MMT: REPORT FROM THE FRONT (PART 3)
In this part, I’ll resume with comments on the critical contributions to the special issue of rwer .
在这一部分中，我将继续评论对 rwer 特刊的关键贡献。
We finished Part 2 with a discussion of the shocking lack of citations to MMT literature in the critiques—especially the dearth of citations to the more academic contributions (as opposed to the summaries of MMT written for undergrads and the general public).
我们在第二部分结束时讨论了评论中对 MMT 文献的引用令人震惊，尤其是对更多学术贡献的引用的缺乏（与为本科生和公众撰写的 MMT 总结相反）。
Let me return to the oversight of contributions made by scholars such as Fullwiler and Tymoigne—who have mostly written academic pieces.
让我回到对富维勒和蒂莫瓦涅等学者所做贡献的监督——他们大多撰写学术论文。
Sawyer does cite Fullwiler (although with the name misspelled!
索耶确实引用了富维勒（尽管名字拼写错误！）
If he was my undergrad student, I would chew him out—at least get the damned names spelled correctly!).
如果他是我的本科生，我会痛骂他——至少把那些该死的名字拼写正确！）。
In his piece, which is largely an exposition that parallels MMT but is disguised as a critique, he wants to argue that MMT doesn’t properly distinguish between what circuitistes call initial versus final finance (Davidson has a similar distinction).
在他的文章中，主要是与现代货币理论相似的阐述，但又伪装成批评，他想论证现代货币理论没有正确区分电路学家所说的初始财务与最终财务（戴维森也有类似的区别）。
But in reality, I have long used the circuit approach in my exposition—including in my own contribution to the rwer issue.
但实际上，我长期以来一直在我的阐述中使用电路方法——包括我自己对 rwer 问题的贡献。
The initial finance of government spending is created when the spending occurs, and today takes the form of two balance sheet credits: the deposit account of the recipient and the reserve account of the recipient’s bank.
政府支出的初始财务是在支出发生时创建的，如今采用两个资产负债表贷项的形式：接收者的存款账户和接收者银行的准备金账户。
Sawyer seems to mostly agree with that.
索耶似乎大多同意这一点。
But according to Sawyer, MMT ignores the point that because bond sales and tax revenues logically follow government spending and can be seen as the funding stage.
但根据索耶的说法，现代货币理论忽略了这一点，因为债券销售和税收收入在逻辑上遵循政府支出，并且可以被视为融资阶段。
However, Eric Tymoigne made exactly this point in a 2014 article, arguing: “Put in terms of the circuit approach, taxes and bond offerings are part of final finance (funding).” So Sawyer is just wrong about this.
然而，Eric Tymoigne 在 2014 年的一篇文章中明确指出了这一点，他认为：“从循环方式来看，税收和债券发行是最终融资（融资）的一部分。”所以索耶在这一点上是错误的。
The problem with Sawyer’s analysis is that he then takes the distinction too literally, imagining that lack of final funding acts as a potential constraint—and he even invokes the orthodox “government budget constraint”, which is not a constraint but an identity (as explained in our textbook).
索耶分析的问题在于，他过于字面地理解了这种区别，认为缺乏最终资金是一种潜在的约束——他甚至援引了正统的“政府预算约束”，这不是一种约束，而是一种身份（正如我们教科书中所解释的）。
This then leads to some missteps as he claims that independent central banks could just say no to providing initial finance and that “The limitation on the use of money funding of budget deficit then comes from limits on the willingness of people to hold their (additional) savings in the form of bank deposits (and for the banks to accept holding reserves with the central bank as assets corresponding to their liabilities in the form of bank deposits).” That is pure nonsense.
这会导致一些失误，因为他声称独立央行可以拒绝提供初始融资，并且“对预算赤字使用货币融资的限制来自于人们以银行存款形式持有（额外）储蓄的意愿受到限制（以及银行接受在央行持有准备金作为与银行存款形式负债相对应的资产）。”这纯粹是无稽之谈。
Central banks have a laser-like focus on the payments system and are not going to start bouncing checks and producing havoc.
各国央行对支付系统有着高度的关注，不会开始空头支票并造成严重破坏。
Dealer banks stand ready to buy government bonds and must place bids to have a seat at the table.
交易商银行已做好购买政府债券的准备，并且必须出价才能在谈判桌上占有一席之地。
And, finally, why should the government care what form the nongovernment sector holds its net financial assets in?
最后，为什么政府要关心非政府部门以何种形式持有其净金融资产？
If they want bonds, give them bonds; if they want reserves, give them reserves; if they want cash, give them cash.
如果他们想要债券，就给他们债券；如果他们想要储备金，就给他们储备金；如果他们想要现金，就给他们现金。
In any case, portfolio preferences affect interest rates, not the government’s ability to finance or fund its spending.
无论如何，投资组合偏好影响利率，而不是政府为其支出提供资金或资助的能力。
The spending comes first and should be seen as creating the finance as well as the funding (using his terms).
支出是第一位的，应该被视为创造财务和资金（用他的术语）。
Sawyer repeats his old and tired warnings about the ELR/JG proposal.
索耶重复了他对 ELR/JG 提案的陈旧警告。
I found nothing really new in the arguments, which he laid out long ago and which Bill and I countered at the time.
我在他的论点中没有发现什么真正的新内容，他很久以前就提出了这些论点，当时比尔和我反驳了这些论点。
He continues to worry that the ELR/JG program will take jobs away from the public and private sectors and somehow depress wages while causing inflation (deflation of wages and inflation of prices at the same time????).
他仍然担心 ELR/JG 计划会夺走公共和私营部门的就业机会，并在某种程度上压低工资，同时导致通货膨胀（工资紧缩和物价同时上涨？？？）。
He presumes that the program wage will be some very low minimum wage although recent proposals have used a target of $15 per hour.
他认为该计划的工资将是非常低的最低工资，尽管最近的提案使用了每小时 15 美元的目标。
We have simulated such a proposal and find that the inflationary effects are minimal.
我们模拟了这样的提议，发现通货膨胀的影响很小。
Inflation disappeared two generations ago—but many of our old PK friends still worry about it.
通货膨胀在两代人之前就已经消失了——但我们的许多老PK朋友仍然担心它。
Kregel’s paper argues that MMT has not taken sufficient account of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference—a theory of asset pricing—and has an interesting discussion of possible payments systems of the future.
克雷格尔的论文认为，现代货币理论没有充分考虑凯恩斯的流动性偏好理论（一种资产定价理论），并对未来可能的支付系统进行了有趣的讨论。
I have also written on liquidity preference theory (as has Tymoigne) but I do agree that it would be useful to do this in the context of discussion of MMT.
我还写过关于流动性偏好理论的文章（蒂莫瓦尼也有），但我确实同意在讨论现代货币理论的背景下这样做是有用的。
The problem—as readers of his piece will find—is that Keynes’s liquidity preference and asset pricing theory is rough going for most readers.
问题是——正如他的文章的读者会发现的那样——凯恩斯的流动性偏好和资产定价理论对大多数读者来说是粗糙的。
But this is a very useful antidote to the typical Post Keynesian “horizontalist” approach that denies any role for liquidity preference theory.
但这是对否认流动性偏好理论任何作用的典型后凯恩斯主义“水平主义”方法的非常有用的解毒剂。
Collander’s piece addresses three big ideas he finds in MMT, and agrees with two.
科兰德的文章阐述了他在 MMT 中发现的三个重要观点，并同意其中两个观点。
Well, two out of three coming from a critic is pretty darned good, so I’ll take it.
好吧，三分之二来自评论家的评论都非常好，所以我会接受。
The third concerns application of the first two ideas to actual real world policy making.
第三个涉及前两个想法在现实世界政策制定中的应用。
For example, he argues “Where I have problems with MMT’s focus on functional finance is when it is extended to real world government monetary and fiscal policy.” He argues that good real world policy should be both sound and functional (poor old Abba Lerner is rolling in his grave) basically for the same reason that Samuelson argued that the role of the economist is to preach the old time religion of balanced budgets: we cannot really trust our dysfunctional politicians.
例如，他认为“我对现代货币理论对功能性金融的关注存在疑问，因为它扩展到了现实世界的政府货币和财政政策。”他认为，良好的现实世界政策应该既健全又实用（可怜的老阿巴·勒纳正在坟墓里打滚），其原因基本上与萨缪尔森认为经济学家的作用是宣扬平衡预算的古老宗教的原因相同：我们不能真正信任我们功能失调的政客。
So it is the economist’s job to lie.
所以说谎是经济学家的工作。
But not any old lie will do.
但任何古老的谎言都行不通。
Collander goes on to emphasize the role of maintaining trust by telling good lies, quoting Keynes: “Keynes, after he looked around the room to see that no newspaper reporters could hear, replied “It’s the art of statesmanship to tell lies but they must be ‘plausible lies.’”
科兰德继续强调通过说善意的谎言来维持信任的作用，并引用凯恩斯的话：“凯恩斯环顾房间，发现没有报纸记者能听到，他回答说：“说谎是政治家的艺术，但它们必须是‘看似合理的谎言’。”
I guess that’s how Trump maintains the trust of his base—his are all plausible lies, no matter how implausible they might be (oh yeah, that hurricane was heading for Alabama and he has the Sharpie to prove it).
我想这就是特朗普维持选民信任的方式——他的谎言都是似是而非的谎言，无论它们有多么难以置信（哦，是的，飓风正前往阿拉巴马州，他有记号笔来证明这一点）。
As readers will know, Keynes was an elitist—not his most redeeming feature–but in any event he was talking about statesmanship, not the role of the scientist.
读者会知道，凯恩斯是一位精英主义者——这不是他最可取之处——但无论如何，他谈论的是政治家才能，而不是科学家的角色。
I prefer to tell the truth and let the “statesmen” do the lying.
我更喜欢说实话，让“政治家”撒谎。
And to hope for the day when we can run the liars out of office.
并希望有一天我们能把骗子赶出办公室。
Finally let’s take a look at Mayhew’s piece, which begins by proclaiming she’s one of the “friendly critics” of MMT.
最后让我们看一下梅休的文章，该文章首先宣称她是现代货币理论的“友好批评者”之一。
(When a piece begins like that, it triggers an automatic flinch.
（当一首曲子这样开始时，它会引发自动退缩。
A friendly critic would tackle this like a scientist: trying to fill holes by making a contribution to the theory—but our critics usually just want to complain.) She continues: “I am, however, a critic, because in their pursuit of policy relevance, MMT advocates too often offer apparently simple solutions to complex issues of political economy.
一个友好的批评家会像科学家一样解决这个问题：试图通过为理论做出贡献来填补漏洞，但我们的批评家通常只是想抱怨。）她继续说道：“然而，我是一个批评家，因为在追求政策相关性的过程中，现代货币理论的倡导者常常为复杂的政治经济问题提供明显简单的解决方案。
That they do so in the cause of political relevance and journalistic attention does not absolve them…” How so?
他们这样做是为了政治相关性和新闻关注，但这并不能免除他们的责任……”怎么会这样呢？
“in carrying out their analysis, MMT advocates often come ever so close to denying the endogeneity of money; they use a severely truncated form of flow-of-funds analysis; they do not employ an accurate description of the relationship of the FED to the rest of government.”
“在进行分析时，现代货币理论的倡导者常常几乎否认货币的内生性；他们使用严重截断的资金流量分析形式；他们没有准确描述美联储与政府其他部门的关系。”
Yet another one who seems to forget that I wrote the damned book on endogenous money.
另一位似乎忘记了我写了一本关于内生货币的该死的书。
She claims that MMT has eroded the endogeneity of money by insisting there is a special arrangement between the government and money.
她声称，现代货币理论坚持政府与货币之间存在特殊安排，从而侵蚀了货币的内生性。
Well, that is because there is.
嗯，那是因为有。
It is enshrined in our Constitution—which gives to Congress the sole power to issue currency.
它被载入我们的宪法——宪法赋予国会发行货币的唯一权力。
Throughout history and around the world today most governments choose the money of account (the measuring unit in which debts and credits—whether or not they are government’s or someone else’s—are denominated), issue a currency denominated in that unit, and accept back currency in payments made to itself.
纵观历史，当今世界，大多数政府都会选择记账货币（债务和信贷（无论是政府的还是其他人的）的计价单位），发行以该单位计价的货币，并在向自己支付的款项中接受返还货币。
That sounds pretty special to me.
这对我来说听起来很特别。
But it doesn’t erode endogenous money—it provides the foundation for it.
但它不会侵蚀内生货币——它为其提供了基础。
Since she rejects the notion of this special arrangement, she also implicitly rejects Chartalism (or State Money).
由于她拒绝这种特殊安排的概念，她也含蓄地拒绝宪章主义（或国家货币）。
Although she doesn’t realize it, that means she is the one who also rejects endogenous money—even the endogenous money approach of the Post Keynesian Horizontalists.
尽管她没有意识到这一点，但这意味着她也拒绝内生货币——甚至是后凯恩斯水平主义者的内生货币方法。
All of them do see a special relationship between the central bank’s reserves and bank deposits; they reject the deposit multiplier story because they reverse causation: causation runs from loans to deposits to reserves.
他们都确实看到了央行准备金和银行存款之间的特殊关系；他们拒绝存款乘数的说法，因为他们颠倒了因果关系：因果关系从贷款到存款再到准备金。
But they accept that reserves are a special “money”—with a direct relationship to the government–used for clearing.
但他们承认储备金是一种特殊的“货币”——与政府有直接关系——用于清算。
What the Horizontalists had not understood is that far more reserves are normally created through treasury spending than through central bank lending or open market purchases.
水平主义者不明白的是，通常通过国库支出创造的储备远多于通过央行贷款或公开市场购买创造的储备。
That is what MMT adds.
这就是现代货币理论所补充的内容。
(Again, I am not claiming that this is a new contribution—I learned it first from John Ranlett.)
（再次强调，我并不是说这是一个新的贡献——我首先是从约翰·兰莱特那里学到的。）
She goes on to reject the taxes-drive-money view: “Of course, it is true that acceptance of payment of tax obligations provides some “backing,” but it is also true that dollars in the U.S., pounds in the U.K. and etc. are “backed” by the willingness of businesses and others to accept them as payment.” That is, she adopts the P.T.
她继续拒绝税收驱动货币的观点：“当然，接受纳税义务确实提供了一些‘支持’，但美国的美元、英国的英镑等也确实得到了企业和其他人接受它们作为付款的意愿的‘支持’。”也就是说，她采用了 P.T.
Barnum greater fool theory of money: “I accept dollars because I think there’s some dope dumber than me that I can fob them off to.” Several of the critics similarly cite “trust” as the force behind money, the financial system, and government itself.
巴纳姆的大傻瓜货币理论：“我接受美元，因为我认为有一些比我更笨的人，我可以欺骗他们。”一些批评者同样将“信任”视为金钱、金融体系和政府本身背后的力量。
There’s no denying that trust is nice.
不可否认，信任是美好的。
But my trust in Trump is pretty much limited to the belief that he will continue to act like a buffoon.
但我对特朗普的信任很大程度上仅限于相信他将继续表现得像个小丑。
Don’t get me wrong, I like the long trajectory of civilization as it moved from ruthless authorities who could be trusted to enslave much of the population in brutal conditions to Medieval monarchs who could be trusted to rape and pillage with abandon to fascist dictatorships that ran concentration camps and gas chambers and on to a hoped-for-future in which AOC becomes the Democratic Socialists of America’s first President of the USA.
别误会我的意思，我喜欢文明的漫长轨迹，它从可以信任在残酷条件下奴役大部分人口的无情当局，到可以信任肆意强奸和掠夺的中世纪君主，到经营集中营和毒气室的法西斯独裁政权，再到充满希望的未来，AOC 成为美国民主社会主义者美国第一任总统。
Trust is nice but it doesn’t explain much of the history of money or of government—unless you are referring to the trust that the authorities who imposed monetary tax obligations will enforce that obligation with substantial penalties for nonpayment.
信任固然很好，但它并不能解释货币或政府的大部分历史——除非你指的是这样一种信任，即征收货币税收义务的当局将强制执行该义务，并对不缴税的行为处以巨额罚款。
Often death.
常死亡。
Today, up to and including incarceration.
今天，直至并包括监禁。
MMT emphasizes the role of trust in the issuer of the currency instead of the role of trust among users of it (which is the P.T.
MMT 强调货币发行者的信任作用，而不是货币使用者之间的信任作用（这是 P.T.
Barnum infinite regress story).
巴纳姆无限回归故事）。
What is the nature of that trust?
这种信任的本质是什么？
Obligations to pay taxes—and many other contracts—will be enforced in the money of account, with the currency (cash as well as reserve deposits at the central bank) the ultimate means of settlement.
纳税义务以及许多其他合同将以记账货币形式执行，货币（现金以及中央银行的准备金存款）是最终的结算手段。
MMT does not argue that promotion of other kinds of trust—enforcement of equal rights and protection of recognized human rights, for example—are unimportant.
现代货币理论并不认为促进其他类型的信任——例如执行平等权利和保护公认的人权——不重要。
Broader trust in government can increase its power—for better and possibly for worse.
对政府更广泛的信任可以增强其权力——这可能是好事，也可能是坏事。
When she argues “To single out the power of taxation as the primary source of acceptability of our dollars or pounds or pesos in their various forms is to use a logical relationship to establish causal sequence: first taxes give value to dollars and then dollars have value in other uses” she is missing the point.
当她提出“将税收的力量作为我们各种形式的美元、英镑或比索可接受的主要来源时，就是使用逻辑关系来建立因果序列：首先税收赋予美元价值，然后美元在其他用途上具有价值”，她没有抓住要点。
Our logical argument is that from inception, a tax (or similar) obligation is sufficient to create a demand for currency.
我们的逻辑论点是，从一开始，税收（或类似）义务就足以创造对货币的需求。
We’ve always argued that it may not be a necessary condition.
我们一直认为这可能不是必要条件。
We are willing to accept an alternative logic if anyone can come up with one.
如果有人能提出一种替代逻辑，我们愿意接受。
And kudos to someone who can not only come up with an alternative logic but can also find some historical evidence to support it.
值得赞扬的是，有人不仅能提出替代逻辑，而且还能找到一些历史证据来支持它。
Mayhew does not—after rejecting ours, she provides no logical alternative, and ducks the challenge to find historical evidence against it, simply stating “It is beyond the scope of this essay to provide a detailed explanation of why this is not an historically accurate account of the development of the various units of account and of banking in the western world.” Why does that sound like evasion?
梅休没有——在拒绝了我们的建议之后，她没有提供任何合乎逻辑的替代方案，并回避了寻找反对它的历史证据的挑战，只是指出“详细解释为什么这不是对西方世界各种记账单位和银行业发展的历史准确描述，超出了本文的范围。”为什么这听起来像是在逃避？
Another issue she raises is our supposed truncation of flow of funds.
她提出的另一个问题是我们所谓的资金流动被截断。
She criticizes us for citing Ritter and following Godley’s sectoral balance approach in our textbook.
她批评我们在教科书中引用里特并遵循戈德利的部门平衡方法。
She prefers Copeland.
她更喜欢科普兰。
We use Ritter because he uses a consolidated framework that shows the relations between sources and uses and he provides a flow of funds matrix (similar to that used by Godley).
我们使用 Ritter 是因为他使用了一个统一的框架来显示来源和用途之间的关系，并且他提供了资金流量矩阵（类似于 Godley 使用的矩阵）。
When we present the sectoral balance approach we use NIPA accounting rather than flow of funds for two reasons: first, most countries do not have flow of funds data, but most do follow international conventions regarding NIPA.
当我们提出部门平衡方法时，我们使用 NIPA 核算而不是资金流量，原因有两个：首先，大多数国家没有资金流量数据，但大多数国家都遵循有关 NIPA 的国际惯例。
Hence we can approximate the sectoral balances using the NIPA data.
因此，我们可以使用 NIPA 数据来估算部门余额。
Second, all macro texts introduce NIPA accounting—and so do we—so it is convenient to use that framework to present Godley’s approach.
其次，所有宏观文本都介绍了 NIPA 会计——我们也是如此——因此使用该框架来介绍戈德利的方法很方便。
While are not dismissing the usefulness of Copeland, we do not believe an undergrad text—that is already too long–is the right place.
虽然我们并不否认 Copeland 的实用性，但我们并不认为本科教材（已经太长了）是合适的地方。
What she wants to do is to claim that our approach “truncates” analysis of financing within sectors and puts too much emphasis on government control, arguing that we hold “that households and businesses will adjust to what government does”, and concludes that in our approach “Government will be the sector that will determine the level of national income, the level of employment, and how rapidly the overall price level will rise or fall.
她想要做的是声称，我们的方法“截断”了对部门内部融资的分析，过分强调政府控制，认为我们认为“家庭和企业将适应政府的行为”，并得出结论，在我们的方法中，“政府将是决定国民收入水平、就业水平以及总体物价水平上涨或下跌速度的部门。”
The private sector plays a secondary role in this analysis.”
私营部门在这项分析中扮演次要角色。”
This is not an accurate statement.
这不是一个准确的说法。
First, we have presented the usual Keynesian argument that instability of private sector spending (especially investment, but in recent years consumption spending has played a destabilizing role) plays a significant role in the cycle—although, as Murphy argues in his piece, taxes can have a big influence on that (in an expansion, tax revenues increase sharply, taking income out of the economy with differential effects across households and firms).
首先，我们提出了通常的凯恩斯主义论点，即私营部门支出的不稳定（尤其是投资，但近年来消费支出起到了破坏稳定的作用）在周期中发挥着重要作用，尽管正如墨菲在他的文章中指出的那样，税收可能对此产生重大影响（在经济扩张中，税收收入急剧增加，将收入从经济中抽离出来，对家庭和企业产生不同的影响）。
Second, what we are actually arguing is that sovereign government alone does not face a financial constraint.
其次，我们实际上争论的是，主权政府本身并不面临财政约束。
At the aggregate level, the private sector doesn’t really face a financial constraint, either, since spending determines income.
从总体水平来看，私营部门也没有真正面临财务约束，因为支出决定收入。
However, at the level of each entity, there is a financial constraint.
然而，在每个实体层面，都存在财务限制。
And since the capitalist economy suffers from the “anarchy of production” (it is not centrally planned), it is up to the government to act as the stabilizing force.
由于资本主义经济遭受“生产无政府状态”（非中央计划）的困扰，因此政府必须充当稳定力量。
Finally—and related to this point—the sovereign currency issuer has a special role to play as both spender and lender of “last resort”, as well as taxer of “first resort” that can put a crimp in paychecks.
最后，与这一点相关的是，主权货币发行人扮演着特殊的角色，既是“最后手段”的支出者和贷款人，又是“第一手段”的征税者，这可能会抑制工资。
We are well aware that causation is complex—the activities of the private sector impact spending and thus income and thus tax revenue.
我们深知因果关系很复杂——私营部门的活动影响支出，从而影响收入，进而影响税收。
Government spending is also affected by private sector behavior; for example, some social spending is triggered by economic performance as well as by means testing and other legislated triggers.
政府支出也受到私营部门行为的影响；例如，一些社会支出是由经济表现以及经济状况调查和其他立法触发因素触发的。
Hence, the outcome of the government’s budget is “endogenous”—we emphasize that government cannot really decide independently to run a surplus, balance, or deficit.
因此，政府预算的结果是“内生的”——我们强调政府不能真正独立决定盈余、平衡或赤字。
However, it can decide to spend more or spend less on specific programs; and it can decide to increase or reduce tax rates on specific activities.
然而，它可以决定在特定项目上增加或减少支出；它可以决定提高或降低特定活动的税率。
But the end-of-period impact on the outcome of the government’s budget is not determined by that behavior.
但期末对政府预算结果的影响并不是由这种行为决定的。
Our point is just the usual Keynesian idea that government can lean against the wind.
我们的观点只是通常的凯恩斯主义观点，即政府可以逆风而行。
And following Godley we emphasize that the size of the deficit will always be “just right” to offset the sum of the domestic private sector plus foreign sector balances.
继戈德利之后，我们强调赤字规模将始终“恰到好处”地抵消国内私营部门与外国部门余额的总和。
But sovereign government still has a very big impact over the level of economic activity at which those balances balance.
但主权政府仍然对这些平衡的经济活动水平具有非常大的影响。
And sovereign government can always maintain full employment of labor resources, as usually, defined through a Job Guarantee.
主权政府始终可以像通常那样通过就业保障来维持劳动力资源的充分就业。
If the program pays $15 per hour, making jobs universally available at that wage, then anyone who remains without a job is not involuntarily unemployed.
如果该计划每小时支付 15 美元，使所有人都能以该工资找到工作，那么任何仍然没有工作的人都不会非自愿失业。
While there could be very good reasons for them to refuse to accept the JG job offer, and while we might even want to develop policies to bring them into employment, the JG represents the minimum level of responsibility that a sovereign government ought to take to ensure a universal right to a job.
虽然他们可能有充分的理由拒绝接受 JG 的工作机会，而且我们甚至可能希望制定政策让他们就业，但 JG 代表了一个主权政府为确保普遍的工作权利而应承担的最低责任。
We argue that this is a far better goal than pursuit of some arbitrary deficit or debt ratio.
我们认为，这是一个比追求任意赤字或债务比率要好得多的目标。
We also prefer this over a GDP growth target.
我们也更喜欢这个而不是 GDP 增长目标。
However, clearly, full employment is not the only legitimate goal of good government.
然而，显然，充分就业并不是好政府的唯一合法目标。
Well this has already reached the blog word limit, so I’ll have to move on to the treatment of MMT by editors and conference organizers in Part 4.
好吧，这已经达到了博客字数限制，所以我必须在第 4 部分中继续讨论编辑和会议组织者对 MMT 的处理。