The People’s Money (Part 4)

Let’s quickly recap: I outlined, in PART 3 , an argument that modern society has evolved in ways that necessitates a dramatic increase in public enterprise—yet, at the same time, we’ve doubled down on an old-world narrative about “money” that makes it mathematically impossible to meet that need.

让我们快速回顾一下：我在第三部分中概述了一个论点，即现代社会的发展方式需要公共企业的急剧增加，但与此同时，我们加倍强调了旧世界关于“金钱”的叙述，这使得从数学上讲不可能满足这种需求。

In PARTS 1 & 2 we reconfirmed a “modern money” perspective by simply observing the actual operations of the Federal Reserve—and reconfirmed, as well, how this new perspective holds out the opportunity to actually confront, through the efforts of public enterprise, the new challenges modern society faces.

在第一部分和第二部分中，我们通过简单地观察美联储的实际运作，再次确认了“现代货币”的观点，并再次确认了这种新观点如何提供了机会，通过公共企业的努力来实际应对现代社会面临的新挑战。

It was my intention, at this point, to focus on the unfolding reality that climate change will soon prove to be the most dramatic challenge modern society is facing—and will be the challenge that necessitates, by far, the greatest need for goods and services produced by public enterprise.

此时此刻，我的目的是关注正在显现的现实，即气候变化很快将被证明是现代社会面临的最严峻的挑战，而且迄今为止，这一挑战将需要公共企业生产的商品和服务。

More to the point, climate change will generate the greatest need—by far—for implementing and managing a “modern money” perspective in America’s economy.

更重要的是，迄今为止，气候变化将产生在美国经济中实施和管理“现代货币”视角的最大需求。

While I still intend to pursue this argument, comments addressed to PART 3 have led me to change sequence: I realize now it will be ineffective (and perhaps futile) to discuss the extraordinary level of public spending that climate-change will necessitate without, first, attempting to address two related issues: (1) the stridently insistent warnings about “inflation,” and (2) the conundrum of the necessity for increased “consumption.”

虽然我仍然打算继续探讨这一论点，但对第三部分的评论使我改变了顺序：我现在意识到，如果不首先尝试解决两个相关问题，讨论气候变化所需的超常公共支出将是无效的（也许是徒劳的）：（1）关于“通货膨胀”的强烈警告，以及（2）增加“消费”的必要性的难题。

I’ll begin this effort with a simple premise: It is willfully self-harming to confront a collective need—for which the labor and materiel are available to provide a remedy—but refuse to employ that labor and materiel by arguing that doing so will create an imbalance in the monetary system.

我将从一个简单的前提开始这项努力：面对集体需求（劳动力和物资可以提供补救措施），但拒绝使用这些劳动力和物资，因为这样做会造成货币体系的失衡，这是故意自残。

This, for all practical purposes, is precisely what is being argued when direct sovereign spending is withheld from public enterprise out of fear of inflation.

出于所有实际目的，这正是当出于对通货膨胀的恐惧而拒绝向公共企业提供直接主权支出时所争论的问题。

At that precise point, it seems to me, the tail begins wagging the dog—and there is very little concern for the dog itself.

在我看来，正是在那个时刻，尾巴开始摇狗——而狗本身却很少受到关注。

To visualize the issue, let’s imagine ourselves a decade hence, and all the money-intensive challenges we’ve earlier outlined (supported by our “modern money” perspective) have largely been met by the efforts of public enterprise.

为了形象化这个问题，让我们想象一下十年后的自己，我们之前概述的所有资金密集型挑战（以我们的“现代货币”观点为支持）在很大程度上已经通过公共企业的努力得到了解决。

It’s the year 2030, and millions of Americans who previously struggled to get available health care can now walk into any doctor’s office, neighborhood clinic, or hospital emergency room with their universal coverage card.

到了 2030 年，数百万以前难以获得医疗保健的美国人现在可以带着全民保险卡走进任何医生办公室、社区诊所或医院急诊室。

Millions of recent college graduates have seen their old tuition debts cancelled—and every high-school grad can now pursue higher education or technical training debt-free.

数百万应届大学毕业生的旧学费债务已被取消，每个高中毕业生现在都可以无债务地接受高等教育或技术培训。

Millions of children are now entering grade-school having been fully nurtured and prepared, during their pre-school years, to engage in becoming educated—and millions more, just coming out of maternity wards, are guaranteed high-quality pre-school care, if their family needs it.

现在，数以百万计的儿童在学前阶段已经得到充分的培养和准备，正在进入小学，以便接受教育，而还有数百万刚刚从产房出来的儿童，如果他们的家庭需要的话，可以保证获得高质量的学前护理。

Millions of families, who previously struggled to find adequate housing at a price they could afford, are now part of a national housing co-op that builds and owns dwelling units and co-housing villages in every American community.

数以百万计的家庭以前很难以负担得起的价格找到足够的住房，现在他们成为了全国住房合作社的一部分，该合作社在美国每个社区建造并拥有住宅单元和共同住宅村。

Finally, we’ve succeeded in implementing the “Green New Deal,” transitioned primarily to zero carbon energy systems, and brought carbon emissions close to the stated parameters of the IPCC.

最后，我们成功实施了“绿色新政”，主要过渡到零碳能源系统，并使碳排放接近IPCC规定的参数。

In accomplishing all this, we’ve also established (just in time for the massive lay-offs of the AIbot revolution) a public enterprise economy that has put millions of Americans back to work nurturing, restoring, and rebuilding the health and diversity of our natural habitats and ecosystems, as well as designing and building climate-adaptive human habitats, systems and communities.

在实现这一切的过程中，我们还建立了公共企业经济（正好赶上人工智能机器人革命的大规模裁员），使数百万美国人重返工作岗位，培育、恢复和重建我们自然栖息地和生态系统的健康和多样性，以及设计和建设适应气候的人类栖息地、系统和社区。

We have, in short, made great strides toward our collective well-being.

简而言之，我们在集体福祉方面取得了长足进步。

There is, however, a “problem.” The problem is not that the $110 trillion price tag we’d initially placed on these accomplishments came in closer to $200 trillion.

然而，有一个“问题”。问题不在于我们最初为这些成就设定的 110 万亿美元价格标签接近 200 万亿美元。

(It turns out that the Federal Reserve system was able to produce, for the purposes of public enterprise, $200 trillion in Reserves just as easily as it could have produced $110 trillion.) The problem we now confront, in 2030, is that the $200 trillion has been paid to American citizens and businesses for producing the goods and services just outlined!

（事实证明，美联储系统能够为公共企业的目的生产 200 万亿美元的储备金，就像生产 110 万亿美元一样容易。） 2030 年，我们现在面临的问题是，为生产上述商品和服务而向美国公民和企业支付了 200 万亿美元！

American families and businesses, in other words, now possess $200 trillion more to spend on food, clothing, housing, automobiles, electronic appliances, labor and materiel, etc. than they otherwise would have.

换句话说，美国家庭和企业现在比原来多拥有200万亿美元用于食品、衣服、住房、汽车、电器、劳动力和物资等的支出。

From many perspectives this could be viewed as a genuinely good thing: a middle-class lifestyle has been extended, presumably, to a larger percentage of society, and private enterprise is positioned to thrive on that expanded market.

从许多角度来看，这都可以被视为一件真正的好事：中产阶级的生活方式大概已经扩展到社会的更大比例，而私营企业也有望在这个扩大的市场上蓬勃发展。

From another perspective, however, there is a big problem—and an even larger conundrum.

然而，从另一个角度来看，存在一个大问题，甚至是一个更大的难题。

First: the “big problem.”

第一：“大问题”。

The simple logic of our old-world “money” narrative warns us that, because of that additional $200 trillion in spending power, prices for consumer purchases in 2030 must have dramatically risen to accommodate the extra money.

旧世界“货币”叙事的简单逻辑警告我们，由于消费能力增加了 200 万亿美元，2030 年消费者的购买价格必定会大幅上涨，以容纳额外的货币。

Or, viewed from another perspective, the value of the U.S. dollars in everyone’s bank accounts must have dramatically fallen.

或者，从另一个角度来看，每个人银行账户中的美元价值肯定大幅下跌。

This, in a nutshell, is the predicted “problem” of price inflation we received dire warnings about a decade ago (back in 2019) when this talk about a new need for public enterprise began.

简而言之，这就是我们在大约十年前（早在 2019 年）开始谈论公共企业新需求时收到的可怕的价格通胀“问题”。

The only previous experience America has had with this dynamic, however, indicates that, if properly understood and managed, it is not a threat, but an opportunity.

然而，美国之前对这种动态的唯一经验表明，如果正确理解和管理，它不是威胁，而是机遇。

That previous experience was the U.S. mobilization for World War 2.

之前的经历是美国为第二次世界大战进行动员。

During the war, public enterprise expanded dramatically, employing, in one way or another, virtually every American citizen.

战争期间，公共企业急剧扩张，以某种方式雇用了几乎每一位美国公民。

Prices did go up—but were held in check in two ways: (a) strict wartime rationing of most consumer goods, and (b) payrolls that were partially made with war-bonds (i.e. future dollars).

价格确实上涨了，但通过两种方式受到控制：（a）大多数消费品的战时严格配给，以及（b）部分用战争债券（即未来的美元）支付的工资。

When the war was over, and the future dollars were made real, the sudden increase in consumer purchasing power was absorbed by the dramatic increase in the new production capabilities of private enterprise—capabilities that were built by the public enterprise of the war effort itself.

当战争结束，未来的美元成为现实时，消费者购买力的突然增长被私营企业新生产能力的急剧增长所吸收——这些能力是由公共企业在战争中建立起来的。

It would be reasonable to imagine this same dynamic has now unfolded in 2030.

可以合理地想象，2030 年也会出现同样的动态。

All those public enterprise efforts we’ve just described have resulted in expanded opportunities for private enterprise to offer goods and services for profit—with the expanded middle-class market standing ready (with all that money they’ve earned through public enterprise) to be the consumers.

我们刚才描述的所有这些公共企业的努力都为私营企业提供了更多的机会来提供商品和服务以获取利润——扩大的中产阶级市场已经准备好成为消费者（他们通过公共企业赚到了所有的钱）。

But maybe not.

但也许不是。

Maybe—as we were just warned by two economists at the St. Louis branch of Federal Reserve itself—now, in 2030, we’d be experiencing hyper-inflation, just like “Germany in 1921-23, Zimbabwe in 2007-09, and Venezuela currently.” It’s disappointing that in their zeal to discredit the newly emerging “modern money” perspective, these economists found it prudent not to explain—or even point out—that in each of those instances of genuine hyper-inflation, the root cause was not “printing money” (as they infer “modern money theory” is all about) but something else instead.

也许——正如美联储圣路易斯分行的两位经济学家刚刚警告的那样——现在，到 2030 年，我们将经历恶性通货膨胀，就像“1921-23 年的德国、2007-09 年的津巴布韦和目前的委内瑞拉”一样。令人失望的是，在热衷于质疑新兴的“现代货币”观点时，这些经济学家发现谨慎的做法是不解释——甚至不指出——在每一次真正的恶性通货膨胀的例子中，根本原因不是“印钞”（正如他们推断的“现代货币理论”的含义），而是其他原因。

To say that “printing money” is the cause of hyper-inflation, it turns out, is like saying that flames are the cause of fire.

事实证明，说“印钞”是恶性通货膨胀的原因，就像说火焰是火灾的原因一样。

“Germany in 1921-23, Zimbabwe in 2007-09, and Venezuela currently,” all shared the same set of matches and kindling for starting the flames of hyper-inflation: a virtual total collapse of the production activities of their society.

“1921-23 年的德国、2007-09 年的津巴布韦和现在的委内瑞拉”都使用相同的火柴和引火物来点燃恶性通货膨胀的火焰：他们的社会生产活动实际上完全崩溃。

They stopped producing (or, in the case of Venezuela, importing) the things that people buy with money—and so, naturally, the money that existed (and continued to be issued to meet government obligations) drove up prices of the few things remaining on the store-shelves.

他们停止生产（或者，就委内瑞拉而言，停止进口）人们用钱购买的东西——因此，自然地，现有的货币（并继续发行以履行政府义务）推高了商店货架上剩余的少数东西的价格。

Quick message to the St. Louis FED from the year 2030: America hasn’t stopped producing things for consumers to buy.

从 2030 年起向圣路易斯联储发出的快速信息：美国并未停止生产供消费者购买的东西。

There are many more things to buy than in 2019 when the push for public enterprise began.

与 2019 年推动上市企业开始时相比，现在有更多东西可供购买。

So why should we imagine that we’ve turned out to be suffering from hyper-inflation?

那么，我们为什么要想象我们已经遭受了恶性通货膨胀呢？

In fact, as we now enter the fourth decade of this century, we have a MUCH BIGGER problem to confront—a conundrum we should have been actively strategizing about much earlier than a decade ago.

事实上，当我们现在进入本世纪的第四个十年时，我们有一个更大的问题需要面对——我们应该比十年前更早地积极制定战略来解决这个难题。

The conundrum faced by today’s modern society is a catch-22 of existential proportions:

当今现代社会面临的难题是关乎生存的第 22 条军规：

The ramifications of this conundrum—this Catch-22 of the 21 st century—define the ultimate challenge, it seems to me, of modern human society.

在我看来，这个难题（21 世纪的第 22 条军规）的后果定义了现代人类社会的终极挑战。

It appears that something truly magical must occur if we are to go forward with a viable, livable future: We must, somehow, dramatically expand the goods and services of private consumption—making them available to greater and greater numbers of people—while simultaneously (a) reducing the consumption of finite resources, and (b) restoring and rebuilding the regenerative capacities of the Earth’s natural systems and habitats.

如果我们要迈向一个可行、宜居的未来，似乎必须发生一些真正神奇的事情：我们必须以某种方式大幅扩大私人消费的商品和服务，使越来越多的人能够获得它们，同时（a）减少有限资源的消耗，（b）恢复和重建地球自然系统和栖息地的再生能力。

To imagine there is any other path defies the physics of reality.

想象还有任何其他路径违背了现实的物理学。

Looking down this path, it is certainly not clear how it can be done.

沿着这条路往下看，当然不清楚如何做到。

What is clear, however, is that the old-world narrative of “money” offers us nothing but the prospect of chaos and conflict.

然而，显而易见的是，旧世界的“金钱”叙事给我们带来的只是混乱和冲突的前景。

As we’ll discuss in PART 5 to come, the perspective of “modern money theory,” however scary or controversial it may seem to mainstream thinkers, offers the very real possibility of hope.

正如我们将在接下来的第五部分中讨论的那样，“现代货币理论”的观点无论对主流思想家来说多么可怕或有争议，都提供了非常真实的希望可能性。