What I Did this Summer

October 2005 The first Summer Founders Program has just finished.

2005 年 10 月 第一届夏季创始人计划刚刚结束。

We were surprised how well it went.

我们很惊讶事情进展顺利。

Overall only about 10% of startups succeed, but if I had to guess now, I'd predict three or four of the eight startups we funded will make it.

总体而言，只有大约 10% 的初创公司取得了成功，但如果我现在必须猜测的话，我预计我们资助的八家初创公司中有三四家会成功。

Of the startups that needed further funding, I believe all have either closed a round or are likely to soon.

在需要进一步融资的初创公司中，我相信所有公司要么已经结束了一轮融资，要么可能很快就会结束。

Two have already turned down (lowball) acquisition offers.

其中两家已经拒绝（低价）收购要约。

We would have been happy if just one of the eight seemed promising by the end of the summer.

如果八个项目中只有一个在夏末看起来有希望的话，我们会很高兴。

What's going on?

这是怎么回事？

Did some kind of anomaly make this summer's applicants especially good?

是否有某种异常现象让今年夏天的申请者变得特别优秀？

We worry about that, but we can't think of one.

我们担心这一点，但我们想不出一个。

We'll find out this <xa href="http://ycombinator.com/wfp2006.html">winter .

我们会找到这个<xa href="http://ycombinator.com/wfp2006.html">冬天。

The whole summer was full of surprises.

整个夏天都充满了惊喜。

The best was that the <a href="hiring.html">hypothesis we were testing seems to be

最好的是，我们正在测试的假设似乎是

correct.

正确。

Young hackers can start viable companies.

年轻的黑客可以创办可行的公司。

This is good news for two reasons: (a) it's an encouraging thought, and (b) it means that Y Combinator, which is predicated on the idea, is not hosed.

这是个好消息，原因有二：(a) 这是一个令人鼓舞的想法，(b) 这意味着基于该想法的 Y Combinator 并未受到影响。

Age More precisely, the hypothesis was that success in a startup depends mainly on how smart and energetic you are, and much less on how old you are or how much business experience you have.

年龄 更准确地说，这个假设是，初创公司的成功主要取决于你的聪明程度和精力，而不是你的年龄或你有多少商业经验。

The results so

结果如此

far bear this out.

足以证明这一点。

The 2005 summer founders ranged in age from 18 to 28 (average 23), and there is no correlation between their ages and how well they're doing.

2005 年夏季创始人的年龄从 18 岁到 28 岁（平均 23 岁）不等，他们的年龄和他们的业绩之间没有相关性。

This should not really be surprising.

这并不奇怪。

Bill Gates and Michael Dell were both 19 when they started the companies that made them famous.

比尔·盖茨 (Bill Gates) 和迈克尔·戴尔 (Michael Dell) 创办公司时都只有 19 岁，并因此而声名大噪。

Young founders are not a new phenomenon: the trend began as soon as computers got cheap enough for college kids to afford them.

年轻创始人并不是一个新现象：当电脑变得便宜到大学生买得起时，这种趋势就开始了。

Another of our hypotheses was that you can start a startup on less money than most people think.

我们的另一个假设是，你可以用比大多数人想象的更少的钱来创办一家初创公司。

Other investors were surprised to hear the most we gave any group was $20,000.

其他投资者听到我们向任何团体提供的最高金额为 20,000 美元时感到惊讶。

But we knew it was possible to start on that little because we started Viaweb on $10,000.

但我们知道从这点钱开始是可能的，因为我们以 10,000 美元创办了 Viaweb。

And so it proved this summer.

今年夏天也证明了这一点。

Three months' funding is enough to get into second gear.

三个月的资金足以进入第二档。

We had a demo day for potential investors ten weeks in, and seven of the eight groups had a prototype ready

十周后，我们为潜在投资者举办了演示日，八个小组中有七个已经准备好原型

by that time.

到那时。

One, Reddit , had already launched, and were able to give a demo of their live site.

其中之一，Reddit，已经推出，并且能够提供其实时网站的演示。

A researcher who studied the SFP startups said the one thing they had in common was that they all worked ridiculously hard.

一位研究 SFP 初创公司的研究人员表示，他们的一个共同点是他们都非常努力地工作。

People this age are commonly seen as lazy.

这个年龄段的人通常被认为是懒惰的。

I think in some cases it's not so much that they lack the appetite for work, but that the work they're offered is unappetizing.

我认为在某些情况下，并不是他们对工作缺乏兴趣，而是他们所提供的工作不合胃口。

The experience of the SFP suggests that if you let motivated people

SFP 的经验表明，如果你让积极主动的人

do real work, they work hard, whatever their age.

做真正的工作，无论年龄多大，他们都努力工作。

As one of the founders said "I'd read that starting a startup consumed your life, but I had no idea what that meant until I did it." I'd feel guilty if I were a boss making people work this hard.

正如一位创始人所说：“我读到过，创办一家初创公司会消耗你的生命，但在我这么做之前我不知道这意味着什么。”如果我是老板让员工这么努力工作，我会感到内疚。

But we're not these people's bosses.

但我们不是这些人的老板。

They're working on their own projects.

他们正在做自己的项目。

And what makes them work is not us but their competitors.

让他们发挥作用的不是我们，而是他们的竞争对手。

Like good athletes, they don't work hard because the coach yells

就像优秀的运动员一样，他们不努力训练是因为教练大喊大叫

at them, but because they want to win.

对他们，但因为他们想赢。

We have less power than bosses, and yet the founders work harder than employees.

我们的权力比老板小，但创始人却比员工更努力。

It seems like a win for everyone.

这似乎对每个人来说都是一场胜利。

The only catch is that we get on average only about 5-7% of the upside, while an employer gets nearly all of it.

唯一的问题是，我们平均只能获得约 5-7% 的收益，而雇主几乎获得了全部收益。

(We're counting on it being 5-7% of a much larger number.) As well as working hard, the groups all turned out to be extraordinarily responsible.

（我们预计这个数字会占到更大数字的 5-7%。）除了努力工作外，这些团队都表现出了非凡的责任感。

I can't think of a time when one failed to do something

我想不出有什么时候一个人没能做某事

they'd promised to, even by being late for an appointment.

他们答应了，即使约会迟到了。

This is another lesson the world has yet to learn.

这是世界尚未吸取的另一个教训。

One of the founders discovered that the hardest part of arranging a meeting with executives at a big cell phone carrier was getting a rental company to rent him a car, because he was too young.

一位创始人发现，安排与一家大型手机运营商高管的会面最困难的部分是让一家租赁公司为他租一辆车，因为他太年轻了。

I think the problem here is much the same as with the apparent laziness of people this age.

我认为这里的问题与这个年龄段的人明显的懒惰非常相似。

They seem lazy because the work they're

他们看起来很懒，因为他们的工作

given is pointless, and they act irresponsible because they're not given any power.

给予是毫无意义的，他们的行为不负责任，因为他们没有被赋予任何权力。

Some of them, anyway.

无论如何，其中一些。

We only have a sample size of about twenty, but it seems so far that if you let people in their early twenties be their own bosses, they rise to the occasion.

我们的样本量只有二十人左右，但到目前为止，如果让二十岁出头的人自己当老板，他们就会迎难而上。

Morale The summer founders were as a rule very idealistic.

士气 夏季创始人通常非常理想主义。

They also wanted very much to get rich.

他们也非常想致富。

These qualities might seem incompatible,

这些品质可能看起来不相容，

but they're not.

但他们不是。

These guys want to get rich, but they want to do it by changing the world.

这些人想致富，但他们想通过改变世界来实现这一目标。

They wouldn't (well, seven of the eight groups wouldn't) be interested in making money by speculating in stocks.

他们不会（嗯，八个群体中的七个不会）对通过炒股赚钱感兴趣。

They want to make something people use.

他们想要制造一些人们使用的东西。

I think this makes them more effective as founders.

我认为这使他们作为创始人更加有效。

As hard as people will work for money, they'll work harder for a cause.

人们会为了金钱而努力工作，他们也会为了某个事业而更加努力地工作。

And since success in a startup depends so much on motivation, the

由于初创公司的成功在很大程度上取决于动机，

paradoxical result is that the people likely to make the most money are those who aren't in it just for the money.

矛盾的结果是，最有可能赚最多钱的人是那些不只是为了钱而参与其中的人。

The founders of Kiko , for example, are working on an Ajax calendar.

例如，Kiko 的创始人正在开发 Ajax 日历。

They want to get rich, but they pay more attention to design than they would if that were their only motivation.

他们想致富，但如果设计是他们唯一的动力，他们就会更加关注设计。

You can tell just by looking at it.

你只要看看就知道了。

I never considered it till this summer, but this might be another reason startups run by hackers tend to do better than those run by

直到今年夏天我才考虑过这个问题，但这可能是由黑客运营的初创公司往往比由黑客运营的初创公司做得更好的另一个原因。

MBAs.

MBA。

Perhaps it's not just that hackers understand technology better, but that they're driven by more powerful motivations.

也许黑客不仅更了解技术，而且他们受到更强大的动机驱动。

Microsoft, as I've said before, is a dangerously misleading example.

正如我之前所说，微软是一个危险的误导性例子。

Their mean corporate culture only works for monopolies.

他们刻薄的企业文化只适用于垄断企业。

Google is a better model.

谷歌是一个更好的模式。

Considering that the summer founders are the sharks in this ocean, we were surprised how frightened most of them were of competitors.

考虑到夏季创始人是这片海洋中的鲨鱼，我们很惊讶他们中的大多数人对竞争对手的恐惧。

But now that I think of it, we were just as frightened when we started Viaweb.

但现在想起来，我们和创办 Viaweb 时一样害怕。

For the first year, our initial reaction to news of a competitor was always: we're doomed.

第一年，我们对竞争对手的消息的第一反应总是：我们注定失败。

Just as a hypochondriac magnifies his symptoms till he's convinced he has some terrible disease, when you're not used to competitors you magnify them into monsters.

就像忧郁症患者会放大自己的症状，直到他确信自己患有某种可怕的疾病一样，当你不习惯竞争对手时，你就会把它们放大成怪物。

Here's a handy rule for startups: competitors are rarely as dangerous

对于初创公司来说，有一条方便的规则：竞争对手很少那么危险

as they seem.

正如他们看起来的那样。

Most will self-destruct before you can destroy them.

在你摧毁它们之前，大多数都会自毁。

And it certainly doesn't matter how many of them there are, any more than it matters to the winner of a marathon how many runners are behind him.

当然，有多少人并不重要，就像对于马拉松获胜者来说，他身后有多少跑步者一样重要。

"It's a crowded market," I remember one founder saying worriedly.

“这是一个拥挤的市场，”我记得一位创始人忧心忡忡地说。

"Are you the current leader?" I asked.

“你是现任领导吗？”我问。

"Yes." "Is anyone able to develop software faster than you?" "Probably not." "Well, if you're ahead now, and you're the fastest, then you'll

“是的。” “有人能比你更快地开发软件吗？” “可能不会。” “好吧，如果你现在领先，而且你是最快的，那么你就会

stay ahead.

保持领先。

What difference does it make how many others there are?" Another group was worried when they realized they had to rewrite their software from scratch.

还有多少人有什么区别呢？”当另一组意识到必须从头开始重写软件时，他们感到很担心。

I told them it would be a bad sign if they didn't.

我告诉他们，如果他们不这样做，那将是一个坏兆头。

The main function of your initial version is to be rewritten.

你初始版本的主要功能是要重写。

That's why we advise groups to ignore issues like scalability, internationalization, and heavy-duty security at first.

这就是为什么我们建议团队首先忽略可扩展性、国际化和重型安全性等问题。

[1] I can

[1] 我可以

imagine an advocate of "best practices" saying these ought to be considered from the start.

想象一下“最佳实践”的倡导者说这些应该从一开始就考虑到。

And he'd be right, except that they interfere with the primary function of software in a startup: to be a vehicle for experimenting with its own design.

他是对的，只不过它们干扰了初创公司软件的主要功能：成为试验自己设计的工具。

Having to retrofit internationalization or scalability is a pain, certainly.

当然，必须改造国际化或可扩展性是一种痛苦。

The only bigger pain is not needing to, because your initial version was too big and rigid to evolve into something users wanted.

唯一更大的痛苦是不需要，因为您的初始版本太大且僵化，无法演变成用户想要的东西。

I suspect this is another reason startups beat big companies.

我怀疑这是初创公司击败大公司的另一个原因。

Startups can be irresponsible and release version 1s that are light enough to evolve.

初创公司可能会不负责任地发布足够轻的版本 1，以便不断发展。

In big companies, all the pressure is in the direction of over-engineering.

在大公司中，所有压力都来自于过度设计。

What Got Learned One thing we were curious about this summer was where these groups would need help.

今年夏天我们好奇的一件事是这些团体在哪些方面需要帮助。

That turned out to vary a lot.

结果差异很大。

Some we helped with technical advice-- for example, about how to set up an application

我们为一些人提供了技术建议——例如，关于如何设置应用程序

to run on multiple servers.

在多个服务器上运行。

Most we helped with strategy questions, like what to patent, and what to charge for and what to give away.

我们帮助大多数人解决战略问题，例如申请什么专利、收取什么费用以及赠送什么。

Nearly all wanted advice about dealing with future investors: how much money should they take and what kind of terms should they expect?

几乎所有人都希望获得有关与未来投资者打交道的建议：他们应该接受多少钱以及他们应该期望什么样的条款？

However, all the groups quickly learned how to deal with stuff like patents and investors.

然而，所有小组很快就学会了如何处理专利和投资者等问题。

These problems aren't intrinsically difficult,

这些问题本质上并不困难，

just unfamiliar.

只是陌生。

It was surprising-- slightly frightening even-- how fast they learned.

他们学得如此之快，令人惊讶，甚至有点可怕。

The weekend before the demo day for investors, we had a practice session where all the groups gave their presentations.

在投资者演示日之前的周末，我们举行了一次练习，所有小组都进行了演示。

They were all terrible.

他们都很糟糕。

We tried to explain how to make them better, but we didn't have much hope.

我们试图解释如何让它们变得更好，但我们没有抱太大希望。

So on demo day I told the assembled angels and VCs that these guys were hackers, not MBAs, and so while

因此，在演示日，我告诉聚集的天使和风险投资人，这些人是黑客，而不是 MBA，所以虽然

their software was good, we should not expect slick presentations from them.

他们的软件很好，我们不应该指望他们有流畅的演示。

The groups then proceeded to give fabulously slick presentations.

随后，各小组进行了精彩绝伦的演讲。

Gone were the mumbling recitations of lists of features.

含糊其辞地背诵功能列表已经一去不复返了。

It was as if they'd spent the past week at acting school.

就好像他们过去的一周是在表演学校度过的。

I still don't know how they did it.

我还是不知道他们是怎么做到的。

Perhaps watching each others' presentations helped them see what they'd been doing wrong.

也许观看彼此的演讲可以帮助他们了解自己做错了什么。

Just as happens in college, the summer

就像大学里发生的那样，暑假

founders learned a lot from one another-- maybe more than they learned from us.

创始人们从彼此身上学到了很多东西——也许比他们从我们身上学到的还要多。

A lot of the problems they face are the same, from dealing with investors to hacking Javascript.

他们面临的很多问题都是相同的，从与投资者打交道到攻击 Javascript。

I don't want to give the impression there were no problems this summer.

我不想给人留下今年夏天没有问题的印象。

A lot went wrong, as usually happens with startups.

出了很多问题，就像初创公司经常发生的那样。

One group got an "<a href="http://www.ventureblog.com/articles/indiv/2003/000024.html">exploding term-sheet " from some VCs.

其中一组从一些风险投资公司那里得到了一份“爆炸性的条款清单”。

Pretty much all the groups who had

几乎所有的团体都有

dealings with big companies found that big companies do everything infinitely slowly.

与大公司打交道发现，大公司做任何事情都无限缓慢。

(This is to be expected.

（这是可以预料到的。

If big companies weren't incapable, there would be no room for startups to exist.) And of course there were the usual nightmares associated with servers.

如果大公司不是没有能力，初创公司就没有生存的空间。）当然，还有与服务器相关的常见噩梦。

<!-- When Kiko's server went down after they got slashdotted, the guy in charge of the server was in China and had to fix it from there.

<!-- 当 Kiko 的服务器在被斜线攻击后宕机时，负责服务器的人在中国，必须从那里修复它。

-->

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In short, the disasters this summer were just the usual childhood diseases.

总之，今年夏天的灾难只是常见的儿童疾病。

Some of this summer's eight startups will probably die eventually; it would be extraordinary if all eight succeeded.

今年夏天的八家初创公司中，有一些最终可能会倒闭；如果八个人都成功了，那就太了不起了。

But what kills them will not be dramatic, external threats, but a mundane, internal one: not getting enough done.

但杀死他们的并不是戏剧性的外部威胁，而是平凡的内部威胁：做得不够。

So far, though, the news is all good.

不过到目前为止，消息都是好消息。

In fact, we were surprised how much fun the summer was for us.

事实上，我们很惊讶这个夏天对我们来说是多么有趣。

The main reason was how much

主要原因是多少

we liked the founders.

我们喜欢创始人。

They're so earnest and hard-working.

他们是如此认真和努力。

They seem to like us too.

他们似乎也喜欢我们。

And this illustrates another advantage of investing over hiring: our relationship with them is way better than it would be between a boss and an employee.

这说明了投资相对于招聘的另一个优势：我们与他们的关系比老板和员工之间的关系要好得多。

Y Combinator ends up being more like an older brother than a parent.

Y Combinator 最终更像是一个哥哥，而不是父母。

I was surprised how much time I spent making introductions.

我很惊讶我花了这么多时间做介绍。

Fortunately I discovered that when a startup needed to talk to

幸运的是，我发现当一家初创公司需要与

someone, I could usually get to the right person by at most one hop.

某人，我通常最多可以通过一跳找到合适的人。

I remember wondering, how did my friends get to be so eminent?

我记得我想知道，我的朋友们是如何变得如此杰出的？

and a second later realizing: shit, I'm forty.

一秒钟后我意识到：妈的，我四十岁了。

Another surprise was that the three-month batch format, which we were forced into by the constraints of the summer, turned out to be an advantage.

另一个令人惊讶的是，我们因夏季的限制而被迫采用的三个月批次格式，结果证明是一种优势。

When we started Y Combinator, we planned to invest the way other venture firms do: as proposals came in,

当我们创办 Y Combinator 时，我们计划像其他风险投资公司那样进行投资：随着提案的出现，

we'd evaluate them and decide yes or no. The SFP was just an experiment to get things started.

我们会评估它们并决定是或否。 SFP 只是一个开始的实验。

But it worked so well that we plan to do all our investing this way, one cycle in the summer and one in winter.

但它的效果非常好，我们计划以这种方式进行所有投资，一个周期在夏季，一个周期在冬季。

It's more efficient for us, and better for the startups too.

这对我们来说更有效率，对初创公司来说也更好。

Several groups said our weekly dinners saved them from a common problem afflicting startups: working so hard that one has no social life.

一些团体表示，我们每周的晚餐让他们摆脱了困扰初创公司的一个常见问题：工作太努力，以至于没有社交生活。

(I remember that part all too well.) This way, they were

（我太清楚那部分了。） 这样，他们就

guaranteed a social event at least once a week.

保证每周至少一次社交活动。

Independence I've heard Y Combinator described as an "incubator." Actually we're the opposite: incubators exert more control than ordinary VCs, and we make a point of exerting less.

独立性 我听说 Y Combinator 被描述为“孵化器”。事实上我们恰恰相反：孵化器比普通风险投资公司施加更多的控制，而我们则强调施加更少的控制。

Among other things, incubators usually make you work in their office-- that's where the word "incubator" comes from.

除此之外，孵化器通常让你在他们的办公室工作——这就是“孵化器”这个词的由来。

That seems the wrong model.

这似乎是错误的模型。

If investors get too involved, they smother one of the most powerful

如果投资者过度参与，他们就会扼杀最有权势的公司之一

forces in a startup: the feeling that it's your own company.

初创公司的力量：感觉这是你自己的公司。

Incubators were conspicuous failures during the Bubble.

泡沫时期孵化器​​的失败是显而易见的。

There's still debate about whether this was because of the Bubble, or because they're a bad idea.

关于这是否是因为泡沫，或者因为它们是一个坏主意，仍然存在争议。

My vote is they're a bad idea.

我的投票是他们是一个坏主意。

I think they fail because they select for the wrong people.

我认为他们失败是因为他们选错了人。

When we were starting a startup, we would never have taken funding from an "incubator." We can find office space, thanks; just give us the money.

当我们创办一家初创公司时，我们永远不会从“孵化器”获得资金。我们可以找到办公空间，谢谢；只要给我们钱就可以了。

And

并且

people with that attitude are the ones likely to succeed in startups.

具有这种态度的人很可能在初创企业中取得成功。

Indeed, one quality all the founders shared this summer was a spirit of independence.

事实上，今年夏天所有创始人所共有的一个品质就是独立精神。

I've been wondering about that.

我一直想知道这一点。

Are some people just a lot more independent than others, or would everyone be this way if they were allowed to?

是否有些人比其他人独立得多，或者如果允许的话每个人都会这样吗？

As with most nature/nurture questions, the answer is probably: some of each.

与大多数先天/后天问题一样，答案可能是：各有一些。

But my main conclusion from the summer is that there's

但我今年夏天的主要结论是

more environment in the mix than most people realize.

混合的环境比大多数人意识到的要多。

I could see that from how the founders' attitudes changed during the summer.

从创始人的态度在夏天的变化中我可以看出这一点。

Most were emerging from twenty or so years of being told what to do.

大多数人都经历了二十多年的被告知要做什么。

They seemed a little surprised at having total freedom.

他们似乎对拥有完全的自由感到有点惊讶。

But they grew into it really quickly; some of these guys now seem about four inches taller (metaphorically) than they did at the beginning of the summer.

但他们很快就融入其中了。其中一些人现在看起来比夏初高了大约四英寸（比喻）。

When we asked the summer founders what surprised them most about starting a company, one said "the most shocking thing is that it worked." It will take more experience to know for sure, but my guess is that a lot of hackers could do this-- that if you put people in a position of independence, they develop the qualities they need.

当我们询问夏季创始人对于创办公司最令他们惊讶的是什么时，其中一个人说“最令人震惊的是它奏效了”。这需要更多的经验才能确定，但​​我的猜测是，很多黑客都可以做到这一点——如果你让人们处于独立的位置，他们就会发展出他们需要的品质。

Throw them off a cliff, and most will find on the way down that they have

把他们扔下悬崖，大多数人会在下落的过程中发现他们已经

wings.

翅膀。

The reason this is news to anyone is that the same forces work in the other direction too.

这对任何人来说都是新闻，因为同样的力量也在另一个方向上发挥作用。

Most hackers are employees, and this molds you into someone to whom starting a startup seems impossible as surely as starting a startup molds you into someone who can handle it.

大多数黑客都是员工，这会将你塑造成一个对初创公司来说似乎不可能的人，就像创办一家初创公司将你塑造成一个能够处理这件事的人一样。

If I'm right, "hacker" will mean something different in twenty years than it does now.

如果我是对的，二十年后“黑客”的含义将与现在有所不同。

Increasingly it will mean the people who run the

这将越来越意味着经营者

company.

公司。

Y Combinator is just accelerating a process that would have happened anyway.

Y Combinator 只是加速了一个无论如何都会发生的过程。

Power is shifting from the people who deal with money to the people who create technology, and if our experience this summer is any guide, this will be a good thing.

权力正在从处理金钱的人转移到创造技术的人，如果我们今年夏天的经历有任何指导意义的话，这将是一件好事。

Notes [1] By heavy-duty security I mean efforts to protect against truly determined attackers.

注释 [1] 我所说的重型安全是指努力防范真正坚定的攻击者。

The image shows us, the 2005 summer founders, and Smartleaf

该图展示了我们、2005 年夏季创始人和 Smartleaf

co-founders Mark Nitzberg and Olin Shivers at the 30-foot table Kate Courteau designed for us.

联合创始人 Mark Nitzberg 和 Olin Shivers 坐在 Kate Courteau 为我们设计的 30 英尺长的桌子旁。

Photo by Alex Lewin.

亚历克斯·勒温摄。

Thanks to Sarah Harlin, Steve Huffman, Jessica Livingston, Zak Stone, and Aaron Swartz for reading drafts of this.

感谢 Sarah Harlin、Steve Huffman、Jessica Livingston、Zak Stone 和 Aaron Swartz 阅读本文的草稿。

<!-- <img src="http://www.virtumundo.com/images/spacer.gif" height=15 width=1> Want to start a startup?

<!-- <img src="http://www.virtumundo.com/images/spacer.gif" height=15 width=1> 想要创业吗？

YC Winter Founders Program .

YC 冬季创始人计划。