Bradley's Ghost
November 2004 (I wrote this essay immediately after the election.
2004 年 11 月(我在选举后立即写了这篇文章。
But after writing it I buried it; I was so depressed about the election that I just didn't want to think about it anymore.
但写完之后我就把它埋葬了;我对选举感到非常沮丧,以至于我不想再去想它了。
I recently came across this essay again, and it strikes me as on the mark.) --> A lot of people are writing now about why Kerry lost.
我最近再次看到这篇文章,它让我感到切中要害。) --> 现在很多人都在写关于克里为何失败的文章。
Here I want to examine a more specific question: why were the exit polls so wrong?
在这里我想探讨一个更具体的问题:为什么出口民调如此错误?
In Ohio, which Kerry ultimately lost 49-51, exit polls gave him a 52-48 victory.
在俄亥俄州,克里最终以 49 比 51 落败,出口民意调查显示克里以 52 比 48 获胜。
And this wasn't just random error.
这不仅仅是随机错误。
In every swing state they overestimated the Kerry vote.
在每个摇摆州,他们都高估了克里的选票。
In Florida, which Bush ultimately won 52-47, exit polls predicted a dead heat.
在佛罗里达州,布什最终以 52 比 47 获胜,出口民意调查预测双方将不分胜负。
(These are not early numbers.
(这些不是早期的数字。
They're from about midnight eastern time, long after polls closed in Ohio and Florida.
它们来自东部时间午夜左右,距离俄亥俄州和佛罗里达州的投票结束很久之后。
And yet by the next afternoon the exit poll numbers online corresponded to the returns.
然而到了第二天下午,网上的出口民意调查数字与回报相对应。
The only way I can imagine this happening is if those in charge of the exit polls cooked the books after seeing the actual returns.
我能想象这种情况发生的唯一方法是那些负责出口民意调查的人在看到实际回报后做假账。
But that's another issue.) What happened?
但这是另一个问题。)发生了什么?
The source of the problem may be a variant of the Bradley Effect.
问题的根源可能是布拉德利效应的一种变体。
This term was invented after Tom Bradley, the black mayor of Los Angeles, lost an election for governor of California despite a comfortable lead in the polls.
这个术语是在洛杉矶黑人市长汤姆·布拉德利(Tom Bradley)在加州州长选举中失利后发明的,尽管他在民意调查中遥遥领先。
Apparently voters were afraid to say
显然选民不敢说
they planned to vote against him, lest their motives be (perhaps correctly) suspected.
他们计划投票反对他,以免他们的动机(也许是正确的)受到怀疑。
It seems likely that something similar happened in exit polls this year.
今年的出口民意调查似乎也发生了类似的情况。
In theory, exit polls ought to be very accurate.
从理论上讲,出口民意调查应该非常准确。
You're not asking people what they would do.
你不是在问人们他们会做什么。
You're asking what they just did.
你问他们刚刚做了什么。
How can you get errors asking that?
问这个问题怎么会出错呢?
Because some people don't respond.
因为有些人没有反应。
To get a truly random sample, pollsters ask, say, every
为了获得真正随机的样本,民意调查人员会询问每个人
20th person leaving the polling place who they voted for.
第 20 位离开投票站的人是他们所投票的人。
But not everyone wants to answer.
但并不是每个人都愿意回答。
And the pollsters can't simply ignore those who won't, or their sample isn't random anymore.
民意调查机构不能简单地忽略那些不这样做的人,否则他们的样本就不再是随机的。
So what they do, apparently, is note down the age and race and sex of the person, and guess from that who they voted for.
显然,他们所做的就是记下这个人的年龄、种族和性别,并从中猜测他们投票给了谁。
This works so long as there is no correlation between who people vote for and whether they're willing to talk about it.
只要人们投票给谁和他们是否愿意谈论它之间不存在相关性,这种方法就有效。
But this
但这
year there may have been.
当年可能有。
It may be that a significant number of those who voted for Bush didn't want to say so.
可能有相当一部分投票给布什的人不想这么说。
Why not?
为什么不呢?
Because people in the US are more conservative than they're willing to admit.
因为美国人比他们愿意承认的更加保守。
The values of the elite in this country, at least at the moment, are NPR values.
至少目前,这个国家的精英价值观是 NPR 价值观。
The average person, as I think both Republicans and Democrats would agree, is more socially conservative.
我认为共和党人和民主党人都会同意,普通人在社会上更加保守。
But while some openly flaunt the fact that they don't share the
但是,尽管有些人公开炫耀他们不认同这一事实
opinions of the elite, others feel a little nervous about it, as if they had bad table manners.
精英的意见,其他人却感到有点紧张,好像他们的餐桌礼仪很糟糕。
For example, according to current NPR values, you can't say anything that might be perceived as disparaging towards homosexuals.
例如,根据当前的 NPR 价值观,您不能说任何可能被视为贬低同性恋者的话。
To do so is "homophobic." And yet a large number of Americans are deeply religious, and the Bible is quite explicit on the subject of homosexuality.
这样做就是“恐同”。然而,许多美国人笃信宗教,《圣经》对同性恋的主题也相当明确。
What are they to do?
他们要做什么?
I think what many do is keep
我认为很多人所做的就是保留
their opinions, but keep them to themselves.
他们的意见,但保留自己的意见。
They know what they believe, but they also know what they're supposed to believe.
他们知道自己相信什么,但他们也知道自己应该相信什么。
And so when a stranger (for example, a pollster) asks them their opinion about something like gay marriage, they will not always say what they really think.
因此,当陌生人(例如民意调查专家)询问他们对同性婚姻等问题的看法时,他们并不总是说出自己的真实想法。
When the values of the elite are liberal, polls will tend to underestimate the conservativeness of ordinary voters.
当精英的价值观是自由主义时,民意调查往往会低估普通选民的保守性。
This seems
这似乎
to me the leading theory to explain why the exit polls were so far off this year.
对我来说,这是解释为什么今年出口民意调查差距如此之大的主要理论。
NPR values said one ought to vote for Kerry.
NPR 价值观认为人们应该投票给克里。
So all the people who voted for Kerry felt virtuous for doing so, and were eager to tell pollsters they had.
因此,所有投票给克里的人都觉得这样做是有道德的,并且渴望告诉民意调查者他们有这样的行为。
No one who voted for Kerry did it as an act of quiet defiance.
没有人把票投给克里,这是一种无声的反抗行为。
<!-- Imagine this scenario.
<!-- 想象一下这个场景。
A husband and wife go to vote.
一对夫妻去投票。
The wife thinks Bush has made a mess in Iraq and that the family is worse
妻子认为布什把伊拉克搞得一团糟,家庭更糟糕
off economically than a few years ago, and plans to vote for Kerry.
经济状况比几年前好,并计划投票给克里。
The husband thinks it's great that America is finally kicking some ass, and sees in George Bush a kind of cowboy figure that he likes to identify with.
丈夫认为美国终于有所作为真是太好了,并在乔治·布什身上看到了他喜欢认同的牛仔形象。
Which of the two is more likely to want to explain to a pollster why they voted as they did?
这两个人中哪一个更有可能向民意测验专家解释他们为什么投票?
-->
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