HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR

Remarks by L.

L 的评论

Randall Wray at “The Treaty of Versailles at 100: The Consequences of the Peace”, a conference at the Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, May 3, 2019.

兰德尔·雷 (Randall Wray) 出席“凡尔赛条约 100 周年：和平的后果”会议，巴德学院利维经济研究所，2019 年 5 月 3 日。

I’m going to talk about war, not peace, in relation to our work on the Green New Deal—which I argue is the big MEOW—moral equivalent of war—and how we are going to pay for it.

我要谈论的是与我们的绿色新政工作相关的战争，而不是和平——我认为绿色新政是大喵——道德上相当于战争——以及我们将如何为此付出代价。

So I’m going to focus on Keynes’s 1940 book— How To Pay for the War —the war that followed the Economic Consequences of the Peace.

因此，我将重点关注凯恩斯 1940 年的书《如何为战争买单》——这场战争是在和平的经济后果之后发生的。

Our analysis (and the MMT approach in general) is in line with JM Keynes’s approach.

我们的分析（以及一般的 MMT 方法）与 JM 凯恩斯的方法一致。

Keynes rightly believed that war planning is not a financial challenge, but a real resource problem.

凯恩斯正确地认为，战争计划不是财政挑战，而是真正的资源问题。

The issue was not how the British would pay for the war, but rather whether the country could produce enough output for the war effort while leaving enough production to satisfy civilian consumption.

问题不在于英国如何支付战争费用，而在于该国是否能够为战争提供足够的产出，同时留下足够的产量来满足民用消费。

To estimate the amount left for consumption we need to determine the maximum current output we can produce domestically, how much we can net import and how much we need for the war.

为了估计剩余的消费量，我们需要确定当前国内可以生产的最大产量、可以净进口的数量以及战争需要的数量。

My argument is that this is precisely how we prepare for the Green New Deal.

我的观点是，这正是我们为绿色新政做准备的方式。

“Paying for” the GND is not a problem—the only question is: do we have the resources and technological know-how to rise to the challenge.

“支付”GND 的费用不是问题，唯一的问题是：我们是否拥有应对挑战的资源和技术知识。

While in normal times we operate with significant underutilization of capacity, during war, Keynes argued, we move from the “age of plenty” to the “age of scarcity” since what is available for consumption is relatively fixed.

凯恩斯认为，虽然在正常时期，我们的产能利用严重不足，但在战争期间，我们从“充足时代”转向“稀缺时代”，因为可供消费的资源相对固定。

At the same time, more output produced for military use means more income, which, if spent on consumption would push up prices.

与此同时，更多的军事用途产出意味着更多的收入，如果用于消费，就会推高物价。

Hence, some of the purchasing power must be withdrawn to prevent inflation.

因此，必须撤回部分购买力以防止通货膨胀。

Thus, Keynes rightly viewed taxes as a tool for withdrawing demand, not paying for government spending.

因此，凯恩斯正确地将税收视为撤回需求的工具，而不是支付政府支出的工具。

He thought taxes could be used to withdraw half of the added demand.

他认为税收可以用来收回一半的新增需求。

The other half would have to come through savings, voluntary or “forced”.

另一半则必须通过自愿或“被迫”的储蓄来实现。

Voluntary savings would only work if everyone saved enough, which can’t be guaranteed.

自愿储蓄只有在每个人都有足够的储蓄的情况下才会起作用，但这是无法保证的。

If households don’t save enough, they bid up prices while consuming the same amount of resources, but paying more.

如果家庭没有足够的储蓄，他们就会抬高价格，同时消​​耗相同数量的资源，但支付更多。

The business ”profiteers” would get a windfall income, some saved and the rest taxed away (so businesses would effectively act as tax collectors for the Treasury—the extra consumer demand facing a relatively fixed supply of consumption goods would generate extra tax revenues on profits).

企业“奸商”将获得意外之财，其中一些被储蓄起来，其余的则被征税（因此企业将有效地充当财政部的征税者——面对相对固定的消费品供应的额外消费者需求将产生额外的利润税收）。

Thus voluntary saving plus taxes would still withdraw demand, but on the backs of workers and to the benefit of profiteers.

因此，自愿储蓄加上税收仍然会减少需求，但会受到工人的支持并有利于奸商。

If workers demanded and got higher wages, the process would simply repeat itself with wages constantly playing catch-up to price increases as workers consumed the same amount of real resources.

如果工人要求并获得更高的工资，这个过程就会重复，随着工人消耗相同数量的实际资源，工资不断追赶价格上涨。

Keynes’s preferred solution was deferred consumption.

凯恩斯首选的解决方案是延期消费。

Instead of taxing away workers’ income, which would prevent them from enjoying the fruits of their labor forever (and possibly reduce support for the war effort), he proposed to defer their consumption by depositing a portion of their wages in “blocked” interest-earning deposits.

他建议通过将部分工资存入“冻结”的生息存款来推迟他们的消费，而不是对工人的收入征税，这将阻止他们永远享受劳动成果（并可能减少对战争努力的支持）。

This solution would avoid inflation, while at the same time more evenly distribute financial wealth toward workers.

这一解决方案将避免通货膨胀，同时将金融财富更均匀地分配给工人。

Furthermore, this would solve the problem of the slump that would likely follow the war, as workers could increase consumption after the war at a measured pace, spending out of their deferred income.

此外，这将解决战后可能出现的经济衰退问题，因为工人们可以在战后以有节奏的速度增加消费，从递延收入中支出。

Keynes recognized that it is not easy for a “free community” to organize for war.

凯恩斯认识到，“自由共同体”组织起来发动战争并不容易。

It would be necessary to adapt the distributive system of a free community to the limitations of war, when the size of the “cake” would be fixed.

当“蛋糕”的大小是固定的时，有必要使自由共同体的分配制度适应战争的限制。

One could neither expect the rich to make all of the necessary sacrifice, nor put too much of the burden on those of low means.

人们既不能指望富人做出所有必要的牺牲，也不能把太多的负担加在低收入者身上。

Simply taking income away from the rich would not free up a sufficient quantity of resources to move toward the war effort—their propensity to consume is relatively low and they have the ways and means to avoid or evade taxes.

简单地剥夺富人的收入并不能释放足够的资源用于战争——他们的消费倾向相对较低，并且有办法避免或逃税。

But taking too much income away from those with too little would cause excessive suffering—especially in light of the possibility they’d face rising prices on necessities.

但从那些收入太少的人手中夺走太多收入会导致过度痛苦——特别是考虑到他们可能面临必需品价格上涨的情况。

To avoid a wage-price spiral, labor would have to agree to moderate wage demands.

为了避免工资价格螺旋式上升，劳动力必须同意适度的工资要求。

This would be easier to obtain if a promise were made that workers would not be permanently deprived of the benefits of working harder now.

如果承诺工人不会永远被剥夺现在更加努力工作的好处，那么这一点会更容易实现。

In other words, the choice facing workers is to forego increased consumption altogether, or to defer it.

换句话说，工人们面临的选择是完全放弃增加消费，还是推迟消费。

In return for working more now, they would be paid more later—accumulating financial wealth in the meantime.

作为现在工作更多的回报，他们以后会得到更多的报酬——同时积累金融财富。

3) maintain adequate minimum standards for those with lower incomes such that they would be better off, not worse off, during the war.

3）为低收入者维持适当的最低标准，以便他们在战争期间生活得更好，而不是更糟。

The deferred compensation would be released in installments, timed with the slump that would follow the war.

递延补偿金将根据战后经济衰退的时间分期发放。

The system would be “self-liquidating both in terms of real resources and of finance”—as resources were withdrawn from the military they could turn to civilian production, with the deferred compensation providing the income needed to buy that output.

该系统将“在实际资源和财务方面实现自我清算”——当资源从军队撤出时，它们可以转向民用生产，而递延补偿则提供购买该产出所需的收入。

While Keynes argued that “some measure of rationing and price control should play a part” he argued that these should be secondary to taxes and deferred compensation.

虽然凯恩斯认为“某种配给和价格控制措施应该发挥作用”，但他认为这些措施应该仅次于税收和递延补偿。

Rationing impinges on consumer choice and inevitably has differential impacts across individuals.

配给会影响消费者的选择，并且不可避免地会对个人产生不同的影响。

Price controls can create shortages.

价格管制可能会造成短缺。

In any case, he argued that an effective program of deferred income will make rationing and price controls easier to implement.

无论如何，他认为有效的递延收入计划将使配给和价格控制更容易实施。

What Keynes wanted to avoid was the UK experience of WWI when the cost of living rose an average of 20-25% annually over the course of the war, and wage hikes tended to match price hikes, but with about a one year lag.

凯恩斯想要避免的是英国在第一次世界大战中的经历，战争期间生活成本平均每年上涨20-25%，工资上涨往往与物价上涨相匹配，但有大约一年的滞后。

This allowed sufficient but permanent loss of consumption by workers to shift resources to the war.

这使得工人的消费有足够但永久性的损失，从而将资源转移到战争中。

By contrast, both the US and the UK managed to contain inflation pressures much more successfully in WWII—the UK hit double digit inflation only in 1940 and 1941, and had remarkably low inflation during the remainder of the war; the US barely reached above 10% only in 1942 and in other years inflation ranged from 1.7% to 8%.

相比之下，美国和英国在二​​战期间都更成功地控制了通货膨胀压力——英国仅在 1940 年和 1941 年达到两位数通货膨胀，并且在战争剩余时间里通货膨胀率非常低；美国仅在 1942 年才勉强达到 10% 以上，其他年份的通货膨胀率在 1.7% 至 8% 之间。

Both of them adopted a variety of anti-inflation policies that approximated Keynes’s policy.

两人都采取了多种与凯恩斯政策相近的反通胀政策。

Given the circumstances, the policies were remarkably effective.

从当时的情况来看，这些政策是非常有效的。

Note that in the US, government spending rose to nearly half of GDP—with the budget deficit rising to 15% of GDP and the national debt climbing to 100% of GDP.

请注意，在美国，政府支出升至 GDP 的近一半，预算赤字升至 GDP 的 15%，国债升至 GDP 的 100%。

In light of that massive mobilization, it is amazing how low inflation was.

鉴于如此大规模的动员，通货膨胀率之低令人惊讶。

I think this will also happen as the GND is phased in—the growth rate will accelerate sharply and the government’s share of GDP will grow from the current 25% or so toward 35% of GDP.

我认为随着GND的逐步实施，这种情况也会发生——增长率将急剧加快，政府占GDP的比重将从目前的25%左右增长到35%。

At the same time, there will be reduction of private spending on healthcare so we end up with maybe an overall boost of GDP of maybe 2.5%.

与此同时，医疗保健方面的私人支出将会减少，因此最终 GDP 总体增长可能为 2.5%。

If desired, we can reduce the stimulus through deferred consumption—perhaps through a surcharge on payrolls that will be returned through more generous benefits after the GND “war” cools down.

如果愿意，我们可以通过递延消费来减少刺激——也许是通过工资附加费，在 GND“战争”冷却后，这些附加费将通过更慷慨的福利来返还。

Me?

我？

I’m an optimist.

我是一个乐观主义者。

I believe the GND boost will put us on a sustained higher growth path, without inflation, that will generate the additional resources required.

我相信 GND 的提振将使我们走上持续更高的增长道路，而不会出现通货膨胀，这将产生所需的额外资源。

If we compare that to the WWII build up, all of this seems quite manageable.

如果我们将其与二战时期的情况进行比较，所有这一切似乎都是可以控制的。

And the inflation effect will be much lower—in part because we are not producing stuff to blow things up and in part because we face strong deflationary pressures from the east—a couple of billion workers have joined the global production force to keep inflation down.

通货膨胀的影响将会低得多——部分是因为我们不再生产足以让事情爆炸的东西，部分是因为我们面临着来自东方的强大通货紧缩压力——数十亿工人已经加入全球生产力大军以压低通货膨胀。

And some of this shift toward the GND will be reversed quickly once the new infrastructure is in place and we have greened our economy.

一旦新的基础设施到位并且我们实现了绿色经济，这种向 GND 的转变将很快得到逆转。

We will release the deferred compensation and we might end up with a government that is permanently bigger but not by that much—say a third of the economy instead of a quarter.

我们将释放递延补偿，我们最终可能会得到一个永久扩大的政府，但幅度不会太大——比如占经济的三分之一而不是四分之一。

Again, that is no big deal.

再说一次，这没什么大不了的。

We long ago became a post-agricultural society.

我们很久以前就进入了后农业社会。

Since WWII we’ve transitioned to a post industrial society.

自二战以来，我们已经过渡到后工业社会。

It makes sense that we are going to have a bigger government since most provisioning already is, and will increasingly be, coming from the service sector—an area where public service Trumps private service—in education, care services—aged and young, healthcare, the arts, and many forms of environmentally-friendly recreation.

我们将拥有一个更大的政府，这是有道理的，因为大多数供应已经并且将越来越多地来自服务部门——公共服务胜过私人服务的领域——教育、护理服务——老年人和年轻人、医疗保健、艺术和多种形式的环保娱乐。

More parks, less shopping.

更多公园，更少购物。

In another important contribution— Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren — written in 1930, Keynes speculated about our future– a time when “for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem—how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well.”

在另一部重要著作《我们子孙的经济可能性》中，凯恩斯写于 1930 年，对我们的未来进行了推测，届时“人类自诞生以来将第一次面临他真正的、永久的问题——如何利用他从紧迫的经济忧虑中获得的自由，如何利用科学和复利为他赢得的闲暇，明智地、愉快地、幸福地生活。”

By Keynes’s timeline, this should have been reached by 2030.

按照凯恩斯的时间表，这一目标应该在 2030 年实现。

We’ve timed our GND to be completed by 2030.

我们预计 GND 将于 2030 年完成。

We have 10 years to make Keynes’s vision become reality.

我们有 10 年的时间让凯恩斯的愿景成为现实。

The alternative is annihilation.

另一种选择是毁灭。

Some (both heterodox and orthodox alike) argue we just cannot “afford” survival.

有些人（无论是异端还是正统）认为我们根本无法“负担”生存。

It is cheaper to just keep doing what we’ve been doing and hope for a different result.

继续做我们一直在做的事情并希望得到不同的结果会更便宜。

That is not only the definition of insanity, but it is—as Keynes would say—unnecessarily defeatist.

这不仅是疯狂的定义，而且正如凯恩斯所说，它是不必要的失败主义。

(*Our report, How to Pay for the Green New Deal , by Yeva Nersisyan and L.

（*我们的报告《如何支付绿色新政》，作者：Yeva Nersisyan 和 L.

Randall Wray, will be published soon at the Levy Economics Institute.)

Randall Wray，即将在利维经济研究所出版。）