My Brief Remarks at the Annual ASSA Meeting
Today is the final day of the Allied Social Science Association’s ( ASSA ) annual meetings.
今天是联合社会科学协会 (ASSA) 年会的最后一天。
They take place in early January each year.
它们于每年一月初举行。
For most of my career, I rarely missed one, but I haven’t been for several years.
在我职业生涯的大部分时间里，我很少错过任何一次，但我已经好几年没有错过了。
It used to be a huge event, drawing 15,000 or more, but attendance has fallen sharply now that the event no longer doubles as a cattle call for newly-minted PhD economists in search of employment.
它曾经是一个盛大的活动，吸引了 15,000 人或更多，但现在参加人数急剧下降，因为该活动不再兼作对新晋博士经济学家寻找工作的牛群召唤。
I was part of a roundtable session on the Trump economic program.
我参加了有关特朗普经济计划的圆桌会议。
Other panelists included James K.
其他小组成员包括 James K.
Galbraith (University of Texas, Austin), Darrick Hamilton (New School University), and Gary Dymski (Leeds University).
Galbraith（德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校）、Darrick Hamilton（新学院大学）和 Gary Dymski（利兹大学）。
The panel was moderated by Geoffrey Schneider (Bucknell University) and Howard Stein (University of Michigan).
该小组由杰弗里·施奈德（巴克内尔大学）和霍华德·斯坦（密歇根大学）主持。
Each of the four panelists was asked to provide 5-10 minutes of opening remarks.
四位小组成员均被要求提供 5 至 10 分钟的开场白。
It was a very good, standing-room-only, session in one of the larger ballrooms.
这是一次非常好的会议，在一个较大的宴会厅举行，只有站立的房间。
Discussion was lively, and it reminded me why it’s important to try to attend these in-person meetings.
讨论很活跃，它提醒我为什么尝试参加这些面对面的会议很重要。
Before I jump to the Trump administration’s current economic program, let me step back for a moment to revisit a—perhaps under-appreciated—break from mainstream economic dogma during Trump’s first term.
在我开始讨论特朗普政府当前的经济计划之前，让我先回顾一下特朗普第一任期期间对主流经济教条的突破（也许没有得到充分重视）。
In some important ways, what we experienced in 2025 was a radical break from Trump 1.0, an era in which Trump’s then budget director—Mick Mulvaney—publicly confessed that “nobody cares” about deficits or the trajectory of public debt.
在某些重要方面，我们在 2025 年经历了与特朗普 1.0 的彻底决裂，当时特朗普的预算主管米克·马尔瓦尼 (Mick Mulvaney) 公开承认“没有人关心”赤字或公共债务的轨迹。
House and Senate Republicans voted for, and Trump signed into law, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 with little regard for its budgetary impacts.
众议院和参议院共和党人投票支持了 2017 年《减税和就业法案》，特朗普将其签署成为法律，几乎不考虑其对预算的影响。
They ignored warnings from the likes of Paul Krugman , Larry Summers, Jack Lew, and the many beltway debt scolds who raised the usual conventional fiscal concerns—higher interest rates from crowding out, lower growth, and a threat to our national security.
他们无视保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）、拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）、杰克·卢（Jack Lew）等人以及许多环城债务批评人士的警告，这些人提出了常见的传统财政担忧——挤出导致的利率上升、经济增长放缓以及对我们国家安全的威胁。
Instead, after passage of the TCJA, we got accelerating growth, 3.9 percent unemployment, and a substantial increase in military spending.
相反，在《TCJA》通过后，我们的经济增长加速，失业率达到 3.9%，军费开支大幅增加。
When COVID hit in March 2020, Trump signed a $2.2 trillion fiscal package—the CARES Act.
2020 年 3 月新冠疫情来袭时，特朗普签署了一项 2.2 万亿美元的财政计划——《CARES 法案》。
That came alongside the $4 trillion federal budget.
与此同时，还有 4 万亿美元的联邦预算。
He defended the spending in a press conference, saying, “It’s $6.2 trillion, because its 2.2 plus 4, and we can handle it easily because of who we are and what we are.
他在新闻发布会上为这笔支出进行了辩护，他说：“这是 6.2 万亿美元，因为它是 2.2 加 4，我们可以轻松处理它，因为我们是谁，我们是什么。
It’s our currency.
这是我们的货币。
It’s our money.” Ah, the beauty of MMT.
这是我们的钱。”啊，MMT 之美。
What we have witnessed under Trump 2.0 is a radical departure from that bolder acknowledgement of the federal government’s spending capacity.
我们在特朗普2.0时代所目睹的情况与对联邦政府支出能力的大胆承认截然不同。
Running throughout Project 2025 is a recommitment to a very old and very damaging idea: that fiscal discipline must be restored, that public purpose must always be subordinated to private wealth, and that the greatest danger facing the economy is public spending rather than private power.
贯穿整个“2025计划”的是对一个非常古老且极具破坏性的想法的重新承诺：必须恢复财政纪律，公共目的必须始终服从于私人财富，经济面临的最大危险是公共支出而不是私人权力。
What has been delivered, thus far, is austerity for the many and abundance for the few.
到目前为止，所实现的是对多数人的紧缩和对少数人的富裕。
Think back to DOGE at the start of Trump 2.0.
回想一下特朗普 2.0 开始时的 DOGE。
Suddenly we needed mass layoffs of federal workers, cuts to Medicaid, the privatization of public institutions, and the dismantling of regulatory agencies to “pay for” tax cuts that would, once again, overwhelmingly benefit those at the top of the income distribution.
突然之间，我们需要大规模裁员联邦工作人员、削减医疗补助、公共机构私有化以及解散监管机构，以“支付”减税的费用，这将再次使收入分配顶层的人受益匪浅。
Are we supposed to believe that Russel Vought, Scott Bessent, Kevin Hasset, and Donald Trump wanted these offsets because they’re genuinely worried about the government’s finances this time around?
我们是否应该相信拉塞尔·沃特、斯科特·贝森特、凯文·哈塞特和唐纳德·特朗普想要这些补偿是因为他们这次真的担心政府的财务状况？
I somehow doubt it.
我有点怀疑。
The United States is a monetary sovereign.
美国是一个货币主权国家。
It does not need to cut essential public services or throw people out of work in order to “afford” tax cuts or any other form of spending.
它不需要削减基本公共服务或让人们失业来“负担”减税或任何其他形式的支出。
The cruelty, as they say, is the point.
正如他们所说，残酷才是重点。
Government employment provides stable, middle-class jobs that anchor local economies.
政府就业提供稳定的中产阶级就业岗位，支撑当地经济。
Medicaid is one of the most effective automatic stabilizers we have.
医疗补助是我们拥有的最有效的自动稳定器之一。
It covers about 1 in 4 Americans.
它覆盖了大约四分之一的美国人。
More than 40 million people rely on SNAP benefits.
超过 4000 万人依赖 SNAP 福利。
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is being gutted precisely because it has been effective at holding powerful financial actors accountable.
消费者金融保护局正在被摧毁，正是因为它有效地追究了强大的金融行为者的责任。
We should not mistake political cruelty for fiscal prudence.
我们不应将政治残酷误认为财政审慎。
Internationally, the same logic applies.
在国际上，同样的逻辑也适用。
Tariffs were not deployed as part of a coherent industrial strategy, but as a blunt political weapon, often wielded against close allies.
关税并不是作为连贯的工业战略的一部分而部署的，而是作为一种生硬的政治武器，经常用来对付亲密盟友。
The withdrawal from multilateral institutions (WHO) and international agreements (Paris Climate) weakens global cooperation, undermines public health, and ultimately leaves the U.S. more exposed, not more secure.
退出多边机构（世卫组织）和国际协议（巴黎气候协议）会削弱全球合作，损害公共健康，最终使美国面临更大的风险，而不是更安全。
And all of this, ironically, is accelerating the very de-dollarization the administration claims to fear.
具有讽刺意味的是，所有这一切都在加速政府声称担心的去美元化进程。
We are decoupling from the rest of the world.
我们正在与世界其他地区脱钩。
Domestically, the administration’s immigration policy reveals another deep contradiction.
在国内，政府的移民政策还暴露出另一个深刻的矛盾。
You cannot claim to be fighting a cost-of-living crisis while deporting millions of farm workers, home builders, caretakers, etc. But of course the point is not to bring down costs.
你不能一边声称自己正在应对生活成本危机，一边驱逐数百万农场工人、房屋建筑商、管理员等。但当然，重点不是降低成本。
The point is to sow fear and entrench authoritarianism.
关键是散布恐惧并巩固独裁主义。
And then there are the attacks on universities, research funding, DEI initiatives and so on.
然后还有对大学、研究经费、DEI 倡议等的攻击。
We are told that these are cultural side-issues, but surely, they are economic issues.
我们被告知这些是文化问题，但可以肯定的是，它们是经济问题。
Public universities are engines of innovation and regional development.
公立大学是创新和区域发展的引擎。
DEI programs exist to expand opportunities to recruit talent in an economy that desperately needs both.
DEI 计划的存在是为了在迫切需要这两种人才的经济中扩大招聘人才的机会。
Undermining these institutions weakens us economically.
破坏这些机构会削弱我们的经济实力。
Trump 2.0 is about building an economy that prioritizes private gains for the few over broad-based prosperity for the many.
特朗普2.0的目标是建立一个优先考虑少数人的私人利益而不是多数人的广泛繁荣的经济。
It is concentrating wealth, weakening democracy, and abandoning the public purpose.
它正在集中财富，削弱民主，并放弃公共目的。
As Keynes, Kalecki, and Minsky might remind us, that does not mean that the stock market cannot grind higher or that the labor market will necessarily crack.
正如凯恩斯、卡莱茨基和明斯基可能提醒我们的那样，这并不意味着股市不能走高，也不意味着劳动力市场必然会崩溃。
It does, however, suggest the exacerbation of a very K-shaped economy.
然而，它确实表明 K 型经济正在恶化。
We could do what Darrick Hamilton and I have urged for decades: guarantee jobs for all to stabilize wages and prices while strengthening communities.
我们可以做达里克·汉密尔顿和我几十年来一直敦促的事情：保证所有人的就业机会，稳定工资和物价，同时加强社区建设。
Address the deficits that matter.
解决重要的赤字问题。
(I devoted an entire chapter to these in my book, The Deficit Myth .) Design trade and industrial policies that build domestic capacity without scapegoating workers or allies.
（我在《赤字神话》一书中用了整整一章来讨论这些问题。）设计贸易和产业政策，以建设国内能力，而不让工人或盟友成为替罪羊。
Regulate the financial system.
规范金融体系。
And treat our great public universities as strategic partners and assets to be strengthened instead of “woke” adversaries that need to be brought to heel.
并将我们伟大的公立大学视为战略合作伙伴和需要加强的资产，而不是需要屈服的“觉醒”对手。