The Brand Age

March 2026 In the early 1970s, disaster struck the Swiss watch industry.

2026 年 3 月 20 世纪 70 年代初，瑞士钟表业遭遇灾难。

Now people call it the quartz crisis, but in fact it was a compound of three separate disasters that all happened at about the same time.

现在人们称之为石英危机，但实际上它是几乎同时发生的三场独立灾难的复合体。

The first was competition from Japan.

首先是来自日本的竞争。

The Swiss had been watching the Japanese in the rear view mirror all through the 1960s, and they'd been improving at an alarming rate.

整个 20 世纪 60 年代，瑞士人一直在后视镜中观察日本人，他们的进步速度惊人。

But even so the Swiss

但即便如此瑞士人

were surprised in 1968 when the Japanese swept all the top spots for mechanical watches at the Geneva Observatory trials.

1968 年，当日本人在日内瓦天文台试验中包揽了机械表的所有冠军位置时，我们感到非常惊讶。

The Swiss knew what was coming.

瑞士人知道接下来会发生什么。

For years the Japanese had been able to make cheaper watches.

多年来，日本人一直能够制造更便宜的手表。

Now they could make better ones too.

现在他们也可以做出更好的。

To make matters worse, Swiss watches were about to become much more expensive.

更糟糕的是，瑞士手表即将变得更加昂贵。

The Bretton Woods agreement, which since 1945 had fixed the exchange rates of most of the world's currencies, had set the

自 1945 年以来，布雷顿森林协定固定了世界上大多数货币的汇率，并规定了

Swiss Franc at an artificially low rate of .228 USD.

瑞士法郎被人为压低至 0.228 美元。

When Bretton Woods collapsed in 1973, the Franc shot upward.

1973 年布雷顿森林体系崩溃后，法郎飙升。

By 1978 it reached .625 USD, meaning Swiss watches were now 2.7 times as expensive for Americans to buy.

到 1978 年，瑞士手表的价格达到 0.625 美元，这意味着美国人购买瑞士手表的价格是现在的 2.7 倍。

[ 1 ] The combined effect of foreign competition and the loss of their protective exchange rate would have decimated the Swiss watch industry even if it hadn't been for quartz movements.

[1] 即使没有石英机芯，外国竞争和失去保护性汇率的综合影响也会摧毁瑞士钟表业。

But quartz

但石英

movements were the final blow.

动作是最后一击。

Now the whole game they'd been trying to win at became irrelevant.

现在他们一直试图赢得的整场比赛变得无关紧要了。

Something that had been expensive — knowing the exact time — was now a commodity.

曾经昂贵的东西——知道确切的时间——现在变成了商品。

Between the early 1970s and the early 1980s, unit sales of Swiss watches fell by almost two thirds.

20 世纪 70 年代初至 80 年代初，瑞士手表的销量下降了近三分之二。

Most Swiss watchmakers became insolvent or close to it and were sold.

大多数瑞士制表商破产或濒临破产并被出售。

But not all of them.

但不是全部。

A handful survived as independent companies.

少数公司作为独立公司幸存下来。

And the way they did it

以及他们的做法

was by transforming themselves from precision instrument makers into luxury brands.

是从精密仪器制造商转型为奢侈品牌。

In the process the nature of the mechanical watch was also transformed.

在此过程中，机械表的性质也发生了转变。

The most expensive watches have always cost a lot, but why they cost a lot and what buyers got in return have changed completely.

最昂贵的手表总是价格昂贵，但为什么它们价格昂贵以及买家得到的回报已经完全改变了。

In 1960 expensive watches cost a lot because they cost a lot to manufacture, and what the buyer got in return was the most accurate

1960年，昂贵的手表价格昂贵，因为它们的制造成本很高，而买家得到的回报是最准确的

timekeeping device, for its size, that could be made.

就其尺寸而言，计时装置是可以制造的。

Now they cost a lot because brands spend a lot on advertising and use tricks to limit supply, and what the buyer gets in return is an expensive status symbol.

现在它们的成本很高，因为品牌在广告上花费了大量资金，并使用技巧来限制供应，而买家得到的回报是昂贵的身份象征。

That turns out to be a profitable business though.

但事实证明这是一项有利可图的业务。

The Swiss watch industry probably makes more now from selling brand than they would have if they were still selling engineering.

瑞士钟表业现在通过销售品牌赚到的钱可能比他们仍然销售工程技术赚的钱还要多。

And indeed, when you

确实，当你

look at the graph of Swiss watch sales by revenue, it tells a different story than the graph of unit sales.

看看瑞士手表销售额（按收入）的图表，它讲述的故事与单位销售额的图表不同。

Instead of falling off a cliff, the revenue numbers merely flatten out for a while, and then take off like a rocket in the late 1980s as the surviving watchmakers come to terms with their new destiny.

收入数字并没有从悬崖上掉下来，只是暂时趋于平稳，然后在 20 世纪 80 年代末，随着幸存的制表商接受他们的新命运，收入数字像火箭一样起飞。

It took the watchmakers about 20 years to figure out the new rules of the game.

制表师们花了大约20年的时间才弄清楚新的游戏规则。

And it's interesting to watch them do it, because the

观看他们这样做很有趣，因为

completeness of their transformation makes it the perfect case study in one of the most powerful forces of our era: brand.

他们转型的完整性使其成为我们这个时代最强大的力量之一：品牌的完美案例研究。

Brand is what's left when the substantive differences between products disappear.

当产品之间的实质性差异消失后，剩下的就是品牌。

But making the substantive differences between products disappear is what technology naturally tends to do.

但让产品之间的实质性差异消失是技术自然倾向于做的事情。

So what happened to the Swiss watch industry is not merely an interesting outlier.

因此，瑞士钟表业所发生的事情不仅仅是一个有趣的异常现象。

It's very much a story of our times.

这很大程度上是我们这个时代的故事。

Jaeger-LeCoultre's web site says that one of their current collections "takes its inspiration from the classic designs of the golden age of watchmaking." In saying this they're implicitly saying something that present-day watchmakers all know but rarely come so close to saying outright: whatever age we're in now, it's not the golden age.

Jaeger-LeCoultre积家的网站称，他们当前的一个系列“从制表黄金时代的经典设计中汲取灵感”。他们这样说，隐含着当今制表师都知道但很少直白说出的话：无论我们现在处于哪个时代，这都不是黄金时代。

The golden age was from 1945 to 1970 — from the point where the

黄金时代是从 1945 年到 1970 年——从那时起

watch industry emerged from the chaos of war with the Swiss on top till the triple cataclysm that struck it starting in the late 60s.

钟表业从瑞士人占主导地位的战争混乱中崛起，直到 60 年代末开始的三重灾难。

There were two things watchmakers sought above all in the golden age: thinness and accuracy.

在黄金时代，制表师最追求的有两件事：薄度和精确度。

And indeed this was arguably the essential tradeoff in watchmaking.

事实上，这可以说是制表业的基本权衡。

A watch is something you carry with you to tell you the time.

手表是您随身携带的用来告诉您时间的东西。

So there are two fundamental ways to improve

所以有两个基本的改进方法

it: to make it easier to carry with you and to make it better at telling the time.

it：让它更容易随身携带，并能更好地报时。

Obviously accuracy is valuable, but in the golden age thinness was if anything more valuable.

显然，准确性很有价值，但在黄金时代，薄度更有价值。

Even in the days of pocket watches the best watchmakers tried to make their watches as thin as they could.

即使在怀表时代，最好的制表师也试图让他们的手表尽可能薄。

Cheap, thick pocket watches were derided as "turnips." But thinness took on a new urgency when men's watches moved onto their wrists

便宜又厚的怀表被嘲笑为“萝卜”。但当男士手表戴在手腕上时，纤薄变得更加紧迫

during World War I.

第一次世界大战期间。

And since thinness was more difficult to achieve than accuracy, it was this quality that tended to distinguish the more expensive watches of the golden age.

由于薄度比精确度更难实现，正是这种品质往往使黄金时代的更昂贵的手表脱颖而出。

There is one other thing watchmakers have pursued in some eras: telling more than the time in the usual way.

在某些时代，制表师还追求另一件事：以通常的方式告诉人们更多的时间。

Telling you the phase of the moon, for example, or telling the time with sound.

例如，告诉您月相，或者用声音告诉您时间。

In the industry the term for these things is "complications." They were

在业界，这些事情的术语是“并发症”。他们是

popular in the nineteenth century and they're popular again now, but except for one pragmatic complication (showing the date), they were a sideshow in the golden age.

它们在十九世纪流行，现在又流行起来，但除了一个实用的复杂功能（显示日期）之外，它们在黄金时代只是一场杂耍。

In the golden age, as always in golden ages, the top watchmakers focused on the essential tradeoff.

在黄金时代，一如既往，顶级制表师专注于必要的权衡。

And, as always in golden ages, they did it beautifully.

而且，就像在黄金时代一样，他们做得很漂亮。

The best watches of the golden age have a quiet perfection that has never been equalled since.

黄金时代最好的腕表拥有自此以来从未有过的完美安静。

And for reasons I'm about to explain, probably

由于我即将解释的原因，可能是

never will be.

永远不会。

The three most prestigious brands of the golden age were the so-called "holy trinity" of Patek Philippe, Vacheron Constantin, and Audemars Piguet.

黄金时代最负盛名的三个品牌是所谓的“三位一体”：百达翡丽、江诗丹顿和爱彼。

Their prestige was mostly deserved; they had earned it by the exceptional quality of their work.

他们的声望是实至名归的。他们凭借卓越的工作质量赢得了这一荣誉。

By the 1960s they stood on two legs, prestige and performance.

到了 20 世纪 60 年代，他们依靠声誉和业绩两条腿走路。

And what they learned in the next two decades was that they had to put all their weight on the

在接下来的二十年里他们学到的是，他们必须把全部精力放在

first leg, because they could no longer win at either of the two things watchmakers had historically striven to achieve.

第一回合，因为他们再也无法在制表师历来努力实现的两件事上获胜。

Quartz movements were not only more accurate than any mechanical movement, but thinner too.

石英机芯不仅比任何机械机芯更精确，而且也更薄。

The holy trinity at least had another leg to stand on.

圣三位一体至少还有另一条腿可以站立。

Most of the other well-known Swiss watchmakers sold only performance.

大多数其他知名瑞​​士制表商只出售性能。

None of those companies survived intact.

这些公司没有一家能够完好无损地幸存下来。

Omega showed what not to do.

欧米茄展示了不该做的事情。

Omega were the nerds of Swiss watchmakers.

欧米茄是瑞士钟表制造商的书呆子。

They made wonderfully accurate watches, but they would have been ambivalent, at best, about the idea of being a luxury brand.

他们制造出极其精准的手表，但他们对于成为奢侈品牌的想法充其量是矛盾的。

When the Japanese got as good as the Swiss at making accurate movements, Omega responded in the Omega way: make even more accurate movements.

当日本人在精准机芯方面与瑞士人一样出色时，欧米茄以欧米茄方式做出回应：打造更精准的机芯。

They introduced a new movement in 1968 that ran at a 45% higher frequency.

他们于 1968 年推出了一款新机芯，运行频率提高了 45%。

In theory this should have made it more accurate, but the new movement was so fragile that it destroyed their reputation

从理论上讲，这应该会使其更加准确，但新机芯非常脆弱，以至于毁了他们的声誉

for reliability.

为了可靠性。

They even tried to make a better quartz movement, but there was nothing down that road but a race to the bottom.

他们甚至试图制造出更好的石英机芯，但除了逐底竞争之外，别无他法。

By 1981 they were insolvent and were taken over by their creditors.

到 1981 年，他们资不抵债，被债权人接管。

Patek Philippe took the opposite approach.

百达翡丽则采取了相反的做法。

While Omega was redesigning their movements, Patek was redesigning their cases.

当欧米茄重新设计他们的机芯时，百达翡丽也在重新设计他们的表壳。

Or more precisely, designing their cases, because until then they hadn't.

或者更准确地说，设计他们的案例，因为在那之前他们还没有这样做。

This is probably the point to mention what a strange beast the Swiss

这大概就是要提一下瑞士人是多么奇怪的野兽了

watch industry was in those days.

那时的钟表业盛行。

It was a kind of capitalism that's hard to imagine today, and even then could only have been made to work in a country like Switzerland — a network of small, specialized companies locked into place by regulation.

这是一种今天很难想象的资本主义，即使在当时也只能在像瑞士这样的国家运作——一个由监管锁定的小型专业公司组成的网络。

The companies that we for convenience have been calling watchmakers were merely the consumer-facing edge of this network.

为了方便起见，我们称之为制表商的公司只是该网络中面向消费者的边缘。

The holy trinity didn't design their own cases, or even their own movements most of the time.

圣三一大部分时候都没有设计自己的表壳，甚至没有设计自己的机芯。

In 1968 (that year again) Patek Philippe launched a new watch that shifted the center of gravity of case design.

1968年（又是那一年）百达翡丽推出了一款新手表，改变了表壳设计的重心。

This time they'd taken their own designs to the casemakers and said "this is what you're going to make for us." The result was a striking new model called the Golden Ellipse .

这次，他们把自己的设计交给了制壳师，并说：“这就是你们要为我们做的。”结果是一个引人注目的新模型，称为“金椭圆”。

Somewhat confusingly, because it wasn't elliptical.

有点令人困惑，因为它不是椭圆形的。

The new case was more of what UI designers would call a round rect:

新的案例更像是 UI 设计师所说的圆形矩形：

a rectangle with rounded corners.

带圆角的矩形。

And this new family of watches was quite successful.

这个新的手表系列非常成功。

But it was more than that: it was the pattern for the future.

但它的意义远不止于此：它是未来的模式。

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