A New Washington Consensus (Renewing American Economic Leadership)

As most of you know, Secretary Yellen gave an important speech just down the street last week on our economic policy with respect to China.

正如你们大多数人所知，耶伦国务卿上周就我们对中国的经济政策在街上发表了重要讲话。

Today I'd like to zoom out to our broader international economic policy, particularly as it relates to President Biden's core commitment—indeed, to his daily direction to us—to more deeply integrate domestic policy and foreign policy.

今天，我想谈谈我们更广泛的国际经济政策，特别是因为它关系到拜登总统的核心承诺——实际上是他对我们的日常指导——更深入地整合国内政策和外交政策。

After the Second World War, the United States led a fragmented world to build a new international economic order.

第二次世界大战后，美国领导支离破碎的世界建立了国际经济新秩序。

It lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

它使数亿人摆脱了贫困。

It sustained thrilling technological revolutions.

它持续了激动人心的技术革命。

And it helped the United States and many other nations around the world achieve new levels of prosperity.

它帮助美国和世界上许多其他国家实现了新的繁荣水平。

But the last few decades revealed cracks in those foundations.

但过去几十年暴露了这些基础的裂缝。

A shifting global economy left many working Americans and their communities behind.

不断变化的全球经济让许多美国工薪阶层及其社区落在了后面。

A financial crisis shook the middle class.

金融危机震动了中产阶级。

A pandemic exposed the fragility of our supply chains.

一场大流行暴露了我们供应链的脆弱性。

A changing climate threatened lives and livelihoods.

气候变化威胁着生命和生计。

Russia's invasion of Ukraine underscored the risks of overdependence.

俄罗斯入侵乌克兰凸显了过度依赖的风险。

That's why the United States, under President Biden, is pursuing a modern industrial and innovation strategy—both at home and with partners around the world.

这就是为什么美国在拜登总统的领导下，正在国内以及与世界各地的合作伙伴一起推行现代工业和创新战略。

One that invests in the sources of our own economic and technological strength, that promotes diversified and resilient global supply chains, that sets high standards for everything from labor and the environment to trusted technology and good governance, and that deploys capital to deliver on public goods like climate and health.

它投资于我们自己的经济和技术实力的来源，促进多元化和有弹性的全球供应链，为从劳动力和环境到值得信赖的技术和良好治理的一切制定高标准，并部署资本来提供气候和健康等公共产品。

Now, the idea that a "new Washington consensus," as some people have referred to it, is somehow America alone, or America and the West to the exclusion of others, is just flat wrong.

现在，一些人所说的“新华盛顿共识”在某种程度上是美国独有的，或者是美国和西方排除其他国家的想法，这是完全错误的。

This strategy will build a fairer, more durable global economic order, for the benefit of ourselves and for people everywhere.

这一战略将建立一个更公平、更持久的全球经济秩序，造福我们自己和世界各地的人民。

So today, what I want to do is lay out what we are endeavoring to do.

所以今天，我想做的就是列出我们正在努力做的事情。

And I'll start by defining the challenges as we see them—the challenges that we face.

我将首先定义我们所看到的挑战——我们面临的挑战。

To take them on, we've had to revisit some old assumptions.

为了应对它们，我们必须重新审视一些旧的假设。

Then I'll walk through, step by step, how our approach is tailored to meeting those challenges.

然后我将逐步介绍我们的方法是如何适应这些挑战的。

When President Biden came into office more than two years ago, the country faced, from our perspective, four fundamental challenges.

拜登总统两年多前上任时，从我们的角度来看，该国面临四个根本挑战。

The vision of public investment that had energized the American project in the postwar years—and indeed for much of our history—had faded.

公共投资的愿景在战后岁月中——实际上在我们历史的大部分时间里——为美国的项目注入了活力，但它已经消失了。

It had given way to a set of ideas that championed tax cutting and deregulation, privatization over public action, and trade liberalization as an end in itself.

它已经让位于一系列主张减税和放松管制、私有化高于公共行动以及贸易自由化本身的想法。

There was one assumption at the heart of all of this policy: that markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently—no matter what our competitors did, no matter how big our shared challenges grew, and no matter how many guardrails we took down.

所有这些政策的核心都有一个假设：市场总是富有成效且高效地配置资本——无论我们的竞争对手做了什么，无论我们共同面临的挑战有多大，无论我们拆除了多少护栏。

Now, no one—certainly not me—is discounting the power of markets.

现在，没有人——当然不是我——低估了市场的力量。

But in the name of oversimplified market efficiency, entire supply chains of strategic goods—along with the industries and jobs that made them—moved overseas.

但以过于简单化的市场效率为名，战略商品的整个供应链以及制造它们的产业和就业岗位都转移到了海外。

And the postulate that deep trade liberalization would help America export goods, not jobs and capacity, was a promise made but not kept.

深度贸易自由化将有助于美国出口商品，而不是就业和产能，这一假设是一个承诺，但没有兑现。

Another embedded assumption was that the type of growth did not matter.

另一个内在的假设是增长的类型并不重要。

All growth was good growth.

所有的增长都是良好的增长。

So, various reforms combined and came together to privilege some sectors of the economy, like finance, while other essential sectors, like semiconductors and infrastructure, atrophied.

因此，各种改革结合在一起，使金融等某些经济部门获得特权，而半导体和基础设施等其他重要部门则萎缩。

Our industrial capacity—which is crucial to any country's ability to continue to innovate—took a real hit.

我们的工业能力——对于任何国家持续创新的能力都至关重要——受到了真正的打击。

The shocks of a global financial crisis and a global pandemic laid bare the limits of these prevailing assumptions.

全球金融危机和全球流行病的冲击暴露了这些普遍假设的局限性。

The second challenge we faced was adapting to a new environment defined by geopolitical and security competition, with important economic impacts.

我们面临的第二个挑战是适应地缘政治和安全竞争所定义的新环境，这会对经济产生重大影响。

Much of the international economic policy of the last few decades had relied upon the premise that economic integration would make nations more responsible and open, and that the global order would be more peaceful and cooperative—that bringing countries into the rules-based order would incentivize them to adhere to its rules.

过去几十年的大部分国际经济政策都依赖这样的前提：经济一体化将使各国更加负责任和开放，全球秩序将更加和平与合作——将各国纳入基于规则的秩序将激励它们遵守其规则。

It didn't turn out that way.

但事实并非如此。

In some cases it did, and in lot of cases it did not.

在某些情况下确实如此，但在很多情况下却没有。

By the time President Biden came into office, we had to contend with the reality that a large non-market economy had been integrated into the international economic order in a way that posed considerable challenges.

到拜登总统上任时，我们不得不面对这样一个现实：一个庞大的非市场经济体已经融入国际经济秩序，而这种方式带来了相当大的挑战。

The People's Republic of China continued to subsidize at a massive scale both traditional industrial sectors, like steel, as well as key industries of the future, like clean energy, digital infrastructure, and advanced biotechnologies.

中国继续大规模补贴钢铁等传统工业部门以及清洁能源、数字基础设施和先进生物技术等未来关键产业。

America didn't just lose manufacturing—we eroded our competitiveness in critical technologies that would define the future.

美国不仅失去了制造业，还削弱了我们在决定未来的关键技术方面的竞争力。

Economic integration didn't stop China from expanding its military ambitions in the region, or stop Russia from invading its democratic neighbors.

经济一体化并没有阻止中国在该地区扩大军事野心，也没有阻止俄罗斯入侵其民主邻国。

Neither country had become more responsible or cooperative.

两国都没有变得更加负责任或合作。

And ignoring economic dependencies that had built up over the decades of liberalization had become really perilous—from energy uncertainty in Europe to supply-chain vulnerabilities in medical equipment, semiconductors, and critical minerals.

忽视数十年来自由化所建立的经济依赖性已经变得非常危险——从欧洲的能源不确定性到医疗设备、半导体和关键矿产的供应链脆弱性。

These were the kinds of dependencies that could be exploited for economic or geopolitical leverage.

这些依赖关系可以被用来获得经济或地缘政治影响力。

The third challenge we faced was an accelerating climate crisis and the urgent need for a just and efficient energy transition.

我们面临的第三个挑战是气候危机的加剧以及公正、高效的能源转型的迫切需要。

When President Biden came into office, we were falling dramatically short of our climate ambitions, without a clear pathway to abundant supplies of stable and affordable clean energy, despite the best efforts of the Obama-Biden Administration to make significant headway.

当拜登总统上任时，尽管奥巴马-拜登政府尽了最大努力取得了重大进展，但我们仍远远没有实现我们的气候雄心，没有明确的途径来提供充足的稳定且负担得起的清洁能源。

Too many people believed that we had to choose between economic growth and meeting our climate goals.

太多人认为我们必须在经济增长和实现气候目标之间做出选择。

President Biden has seen things totally differently.

拜登总统对事情的看法完全不同。

As he's often said, when he hears "climate," he thinks "jobs." He believes that building a twenty-first-century clean-energy economy is one of the most significant growth opportunities of the twenty-first century—but that to harness that opportunity, America needs a deliberate, hands-on investment strategy to pull forward innovation, drive down costs, and create good jobs.

正如他经常说的，当他听到“气候”时，他会想到“就业”。他认为，建设二十一世纪的清洁能源经济是二十一世纪最重要的增长机会之一，但要利用这一机会，美国需要采取深思熟虑、切实可行的投资战略，以推动创新、降低成本并创造良好的就业机会。

Finally, we faced the challenge of inequality and its damage to democracy.

最后，我们面临不平等及其对民主的损害的挑战。

Here, the prevailing assumption was that trade-enabled growth would be inclusive growth—that the gains of trade would end up getting broadly shared within nations.

在这里，普遍的假设是，贸易推动的增长将是包容性增长——贸易的收益最终将在各国内部广泛分享。

But the fact is that those gains failed to reach a lot of working people.

但事实是，这些成果并没有惠及很多劳动人民。

The American middle class lost ground while the wealthy did better than ever.

美国中产阶级失去了地位，而富人却比以往任何时候都表现得更好。

And American manufacturing communities were hollowed out while cutting-edge industries moved to metropolitan areas.

当尖端产业转移到大都市地区时，美国的制造业社区被空心化。

Now, the drivers of economic inequality—as many of you know even better than I—are complex, and they include structural challenges like the digital revolution.

现在，经济不平等的驱动因素（你们中的许多人比我更清楚）很复杂，其中包括数字革命等结构性挑战。

But key among these drivers are decades of trickle-down economic policies—policies like regressive tax cuts, deep cuts to public investment, unchecked corporate concentration, and active measures to undermine the labor movement that initially built the American middle class.

但这些驱动因素中的关键是几十年来的涓滴经济政策——诸如累退减税、大幅削减公共投资、不受限制的企业集中度以及破坏最初建立美国中产阶级的劳工运动等政策。

Efforts to take a different approach during the Obama Administration—including efforts to pass policies to address climate change, invest in infrastructure, expand the social safety net, and protect workers' rights to organize—were stymied by Republican opposition.

奥巴马政府期间采取不同方法的努力——包括通过应对气候变化政策、投资基础设施、扩大社会安全网以及保护工人组织权利的努力——遭到了共和党的反对。

And frankly, our domestic economic policies also failed to fully account for the consequences of our international economic policies.

坦率地说，我们的国内经济政策也没有充分考虑到我们的国际经济政策的后果。

For example, the so-called "China shock" that hit pockets of our domestic manufacturing industry especially hard—with large and long-lasting impacts—wasn't adequately anticipated and wasn't adequately addressed as it unfolded.

例如，所谓的“中国冲击”对我们国内制造业的影响尤其严重，影响巨大且持久，但在它发生时没有得到充分的预见和充分的解决。

And collectively, these forces had frayed the socioeconomic foundations on which any strong and resilient democracy rests.

总的来说，这些力量已经破坏了任何强大而有弹性的民主制度赖以生存的社会经济基础。

Now, these four challenges were not unique to the United States.

现在，这四项挑战并非美国独有。

Established and emerging economies were confronting them, too—in some cases more acutely than we are.

成熟经济体和新兴经济体也面临着这些问题——在某些情况下比我们更严重。

When President Biden came to office, he knew the solution to each of these challenges was to restore an economic mentality that champions building.

当拜登总统上任时，他知道解决这些挑战的方法是恢复支持建设的经济心态。

And that is the core of our economic approach.

这是我们经济方针的核心。

To build.

建造。

To build capacity, to build resilience, to build inclusiveness, at home and with partners abroad.

在国内和国外与合作伙伴一起建设能力、增强复原力、增强包容性。

The capacity to produce and innovate, and to deliver public goods like strong physical and digital infrastructure and clean energy at scale.

生产和创新的能力，以及大规模提供强大的物理和数字基础设施以及清洁能源等公共产品的能力。

The resilience to withstand natural disasters and geopolitical shocks.

抵御自然灾害和地缘政治冲击的能力。

And the inclusiveness to ensure a strong, vibrant American middle class and greater opportunity for working people around the world.

包容性确保美国中产阶级强大、充满活力，并为世界各地的劳动人民提供更多机会。

All of that is part of what we have called a foreign policy for the middle class.

所有这些都是我们所说的中产阶级外交政策的一部分。

The first step is laying a new foundation at home—with a modern American industrial strategy.

第一步是在国内奠定新的基础——采用现代美国工业战略。

My friend and former colleague Brian Deese has spoken about this new industrial strategy at some length, and I commend his remarks to you, because they are better than any remarks I could give on the subject.

我的朋友和前同事布赖恩·迪斯（Brian Deese）详细地谈到了这一新的产业战略，我向你们推荐他的言论，因为它们比我在这个主题上所能发表的任何言论都要好。

But in summary:

但总而言之：

A modern American industrial strategy identifies specific sectors that are foundational to economic growth, strategic from a national security perspective, and where private industry on its own isn't poised to make the investments needed to secure our national ambitions.

现代美国工业战略确定了对经济增长至关重要的特定部门，从国家安全的角度来看具有战略意义，而私营工业本身无法进行必要的投资来实现我们的国家雄心。

It deploys targeted public investments in these areas that unlock the power and ingenuity of private markets, capitalism, and competition to lay a foundation for long-term growth.

它在这些领域部署有针对性的公共投资，释放私人市场、资本主义和竞争的力量和创造力，为长期增长奠定基础。

It helps enable American business to do what American business does best—innovate, scale, and compete.

它帮助美国企业做美国企业最擅长的事情——创新、规模化和竞争。

This is about crowding in private investment—not replacing it.

这是关于挤入私人投资，而不是取代它。

It's about making long-term investments in sectors vital to our national wellbeing—not picking winners and losers.

这是对对我们国家福祉至关重要的行业进行长期投资，而不是挑选赢家和输家。

And it has a long tradition in this country.

它在这个国家有着悠久的传统。

In fact, even as the term "industrial policy" went out of fashion, in some form it remained quietly at work for America—from DARPA and the Internet to NASA and commercial satellites.

事实上，即使“产业政策”一词已经过时，它在某种形式上仍然默默地为美国发挥着作用——从 DARPA 和互联网到 NASA 和商业卫星。

Now, looking over the course of the last couple of years, the initial results of this strategy are remarkable.

现在，回顾过去几年的历程，这一战略的初步成果是显着的。

The Financial Times has reported that large-scale investments in semiconductor and clean-energy production have already surged 20-fold since 2019, and a third of the investments announced since August involve a foreign investor investing here in the United States.

据英国《金融时报》报道，自 2019 年以来，半导体和清洁能源生产的大规模投资已激增 20 倍，自 8 月以来宣布的投资中有三分之一涉及在美国投资的外国投资者。

We've estimated that the total public capital and private investment from President Biden's agenda will amount to some $3.5 trillion over the next decade.

我们估计，拜登总统议程中的公共资本和私人投资总额在未来十年将达到约 3.5 万亿美元。

Consider semiconductors, which are as essential to our consumer goods today as they are to the technologies that will shape our future, from artificial intelligence to quantum computing to synthetic biology.

以半导体为例，它对于我们今天的消费品至关重要，就像它们对于塑造我们未来的技术一样重要，从人工智能到量子计算再到合成生物学。

America now manufactures only around 10 percent of the world's semiconductors, and production—in general and especially when it comes to the most advanced chips—is geographically concentrated elsewhere.

美国现在仅生产世界半导体的 10% 左右，而且生产——总体而言，特别是最先进的芯片——在地理上集中在其他地方。

This creates a critical economic risk and a national security vulnerability.

这造成了严重的经济风险和国家安全漏洞。

So thanks to the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act, we've already seen an orders-of-magnitude increase in investment into America's semiconductor industry.

因此，得益于两党的《芯片和科学法案》，我们已经看到美国半导体行业的投资出现了数量级的增长。

And it's still early days.

现在还为时尚早。

Or consider critical minerals—the backbone of the clean-energy future.

或者考虑一下关键矿物——清洁能源未来的支柱。

Today, the United States produces only 4 percent of the lithium, 13 percent of the cobalt, 0 percent of the nickel, and 0 percent of the graphite required to meet current demand for electric vehicles.

如今，美国仅生产 4% 的锂、13% 的钴、0% 的镍和 0% 的石墨，以满足当前电动汽车的需求。

Meanwhile, more than 80 percent of critical minerals are processed by one country, China.

与此同时，超过 80% 的关键矿物是由中国这个国家加工的。

Clean-energy supply chains are at risk of being weaponized in the same way as oil in the 1970s, or natural gas in Europe in 2022.

清洁能源供应链面临着被武器化的风险，就像 20 世纪 70 年代的石油或 2022 年欧洲的天然气一样。

So through the investments in the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, we're taking action.

因此，通过对《减少通货膨胀法案》和《两党基础设施法》的投资，我们正在采取行动。

At the same time, it isn't feasible or desirable to build everything domestically.

与此同时，在国内建造所有东西是不可行或不可取的。

Our objective is not autarky—it's resilience and security in our supply chains.

我们的目标不是自给自足，而是我们供应链的弹性和安全性。

Now, building our domestic capacity is the starting point.

现在，我们的国内产能建设是起点。

But the effort extends beyond our borders.

但我们的努力超出了我们的国界。

And this brings me to the second step in our strategy: working with our partners to ensure they are building capacity, resilience, and inclusiveness, too.

这让我想到了我们战略的第二步：与我们的合作伙伴合作，确保他们也在建设能力、复原力和包容性。

Our message to them has been consistent: We will unapologetically pursue our industrial strategy at home—but we are unambiguously committed to not leaving our friends behind.

我们向他们传达的信息是一致的：我们将毫无歉意地在国内推行我们的产业战略，但我们明确致力于不让我们的朋友落后。

We want them to join us.

我们希望他们加入我们。

In fact, we need them to join us.

事实上，我们需要他们加入我们。

Creating a secure and sustainable economy in the face of the economic and geopolitical realities will require all of our allies and partners to do more—and there's no time to lose.

面对经济和地缘政治现实，创建一个安全、可持续的经济将需要我们所有的盟友和合作伙伴付出更多努力——而且刻不容缓。

For industries like semiconductors and clean energy, we're nowhere near the global saturation point of investments needed, public or private.

对于半导体和清洁能源等行业，无论是公共还是私人投资，我们远未达到全球所需投资的饱和点。

Ultimately, our goal is a strong, resilient, and leading-edge techno-industrial base that the United States and its like-minded partners, established and emerging economies alike, can invest in and rely upon together.

最终，我们的目标是建立一个强大、有弹性和领先的技术工业基础，美国及其志同道合的合作伙伴、成熟经济体和新兴经济体都可以共同投资和依赖。

President Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen talked about this here in Washington last month.

拜登总统和欧盟委员会主席乌苏拉·冯德莱恩上个月在华盛顿谈到了这一点。

They released a very important statement, which, if you haven't read it, I really encourage you to read.

他们发布了一个非常重要的声明，如果你还没有读过，我真的鼓励你阅读。

At its heart, what the statement said was the following: bold public investments in our respective industrial capacity needs to be at the heart of the energy transition.

声明的核心内容如下：对我们各自工业能力的大胆公共投资需要成为能源转型的核心。

And President von der Leyen and President Biden committed to working together to ensure that the supply chains of the future are resilient, secure, and reflective of our values—including on labor.

冯德莱恩总统和拜登总统承诺共同努力，确保未来的供应链具有弹性、安全并反映我们的价值观（包括劳工价值观）。

They laid out practical steps in the statement to achieve those goals—like aligning respective clean-energy incentives on each side of the Atlantic and launching a negotiation on supply chains for critical minerals and batteries.

他们在声明中提出了实现这些目标的实际步骤，例如调整大西洋两岸各自的清洁能源激励措施，并就关键矿物和电池的供应链启动谈判。

Shortly after that, President Biden went to Canada.

此后不久，拜登总统前往加拿大。

He and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau established a task force to accelerate cooperation between Canada and the United States toward exactly the same end: ensuring our clean-energy supply and creating middle-class jobs on both sides of the border.

他和贾斯汀·特鲁多总理成立了一个特别工作组，以加速加拿大和美国之间的合作，以实现完全相同的目标：确保我们的清洁能源供应并在边境两侧创造中产阶级就业机会。

And just a few days after that, the United States and Japan signed an agreement deepening our cooperation on critical-mineral supply chains.

就在几天后，美国和日本签署了一项深化关键矿产供应链合作的协议。

So we are leveraging the Inflation Reduction Act to build a clean-energy manufacturing ecosystem rooted in supply chains here in North America, and extending to Europe, Japan, and elsewhere.

因此，我们正在利用《通货膨胀削减法案》建立一个植根于北美供应链并延伸到欧洲、日本和其他地方的清洁能源制造生态系统。

This is how we will turn the IRA from a source of friction into a source of strength and reliability.

这就是我们如何将爱尔兰共和军从摩擦源转变为力量和可靠性源泉的方法。

And I suspect you'll hear more on this at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima next month.

我怀疑您会在下个月于广岛举行的七国集团峰会上听到更多相关内容。

Now, our cooperation with partners is not limited to clean energy.

现在，我们与合作伙伴的合作不仅仅局限于清洁能源。

For example, we're working with several countries—in Europe, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and India—and we're also working with Taiwan—to coordinate our approaches to semiconductor incentives.

例如，我们正在与欧洲、韩国、日本、台湾和印度等多个国家/地区合作，并与台湾地区合作，协调我们的半导体激励措施。

Analyst projections on where semiconductor investments will happen over the next three years have shifted dramatically, with the United States and key partners now topping the charts.

分析师对未来三年半导体投资地点的预测发生了巨大变化，美国和主要合作伙伴目前位居榜首。

Let me also underscore that our cooperation with partners is not limited to advanced industrial democracies.

我还要强调，我们与合作伙伴的合作不仅限于先进的工业民主国家。

Fundamentally, we have to—and we intend to—dispel the notion that America's most important partnerships are only with established economies.

从根本上说，我们必须——而且我们打算——消除这样一种观念，即美国最重要的伙伴关系只与成熟的经济体建立。

Not just by saying it, but by proving it.

不只是通过说出来，而是通过证明。

Proving it with India—on everything from hydrogen to semiconductors.

与印度一起证明这一点——从氢到半导体的各个方面。

Proving it with Angola—on carbon-free solar power.

与安哥拉一起证明这一点——无碳太阳能。

Proving it with Indonesia—on its Just Energy Transition Partnership.

与印度尼西亚一起证明其公正的能源转型伙伴关系。

Proving it with Brazil—on climate-friendly growth.

与巴西一起证明这一点——气候友好型增长。

This brings me to the third step in our strategy: moving beyond traditional trade deals to innovative new international economic partnerships focused on the core challenges of our time.

这让我谈到我们战略的第三步：超越传统的贸易协定，转向专注于我们时代核心挑战的创新型国际经济伙伴关系。

The main international economic project of the 1990s was reducing tariffs.

20世纪90年代的主要国际经济项目是降低关税。

On average, applied U.S. tariff rates were nearly cut in half during the 1990s.

平均而言，20 世纪 90 年代美国的适用关税几乎减少了一半。

Today, in 2023, our trade-weighted average tariff rate is 2.4 percent—which is low historically, and relative to other countries.

今天，到 2023 年，我们的贸易加权平均关税率为 2.4%，相对于其他国家而言，处于历史低位。

Of course, those tariffs aren't uniform, and there is still work to be done bringing tariff levels down in many other countries.

当然，这些关税并不统一，许多其他国家仍需要努力降低关税水平。

As Ambassador Tai has said, "We have not sworn off market liberalization." We do intend to pursue modern trade agreements.

正如戴大使所说，“我们并没有宣誓放弃市场自由化”。我们确实打算寻求现代贸易协定。

But to define or measure our entire policy based on tariff reduction misses something important.

但以关税削减为基础来定义或衡量我们的整个政策忽略了一些重要的事情。

Asking what our trade policy is now—narrowly framed as plans to reduce tariffs further—is simply the wrong question.

问我们现在的贸易政策是什么——狭义上是进一步降低关税的计划——根本就是一个错误的问题。

The right question is: how does trade fit into our international economic policy, and what problems is it seeking to solve?

正确的问题是：贸易如何融入我们的国际经济政策，以及它寻求解决什么问题？

The project of the 2020s and the 2030s is different from the project of the 1990s.

2020年代和2030年代的项目与1990年代的项目不同。

We know the problems we need to solve today: Creating diversified and resilient supply chains.

我们知道今天需要解决的问题：创建多元化和有弹性的供应链。

Mobilizing public and private investment for a just clean energy transition and sustainable economic growth.

动员公共和私人投资以实现公正的清洁能源转型和可持续的经济增长。

Creating good jobs along the way, family-supporting jobs.

一路创造良好的就业机会，支持家庭的工作。

Ensuring trust, safety, and openness in our digital infrastructure.

确保我们的数字基础设施的信任、安全和开放。

Stopping a race-to-the-bottom in corporate taxation.

停止企业税收的逐底竞争。

Enhancing protections for labor and the environment.

加强劳动和环境保护。

Tackling corruption.

打击腐败。

That is a different set of fundamental priorities than simply bringing down tariffs.

这是一组与简单降低关税不同的基本优先事项。

And we have designed the elements of an ambitious regional economic initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, to focus on those problems—and solving those problems.

我们设计了雄心勃勃的区域经济倡议“印度-太平洋经济框架”的要素，以关注并解决这些问题。

We're negotiating chapters with thirteen Indo-Pacific nations that will hasten the clean-energy transition, implement tax fairness and fight corruption, set high standards for technology, and ensure more resilient supply chains for critical goods and inputs.

我们正在与 13 个印太国家就加速清洁能源转型、实施税收公平和打击腐败、制定高标准技术以及确保关键商品和投入品的供应链更具弹性等章节进行谈判。

Let me speak a bit more concretely.

让我说得更具体一些。

Had IPEF been in place when COVID wreaked havoc on our supply chains and factories sat idling, we would have been able to react more quickly— companies and governments together— pivoting to new options for sourcing and sharing data in real-time.

如果当新冠疫情对我们的供应链造成严重破坏、工厂闲置时 IPEF 就位，我们公司和政府就能够更快地做出反应，转向实时采购和共享数据的新选择。

That's what a new approach can look like on that issue—as on many others.

这就是解决这个问题的新方法——就像解决许多其他问题一样。

Our new Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, launched with a number of our key partners here in the Americas, is aimed at the same basic set of objectives.

我们与美洲的一些主要合作伙伴发起了新的美洲经济繁荣伙伴关系，旨在实现同样的基本目标。

Meanwhile, through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, and through our trilateral coordination with Japan and Korea, we are coordinating on our industrial strategies to complement one another, and avert a race-to-the-bottom by all competing for the same targets.

与此同时，通过美国-欧盟贸易和技术理事会，以及我们与日本和韩国的三边协调，我们正在协调我们的产业战略，以相互补充，避免各方为同一目标竞争而出现逐底竞争。

Some have looked at these initiatives and said, "but they aren't traditional FTAs." That's exactly the point.

一些人在研究了这些举措后表示，“但它们不是传统的自由贸易协定”。这正是重点。

For the problems we are trying to solve today, the traditional model doesn't cut it.

对于我们今天试图解决的问题，传统模型已经无法解决。

The era of after-the-fact policy patches and vague promises of redistribution is over.

事后政策补丁和模糊承诺再分配的时代已经结束。

We need a new approach.

我们需要一种新方法。

Simply put: In today's world, trade policy needs to be about more than tariff reduction, and trade policy needs to be fully integrated into our economic strategy, at home and abroad.

简而言之：在当今世界，贸易政策需要不仅仅是降低关税，贸易政策需要充分融入我们的国内外经济战略。

At the same time, the Biden Administration is developing a new global labor strategy that advances workers' rights through diplomacy, and we will be unveiling this strategy in the weeks ahead.

与此同时，拜登政府正在制定一项新的全球劳工战略，通过外交手段促进工人权利，我们将在未来几周内公布这一战略。

It builds on tools like the rapid-response labor mechanism in USMCA that enforces workers' association and collective-bargaining rights.

它建立在 USMCA 中的快速反应劳工机制等工具的基础上，该机制强制执行工人协会和集体谈判权利。

Just this week, in fact, we resolved our eighth case with an agreement that improved working conditions—a win-win for Mexican workers and American competitiveness.

事实上，就在本周，我们解决了第八起案件，并达成了一项改善工作条件的协议——这对墨西哥工人和美国竞争力来说是双赢的。

We're in the process now of continuing to lead a historic agreement with 136 countries to finally end the race-to-the-bottom on corporate taxes that hurt middle-class and working people.

我们现在正在继续主导与 136 个国家达成一项历史性协议，以最终结束伤害中产阶级和工薪阶层的企业税逐底竞争。

Now Congress needs to follow through with the implementing legislation, and we are working them to do exactly that.

现在国会需要落实实施立法，我们正在努力让他们做到这一点。

And we're taking another kind of new approach that we think a critical blueprint for the future—linking trade and climate in a way that has never been done before.

我们正在采取另一种新方法，我们认为这是未来的关键蓝图——以前所未有的方式将贸易和气候联系起来。

The Global Arrangement on Steel and Aluminum that we're negotiating with the European Union could be the first major trade deal to tackle both emissions intensity and over-capacity.

我们正在与欧盟谈判的全球钢铁和铝安排可能是第一个解决排放强度和产能​​过剩问题的重大贸易协议。

And if we can apply it to steel and aluminum, we can look at how it applies to other sectors as well.

如果我们可以将其应用于钢铁和铝，我们就可以看看它如何应用于其他行业。

We can help create a virtuous cycle and ensure our competitors aren't gaining an advantage by degrading the planet.

我们可以帮助创造一个良性循环，并确保我们的竞争对手不会通过破坏地球来获得优势。

Now, for those who have posed the question, the Biden Administration is still committed to the WTO and the shared values upon which it is based: fair competition, openness, transparency, and the rule of law.

现在，对于那些提出问题的人来说，拜登政府仍然致力于世贸组织及其所依据的共同价值观：公平竞争、开放、透明和法治。

But serious challenges, most notably nonmarket economic practices and policies, threaten those core values.

但严峻的挑战，尤其是非市场经济实践和政策，威胁着这些核心价值观。

So that's why we're working with so many other WTO members to reform the multilateral trading system so that it benefits workers, accommodates legitimate national security interests, and confronts pressing issues that aren't fully embedded in the current WTO framework, like sustainable development and the clean-energy transition.

因此，我们正在与许多其他世贸组织成员合作，改革多边贸易体系，使其惠及工人，照顾合法的国家安全利益，并应对尚未完全纳入当前世贸组织框架的紧迫问题，例如可持续发展和清洁能源转型。

In sum, in a world being transformed by that clean energy transition, by dynamic emerging economies, by a quest for supply chain resilience—by digitization, by artificial intelligence, and by a revolution in biotechnology—the game is not the same.

总而言之，在一个因清洁能源转型、充满活力的新兴经济体、对供应链弹性的追求（数字化、人工智能和生物技术革命）而改变的世界中，游戏已经不一样了。

Our international economic policy has to adapt to the world as it is, so we can build the world that we want.

我们的国际经济政策必须适应世界现状，这样我们才能建设我们想要的世界。

This brings me to the fourth step in our strategy: mobilizing trillions in investment into emerging economies—with solutions that those countries are fashioning on their own, but with capital enabled by a different brand of U.S. diplomacy.

这让我想到了我们战略的第四步：动员数万亿美元的投资进入新兴经济体——这些国家正在自己制定解决方案，但资本是由美国外交的不同品牌提供支持的。

We've launched a major effort to evolve the multilateral development banks so they are up to the challenges of today.

我们为发展多边开发银行做出了重大努力，以便它们能够应对当今的挑战。

2023 is a big year for this.

2023 年对此来说是重要的一年。

As Secretary Yellen has outlined, we need to update the banks' operating models—especially the World Bank but the regional development banks as well.

正如耶伦部长所概述的那样，我们需要更新银行的运营模式，尤其是世界银行，但也包括区域开发银行。

We need to stretch their balance sheets to address climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict.

我们需要扩大他们的资产负债表，以应对气候变化、流行病、脆弱性和冲突。

And we have to expand access to concessional, high-quality finance for low income and for middle-income countries as they deal with challenges that span beyond any single nation's borders.

我们必须扩大低收入和中等收入国家获得优惠、高质量融资的机会，因为它们应对跨越任何单一国家边界的挑战。

We saw an early down payment on this agenda last month, but we will need to do much more.

上个月我们在这个议程上看到了提前支付首付，但我们还需要做更多的事情。

And we're very excited for Ajay Banga's new leadership at the World Bank to make this vision a reality.

我们对阿贾伊·班加 (Ajay Banga) 在世界银行的新领导层实现这一愿景感到非常兴奋。

At the same time as we are evolving the multilateral development banks, we've also launched a major effort to close the infrastructure gap in low- and middle-income countries.

在我们发展多边开发银行的同时，我们还做出了重大努力，以缩小低收入和中等收入国家的基础设施差距。

We call it the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment—PGII.

我们称之为全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系——PGII。

PGII will mobilize hundreds of billions of dollars in energy, physical, and digital infrastructure financing between now and the end of the decade.

从现在到本世纪末，PGII 将筹集数千亿美元的能源、实体和数字基础设施融资。

And unlike the financing that comes in the Belt and Road Initiative, projects under PGII are transparent and high-standard and in service of long-term, inclusive, and sustainable growth.

与“一带一路”倡议中的融资不同，PGII项目透明、高标准，服务于长期、包容和可持续增长。

And in just under a year since this initiative launched, we have already delivered significant investments in everything from the mines needed to power electric vehicles to global subsea telecom cables.

自该计划启动以来不到一年的时间里，我们已经在从电动汽车所需的矿山到全球海底电信电缆的各个方面进行了大量投资。

At the same time, we're also committed to addressing the debt distress faced by an increasingly large number of vulnerable countries.

与此同时，我们还致力于解决越来越多脆弱国家面临的债务困扰。

We need to see genuine relief, not just "extending and pretending." And we need to see all bilateral official and private creditors share the burden.

我们需要看到真正的缓解，而不仅仅是“延伸和假装”。我们需要看到所有双边官方和私人债权人分担负担。

That includes China, which has worked to build its influence through massive lending to the emerging world, almost always with strings attached.

其中包括中国，它一直致力于通过向新兴世界提供大量贷款来建立自己的影响力，而且几乎总是附带条件。

We share the view of many others that China now needs to step up as a constructive force in assisting debt-stressed countries.

我们同意许多其他人的观点，即中国现在需要成为援助债务压力国家的建设性力量。

Finally, we are protecting our foundational technologies with a small yard and high fence.

最后，我们用小院子和高栅栏来保护我们的基础技术。

As I've argued before, our charge is to usher in a new wave of the digital revolution—one that ensures that next-generation technologies work for, not against, our democracies and our security.

正如我之前所说，我们的责任是引领新一轮数字革命，确保下一代技术有利于而不是反对我们的民主和安全。

We've implemented carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China.

我们对向中国出口最先进的半导体技术实施了精心设计的限制。

Those restrictions are premised on straightforward national security concerns.

这些限制是基于直接的国家安全担忧。

Key allies and partners have followed suit, consistent with their own security concerns.

主要盟友和合作伙伴也纷纷效仿，这符合他们自身的安全担忧。

We're also enhancing the screening of foreign investments in critical areas relevant to national security.

我们还在与国家安全相关的关键领域加强对外国投资的审查。

And we're making progress in addressing outbound investments in sensitive technologies with a core national security nexus.

我们在处理与国家安全有核心关系的敏感技术的对外投资方面正在取得进展。

These are tailored measures.

这些都是量身定制的措施。

They are not, as Beijing says, a "technology blockade." They are not targeting emerging economies.

正如北京所说，它们并不是“技术封锁”。他们并不针对新兴经济体。

They are focused on a narrow slice of technology and a small number of countries intent on challenging us militarily.

他们专注于一小部分技术和少数意图在军事上挑战我们的国家。

A word on China more broadly.

更广泛地谈论中国。

As President von der Leyen put it recently, we are for de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling.

正如冯德莱恩总统最近所说，我们主张去风险和多元化，而不是脱钩。

We'll keep investing in our own capacities, and in secure, resilient supply chains.

我们将继续投资于我们自己的能力以及安全、有弹性的供应链。

We'll keep pushing for a level playing field for our workers and companies and defending against abuses.

我们将继续努力为我们的工人和公司创造一个公平的竞争环境，并防止虐待行为。

Our export controls will remain narrowly focused on technology that could tilt the military balance.

我们的出口管制仍将集中于可能倾斜军事平衡的技术。

We are simply ensuring that U.S. and allied technology is not used against us.

我们只是确保美国和盟国的技术不会被用来对付我们。

We are not cutting off trade.

我们不会切断贸易。

In fact, the United States continues to have a very substantial trade and investment relationship with China.

事实上，美国与中国仍然保持着非常实质性的贸易和投资关系。

Bilateral trade between the United States and China set a new record last year.

去年，中美双边贸易创下新纪录。

Now, when you zoom out from economics, we are competing with China on multiple dimensions, but we are not looking for confrontation or conflict.

现在，当你把目光从经济上缩小时，我们正在与中国在多个维度上竞争，但我们并不是在寻求对抗或冲突。

We're looking to manage competition responsibly and seeking to work together with China where we can.

我们希望以负责任的方式管理竞争，并尽可能与中国合作。

President Biden has made clear that the United States and China can and should work together on global challenges like climate, like macroeconomic stability, health security, and food security.

拜登总统明确表示，美国和中国可以而且应该合作应对气候、宏观经济稳定、健康安全和粮食安全等全球挑战。

Managing competition responsibly ultimately takes two willing parties.

负责任地管理竞争最终需要两个自愿的团体。

It requires a degree of strategic maturity to accept that we must maintain open lines of communication even as we take actions to compete.

即使我们采取行动进行竞争，我们也必须保持开放的沟通渠道，这需要一定程度的战略成熟度。

As Secretary Yellen said last week in her speech on this topic, we can defend our national security interests, have a healthy economic competition, and work together where possible, but China has to be willing to play its part.

正如耶伦国务卿上周在该主题的演讲中所说，我们可以捍卫我们的国家安全利益，进行良性的经济竞争，并在可能的情况下进行合作，但中国必须愿意发挥自己的作用。

The world needs an international economic system that works for our wage-earners, works for our industries, works for our climate, works for our national security, and works for the world's poorest and most vulnerable countries.

世界需要一个有利于我们工薪阶层、有利于我们工业、有利于我们气候、有利于我们国家安全以及有利于世界上最贫穷和最脆弱国家的国际经济体系。

That means replacing a singular approach focused the oversimplified assumptions that I set out at the top of my speech with one that encourages targeted and necessary investments in places that private markets are ill-suited to address on their own—even as we continue to harness the power of markets and integration.

这意味着，即使我们继续利用市场和一体化的力量，也要取代单一的方法，这种方法集中于我在演讲开头提出的过于简单化的假设，而是鼓励在私人市场不适合自行解决的问题上进行有针对性和必要的投资。

It means providing space for partners around the world to restore the compacts between governments and their voters and workers.

这意味着为世界各地的合作伙伴提供空间，以恢复政府与其选民和工人之间的契约。

It means grounding this new approach in deep cooperation and transparency to ensure that our investments and those of partners are mutually reinforcing and beneficial.

这意味着将这种新方法建立在深度合作和透明度的基础上，以确保我们的投资和合作伙伴的投资相辅相成、互惠互利。

And it means returning to the core belief we first championed 80 years ago: that America should be at the heart of a vibrant, international financial system that enables partners around the world to reduce poverty and enhance shared prosperity.

这意味着回归我们 80 年前首次倡导的核心信念：美国应该处于充满活力的国际金融体系的核心，使世界各地的合作伙伴能够减少贫困并促进共同繁荣。

And that a functioning social safety net for the world's most vulnerable countries is essential to our own core interests.

为世界上最脆弱的国家建立一个运转良好的社会安全网对于我们自身的核心利益至关重要。

It also means building new norms that allow us to address the challenges posed by the intersection of advanced technology and national security, without obstructing broader trade and innovation.

它还意味着建立新的规范，使我们能够应对先进技术与国家安全交叉带来的挑战，同时又不阻碍更广泛的贸易和创新。

This strategy will take resolve—it will take a dedicated commitment to overcoming the barriers that have kept this country and our partners from building rapidly, efficiently, and fairly as we were able to do in the past.

这项战略需要下定决心——需要全身心地致力于克服阻碍这个国家和我们的合作伙伴像我们过去那样快速、高效和公平建设的障碍。

But it is the surest path to restoring the middle class, to producing a just and effective clean-energy transition, to securing critical supply chains, and, through all of this, to repairing faith in democracy itself.

但这是恢复中产阶级、实现公正有效的清洁能源转型、确保关键供应链安全以及通过所有这一切修复对民主本身的信心的最可靠途径。

As always, we need the full and bipartisan partnership of Congress if we are going to succeed.

一如既往，如果我们要取得成功，我们需要国会的全面和两党合作。

We need support from Congress to revive America's unique capacity to attract and retain the brightest talent from around the world.

我们需要国会的支持，以重振美国吸引和留住世界各地最聪明人才的独特能力。

We need the Hill's full partnership in our reform initiatives in development finance.

我们需要国会在我们的发展金融改革举措中充分合作。

And we need to double down on our investments in infrastructure, innovation, and clean energy.

我们需要加倍加大对基础设施、创新和清洁能源的投资。

Our national security and our economic vitality depend on it.

我们的国家安全和经济活力取决于它。

President Kennedy was fond of saying that "a rising tide lifts all boats." Over the years, advocates of trickle-down economics appropriated this phrase for their own uses.

肯尼迪总统喜欢说“水涨船高”。多年来，涓滴经济学的倡导者将这句话用于自己的用途。

But President Kennedy wasn't saying what's good for the wealthy is good for the working class.

但肯尼迪总统并不是说对富人有利的事情对工人阶级也有利。

He was saying we're all in this together.

他说我们在一起。

And look at what he said next: "If one section of the country is standing still, then sooner or later a dropping tide drops all the boats."

看看他接下来说的话：“如果这个国家的一部分停滞不前，那么退潮迟早会淹没所有的船只。”

That's true for our country.

对于我们国家来说也是如此。

That's true for our world.

对于我们的世界来说也是如此。

End economically, over time, we're going to rise—or fall—together.

从经济角度来看，随着时间的推移，我们将一起崛起——或者一起堕落。

And that goes for the strength of our democracies as well as for the strength of our economies.

这对于我们民主国家的实力以及我们经济的实力都是如此。

As we pursue this strategy at home and abroad, there will be reasonable debate.

当我们在国内外推行这一战略时，将会出现合理的争论。

And this is going to take time.

这需要时间。

The international order that emerged after the end of the Second World War and then the Cold War were not built overnight.

第二次世界大战和冷战结束后出现的国际秩序并不是一夜之间建立起来的。

Neither will this one.

这个也不会。

But together, we can work to lift up all of America's people, communities, and industries, and we can do the same with our friends and partners everywhere around the globe as well.

但只要齐心协力，我们就可以努力提升所有美国人民、社区和行业的水平，我们也可以与全球各地的朋友和合作伙伴一起做同样的事情。

This is a vision the Biden Administration must and will fight to achieve.

这是拜登政府必须而且将会努力实现的愿景。

This is what is guiding us as we make our policy decisions at the intersection of economics, national security, and democracy.

这就是我们在经济、国家安全和民主的交叉点上做出政策决策时的指导方针。

And this is the work that we will do not just as a government, but with every element of the United States, and with the support and help of partners both in government and out of government around the world.

这就是我们不仅作为政府要做的工作，而且是与美国各个部门一起做的工作，并得到世界各地政府内外合作伙伴的支持和帮助。

Joseph R.

约瑟夫·R。

Biden, Jr., Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.

小拜登在布鲁金斯学会在线发表国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文关于更新美国经济领导地位的讲话，作者：格哈德·彼得斯和约翰·T·拜登

Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/360988

伍利，美国总统项目 https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/360988