How Far Can We Push This Thing? Some Optimistic Reflections on the Potential For Economic Experimentation

Crossposted from Phil Pilkington’s Blog – Fixing the Economists .

交叉发布于 Phil Pilkington 的博客 – 修复经济学家。

Readers are probably aware that there is quite a lot of discussion of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and the potential for fiscal experimentation batting around at the moment.

读者可能知道，目前有很多关于现代货币理论（MMT）和财政实验潜力的讨论。

Others have weighed in on this already, and I have little to add.

其他人已经对此进行了权衡，我没什么可补充的。

It is striking, however, that most of the push-back — where there is push-back — is not focused on trying to discredit the idea that we should engage in fiscal experimentation.

然而，令人惊讶的是，大多数阻力——即使有阻力——并不是试图抹黑我们应该进行财政实验的想法。

Indeed, the notion that we should engage in fiscal experimentation seems to be, if not mainstream, at the very least part of the discussion.

事实上，我们应该进行财政实验的想法即使不是主流，至少也是讨论的一部分。

Yet, vulgar strawman-style arguments against MMT aside, no one seriously disputes the fact that if too much fiscal expansion is undertaken the economy will eventually hit a hard inflation barrier, past which any increase in spending will generate inflation rather than real output expansion.

然而，撇开反对现代货币理论的粗俗稻草人式的论点不谈，没有人认真质疑这样一个事实：如果进行过多的财政扩张，经济最终将触及严格的通胀障碍，超过这一障碍，任何支出的增加都将导致通胀，而不是实际产出扩张。

Interestingly, no one seems to have tried to come up with a new framework for estimating where this inflation barrier might be and whether it is too risky to overshoot it.

有趣的是，似乎没有人试图提出一个新的框架来估计这一通胀障碍可能在哪里，以及超过它的风险是否太大。

So, I’ve decided to fill that gap.

所以，我决定填补这个空白。

Linked below is a paper where I use a new capacity utilisation-based framework to provide hard, yet optimistic numbers of how far we might push the economy in the spirit of fiscal experimentation.

下面链接的是一篇论文，我在其中使用了一个新的基于产能利用率的框架，提供了严格而乐观的数据，说明我们本着财政实验的精神可以将经济推动到什么程度。

I find that we could probably safely increase the current US fiscal deficit by around 5% of GDP structurally — that is, from the current level of around 3.8% of GDP to around 8.8%.

我发现，我们或许可以在结构上安全地将当前美国财政赤字占 GDP 的 5% 左右增加——也就是说，从目前占 GDP 3.8% 左右的水平增加到 8.8% 左右。

This would give rise to annual real GDP growth of around 6% and a once-off shot of inflation that would drive the annual growth in CPI to around 4.9%.

这将导致年度实际 GDP 增长 6% 左右，一次性通胀将推动 CPI 年度增长至 4.9% 左右。

As I say in the paper, this would then lower the private debt-to-GDP ratio from around 200% of GDP to around 190%.

正如我在论文中所说，这将使私人债务与 GDP 的比率从 GDP 的 200% 左右降低到 190% 左右。

I argue that, based on a new framework I’ve developed for measuring the likelihood of sustained, runaway inflation that I call the Worker Bargaining Index (WBI), it is highly unlikely that a sustained inflation will result.

我认为，根据我开发的用于衡量持续失控通胀可能性的新框架（我称之为工人谈判指数（WBI）），持续通胀的可能性极小。

That said, after undertaking such an experiment, we would be wise to watch whether sustained, overly high nominal wage growth results and if so take action.

也就是说，在进行这样的实验之后，我们明智的做法是观察是否会产生持续的、过高的名义工资增长，如果是的话就采取行动。

Given the current institutional arrangement, tight monetary policy would probably be the best response but it would also be possible to tighten the fiscal stance.

鉴于目前的制度安排，紧缩的货币政策可能是最好的应对措施，但也有可能收紧财政立场。

So long as nominal wage growth merely kept pace with the new 4.9% rate of inflation and did not greatly outstrip it, the economy should be safe from a wage-price spiral.

只要名义工资增长仅与新的 4.9% 通胀率保持同步，并且没有大幅超过通胀率，经济就应该免受工资价格螺旋式上升的影响。