STATEMENT: House Budget Committee, “Reexamining the economic costs of debt”, Nov 20, 2019

This blog is based on the testimony I provided to the US House of Representatives.

这篇博客是基于我向美国众议院提供的证词。

My written statement will be published in the Congressional Record (a version is also at the Levy Economics Institute: http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/statement-of-senior-scholar-l-randall-wray-to-the-house-budget-committee .

我的书面声明将发表在国会记录中（利维经济研究所也有一个版本：http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/statement-of-senior-scholar-l-randall-wray-to-the-house-budget-committee。

The full statement was co-authored with Yeva Nersisyan.

完整的声明是与 Yeva Nersisyan 共同撰写的。

I will argue that the Federal Government’s deficit and debt are not so scary as we are led to believe.

我认为联邦政府的赤字和债务并不像我们想象的那么可怕。

Neither the deficit nor the debt ratio is on an unsustainable path.

赤字和债务比率都没有走上不可持续的道路。

In some sense, chronic deficits and a rising debt ratio are normal.

从某种意义上说，长期赤字和债务比率上升是正常的。

They are not due to out of control spending—now or in the future.

它们并不是由于现在或将来的支出失控造成的。

They serve a useful public purpose.

它们服务于有用的公共目的。

In any case they are largely outside the control of Congress.

无论如何，它们很大程度上不受国会的控制。

It is hard to imagine a scenario in which rising deficits and the debt ratio will create a financial crisis, lead to government insolvency, generate high inflation, or trigger an attack by bond vigilantes.

很难想象赤字和债务比率上升会引发金融危机、导致政府破产、引发高通胀或引发债券自卫队攻击的情景。

Figure 1 looks at government spending from several angles but just focus on the red line—which is total Federal Government spending as a percent of GDP.

图 1 从多个角度审视了政府支出，但仅关注红线——联邦政府支出总额占 GDP 的百分比。

It is essentially stable since 1960.

1960年以来基本稳定。

Figure 2 shows the deficit as a percent of GDP since 1930.

图 2 显示了 1930 年以来赤字占 GDP 的百分比。

Three things are apparent: we ran a deficit ratio as high as 25% of GDP during WWII; deficits are normal over the whole period—with only 2 short periods of surpluses; however, since the 1970s the swings are bigger and the average deficit ratio is higher.

有三件事是显而易见的：二战期间我们的赤字率高达 GDP 的 25%；整个时期的赤字都是正常的——只有2个短期的盈余；然而，自20世纪70年代以来，波动更大，平均赤字率更高。

Figure 3 shows the debt ratio.

图3显示了负债率。

The blue graph shows the debt held by the public as a percent of GDP.

蓝色图显示了公众持有的债务占 GDP 的百分比。

The long term trend is upward but there was a big boost due to the Great Recession; as well as after the Reagan and Bush Sr recessions.

长期趋势是向上的，但由于经济大衰退，有很大的推动；以及里根和老布什经济衰退之后。

Table 1 (borrowed from Eric Tymoigne) shows that the long term trend is not new—the debt ratio has increased at an average pace of 1.8% since 1791.

表 1（借自 Eric Tymoigne）显示，长期趋势并不新鲜——自 1791 年以来，债务比率平均以 1.8% 的速度增长。

What has changed is that the rate of growth is higher since 1930.

发生的变化是自 1930 年以来增长率更高。

Before 1930 the debt ratio dropped in more than half the years—although the increases were bigger than the decreases.

1930 年之前，债务比率在超过一半的时间里都在下降，尽管增幅大于下降幅度。

However since 1930 there have been only 5 years in which the debt ratio actually fell—and 83 in which it went up.

然而，自 1930 年以来，只有 5 年债务比率实际下降，而有 83 年债务比率上升。

Figure 4 shows the countercyclical nature of taxes and transfer payments.

图4显示了税收和转移支付的反周期性质。

Tax revenues grow in an expansion and fall in recession; transfers grow with a lag in recession and fall in expansion.

经济扩张时税收收入增长，经济衰退时税收收入下降；经济衰退时转移增长滞后，扩张时转移下降。

However, the swings of taxes have become very much larger in the past 2 decades—falling off a cliff in a downturn.

然而，在过去的二十年里，税收的波动变得非常大——在经济低迷时期跌落悬崖。

Interestingly, in the current expansion, the growth rate has been unusually low.

有趣的是，在当前的扩张中，增长率却异常低。

Figure 5 breaks taxes down into the withheld and nonwithheld types.

图 5 将税收分为预扣税和非预扣税。

Both swing with the cycle, but nonwithheld taxes swing more wildly especially in recent years.

两者都随周期波动，但非预扣税波动更为剧烈，尤其是近年来。

However note that under Trump, withheld tax growth has dropped like it usually does only in recession.

但请注意，在特朗普的领导下，预扣税增长已经下降，通常只有在经济衰退时才会出现这种情况。

Figure 6 breaks government nontransfer spending into consumption and investment.

图 6 将政府非转移支出分为消费和投资。

Swings of these components do not follow a clear countercyclical path—if anything they are somewhat procyclical, rising in an expansion and falling in recession.

这些成分的波动并不遵循明显的反周期路径——如果有的话，它们在某种程度上是顺周期的，在经济扩张时上升，在衰退时下降。

All in all we conclude that Federal spending provides a modest stabilizing role, mostly through transfer payments—but that has weakened in recent decades.

总而言之，我们得出的结论是，联邦支出主要通过转移支付提供了适度的稳定作用，但近几十年来这种作用有所减弱。

Taxes play the bigger stabilizer role but they are more effective at reducing the drag in a recession than at pulling out demand in expansion.

税收发挥着更大的稳定器作用，但它们在减少经济衰退中的拖累方面比在拉动经济扩张中的需求方面更有效。

US sectoral balances are shown in Figure 7.

美国的部门平衡如图 7 所示。

At the aggregate level spending equals income by identity.

从总体水平来看，支出等于身份的收入。

One sector can spend less than its income (run a surplus) only if at least one other spends more than its income (runs a deficit).

只有当至少一个部门的支出超过其收入（出现赤字）时，一个部门的支出才能少于其收入（出现盈余）。

The government sector taken as a whole is red.

政府部门作为一个整体是红色的。

You will notice that with the one brief exception during the Clinton years, the red is always in deficit—below the line.

你会注意到，除了克林顿时期的一个短暂例外之外，红色总是处于赤字状态——低于红线。

On the other hand, the private sector, including firms and households and shown in blue, is almost always in surplus.

另一方面，私营部门，包括公司和家庭（以蓝色显示）几乎总是有盈余。

The exception was during the decade between 1996 and 2006 the private sector spent more than its income.

例外的是 1996 年至 2006 年这十年间，私营部门的支出超过了收入。

This coincides with the period of the Clinton surplus.

这与克林顿盈余时期相吻合。

The final sector, shown in green, is the foreign sector—or rest of the world.

最后一个部门（以绿色显示）是国外部门，即世界其他地区。

It has run a surplus balance since the Reagan years.

自里根时代以来，它一直保持盈余。

That is because we run a current account deficit—to simplify we can say this reflects our trade deficit.

这是因为我们存在经常账户赤字——简单地说，我们可以说这反映了我们的贸易赤字。

So the usual case is that the government’s budget deficit equals the sum of the private sector’s surplus plus the current account deficit (with its sign reversed).

因此，通常的情况是政府的预算赤字等于私营部门盈余加上经常账户赤字（符号相反）之和。

This is an identity.

这是一个身份。

Anyone who is going to argue for eliminating the budget deficit must tell us which of the other two balances is going to change so that can happen.

任何主张消除预算赤字的人都必须告诉我们其他两个平衡中的哪一个将发生变化，以便实现这一目标。

Are balanced budget hawks also advocating to eliminate the private sector’s surplus and run deficits again—as they did in the dot com and housing bubbles?

平衡预算鹰派是否也主张消除私营部门的盈余并再次出现赤字——就像他们在互联网泡沫和房地产泡沫时期所做的那样？

If so, how will we avoid another Global Crash?

如果是这样，我们将如何避免另一场全球崩溃？

Or are they suggesting we’ll get the rest of the world to run deficits so that we can run a current account surplus?

还是他们建议我们让世界其他国家出现赤字，以便我们能够实现经常账户盈余？

We’ve had a current account deficit for half a century—and the Trump Administration’s tariffs have reduced international trade but have not yet significantly reduced our current account deficit.

我们的经常账户赤字已有半个世纪了，特朗普政府的关税减少了国际贸易，但尚未显着减少我们的经常账户赤字。

Even if we could control our imports, we can’t control exports.

即使我们可以控制进口，我们也无法控制出口。

Understanding sectoral balances leads us to conclude the Federal balance is not under close control of Congress because the outcome depends on the other 2 sectors.

了解部门平衡使我们得出结论，联邦平衡不受国会密切控制，因为结果取决于其他两个部门。

Even if we can control Federal spending (which has not been growing as a percent of GDP), tax revenues depend on economic performance—which also goes into determining the other 2 sectoral balances.

即使我们能够控制联邦支出（其占 GDP 的百分比并未增长），税收收入也取决于经济表现——这也决定了其他两个部门的平衡。

The budget deficit is endogenously determined—growing when the economy slows and falling when growth picks up.

预算赤字是内生决定的——经济放缓时预算赤字增加，经济增长加速时预算赤字下降。

That’s not always the case but it is the best case scenario because it is stabilizing.

情况并非总是如此，但这是最好的情况，因为它正在稳定下来。

Figure 8 shows the relation between economic growth (horizontal axis) and the Federal government deficit (shown as positive on the vertical axis).

图 8 显示了经济增长（横轴）与联邦政府赤字（纵轴为正）之间的关系。

Surprisingly, there’s no obvious relationship.

令人惊讶的是，没有明显的关系。

We can obtain the same deficit ratio—say 4%–with a wide variety of growth rates.

我们可以在不同的增长率下获得相同的赤字率（比如 4%）。

We could hypothesize that we can move from a 4% deficit ratio to an 8% deficit ratio in either the good way or the ugly way—as shown in the next graph.

我们可以假设，我们可以以好的方式或丑陋的方式从 4% 的赤字率转向 8% 的赤字率——如下图所示。

Start at point A, which shows a deficit ratio of 4% with a growth rate of 4%.

从 A 点开始，赤字率为 4%，增长率为 4%。

Now let’s cut spending or raise taxes in an attempt to cut the deficit.

现在让我们削减支出或提高税收以削减赤字。

If this slows growth, we could move up to point B—with a deficit ratio of 8% and negative growth.

如果增长放缓，我们可能会上升到 B 点——赤字率为 8%，负增长。

That’s the ugly way to produce a bigger deficit.

这是产生更大赤字的丑陋方式。

That is the Japanese way.

这就是日本人的方式。

Whenever the economy begins to escape stagnation, the government adopts a new consumption tax that kills the recovery and causes the deficit to grow.

每当经济开始摆脱停滞时，政府就会采取新的消费税，从而扼杀复苏并导致赤字增加。

Or we can increase the deficit the good way, by embarking on a public infrastructure investment campaign.

或者，我们可以通过开展公共基础设施投资活动来增加赤字。

We move from point A to point C.

我们从A点移动到C点。

The increased spending boosts the deficit and economic growth.

支出的增加促进了赤字和经济增长。

However, as growth picks up, tax revenue grows and we shift down the arrow to Point D—with a lower deficit and higher growth.

然而，随着增长加快，税收收入增加，我们将箭头向下移动到 D 点——赤字更低，增长更高。

That’s the good path to deficits.

这是通向赤字的好途径。

Of course that’s all hypothetical.

当然，这都是假设。

We can actually trace the path of the combinations of deficits and growth in the following two graphs.

我们实际上可以在下面两张图中追踪赤字和增长组合的路径。

Figure 9 shows the decade from 1991-2001 as a relatively high budget deficit at the beginning of the decade boost growth, and maintenance of high growth shrinks the deficit over the rest of the decade until a surplus is generated.

图9显示了1991-2001年的十年，十年初期相对较高的预算赤字促进了增长，而维持高增长则在十年的剩余时间内缩小了赤字，直到产生盈余。

However, that killed the boom.

然而，这扼杀了繁荣。

Figure 10 shows a loop-da-loop as the deficit rises after 2001, as the economy recovers until the mid 2000s, crashing into the Great Recession that drives the deficit to 10% of GDP in 2009.

图 10 显示了 2001 年之后赤字上升的循环，直到 2000 年代中期经济复苏，陷入大衰退，导致 2009 年赤字达到 GDP 的 10%。

Over the next decade, growth settles in at a 3-4% pace and the deficit comes down to the range of 3-4% of GDP

未来十年，经济增速将稳定在 3-4%，赤字将降至 GDP 的 3-4%

Figure 11 displays the interest on the debt as a percent of GDP—rising sharply through the mid 1980s and then settling at about 2.5% of GDP for the past 15 years.

图 11 显示了债务利息占 GDP 的百分比——在 20 世纪 80 年代中期急剧上升，然后在过去 15 年稳定在 GDP 的 2.5% 左右。

That is in spite of the rising debt ratio (grey line, which scales the debt ratio).

尽管债务比率不断上升（灰线，衡量债务比率），但情况仍然如此。

The fed funds rate (red, right hand scale) is the main driver of the debt service ratio.

联邦基金利率（红色，右侧刻度）是偿债比率的主要驱动因素。

That is why interest payments by government have remained low for the past 20 years even as the debt ratio has risen.

这就是为什么尽管债务比率上升，但政府支付的利息在过去20年里仍然保持在较低水平。

In case someone objects that while the Fed controls the federal funds rate, bond vigilantes determine rates on longer maturities, this graph shows that the correlation of the ffr to long rates is very high.

如果有人反对美联储控制联邦基金利率，而债券义务人决定较长期限的利率，则该图显示 FFR 与长期利率的相关性非常高。

And, of course, the Fed can perfectly control long rates if it is told to do so.

当然，如果美联储被告知这样做，它可以完全控制长期利率。

(Thanks to Eric Tymoigne for supplying this graph.) The Fed is the only bond vigilante we need to worry about.

（感谢 Eric Tymoigne 提供了这张图表。）美联储是我们唯一需要担心的债券维护者。

Figure 12 displays Federal government debt to world GDP.

图 12 显示了联邦政府债务占世界 GDP 的比例。

As a percent of global GDP, the debt ratio has gradually climbed back to where it was in 1960.

作为全球GDP的一部分，债务比率已逐渐回升至1960年的水平。

In 1960, however, the world was on the Bretton Woods system, in which the US dollar was pegged to—and competed with—gold.

然而，1960 年，世界处于布雷顿森林体系之中，美元与黄金挂钩并与之竞争。

Today the Dollar is the primary international reserve currency.

如今，美元是主要的国际储备货币。

The portion of Federal debt held abroad has been running approximately 40% to nearly half.

国外持有的联邦债务比例一直在 40% 到近一半。

Hence, the ratio of Federal debt to global GDP is less than 6%.

因此，联邦债务占全球GDP的比例不到6%。

This could be the more relevant yardstick for measuring the debt ratio for the international currency reserve.

这可能是衡量国际货币储备债务比率更相关的标准。

The largest foreign holders of US government bonds are foreign treasuries and central banks; most of the rest is held in financial institutions and particularly in offshore banking centers.

美国政府债券的最大外国持有者是外国财政部和中央银行；其余大部分存放在金融机构，特别是离岸银行中心。

Other than the offshore banks, US treasury holdings are mostly accumulated by countries running bilateral current account surpluses against the US.

除离岸银行外，美国国债持有量主要是由对美国有双边经常账户盈余的国家积累的。

It is highly unlikely that the demand for US dollars is even close to satiation.

对美元的需求不太可能接近饱和。

International exporters often trade with the US because they want US dollars—often because they need them for imports or to manage their exchange rates.

国际出口商经常与美国进行贸易，因为他们需要美元——通常是因为他们需要美元来进口或管理汇率。

Further, in the last global financial crisis, there was an immediate run to dollars, only relieved by massive intervention of the Federal Reserve—which originated over $29 trillion in loans, of which approximately 40% went to foreign banks and much of the rest went to private global banks.

此外，在上次全球金融危机中，美元立即出现挤兑，只有美联储的大规模干预才得以缓解——美联储发放了超过 29 万亿美元的贷款，其中约 40% 流向外国银行，其余大部分流向全球私人银行。

US treasuries are held as the safest financial assets in the world.

美国国债被视为世界上最安全的金融资产。

So, you can stop worrying about Federal government debt and deficits.

因此，您可以不再担心联邦政府的债务和赤字。