The engineering mindset | Will Larson (Carta, Stripe, Uber, Calm, Digg)

Will Larson: I think that we often treat engineers a little bit like children instead of giving them the responsibilities and ability to actually thrive as adults.

威尔·拉森（Will Larson）：我认为我们经常像对待孩子一样对待工程师，而不是给予他们作为成年人真正成长的责任和能力。

And so like, "Oh, the engineers won't want to do that work." Well, that's actually not good for the engineers to be sheltered from what is important.

就像，“哦，工程师不想做这项工作。”嗯，实际上，让工程师远离重要的事情并不是一件好事。

And so actually one of the, I think, highlights is that I think we're coming back this moment where we can actually treat engineers like our peers and put them into really senior leadership roles and not have this kind of baseline assumption of like, "Oh, we have to coddle them or hide them from the real problems." And this is how they're going to get the opportunity to grow as well.

所以实际上，我认为，亮点之一是，我认为我们现在可以像对待我们的同事一样对待工程师，让他们担任真正的高级领导角色，而不是有这样的基线假设，“哦，我们必须溺爱他们或隐藏他们，让他们避开真正的问题。”这也是他们获得成长机会的方式。

Lenny: Today, my guest is Will Larson, one of the most requested guests I've had on this podcast.

莱尼：今天，我的嘉宾是威尔·拉尔森，他是我在这个播客中邀请最多的嘉宾之一。

Will is currently CTO at Carta.

Will 目前担任 Carta 的首席技术官。

He's been a software engineering leader at Stripe, Uber, and Calm.

他曾担任 Stripe、Uber 和 Calm 的软件工程领导者。

He's the author of two essential books for all engineers, An Elegant Puzzle and Staff Engineer, and he's releasing his newest book The Engineering Executive's Primer in February of next year.

他是所有工程师必备的两本书籍《优雅的谜题》和《高级工程师》的作者，并且他将于明年 2 月发布他的最新著作《工程主管入门》。

He also publishes regularly on his blog at lethain.com, which is a must read for every engineer and eng leader.

他还定期在其博客 lethain.com 上发表文章，这是每位工程师和工程领导者的必读之作。

Lenny: In our conversation, Will shares advice on developing your engineering strategy and strategy in general, how to improve the relationship between an eng manager and a PM, how he finds time to write, while also working an intense full-time job, how he recommends approaching measuring engineering productivity, how to develop your company values, an amazing story about his time at Digg and so much more.

Lenny：在我们的谈话中，Will 分享了有关制定工程战略和总体战略的建议、如何改善工程经理和 PM 之间的关系、他如何在从事紧张的全职工作的同时找到时间写作、他如何建议衡量工程生产力、如何发展公司价值观、关于他在 Digg 时光的精彩故事等等。

Will is such a gem of a human and leader and I'm excited to bring you this episode.

威尔是一位杰出的人性和领导者，我很高兴为您带来这一集。

With that, I bring you Will Larson after a short word from our sponsor.

在我们的赞助商简短发言后，我为您带来了威尔·拉尔森 (Will Larson)。

Lenny: Today's episode is brought to you by DX, a platform for measuring and improving developer productivity.

Lenny：今天的节目是由 DX 为您带来的，DX 是一个用于衡量和提高开发人员生产力的平台。

DX is designed by the researchers behind frameworks such as Dora, Space and DevEx.

DX 由 Dora、Space 和 DevEx 等框架背后的研究人员设计。

If you've tried measuring developer productivity, you know that there are a lot of basic metrics out there and a lot of ways to do this wrong.

如果您尝试过衡量开发人员的生产力，您就会知道有很多基本指标以及很多错误的方法。

And getting that full view of productivity is still really hard.

全面了解生产力仍然非常困难。

DX tackles this problem by combining qualitative and quantitative insights, giving you full clarity into how your developers are doing.

DX 通过结合定性和定量见解来解决这个问题，让您完全清楚地了解开发人员的工作情况。

Lenny: DX is used by both startups and Fortune 500 companies, including companies like Twilio, Amplitude, eBay, Brex, Toast, Pfizer, and Proctor and Gamble.

Lenny：初创公司和财富 500 强公司都在使用 DX，包括 Twilio、Amplitude、eBay、Brex、Toast、Pfizer 和 Proctor and Gamble 等公司。

To learn more about DX and get a demo of their product, visit their website at getdx.com/lenny.

要了解有关 DX 的更多信息并获取其产品演示，请访问其网站 getdx.com/lenny。

That's getdx.com/lenny.

那是 getdx.com/lenny。

Lenny: Today's episode is brought to you by OneSchema, the embeddable CSV importer for SaaS.

Lenny：今天的节目是由 OneSchema 为您带来的，OneSchema 是 SaaS 的嵌入式 CSV 导入器。

Customers always seem to want to give you their data in the messiest possible CSV file.

客户似乎总是希望在最混乱的 CSV 文件中向您提供他们的数据。

And building a spreadsheet importer becomes a never ending sync for your engineering and support resources.

构建电子表格导入器将成为您的工程和支持资源的永无休止的同步。

You keep adding features to your spreadsheet importer, but customers keep running into issues.

您不断向电子表格导入器添加功能，但客户不断遇到问题。

Six months later, you're fixing it.

六个月后，你正在修复它。

Another date conversion edge-case bug.

另一个日期转换边缘情况错误。

Most tools aren't built for handling messy data, but OneSchema is.

大多数工具并不是为处理杂乱数据而构建的，但 OneSchema 却是。

Companies like Scale AI and Pave are using OneSchema to make it fast and easy to launch delightful spreadsheet import experiences.

Scale AI 和 Pave 等公司正在使用 OneSchema 来快速轻松地推出令人愉悦的电子表格导入体验。

Lenny: From embeddable CSV import to importing CSVs from an SFTP folder on a recurring basis.

Lenny：从嵌入式 CSV 导入到定期从 SFTP 文件夹导入 CSV。

Spreadsheet import is such an awful experience in so many products.

对于许多产品来说，电子表格导入是一种非常糟糕的体验。

Customers get frustrated by useless messages like error online 53 and never end up getting started with your product.

客户会对错误在线 53 等无用消息感到沮丧，并且永远不会开始使用您的产品。

OneSchema intelligently corrects messy data so that your customers don't have to spend hours in Excel just to get started with your product.

OneSchema 可以智能地纠正杂乱的数据，这样您的客户就不必在 Excel 上花费数小时来开始使用您的产品。

For listeners of this podcast, OneSchema is offering a $1,000 discount.

OneSchema 为该播客的听众提供 1,000 美元的折扣。

Learn more at oneschema.co/lenny.

如需了解更多信息，请访问 oneschema.co/lenny。

Lenny: Will, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.

莱尼：威尔，非常感谢您来到这里，欢迎来到播客。

Will Larson: Thank you so much.

威尔·拉尔森：非常感谢。

Super, super excited to be here.

来到这里超级非常兴奋。

Lenny: So many people have suggested that I bring you on this podcast.

莱尼：很多人建议我带你来参加这个播客。

You have a lot of fans out there and I am excited to be digging into engineering topics, which we don't do enough of on this podcast.

你们有很多粉丝，我很高兴能够深入研究工程主题，而我们在这个播客中对此做得还不够。

So thank you for making time for this.

感谢您抽出时间来做这件事。

Will Larson: No, thanks.

威尔·拉尔森：不，谢谢。

I hope to be a good early engineering guest before you pivot entirely to engineering at some point in the future.

我希望在您将来某个时候完全转向工程之前成为一名优秀的早期工程嘉宾。

Lenny: Wow, I love that.

莱尼：哇，我喜欢这个。

How cool would that be?

那有多酷？

I was an engineer actually when I started my career.

当我开始我的职业生涯时，我实际上是一名工程师。

How interesting would that be if we come full circle?

如果我们回到原点，那该有多有趣？

Anyway, I thought it'd be fun to start with just what is changing in engineering?

不管怎样，我认为从工程领域正在发生的变化开始会很有趣吗？

It feels like there's been a lot that has changed over the past few years, especially from kind of the ZIRP zero interest rate era to today's market, which is very different.

感觉过去几年发生了很多变化，尤其是从零利率零利率时代到今天的市场，这是非常不同的。

What have you seen most change from an engineer's perspective and then just also what are you telling eng leaders about how to handle all this change?

从工程师的角度来看，您看到的最大变化是什么？您还告诉工程领导者如何应对所有这些变化？

Will Larson: I think it's a pretty strange time in the market.

威尔·拉尔森：我认为现在市场正处于一个非常奇怪的时期。

So I think that I started working and right before the 2008 kind of crash.

所以我想我是在 2008 年金融危机发生之前就开始工作的。

And so the first two years there were not so good.

所以前两年的情况不太好。

When I joined Yahoo, there was a layoff basically every four months.

当我加入雅虎时，基本上每四个月就有一次裁员。

There was a layoff of some sort.

有某种形式的裁员。

It's pretty chaotic.

这是相当混乱的。

But then we got into the last decade and it was just smooth.

但后来我们进入了最后十年，一切都很顺利。

So numbers went up, revenue went up, headcount went up and people started learning how to build really large teams.

因此，人数增加了，收入增加了，员工人数增加了，人们开始学习如何建立真正的大型团队。

Will Larson: People started learning how to hire a lot.

威尔·拉尔森：人们开始学习如何招聘很多人。

When I was at Uber, some days I would do six interviews back to back.

当我在 Uber 工作时，有时我会连续进行六次面试。

I would just be in a conference room and at some point you can't even remember who you're talking to because you talk to so many people, one after another after another.

我会在会议室里，有时你甚至不记得自己在和谁说话，因为你和很多人交谈，一个接一个。

You just have some scrambled notes you're trying to decode afterwards.

你只有一些乱七八糟的笔记，你想稍后解码。

Will Larson: Pretty different now.

威尔·拉尔森：现在完全不同了。

A lot of engineering managers are spending half their time or more hiring 18 months ago and now they're doing two interviews a month or less.

18 个月前，许多工程经理花费一半或更多的时间进行招聘，而现在他们每月或更短时间进行两次面试。

Maybe zero interviews a month.

也许一个月零面试。

So there's a real shift in just the amount of time people are putting into hiring.

因此，人们花在招聘上的时间确实发生了变化。

Instead, all these different competencies that have become more critical or a really great engineering director might've just been spending their time hiring really well and that could be a top performer and now that person can't actually demonstrate what they're great at.

相反，所有这些不同的能力变得更加重要，或者一个真正伟大的工程总监可能只是花时间招聘得非常好，这可能是一个表现最好的人，但现在这个人无法真正展示他们擅长什么。

Will Larson: So that person might be perceived as a low performer if they're not also figuring out how to lead the team, getting deeper into the details and also sometimes getting into the figuring out what is the right allocation, what is the right sizing of the engineering teams, this is stuff that we weren't talking about much or maybe if you really pissed off the CEO, maybe an infrastructure you just grew a little bit slower next year, but different ballgame at this point where teams are actually disappearing, teams are getting cut down, teams are getting consolidated.

威尔·拉尔森：所以，如果这个人不弄清楚如何领导团队，更深入地了解细节，有时也不去弄清楚什么是正确的分配，什么是工程团队的正确规模，这些都是我们没有谈论太多的东西，或者如果你真的惹恼了首席执行官，也许明年你的基础设施增长速度会慢一些，但在这一点上团队实际上正在消失，团队正在被削减，那么他们可能会被认为是低绩效者下来，团队正在整合。

And that's just something that we've avoided for that ZIRP era that now we become a core part of a lot of the job.

这正是我们在 ZIRP 时代所避免的事情，现在我们已成为许多工作的核心部分。

Lenny: It feels like also engineers...

Lenny：感觉也是工程师……

They used to have a lot of leverage over companies, inside companies.

他们过去对公司、公司内部拥有很大的影响力。

I imagine that's also changing in a big way.

我想这也会发生很大的变化。

Will Larson: I think that's true.

威尔·拉尔森：我认为这是真的。

I think this actually has been bad for engineers in some way.

我认为这实际上在某种程度上对工程师来说是不利的。

One of my hobby horses is that I think that we often treat engineers a little bit like children instead of giving them the responsibilities and ability to actually thrive as adults.

我的爱好之一是，我认为我们经常像对待孩子一样对待工程师，而不是给予他们作为成年人真正成长的责任和能力。

And so like, "Oh, the engineers won't want to do that work."

就像，“哦，工程师不想做这项工作。”

Will Larson: Well, that's actually not good for the engineers to be sheltered from what is important.

威尔·拉尔森：嗯，对于工程师来说，远离重要的事情实际上并不好。

Actually one of the, I think ,highlights is that I think we're coming back this moment where we can actually treat engineers like our peers and put them into really senior leadership roles and not have this baseline assumption of like, "Oh, we have to coddle them or hide them from the real problems." And this is how they're going to get the opportunity to grow as well.

实际上，我认为亮点之一是，我们现在可以像对待我们的同事一样对待工程师，让他们担任真正的高级领导角色，而不是有这样的基本假设：“哦，我们必须溺爱他们或隐藏他们，让他们免受真正的问题困扰。”这也是他们获得成长机会的方式。

That's a highlight for me and the shift recently.

这对我来说是一个亮点，也是最近的转变。

Lenny: I have definitely worked with that and experienced that where you don't want to piss off engineers.

Lenny：我确实曾经处理过这种情况，并且经历过这种情况，你不想惹恼工程师。

And so are you saying that because that's changing, leaders maybe don't have to worry as much about upsetting engineers plus you just generally think we shouldn't treat engineers that way?

那么你是说，因为这种情况正在发生变化，领导者可能不必太担心让工程师感到不安，而且你通常认为我们不应该那样对待工程师？

Will Larson: Yeah, I think a little bit of both, but I think there's been, in this previous era, where hiring and retention were one of the biggest ways you evaluated middle management.

威尔·拉尔森：是的，我认为两者都有一点，但我认为在之前的时代，招聘和保留是评估中层管理人员的最大方式之一。

Losing team members was huge, huge issue.

失去团队成员是一个非常非常大的问题。

And so you started to coddle a little bit, which is actually bad, again, bad for the engineers, bad for the teams, bad for everyone, bad for efficiency of the organization.

所以你开始有点溺爱，这实际上又不好，对工程师、团队、每个人、组织的效率都不好。

But now something that I love is we get to give engineers real hard problems and we get to actually hold them accountable.

但现在我喜欢的是我们可以给工程师提出真正的难题，并且我们可以真正让他们承担责任。

And that means we can put them in senior roles.

这意味着我们可以让他们担任高级职务。

Will Larson: One of the things that I've been pushing on, I wrote my last book, Staff Engineer about what is the career path for senior engineers.

威尔·拉尔森：我一直在推动的事情之一是，我写了我的上一本书《高级工程师》，讲述了高级工程师的职业道路。

One of the challenges is if we aren't comfortable holding engineers accountable because we just want to retain all the engineers, then we can't put them in senior roles.

挑战之一是，如果我们不愿意让工程师承担责任，因为我们只想保留所有工程师，那么我们就不能让他们担任高级职位。

And so I think we're actually seeing a bit of a shift where we can actually hold them accountable, which means we can put them in senior roles, which means the engineers can actually get what they've been trying to get the entire time, but we haven't been able to because we've been coddling them a little bit too much.

所以我认为我们实际上看到了一些转变，我们实际上可以让他们承担责任，这意味着我们可以让他们担任高级职位，这意味着工程师实际上可以得到他们一直试图得到的东西，但我们却无法做到，因为我们对他们太过溺爱了。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

So there's a few directions I want to go and I'm just going to poke around and see where we go.

所以我有几个想去的方向，我只是四处看看，看看我们要去哪里。

The first is you're a big advocate of systems thinking.

首先，您是系统思维的大力倡导者。

We were chatting about this before.

我们之前就聊过这个问题。

I think a lot of people have heard this term systems thinking and there's books about it.

我想很多人都听说过系统思考这个术语，并且有相关的书籍。

It's sounds great.

听起来很棒。

I want to be a systems thinker.

我想成为一名系统思考者。

What does that actually mean?

这实际上意味着什么？

How do you find you apply it in your work?

您如何将其应用到工作中？

How do people get better at this way of thinking?

人们如何才能更好地掌握这种思维方式？

Will Larson: A lot of the least successful but smartest people I've worked with were really strong systems thinking advocates.

威尔·拉尔森：与我共事过的许多最不成功但最聪明的人都是非常强大的系统思维倡导者。

And so I do want to say every kind of framework has a lot of downsides.

所以我确实想说每种框架都有很多缺点。

There's no framework that people can apply consistently, universally, and get good results.

没有任何框架可以让人们一致、普遍地应用并获得良好的结果。

And so briefly on this one, what I see is often people will find a spot where their system and reality are in conflict and they'll be like, "Reality is wrong." And so what's a concrete example?

简而言之，我看到人们常常会发现他们的系统和现实发生冲突，他们会说，“现实是错误的。”那么具体的例子是什么呢？

Will Larson: At Stripe, we worked on incident management.

Will Larson：在 Stripe，我们致力于事件管理。

And so Stripe pretty important company where our API is available.

因此，Stripe 是非常重要的公司，我们可以使用我们的 API。

If the API is down, you lose money and if you lose a lot of money, you leave Stripe because you're pretty upset about that.

如果 API 宕机，你就会损失金钱，如果损失很多钱，你就会离开 Stripe，因为你对此感到非常沮丧。

The number one thing businesses need to do is to collect money successfully for the service that they're selling, right?

企业需要做的第一件事就是为他们销售的服务成功收款，对吧？

Stripe is super important.

条纹超级重要。

Will Larson: And so we did a lot of analysis on incidents trying to understand why things weren't working, what we could do better, but we got so caught up in the analysis that we lost track of whether we're actually improving things.

威尔·拉尔森：因此，我们对事件进行了大量分析，试图了解为什么事情不起作用，我们可以做得更好，但我们过于专注于分析，以致于我们不知道我们是否真的在改进事情。

And it took us a while to figure that out because we were so stuck in the systems thinking model and it's not like, "Oh, the team was wrong." It's like, "I was wrong." I was caught up in that model myself, to realize like, "Hey, we weren't actually prioritizing improvements, we were just prioritizing measurement." And you can't keep measuring.

我们花了一段时间才弄清楚这一点，因为我们太陷入系统思维模型了，而不是“哦，团队错了”。就像是“我错了”。我自己也陷入了这个模型，意识到，“嘿，我们实际上并没有优先考虑改进，我们只是优先考虑测量。”而且你不能一直测量。

There's measure twice, cut once.

测量两次，切割一次。

Sure, but you don't measure infinite times and never get to cut.

当然可以，但你不可能无限次地测量而永远无法切割。

Will Larson: And you do have to cut at some point to actually make impact.

威尔·拉尔森：你确实必须在某个时刻进行剪辑才能真正产生影响。

But we just got caught a little bit there.

但我们只是在那里被抓住了一点。

I think a lot of people who get too far in systems thinking make the same mistake where they think reality is wrong and reality is never wrong.

我认为很多在系统思考中走得太远的人都会犯同样的错误，他们认为现实是错误的，而现实永远不会错。

Reality is always right.

现实总是对的。

Your model is always wrong if it's in conflict with reality.

如果你的模型与现实相冲突，那么它总是错误的。

But that conflict, that gap is really interesting and that's where you can learn.

但那种冲突、那种差距真的很有趣，这就是你可以学习的地方。

Will Larson: And so I had this model.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我有了这个模型。

It's really clean.

真的很干净。

It represents your hiring pipeline that moving through different steps.

它代表了您的招聘流程，经历了不同的步骤。

It represents your incidents and how you remediate incidents.

它代表您的事件以及您补救事件的方式。

It can model almost anything pretty quickly when you get good at it.

当你擅长时，它几乎可以很快地对任何东西进行建模。

And then understanding how reality is in conflict with that, you start to understand where your mental model is wrong and then you can go educate yourself and improve the model and just keep doing that.

然后了解现实与现实是如何相冲突的，你开始了解你的思维模型哪里出了问题，然后你可以去教育自己并改进模型，然后继续这样做。

Will Larson: At some point the model is close enough and you can stop doing that and go actually do the work.

威尔·拉尔森：在某些时候，模型足够接近，你可以停止这样做并开始实际工作。

So that the biggest thing I tell people is this is a great way to learn, but you also have to do things.

因此，我告诉人们的最重要的事情是，这是一种很好的学习方式，但你也必须做一些事情。

You can't just learn.

你不能只是学习。

That's not our entire job.

这不是我们的全部工作。

Lenny: To make it a little more concrete, how would you best describe this idea of systems thinking?

Lenny：为了更具体一点，您如何最好地描述系统思维的想法？

What's a good way to just like, "Okay.

有什么好方法只是喜欢“好吧。

I get what you're talking about?"

我明白你在说什么？”

Will Larson: This is probably a better place to start versus a rambling anecdote about using it.

Will Larson：与使用它的漫无目的的轶事相比，这可能是一个更好的起点。

Lenny: We can go backwards.

莱尼：我们可以倒退。

It'll be great.

会很棒的。

Will Larson: Systems thinking is basically you try to think about stocks and flows.

威尔·拉尔森：系统思维基本上就是你尝试思考存量和流量。

So stocks are things that accumulate and flows are kind of the movement from a stock to another thing.

因此，股票是积累的东西，流动是从一种股票到另一种东西的运动。

So what's a simple example of a stock?

那么，什么是股票的简单例子呢？

A stock could be the number of fish in a lake.

存量可以是湖中鱼的数量。

A stock could be the number of people fishing in a lake.

存量可以是在湖中钓鱼的人数。

And so a flow between those two could be the number of fish in a lake will decrease at some rate based on the number of people fishing in that lake.

因此，这两者之间的流动可能是，湖中鱼的数量会根据该湖中钓鱼的人数以某种程度减少。

Will Larson: So if there's a ton of fishers, the stock of fish will go down faster.

威尔·拉尔森：所以如果有大量渔民，鱼类资源就会下降得更快。

There's only a couple of fish, IT will go down slower.

鱼只有几条，速度会慢一些。

But also then there's these flows which kind of dictate that where if we've got much more efficient fishermen, the flow of fish out might go down, but also the fish do reproduce.

但这些流量也决定了，如果我们有效率更高的渔民，鱼的流出量可能会下降，但鱼也会繁殖。

So then there's another flow going back.

然后还有另一个流程返回。

So based on the current number of fish and the reproduction rate, the current number of fishers and their fishing rate, you start to see how these can evolve over time.

因此，根据当前的鱼类数量和繁殖率、当前的渔民数量及其捕捞率，您开始了解这些将如何随着时间的推移而演变。

And a lot of this.

还有很多这样的。

Will Larson: So first always recommend Thinking In Systems by Donella Meadows.

Will Larson：所以首先推荐 Donella Meadows 的《系统思考》。

Really phenomenal book.

真是非凡的书。

And a lot of her work is also kind of referencing the work in Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, which talks about how small amount of carcinogens or something low in the ecosystem or the food chain rather as they get consumed by predators further and further up get concentrated.

她的很多作品也在某种程度上参考了雷切尔·卡森（Rachel Carson）的《寂静的春天》中的作品，该作品讲述了生态系统或食物链中的少量致癌物或低位物质如何随着捕食者的不断捕食而浓缩。

And that's a kind of a classic systems thinking problem to think about where you wouldn't think a small amount of carcinogens and a small fish actually matter.

这是一种经典的系统思维问题，要思考在哪里你会认为少量的致癌物和小鱼实际上并不重要。

But as they go up the food chain, they start to concentrate it and an unexpected change can happen.

但当它们沿着食物链向上延伸时，它们开始集中食物链，并且可能会发生意想不到的变化。

Lenny: So then going back to your example of the hiring pipeline, let's come back to that to help connect this definition, which I've never heard, which is awesome, very clear to how you actually implemented say in hiring.

莱尼：那么，回到你的招聘渠道的例子，让我们回到这个例子来帮助联系这个定义，我从来没有听说过，这太棒了，非常清楚你在招聘中如何实际实施。

Will Larson: The first thing to do is to get a model out there of any sort.

威尔·拉尔森：首先要做的就是建立一个模型。

And so you think about your stocks.

所以你要考虑一下你的股票。

And so in a hiring pipeline you might have potential candidates and this could be basically infinite, and then you have a couple of inflows.

因此，在招聘渠道中，您可能有潜在的候选人，这基本上可能是无限的，然后您就会有一些流入。

So you could have sourced, you could have outreach, you could have referrals, and then you have the candidates and those...

所以你可以寻找资源，你可以进行外展，你可以进行推荐，然后你就有了候选人和那些......

How many people get sourced.

有多少人得到货源。

There's probably a function of number of sources you have dedicated to a role.

您为某个角色投入的资源数量可能与您的角色有关。

So you'd have another stock of how many sources you have and then that would impact the rate going from potential candidates to actual candidates you've sourced.

因此，您将拥有另一份关于您拥有多少来源的库存，然后这将影响从潜在候选人到您已找到的实际候选人的比率。

Will Larson: And then from candidates that you have in that box, you'd have a conversion rate for people who pass the first recruiter screen and that would move into step two of your process.

威尔·拉尔森：然后，从该框中的候选人中，您将获得通过第一个招聘人员筛选的人员的转化率，这将进入流程的第二步。

And then from step two you have maybe a hiring manager screen and that would be another conversion rate.

然后从第二步开始，您可能会看到招聘经理屏幕，这将是另一个转化率。

So you can see over time how the candidates of the infinite potential candidates like wandering around LinkedIn, posting about their deep thoughts, convert into actual people, your first, your second, your third.

因此，随着时间的推移，你可以看到无限潜力的候选人中的候选人如何喜欢在 LinkedIn 上闲逛，发布他们的深刻想法，然后转变为实际的人，你的第一个，你的第二个，你的第三个。

Will Larson: But then as you get deeper into it, you start to actually see interesting things.

威尔·拉尔森：但是当你深入其中时，你就会开始真正看到有趣的事情。

And so for a lot of candidate or a lot of pipelines, the biggest issue is hiring managers don't want to extend any offers because the hiring managers can't get to confidence on any candidate.

因此，对于很多候选人或很多管道来说，最大的问题是招聘经理不想提供任何offer，因为招聘经理无法对任何候选人产生信心。

And you'll see in this pipeline, you'll see a ton of candidates getting to offer stage, but almost none of them converting from a potential offer to actually offer.

你会看到，在这个管道中，你会看到大量候选人进入录用阶段，但几乎没有一个人从潜在录用转变为实际录用。

And then you can say, "Hey, here's the problem.

然后你可以说：“嘿，问题来了。

You need to go work with the recruiter and the hiring managers on getting conviction about who they should hire.

您需要与招聘人员和招聘经理合作，确定他们应该雇用谁。

Will Larson: Classic problem with early managers, right?

威尔·拉尔森：早期管理者的经典问题，对吧？

Here's a second problem.

这是第二个问题。

Manager wants to extend a ton of offers.

经理想要提供大量优惠。

They do extend them and none of them actually accept.

他们确实延长了这些期限，但没有一个人真正接受。

And so that focuses you on the second problem.

这样你就可以关注第二个问题了。

But there's a third potential world where actually you're just not getting enough candidates in.

但还有第三个潜在的世界，实际上你只是没有找到足够的候选人。

You're actually doing a great job of making decisions, great job of closing candidates.

事实上，你在做出决定方面做得很好，在关闭候选人方面做得很好。

There's just not enough candidates coming in.

只是没有足够的候选人加入。

And so by looking at this and you can build this model, then you can go to your applicant tracking system, a greenhouse or whatever and pull the historicals and you can just see how the historicals work versus how you'd expect it to work.

因此，通过查看这个，您可以构建这个模型，然后您可以进入您的申请人跟踪系统、温室或其他任何地方并提取历史记录，您可以看到历史记录如何工作以及您期望它如何工作。

Will Larson: You can see the drop-offs and this helps you figure out where should you go try to fix things first.

威尔·拉尔森：你可以看到下降的情况，这可以帮助你弄清楚你应该先去哪里尝试解决问题。

I think we've all worked in companies where you roll out big changes with no data behind them because like, "Oh, it feels like we're not hard enough in how we evaluate candidates or something." You go change a bunch of stuff.

我想我们都曾在这样的公司工作过：在没有数据支持的情况下推出重大变革，因为就像，“哦，感觉我们在评估候选人或其他方面不够努力。”你去改变一堆东西。

But often the real problem might be that the hiring managers making offer extensions to people who never passed the loop anyway.

但通常真正的问题可能是招聘经理向那些从未通过循环的人提供延期。

It's just the managers are issuing too many offers because they're panicking.

只是经理们因为恐慌而发出了太多的报价。

And man, less true now, but a decade...

伙计，现在不那么真实了，但是十年了......

Or not a decade, two years ago, hiring managers panicking to get offers out, that was a real thing that happened a lot.

或者不是十年前、两年前，招聘经理们惊慌失措地发出录用通知，这是真实发生过的事情。

And this just helps you take a complex kind of abstract problem and turn it into something you can actually work in a systematic way.

这只会帮助你解决复杂的抽象问题，并将其转化为你可以系统地实际工作的问题。

Lenny: I feel like product managers will either naturally do it things this way already because a lot of them think in funnels.

莱尼：我觉得产品经理自然会这样做，因为他们中的很多人都在用漏斗的方式思考。

And it's interesting to hear this version of it of this idea of just following the stock through the flow of the different steps.

听到这个版本的想法很有趣，即通过不同步骤的流程来跟踪库存。

Awesome.

太棒了。

Another thing that I know that you are very passionate about and spend a lot of time thinking about is engineering strategy.

我知道您非常热衷并花费大量时间思考的另一件事是工程策略。

I think you have this kind of feeling like engineers don't think enough about the end strategy.

我认为你有这样的感觉，就像工程师没有对最终策略进行足够的思考。

Every other function has a strategy and engineers often don't.

其他所有职能都有策略，而工程师通常没有。

Talk about what you find there and what your advice is around that.

谈谈你在那里发现了什么以及你对此有何建议。

Will Larson: First, I start to question whether any function has a strategy at most companies.

威尔·拉尔森：首先，我开始质疑大多数公司中是否有任何职能部门都有战略。

My general experience is that there's very rarely a written strategy for any company.

我的一般经验是，任何公司都很少有书面战略。

Sometimes it's a value statement.

有时它是一种价值陈述。

It's like we build the highest quality products and you're like, "Good.

就好像我们制造了最高品质的产品，而你会说：“很好。

Okay.

好的。

What do I do with that?" You're like, "Build a high quality product." You're like, "Okay.

我该怎么办？”你会说，“打造高质量的产品。”你会说，“好吧。

I don't don't know what that means."

我不知道这意味着什么。”

Will Larson: Engineering often has this problem where I think people will make comments in their culture amp or their quarterly surveys or whatever.

威尔·拉尔森：工程学经常遇到这个问题，我认为人们会在他们的文化放大器或季度调查或其他什么中发表评论。

It's like, "Hey, the strategy is not clear or where's the engineering strategy?" And the biggest thing I tell people when they complain and then engineers complain about the product strategy.

就像，“嘿，策略不清楚，或者工程策略在哪里？”当人们抱怨然后工程师抱怨产品策略时，我告诉他们的最重要的事情。

The PMs don't have any strategy or the business has no strategy.

产品经理没有任何战略，或者企业没有战略。

And the reality is product eng and business always have a strategy.

现实是产品工程和业务总是有一个策略。

It's just often not written down.

只是常常没有写下来。

Will Larson: And so the first thing I want to do is I push people not to get caught up on the fact that there's no template out there, which is product strategy that someone has forked and filled in.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我想做的第一件事就是敦促人们不要陷入这样一个事实：没有模板，这是有人分叉和填写的产品策略。

It doesn't mean you don't have a strategy.

这并不意味着你没有策略。

You do have a strategy.

你确实有一个策略。

It's maybe a little bit hard to articulate and maybe it's applied inconsistently across different layers of the product reporting chain because it's not written down.

它可能有点难以阐明，并且可能在产品报告链的不同层中应用不一致，因为它没有被写下来。

But it's never true that there's no product strategy.

但没有产品策略是不正确的。

There's always a product strategy.

总有一个产品策略。

Sometimes it's bad, but there's always one.

有时情况很糟糕，但总有一种情况。

And true for engineering as well.

对于工程来说也是如此。

There's always an engineering strategy.

总有一个工程策略。

Just sometimes it's bad.

只是有时候情况不好。

Will Larson: The first rule of strategy is that if you write it down, then you can improve it.

威尔·拉尔森：战略的第一条规则是，如果你把它写下来，那么你就可以改进它。

If it's not written down, it's hard to say if this PM is just not a good PM or if they're trying to apply the strategy that they've misunderstood or if they actually are correctly applying the strategy from the head of product that's just not appropriate to the problems they're working on, how do you debug any of that?

如果没有写下来，很难说这个 PM 是否不是一个好的 PM，或者他们是否试图应用他们误解的策略，或者他们是否实际上正确地应用了产品负责人的策略，但不适合他们正在解决的问题，你如何调试其中的任何一个？

Will Larson: If you have a written document, even if it's not a super compelling strategy, at least you can start debugging.

Will Larson：如果你有一份书面文档，即使它不是一个超级引人注目的策略，至少你可以开始调试。

It's like, "Hey, the head of product should improve the clarity of this document.

就像，“嘿，产品负责人应该提高这份文档的清晰度。

Hey, this DM actually isn't applying it correctly.

嘿，这个 DM 实际上没有正确应用它。

Hey, the strategy actually isn't appropriate for this one business unit where it makes sense for the others."

嘿，这个策略实际上并不适合这个业务部门，而它对其他部门来说却很有意义。”

Will Larson: So that's the first thing I think about.

威尔·拉尔森：这是我首先想到的事情。

But the second big theme on strategy I think about is that often good strategy is so boring.

但我想到的关于策略的第二个大主题是，好的策略往往很无聊。

It's hard to talk about.

很难谈论。

For example, on the engineering side of thing, a common strategy that's really good but very boring is we only use the tools we have today.

例如，在工程方面，一个非常好的但非常无聊的常见策略是我们只使用我们今天拥有的工具。

So a lot of times you'll get engineers that want to introduce new programming languages, new databases, new cloud providers.

所以很多时候你会遇到想要引入新的编程语言、新的数据库、新的云提供商的工程师。

And a really good strategy for almost all companies is like we just use the standard kit we already have today.

对于几乎所有公司来说，一个真正好的策略就是我们只使用今天已有的标准套件。

Will Larson: And at Carta, when I joined one of the engineers, Eric Vogel wrote the standard kit and that is our strategy of the tools we use.

Will Larson：在 Carta，当我加入其中一位工程师时，Eric Vogel 编写了标准套件，这就是我们使用的工具的策略。

And you know what?

你知道吗？

Some people are really frustrated by that and I feel for them.

有些人对此感到非常沮丧，我对他们感同身受。

It feels like they're losing control, but the power of these boring strategies is that it focuses people's energy on the problems that we value as a company.

感觉他们正在失去控制，但这些无聊策略的力量在于，它将人们的精力集中在我们作为公司所重视的问题上。

And so it is painful coming into alignment if you're kind of slightly misaligned over time, but boring strategies that tell you what actually matters and aligns you with what the company actually caress about are really good for you even if they're a little bit annoying at a time.

因此，如果随着时间的推移，你的态度略有偏差，那么调整起来就会很痛苦，但那些告诉你真正重要的事情并使你与公司真正关心的事情保持一致的无聊策略对你来说确实有好处，即使它们有时有点烦人。

And I can expand on this idea a lot, but I won't ramble indefinitely on it.

我可以对这个想法进行很多扩展，但我不会无限期地闲聊。

Lenny: Well, maybe what might be helpful is what are some other examples of engineering strategies that you've seen just to give people even more just like, "Oh yeah, maybe this should be part of our strategy."

莱尼：嗯，也许有用的是您所看到的其他一些工程策略示例，这些示例只是为了让人们更加喜欢，“哦，是的，也许这应该成为我们策略的一部分。”

Will Larson: So first, what is a definition of strategy?

威尔·拉尔森：那么首先，战略的定义是什么？

And the best one I've ever seen is from Richard Rumelt.

我见过的最好的一篇来自理查德·鲁梅尔特。

He wrote Good Strategy, Bad Strategy.

他写了《好策略，坏策略》。

Will Larson: Amazing.

威尔·拉森：太棒了。

He also wrote, The Crux I think came out this year sometime, which I also read.

他还写道，《The Crux》我认为今年某个时候出版了，我也读过。

I think both great and just a phenomenal thinker who has so much depth.

我认为他既是一位伟大的思想家，也是一位具有如此深度的非凡思想家。

I think one of the challenges of writing about strategy is you're like, I've seen two things and I write the book, but I think the thing that's impressive about Richard Rumelt is he's seen so many different scenarios that he's able to really operate from both the particular but also the general and dataset in a really interesting way.

我认为撰写策略的挑战之一是，我看到了两件事，然后写了这本书，但我认为理查德·鲁梅尔特令人印象深刻的是，他看到了如此多不同的场景，以至于他能够以一种非常有趣的方式从特定场景、一般场景和数据集进行操作。

Another book with similar characteristics is How Big Things Get Done by...

另一本具有类似特征的书是《如何完成大事》...

I forget the authors, but really amazing dataset of how mega projects kind of succeed and fail.

我忘记了作者，但关于大型项目如何成功和失败的真正令人惊叹的数据集。

Will Larson: But anyway, Richard Rumelt, definition of strategy is basically three components.

威尔·拉尔森：但无论如何，理查德·鲁梅尔特，战略的定义基本上由三个组成部分组成。

There's a diagnosis.

有一个诊断。

What is the current status quo?

目前现状如何？

What are the things that are real today?

今天有哪些真实的事情？

There are guiding policies which are basically based on the diagnoses, how do you want to address them?

有指导性政策，基本上是基于诊断，你想如何解决？

And there's actions.

还有行动。

And actions are how are we going to implement these guiding policies.

行动就是我们如何落实这些指导方针。

He talks a lot about actions because concerned about this idea of inert strategy where you have like, "We're going to deprecate our old product features we don't use, but no one deprecates any of them."

他谈论了很多关于行动的内容，因为担心这种惰性策略的想法，你会说，“我们将弃用我们不使用的旧产品功能，但没有人弃用它们中的任何一个。”

Will Larson: So he's really concerned about this non implementation kind of useless strategy that doesn't do anything.

威尔·拉尔森（Will Larson）：所以他真的很担心这种不实施、无用的策略，它没有任何作用。

On engineering, I'm a little bit less worried about that.

在工程方面，我对此不太担心。

I think strategy is more interesting on engineering in terms of clarifying how we make future decisions.

我认为战略对于工程来说更有趣，因为它可以阐明我们如何做出未来的决策。

And so what are a few examples of that?

那么有哪些例子呢？

At Uber, we only used our own data centers.

在 Uber，我们只使用我们自己的数据中心。

We didn't use the cloud.

我们没有使用云。

And this has changed since the era I was there, but in the 2014 era, no cloud, and we had a strict no cloud policy.

自从我在那里的时代以来，这种情况已经发生了变化，但在 2014 年时代，没有云，我们有严格的无云政策。

And this was annoying because we had to indent everything ourselves or run copies of everything ourselves.

这很烦人，因为我们必须自己缩进所有内容或自己运行所有内容的副本。

Will Larson: But it also meant that we were able to spin up in China in literally three months and some surreal stories from that.

威尔·拉尔森：但这也意味着我们能够在三个月内在中国开展业务，并从中产生一些超现实的故事。

We couldn't fit our racks into the data centers, so they had to take the roof off the data center and lift the racks in with the crane.

我们无法将机架安装到数据中心，因此他们不得不将数据中心的屋顶拆下来，然后用起重机将机架吊进去。

Will Larson: Just tons of stories and all this had done in three months and truly phenomenal.

威尔·拉尔森：有很多故事，而这一切都是在三个月内完成的，确实非常惊人。

And Uber wasn't in China for very long, so in some ways you're like, we did all that just a leave?

Uber 进入中国的时间并不长，所以在某些方面你会觉得，我们所做的一切只是为了休假？

But they left with a nice stake of Didi Kuaidi and not a bad outcome overall.

但他们留下了滴滴快的的大量股份，总体来说结果还不错。

But I think that strategy, we run everything in data centers.

但我认为这个策略是，我们在数据中心运行一切。

We don't use the cloud, meant we were able to move in and out of different geopolitical constraints and companies that relied on cloud presence simply can't.

我们不使用云，这意味着我们能够摆脱不同的地缘政治限制，而依赖云存在的公司根本做不到。

There are fully constrained by where AWS or Google Cloud or Azure have built out.

完全受到 AWS、谷歌云或 Azure 建设地点的限制。

So that's one good example.

这是一个很好的例子。

Will Larson: Another good example at Stripe was this idea of we run a Ruby monolith and that's what we did and that's evolved a bit since then.

Will Larson：Stripe 的另一个很好的例子是我们运行 Ruby 整体的想法，这就是我们所做的，并且从那时起它已经发生了一些变化。

There's more Java and the Stripe of 2023 than there was in the stripe of 2016 or the 2012 or whatnot.

2023 年的 Java 和 Stripe 比 2016 年或 2012 年的 Stripe 还要多。

But that policy really focused the engineers on building innovative features for our users rather than building different tooling to support different programming languages.

但该政策确实让工程师专注于为用户构建创新功能，而不是构建不同的工具来支持不同的编程语言。

And so in both cases, both the Uber policy around running our own data centers and the Stripe policy around Ruby monoliths, a lot of engineers hated these.

因此，在这两种情况下，无论是 Uber 围绕运行我们自己的数据中心的政策，还是 Stripe 围绕 Ruby 巨石的政策，很多工程师都讨厌这些。

Will Larson: But the goal of good strategy is not to appease everyone.

威尔·拉尔森：但是好的战略的目标并不是安抚所有人。

The goal of good strategy is to dictate how we invest the limited capacities we have or the limited capabilities we have into the problems we care about.

良好战略的目标是决定我们如何将我们拥有的有限能力或我们拥有的有限能力投入到我们关心的问题上。

And I think both of them were really effective towards that end.

我认为他们俩都非常有效地实现了这一目标。

Lenny: A common theme across all these examples is essentially constraint, deciding we will constrain our options to move faster and focus on the things that really matter.

莱尼：所有这些例子的一个共同主题本质上是约束，决定我们将限制我们的选择，以更快地行动并专注于真正重要的事情。

Will Larson: In solving the constraints is to me, I think the most interesting thing that strategy really does, and I think when we talk about bad strategy usually is because the diagnosis is bad and it's usually because people are exerting what they want to be true on constraints where it's like, "Hey, we can do all of these projects at once." And often that's just not true, but it's hard to convince people that when they're the CEO or they are really committed to believing it, but almost all bad strategies basically come down from a willful disbelief of what an accurate diagnosis is, which means then your guiding policies are kind of incoherent to begin with.

威尔·拉尔森：对我来说，在解决约束方面，我认为策略真正所做的最有趣的事情，我认为当我们谈论糟糕的策略时，通常是因为诊断很糟糕，通常是因为人们在约束上发挥了他们想要的真实效果，就像“嘿，我们可以同时完成所有这些项目。”通常情况并非如此，但很难让人们相信，当他们担任首席执行官时，或者他们真的致力于相信这一点，但几乎所有糟糕的策略基本上都源于对准确诊断的故意怀疑，这意味着你的指导政策一开始就有点不连贯。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

I'm excited for that episode of Richard where we're going to go real deep into strategy, but maybe just as a lasting topic around there, if someone listening wanted to get better at say end strategy specifically or a strategy in general, is there anything you recommend they do?

我对理查德的那一集感到很兴奋，我们将真正深入探讨策略，但也许只是作为一个持久的话题，如果有人想在特定的最终策略或一般策略方面做得更好，你有什么建议他们做吗？

Is it read these books?

是读这些书吗？

Is there anything else?

还有别的吗？

Will Larson: If people want to get good at strategy, there's a lot of different types of strategy, but here are some things I'd really recommend.

威尔·拉尔森：如果人们想要擅长策略，有很多不同类型的策略，但这里有一些我真正推荐的东西。

First, I think the Richard Rumelt book, I think Good Strategy, Bad Strategy is probably the right starting point.

首先，我认为理查德·鲁梅尔特的书《好策略，坏策略》可能是正确的起点。

I think The Crux also quite good, but maybe I would read that one second.

我认为《The Crux》也不错，但也许我会读一读。

Great overview of how to think about strategy.

关于如何思考战略的精彩概述。

Also Thinking in Systems, I mentioned that before related to systems thinking, a big part of strategy is being able to model the reality so we can improve your diagnosis.

在系统思考中，我提到在涉及系统思考之前，策略的很大一部分是能够对现实进行建模，以便我们可以改进您的诊断。

Will Larson: So I think that one is really quite good as well.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我认为这也非常好。

If you get into the engineering side of things, there's a lot of interesting books here.

如果您涉足工程方面，这里有很多有趣的书籍。

There's Technology Strategy Patterns by Evan Hewitt.

埃文·休伊特 (Evan Hewitt) 撰写了《技术战略模式》。

There's The Value Flywheel effect by Anderson, McCann and O'Reilly.

安德森、麦肯和奥莱利提出了“价值飞轮效应”。

The Phoenix Project by Kim, Behr, Spafford, which is a modern rewrite of The Goal by Goldratt.

Kim、Behr、Spafford 的《凤凰计划》是对 Goldratt 的《目标》的现代重写。

But I think there's still the missing canonical book is kind of missing on this one.

但我认为这本书上仍然缺少那本缺失的规范书。

So I took a stab at strategy and my upcoming book, which is coming out the Engineering Executives Primer coming out early next year.

因此，我尝试了战略和我即将出版的书，该书将于明年初出版《工程高管入门》。

Will Larson: Also, took a stab at it.

威尔·拉尔森：另外，也尝试了一下。

In staff engineer my previous book, but I still think there's a missing book here.

在我的前一本书中，我仍然认为这里缺少一本书。

So I am dreaming of writing an engineering strategy book for my next project, although we'll see if that actually comes together.

所以我梦想为我的下一个项目写一本工程策略书，尽管我们会看看这是否真的能实现。

Lenny: Well, let's actually follow that thread of writing something I was definitely hoping to chat about.

莱尼：好吧，让我们实际上按照这个思路写一些我绝对希望谈论的事情。

You write a lot.

你写了很多。

You've written two, three, four-ish.

你已经写了二、三、四了。

You're writing a new book.

你正在写一本新书。

How many books you've published?

您出版了多少本书？

Two books and there's a third one coming up.

两本书，第三本即将出版。

Will Larson: So I have two books.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我有两本书。

First one with Stripe Press, the second one, self-published and the third one with the Riley coming out in two months effectively.

第一本由 Stripe Press 出版，第二本由自行出版，第三本由 Riley 出版，有效期限为两个月。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

And then also many, many blog posts for many, many years.

还有很多很多年的博客文章。

I asked a few people what to ask you, and this came up a lot, Gergely Orosz and Alex Xu from ‎ByteByteGo both asked just this question of just, "How do you make time to write as much as you do?" And then I also, I'll ask this too and just answer it either first or second, just what impact has writing had on your career?

我问了几个人要问你什么，这个问题出现了很多，来自 ByteByteGo 的 Gergely Orosz 和 Alex Xu 都问了这样一个问题：“你如何腾出时间来写这么多？”然后我也会问这个问题，要么先回答，要么先回答，写作对你的职业生涯有什么影响？

Why do you keep doing it?

你为什么继续这样做？

Will Larson: I feel really strongly that you can write a lot more if you write what you want to write.

威尔·拉尔森：我真的强烈地感觉到，如果你写你想写的东西，你可以写更多。

And so this is one of the reasons I don't write for financial gain and I don't write very much on a schedule, so I've done a few pieces for magazines, et cetera, but I find that actually really draining to be you have a topic, you have to agree on the topic.

所以这是我不会为了经济利益而写作的原因之一，而且我不会按计划写太多东西，所以我为杂志等写了一些文章，但我发现实际上真的很累，因为你有一个主题，你必须就这个主题达成一致。

If a topic starts missing what you want to write about, you can't fix it a lot of the time and you're also on this deadline.

如果一个主题开始缺少你想写的内容，你很多时候都无法修复它，而且你也到了这个截止日期。

You're like, "Ah, I'm screwing up.

你会说，“啊，我搞砸了。

I need to ship this.

我需要运送这个。

It needs to be done tomorrow."

这需要明天完成。”

Will Larson: I just find that really draining.

威尔·拉尔森：我觉得这真的很让人筋疲力尽。

Conversely, when I own the schedule, when I get to write about, "Hey, I'm writing out something." So I started writing this infrastructure engineering book a couple of years ago.

相反，当我拥有时间表时，当我开始写“嘿，我正在写一些东西”时。所以我几年前开始写这本基础设施工程书。

It just wasn't there.

它只是不在那里。

I just couldn't get it to come together and so I just stopped.

我就是无法让它融合在一起，所以我就停下来了。

I'm not writing it anymore.

我不再写了。

Maybe I'll come back to it at some point, but probably not.

也许我会在某个时候回过头来讨论这个问题，但可能不会。

Will Larson: To me, the biggest strength of writing what you want is you get to write where there's energy and you don't have to write where there's no energy, which takes you really, really negative.

威尔·拉尔森：对我来说，写你想要的东西的最大优势是你可以在有能量的地方写，而不必在没有能量的地方写，这会让你非常非常消极。

And this also ties into how I write books, which is that I basically write the entire thing before I start working with a publisher.

这也与我写书的方式有关，也就是说，我基本上是在开始与出版商合作之前写下整本书。

And if you are, I think diligent and good at anticipating what their concerns are going to be, you can mostly reuse the content that you're trying to write.

如果你是，我认为勤奋并且善于预测他们的担忧是什么，你就可以重用你正在尝试编写的内容。

This is also easier in the sorts of books I write.

在我写的这类书中，这也更容易。

Will Larson: I think harder to do in a really technical introduction to MySQL or something, you can't just resequence those chapters and pretend it's going to work.

Will Larson：我认为在对 MySQL 之类的真正技术性介绍中做起来比较困难，你不能只是重新排列这些章节并假装它会起作用。

Those chapters build in a different way than the sort of business book that I write does.

这些章节的构建方式与我写的商业书籍不同。

Writing the stuff that's energizing and just giving up on the stuff that's not energizing, that's how I write a lot and how I've been writing for 16 some years.

写出充满活力的东西，放弃那些没有活力的东西，这就是我的写作方式，这就是我 16 年来的写作方式。

And the way I keep doing it is just by writing what's energizing and what I'm thinking about now.

我继续这样做的方式就是写下那些充满活力的事情和我现在正在思考的事情。

Will Larson: I don't write what I'm not thinking about and I don't write for any audience, I just write what is interesting to me.

威尔·拉尔森：我不会写我没有想到的东西，我也不会为任何观众而写，我只是写我感兴趣的东西。

And that means some people don't like it and that's great.

这意味着有些人不喜欢它，这很好。

That's totally fine.

那完全没问题。

It's not really for them, it's for people who want to follow the ride and that's where I focus.

这并不是真正适合他们，而是适合那些想要跟随骑行的人，这就是我关注的重点。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Vanta, helping you streamline your security compliance to accelerate your growth.

Lenny：本集由 Vanta 为您带来，可帮助您简化安全合规性以加速您的成长。

Thousands of fast-growing companies like Gusto, Qom, Quora, and Modern Treasury trust Vanta to help build scale, manage and demonstrate their security and compliance programs and get ready for audits in weeks, not months.

Gusto、Qom、Quora 和 Modern Treasury 等数千家快速发展的公司信任 Vanta 帮助扩大规模、管理和展示其安全与合规计划，并在数周（而不是数月）内为审计做好准备。

By offering the most in-demand, security and privacy frameworks such as SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR, HIPAA and many more, Vanta helps companies obtain the reports they need to accelerate growth, build efficient compliance processes, mitigate risks to their businesses, and build trust with external stakeholders.

通过提供最受欢迎的安全和隐私框架（例如 SOC 2、ISO 27001、GDPR、HIPAA 等），Vanta 帮助公司获取加速增长、构建高效合规流程、降低业务风险以及与外部利益相关者建立信任所需的报告。

Lenny: Over 5,000 fast-growing companies use Vanta to automate up to 90% of the work involved with SOC 2 and these other frameworks.

Lenny：超过 5,000 家快速发展的公司使用 Vanta 自动化 SOC 2 和其他框架所涉及的高达 90% 的工作。

For a limited time Lenny's podcast listeners get $1,000 off of Vanta.

Lenny 的播客听众可在 Vanta 限时优惠 1,000 美元。

Go to vanta.com/lenny.

访问vanta.com/lenny。

That's vanta.com/lenny to learn more and to claim your discounts.

要了解更多信息并申请折扣，请访问vanta.com/lenny。

Get started today.

今天就开始吧。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

There's a lot more I want to dig into here.

我想在这里深入探讨的还有很多。

How many posts have you written do you think over the 16 years?

您认为这 16 年里您写了多少帖子？

Will Larson: I would guess about a thousand.

威尔·拉尔森：我猜大约有一千个。

That would roughly be my assumption.

这大概是我的假设。

I think there are a few years where I wrote hundreds of posts, and so if you do that like three years, it's not that hard to get to a thousand from there.

我认为有几年我写了数百篇文章，所以如果你这样做三年，从那里达到一千篇文章并不难。

Lenny: That's incredible, especially because you've had intense jobs for all of those years or most of those years.

莱尼：这太不可思议了，特别是因为这些年或大部分时间你都在从事紧张的工作。

Very high pressure, fast growing hypergrowth companies.

压力非常大、发展迅速的高增长公司。

Somehow you find time to work.

不知怎的，你找到了工作时间。

So first, let me just double click slash co-sign your advice here around paying attention to what gives you energy and working on things that you're actually curious about.

首先，让我双击斜线来共同签署你的建议，关注那些能给你能量的事物，并致力于你真正好奇的事情。

This is exactly the advice I give to people.

这正是我给人们的建议。

A lot of people start this full-time writer, creator life, and they're like, "What do people want?

很多人开始了全职作家、创作者的生活，他们会想，“人们想要什么？

What do people want me to write about?

人们希望我写什么？

What's popular?

什么是流行的？

What's going to inspire go viral?"

什么会激发病毒式传播？”

Lenny: And that's easy to do a couple times, but then you end up creating this job for yourself that you don't want.

莱尼：这很容易做到几次，但最终你会为自己创造一份你不想要的工作。

You don't want to be spending all your days writing about AI if you're not that excited by AI or whatever's hot these days.

如果你对人工智能或当今热门的事物不那么兴奋，你就不想整天都在写有关人工智能的文章。

What I find is important is almost like 80, 90% of what you write has to be stuff you're excited about.

我发现重要的是，你所写的内容中 80%、90% 必须是你感到兴奋的内容。

And then maybe there's a bit of, "Here's what I know people really want.

然后也许会有一点，“这就是我知道人们真正想要的。

Here's what I know is going to do really well." Because otherwise you just burn out.

这就是我知道会做得非常好的事情。”因为否则你就会精疲力竭。

You create a job for yourself that you don't want.

你为自己创造了一份你不想要的工作。

Why would you do that?

你为什么要这么做？

Will Larson: Yeah.

威尔·拉尔森：是的。

I just a hundred percent agree with that.

我百分百同意这一点。

I think the other thing is that everyone converges on the same thing that they think people want.

我认为另一件事是，每个人都集中在他们认为人们想要的同一件事上。

So it's crypto two years ago.

所以两年前它还是加密货币。

It's like AI right now or it's counter AI.

这就像现在的人工智能或者是反人工智能。

AI is going to ruin the world.

人工智能将毁灭世界。

It's hard to say something very novel because, one, everyone is trying to say something about it.

很难说一些非常新颖的东西，因为，第一，每个人都试图对此说些什么。

Two, it's almost certainly not what you're that knowledgeable about where if you just stick in your lane, I think the biggest risk to writers is quitting.

第二，几乎可以肯定的是，如果你只是坚持自己的路线，那几乎肯定不是你所了解的，我认为作家最大的风险就是退出。

Will Larson: A little bit like the 40-year career idea.

威尔·拉尔森：有点像 40 年职业生涯的想法。

The biggest risk to content creation of any sort is quitting soon because you get burned out.

任何类型的内容创作的最大风险就是很快退出，因为你会精疲力竭。

The biggest risk is not that you grow too slow initially.

最大的风险不是一开始发展得太慢。

There's always this sense that you've missed the wave.

总有一种感觉，你已经错过了浪潮。

It's too late to join Substack.

现在加入 Substack 已经太晚了。

The top writers are already there.

顶级作家已经在那里了。

You'll never be a top writer.

你永远成不了顶级作家。

It's too late to podcast.

现在播客已经太晚了。

There's too many podcasts.

播客太多了。

You'll never make it.

你永远不会成功。

It's too late to join Medium.

现在加入 Medium 已经太晚了。

You'll never make it.

你永远不会成功。

There's too many Medium writers.

Medium 作家太多了。

Will Larson: But it is just not true.

威尔·拉尔森：但这不是真的。

If you just keep writing good stuff, you'll build an audience over time and you can take that audience from platform to platform.

如果你继续写好东西，随着时间的推移，你就会建立起一批受众，并且可以将这些受众从一个平台带到另一个平台。

What really matters is finding something you can actually keep doing for the next decade.

真正重要的是找到你可以在未来十年继续做的事情。

That's way harder than doing it for one year.

这比做一年要难多了。

Lenny: We have the same exact advice on this.

莱尼：我们对此有同样的建议。

This is exactly the things I tell everyone.

这正是我告诉大家的事情。

When I joined Substack, I thought it was too late.

当我加入 Substack 时，我觉得已经太晚了。

I was like, "Man, it's over." And when I started this podcast like, "Oh man, there's a billion podcasts.

我当时想，“伙计，一切都结束了。”当我开始这个播客时，“天哪，有十亿个播客。

How is it ever going to work?" So I so agree, and I also so agree on the fact that this whole thing is such a...

到底要怎样才能发挥作用呢？”所以我非常同意，我也非常同意整个事情是如此......

It's a long game.

这是一场漫长的比赛。

There's a lot of people.

有很多人。

I always say it's easy to start a newsletter, hard to keep it up.

我总是说，开始写时事通讯很容易，坚持下去很难。

Nobody actually keeps it up because people are going to come and go.

没有人真正坚持下去，因为人们会来来去去。

The thing that really separates success from failure is just people that can keep at it.

成功与失败的真正区别在于人们能否坚持下去。

There's not an end game to this.

这没有结局。

It's an infinite game and it's about being able to sustain that over the long term.

这是一个无限的游戏，并且要能够长期维持下去。

Will Larson: You're not competing with other content creators.

威尔·拉尔森：你不是在与其他内容创作者竞争。

If you think of it as an infinite game, you're all working together.

如果你把它看作一个无限的游戏，那么你们就在一起工作。

You can all help each other grow.

你们都可以互相帮助成长。

There's no maximum number of product writers or thinkers who can be doing something.

可以做某事的产品作家或思想家的数量没有上限。

You're not less successful because exists or something like that.

你的成功并不会因为存在或类似的事情而减少。

There's no competition there.

那里没有竞争。

It's like a false, false dichotomy.

这就像一个错误的、错误的二分法。

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

I totally agree with that.

我完全同意这一点。

Unless there's so many and then all of a sudden what happens is the bar just gets higher, which is good because then people get better stuff and that's fine.

除非有这么多，然后突然发生的事情是标准会变得更高，这很好，因为这样人们就会得到更好的东西，这很好。

That's happening anyway.

无论如何，这种事正在发生。

Just the bar continues to increase because there's more and more content out there.

只是门槛不断增加，因为内容越来越多。

And to me that's the ultimate thing you got to get right is just the bar.

对我来说，最重要的事情就是把酒吧做好。

You just got to be at a high bar for anyone to care about anything you're writing about.

你必须达到一个很高的标准，才能让任何人关心你所写的任何东西。

And to your point, to do that well, you have to actually be excited about writing about it and have background and have something to contribute.

就你的观点而言，要做好这一点，你必须真正对撰写它感到兴奋，并且有背景并有一些贡献。

Lenny: I'm just ranting here, but the way I think about this is you need to add something new to the conversation for anyone to pay attention because there's so much fluffy, superficial stuff.

莱尼：我只是在这里咆哮，但我的想法是，你需要在对话中添加一些新的东西，以便任何人都能注意到，因为有太多毛茸茸的、肤浅的东西。

And to get anyone to care is you need to say something new that no one's heard before or share new information they haven't seen anywhere else.

为了让任何人关心，你需要说一些以前没有人听过的新内容，或者分享他们在其他地方没有见过的新信息。

Will Larson: I totally agree.

威尔·拉尔森：我完全同意。

I could keep ranting about this for the entire time.

我可以一直抱怨这件事。

I don't want to derail on this, but I totally agree.

我不想破坏这一点，但我完全同意。

Lenny: We'll control ourselves.

莱尼：我们会控制自己的。

So then getting very tactical, I think this is what a lot of people are always wondering, how do you make time?

然后变得非常有策略，我想这就是很多人总是想知道的，你如何腾出时间？

What's your workflow?

你的工作流程是什么？

How do you make time for writing so that you keep at it with knowing you have an intense full-time job?

你如何腾出时间写作，以便在知道自己有一份紧张的全职工作的情况下继续写作？

Will Larson: I used to do things differently before I had a kid, so I have a three and a half year old and just timing your life just really shifts a lot once you have kids.

威尔·拉尔森：在我有孩子之前，我做事的方式有所不同，所以我有一个三岁半的孩子，一旦有了孩子，你的生活时间就会发生很大的变化。

But the biggest thing that I found is finding things to write about that also directly relate to what I'm working on.

但我发现最重要的事情是找到与我正在做的事情直接相关的东西来写。

And this is where I can do something that helps me at work and helps me write at the same time because I think it's incredibly hard to find time to write about stuff that has nothing to do with your work.

这就是我可以做一些既能帮助我工作又能帮助我写作的事情，因为我认为很难找到时间来写与你的工作无关的东西。

Will Larson: And this distracts you from your work because these...

威尔·拉尔森：这会分散你的工作注意力，因为这些......

Particularly if you're in a senior role, these can be pretty demanding jobs, but they're not demanding because you're responding to an urgent DM on Slack every five or six minutes.

特别是如果你担任高级职位，这些工作可能要求相当高，但其实要求并不高，因为你每五六分钟就要在 Slack 上回复一条紧急私信。

They're demanding because you need to make some really difficult decisions really well.

他们的要求很高，因为你需要很好地做出一些非常困难的决定。

And I think writing about related topics is a great way to refine your thinking and improve your performance.

我认为撰写相关主题是完善思维和提高表现的好方法。

It's not like a conflict or you do one.

这不像是一场冲突，或者你做了一个冲突。

Will Larson: You either write or you do your job well.

威尔·拉尔森：你要么写作，要么把工作做好。

I think you can find a way to align.

我认为你可以找到一种调整的方法。

And so a lot of podcast folks do interviews with folks who are related to what they're thinking about at work, and that's a great way for them to learn, build their network, to refine their thinking, to test their thinking against experts in the field.

因此，很多播客人员都会采访与他们在工作中思考的问题相关的人，这对他们来说是学习、建立网络、完善他们的思维、与该领域的专家测试他们的想法的好方法。

It's not like in conflict with the work, it's in alignment.

这与工作并不冲突，而是一致的。

So that's one piece.

所以这是一件。

But yeah, I've played around with my schedule a lot.

但是，是的，我经常调整自己的日程安排。

Will Larson: Before I had a kid, often Saturdays would be the writing day and so morning and early afternoon would just be writing.

威尔·拉尔森：在我有孩子之前，周六通常是写作日，所以早上和下午早些时候就只是写作。

I can't do that anymore, so now I mostly write at night, which is tricky from an energy management perspective.

我不能再这样做了，所以现在我主要在晚上写作，从精力管理的角度来看，这很棘手。

But the biggest thing I would say is just if you're actually excited about something, you will find time and energy for it.

但我想说的最重要的事情是，如果你真的对某件事感到兴奋，你就会找到时间和精力去做它。

If you're not excited about it and it's 9:00 PM, you're just going to get asleep.

如果您对此不感兴趣，那么现在已经是晚上 9:00，您就会去睡觉。

And so I really think that this is where you have to schedule a little bit deliberately, but the first thing we talked about around energy management, they really come together.

所以我真的认为这是你必须刻意安排的地方，但我们围绕能源管理讨论的第一件事是，它们真的走到了一起。

When your schedule gets tight, if you're not energized, you just won't get it done.

当你的日程安排很紧时，如果你没有精力，你就无法完成任务。

And why would you?

你为什么要这么做？

It just doesn't make sense.

这根本没有意义。

Lenny: Just to close out this thread for someone that wants to do more writing knows that it's going to be valuable, but just hasn't any one tip that you would leave them with to get on this train?

莱尼：对于那些想要做更多写作的人来说，我想结束这个话题，因为他们知道这会很有价值，但是你没有给他们留下任何登上这列火车的建议吗？

Will Larson: It depends why people want to write.

威尔·拉尔森：这取决于人们为什么想要写作。

I tell people, if you just want to write something that is going to help advance your career, you should really focus on writing two or three really good things and spend a ton of time drafting, revising, getting feedback.

我告诉人们，如果你只是想写一些有助于推进你职业生涯的东西，你应该真正专注于写两到三篇真正好的东西，并花大量时间起草、修改、获取反馈。

You just focus on making one great artifact or two or three great artifacts.

你只需专注于制作一件伟大的文物或两到三件伟大的文物。

You don't need to create a long-running blog where you publish every week.

您不需要创建一个长期运行的博客，每周都会发布内容。

There's really no need to do that if your goal is just to create some artifacts that show you're a deep thinker, that help position you in the industry.

如果您的目标只是创建一些工件来表明您是一位深刻的思想家，从而帮助您在行业中占据一席之地，那么实际上没有必要这样做。

Will Larson: Don't start a newsletter if you just want to advance yourself in the industry a little bit.

威尔·拉森（Will Larson）：如果您只是想在行业中取得一点进步，就不要开始撰写时事通讯。

Just write two or three really good things.

写两三个真正好的东西就可以了。

So that's the first thing I'd say.

这就是我要说的第一件事。

But if your goal is to write a lot consistently over time, my biggest advice would be just publish.

但如果你的目标是随着时间的推移持续写很多东西，我最大的建议就是发表。

And so there's a lot of people out there with stuff that hundreds of drafts and they've not published anything.

因此，有很多人有数百份草稿，但他们还没有发表任何内容。

And my thing is I publish almost everything I write.

我的事情是我出版几乎所有我写的东西。

If there's something that I'm not going to publish, I don't start writing it because I have a quick check in my head like is this something I can write and publish?

如果有一些我不打算发布的东西，我不会开始写它，因为我会快速检查一下我是否可以编写和发布它？

Will Larson: And if my answer was like, "No, I just don't even start." And my accuracy has gotten higher over time as I've written more, but I published pretty much everything I write.

威尔·拉尔森：如果我的回答是：“不，我根本就没有开始。”随着时间的推移，随着我写的越来越多，我的准确性也越来越高，但我几乎发表了我写的所有内容。

That's why some of it is not that good.

这就是为什么其中一些不是那么好。

And that's okay.

没关系。

Again, I want to write.

再次，我想写。

I want to get these ideas out.

我想把这些想法表达出来。

I want to show what I'm focused on and my evolution as a thinker trying to learn how to operate in these different roles in these different companies.

我想展示我所关注的内容以及我作为一名思想家的演变，试图学习如何在这些不同的公司中担任不同的角色。

I'm not writing trying to create a polished perfect thing, and also I'm not writing to maximize a reader's experience of reading it.

我写作并不是为了创造一个完美的东西，我也不是为了最大化读者的阅读体验而写作。

Will Larson: Some people don't like that, and I think that's a totally reasonable thing not to, but I think what I can bring you is my experience as an operator who's actively learning and thinking through.

威尔·拉尔森：有些人不喜欢这样，我认为不这样做是完全合理的，但我认为我能给你们带来的是我作为一名积极学习和思考的运营商的经验。

I think that's really valuable to other operators in the industry.

我认为这对于业内其他运营商来说非常有价值。

In terms of giving you the perfect writing, I try to do that, closer to that.

在为您提供完美的写作方面，我尽力做到这一点，更接近这一点。

I don't know if I ever hit perfect writing, but that's where my books are.

我不知道我是否曾经达到过完美的写作，但这就是我的书所在。

The books are taking a collection of thoughts over a couple of years, cleaning them up a little bit, packaging them.

这些书收集了几年来的想法，对它们进行了一些清理和包装。

They're way higher quality than my typical writing.

它们的质量比我的典型写作要高得多。

Will Larson: But yeah, I would just publish a lot.

威尔·拉尔森：但是，是的，我只会发表很多内容。

Don't worry about the quality.

不用担心质量。

Sometimes people will send you silly feedback and I just don't respond to that stuff anymore.

有时人们会给你发送愚蠢的反馈，而我只是不再回复这些东西。

You never know why people send you something like that.

你永远不知道为什么人们会给你发这样的东西。

I think trying to debug people you don't know is a bad use of time.

我认为试图调试你不认识的人是浪费时间的行为。

It's just kind of like, "Thank you.

就好像，“谢谢你。

Move on to the next.

继续下一步。

Don't even spend time worrying about it."

甚至不用花时间去担心它。”

Lenny: I like that term debug people.

Lenny：我喜欢“调试人员”这个词。

I think people way overestimate how much anyone cares about what you put out.

我认为人们高估了人们对你所发布内容的关心程度。

Most people are going to look at it for three seconds and be like, "Eh." That's the worst case scenario basically is just like, "I don't care about this." Not like, "Oh, Will is such a fool." What a dumb thing to say.

大多数人都会看它三秒钟，然后说“呃”。最坏的情况基本上就是“我不在乎这个”。不像，“哦，威尔真是个傻瓜。”说出来是多么愚蠢的事情啊。

Right?

正确的？

No one has time for that.

没有人有时间这样做。

Will Larson: And if they do, that's a them problem, right?

威尔·拉尔森：如果他们这样做了，那就是他们的问题了，对吧？

The internet is a big place with a lot of people and there are people who are going to be having a really bad day when they encounter something you do and they're going to channel that anger at you or that frustration at you, but that's not about you.

互联网是一个很大的地方，有很多人，有些人在遇到你所做的事情时会度过非常糟糕的一天，他们会向你表达愤怒或对你的沮丧，但这与你无关。

That's just like you happen to be there when they engage with it.

就像当他们参与其中时你恰好在场一样。

You don't have to take that on.

你不必承受这个。

That's not your situation.

那不是你的情况。

It's okay.

没关系。

Lenny: Also, when you're just starting out, that's going to be the least stressful time to write because nobody knows it or sees it, so that's when it's like "Take all the crazy...

莱尼：另外，当你刚开始写作时，这将是写作压力最小的时候，因为没有人知道或看到它，所以那时就像“把所有的疯狂......

Just do stuff." It only gets more stressful as you build an audience over time.

就做事吧。”随着时间的推移，当你建立起受众群体时，压力只会变得更大。

Will Larson: Yeah, absolutely.

威尔·拉尔森：是的，绝对是。

Absolutely true.

绝对正确。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Shifting topics.

转移话题。

There's a lot of product managers that listen to this.

有很多产品经理都在听这个。

Something PMs often wonder is how to have better relationships with their engineers, their eng managers.

产品经理经常想知道如何与工程师、工程经理建立更好的关系。

What advice could you give to product managers to build more productive happy relationships with their engineers and eng managers?

您可以给产品经理什么建议，以与他们的工程师和工程经理建立更富有成效的愉快关系？

Will Larson: So the core problem, and most of the EM PM peers that I've worked on...

Will Larson：所以核心问题以及我研究过的大多数 EM PM 同行......

There's two core problems.

有两个核心问题。

So one, sometimes the incentives are misaligned and that's hard to navigate, but if you can just be honest with each other and understand the incentives, sometimes you can find a compromise, but sometimes the EMs and PMs will be misaligned because just their incentives are so far apart that there's no way to get to the bottom of it.

因此，有时激励措施不一致，很难驾驭，但如果你能彼此诚实并理解激励措施，有时你可以找到妥协方案，但有时 EM 和 PM 会不一致，因为他们的激励措施相差甚远，以至于无法追根究底。

And so this might be timeline related or saying yes to sales related.

因此，这可能与时间线相关或与销售相关。

Or the engineer is like, "Hey, we definitely can't say yes to that." And the PMs are like, "Actually, we're going to say yes to it because really important for me getting promoted," or something like that.

或者工程师会说，“嘿，我们绝对不能同意。”产品经理们会说，“实际上，我们会同意它，因为升职对我来说非常重要”，或者类似的话。

Will Larson: Is it ever this simple?

威尔·拉尔森：有这么简单吗？

It's really never that simple.

事情真的从来没有那么简单。

People create simplistic narratives to find villains that they work with.

人们创造简单化的叙述来寻找与他们共事的恶棍。

There are no villains in the workplace.

职场上没有小人。

They're just people with complex incentives that are doing complex things.

他们只是有着复杂动机、做着复杂事情的人。

But sometimes I talk to EMs who think, "Oh, the product manager is just saying yes because they want to get promoted because the salesperson will review their promotion or something."

但有时我与 EM 交谈，他们认为：“哦，产品经理只是说是，因为他们想升职，因为销售人员会审查他们的升职或其他什么。”

Will Larson: The reality is never as simple.

威尔·拉尔森：现实从来没有那么简单。

The reality is the business needs to sell stuff to remain functioning.

现实情况是，企业需要出售产品才能维持运营。

You can't just say no and have the business succeed.

你不能只是说“不”就让业务成功。

That doesn't work either.

那也行不通。

So one, understanding the incentives.

第一，了解激励因素。

The other piece though, and I think this is the more common case or just that the EM or the PM just don't understand the other person's needs and they start arguing before understanding.

另一方面，我认为这是更常见的情况，或者只是 EM 或 PM 不理解对方的需求，他们在理解之前就开始争论。

So my biggest advice to both the EMs and the PMs, is before you try to solve the conflict, it's like pushing to ship this feature, pushing to change the approach.

因此，我对 EM 和 PM 的最大建议是，在尝试解决冲突之前，就像推动推出此功能一样，推动改变方法。

Just make sure you actually understand what they care about.

只要确保您真正了解他们关心什么即可。

Will Larson: There is this idea that you have to make trade-offs and that there are tons of hard trade-offs to be made in the field, but my experience is if you really deeply understand what everyone wants, there's usually a compromised solution that gives everyone exactly what they want.

威尔·拉尔森：有一种观点认为，你必须做出权衡，并且在该领域需要做出大量艰难的权衡，但我的经验是，如果你真正深入了解每个人想要什么，通常会有一个折衷的解决方案，可以为每个人提供他们想要的东西。

That doesn't take more time.

这并不需要更多的时间。

You just have to be willing to dig deeper into it and understand the true needs for each party, which is often not what they're saying by the way, which is part of the confusion.

你只需要愿意深入挖掘并了解各方的真正需求，顺便说一句，这通常不是他们所说的，这是混乱的一部分。

Lenny: On the incentives piece, is there anything you've seen work to fix that problem?

莱尼：在激励方面，您认为有什么措施可以解决这个问题吗？

Because if PM performance reviews are based on impact engineering, performance reviews are based on interesting projects or uptime, do you just work to change those ladder definitions?

因为如果 PM 绩效评估基于影响工程，绩效评估基于有趣的项目或正常运行时间，那么您是否只是努力更改这些阶梯定义？

What actually can help that situation?

什么实际上可以帮助解决这种情况？

Will Larson: So my biggest thing has been trying to force this idea that EM/PM pairs are peers and they generally have the same performance rating.

Will Larson：所以我最重要的事情就是试图强迫这样一种观念，即 EM/PM 是同等的，而且他们通常具有相同的绩效评级。

And there's exceptions here.

这里也有例外。

It could be the EM is clearly not performing and then it's not the PM's fault if the EM is can't show up to work.

可能是 EM 明显没有发挥作用，如果 EM 无法正常工作，那也不是 PM 的错。

The team doesn't respect them.

团队不尊重他们。

Sometimes there's clear non-performance, but generally hard situations are not situations where one person is obviously terrible.

有时会出现明显的表现不佳的情况，但一般来说，困难的情况并不是一个人明显表现得很糟糕的情况。

Those are easy to diagnose, those are the easy ones.

这些很容易诊断，那些很容易。

But in cases where there's two folks who seem to be pretty good, but just the overall execution is not working out, I think this idea that same perf rating for both drives a level of one pain, but the right perspective.

但如果有两个人看起来相当不错，但整体执行效果不佳，我认为对两个人进行相同的绩效评级的想法会带来一定程度的痛苦，但这是正确的观点。

Will Larson: Also, something that I think Carta has experimented a little bit with over time.

威尔·拉尔森：另外，我认为随着时间的推移，Carta 已经进行了一些尝试。

Henry, our CEO has a blog post about trifectas in doing that, but not just for EM and for PM, but also for that business leadership as well where you all get graded the same score based on your ability to evaluate and solve for the entire set of constraints, not just your functional constraints.

我们的首席执行官亨利 (Henry) 有一篇关于这样做的三连胜的博客文章，但不仅适用于 EM 和 PM，还适用于业务领导力，根据您评估和解决整套约束（而不仅仅是功能约束）的能力，所有人都会获得相同的分数。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

That's so interesting.

那太有趣了。

So your recommendation, something you're doing, it sounds like is the engineer manager and the PM get the same performance review rating?

那么你的建议，你正在做的事情，听起来工程师经理和 PM 得到了相同的绩效评估评级吗？

And so they're discussed in the same meeting.

所以它们是在同一次会议上讨论的。

Will Larson: Our chief product officer, Vrushali and I spend a fair amount of time calibrating together and making sure...

Will Larson：我们的首席产品官 Vrushali 和我花了相当多的时间一起校准并确保......

Again, there's cases where there's an exception because there's clear issues happening for someone.

同样，在某些情况下会有例外，因为某人发生了明显的问题。

But on average that is what's happening.

但平均而言，这就是正在发生的事情。

And I think people know that's what's happening because we told them that.

我认为人们知道正在发生的事情，因为我们告诉了他们这一点。

And I think that's pretty powerful.

我认为这非常强大。

Lenny: That is so interesting.

莱尼：这太有趣了。

I've never heard of that approach.

我从未听说过这种方法。

That is definitely solving that problem of EM/PM or...

这绝对是解决 EM/PM 的问题或者......

Will Larson: Yeah, the incentives are shared now, which isn't perfect.

威尔·拉尔森：是的，现在激励措施是共享的，这并不完美。

It's still hard to balance them.

平衡它们仍然很困难。

They can still make the wrong trade-offs, but at least they understand the incentives are shared, which I think is a pretty powerful idea.

他们仍然可能做出错误的权衡，但至少他们明白激励措施是共享的，我认为这是一个非常强大的想法。

Lenny: That is really interesting.

莱尼：这真的很有趣。

I imagine some companies might even want to include design managers in that, take another step.

我想有些公司甚至可能希望让设计经理参与进来，再迈出一步。

Will Larson: The role and the primacy of different functions in different companies varies so much that it's hard to have a one size.

威尔·拉尔森：不同公司中不同职能部门的角色和首要地位差异很大，因此很难有一个统一的标准。

You could also imagine where you want a staff engineer in that or not.

您还可以想象您是否需要一名高级工程师。

And so I think very company specific.

所以我认为非常有公司特色。

But yeah, I think design could absolutely be involved particularly for a design led company like an Airbnb or something like that.

但是，是的，我认为设计绝对可以参与其中，特别是对于像 Airbnb 之类的以设计为主导的公司。

Lenny: Wow.

莱尼：哇。

So interesting.

太有趣了。

Maybe just as a final thought there, if a PM is having challenges with their EM, what do you think PMs maybe don't realize their engineering managers are finding important or maybe are stressed about that they're just like, "Oh wow, I never thought about that."

也许最后一个想法是，如果项目经理在他们的 EM 方面遇到挑战，你认为项目经理可能没有意识到他们的工程经理发现了重要的事情，或者可能因为他们的压力而感到压力，“哦，哇，我从来没有想过这个。”

Will Larson: I think one of the biggest challenges I've historically seen, particularly in the last decade is this idea that engineering managers have the job of giving their team interesting work.

威尔·拉森（Will Larson）：我认为我历史上见过的最大挑战之一，特别是在过去十年中，是工程经理有责任为他们的团队提供有趣的工作。

I think that that can put...

我认为这可以把...

You often see this in growth teams where the growth team is like, "Hey, we just need to do a ton of experiments." An engineer is like, "I want to build something brand new." And the eng managers in between those try to figure out, "Need to ship 50 experiments that are pretty boring and they want to do something brand new.

你经常在增长团队中看到这种情况，增长团队会说，“嘿，我们只需要做大量的实验。”工程师会说，“我想构建一些全新的东西。”介于两者之间的工程经理试图弄清楚，“需要进行 50 个非常无聊的实验，他们想做一些全新的事情。

I don't know how to do solve this."

我不知道如何解决这个问题。”

Will Larson: So it's a tricky moment.

威尔·拉尔森：所以这是一个棘手的时刻。

And good EMs find the way to balance, but that's the biggest source of ongoing friction where the EMs have been told by their teams they need to do something that the PMs just have no visibility into.

优秀的 EM 会找到平衡的方法，但这是持续摩擦的最大根源，EM 的团队告诉他们需要做一些 PM 无法了解的事情。

And it makes the EM seem totally unreliable partners because they're trying to solve these little bit of these invisible constraints.

这使得新兴市场看起来完全是不可靠的合作伙伴，因为他们试图解决这些无形限制中的一小部分。

And that's where I think pushing further to understand, "Hey, you keep prioritizing this rewrite into a new programming language."

这就是我认为进一步理解的地方，“嘿，你一直优先考虑将重写变成一种新的编程语言。”

Will Larson: To me that seems like completely idiotic thing to be doing.

威尔·拉尔森：对我来说，这似乎是一件完全愚蠢的事情。

What's going on?

这是怎么回事？

And then once you understand, you might not agree with them, but at least you can have an honest conversation about how to navigate those constraints versus just like, "Man, you won't believe what my EM partner did today.

一旦你理解了，你可能不同意他们的观点，但至少你可以就如何克服这些限制进行诚实的对话，而不是像这样说：“伙计，你不会相信我的 EM 合作伙伴今天做了什么。

This bozo did blah, blah, blah." And having this victim villain mindset about your peers.

这个笨蛋做了废话、废话、废话。”对你的同龄人抱有这种受害者恶棍的心态。

Lenny: An adjacent topic that I wanted to spend some time on is measuring engineering velocity productivity.

Lenny：我想花一些时间讨论的一个相邻主题是测量工程速度生产力。

I think it's probably one of the most common and also maybe the most annoying questions eng leaders get is just how do I know if my engineers are moving as quickly as they can?

我认为这可能是工程师领导者最常见、也可能是最烦人的问题之一，那就是我如何知道我的工程师是否正在尽快行动？

How do we help them move faster?

我们如何帮助他们更快地行动？

What advice do you give to eng leaders for eng teams just for how to measure productivity well?

对于如何很好地衡量生产力，您对工程团队的工程领导者有何建议？

Will Larson: This is a question that's coming up even more in a moment when we're reducing a lot of the size of teams from the industry when the venture capitalists that are on the board for these venture-backed companies are pushing on the efficiency of engineering.

威尔·拉森（Will Larson）：当我们大幅削减行业团队规模时，当这些风险投资支持的公司董事会中的风险资本家正在推动工程效率时，这个问题就更容易出现。

Engineers are trying to figure out how do we represent this?

工程师们正在试图弄清楚我们如何表示这一点？

How do we prove that we're appropriately productive for the amount of headcount and funding that we have as an organization?

我们如何证明我们作为一个组织拥有的员工数量和资金具有适当的生产力？

Will Larson: And man, that's hard.

威尔·拉尔森：伙计，这很难。

So the first way that people focus on trying to answer these questions is just benchmarking by the amount of funding that you have.

因此，人们专注于回答这些问题的第一种方法就是根据您拥有的资金量进行基准测试。

And that's pretty straightforward to do is a mechanical exercise.

这是一项非常简单的机械练习。

You get a data set from your venture capital funds or whatnot, and you figure out, "Okay.

你从风险投资基金或其他机构获得数据集，然后你会发现，“好吧。

How much should we be spending in R&D?

我们应该在研发上投入多少？

How much should we be spending in engineering?

我们应该在工程上花费多少？

How much should we be sending on infrastructure engineering in R&D?" And you can benchmark this all out and figure out what the correct numbers are there.

我们应该在研发基础设施工程上投入多少资金？”您可以对这一切进行基准测试并找出正确的数字。

Will Larson: The problem is this is a very mechanical and not very insightful, driven way.

威尔·拉尔森：问题是这是一种非常机械且缺乏洞察力的驱动方式。

It'll get you a defensible answer.

它会给你一个有理有据的答案。

It's like the old, no one gets fired for buying IBM, which definitely hasn't been true in my career ever.

就像老话一样，没有人会因为购买 IBM 而被解雇，这在我的职业生涯中绝对不是真的。

But this idea that if you just have the right benchmarks, DCs won't judge you for spending too much in engineering, but this doesn't actually help you get to the right place.

但是，如果你有正确的基准，DC 不会因为你在工程上花费太多而评判你，但这实际上并不能帮助你到达正确的位置。

It just helps you get your board to be less angry at you, which is useful because it's hard to do good work when your board is angry at you.

它只会帮助你让董事会减少对你的愤怒，这很有用，因为当董事会对你生气时很难做好工作。

Will Larson: But it's not useful in the sense that it doesn't actually help you run your organization effectively.

威尔·拉尔森：但它并没有什么用处，因为它实际上并不能帮助您有效地运营您的组织。

So then there's the much harder mediator problem of how do you actually know if your R&D team or engineering team is effective?

那么，还有一个更难的中介问题，即您如何真正知道您的研发团队或工程团队是否有效？

What I find is a couple of things.

我发现有几件事。

First, if you're a good leader and you talk to engineers, they will tell you...

首先，如果你是一个好的领导者并且你与工程师交谈，他们会告诉你......

The engineers know if their teams are effective or not.

工程师知道他们的团队是否有效。

And if they're not, they'll also tell you why not.

如果他们不这样做，他们也会告诉你为什么不这样做。

And their diagnosis can be wrong, but there's a crumb you can start picking up and you can trace the crumbs to figure out what's wrong.

他们的诊断可能是错误的，但你可以开始捡起一些面包屑，并追踪这些面包屑以找出问题所在。

Will Larson: Often you'll have more experience to analyze the complaints to figure out what kind of the contributing causes are to them.

威尔·拉尔森：通常，您会拥有更多的经验来分析投诉，以找出造成这些投诉的原因。

But yeah, if you just go talk to the team on an ongoing basis, you'll know if they're effective or not and you can go work to solve those specific problems.

但是，是的，如果您持续与团队交谈，您就会知道他们是否有效，并且您可以着手解决这些具体问题。

But again, you can't tell your board, "Oh, it's fine.

但同样，你不能告诉董事会：“哦，没关系。

I talked to the teams that they're good." My intuition's spot on because how do they know if your intuition is good or not?

我和球队谈过，他们很棒。”我的直觉很准，因为他们怎么知道你的直觉好不好？

Will Larson: They're dealing with a huge portfolio and some of their leaders are talking to are good, and some of them have terrible intuition.

威尔·拉尔森：他们正在处理庞大的投资组合，与他们交谈的一些领导者很好，但其中一些人的直觉很糟糕。

How do they actually assess?

他们实际上如何评估？

I think it's tricky.

我认为这很棘手。

What I've tried to do is basically two things.

我尝试做的基本上是两件事。

One, aligning engineering evaluation to the business and product goals.

第一，使工程评估与业务和产品目标保持一致。

So I want us to be wholly accountable with the product goals.

所以我希望我们对产品目标完全负责。

Well, we did a good job products like screwing up over there.

好吧，我们的产品做得很好，比如那边搞砸了。

Obviously, a lot of companies find comfort in doing that, but really we're here to support the product, to support our customers in doing something interesting.

显然，很多公司都觉得这样做很舒服，但实际上我们来这里是为了支持产品，支持我们的客户做一些有趣的事情。

We're not here to build novel systems unless it supports the customer and the product.

我们不是来构建新颖的系统，除非它支持客户和产品。

Will Larson: So first try to align heavily there.

威尔·拉尔森（Will Larson）：所以首先尝试在那里进行大量调整。

Second, I think just showing the roadmap of the valuable things we've done in the last six months is really powerful.

其次，我认为仅仅展示我们在过去六个月中所做的有价值的事情的路线图就非常强大。

I think sometimes people are like, "I don't have anything to put there." And you're like, "Yeah, that's a real issue." Or if you have the ton of stuff to put there, that's great.

我想有时人们会说，“我没有任何东西可以放在那里。”你会说，“是的，这是一个真正的问题。”或者，如果您有大量的东西可以放在那里，那就太好了。

I really find that if you just commit, show the number of meaningful, meaty things that have impact that you're doing and you can explain the impact, people will step back and give you space.

我真的发现，如果你只是承诺，展示你正在做的有影响力的有意义的、实质性的事情的数量，并且你可以解释其影响，人们就会退后一步，给你空间。

If you can't populate that list, people will have concerns and rightly so, they should be concerned about that.

如果你不能填写该列表，人们就会感到担忧，他们应该对此感到担忧，这是理所当然的。

Lenny: Is there any metrics or tools or anything like that that you find useful too?

Lenny：是否有任何您认为有用的指标或工具或类似的东西？

Because these are all awesome piece of advice, but I imagine everyone is always just like, "Give us this number we're tracking, give us this dashboard, see what engineers doing."

因为这些都是很棒的建议，但我想每个人总是会说，“给我们我们正在跟踪的这个数字，给我们这个仪表板，看看工程师在做什么。”

Will Larson: So one of the most influential books in the last decade in software engineering leadership and infrastructure is Accelerate by Nicole Forsgren, Gene Kim, and I believe there's a third author on that one, but I'm forgetting right now.

Will Larson：过去十年中软件工程领导力和基础设施领域最有影响力的书籍之一是 Nicole Forsgren、Gene Kim 所著的《Accelerate》，我相信这本书还有第三位作者，但我现在忘记了。

Really phenomenal book and it comes up with these four metrics.

真是一本非凡的书，它提出了这四个指标。

It comes up with lead time.

它提出了交货时间。

It comes up with incident remediation time.

它提出了事件补救时间。

It comes up with failure rate.

它提出了失败率。

And the fourth one of some sort.

还有第四个之类的。

There's at least 50 different startups out there that are selling you dashboards that instrument these pieces of data and they want you to just evaluate your team on them.

至少有 50 家不同的初创公司向您出售仪表板，用于分析这些数据，他们希望您仅根据它们来评估您的团队。

Will Larson: The challenge is these are really good diagnosis metrics.

威尔·拉尔森：挑战在于这些确实是很好的诊断指标。

And so hey, our deployments are slow.

所以嘿，我们的部署速度很慢。

Why is that?

这是为什么？

How do we speed them up?

我们如何加快它们的速度？

But your deployments being slow doesn't make you a good company or a bad company, it just tells you where you should focus on improving.

但部署缓慢并不意味着你是一家好公司或一家坏公司，它只是告诉你应该在哪些方面重点改进。

It doesn't actually change how you are.

它实际上并没有改变你的本来面目。

And similarly, if your lead time is quick or slow, it tells you where you should invest or it doesn't actually tell you if you should fire your engineers or something like that.

同样，如果您的交货时间快或慢，它会告诉您应该在哪里投资，或者它实际上不会告诉您是否应该解雇工程师或类似的事情。

That's way, way more details specific.

就是这样，更具体的细节。

Will Larson: So people do like to see these metrics just like they see uptime metrics.

Will Larson：所以人们确实喜欢看到这些指标，就像他们看到正常运行时间指标一样。

A lot of engineers report on sprint points or stuff like that to their board, which are just totally, totally fake thing to be reporting on.

许多工程师向董事会报告冲刺点或类似的东西，这些报告完全是假的。

But people get some comfort on it.

但人们从中得到了一些安慰。

So my biggest thing here is when people measure things, this isn't an engineering only problem, but when people measure, they take on the perspective of an expert and they can tell you why not to measure everything.

所以我最重要的是，当人们测量事物时，这不仅仅是一个工程问题，但是当人们测量时，他们会站在专家的角度，他们可以告诉你为什么不测量一切。

They can tell you why every measure is wrong or inaccurate and they rule everything out and so they measure nothing and they go to someone who's not an expert and well actually there's no accurate measure to give.

他们可以告诉你为什么每一项措施都是错误或不准确的，他们排除了一切，所以他们什么也不测量，他们去找非专家的人，实际上没有准确的措施可以给出。

Will Larson: They're not an expert is like you don't know what you're doing.

威尔·拉尔森：他们不是专家，就像你不知道自己在做什么一样。

And so you just have to get comfortable measuring something that's not perfect, but you can actually measure and reporting on it and then the measure that's imperfect as people ask questions, that's an opportunity to educate people on why the measure is imperfect.

因此，你只需要习惯于测量不完美的东西，但你可以实际测量并报告它，然后当人们提出问题时，不完美的测量，这是教育人们为什么该测量不完美的机会。

What are some things that misses or kind of the lies from the conversation.

谈话中遗漏了哪些内容或存在哪些谎言？

Will Larson: Metrics are about educating the people consuming the metrics about the reality of the rich data underneath.

Will Larson：指标的目的是让使用指标的人了解底层丰富数据的真实情况。

They're not about this perfect data set that shows everything starting with something mediocre and the Dora metrics are really helpful for diagnosis, but if you have to, they can also be a good enough starting place to start reporting to your board or your CEO or to the other executives and then you're like, "Oh, there's all these problems with them."

它们不是关于这个完美的数据集，它显示一切从平庸的东西开始，Dora 指标确实有助于诊断，但如果你必须这样做，它们也可以是一个足够好的起点，开始向你的董事会或你的首席执行官或其他高管报告，然后你会想，“哦，他们有所有这些问题。”

Will Larson: Yes.

威尔·拉森：是的。

There are all those problems with them, but that's this place you start and you educate people up from there to help them understand the nuances and that's how they become more sophisticated, understanding engineering, not by refusing to give them anything they can possibly measure.

他们存在所有这些问题，但这就是你开始的地方，你从那里教育人们，帮助他们理解细微差别，这就是他们变得更加复杂、理解工程的方式，而不是拒绝给他们任何他们可能测量的东西。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

I'm glad that was your answer because we had Nicole on the podcast and she talked through Dora and all the frameworks that she recommends.

我很高兴这是你的答案，因为我们有 Nicole 在播客上，她谈论了 Dora 和她推荐的所有框架。

And she even actually shared some benchmarks that she points people to that give you some sense of just like, "Are you in a good place roughly or not?" So we'll point people to that episode to dig deeper.

她甚至分享了一些她向人们指出的基准，让你有一种感觉，“你大致处于一个好的位置吗？”因此，我们将引导人们查看该集以进行更深入的挖掘。

Awesome.

惊人的。

I'm glad that you're a fan.

我很高兴你是粉丝。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Just a couple more questions before we get to our very exciting lightning round.

在我们进入非常激动人心的闪电回合之前，还有几个问题。

One is around values, company values, org values.

一是围绕价值观、公司价值观、组织价值观。

Do you have some really good advice for people for how to think about coming up with values?

对于如何思考如何形成价值观，您有一些非常好的建议吗？

What do you share?

你分享什么？

What do you recommend to people that are trying to figure out what values they should define for their org and their company?

对于那些试图弄清楚应该为组织和公司定义什么价值观的人，您有什么建议？

Will Larson: I mean, values are really interesting, right?

威尔·拉尔森：我的意思是，价值观真的很有趣，对吧？

And different companies talk about values in different ways.

不同的公司谈论价值观的方式也不同。

I once worked at a company where the execs went to visit the Facebook campus.

我曾经在一家公司工作，那里的高管们去参观了 Facebook 园区。

They saw the values written up on the wall and they took the Facebook values and wrote them up in our walls and that didn't do a whole lot.

他们看到了写在墙上的价值观，他们把 Facebook 的价值观写在了我们的墙上，但这并没有起到多大作用。

It maybe undermined people's confidence in the critical thinking of the executive team that just took these written up on Facebook walls and replicated it.

这可能会削弱人们对执行团队批判性思维的信心，因为他们只是将这些内容写在 Facebook 墙上并进行复制。

Will Larson: But I think those values did work well for Facebook and those values were meaningful for Facebook.

威尔·拉尔森：但我认为这些价值观对 Facebook 来说确实有效，而且这些价值观对 Facebook 来说很有意义。

And so first you can't do is just steal values.

所以首先你不能做的就是窃取价值观。

Value cargo culting.

价值货崇拜。

Users first.

用户第一。

Great Amazon value.

巨大的亚马逊价值。

A lot of companies aren't users first and that's okay, but what's not okay is when you put, "Hey, we're users first," and then you actually show the decisions you're making and you clearly aren't users first.

很多公司并不是用户至上，这没关系，但不好的是当你说“嘿，我们是用户至上”，然后你实际上展示了你正在做出的决策时，你显然不是用户至上。

Will Larson: So one of the things I think about is just honesty.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我考虑的事情之一就是诚实。

And so good values have to be honest and so any value can be honest or there's no universally honest values.

因此，良好的价值观必须是诚实的，因此任何价值观都可以是诚实的，否则就不存在普遍诚实的价值观。

You can say something like, "We're thrifty." Or we can say something like we spend as much as we need to get the best value.

你可以这样说：“我们很节俭。”或者我们可以说，我们花尽可能多的钱来获得最好的价值。

Those are totally different and good companies are run both ways.

这些是完全不同的，好的公司是双向经营的。

So the first rule I think about a lot is honesty.

所以我经常思考的第一条规则是诚实。

You actually do what you claim you do and the value.

你实际上做了你声称所做的事情和价值。

The second one is applicability.

第二个是适用性。

You have to have value that you can actually figure out how to apply to your work.

你必须拥有能够真正弄清楚如何应用到你的工作中的价值。

Will Larson: And so one of Stripe's values was no longer a value I believe, but it's optimized globally.

Will Larson：所以 Stripe 的价值观之一不再是我相信的价值观，而是在全球范围内进行了优化。

And so optimized globally is a really interesting problem because sometimes you'll have something you wanted for interesting value.

因此，全局优化是一个非常有趣的问题，因为有时你会得到一些你想要的有趣的价值。

Sometimes you want to do something and you're like, "Hey, I want to introduce a new programming language that's better for my team." For the organization overall, this is actually much worse for the organization so I'm not going to do it.

有时你想做一些事情，然后你会想，“嘿，我想引入一种对我的团队更有利的新编程语言。”对于整个组织来说，这实际上对组织来说更糟糕，所以我不会这样做。

Will Larson: Uber didn't have this as a written value, but implicitly Uber's value was do what's good for your team and ignore everyone else because that will slow us down.

威尔·拉尔森：Uber 并没有将此作为书面价值观，但隐含的 Uber 价值观是做对你的团队有利的事情，而忽略其他人，因为这会减慢我们的速度。

So the two different companies had opposite values, but they're both very applicable.

因此，这两家不同的公司有着相反的价值观，但它们都非常适用。

It's like how should we navigate decisions?

这就像我们应该如何做出决定？

Should I optimize for my team or for the organization?

我应该为我的团队还是为组织进行优化？

So those are applicable to real problems and they were honest where Uber was just like, "Don't worry about other people." Make it work for your team.

所以这些都适用于实际问题，而且他们很诚实，Uber 就说，“别担心其他人。”让它为您的团队工作。

And that's how they moved so fast because they just didn't worry.

这就是他们行动如此之快的原因，因为他们根本不担心。

Lenny: Wasn't their value of toe-stepping, encouraging toe-stepping, something like that?

莱尼：他们的价值不就是踮起脚尖、鼓励踮起脚尖之类的吗？

Will Larson: Let builders build toe stepping.

威尔·拉尔森：让建筑商建造脚趾踏步。

There were a number of values that could be interpreted in different ways and sometimes they got weaponized in various ways as all values do.

有许多价值观可以用不同的方式解释，有时它们像所有价值观一样以各种方式被武器化。

But these are both interesting in different ways.

但这些都以不同的方式有趣。

And so number one is honest and two is applicable.

所以第一是诚实的，第二是适用的。

Three is I think the last thing for a good value is this idea of reversibility.

第三，我认为要获得良好的价值，最后一件事就是可逆性的想法。

So there's some values that aren't actually usable.

所以有些值实际上并不可用。

And so here's a good example.

这是一个很好的例子。

We build good software.

我们构建优秀的软件。

Okay.

好的。

But why would you ever not build good software?

但为什么你不开发出好的软件呢？

That doesn't make sense or we solve customer problems that matter.

这是没有意义的，否则我们解决的是重要的客户问题。

Good.

好的。

Will Larson: What company doesn't think they're solving customer problems that matter?

威尔·拉尔森：哪家公司不认为他们正在解决重要的客户问题？

And so there's certain values that just you can't apply.

因此，有些值是您无法应用的。

And so I think of these as identity values.

所以我认为这些是身份价值观。

These are really just you describing who you want to be or we care about our customers.

这些实际上只是您描述您想成为谁或我们关心我们的客户。

Great.

伟大的。

But who would say they don't care about that?

但谁会说他们不关心这个呢？

There's certain values that I think of as just identity values and they're not wrong to have identity values, they just aren't very useful.

我认为某些价值观只是身份价值观，拥有身份价值观并没有错，它们只是不是很有用。

Will Larson: You can't actually use them for anything.

威尔·拉尔森：你实际上不能用它们来做任何事。

And so I just always push people not to spend too much time on these because they feel good when you're an executive team debating what are these identity values?

因此，我总是敦促人们不要在这些问题上花费太多时间，因为当您作为执行团队讨论这些身份价值观是什么时，他们会感觉很好？

It's like we're kind to other people or sure that sounds good.

就好像我们对其他人很友善，或者确信这听起来不错。

We're a family.

我们是一家人。

Sure, that sounds good.

当然，这听起来不错。

That one I guess is a little bit reversible.

我想这个有点可逆。

There's Netflix, which is like, "We're a team like a sports team.

Netflix 的说法是，“我们是一支像运动队一样的团队。

We're not a family." And so a little bit reversible, but not perfectly.

我们不是一家人。”所以有点可逆，但并不完美。

Will Larson: But yeah, these are the three that I found really useful for any value.

威尔·拉尔森：但是，是的，我发现这三个对任何价值都非常有用。

Is it honest?

诚实吗？

Is it applicable?

是否适用？

And can you reverse it?

你能扭转它吗？

And if not, it's probably actually not helping the team make decisions.

如果不是，它实际上可能无法帮助团队做出决策。

Lenny: These are great.

莱尼：这些都很棒。

It reminds me a lot of...

它让我想起很多...

I was there during Airbnb's period of coming up with values.

我在 Airbnb 提出价值观的时期就在那里。

Something that I would maybe add and maybe fits into one of these buckets is it needs to be clear who doesn't?

我可能会添加并且可能适合这些桶之一的东西是需要明确谁不这样做？

There needs to be a group that doesn't quite fit because if everyone fits, you're not doing anything useful.

需要有一个不太适合的群体，因为如果每个人都适合，那么你就没有做任何有用的事情。

What's the point?

有什么意义？

Which feels weird to say, why would not everyone fit in our big group of awesome company?

说起来感觉很奇怪，为什么不是每个人都适合我们这个很棒的公司大集团呢？

But it's clear who is not a good fit, who doesn't belong basically.

但很明显谁不适合，谁基本上不属于。

It's kind of like a cult a little bit like, "Who's not in our cult?

这有点像邪教，“谁不属于我们的邪教？

Who doesn't belong?"

谁不属于？”

Will Larson: But I agree.

威尔·拉尔森：但我同意。

If it doesn't apply to anyone, then why bother saying it?

如果它不适用于任何人，那为什么还要费力地说呢？

It doesn't mean anything.

这没有任何意义。

And you could say it's actually the hiring filter where there are people who you've explicitly chosen not to hire because this wouldn't apply to them.

您可以说这实际上是招聘过滤器，您明确选择不雇用某些人，因为这不适用于他们。

Then I think it's useful because it helps you actually figure out who to bring in.

然后我认为它很有用，因为它可以帮助你真正弄清楚要引入谁。

But if it doesn't apply to anyone you're hiring or anyone that you have in the company, then it's just isn't worth having because you already have too many values.

但如果它不适用于您正在雇用的任何人或您在公司中拥有的任何人，那么它就不值得拥有，因为您已经拥有太多的价值观。

You are already trying to get rid of values because you have 17 and you need to get down to four where people can remember them.

你已经在尝试摆脱价值观，因为你有 17 个价值观，你需要减少到 4 个，这样人们才能记住它们。

So if it doesn't apply to anyone, why bother having it at all?

因此，如果它不适用于任何人，为什么还要费心拥有它呢？

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

Integrity is a common one.

诚信是一种普遍现象。

Integrity.

正直。

Everyone has that.

每个人都有这个。

Nobody wouldn't want integrity.

没有人不想要正直。

What is unique?

有什么独特之处？

Will Larson: We're a non-integrity company.

威尔·拉尔森：我们是一家不诚信的公司。

We're the company that thinks integrity is bad.

我们是一家认为诚信不好的公司。

That's not a real thing.

那不是真的。

Lenny: The other one I'll add to is honest.

莱尼：我要补充的另一点是诚实的。

So Airbnb, we had six values initially.

所以 Airbnb，我们最初有六个价值观。

One of them was simplify and a year or two later everyone just realized we're not actually good at this.

其中之一是简化，一两年后，每个人都意识到我们实际上并不擅长这一点。

We want to simplify, but we're not great at this skill and values should describe who you are not who you want to be and aspire to be.

我们想要简化，但我们不擅长这项技能，价值观应该描述你是谁，而不是你想成为和渴望成为的人。

So they cut two values including that one, and they're just like, "Let's just do these four because this is actually who we are.

所以他们削减了两个值，包括那个值，他们就像，“让我们只做这四个值，因为这实际上就是我们。

Let's be honest with ourselves."

让我们对自己诚实吧。”

Lenny: Okay, final question.

莱尼：好的，最后一个问题。

I wanted to visit Failure Corner, something that I've added recently to this podcast where people share a story of failure.

我想参观失败角，这是我最近添加到这个播客中的东西，人们在那里分享失败的故事。

And you have this amazing post about your experience with Digg and the rewrite that you all went through.

你有这篇精彩的文章，讲述了你使用 Digg 的经历以及你们所经历的重写。

I think it was the version four of Digg.

我认为这是 Digg 的第四版。

Can you just tell that story and what happened?

你能简单讲一下这个故事和发生的事情吗？

How much of a mess it ended up being?

最终造成了多大的混乱？

Will Larson: Yeah, Dig V4 is...

威尔·拉尔森：是的，Dig V4 是……

I mean, it's still something I have a lot of fond memories for.

我的意思是，这仍然是我有很多美好回忆的事情。

There's one picture that I've kept and there's a picture of a lot of the engineers around this table in the middle of this giant office and they're serving sushi.

我保留了一张照片，在这个巨大的办公室中间，有一张桌子周围有很多工程师的照片，他们正在供应寿司。

We had waiters, caterers come in that day.

那天我们有服务员、餐饮承办人进来。

They're serving sushi.

他们正在供应寿司。

They have plates with champagne flutes on it.

他们的盘子上有香槟笛子。

There was a full bar and we're all around this table because the site is not up.

有一个完整的酒吧，我们都围在这张桌子周围，因为网站没有启动。

Will Larson: And so Digg before essentially what Kevin Rose or the board or some combination there realized is that Digg was losing to the social networks and that this idea of aggregated news was going to be outcompeted by the Twitters, the Facebooks, et cetera, if we didn't find a way to move to have a social component for it.

威尔·拉尔森：所以在 Digg 之前，凯文·罗斯或董事会或其他一些组合意识到，Digg 正在输给社交网络，如果我们没有找到一种方法来为其添加社交组件，这种聚合新闻的想法将被 Twitter、Facebook 等竞争。

It even outcompeted by Reddit longterm was kind of the fear.

它甚至长期被 Reddit 击败也是一种恐惧。

Although at the time that that was far from obvious.

尽管在当时这还远非显而易见。

And so we needed to move to support social functionality and the previous version we simply couldn't get it to work.

因此，我们需要转向支持社交功能，而之前的版本根本无法让它发挥作用。

Will Larson: So the decision that was done, I think two and a half years before I joined, and the shift about six months after I joined was they needed to do a complete rewrite in order to get there.

威尔·拉尔森：所以，我想在我加入前两年半做出的决定，以及我加入后大约六个月的转变是，他们需要进行完全重写才能实现这一目标。

This is a decision that never works out for anyone.

这是一个永远不会对任何人都有效的决定。

So I think as someone with more experience, I could have predicted this wasn't going to work out.

所以我认为作为一个有更多经验的人，我可以预见到这不会成功。

But I was earlier in my career.

但我的职业生涯还比较早。

My PM counterpart at Yahoo, Das Kofinovsky.

我在雅虎的同事达斯·科菲诺夫斯基 (Das Kofinovsky)。

He went to Yahoo and he's like, "Come to Digg."

他去了雅虎，他说，“来 Digg 吧。”

Will Larson: Worst case you'll make a couple hundred thousand in a year.

威尔·拉尔森：最坏的情况是你一年能赚几十万。

Worst case.

最坏的情况。

Probably really great outcome.

也许真的是很棒的结果。

Anyway, that's not what happened.

无论如何，事实并非如此。

The worst case was a little bit optimistic.

最坏的情况还算乐观。

So we go and the CEO got fired two days before I joined.

所以我们就走了，在我加入的前两天，首席执行官被解雇了。

So the current CEO left and then Kevin Rose came back for about six months, something like that.

所以现任首席执行官离开了，然后凯文·罗斯回来了大约六个月，类似的事情。

And we're just on the death march trying to get this thing out.

我们正踏上死亡之旅，试图把这件事弄出来。

Will Larson: So we pushed really hard.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我们非常努力。

This was before the cloud for the most part.

这在很大程度上是在云出现之前。

So we wiped pretty much all of our existing servers to re-image them to the new software.

因此，我们擦除了几乎所有现有服务器，将它们重新映像到新软件。

We try to bring the site up and just keeps crashing.

我们尝试恢复该网站，但总是崩溃。

And so it basically takes us a month to get it fully functional again.

所以我们基本上需要一个月的时间才能让它再次完全发挥作用。

And so that day sitting around that table with champagne and sushi, that's just like day one.

所以那天，坐在那张桌子旁，喝着香槟，吃着寿司，就像第一天一样。

And by 30 days in, most people aren't even trying to get the site back up anymore.

30 天后，大多数人甚至不再尝试恢复网站。

Will Larson: There's maybe five of us who are still trying.

威尔·拉尔森：我们可能有五个人仍在尝试。

And we did.

我们做到了。

I think that was a really powerful moment for me.

我认为那对我来说是一个非常强大的时刻。

I think in the first two days myself and Rich Schumacher, one of the other engineers, we had to write a caching system from scratch, which got us half the way up.

我认为在前两天，我和其他工程师之一 Rich Schumacher 必须从头开始编写一个缓存系统，这让我们成功了一半。

Really a terrible way to do software on a side note.

附带说明一下，这确实是一种糟糕的软件开发方式。

I'm not recommending this to anyone.

我不会向任何人推荐这个。

This was a series of anti-patterns kludged into a launch.

这是一系列反模式混杂在一次发布中。

But we got it partially up, but we had to restart it every 12 months.

但我们已经部分恢复了，但我们必须每 12 个月重新启动一次。

Will Larson: Every 12 hours, every server had to be restarted even with the caching mechanism.

Will Larson：每 12 小时，即使有缓存机制，每台服务器也必须重新启动。

And then about three weeks after that, I finally figured out what the core bug was, that was bringing us down every 12 hours.

大约三周后，我终于弄清楚了核心错误是什么，它每 12 小时就会让我们崩溃一次。

It was this incredibly simple issue that had just been hard to debug, basically related to the way that Python initiates variables used as default parameters.

这个极其简单的问题却很难调试，基本上与 Python 启动用作默认参数的变量的方式有关。

It's something super silly and we just had someone who hadn't written Python before who was working on the API code, so they didn't realize it's gotcha.

这是一件非常愚蠢的事情，我们只是有一个以前没有写过 Python 的人在处理 API 代码，所以他们没有意识到这是一个陷阱。

Will Larson: Then no one else caught it when it was reviewed and it just took a long time to debug.

Will Larson：然后在审查时没有其他人发现它，只是花了很长时间来调试。

It was such a non-obvious.

这是如此不明显。

It didn't break anything, it was just doing a lot of extra load on the servers.

它没有破坏任何东西，只是给服务器带来了很多额外的负载。

We finally figured it out and it was just really remarkable experience pulling through.

我们终于想通了，这真是一次非凡的经历。

And you know what?

你知道吗？

The company still went to zero.

该公司仍然归零。

So we had this at launch.

所以我们在发布时就有了这个。

I think we did this heroic, heroic stretch to get it working.

我认为我们做了如此英勇的努力才使其发挥作用。

Will Larson: A couple weeks after that, a new CEO came in, did a round of layoffs.

威尔·拉尔森：几周后，新任首席执行官上任，进行了一轮裁员。

This is back I think 2012.

我想这又回到了2012年。

The team nine months after I started was down to 30 people from about a hundred and it went downhill from there, from a business perspective.

我开始工作 9 个月后，团队人数从大约 100 人减少到 30 人，从业务角度来看，团队从此开始走下坡路。

But we launched a lot of functionality, has really learned just a tremendous amount.

但我们推出了很多功能，确实学到了很多东西。

And it kind of shaped what I think about in terms of early in your career, getting learning and going into a company that is maybe having a rough time.

这在某种程度上塑造了我对职业生涯早期的看法，即学习和进入一家可能会遇到困难的公司。

Will Larson: I became a manager two and a half years into my career.

威尔·拉尔森：我在职业生涯两年半后就成为了一名经理。

Basically running the entire engineering team there because everyone who had a lick of sense quit or got laid off, and it was just complete idiot me trying to be the manager for the engineering org, wasn't qualified and no one would've given me that job, but I was the only one dumb enough to take it at that point.

基本上，在那里管理整个工程团队，因为每个有一点理智的人都辞职或被解雇，而我试图成为工程组织的经理完全是白痴，没有资格，没有人会给我这份工作，但我是唯一一个愚蠢到接受它的人。

I learned so much and I really the kernel that turned into my entire career where it was that opportunity, even though at the time it was pretty grim.

我学到了很多东西，我确实成为了我整个职业生涯的核心，这就是那个机会，尽管当时情况相当严峻。

Lenny: That's an amazing story.

莱尼：那是一个了不起的故事。

I feel like a lot of these experiences were in the moment, it's just like, "What is going on?

我觉得很多这样的经历都发生在当下，就像是，“发生了什么事？

This is so bad and hard," end up being the most interesting and looking back end up being the most biggest teaching experiences.

这是如此糟糕和艰难，”最终成为最有趣的，回顾起来最终成为最重要的教学经历。

The ones you like bond over with people you work with like Apple.

你喜欢的人和你一起工作的人（比如苹果公司）关系密切。

It always comes to mind where it's just like Steve Jobs's joke, people like crazy and then they look back and that was the best moment in my career.

我总是会想起这就像史蒂夫·乔布斯的笑话，人们喜欢疯狂，然后当他们回首往事时，那是我职业生涯中最美好的时刻。

Will Larson: You would never voluntarily take on a lot of these really challenging things, but sometimes when they show up, you're with a group of people you really respect, you love working with and you want to overcome together.

威尔·拉尔森：你永远不会自愿承担很多真正具有挑战性的事情，但有时当它们出现时，你会和一群你真正尊重的人在一起，你喜欢与他们一起工作，并且你想一起克服困难。

And that's really powerful experience.

这是非常强大的体验。

Even if Uber China was similar where if someone had been like, "Hey, do you want to go work on this Uber China migration?" I would've been like, "Absolutely not." But no one asked.

即使 Uber 中国也类似，如果有人问：“嘿，你想参与 Uber 中国的迁移吗？”我会说：“绝对不会。”但没有人问。

They're just like, "Get this done," and so we did.

他们只是说，“把这件事完成”，我们就这么做了。

I think these things are pretty remarkable.

我认为这些事情非常了不起。

Lenny: And just to be clear, so Digg was down for a month basically during this period?

Lenny：澄清一下，Digg 在此期间基本上宕机了一个月？

Is that...

难道是……

Will Larson: So it basically didn't work properly for much of the month.

威尔·拉尔森：所以这个月的大部分时间它基本上都不能正常工作。

It was like read only was back up in about three days, but the vast majority of the actual user functionality just wasn't working properly for pretty much an entire month and it was not that good.

好像只读在大约三天内就恢复了，但绝大多数实际用户功能在几乎整个月的时间里都无法正常工作，而且效果并不好。

I mean not great, but that wasn't the biggest problem Digg had at that point.

我的意思是不是很好，但这并不是 Digg 当时遇到的最大问题。

But it was one of the biggest problems that had at that point and it wasn't a real sign of things likely to go well for us.

但这是当时遇到的最大问题之一，而且这并不是我们一切顺利的真正迹象。

But like I said, you learn from those and I'm really proud that we and the team got it working, got it running even if ultimately we still went to zero and ran out of money and kind of sold for parts.

但就像我说的，你可以从中学习，我真的很自豪我们和团队让它发挥作用，让它运行，即使最终我们仍然为零并且耗尽了钱并且被卖掉了零件。

Lenny: Do you think Digg could have made it?

莱尼：你认为迪格能成功吗？

There was a world where Digg would've been a hugely successful business or do you think it was just way too late and it's the wrong product?

在过去的世界里，Digg 会成为一家非常成功的企业，还是您认为它为时已晚并且是错误的产品？

Will Larson: The thing that really killed Digg is the change.

威尔·拉尔森：真正杀死 Digg 的是变化。

It wasn't SEO driven.

它不是 SEO 驱动的。

So monetization was from ads.

所以货币化是通过广告来实现的。

Well, many companies including Digg claimed that it was the first in kind of stream, in feed like advertising company where Twitter has ads within the tweets or Facebook does.

嗯，包括 Digg 在内的许多公司都声称，它是第一家类似流媒体、提要的广告公司，其中 Twitter 在推文中添加广告，而 Facebook 则在推文中添加广告。

But Digg did that before Facebook or Twitter really innovated the ad format.

但 Digg 在 Facebook 或 Twitter 真正创新广告格式之前就这么做了。

But the vast majority of monetization was on these...

但绝大多数的货币化都是在这些......

We call them permalink pages, which is page 40.

我们称它们为永久链接页面，即第 40 页。

Then article we crawled and the vast majority of traffic for that was driven by Google search.

然后我们抓取了文章，其绝大多数流量是由 Google 搜索驱动的。

And so there was an SEO change, which really is the thing that started creating the urgency for us to launch this migration.

因此，SEO 发生了变化，这确实让我们开始迫切需要启动此迁移。

Will Larson: SEO changed, traffic started going down, monetization was driven by that.

威尔·拉尔森：搜索引擎优化发生了变化，流量开始下降，货币化是由此推动的。

And so we were already on fire by the time we tried to launch this.

所以当我们尝试推出这个产品时，我们已经很着急了。

But I do think that I still want something like what Digg was trying to become today.

但我确实认为我仍然想要像 Digg 今天想要成为的那样。

Social news based on like what my friends are actually reading and liking merged with a global index of similar users who are interested in similar topics.

基于我的朋友实际阅读和喜欢的内容的社交新闻与对相似主题感兴趣的相似用户的全球索引合并。

It's still a product that I think Google Reader has some kind of similar components to it.

我认为 Google Reader 仍然是一个具有某种类似组件的产品。

Will Larson: These are both interesting products solving interesting problems that have not for whatever reason been successful as businesses.

威尔·拉森：这些都是有趣的产品，解决了一些有趣的问题，但无论出于何种原因，这些问题都没有在商业上取得成功。

And I do think there's a gap there still, but there's a lot of people trying unsuccessfully to fill it and there must be a reason why people struggle to fill it despite so many people trying.

我确实认为那里仍然存在差距，但是有很多人试图填补它但没有成功，而且尽管有这么多人尝试，但人们仍然难以填补它，这肯定是有原因的。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Will, is there anything else you want to share or leave people with before we get to our very fast lightning round because I know you have to run in about five minutes?

威尔，在我们开始快速闪电回合之前，你还有什么想分享或留给大家的吗？因为我知道你必须在大约五分钟内跑完？

Will Larson: I think we've covered a lot of it.

Will Larson：我想我们已经讨论了很多内容。

New book coming out.

新书即将出版。

New book coming out in February, Engineering Executive's Primer, O'Reilly.

新书《工程主管入门》，O'Reilly，将于二月出版。

But that's probably it.

但大概就是这样了。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Where do people find that?

人们在哪里找到它？

I know it's on O'Reilly.

我知道这是奥莱利的节目。

You can look at a preview of it even today, right?

即使今天你也可以看到它的预览，对吧？

Will Larson: Yeah.

威尔·拉尔森：是的。

O'Reilly, you can see the early copy.

奥莱利，你可以看看早期的副本。

You can order it on Amazon as well, but it won't be shipping until February.

你也可以在亚马逊上订购，但要到二月份才能发货。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

And then just to be clear, who's this for?

然后要澄清的是，这是给谁的？

It's for engineering executives by the sound of it.

从字面上看，它是为工程主管设计的。

Will Larson: It's for engineering executives, but more so like anyone who wants to be one, anyone who's trying to figure out how to work with an engineering executive.

威尔·拉尔森：它适用于工程主管，但更适合任何想成为工程主管的人，任何试图弄清楚如何与工程主管一起工作的人。

So I think if you are struggling to understand why your CTO keeps doing boneheaded things, or if you want to side manage them, you're the head of product and you can't get the CTO to stop complaining about the engineers need more interesting projects to work on, this might be useful for you too.

所以我认为，如果你很难理解为什么你的 CTO 总是做一些愚蠢的事情，或者如果你想侧面管理它们，你是产品主管，你无法让 CTO 停止抱怨工程师需要更多有趣的项目来工作，这可能对你也有用。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

Ready for the lightning round?

准备好迎接闪电回合了吗？

Lenny: What are two or three books you've recommended most to other people?

莱尼：你向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？

Will Larson: So I talked about Thinking in Systems and Primer.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我谈到了系统思考和入门。

I talked about Good Strategy, Bad Strategy, but I'll give you a third one, which is Don't Think of an Elephant by George Lakoff.

我谈到了好策略、坏策略，但我会给你第三个策略，那就是乔治·莱考夫的《别想大象》。

It's a really interesting book about framing things in conversations that has really changed how I communicate.

这是一本非常有趣的书，关于在对话中构建事物，它确实改变了我的沟通方式。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Favorite recent movie or TV show you've really enjoyed?

您最近最喜欢的电影或电视节目是？

Will Larson: I don't watch much TV or many movies anymore, but something I do still watch is Top Chef with my wife.

威尔·拉尔森：我不再看太多电视或电影了，但我仍然和妻子一起看《顶级厨师》。

She's a Top Chef, super fan.

她是顶级厨师，超级粉丝。

And there's something just very relaxing from these formulaic structured shows where you kind of know what's going to happen.

这些公式化的结构化节目让人非常放松，你知道会发生什么。

There's no real consequences that matter too much and just escaping from real life to these formulas can be pretty peaceful.

没有什么真正的后果太重要，只是从现实生活中逃离到这些公式中就可以非常平静。

Lenny: No one has ever mentioned Top Chef before, so that's fun.

莱尼：以前没有人提到过顶级厨师，所以这很有趣。

Do you have a favorite interview question that you like to ask candidates that you're interviewing for a job?

您有一个最喜欢问正在面试的求职者的面试问题吗？

Will Larson: A lot of my interviews now are trying to help people decide if they actually want to join a company.

威尔·拉尔森：我现在的很多采访都试图帮助人们决定他们是否真的想加入一家公司。

And so my favorite question I ask now is like, "Hey, we've really loved you.

所以我现在最喜欢问的问题是，“嘿，我们真的很爱你。

You're going to come through.

你会挺过去的。

I think you're going to get a lot of offers from other companies too.

我想你也会从其他公司得到很多offer。

I bet you'll have three or four really compelling offers because you're a fantastic candidate.

我打赌你会收到三到四个非常有吸引力的工作机会，因为你是一个出色的候选人。

How are you going to figure out really specifically which of those options are right for you?"

您将如何明确哪些选项最适合您？”

Will Larson: I think it forces people to tell you what they want and then you tell them why you have that more than anyone else, and then you can actually pitch them on what matters versus pitching on things that don't.

威尔·拉尔森：我认为这迫使人们告诉你他们想要什么，然后你告诉他们为什么你比其他人更拥有这些，然后你实际上可以向他们推销重要的事情，而不是向他们推销不重要的事情。

Lenny: Love that.

莱尼：喜欢这个。

Do you have a favorite life motto that you often come back to share with friends, find useful either in work or in life?

您是否有一条最喜欢的人生格言，您经常回来与朋友分享，并认为它在工作或生活中都很有用？

Will Larson: No mottos, but I can think of two things I thought about a lot.

威尔·拉尔森：没有座右铭，但我能想到我经常思考的两件事。

At Uber is something I talk to people a lot because it was a challenging time for much of it.

在 Uber，我经常与人们交谈，因为那段时间对我来说是一个充满挑战的时期。

It was there's no way around, just through.And that was like, "Hey, we're not going to dodge around this.

没有办法绕过，只能通过。这就像是，“嘿，我们不会回避这个。

We're going to gut through it and we're going to get to the other side and then we're going to be there." What I think about a lot more now is, will anyone remember what we decided in six months?

我们将彻底解决它，我们将到达另一边，然后我们就会到达那里。”我现在想得更多的是，有人会记得我们在六个月后做出的决定吗？

Because I think people stress out about a lot of decisions, but I increasingly believe most decisions people stress out about just aren't that important.

因为我认为人们对很多决定感到压力，但我越来越相信人们感到压力的大多数决定并不那么重要。

Will Larson: So I'm like, "Will anyone care in six months what we did here?" And the answer is no. Just do something reasonable and let's move on to the next more important thing.

威尔·拉尔森：所以我想，“六个月后会有人关心我们在这里做了什么吗？”答案是否定的。做一些合理的事情，然后让我们继续做下一个更重要的事情。

Lenny: I love that.

莱尼：我喜欢这个。

You've done a lot of writing.

你已经写了很多。

Is there a piece that you've written that you feel like is underappreciated that no one really totally got and hasn't spread and you're like, "Ah, I'm so proud of that one"?

是否有一篇你写过的文章，你觉得没有被充分重视，没有人真正完全理解并且没有传播开来，你会想，“啊，我为那篇文章感到骄傲”？

Will Larson: Maybe the piece I'm most proud of from last year was Hard To Work With.

威尔·拉尔森：也许去年我最引以为豪的作品是《难以合作》。

So Hard To Work With is basically I see a lot of people who are incredibly talented, but they try to hold their peers to a high standard and then they're viewed as combative or difficult to work with.

很难共事基本上是我看到很多非常有才华的人，但他们试图让他们的同事达到高标准，然后他们被视为好斗或难以共事。

And this one comes from a core struggle of my early career where I kept trying.

这一点来自我早期职业生涯的核心斗争，我一直在努力。

I thought I was holding people accountable and people were just like, "You suck to work with."

我以为我是在让人们承担责任，但人们却说：“和你一起工作很糟糕。”

Will Larson: And I was like, "But I'm just trying to have a high standard.

威尔·拉尔森：我当时想，“但我只是想有一个高标准。

Isn't that what we want?" And talk about honest values.

这不是我们想要的吗？”并谈论诚实的价值观。

Every company is like, "We have high standards," and you're like, "Well, let's do it." And then they're like, "We don't have high standards here.

每家公司都会说，“我们有高标准”，而你会说，“好吧，我们就这么做吧。”然后他们会说，“我们这里没有高标准。

You suck." So that one is one that really is so transformational to me, and I think it really hits some people hard because I think a lot of people really go their entire career without figuring this one out.

你真是太糟糕了。”所以这对我来说确实是一个变革性的问题，我认为这确实对一些人造成了沉重打击，因为我认为很多人在整个职业生涯中都没有弄清楚这一点。

Will Larson: And they're some of the most talented, hardest working people you'll ever work with and can't quite land this one idea that's holding them back.

威尔·拉尔森：他们是你共事过的最有才华、最勤奋的人，但你无法完全理解阻碍他们前进的这一想法。

And they care so much and they are often despised because they care so much.

他们如此在乎，却常常因为如此在乎而被鄙视。

I think this is one that I hope more people will read over times and there's a really important lesson for me in there.

我认为我希望更多的人能够阅读这本书，这对我来说是一个非常重要的教训。

Lenny: Well, we will link to it in the show notes and help more people discover it.

Lenny：嗯，我们会在节目笔记中链接到它，帮助更多的人发现它。

Two last questions.

最后两个问题。

Where can folks find you online if they want to reach out and maybe follow up on questions?

如果人们想要联系您并跟进问题，可以在哪里找到您？

And how can listeners be useful to you?

听众如何对你有用？

Will Larson: So find me online, lethain.com, lethain.com.

威尔·拉尔森：所以可以在网上找到我，lethain.com，lethain.com。

All my writing, my books, everything links linked there.

我所有的写作，我的书，所有的链接都链接在那里。

And the biggest thing that I'm thinking about right now is just strategy.

我现在考虑的最重要的事情就是策略。

So really curious for folks who are thinking about strategy, who think they've done product, business, or engineering strategy well.

对于那些正在思考战略、认为自己已经很好地完成了产品、业务或工程战略的人来说，我真的很好奇。

Would love to hear from folks what they're thinking about, what's actually worked and maybe what are the lies that have not turned out to work that they thought might work earlier in their journey.

我很想听听人们的想法，什么实际上有效，也许还有哪些谎言没有被证明有效，而他们认为在他们的早期旅程中可能有效。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Will, thank you so much for being here.

威尔，非常感谢你来到这里。

Will Larson: Thank you so much.

威尔·拉尔森：非常感谢。

This is really fantastic.

这真是太棒了。

Lenny: Same for me.

莱尼：对我来说也一样。

Bye, everyone.

再见，大家。

Thank you so much for listening.

非常感谢您的聆听。

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如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.

另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。

You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.

您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。