A New Venture Animal

March 2008, rev May 2013 (This essay grew out of something I wrote for myself to figure out what we do.

2008 年 3 月，2013 年 5 月修订（这篇文章源于我为自己写的一些内容，目的是弄清楚我们在做什么。

Even though Y Combinator is now 3 years old, we're still trying to understand its implications.) I was annoyed recently to read a description of Y Combinator that said "Y Combinator does seed funding for startups." What was especially annoying about it was that I wrote it.

尽管 Y Combinator 已经成立 3 年了，但我们仍在努力了解其含义。）最近我读到 Y Combinator 的描述“Y Combinator 确实为初创公司提供种子资金”，这让我很恼火。尤其令人恼火的是我写了它。

This doesn't really convey what we do.

这并没有真正传达我们所做的事情。

And the reason it's inaccurate is that,

它不准确的原因是，

paradoxically, funding very early stage startups is not mainly about funding.

矛盾的是，为非常早期的初创公司提供资金并不主要是为了融资。

Saying YC does seed funding for startups is a description in terms of earlier models.

说 YC 确实为初创公司提供种子资金是对早期模型的描述。

It's like calling a car a horseless carriage.

这就像称汽车为无马拉的马车一样。

When you scale animals you can't just keep everything in proportion.

当你对动物进行缩放时，你不能只保持一切都成比例。

For example, volume grows as the cube of linear dimension, but surface area only as the square.

例如，体积随着线性尺寸的立方而增长，但表面积仅随着线性尺寸的平方而增长。

So as animals get bigger they

所以当动物变大时

have trouble radiating heat.

散热有困难。

That's why mice and rabbits are furry and elephants and hippos aren't.

这就是为什么老鼠和兔子是毛茸茸的，而大象和河马却没有。

You can't make a mouse by scaling down an elephant.

你不能通过缩小大象来制作老鼠。

YC represents a new, smaller kind of animal—so much smaller that all the rules are different.

YC 代表了一种新的、更小的动物——小得多，以至于所有规则都不同。

Before us, most companies in the startup funding business were venture capital funds.

在我们之前，大多数从事创业融资业务的公司都是风险投资基金。

VCs generally fund later stage companies than we do.

风险投资公司通常比我们资助处于后期阶段的公司。

And they supply so much money that, even though the

他们提供了如此多的资金，即使

other things they do may be very valuable, it's not that inaccurate to regard VCs as sources of money.

他们所做的其他事情可能非常有价值，将风险投资视为资金来源并不是那么不准确。

Good VCs are "smart money," but they're still money.

好的风险投资是“聪明的钱”，但它们仍然是钱。

All good investors supply a combination of money and help.

所有优秀的投资者都会提供金钱和帮助。

But these scale differently, just as volume and surface area do.

但它们的比例不同，就像体积和表面积一样。

Late stage investors supply huge amounts of money and comparatively little help: when a company about to go public gets a mezzanine round of $50 million, the deal tends to be almost

后期投资者提供了大量资金，但提供的帮助相对较少：当一家即将上市的公司获得 5000 万美元的夹层融资时，交易往往几乎是

entirely about money.

完全与金钱有关。

As you move earlier in the venture funding process, the ratio of help to money increases, because earlier stage companies have different needs.

当您进入风险投资流程的早期时，帮助与资金的比率会增加，因为早期阶段的公司有不同的需求。

Early stage companies need less money because they're smaller and cheaper to run, but they need more help because life is so precarious for them.

早期公司需要较少的资金，因为它们规模较小，运营成本较低，但他们需要更多的帮助，因为他们的生活如此不稳定。

So when VCs do a series A round for, say, $2 million, they generally expect to offer a significant amount of help along with the money.

因此，当风险投资公司以 200 万美元为例进行 A 轮融资时，他们通常希望在提供资金的同时提供大量帮助。

Y Combinator occupies the earliest end of the spectrum.

Y Combinator 占据了最早的一端。

We're at least one and generally two steps before VC funding.

在获得风险投资之前，我们至少走了一步，通常是两步。

(Though some startups go straight from YC to VC, the most common trajectory is to do an angel round first.) And what happens at Y Combinator is as different from what happens in a series A round as a series A round is from a mezzanine financing.

（虽然有些初创公司直接从 YC 转向 VC，但最常见的轨迹是先进行天使轮融资。）Y Combinator 的情况与 A 轮融资的情况不同，就像 A 轮融资来自夹层融资一样。

At our end, money is almost a negligible factor.

对我们来说，金钱几乎是一个可以忽略不计的因素。

The startup usually

启动时通常

consists of just the founders.

仅由创始人组成。

Their living expenses are the company's main expense, and since most founders are under 30, their living expenses are low.

他们的生活开支是公司的主要开支，而且由于大多数创始人都在30岁以下，所以他们的生活开支较低。

But at this early stage companies need a lot of help.

但在这个早期阶段，公司需要很多帮助。

Practically every question is still unanswered.

实际上每个问题都还没有答案。

Some companies we've funded have been working on their software for a year or more, but others haven't decided what to work on, or even who the founders should be.

我们资助的一些公司已经在其软件上开发了一年或更长时间，但其他公司还没有决定要开发什么，甚至还没有决定创始人应该是谁。

When PR people and journalists recount the histories of startups after they've become big, they always underestimate how uncertain things were at first.

当公关人员和记者讲述初创公司壮大后的历史时，他们总是低估事情一开始的不确定性。

They're not being deliberately misleading.

他们并不是故意误导。

When you look at a company like Google, it's hard to imagine they could once have been small and helpless.

当你看到像谷歌这样的公司时，很难想象它们曾经是小而无助的。

Sure, at one point they were a just a couple guys in a garage—but even then their greatness was assured, and all they had to do was roll forward along

当然，在某一时刻，他们只是车库里的几个人——但即便如此，他们的伟大性也得到了保证，他们所要做的就是向前滚动

the railroad tracks of destiny.

命运的铁轨。

Far from it.

远非如此。

A lot of startups with just as promising beginnings end up failing.

许多初创企业的开局同样充满希望，但最终却以失败告终。

Google has such momentum now that it would be hard for anyone to stop them.

谷歌现在的势头如此之大，任何人都很难阻止他们。

But all it would have taken in the beginning would have been for two Google employees to focus on the wrong things for six months, and the company could have died.

但一开始，如果两名谷歌员工在六个月内专注于错误的事情，那么公司可能就会灭亡。

We know, because we've been there, just how vulnerable startups are

我们知道，因为我们曾经去过那里，所以初创公司是多么脆弱

in the earliest phases.

在最早的阶段。

Curiously enough, that's why founders tend to get so rich from them.

奇怪的是，这就是为什么创始人往往能从它们那里变得如此富有。

Reward is always proportionate to risk, and very early stage startups are insanely risky.

回报总是与风险成正比，而处于早期阶段的初创公司风险极高。

What we really do at Y Combinator is get startups launched straight.

我们在 Y Combinator 真正做的是让初创公司直接启动。

One of many metaphors you could use for YC is a steam catapult on an aircraft carrier.

您可以对 YC 使用的许多比喻之一是航空母舰上的蒸汽弹射器。

We get startups airborne.

我们让初创公司腾飞。

Barely airborne, but enough that they can accelerate fast.

勉强在空中飞行，但足以让它们快速加速。

When you're launching planes they have to be set up properly or you're just launching projectiles.

当你发射飞机时，必须正确设置它们，否则你只是发射射弹。

They have to be pointed straight down the deck; the wings have to be trimmed properly; the engines have to be at full power; the pilot has to be ready.

它们必须直接指向甲板；翅膀必须适当修剪；发动机必须处于全功率状态；飞行员必须做好准备。

These are the kind of problems we deal with.

这些都是我们要处理的问题。

After we fund startups we work closely with them for three months—so closely in fact that we insist they move to where we are.

在我们资助初创公司之后，我们与他们密切合作了三个月——事实上，我们坚持让他们搬到我们所在的地方。

And what we do in those three

我们在这三个方面做了什么

months is make sure everything is set up for launch.

几个月的时间确保一切准备就绪，可供发布。

If there are tensions between cofounders we help sort them out.

如果联合创始人之间存在紧张关系，我们会帮助解决。

We get all the paperwork set up properly so there are no nasty surprises later.

我们正确设置了所有的文书工作，这样以后就不会出现令人讨厌的意外。

If the founders aren't sure what to focus on first, we try to figure that out.

如果创始人不确定首先要关注什么，我们会尽力弄清楚。

If there is some obstacle right in front of them, we either try to remove it, or shift the startup sideways.

如果他们面前有一些障碍，我们要么尝试将其移除，要么将启动转向侧面。

The goal is to get every distraction out of the way so the founders can use

目标是消除一切干扰，以便创始人可以利用

that time to build (or finish building) something impressive.

那个时候去建造（或完成建造）一些令人印象深刻的东西。

And then near the end of the three months we push the button on the steam catapult in the form of Demo Day, where the current group of startups present to pretty much every investor in Silicon Valley.

然后在三个月快结束时，我们以演示日的形式按下了蒸汽弹射器的按钮，当前的初创公司群体向硅谷的几乎每一位投资者展示。

Launching companies isn't identical with launching products.

推出公司与推出产品并不相同。

Though we do spend a lot of time on launch strategies for products, there are some things that take too long to build for a startup to launch

尽管我们确实花了很多时间制定产品的发布策略，但对于初创公司来说，有些东西需要很长时间才能发布

them before raising their next round of funding.

他们在筹集下一轮资金之前。

Several of the most promising startups we've funded haven't launched their products yet, but are definitely launched as companies.

我们资助的几家最有前途的初创公司尚未推出他们的产品，但肯定是作为公司推出的。

In the earliest stage, startups not only have more questions to answer, but they tend to be different kinds of questions.

在最早阶段，初创公司不仅要回答更多的问题，而且往往是不同类型的问题。

In later stage startups the questions are about deals, or hiring, or organization.

在后期的初创公司中，问题是关于交易、招聘或组织。

In the earliest phase they tend to be about technology

在最早的阶段，它们往往与技术有关

and design.

和设计。

What do you make?

你做什么？

That's the first problem to solve.

这是首先要解决的问题。

That's why our motto is "Make something people want." This is always a good thing for companies to do, but it's even more important early on, because it sets the bounds for every other question.

这就是为什么我们的座右铭是“创造人们想要的东西”。对于公司来说，这始终是一件好事，但在早期就更加重要，因为它为其他所有问题设定了界限。

Who you hire, how much money you raise, how you market yourself—they all depend on what you're making.

你雇用谁、筹集多少资金、如何推销自己——这些都取决于你的收入。

Because the early problems are so much about technology and design,

因为早期的问题主要与技术和设计有关，

you probably need to be hackers to do what we do.

您可能需要成为黑客才能做我们所做的事情。

While some VCs have technical backgrounds, I don't know any who still write code.

虽然一些风险投资家具有技术背景，但我不知道还有谁还在编写代码。

Their expertise is mostly in business—as it should be, because that's the kind of expertise you need in the phase between series A and (if you're lucky) IPO.

他们的专业知识主要集中在商业领域——这是应该的，因为这是你在 A 轮融资和（如果你幸运的话）IPO 之间的阶段所需要的专业知识。

We're so different from VCs that we're really a different kind of animal.

我们与风险投资家如此不同，以至于我们确实是一种不同的动物。

Can we claim founders are better off as a result of this

我们可以说创始人因此而变得更好吗

new type of venture firm?

新型风险投资公司？

I'm pretty sure the answer is yes, because YC is an improved version of what happened to our startup, and our case was not atypical.

我很确定答案是肯定的，因为 YC 是我们初创公司所发生的事情的改进版本，而且我们的案例并不典型。

We started Viaweb with $10,000 in seed money from our friend Julian.

我们用朋友 Julian 提供的 10,000 美元种子资金创办了 Viaweb。

He was a lawyer and arranged all our paperwork, so we could just code.

他是一名律师，负责安排我们所有的文书工作，所以我们可以直接编码。

We spent three months building a version 1, which we then presented to investors to raise more money.

我们花了三个月的时间构建了第 1 版，然后将其提交给投资者以筹集更多资金。

Sounds familiar, doesn't it?

听起来很熟悉，不是吗？

But YC improves on that

但 YC 对此有所改进

significantly.

显着。

Julian knew a lot about law and business, but his advice ended there; he was not a startup guy.

朱利安对法律和商业了解很多，但他的建议仅限于此。他不是一个创业者。

So we made some basic mistakes early on.

所以我们很早就犯了一些基本错误。

And when we presented to investors, we presented to only 2, because that was all we knew.

当我们向投资者介绍时，我们只向 2 名投资者介绍，因为这就是我们所知道的全部。

If we'd had our later selves to encourage and advise us, and Demo Day to present at, we would have been in much better shape.

如果我们能得到后来的自己的鼓励和建议，并在演示日上进行展示，我们的状况会好得多。

We probably could have raised money at 3 to 5 times the valuation we did.

我们可能可以以估值的 3 至 5 倍筹集资金。

If we take 7% of a company we fund, the founders only have to do 7.5% better in their next round of funding to end up net ahead.

如果我们持有所投资公司 7% 的股份，那么创始人只需在下一轮融资中做得好 7.5% 即可最终实现净领先。

We certainly manage that.

我们当然能做到这一点。

So who is our 7% coming out of?

那么我们这7%的人是谁呢？

If the founders end up net ahead it's not coming out of them.

如果创始人最终获得了净领先，那也不是他们的功劳。

So is it coming out of later stage investors?

那么它是来自后期投资者吗？

Well, they do end up paying more.

好吧，他们最终确实付出了更多。

But I think they pay more because the company is actually more valuable.

但我认为他们支付更多是因为公司实际上更有价值。

And later stage

还有后期

investors have no problem with that.

投资者对此没有任何问题。

The returns of a VC fund depend on the quality of the companies they invest in, not how cheaply they can buy stock in them.

风险投资基金的回报取决于他们投资的公司的质量，而不是他们购买这些公司股票的便宜程度。

If what we do is useful, why wasn't anyone doing it before?

如果我们所做的事情有用，为什么以前没有人这样做？

There are two answers to that.

对此有两个答案。

One is that people were doing it before, just haphazardly on a smaller scale.

一是人们以前就这样做过，只是规模较小。

Before us, seed funding came primarily from individual angel investors.

在我们之前，种子资金主要来自个人天使投资者。

Larry and Sergey, for

拉里和谢尔盖，因为

example, got their seed funding from Andy Bechtolsheim, one of the founders of Sun.

例如，他们从 Sun 的创始人之一安迪·贝托尔斯海姆 (Andy Bechtolsheim) 那里获得了种子资金。

And because he was a startup guy he probably gave them useful advice.

因为他是一名初创公司的人，所以他可能给了他们有用的建议。

But raising money from angel investors is a hit or miss thing.

但从天使投资者那里筹集资金是一件碰运气的事情。

It's a sideline for most of them, so they only do a handful of deals a year and they don't spend a lot of time on the startups they invest in.

对于他们中的大多数人来说，这是副业，因此他们每年只进行少量交易，并且不会在投资的初创公司上花费大量时间。

And they're hard to reach, because they don't want random startups pestering them with business plans.

而且他们很难联系到，因为他们不希望随机的初创公司用商业计划来烦扰他们。

The Google guys were lucky because they knew someone who knew Bechtolsheim.

谷歌的人很幸运，因为他们认识认识贝托尔斯海姆的人。

It generally takes a personal introduction with angels.

通常需要与天使进行个人介绍。

The other reason no one was doing quite what we do is that till recently it was a lot more expensive to start a startup.

没有人做我们所做的另一个原因是，直到最近，创办一家初创公司的成本要高得多。

You'll notice we haven't funded any biotech startups.

您会注意到我们没有资助任何生物技术初创公司。

That's still expensive.

那还是很贵。

But advancing technology has made web startups so cheap that you really can get a company airborne for $15,000.

但先进的技术使得网络初创公司变得如此便宜，以至于你真的可以花 15,000 美元就空降一家公司。

If you

如果你

understand how to operate a steam catapult, at least.

至少了解如何操作蒸汽弹射器。

So in effect what's happened is that a new ecological niche has opened up, and Y Combinator is the new kind of animal that has moved into it.

因此，事实上，一个新的生态位已经出现，而 Y Combinator 就是进入其中的新型动物。

We're not a replacement for venture capital funds.

我们不能替代风险投资基金。

We occupy a new, adjacent niche.

我们占据了一个新的、相邻的利基市场。

And conditions in our niche are really quite different.

我们的利基市场的条件确实非常不同。

It's not just that the problems we face are different; the whole structure of the business is different.

这不仅是我们面临的问题不同；而且我们面临的问题也不同。整个业务的结构是不同的。

VCs are playing a zero-sum game.

风险投资家正在玩一场零和游戏。

They're all competing for a slice of a fixed amount of "deal flow," and that explains a lot of their behavior.

他们都在争夺固定数量的“交易流”的份额，这解释了他们的很多行为。

Whereas our m.o.

而我们的方式。

is to create new deal flow, by encouraging hackers who would have gotten jobs to start their own startups instead.

是通过鼓励本可以找到工作的黑客创办自己的初创公司来创造新的交易流。

We compete more with employers than VCs.

我们与雇主的竞争比与风投的竞争更多。

It's not surprising something like this would happen.

发生这样的事情并不奇怪。

Most fields become more specialized—more articulated—as they develop,

大多数领域随着它们的发展而变得更加专业化、更加明确化，

and startups are certainly an area in which there has been a lot of development over the past couple decades.

初创企业无疑是过去几十年来取得很大发展的领域。

The venture business in its present form is only about forty years old.

目前形式的风险投资业务只有大约四十年的历史。

It stands to reason it would evolve.

按理说它会进化。

And it's natural that the new niche would at first be described, even by its inhabitants, in terms of the old one.

很自然，新的生态位一开始就会用旧的生态位来描述，甚至是它的居民。

But really Y Combinator is not in the startup funding business.

但实际上 Y Combinator 并不从事创业融资业务。

Really we're

真的我们是

more of a small, furry steam catapult.

更像是一个毛茸茸的小型蒸汽弹射器。

Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.

感谢 Trevor Blackwell、Jessica Livingston 和 Robert Morris 阅读本文的草稿。

Comment on this essay.

评论这篇文章。