that the mission must continue."
无论你有何感受，请记住，使命必须继续下去。”
And then there's a series of tips.
然后还有一系列提示。
You have 17 tips here that you say can help you do the mission and live with the memories without being haunted by them.
您这里有 17 条建议，您认为它们可以帮助您完成任务并与回忆一起生活，而不被它们困扰。
And they include very practical things like number eight, keep humor alive, even graveyard humor, with buddies who understand it.
它们包括非常实用的东西，比如第八，保持幽默，甚至墓地幽默，与理解它的朋友一起。
Right.
正确的。
Ira Glass But don't get too gross or too personal.
Ira Glass：但是不要太粗俗或太个人化。
Right.
正确的。
Ira Glass Number 16, don't be disheartened by horrible dreams, feeling tense or intrusive memories.
艾拉·格拉斯第 16 条，不要因可怕的梦境、紧张的感觉或侵入性的记忆而感到沮丧。
These are normal.
这些都是正常的。
And it's better to have them now than to suppress them.
现在拥有它们比压制它们更好。
Don't keep them hidden.
不要把它们隐藏起来。
Share them with your buddies.
与您的好友分享。
Right.
正确的。
We're trying to give the soldiers the tools to say hey, I'm OK.
我们正在努力为士兵们提供工具，让他们说“嘿，我很好”。
These are natural feelings.
这些都是自然的感受。
Get it off my chest, and then I can focus on the mission the next day.
把它说出来，然后我就可以专注于第二天的任务。
Milt Hileman.
米尔特·希勒曼.
So if all of that is what the military is thinking about when it comes to this war, what do we civilians mostly think about?
那么，如果所有这些都是军方在这场战争中所考虑的问题，那么我们平民主要考虑的是什么呢？
Well, we have one answer anyway now, in act two of our show, on the civilian perspective.
好吧，无论如何，我们现在有一个答案，在我们节目的第二幕中，从平民的角度来看。
Act two, Am Not.
第二幕，我不是。
Are Too.
太。
Am Not.
我不是。
Are Too.
太。
The journalist George Packer, who reports from Iraq and who wrote the book Assassin's Gate said in an interview recently, when he was back in the United States, that while Iraqis tend to get stuck arguing and refighting old historical battles, there is an American version of that too, where we seem condemned to keep reliving the debates from before the Iraq War over whether to go to war, because they never really happened the right way the first time, out in the open, in the sunlight, which I think is true.
在伊拉克进行报道并撰写《刺客之门》一书的记者乔治·帕克(George Packer)最近回到美国后在接受采访时表示，虽然伊拉克人往往陷入争论和重新打旧的历史战役，但美国也有这样的情况，我们似乎注定要不断重温伊拉克战争前关于是否开战的争论，因为它们从来没有真正以正确的方式第一次发生，在公开场合，在阳光下，我认为是真的。
In Salt Lake City, they recently reargued that argument over the war.
在盐湖城，他们最近重新争论了关于战争的争论。
It was a good place for it, actually, because Salt Lake City is like the Austin, Texas of Utah, the one liberal city in the state.
事实上，这是一个好地方，因为盐湖城就像犹他州德克萨斯州的奥斯汀，是该州唯一一个自由主义城市。
But because the conservatives are more conservative in Utah, it seems like the liberals are more fiercely liberal.
但由于犹他州的保守派更加保守，自由派似乎更加自由。
And each of those sides brought a champion, so it was kind of like a superfight of the two sides.
而且双方都各自带来了冠军，所以这有点像双方的超级大战。
On the left, you had the liberal mayor of Salt Lake City, Rocky Anderson, who's traveled around the country calling for President Bush's impeachment.
左边是盐湖城的自由派市长洛基·安德森，他走遍全国呼吁弹劾布什总统。
And on the right, one of the icons of conservative talk radio-- and TV for that matter-- Mr. Sean Hannity.
右边是保守派谈话电台和电视的偶像之一肖恩·汉尼提先生。
One of our regular contributors, Scott Carrier, lives in Salt Lake.
我们的定期撰稿人之一斯科特·卡里尔（Scott Carrier）住在盐湖城。
And he was there too, sitting way in the back on the lower level.
他也在那儿，坐在下层的后面。
It was in the air, walking into the theater.
就在空中，走进了剧场。
Truth be told, we don't like each other very much, us and them.
说实话，我们不太喜欢对方，我们和他们。
We can be surprisingly civil in the grocery store, or even on the road.
我们在杂货店甚至在路上都可以表现得令人惊讶的文明。
But inside the theater, our contempt for each other was naked and exposed.
但在剧院里，我们对彼此的蔑视却赤裸裸地暴露了出来。
Both sides had come for blood.
双方都是为了血而来的。
Good evening ladies and gentlemen.
女士们先生们晚上好。
On behalf of the Associated Students of the University of Utah, we would like to welcome you to our campus.
我们谨代表犹他大学的联合学生欢迎您来到我们的校园。
The place was sold out and the seating was mixed, so Hannity supporters were sitting shoulder to shoulder with Rocky supporters, and everyone was checking out their surroundings, trying to read hairstyles and body posture.
场地已经卖完了，座位也很混杂，所以汉尼蒂的支持者和洛基的支持者并肩而坐，每个人都在观察周围的环境，试图解读发型和身体姿势。
Who is us, and who is them?
我们是谁，他们又是谁？
And now, the mayor of Salt Lake City, Utah, Mr. Rocky Anderson.
现在是犹他州盐湖城市长洛基·安德森先生。
[CHEERS AND BOOS]
[欢呼声和嘘声]
Suddenly, it was like, at last, it's on.
突然之间，就好像它终于开始了。
There was a half minute of cheering, followed by a half minute of booing, and nothing had happened yet.
欢呼了半分钟，嘘声响了半分钟，但还没有发生任何事情。
[CHANTING - "ROCKY, ROCKY"]
[吟唱-“洛基，洛基”]
All right, there will be a time for that.
好吧，总会有时间的。
It is now my great privilege, please join us in welcoming national television and radio host, Mr. Sean Hannity.
现在我深感荣幸，请与我们一起欢迎国家电视和广播主持人肖恩·汉尼提先生。
[CHEERS AND BOOS]
[欢呼声和嘘声]
I looked around at all the Hannity people and started to count.
我环顾四周所有的汉尼提人并开始数数。
So on my right, there were two married couples, mid-30's, maybe friends who had left their kids with the same babysitter, clapping and cheering for Hannity.
在我的右边，有两对三十多岁的已婚夫妇，也许是朋友，他们把孩子留给了同一个保姆，他们为汉尼蒂鼓掌欢呼。
And behind, to my left, were five lesbians, like a rugby team, shouting, Rocky, Rocky.
在我的左边，后面有五个女同性恋，就像一支橄榄球队，喊着“洛基，洛基”。
It seemed the two sides were about even, and that everyone had gone equally crazy.
看起来双方势均力敌，每个人都疯狂了。
Rocky went first.
洛基先走。
He had 30 minutes to lay out his argument.
他有 30 分钟的时间阐述他的论点。
We are in the midst of a tragic, disastrous, illegal war of aggression, into which this nation was led by a disastrous presidency.
我们正处于一场悲惨的、灾难性的、非法的侵略战争之中，而这个国家是在一位灾难性的总统的领导下陷入这场战争的。
Rocky's a civil litigator by training and profession, so his strategy was, present the evidence.
洛基是一位受过培训和专业的民事诉讼律师，所以他的策略是，提出证据。
And he had a lot of it.
他有很多。
He showed quotes from intelligence reports, and played video of speeches all up on the big screen with a PowerPoint presentation, like President Bush from 2002, speaking about Iraq.
他引用了情报报告的内容，并在大屏幕上播放了演讲视频和 PowerPoint 演示文稿，就像 2002 年布什总统谈论伊拉克一样。
It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons.
它拥有并生产化学和生物武器。
It is seeking nuclear weapons.
它正在寻求核武器。
If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today-- and we do-- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger, and develops even more dangerous weapons?
如果我们知道萨达姆·侯赛因今天拥有危险的武器——我们确实如此——那么当他变得更加强大并开发出更危险的武器时，世界等待与他对抗还有什么意义吗？
Here's Rocky.
这是洛基。
Rocky Anderson We were deceived.
洛基·安德森 我们被骗了。
President Bush had no basis whatsoever for making those categorical statements.
布什总统做出这些断然声明是没有任何依据的。
Because the Bush administration was not acting in self defense.
因为布什政府的行动并不是出于自卫。
The tragic invasion and occupation of Iraq has been utterly illegal.
对伊拉克的悲惨入侵和占领是完全非法的。
It constitutes a crime against peace, the same crime for which people were convicted at the Nuremberg Trial.
它构成了危害和平罪，与纽伦堡审判中的人们被定罪的罪名相同。
Those costs of the war to the Iraqi people have been massive and tragic.
战争给伊拉克人民造成了巨大而悲惨的代价。
The US invasion and occupation of Iraq has no doubt been the best terrorist recruiting tool Bin Laden could ever have hoped for.
美国入侵和占领伊拉克无疑是本·拉登所希望的最好的恐怖分子招募工具。
[APPLAUSE] Given the scale, frequency, and moral depravity of these outrages, President Bush must be held to account through impeachment and removal from office.
[掌声]鉴于这些暴行的规模、频率和道德败坏，布什总统必须通过弹劾和免职来承担责任。
If we do not call for accountability, we are complicit.
如果我们不呼吁问责，我们就是同谋。
[APPLAUSE]
[掌声]
Let me explain something.
让我解释一下。
Utah is about 2/3 Mormon, except for right here in the city of their most holy temple, where they're actually in the minority.
犹他州大约有 2/3 的摩门教徒，除了在他们最神圣的圣殿所在的城市，他们实际上是少数。
Rocky was born into a prominent Mormon family, but as a teenager, he crossed over and began to fight what he called the culture of obedience-- people blindly following authority.
洛基出生于一个显赫的摩门教家庭，但十几岁的时候，他开始与他所谓的“服从文化”——人们盲目追随权威——作斗争。
And this is why we elected him as our mayor.
这就是我们选举他为市长的原因。
It's also the reason we, or at least a lot of us, are so proud of him now.
这也是我们，或者至少我们很多人现在为他感到骄傲的原因。
And it's why the rest of the state pretty much hates him.
这就是为什么该州其他人非常讨厌他。
After Rocky, Hannity had his 30 minutes.
继《洛基》之后，汉尼蒂也完成了 30 分钟的比赛。
We've got a lot of ground to cover.
我们还有很多工作要做。
I want to thank the mayor for being here, taking time, especially out of his busy protesting schedule.
我要感谢市长抽出时间来到这里，特别是在他繁忙的抗议日程之外。
I know he's been going around the country on his I hate George Bush tour, it's nice to see him back in Salt Lake City a few days.
我知道他在全国各地进行“我讨厌乔治布什”之旅，很高兴几天后在盐湖城见到他。
I wonder how much the people of Salt Lake City paid for that little PowerPoint presentation from the 1980s.
我想知道盐湖城的人们为 20 世纪 80 年代的那个小小的 PowerPoint 演示文稿花了多少钱。
Hannity didn't talk about the things Rocky had said, whether we were lied to or misled by the President, or whether the invasion of Iraq was a criminal act.
汉尼蒂没有谈论洛基说过的话，我们是否被总统欺骗或误导，或者入侵伊拉克是否是犯罪行为。
Instead, he attacked.
相反，他发起了攻击。
Did you, in all this talk about impeaching the president, all the platitudes, did you hear any solutions on how we're going to win the war on terror against people that want to destroy our cities?
在所有关于弹劾总统的谈话中，所有的陈词滥调，你有没有听到关于我们如何赢得针对那些想要摧毁我们城市的人的反恐战争的任何解决方案？
Did you hear anything about how to help our president win a war after one of the worst attacks in American history?
您是否听说过如何帮助我们的总统在美国历史上最严重的袭击之一之后赢得战争？
Did you hear any praise for these brave men and women that, as we speak tonight, are in harm's way?
当我们今晚讲话时，您是否听到过对这些勇敢的男男女女的赞扬？他们正处于危险之中？
Did you hear any talk about any success, how our troops are responsible for liberating 50 million people between Afghanistan and Iraq, women and children and men and women?
您是否听说过我们的军队如何成功地解放了阿富汗和伊拉克之间的 5000 万人，包括妇女和儿童、男人和女人？
[APPLAUSE] Did you hear any discussion about how we closed rape rooms, and torture chambers, and mass graves tonight?
[掌声]你们有没有听到关于我们今晚如何关闭强奸室、酷刑室和万人坑的讨论？
Or did you hear the same, old, predictable I hate George Bush?
或者你是否也听到过同样的、陈旧的、可预见的“我讨厌乔治·布什”？
George lied, George lied, George lied.
乔治撒谎了，乔治撒了谎，乔治撒了谎。
It is the same thing.
这是同样的事情。
Hannity's main point, and he said it over and over, was that there was nothing wrong with President Bush wanting to go to war with Iraq.
汉尼蒂一再强调的主要观点是，布什总统想要与伊拉克开战并没有什么错。
Lots of Democrats wanted it too.
许多民主党人也希望如此。
He had video to prove it, of John Kerry, Al Gore, Ted Kennedy, and Hillary Clinton.
他有约翰·克里、阿尔·戈尔、特德·肯尼迪和希拉里·克林顿的视频来证明这一点。
Intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program.
情报报告显示，萨达姆·侯赛因一直在努力重建他的化学和生物武器库存、导弹运载能力和核计划。
He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaida members.
他还向包括基地组织成员在内的恐怖分子提供援助、安慰和庇护。
[APPLAUSE] Sean Hannity And I will say this, if Rocky Anderson will not be equally intellectually honest and open and criticize the very same people that made the very same arguments, it's not George Bush who should be impeached or removed from office, it's your mayor.
[掌声] 肖恩·汉尼蒂 我要说的是，如果洛基·安德森在智力上不同样诚实和开放，并批评提出同样论点的同一个人，那么应该弹劾或免职的不是乔治·布什，而是你们的市长。
Thank you for hearing me out.
谢谢你听我说完。
[CHEERS AND BOOS] Scott Carrier After the 30-minute opening statements, the next round was a question and answer period.
[欢呼和嘘声] Scott Carrier 在 30 分钟的开场白之后，下一轮是问答环节。
Rocky got to ask the first question.
洛基必须问第一个问题。
We're to start the clock right now.
我们现在就开始计时。
Mayor Anderson questioning Mr. Hannity.
安德森市长询问汉尼提先生。
We rely upon governmental leaders for our protection, billions of tax dollars--
我们依靠政府领导人的保护，以及数十亿美元的税收——
But instead of asking a question, Rocky made a three minute background statement.
但洛基没有提出问题，而是做了三分钟的背景陈述。
And this upset even some of his supporters.
这甚至让他的一些支持者感到不安。
Finally, Hannity stepped in.
最后，汉尼蒂介入了。
What's the question, mayor?
市长有什么问题？
Do you have a question?
您有问题吗？
I know you don't want to know what's in the rest this memorandum, but this memorandum that laid out--
我知道你不想知道这份备忘录的其余部分是什么，但是这份备忘录列出了——
Then the moderator jumped in, Ken Verdoya from the local public television station.
然后主持人插了进来，他是当地公共电视台的肯·维尔多亚(Ken Verdoya)。
Ladies and gentlemen, everyone including Mayor Anderson, this is, by your agreed format, a question and answer period.
女士们、先生们，包括安德森市长在内的所有人，按照你们商定的格式，这是一个问答期。
[APPLAUSE] And so, I've got to call for the question.
[掌声]所以，我必须提出这个问题。
So, this memorandum, this brief was given to the President.
因此，这份备忘录、这份简报已提交给总统。
Mr. Hannity--
汉尼蒂先生——
Rocky wasted a lot of time and energy throwing punches in the air, while Hannity walked the stage, gesturing to the crowd.
洛基浪费了大量的时间和精力向空中挥拳，而汉尼蒂则走上舞台，向人群做手势。
In all of my research of you, all my research of you Mr. Mayor, you focus on one person: George Bush.
在我对你的所有研究中，市长先生，我对你的所有研究都集中在一个人身上：乔治·布什。
I have never heard on the issues of weapons of mass destruction.
我从未听说过大规模杀伤性武器问题。
You have never, in any press I've seen, asked for John Kerry to resign, Hillary Clinton to resign.
在我见过的任何媒体中，你从未要求约翰·克里、希拉里·克林顿辞职。
You admire Joe Biden, you've said in interviews.
你在采访中说过，你钦佩乔·拜登。
You've said you admire the former Klansman Robert Byrd.
你说过你很钦佩前三K党成员罗伯特·伯德。
Why won't you, and here's my question, why won't you show intellectual honesty?
你为什么不这样做，这是我的问题，你为什么不表现出理智上的诚实？
And if you're going to demand that George Bush be removed from office, what about some of your democratic friends who made the same arguments?
如果你要要求乔治·布什下台，那么你的一些民主党朋友也提出了同样的论点呢？
[APPLAUSE] Rocky Anderson OK, do I get a chance to respond?
[掌声] Rocky Anderson 好的，我有机会回应吗？
I, as everybody here probably knows, you say you've read my speeches, but apparently you haven't gotten through to the end.
我，这里的每个人可能都知道，你说你已经读过我的演讲，但显然你还没有读完。
I think that our Congress is absolutely complicit.
我认为我们的国会绝对是同谋。
Those who voted for this resolution were wrong.
那些投票支持这项决议的人是错误的。
But let me tell you--.
但让我告诉你——。
Too much.
太多了。
It got ugly.
它变得丑陋了。
Verdoya, the moderator, tried to keep things in line, but there wasn't much he could do.
主持人维尔多亚试图让事情保持一致，但他无能为力。
He just said something.
他只是说了一句话。
I want to respond to that.
我想对此做出回应。
I want to respond.
我想回应一下。
I will let you do that, because I can't stop anybody else.
我会让你这样做，因为我无法阻止其他人。
I would throw this watch away, but it was a gift from my wife.
我本来想扔掉这只手表，但它是我妻子送给我的礼物。
[LAUGHTER]
[笑声]
I've researched you.
我已经研究过你了
I know you are out of town, what 74 days out of the year last year.
我知道你去年一年中有 74 天不在城里。
I know that you have-- [BOOS] Hang on.
我知道你——[嘘声]坚持住。
Can I finish?
我可以完成吗？
Rocky Anderson This is classic--.
洛基·安德森 这是经典——。
All right, all right.
好吧，好吧。
Gentlemen, OK, right now, we're going to freeze.
先生们，好吧，现在我们要冻结了。
I want to take a break.
我想休息一下。
I do not want this to go any more personal.
我不想让这件事变得更加个人化。
I want you to ask a damn question about Iraq, and I want you to answer it.
我想让你问一个关于伊拉克的该死的问题，我想让你回答。
Get to the point, ask the question, find the bottom line, put it out there, and then you respond.
开门见山，提出问题，找到底线，把它说出来，然后你就做出回应。
When I asking that question, he divides everybody, liberals, conservatives.
当我问这个问题时，他对每个人都进行了划分，无论是自由派还是保守派。
The question is, let me give the background.
问题是，让我介绍一下背景。
When it was over, I walked home feeling tired, asking myself, what just happened?
结束后，我走回家，感觉很累，问自己，刚刚发生了什么？
There was no knockout, no clear decision.
没有淘汰赛，也没有明确的决定。
Everybody came out thinking their guy had won.
每个人都认为他们的人赢了。
Nobody had changed their minds.
没有人改变主意。
And then I remembered there were two moments in the debate when everybody felt the same way, like what happens sometimes in a concert or a play.
然后我记得在辩论中有两个时刻每个人都有同样的感觉，就像音乐会或戏剧中有时会发生的情况一样。
The audience becomes one emotion.
观众变成一种情感。
It happened the first time when Rocky showed photos of dead Iraqi civilians, including bloody bodies of Iraqi children.
这是洛基第一次展示死去的伊拉克平民的照片，其中包括伊拉克儿童的血腥尸体。
Initially, the audience cried foul.
起初，观众们纷纷喊冤。
You're hitting below the belt.
你正在触及腰带以下。
But as the images continued, the room became quiet.
但随着影像的继续，房间里变得安静了。
Photos of dead children, time stopped, thinking stopped.
死去的孩子的照片，时间停止了，思维停止了。
All that was left was the feeling, this can't go on.
剩下的就是这种感觉，不能再这样下去了。
We have to stop doing this.
我们必须停止这样做。
It was like mass nausea.
这就像大规模的恶心。
Then the screen showed a government document, and everyone snapped out of it.
然后屏幕上出现了一份政府文件，所有人都惊呆了。
It went by so quickly, but then it happened again, when Hannity showed documentary footage of dead Kurds, victims of Saddam's nerve gas bombings.
一切都过得很快，但当汉尼蒂展示了萨达姆神经毒气爆炸受害者库尔德人死亡的纪录片时，这种情况又发生了。
Whole families lying dead in the street, little kids, dead children.
整个家庭都死在街上，小孩子，死去的孩子。
The room became like a quiet lake.
房间变得像一片安静的湖水。
And I thought, this is it.
我想，就是这样了。
The solution lies here.
解决方案就在这里。
Forget all the political arguments, and just sit by this lake and try to figure out its name.
忘记所有的政治争论，坐在这个湖边，试着找出它的名字。
The moon was nearly full.
月亮快满了。
The city was going to sleep.
这座城市即将沉睡。
Train horns spread out across the valley floor, and rolled up the sides of the foothills.
火车的喇叭声传遍了谷底，并卷上了山麓的两侧。
We don't like each other very much, us and them.
我们不太喜欢彼此，我们和他们。
But we have this lake between us.
但我们之间有这个湖。
Scott Carrier in Salt Lake City.
斯科特·开利在盐湖城。
He's the author of Running After Antelope , and a producer with hearingvoices.com.
他是《追羚羊》的作者，也是hearingvoices.com 的制作人。
[MUSIC - "NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME" BY RICKIE LEE JONES]
[音乐 - 瑞奇·李·琼斯的《没有人知道我的名字》]
Act three, The Lessons of Tomorrow, Today.
第三幕，明天的教训，今天的教训。
Earlier in our radio show, we were talking about how lately, Congress has been debating withdrawing from Iraq, and timelines for withdrawal, and benchmarks for withdrawal.
早些时候，在我们的广播节目中，我们讨论了国会最近一直在讨论从伊拉克撤军、撤军时间表和撤军基准。
And we all just felt like, what happened?
我们都觉得，发生了什么事？
It's like suddenly people have staked out positions for and against withdrawing from Iraq, and they're all shouting at each other, and there is this momentum toward withdrawal.
就好像突然间人们表明了支持和反对从伊拉克撤军的立场，他们都互相大喊大叫，有一种撤军的势头。
And the only question seems to be how soon.
唯一的问题似乎是多久。
Is it going to be super soon or is it only going to be somewhat soon?
是很快还是只是稍微快一点？
And it's like the US skipped the part where everybody looks seriously at whether withdrawal is a good idea in the first place, or what would happen in Iraq if we would withdraw.
这就好像美国跳过了每个人都认真考虑撤军是否是一个好主意，或者如果我们撤军的话伊拉克会发生什么的部分。
You know what it's like?
你知道那是什么样子吗？
It's like we got into the war in Iraq without much of a national debate about realistically what's this war going to mean?
这就好像我们卷入了伊拉克战争，却没有就这场战争实际上意味着什么进行太多的全国性辩论？
What's it going to mean to be in Iraq?
来到伊拉克意味着什么？
And now people are talking about withdrawing, without much serious discussion at all about realistically what it will mean to leave, or why we're leaving.
现在人们都在谈论退出，但根本没有认真讨论退出意味着什么，或者我们为什么要离开。
So to get some perspective on all these questions about Iraq that are not being talked about so much, we called Thomas Ricks, a Washington Post reporter, author of the book Fiasco , about the invasion and the early years of the war.
因此，为了对有关伊拉克的所有这些没有被广泛讨论的问题有一些看法，我们致电《华盛顿邮报》记者托马斯·里克斯（Thomas Ricks），他是《惨败》一书的作者，内容涉及入侵和战争初期。
I reached him in Baghdad.
我在巴格达联系到了他。
Right now here in the States, I feel like we hear two opposite things that will happen if the US leaves.
现在在美国，我觉得我们听到了如果美国离开就会发生两种相反的事情。
And one is that if we leave, it's going to be terrible and it will be a bloodbath.
其中之一是，如果我们离开，那将是可怕的，这将是一场大屠杀。
And then the other thing we hear is that if we withdraw, it will help make things better.
我们听到的另一件事是，如果我们退出，这将有助于让事情变得更好。
That we are part of the problem.
我们是问题的一部分。
That we are preventing the Iraqis from sitting down and working this thing out themselves.
我们正在阻止伊拉克人坐下来自己解决这个问题。
Those are two radically different versions of what the future would be.
这是未来的两个截然不同的版本。
Can I ask you to talk about how do we even think about that?
我可以请你谈谈我们是如何看待这个问题的吗？
How should we even think about this question?
我们应该如何思考这个问题？
I think it's a good question.
我认为这是一个好问题。
I would add a corollary to it though, which is the debate also presumes that it's a binary situation.
不过，我想添加一个推论，即辩论也假设这是一个二元情况。
Either we get out or we stay big and heavy like we are now.
要么我们出去，要么我们像现在一样又大又重。
You might be able to get yourself to a situation where you stay in a much smaller way, not as an occupying force, which is what we are really now, but as a small security guarantee for all parties.
你或许可以让自己以一种小得多的方式留下来，不是作为占领军（这就是我们现在的样子），而是作为各方的小型安全保障。
And that might be one aspect of the discussion of withdrawal, is there's different ways to withdraw.
这可能是讨论退出的一个方面，是否有不同的退出方式。
There is a responsible way, perhaps.
也许有一种负责任的方式。
What should we be thinking about in thinking about that?
思考这个问题时我们应该思考什么？
Well, you certainly would be playing a different role.
好吧，你肯定会扮演不同的角色。
You no longer would be an intervener in the daily life of Iraqis.
你不再是伊拉克人日常生活的干预者。
What would your role be?
你的角色是什么？
You probably would have a few thousand American troops training and advising this Iraqi army we created.
可能会有几千名美国士兵为我们创建的这支伊拉克军队提供训练和建议。
You probably would have a few more thousand American troops to be available to bail out that Iraqi army, if it got in a big difficult fight, or to rescue the American advisers if they were somehow beleaguered.
如果伊拉克军队陷入一场艰难的战斗，你可能会再派出数千名美军来救援，或者在美国顾问陷入困境时救援他们。
You'd also want a few thousand troops in Baghdad as a security guarantor for the Iraqi government you created.
您还希望在巴格达部署数千名士兵，作为您创建的伊拉克政府的安全保障。
All that probably adds up to somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 US troops.
所有这些加起来可能有 30,000 到 50,000 名美军。
And the only thing is, this was actually the recommendation made at the Pentagon last fall by a group of smart colonels, who were convened to consider the future strategy for Iraq.
唯一的问题是，这实际上是五角大楼去年秋天一群聪明的上校提出的建议，他们被召集起来考虑伊拉克的未来战略。
They summarized it as three options: go big, go long, go home.
他们将其总结为三个选择：做大、做长、回家。
Go long, meaning have a smaller force, but stay for a longer period of time?
走长，是指用较小的力量，但停留较长的时间？
Exactly.
确切地。
Find a way to get smaller and stay longer.
找到一种方法可以变小并保持更长的时间。
Let me ask you something very basic, and that is it seems that the only reason to do a kind of mass pullout from our presence in Iraq is if it turns out we are doing not much good for anybody at all.
让我问你一些非常基本的问题，那就是，大规模撤出我们在伊拉克的存在的唯一理由似乎是，如果事实证明我们对任何人都没有做任何好事。
How do we tell when we've gotten to that point?
我们如何判断何时已经达到了这一点？
I think actually the break-point for something like that would probably come out of the American political system.
我认为实际上类似的事情的转折点可能来自美国的政治体系。
The scenarios you hear here in Iraq from people are things like this: what happens if an Iraqi army unit turns on an American unit and slaughters it?
你在伊拉克听到的情景是这样的：如果伊拉克军队向美国军队发起攻击并屠杀它，会发生什么？
Would the American political system, at that point, simply get us out of there?
到那时，美国的政治制度会简单地让我们摆脱困境吗？
We don't need this.
我们不需要这个。
Or if it becomes very clear that there is a full-blown civil war going on in this country, not just the low level chronic civil war you have now.
或者，如果很明显这个国家正在发生一场全面的内战，而不仅仅是现在的低水平慢性内战。
I have to tell you, it's hard to understand how that version of the civil war would look so terribly different from this version of the civil war from here.
我必须告诉你，很难理解那个版本的内战与这里的内战版本看起来有如此大的不同。
It would look and feel very different here in Iraq, I think.
我认为，在伊拉克这里看起来和感觉起来都会非常不同。
This is not a normal country right now, by any means.
无论如何，现在这不是一个正常的国家。
You've had kind of a soft ethnic cleansing going on, but you haven't had the forced movements of hundreds of thousands of people under fire like you had in Bosnia, for example.
正在进行某种温和的种族清洗，但没有像波斯尼亚那样，数十万人在炮火下被迫迁移。
It would look very different, I think.
我想，它看起来会非常不同。
So in thinking about different ways to leave, what should we be thinking about in thinking about that?
那么，在考虑不同的离开方式时，我们应该考虑什么？
Leaving is problematic.
离开是有问题的。
It is actually not-- the most difficult of all military movements is retreat under fire.
其实不然，所有军事行动中最困难的就是在炮火下撤退。
And leaving would probably would be that.
离开可能就是这样。
Basically, you have 40% of the US Army's equipment, and 40% of the US Marine Corps' equipment in this country.
基本上，美国陆军40%的装备，美国海军陆战队40%的装备都在这个国家。
Literally tens of thousands of Humvees, of trucks, of tanks, and Bradley fighting vehicles, and Stryker fighting vehicles, and all this sort of gear of war, of a high tech war of generators and computers.
从字面上看，有数以万计的悍马车、卡车、坦克、布拉德利战车、史赛克战车，以及所有此类战争装备，一场由发电机和计算机组成的高科技战争。
It would take a long time to get all the Americans out of the country and all the American equipment.
将所有美国人和所有美国设备运出该国需要很长时间。
So you'd have the prospect of long American convoys, thousands of vehicles trailed, or interspersed among them, with thousands of Iraqi refugees.
因此，你会看到美国的车队很长，数千辆车辆尾随或散布在其中，还有数千名伊拉克难民。
Month upon month of convoys heading from here to Kuwait.
车队逐月从这里前往科威特。
It would be daily televised images for months, perhaps also of those convoys being bombed or shot at.
这将是连续几个月每天播出的电视画面，也许还有那些被轰炸或枪击的车队的画面。
Do you think somehow it's connected, the fact that we didn't debate so well how to get into the war, and the fact that we're not debating so well what to do at this stage, and how to withdraw or end or adjust to what to do next in the war?
您认为这之间有什么联系吗？事实上，我们没有很好地讨论如何加入战争，以及我们没有很好地讨论现阶段该做什么，以及如何撤军、结束或调整战争下一步该怎么做？
I think because we didn't have the debate going in, because we didn't have congressional oversight, hearings on things like what our strategy was, what the training program for Iraqis was, how many American troops were involved, how much did it cost, was it effective?
我认为因为我们没有进行辩论，因为我们没有国会的监督，没有就我们的战略、伊拉克人的训练计划是什么、有多少美军参与、花费了多少等问题举行听证会，它有效吗？
The basic questions were never asked about this war.
关于这场战争的基本问题从未被问到。
It was only last fall, after the Iraq War had gone on longer than American participation in World War II, that Congress kind of began to awake from its slumbers and ask some of the basic questions.
直到去年秋天，伊拉克战争的持续时间比美国参加第二次世界大战的时间还要长之后，国会才开始从沉睡中醒来，并提出一些基本问题。
But there's an awful lot of lost time there, and Congress still hasn't held a lot of the basic hearings about this war, how it operates.
但那里浪费了很多时间，国会仍然没有就这场战争及其运作方式举行很多基本听证会。
And I think that's one reason the debate seems both so rudimentary, so lacking in information, and so unable to move forward and consider alternatives, and third ways, and consequences.
我认为这就是这场辩论看起来如此初级、如此缺乏信息、如此无法向前推进并考虑替代方案、第三种方式和后果的原因之一。
Right.
正确的。
It's a debate that's built on slogans.
这是一场建立在口号之上的辩论。
Yeah.
是的。
Ira Glass And one of the things that is not happening here in the States is people talking about, well, what is our moral obligation to this country that we invaded?
艾拉·格拉斯（Ira Glass） 在美国这里没有发生的事情之一是人们在谈论，我们对这个我们入侵的国家有什么道德义务？
Don't we have an obligation to just stay until something gets fixed, until we fix something?
难道我们没有义务留下来直到问题得到解决，直到我们解决问题吗？
Does that idea come up among the soldiers you talk to?
与你交谈的士兵中是否出现过这个想法？
Do they talk about our obligation to the Iraqi people?
他们是否谈论我们对伊拉克人民的义务？
Not with the front-line grunt.
不是前线的士兵。
Yeah, in the cool confines of the military planners, yeah, you do have those conversations.
是的，在军事规划者的冷静范围内，是的，你确实进行了这些对话。
And that might be why you see a movement to a different sort of American presence.
这可能就是为什么你会看到美国出现另一种形式的运动。
I've got to tell you, the American military approach here now feels very different to me than it did in 2003, 2004, 2005.
我必须告诉你，我现在感觉美国在这里的军事做法与2003年、2004年、2005年有很大不同。
Back then, the American military was very focused on killing or capturing the enemy, and treated the Iraqi people basically as the playing field on which the game was played.
当时的美军非常注重杀戮或俘虏敌人，基本上把伊拉克人民当作了比赛的场地。
And there wasn't a lot of looking out for the interest, I think, of the Iraqi people, of saying the paramount thing is to protect the Iraqi population.
我认为，没有太多考虑伊拉克人民的利益，没有说最重要的是保护伊拉克人民。
Now they are clearly being told by the American generals here, the troops are being told, your number one priority is protecting the Iraqis.
现在，这里的美国将军和部队显然正在告诉他们，你们的首要任务是保护伊拉克人。
Listen to the Iraqis.
听听伊拉克人的说法。
Respect the Iraqis.
尊重伊拉克人。
Honor the Iraqis.
尊重伊拉克人。
That's a very different message going out to our troops.
这是向我们的军队传达的一个非常不同的信息。
And putting US forces out in these small combat outposts does increase the risk to US troops, and you're seeing that with the numbers of troops, the 6, 12, 15 a day you're seeing die right now.
将美军部署在这些小型战斗前哨确实会增加美军的风险，而且你会看到，从美军的数量来看，你现在每天看到的死亡人数为 6、12、15 人。
You are taking more risk.
你正在冒更大的风险。
We're seeing more American troops die in the service of protecting the Iraqi population.
我们看到越来越多的美军在保护伊拉克人民的过程中牺牲。
So it is possible to change the nature of the American presence.
因此，改变美国存在的性质是可能的。
It was really striking to me.
这对我来说真的很震撼。
I was down in the Green Zone today, where the American headquarters is in Baghdad.
今天我来到了绿区，美国总部就设在巴格达。
And I thought man, I used to hate coming into the Green Zone.
我想，伙计，我曾经讨厌进入绿区。
And the reason I hated it is because it had such an air of unreality to it.
我讨厌它的原因是因为它有一种不真实的感觉。
It gave me a headache.
这让我很头疼。
I would rather be out on the hot, nasty streets of Baghdad than inside the air conditioned hallways of the palace there.
我宁愿呆在巴格达炎热、肮脏的街道上，也不愿呆在装有空调的宫殿走廊里。
Because it was just so wildly irrelevant to what was happening outside the walls of the Green Zone in the real Iraq.
因为这与真实的伊拉克绿区围墙外发生的事情完全无关。
I remember getting a little bit surly with an American general about 14 months ago here, it was February '06.
我记得大约 14 个月前，那是 2006 年 2 月，我和一位美国将军有点脾气暴躁。
And I said, you have no idea what it's like on the streets of Baghdad, do you?
我说，你不知道巴格达的街道是什么样子，是吗？
Because it was really a pure Hobbesian state at that point.
因为那时它确实是一个纯粹的霍布斯状态。
And he said, no, no, it's actually pretty good out there.
他说，不，不，那里实际上相当不错。
I said, put on civilian clothes, and see if you can walk one mile anywhere in Baghdad alone.
我说，穿上便服，看看你能不能一个人在巴格达的任何地方走一英里。
And I said, I guarantee you, you won't.
我说，我向你保证，你不会的。
By the end of that mile, you're going to be dead or kidnapped.
到这一英里结束时，你就会死亡或被绑架。
And he said, I don't believe you.
他说，我不相信你。
And I thought, these guys are just totally out of touch.
我想，这些家伙完全脱离了现实。
It struck me today, being here in the Green Zone, what the assessments are to the situation, this is the first time I've really heard American officials talk about this in a way that the average Iraqi man on the street could understand and say, yeah, that's right.
今天，在绿区，我对局势的评估感到震惊，这是我第一次真正听到美国官员以街上普通伊拉克人都能理解的方式谈论这个问题，并说，是的，没错。
That's pretty much what's happening here.
这几乎就是这里发生的事情。
But it was very sober, very understanding of how many mistakes we've made, how much this has been screwed up by the US government, and what a deep hole they're in.
但我们非常清醒，非常理解我们犯了多少错误，美国政府搞砸了多少事情，以及他们陷入了多么深的困境。
I found the sobriety and the edge of pessimism refreshing.
我发现这种清醒和悲观的边缘令人耳目一新。
I have to say, that sounds actually sort of hopeful.
我不得不说，这听起来确实有点希望。
Hopeful in the bizarre sense that it's a different crew in here now.
奇怪的是，现在这里有不同的船员了，充满希望。
The problem is, and the huge question is, is it simply too little, too late?
问题是，最重要的问题是，这是否太少、太晚了？
Thomas Ricks in Baghdad.
托马斯·里克斯在巴格达。
A new paperback edition of his book Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq comes out in July, with a new afterword discussing some of these questions about what now.
他的书《惨败：美国在伊拉克的军事冒险》的新平装本将于 7 月出版，新的后记讨论了其中一些关于现在的问题。
Our program was produced today by Nancy Updaike and myself, with Alex Blumberg, Jane Feltes, Sarah Koenig, Lisa Pollack, and Alisa Shipp.
今天我们的节目由 Nancy Updaike 和我本人以及 Alex Blumberg、Jane Feltes、Sarah Koenig、Lisa Pollack 和 Alisa Shipp 共同制作。
Our senior producer is Julie Snyder.
我们的高级制片人是朱莉·斯奈德。
Production help from Seth Lind and Tommy Andres.
塞思·林德 (Seth Lind) 和汤米·安德烈斯 (Tommy Andres) 为制作提供帮助。
Music help from Jessica Hopper, web help from Sho Jou Yung.
Jessica Hopper 提供音乐帮助，Sho Jou Yung 提供网络帮助。
Special thanks today to Steve Cashket, Dan Ephron, Andrew Metz, Haider Hamza, Kiki Munchy, and Brian Sargent.
今天特别感谢 Steve Cashket、Dan Ephron、Andrew Metz、Haider Hamza、Kiki Munchy 和 Brian Sargent。
Our website, www.thisamericanlife.org.
我们的网站：www.thisamericanlife.org。
This American Life is distributed by Public Radio International.
《美国生活》由国际公共广播电台发行。
Support also comes from audible.com, where you can download audio books, magazines, newspapers, and radio shows, including archives from the last 10 years of this show, audible.com/thisamericanlife.
audible.com 也提供支持，您可以在其中下载有声读物、杂志、报纸和广播节目，包括该节目过去 10 年的档案，audible.com/thisamericanlife。
WBEZ management oversight for our program by our boss Torey Malatia, who says we are not using his real talents.
我们的老板托里·马拉蒂亚 (Torey Malatia) 对我们的项目进行了 WBEZ 管理监督，他说我们没有发挥他真正的才能。
You know, you live your whole life learning how to dominate an enemy and all that kind of stuff.
你知道，你一生都在学习如何控制敌人以及诸如此类的事情。
Who likes to be in charge of ensuring that diapers are available?
谁喜欢负责确保尿布可用？
I'm Ira Glass, back next week with more stories of This American Life.
我是艾拉·格拉斯，下周回来，带来更多《美国生活》的故事。
This American Life is produced in collaboration with WBEZ Chicago and delivered to stations by PRX The Public Radio Exchange.
《This American Life》与 WBEZ Chicago 合作制作，并由 PRX 公共广播电台传送到各电台。