Mental models for building products people love ft. Stewart Butterfield

Stewart Butterfield: This is 2014.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：这是 2014 年。

That was the year that Slack actually launched.

那是 Slack 真正推出的一年。

I was interviewed by MIT Technology Review and asked if we were working to improve Slack.

我接受了《麻省理工科技评论》的采访，并询问我们是否正在努力改进 Slack。

I said, "I feel like what we have right now is just a giant piece of shit.

I said, "I feel like what we have right now is just a giant piece of shit.

It's just terrible and we should be humiliated that we offer this to the public."

这太可怕了，我们应该为向公众提供这个而感到羞辱。”

Stewart Butterfield: To me that was like, "You should be embarrassed." If you can't see almost limitless opportunities to improve, then you shouldn't be designing the product.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：对我来说，这就像“你应该感到尴尬”。如果您看不到几乎无限的改进机会，那么您就不应该设计该产品。

Lenny Rachitsky: Slack was famous for being one of the early, consumerized B2B SaaS products.

Lenny Rachitsky：Slack 因其早期的消费化 B2B SaaS 产品之一而闻名。

Stewart Butterfield: At more than one company all hands, I made everyone in the company repeat this as a chant.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：在不止一家公司全体员工中，我让公司里的每个人都重复这句话作为口号。

In the long run, the measure of our success will be the amount of value that we create for customers, and you can put effort into demonstrating that you have created this value and stuff like that, but there's no substitute for actually having created it.

从长远来看，衡量我们成功的标准将是我们为客户创造的价值量，你可以努力证明你已经创造了这种价值和类似的东西，但没有什么可以替代实际创造它。

Lenny Rachitsky: Something else I heard that you often espouse is friction in a product experience is actually often a good thing?

Lenny Rachitsky：我听说您经常支持的另一件事是，产品体验中的摩擦实际上通常是一件好事？

Stewart Butterfield: It became an assumption that it should always be trying to remove friction when the challenge is really comprehension.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：当真正的挑战是理解时，它应该始终努力消除摩擦，这成为了一种假设。

If your software stops me and asks me to make a decision and I don't really understand it, you make me feel stupid.

如果你的软件阻止我并要求我做出决定而我并不真正理解它，你会让我觉得自己很愚蠢。

If people could get over the idea of reducing friction as a number of goal or reducing the number of clicks or taps to do something, and instead focus on how can I make this simple?

如果人们能够克服将减少摩擦作为一个目标或减少做某事的点击次数的想法，而是专注于如何让这件事变得简单？

How do I prevent people from having to think in order to use my software?

如何防止人们在使用我的软件时不得不思考？

Lenny Rachitsky: You started two companies, both famously pivoted.

Lenny Rachitsky：您创办了两家公司，两家公司都以转型着称。

I imagine many people come to you for advice on pivoting.

我想很多人都会向您寻求有关转型的建议。

Stewart Butterfield: The decision is about have you exhausted the possibilities?

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：这个决定是关于你是否已经用尽了可能性？

Creating the distance so that you can make an intellectual rational decision about it rather than an emotional decision is essential.

创造距离，以便你能够做出理性的决定，而不是感性的决定，这是至关重要的。

And the reason I say you have to be coldly rational about it is because it's fucking humiliating.

我之所以说你必须对此保持冷静的理性，是因为这实在是太丢脸了。

Lenny Rachitsky: Today, my guest is Stewart Butterfield, a founder and product legend who rarely does podcasts.

Lenny Rachitsky：今天，我的嘉宾是斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield），他是一位很少做播客的创始人和产品传奇人物。

Stewart founded Flickr and then Slack, which he sold to Salesforce in one of the biggest acquisitions in tech history at the time.

斯图尔特创立了 Flickr，然后创立了 Slack，并将其卖给了 Salesforce，这是当时科技史上最大的收购之一。

There is so much product and leadership wisdom locked away in his head.

他的头脑中蕴藏着如此多的产品和领导智慧。

I feel like our conversation just scratched the surface.

I feel like our conversation just scratched the surface.

We chat about utility curves, something he calls the owner's delusion, a hilarious pattern he sees at companies he calls hyperrealistic work-like activities, what he's learned about product and craft and taste and Parkinson's law, why you need to obsess with not making your users think, the backstory on his legendary we don't sell saddles here memo, and so much more.

我们谈论效用曲线，他称之为所有者的错觉，他在他所谓的超现实工作类活动的公司中看到的搞笑模式，他对产品、工艺、品味和帕金森定律的了解，为什么你需要痴迷于不让你的用户思考，他传奇般的我们这里不卖马鞍备忘录的背景故事，等等。

A huge thank you to Noah Weiss, Chris Cordell, Ali Rael, and Johnny Rogers for suggesting topics and questions for this conversation.

非常感谢诺亚·韦斯、克里斯·科德尔、阿里·雷尔和约翰尼·罗杰斯为本次对话提出的主题和问题。

This is a really special one and I really hope to have Stewart back to delve even deeper.

这是一件非常特别的事情，我真的希望斯图尔特能回来进行更深入的研究。

Lenny Rachitsky: If you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube.

Lenny Rachitsky：如果您喜欢这个播客，请不要忘记订阅并在您最喜欢的播客应用程序或 YouTube 中关注它。

It helps tremendously.

它有很大帮助。

And if you become an annual subscriber of my newsletter, you get 17 incredible products for free for an entire year, including Devin, Lovable, Replit, Bolt, n8n, Linear, Superhuman, Descript, Wispr Flow, Gamma, Perplexity, Warp, Granola, Magic Patterns, Raycast, ChatPRD, and Mobbin.

如果您成为我的时事通讯的年度订阅者，您可以全年免费获得 17 种令人难以置信的产品，包括 Devin、Lovable、Replit、Bolt、n8n、Linear、Super human、Descript、Wispr Flow、Gamma、Perplexity、Warp、Granola、Magic Patterns、Raycast、ChatPRD 和 Mobbin。

Head on over to lennysnewsletter.com and click Product Pass.

前往 lennysnewsletter.com 并单击 Product Pass。

With that, I bring you Stewart Butterfield after a short word from our sponsors.

With that, I bring you Stewart Butterfield after a short word from our sponsors.

Lenny Rachitsky: Here's a puzzle for you.

Lenny Rachitsky：这是给你的一个谜题。

What do OpenAI, Cursor, Perplexity, Vercel, Plaid and hundreds of other winning companies have in common?

OpenAI、Cursor、Perplexity、Vercel、Plaid 和其他数百家获奖公司有什么共同点？

The answer is they're all powered by today's sponsor, WorkOS.

答案是它们全部由当今的赞助商 WorkOS 提供支持。

If you're building software for enterprises, you've probably felt the pain of integrating single sign-on, SCIM, RBAC, audit logs, and other features required by big customers.

如果您正在为企业构建软件，您可能已经感受到集成单点登录、SCIM、RBAC、审核日志和大客户所需的其他功能的痛苦。

WorkOS turns those deal blockers into drop-in APIs with a modern developer platform built specifically for B2B SaaS.

WorkOS 通过专为 B2B SaaS 构建的现代开发者平台将这些交易阻碍因素转变为嵌入式 API。

Lenny Rachitsky: Whether you're a seed-stage startup trying to land your first enterprise customer or a unicorn expanding globally, WorkOS is the fastest path to becoming enterprise-ready and unlocking growth.

Lenny Rachitsky：无论您是一家试图吸引第一个企业客户的种子期初创公司，还是一家在全球范围内扩张的独角兽，WorkOS 都是实现企业就绪并释放增长的最快途径。

They're essentially Stripe for enterprise features.

它们本质上是用于企业功能的 Stripe。

Visit WorkOS.com to get started or just hit up their Slack support where they have real engineers in there who answer your questions superfast.

Visit WorkOS.com to get started or just hit up their Slack support where they have real engineers in there who answer your questions superfast.

WorkOS allows you to build like the best with delightful APIs, comprehensive docs, and a smooth developer experience.

WorkOS 允许您通过令人愉悦的 API、全面的文档和流畅的开发人员体验进行最佳构建。

Go to workos.com to make your app enterprise-ready today.

立即访问 workos.com 让您的应用程序做好企业准备。

Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Metronome.

Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Metronome 为您带来。

You just launched your new shiny AI product.

您刚刚推出了全新的闪亮人工智能产品。

The new pricing page looks awesome, but behind it, last-minute glue code, messy spreadsheets, and running ad hoc queries to figure out what to bill.

新的定价页面看起来棒极了，但其背后是最后一刻的粘合代码、混乱的电子表格以及运行临时查询来确定要计费的内容。

Customers get invoices they can't understand.

客户收到他们无法理解的发票。

Engineers are chasing billing bugs.

工程师们正在寻找计费错误。

Finance can't close the books.

财务无法结账。

With Metronome, you hand it all off to the real-time billing infrastructure that just works.

借助 Metronome，您可以将一切交给正常运行的实时计费基础设施。

Reliable, flexible, and built to grow with you.

可靠、灵活，旨在与您共同成长。

Metronome turns raw usage events into accurate invoices, gives customers bills they actually understand and keeps every team in sync in real-time.

Metronome 将原始使用事件转化为准确的发票，为客户提供他们真正理解的账单，并使每个团队实时同步。

Whether you're launching usage-based pricing, managing enterprise contracts, or rolling out new AI services, Metronome does the heavy lifting so that you can focus on your product, not your billing.

无论您是推出基于使用情况的定价、管理企业合同，还是推出新的人工智能服务，Metronome 都会承担繁重的工作，以便您可以专注于您的产品，而不是计费。

That's why some of the fastest growing companies in the world like OpenAI and Anthropic run their billing on Metronome.

That's why some of the fastest growing companies in the world like OpenAI and Anthropic run their billing on Metronome.

Visit metronome.com to learn more.

访问 Metronome.com 了解更多信息。

That's metronome.com.

那是 Metronome.com。

Lenny Rachitsky: Stewart, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.

Lenny Rachitsky：斯图尔特，非常感谢您来到这里，欢迎来到播客。

Stewart Butterfield: Thank you for having me.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：谢谢你邀请我。

I'm excited.

我很兴奋。

Lenny Rachitsky: I'm even more excited.

Lenny Rachitsky：我更兴奋。

I'm so honored to have you here.

我很荣幸你能来到这里。

I never told you this, but you've been towards the very top of my wish list of guests I have on this podcast ever since I started this podcast a few years ago, so I'm very excited that we're finally making this happen.

我从来没有告诉过你这一点，但自从几年前我开始这个播客以来，你一直是我在这个播客上的愿望清单的首位，所以我很高兴我们终于实现了这一目标。

I have so many questions for you.

我有很多问题要问你。

My first question is just what the heck are you up to these days?

My first question is just what the heck are you up to these days?

I feel like ever since you left Slack, we haven't heard much from Stewart.

I feel like ever since you left Slack, we haven't heard much from Stewart.

I'm curious what you're up to you hopefully or just chilling.

I'm curious what you're up to you hopefully or just chilling.

Stewart Butterfield: I'm mostly just chilling.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我主要只是放松一下。

I left Salesforce two and a half years ago and I have a two and a half year old, so she was actually born three days after my last day, so a lot of time with family and it's an enormous privilege to be able to spend time with young kids while they're young.

我两年半前离开 Salesforce，我有一个两岁半的孩子，所以她实际上是在我最后一天后三天出生的，所以我有很多时间与家人在一起，能够在孩子们还小的时候与他们共度时光是一种巨大的荣幸。

No new company to announce or anything like that.

No new company to announce or anything like that.

I do get a lot of emails and texts.

我确实收到很多电子邮件和短信。

Basically every three to six weeks there's this cycle because Cal Henderson who's the CTO of Slack and who also, we worked together on Flickr, so have worked together now for 23 years, have been talking about what we want to do next if there is something.

基本上每三到六周就会有一个这样的周期，因为 Cal Henderson 是 Slack 的首席技术官，我们在 Flickr 上也一起工作过，所以现在已经合作了 23 年，他一直在讨论如果有什么事情我们下一步想做什么。

Stewart Butterfield: But honestly, the big challenge has been I think these things are destroying the world and what we're good at is making software.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但老实说，最大的挑战是我认为这些东西正在摧毁世界，而我们擅长的是制作软件。

So you find some way to make software that helped people use their phones less often, then that would be a big winner, but haven't come up with anything good.

所以你找到了一些方法来制作软件来帮助人们减少使用手机的频率，那么这将是一个大赢家，但还没有拿出任何好的东西。

A lot of philanthropic work, nothing to announce there yet, but there's some cool projects that I'm working on, and a lot of just personal creative art projects and supporting other artists and stuff like that.

有很多慈善工作，目前还没有什么可宣布的，但我正在从事一些很酷的项目，还有很多个人创意艺术项目和支持其他艺术家之类的事情。

Lenny Rachitsky: To prep for this chat, I talked to so many people that have worked with you over the years to try to figure out what you taught them about building product, building teams, building companies that most stuck with them, that most helped them build amazing products.

Lenny Rachitsky：为了准备这次谈话，我和很多多年来与你共事的人进行了交谈，试图找出你教给他们的关于构建产品、构建团队、构建最能吸引他们、最能帮助他们构建令人惊叹的产品的公司的知识。

The first is a concept called utility curves.

第一个是称为效用曲线的概念。

This came up a bunch across so many people that have worked with you.

This came up a bunch across so many people that have worked with you.

Talk about what is a utility curve, how you use that to build better products.

谈论什么是效用曲线，如何利用它来构建更好的产品。

Stewart Butterfield: This is pretty easy because it's a very familiar S-curve where you have, it's flat and it starts arcing up and then there's a really steep part and then it levels off again.

Stewart Butterfield：这非常简单，因为这是一条非常熟悉的 S 曲线，它是平坦的，开始向上弧线，然后有一个非常陡峭的部分，然后再次趋于平稳。

And on the horizontal axis, you can think of cost or effort and on the vertical axis, it's value or convenience.

And on the horizontal axis, you can think of cost or effort and on the vertical axis, it's value or convenience.

It depends exactly what you're talking about, but the idea is the first bit of effort you put into something doesn't result in a huge amount of value.

这完全取决于你在说什么，但这个想法是你在某件事上投入的第一点努力不会产生巨大的价值。

And then there's some magic threshold where it produces an enormous amount of value and then continued investment doesn't really pay off.

And then there's some magic threshold where it produces an enormous amount of value and then continued investment doesn't really pay off.

The most basic example I can think of is let's say you're making a hammer, and on that bottom axis, it's now quality, and if the hammer has a handle that breaks with any impact, then is totally useless.

我能想到的最基本的例子是，假设你正在制作一把锤子，在底部轴上，它现在是质量的，如果锤子的手柄在任何撞击下都会破裂，那么它就完全没有用了。

And if you make it a little bit stronger, it's still pretty useless and it's like junk, junk, junk, junk, junk.

And if you make it a little bit stronger, it's still pretty useless and it's like junk, junk, junk, junk, junk.

Okay, good, great.

好的，很好，太好了。

Then it doesn't matter anymore.

那么就不再重要了。

Stewart Butterfield: If you're making an app, okay, this app's going to have users and so let's make a user's table and a database, and so far you have generated no value.

Stewart Butterfield：如果您正在制作一个应用程序，好吧，这个应用程序将拥有用户，所以让我们制作一个用户表和一个数据库，到目前为止您还没有产生任何价值。

The reason I felt like this was so important is because we would talk about a feature, and usually features are thought of as a binary.

我觉得这如此重要的原因是因为我们会讨论一个功能，而功能通常被认为是二进制的。

You either have this feature or you don't.

你要么有这个功能，要么没有。

The argument I guess was have we just not invested enough in this or have we got all the value or convenience or quality or whatever that we could get out of this?

我想争论的焦点是，我们是否在这方面投入了足够的资金，或者我们是否获得了所有的价值、便利性、质量或我们可以从中获得的任何东西？

And we had pointed diminishing returns and it just doesn't matter.

我们已经指出了收益递减，但这并不重要。

Stewart Butterfield: I think in many cases, people will add a feature, it's not good enough and so people don't use it or appreciate it, but now you've added some complexity to the app and then people give up or take it back or they try something in testing and they don't get the results they want, and so they decide that this a thing is worth doing.

Stewart Butterfield：我认为在很多情况下，人们会添加一个功能，它不够好，所以人们不会使用它或欣赏它，但现在你给应用程序添加了一些复杂性，然后人们放弃或收回它，或者他们在测试中尝试一些东西，但没有得到他们想要的结果，所以他们认为这是值得做的事情。

We would try to really investigate and decide whether we were on the first shallow part of the curve, the second shallow part of the curve, or we're just coming up to it.

我们会尝试真正调查并确定我们是否处于曲线的第一个浅部分，曲线的第二个浅部分，或者我们刚刚接近它。

So I think it's a lot easier to understand the value of this when you're talking about a specific app and a specific feature, but I think it was ultimately helpful in getting people to understand whether something was worth it or not.

因此，我认为当您谈论特定应用程序和特定功能时，更容易理解它的价值，但我认为这最终有助于让人们了解某些东西是否值得。

Lenny Rachitsky: So just to mirror back what I'm hearing, there's this, if you visualize this curve at the bottom, it's like I don't even know what this is.

Lenny Rachitsky：为了反映我所听到的，如果你想象底部的这条曲线，就好像我什至不知道这是什么。

And then up the curve is like, okay, I sort of get it.

And then up the curve is like, okay, I sort of get it.

And then at the top is, okay, I can't live without this now that I understand what this is for, it feels like it's a really a different way of thinking about getting to the aha moment for someone where they see, okay, saved items, I get it, I need to use this constantly.

然后在顶部，好吧，我不能没有这个，现在我明白了它的用途，感觉这对于那些看到“好吧，保存的物品”的人来说，这是一种真正不同的思考方式，让他们看到，好吧，保存的物品，我明白了，我需要不断地使用它。

It feels like this works both for a specific feature and also just for Slack, getting people to even understand here's what Slack can do for you.

感觉这既适用于特定功能，也适用于 Slack，让人们甚至了解 Slack 可以为您做什么。

And then now I can't live without Slack.

现在我的生活离不开 Slack。

And essentially this is a lens you use to figure out where to spend product resources because if you don't get up that curve to I get it and I can't live without it, nothing else matters.

从本质上讲，这是一个你用来弄清楚在哪里花费产品资源的镜头，因为如果你没有达到这个曲线，我就明白了，没有它我就无法生活，其他一切都不重要。

Is that the framework?

是这个框架吗？

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah, and I think then you layer on another concept like the, Bezos used the term divine discontent.

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah, and I think then you layer on another concept like the, Bezos used the term divine discontent.

The line actually moves because once people are familiar with a piece of software or the way a feature is implemented or something like that, their standards go up, and so there's this competition.

实际上，这条线是在移动的，因为一旦人们熟悉了一款软件或某个功能的实现方式或类似的东西，他们的标准就会提高，所以就会出现这种竞争。

And again, this axis can be, utility is the best general term for it, but it could be quality, convenience, speed, it could be any number of things, but as you improve your search capability or as you improve your login experience or your forget password experience or your checkout experience or whatever everyone else is as well.

再说一遍，这个轴可以是，实用性是它的最佳通用术语，但它可以是质量、便利性、速度，它可以是任何数量的东西，但当你提高你的搜索能力或当你改善你的登录体验或你忘记密码的体验或你的结账体验或其他人的任何东西。

And so there's this continued investment and when forget about thinking about a new feature, you're looking at how the product works overall and usually things get implemented once, and then if they're lucky, they get improved upon periodically.

因此，存在持续的投资，当忘记考虑新功能时，您会关注产品的整体工作原理，通常事情会实现一次，然后如果幸运的话，它们会定期得到改进。

Most things get improved upon very infrequently and some things get improved upon never.

Most things get improved upon very infrequently and some things get improved upon never.

Stewart Butterfield: I want to give an example at the absolute extreme because I actually don't know how long this has been, but I try not to criticize other people's software so much because I'm very familiar with the trade-offs and prioritization and how hard it can be and blah, blah, blah, blah.

Stewart Butterfield：我想举一个绝对极端的例子，因为我实际上不知道这已经持续了多久，但我尽量不过多批评其他人的软件，因为我非常熟悉其中的权衡和优先级以及它的难度，等等，等等，等等。

But okay, so most people have the Gmail Calendar app on their phone.

不过没关系，大多数人的手机上都有 Gmail 日历应用程序。

I travel a fair bit.

我经常出差。

I'm mostly in the Eastern Time Zone, sometimes in Mountain Time, sometimes in Pacific, sometimes in English time, and sometimes in Japan, Central Europe.

我主要在东部时区，有时在山地时间，有时在太平洋时间，有时在英国时间，有时在日本、中欧。

There's maybe 10 time zones, 12 time zones that I would ever choose.

我可能会选择 10 个时区、12 个时区。

When you hit the option to set the time zone on an event in Google Calendar, on the iOS app, it presents all the time zones in the world in alphabetical order.

当您在 Google 日历中点击设置活动时区的选项时，iOS 应用程序上会按字母顺序显示世界上所有时区。

And I mean, there's probably worse orderings, but there's no value in that.

我的意思是，可能会有更糟糕的订单，但这没有任何价值。

Stewart Butterfield: And even when you start searching, it still presents them in alphabetical order by country with that turn.

Stewart Butterfield：即使您开始搜索，它仍然会按国家/地区的字母顺序显示它们。

So if I'm in California and I'm trying to set the appointment for next week when I'm back in New York and I type in E-A-S-T and I get a bunch of garbage, okay, Eastern, and then the first one is Eastern Australia, New South Wales, and then Eastern Australia, Queensland, and then Eastern Australia, Daylight Savings and Eastern Australia standard time.

所以，如果我在加利福尼亚州，我想在下周回到纽约时安排约会，我输入 E-A-S-T，然后我得到一堆垃圾，好吧，东部，然后第一个是澳大利亚东部、新南威尔士，然后是澳大利亚东部、昆士兰，然后是澳大利亚东部、夏令时和澳大利亚东部标准时间。

And then you're like, "Well, fuck, I can't remember which one is Daylight Savings and which one is standard time?" I could keep going like this for a while.

然后你会想，“好吧，操，我不记得哪一个是夏令时，哪一个是标准时间？”我可以继续这样一段时间。

This is an app that's used by at least hundreds of millions of people, presumably every single Google employee.

这是一款至少有数亿人使用的应用程序，大概是每一位 Google 员工都在使用。

It's bananas how bad it is.

香蕉有多糟糕。

There's so many, there's all these clever things you could do.

有这么多，你可以做所有这些聪明的事情。

Like you know me, I'm on the West Coast, first option should be the East Coast and vice versa.

就像你认识我一样，我在西海岸，第一选择应该是东海岸，反之亦然。

But it definitely shouldn't be that every time zone is presented with equal value.

但绝对不应该每个时区都具有相同的价值。

I don't a couple hundred time zones.

我没有几百个时区。

I grew up in Canada.

我在加拿大长大。

Newfoundland has its own time zone, which is offset by half an hour.

纽芬兰有自己的时区，时差半小时。

The population of Newfoundland has about half a million people.

纽芬兰的人口约有五十万。

Not that many people go to visit Newfoundland, maybe a million people in all of history so like a million and a half out of 8 billion people.

去纽芬兰旅游的人并不多，历史上可能有一百万人，就像八十亿人中的一百五十万人一样。

And there's Newfoundland, the same with China time, which is like 25% of the world's population in this.

还有纽芬兰，与中国时间相同，这里的人口约占世界人口的25%。

Stewart Butterfield: Anyway, that was a little bit longer than I intended to go on this example, but it's crazy because no one's going to switch to Gmail or to G Suite, Google Calendar from Outlook Exchange because the time zone picker is good, so maybe in some sense it doesn't matter, but at the same time there's a real value in delighting customers and there's an emotional connection that they form or don't form.

Stewart Butterfield：无论如何，这比我打算继续这个例子的时间要长一点，但这很疯狂，因为没有人会因为时区选择器很好而从 Outlook Exchange 切换到 Gmail 或 G Suite、Google 日历，所以也许在某种意义上这并不重要，但与此同时，取悦客户确实具有价值，并且他们形成或不形成情感联系。

And in some cases that could be really positive like they would recommend it.

在某些情况下，这可能非常积极，就像他们推荐的那样。

And when they switch companies or decide to start their own company, they're going to choose to use this product or advocate for it because of that emotional connection and vice versa.

当他们更换公司或决定创办自己的公司时，他们会因为这种情感联系而选择使用该产品或倡导它，反之亦然。

Stewart Butterfield: They'll also be like, "I hate this thing that drives me bananas.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：他们也会说，“我讨厌这个让我发疯的东西。

I really think we should stop using it," or advocate for the alternative.

我真的认为我们应该停止使用它，”或者提倡替代方案。

And I think people just don't appreciate or come back to those things often enough.

我认为人们只是不太欣赏或经常回顾这些事情。

And then there's this category of really essential parts of the app again like account creation, sign up, forgot password, things like that, that for most organizations very infrequently get a lot of love and iteration and improvement despite the fact that the quality bar has gone up across the board and continually goes up.

然后还有应用程序中真正重要的部分，例如帐户创建、注册、忘记密码等，对于大多数组织来说，尽管质量标准已经全面提高并且不断提高，但对于大多数组织来说，这些部分很少得到很多爱、迭代和改进。

Lenny Rachitsky: Let's go down that rabbit hole a little bit more around delight and craft.

Lenny Rachitsky：让我们进一步围绕快乐和工艺深入探讨这个兔子洞。

Slack was famous for being one of the early, let's say consumerized B2B SaaS products.

Slack 因其早期消费化 B2B SaaS 产品之一而闻名。

Slack leaned into delight and experience and craft and a great experience.

Slack 倾向于快乐、体验、工艺和很棒的体验。

And you just as a product leader, I'd say are known as very taste forward, very craft oriented leader, which is pretty rare and I think continues to be rare.

我想说，你作为产品领导者，被认为是非常品味前卫、非常注重工艺的领导者，这非常罕见，而且我认为仍然很少见。

So there's a few things I want to talk about here.

所以我想在这里谈谈一些事情。

One is taste.

一是品味。

I heard at a talk, you gave a talk on taste and you have a really unique perspective on just what taste is, what product taste looks like.

我在一次演讲中听说，你做了一个关于味道的演讲，你对味道是什么、产品味道是什么样子有非常独特的视角。

Can you share that?

你能分享一下吗？

Stewart Butterfield: There is a lot of you going back to the utility curves again, people who are obsessed with this one little thing and keep on adding more and more detailed improvements beyond the point where it makes much of a difference.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：你们中的很多人再次回到效用曲线，人们痴迷于这一点小事，并不断添加越来越多的细节改进，超出了它产生很大影响的程度。

But I guess a couple of things about taste.

但我想有一些关于味道的事情。

So one is can you learn to develop it?

那么一是你能学会开发它吗？

I think so because the word literally comes from experiencing food and putting stuff in your mouth.

我想是的，因为这个词的字面意思是体验食物并将东西放进嘴里。

And can people become better chefs with training?

人们可以通过培训成为更好的厨师吗？

Yes, absolutely.

是的，绝对是。

Undoubtedly, some people have a natural advantage and are born with this ability to make discernments that are difficult for other people to make and stuff like that.

毫无疑问，有些人有天生的优势，天生就有这种能力，能够做出别人很难做出的辨别之类的事情。

But you can definitely practice and you can definitely get better.

但你绝对可以练习，并且绝对可以变得更好。

The second thing I'd say is you can create a real advantage for yourself, for your product, for your company by leaning into it because most people don't have good taste and don't invest.

我要说的第二件事是，你可以通过投入为自己、为你的产品、为你的公司创造真正的优势，因为大多数人没有良好的品味，也不会投资。

You're probably familiar with, again, Jeff Bezos line, your margin is my opportunity and pretty obvious what he meant by that.

你可能又熟悉杰夫·贝佐斯的一句话，你的利润就是我的机会，他的意思很明显。

Stewart Butterfield: I would tell the story at Slack over and over again.

Stewart Butterfield：我会在 Slack 上一遍又一遍地讲述这个故事。

It actually made it part of the new hire welcome.

这实际上使它成为新员工欢迎的一部分。

I'm in Vancouver at our Vancouver office and I'm going for a walk with Brandon Velestuk who's our, at the time creative director for product development, I think that was his title.

我在温哥华的温哥华办事处，打算和我们的 Brandon Velestuk 一起散步，他当时是产品开发的创意总监，我想这就是他的头衔。

And we're in the Yaletown neighborhood in Vancouver so there's really narrow sidewalks because it used to be a warehouse district and now it's fancy restaurants and nail salons and boutiques and stuff.

我们位于温哥华的耶鲁镇附近，所以人行道非常狭窄，因为它曾经是一个仓库区，现在是高档餐厅、美甲沙龙、精品店等。

And as it does in Vancouver, it starts to rain.

就像温哥华一样，开始下雨。

We don't have umbrellas.

我们没有雨伞。

We're walking back to the office and most people have umbrellas and we're on these narrow sidewalks with people coming towards us with umbrellas.

我们走回办公室，大多数人都带着雨伞，我们在狭窄的人行道上，人们带着雨伞向我们走来。

We noticed how few people would move their umbrella out of the way.

我们注意到很少有人会把伞移开。

And of course, the other person, their umbrella, the pokey bits are exactly at eye level for people walking towards them.

当然，另一个人、他们的雨伞、那些小东西正好在人们走向他们的视线水平处。

We would get forced off the sidewalk or having to duck down or whatever.

我们会被迫离开人行道或不得不蹲下或其他什么。

Stewart Butterfield: It became a game like we were guessing is this person going to tilt their umbrella out of the way so we can pass or not?

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：这变成了一场游戏，就像我们猜测这个人是否会将雨伞倾斜，以便我们可以通过或不通过？

And something like one-third of the people would do it.

大约有三分之一的人会这么做。

And we had this conversation about it where it's like, okay, I can think of three reasons why people wouldn't do it.

我们就此进行了一次对话，感觉是，好吧，我可以想到人们不这样做的三个原因。

One is they have very few avenues in their life to exercise power and this is one of them.

一是他们在生活中行使权力的途径很少，这就是其中之一。

And they're just, want to get out there and dominate people and cause suffering.

他们只是想出去统治人们并造成痛苦。

Shouldn't ascribe to malice that which can be ascribed to ignorance so that probably is the explanation for a tiny, tiny, tiny percentage of people.

不应该将可以归因于无知的恶意归咎于恶意，因此这可能是一小部分人的解释。

Stewart Butterfield: But the other two explanations aren't that great either.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但其他两种解释也不是那么好。

One is that they see it's happening, they see they're pushing other people off the sidewalk or poking them in the eye or whatever, and they're just like, "Fuck, that's too bad.

一是他们看到事情正在发生，他们看到自己把其他人推离人行道，或者戳他们的眼睛等等，然后他们就会说，“操，那太糟糕了。

I wish there was something I could do about that, but I can't think of anything." And the last reason is they just don't notice it all.

我希望我能为此做点什么，但我想不出什么。”最后一个原因是他们没有注意到这一切。

They're just oblivious to their impact on other people.

他们只是忘记了自己对其他人的影响。

And they're so in their head, and I can't really think of any other explanations for it besides that.

他们的想法如此强烈，除此之外我实在想不出任何其他解释。

Stewart Butterfield: And so we would say it's not like tilting your umbrella is our opportunity.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：所以我们会说倾斜你的伞并不是我们的机会。

That's not a great rephrase of your margin is my opportunity, but your failure to really be consider it exercise this courtesy and really be empathic about other people's experience is an advantage that you can create a critical advantage.

这并不是对“你的利润是我的机会”的一个很好的改写，但你未能真正考虑到这种礼貌并真正对其他人的经历产生同理心，这是你可以创造关键优势的优势。

I think that there's many reasons why Slack was successful at the moment.

我认为 Slack 目前取得成功的原因有很多。

It was successful and we think we had a bunch of really wonderful tailwinds and all of that stuff, but it wouldn't have grown the way it did without those little conveniences which caused people to form an emotional connection because a lot of our growth came from startup A uses Slack, and then someone leaves startup A for startup B, and startup B doesn't use Slack yet.

它很成功，我们认为我们有很多非常好的顺风车和所有这些东西，但如果没有那些让人们形成情感联系的小便利，它就不会像现在这样发展，因为我们的很多增长来自初创公司 A 使用 Slack，然后有人离开初创公司 A 去了初创公司 B，而初创公司 B 还没有使用 Slack。

And they would be like, "Oh my God, you guys, you really, this is so good.

他们会说，“天啊，你们，真的，这太棒了。

We got to try it." And the spread was driven by that and people really genuinely advocating for it.

我们必须尝试一下。”传播是由这一点推动的，人们也真诚地倡导它。

Lenny Rachitsky: That is an amazing metaphor.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这是一个令人惊奇的比喻。

I love that one moment became a value of product craftsmanship at Slack.

我喜欢那一刻成为 Slack 产品工艺的价值。

Stewart Butterfield: Tilt your umbrella was a very common saying on company swag and stuff like that.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：“倾斜你的雨伞”是公司赃物之类的一个非常常见的说法。

Lenny Rachitsky: Is there an example, I imagine there are many, but from the time of building Slack, especially in the early days where you chose to go big on craftsmanship and experience and delight versus speed where you thought looking back that was a really great idea and worth really core just to success.

Lenny Rachitsky：有没有这样的例子，我想有很多，但是从构建 Slack 的时候开始，特别是在早期，你选择在工艺、经验和快乐而不是速度上大做文章，你认为回顾过去，这是一个非常伟大的想法，并且值得成为成功的核心。

Stewart Butterfield: Here's a bunch of little examples.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：这里有很多小例子。

Someone else came up with this idea, and I'm trying to remember who it was, but let's see, maybe Andrea Torres, maybe Ben Brown, something like that who was like, "Why did we ask people for email address and password if their ownership of the email address was the thing that allowed them to create the account in the first place?

其他人提出了这个想法，我试图记住是谁，但让我们看看，也许是安德里亚·托雷斯，也许是本·布朗，类似的人，“如果他们对电子邮件地址的所有权是他们首先创建帐户的原因，为什么我们要要求人们提供电子邮件地址和密码呢？

Why don't we just ask them for their email address and then send them a link?"

我们为什么不直接询问他们的电子邮件地址，然后向他们发送链接呢？”

Stewart Butterfield: And so when Slack's first version of the mobile app came out, we're like, "Typing your password on your phone if you have any minimal threshold of password hygiene is a terrible experience." Capital H, lowercase Q, six, caret, period.

Stewart Butterfield：因此，当 Slack 的第一个移动应用程序版本推出时，我们会说，“如果您对密码卫生有任何最低限度的限制，那么在手机上输入密码将是一种糟糕的体验。”大写 H、小写 Q、六、插入符、句点。

So let's just have them enter the email address.

因此，让他们输入电子邮件地址即可。

We'll send them a link.

我们将向他们发送链接。

The link will automatically open the app and authenticate them.

该链接将自动打开应用程序并对其进行身份验证。

And so there's one, a little example.

这里有一个小例子。

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：哇。

So you guys invented the magic link experience.

所以你们发明了魔法链接体验。

Stewart Butterfield: Someone else invented.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是别人发明的。

I want to be clear that I had seen that idea somewhere else, someone else, a blog post about it or something like that.

我想澄清的是，我曾在其他地方、其他人、关于它的博客文章或类似的东西看到过这个想法。

But we were the first ones, to my knowledge, that really scaled that and made it a standard.

但据我所知，我们是第一批真正扩大规模并使其成为标准的公司。

There is another one which we really puzzled about in the very early days where people have a long history of using messaging apps from AOL Instant Messenger to SMS to WhatsApp, where their expectation is they get a notification for every message that's received.

还有一个问题是我们在早期真正感到困惑的，人们长期以来一直使用从 AOL Instant Messenger 到 SMS 到 WhatsApp 等消息应用程序，他们的期望是收到的每条消息都会收到通知。

And in the case of Slack, that doesn't make as much sense because you're a member of many channels and the messages may not be for you, and so that's why we have the @ tagging people.

就 Slack 而言，这没有多大意义，因为你是许多频道的成员，而这些消息可能不适合你，所以这就是为什么我们有 @ 标签的人。

And we certainly didn't invent that, that was Twitter.

当然，这不是我们发明的，那就是 Twitter。

Stewart Butterfield: But what we realized was people were signing up for Slack, and it's one engineer on this team inside of this larger organization, inside this larger company, and they would pull in the person next to them and they would say, "Let's try it out."

Stewart Butterfield：但我们意识到，人们注册了 Slack，这是这个更大的组织、更大的公司内部团队中的一名工程师，他们会拉来旁边的人，他们会说，“让我们尝试一下。”

Stewart Butterfield: And then they would send a message and then one person would be like, "I didn't get a notification.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：然后他们会发送一条消息，然后一个人会说，“我没有收到通知。

This is bullshit."

这是胡说八道。”

Stewart Butterfield: We reluctantly decided that we had to send notifications for every single message as the default for new accounts.

Stewart Butterfield：我们不情愿地决定必须为每条消息发送通知作为新帐户的默认设置。

But once you had, I don't remember what the threshold would happen, I think it's once you had received 10 messages, we would pop up this little thing that says, "Hey, you have our default settings for notifications.

但是一旦你有了，我不记得阈值会发生什么，我想一旦你收到了 10 条消息，我们就会弹出这个小东西，上面写着：“嘿，你有我们的默认通知设置。

We don't want Slack to be noisy for you.

我们不希望 Slack 对您造成噪音。

Would you like to switch to our-"

你想切换到我们的——”

Stewart Butterfield: ...

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：……

For notifications.

用于通知。

We don't want Slack to be noisy for you.

我们不希望 Slack 对您造成噪音。

Would you like to switch to our recommended settings?

您想切换到我们推荐的设置吗？

And then they would just click a link and it would have what should be the default, which is, you only get a notification if it's a DM or someone tags you.

然后他们只需点击一个链接，它就会有默认的内容，也就是说，只有当它是私信或有人标记你时，你才会收到通知。

But we realized it was worth that investment to get people over the hump.

但我们意识到，帮助人们渡过难关的投资是值得的。

I'll give one more simple one and then one kind of more complex.

我将给出一种更简单的，然后一种更复杂的。

One, people would just like the, I can't remember if it's called urgent or important, but the flag in Outlook, set the priority of a message for the recipients always got abused inside of every company.

第一，人们只是喜欢，我不记得它是否被称为紧急或重要，但 Outlook 中为收件人设置邮件优先级的标志在每个公司内部总是被滥用。

As soon as someone does it, everyone's like, "Okay, I'm going to do that too for my message."

一旦有人这样做，每个人都会说：“好吧，我也会为了我的信息而这样做。”

Stewart Butterfield: And so all of your messages have the little flag and it becomes useless.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：所以你所有的消息都有这个小标志，它就变得毫无用处。

We have @everyone, which causes a notification to be sent to every member of the channel when the message is sent and people would start, someone would find this feature inside of a organization.

我们有@everyone，当消息发送并且人们开始时，这会导致向频道的每个成员发送通知，有人会在组织内部找到此功能。

They would @everyone, everyone would get a notification and then the next person to send a message who was like, " Well, my thing's more important than Bob's thing.

他们会@everyone，每个人都会收到通知，然后下一个发送消息的人会说：“好吧，我的事情比鲍勃的事情更重要。

I'm going to also @everyone." And it became really obnoxious and people would complain about it, but it was, I don't know, I guess tragedy of the commons.

我也会@everyone。”它变得非常令人讨厌，人们会抱怨它，但我不知道，我猜这是公地悲剧。

It's not quite exactly the same thing, but it was this real dynamic that happened over and over again.

这并不完全是同一件事，但这种真实的动态一次又一次地发生。

Stewart Butterfield: So we came up with what was called the shouty rooster, and internally we said, "Don't be a cock." But we didn't obviously say that publicly when you @everyone, a little rooster would pop up and it would have you sound waves coming out of its mouth and being really obnoxious and say, "Hey, this is going to cause a notification for 147 people in eight different time zones.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：所以我们想出了所谓的叫喊公鸡，我们在内心说，“不要做一只公鸡。”但我们并没有明确公开地说，当你@everyone 时，一只小公鸡会突然出现，它会让你从它的嘴里发出声波，非常令人讨厌，并说：“嘿，这将导致八个不同时区的 147 个人收到通知。

Are you sure you want to send this message with the @everyone?" And of course, that worked amazingly and it dropped off.

您确定要与@everyone 一起发送此消息吗？”当然，这非常有效，但效果却下降了。

And again, it was really trying to shape people's behavior so that they used, one is not to be very flexible, but we knew that there was ways to use it that would be annoying and difficult for everyone.

再说一次，它确实试图塑造人们的行为，以便他们使用，一种不是非常灵活，但我们知道有一些使用它的方法对每个人来说都是烦人和困难的。

And so try to shape the communication culture inside the organization to take best advantage on it.

因此，请尝试塑造组织内部的沟通文化，以充分利用它。

Lenny Rachitsky: That feature still exists.

Lenny Rachitsky：这个功能仍然存在。

I see that rooster all the, no, I don't see it all, well, actually I do @channel, because I run a big Slack, so I see that rooster, that survived.

我看到了那只公鸡，不，我没有看到全部，好吧，实际上我看到了@channel，因为我运行了一个很大的 Slack，所以我看到了那只幸存下来的公鸡。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

Yeah, that survived and good because it was a trivially easy thing to implement and made a really big difference.

是的，它幸存了下来并且很好，因为它是一件非常容易实施的事情，并且产生了很大的变化。

But it also taught people how the product worked, because people probably didn't know that @everyone or @channel...

但它也教会了人们该产品是如何工作的，因为人们可能不知道@everyone或@channel......

Didn't think about the cost, at least.

至少没有考虑成本。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

Here's one more.

这里还有一个。

So we decided we were going to Do Not Disturb as a feature.

所以我们决定将“请勿打扰”作为一项功能。

And we had this, not conundrum, but you're trying to take into account all the different uses of Slack because by the time we implemented this, 2017, there was tens of thousands of paying customers, the organizations, hundreds of probably millions of users, maybe hundreds of thousands of organizations.

我们遇到了这个，不是难题，但你要考虑 Slack 的所有不同用途，因为当我们在 2017 年实现这一点时，已经有数以万计的付费客户、组织、数以亿计甚至数百万的用户，也许还有数十万个组织。

I don't remember how many.

我不记得有多少了。

And everyone had set up stuff the way that they liked it, including things like ops alerts going into channels for on-call engineers for some of the biggest systems and apps in the world.

每个人都按照自己喜欢的方式设置了一些东西，包括将操作警报输入到世界上一些最大的系统和应用程序的待命工程师的渠道中。

And so we couldn't just deploy it right away.

所以我们不能立即部署它。

We realized that some of the decision-makers, the owners of the organizations were going to have really strong opinions about this.

我们意识到一些决策者、组织的所有者对此会有非常强烈的意见。

We also realized that some of the end users are going to have strong opinions, and we wanted to figure out a way to balance the concerns and give people appropriate means of control.

我们还意识到一些最终用户会有强烈的意见，我们希望找到一种方法来平衡这些担忧并为人们提供适当的控制手段。

Stewart Butterfield: So we came up with this really elaborate system for the rollout, which was, we told everyone, I'm sorry, every Slack administrator that this was coming weeks before it came.

Stewart Butterfield：所以我们想出了一个非常复杂的系统来进行部署，我们告诉每个人，对不起，每个 Slack 管理员，这将在几周前到来。

And we told them that we were going to set a default for their organization, which I believe was either 7:00 P.M.

我们告诉他们，我们将为他们的组织设置默认值，我认为是晚上 7:00 到下午 7:00。

to 7:00 A.M.

至上午 7:00

in their local time zone, or 8: 00 A.M.

在当地时区，或上午 8: 00

to 8:00 P.M., I can't remember which it was, but also that they could override that default, and also that the individual end users could override that system owner default.

到晚上 8:00，我不记得它是什么，但他们可以覆盖该默认值，而且各个最终用户也可以覆盖该系统所有者的默认值。

And finally, that the system owner could, if they changed the default again, would override all of the end user's preferences and then the end users could override them again.

最后，如果系统所有者再次更改默认值，则可以覆盖最终用户的所有首选项，然后最终用户可以再次覆盖它们。

And it wasn't to create this dynamic where people were at war, but so that you could change a policy and then people could still customize and stuff like that.

这并不是为了在人们处于战争状态时创造这种动态，而是为了让你可以改变政策，然后人们仍然可以定制诸如此类的东西。

Stewart Butterfield: But this was a much longer and more convoluted process, but it allowed the millions of people who were using Slack to get the feature without creating a bunch of conflict and without people turning it off automatically.

Stewart Butterfield：但这是一个更长、更复杂的过程，但它允许数百万使用 Slack 的人获得该功能，而不会造成一堆冲突，也不会让人自动关闭它。

And I think critically, with setting a bunch of defaults, because if we didn't set the default, most people wouldn't turn it on at all.

我认为，通过设置一堆默认值，我认为至关重要，因为如果我们不设置默认值，大多数人根本不会打开它。

If we didn't default you to Do Not Disturb from 8:00 P.M.

如果我们没有默认您从晚上 8:00 开始请勿打扰

to 8:00 A.M.

至上午 8:00

you probably, if you're the average person, wouldn't ever do it yourself.

如果您是普通人，您可能永远不会自己这样做。

So that's another elaborate example where I think that investment made sense because it was a critical feature for a lot of people.

这是另一个详细的例子，我认为投资是有意义的，因为它对很多人来说是一个关键功能。

And if we hadn't done it that way, I think it would've caused a lot of complaints and conflict and stuff like that.

如果我们不这样做，我认为这会引起很多抱怨和冲突之类的事情。

Lenny Rachitsky: Those are amazing examples.

Lenny Rachitsky：这些都是很棒的例子。

I very much appreciate that Do Not Disturb feature when you guys launched that.

我非常感谢你们推出“请勿打扰”功能。

I still remember that coming out.

我还记得那件事出来了。

I'm sure a lot of people are very thankful for that.

我相信很多人对此都非常感激。

Lenny Rachitsky: Something else I heard that you often espouse, which is counterintuitive to a lot of people is about friction, friction in the product experience.

Lenny Rachitsky：我听说你经常支持的另一件事是关于摩擦，产品体验中的摩擦，这对很多人来说是违反直觉的。

That friction is actually often a good thing.

这种摩擦实际上通常是一件好事。

It's a feature, not a bug a lot of times if you use it well.

如果你用得好的话，很多时候它是一个功能，而不是一个错误。

Talk about your experience there.

谈谈你在那里的经历。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

So yes, and there's also another issue around friction, which is it became like a mantra or just kind of an assumption that you should always be trying to remove friction.

所以，是的，关于摩擦还有另一个问题，那就是它变得像一个咒语，或者只是一种假设，即你应该始终尝试消除摩擦。

And in some cases that's true.

在某些情况下确实如此。

We would talk about it in Slack.

我们会在 Slack 中讨论它。

It was hard to market.

很难推向市场。

It was hard to explain what it was if you had never used it before.

如果您以前从未使用过它，则很难解释它是什么。

You could say a messaging app for businesses or whatever, but a critical disadvantage to Slack doing out-of-home advertising, putting up a billboard versus beer or cars is, no one needs to be explained why they would want a car or beer, but everyone will have to explain one day why they want Slack.

你可以说它是一款面向企业或其他用途的消息应用程序，但与啤酒或汽车相比，Slack 做户外广告、张贴广告牌的一个关键缺点是，没有人需要解释为什么他们想要一辆汽车或啤酒，但有一天每个人都必须解释为什么他们想要 Slack。

And so the problem there is comprehension, and this will come up an enormous amount.

所以问题是理解，而且这个问题会出现很多。

So now imagine you want to get tickets to the Taylor Swift concert in San Francisco and you go to the Ticketmaster website.

现在想象一下，您想要获得旧金山泰勒·斯威夫特 (Taylor Swift) 演唱会的门票，您可以访问 Ticketmaster 网站。

Stewart Butterfield: If you think about both your comprehension, it's perfect to this case.

Stewart Butterfield：如果你考虑一下你的理解，那么对于这个例子来说它是完美的。

And that translates into the specificity of your intent and the degree of your intent is also kind of maxed out.

这转化为你的意图的特殊性，并且你的意图的程度也达到了极限。

So look, I really want to get these tickets.

所以看，我真的很想得到这些票。

I know exactly what they are.

我清楚地知道它们是什么。

They're Taylor Swift tickets for this date at this venue.

这些是泰勒·斯威夫特 (Taylor Swift) 当天在该场馆的门票。

And so in that scenario, it doesn't really matter if Ticketmaster's website is slow, it doesn't really matter if the payments page errors out, you're going to persist and get through it.

因此，在这种情况下，Ticketmaster 的网站是否缓慢并不重要，支付页面是否出错也并不重要，您将坚持下去并完成它。

So obviously they're better to reduce friction, but in some sense there's not a huge amount of value in doing that.

显然，它们可以更好地减少摩擦，但从某种意义上说，这样做并没有太大的价值。

For most creators of products, there are a handful of cases where that really is true for you as well.

对于大多数产品创造者来说，在少数情况下，这对您来说也确实如此。

And they include things like user registration, authentication, checkout flows for e-commerce.

它们包括电子商务的用户注册、身份验证、结账流程等。

I am significantly more likely to buy something if there's Apple Pay or Shop Pay or something like that.

如果有 Apple Pay 或 Shop Pay 或类似的东西，我更有可能购买东西。

Stewart Butterfield: I'm significantly less likely to carry through the purchase of something if I have to manually enter all of the fields of my address one at a time rather than having one of those address pickers.

Stewart Butterfield：如果我必须一次一个地手动输入我的地址的所有字段，而不是使用这些地址选择器之一，那么我购买某样东西的可能性就会大大降低。

It's crazy, but the issue is my intent isn't always 100%, and the specificity of my intent isn't always 100%.

这很疯狂，但问题是我的意图并不总是 100%，而且我的意图的特异性并不总是 100%。

So if your thing is direct to consumer T-shirts and you acquire customers through Instagram ads, all of them know what T-shirts are.

因此，如果您的产品是直接面向消费者的 T 恤，并且您通过 Instagram 广告获取客户，那么所有人都知道 T 恤是什么。

It's like, "This looks like a good T-shirt to me." But I'm rarely 100% intent.

就像，“这对我来说看起来像是一件不错的 T 恤。”但我很少有 100% 的意图。

I might have a very specific intent, but my intent's like 70%.

我可能有一个非常具体的意图，但我的意图大约是 70%。

So if you're, the amount of friction is above that, I'm not going to do it.

所以如果你的摩擦力超过这个值，我就不会这样做。

But now, okay, people coming to Slack.com, some friend had mentioned Slack and talked their ear off at some point months ago, and then they saw a news article and then they saw someone's tweet and then they saw an ad on about the website they were visiting and they finally said, "Okay, I'm going to go to this website."

但现在，好吧，人们来到 Slack.com，一些朋友在几个月前的某个时候提到了 Slack 并大谈特谈，然后他们看到了一篇新闻文章，然后他们看到了某人的推文，然后他们看到了有关他们正在访问的网站的广告，他们最后说，“好吧，我要去这个网站。”

Stewart Butterfield: So their intent is at the absolute minimum threshold, it was before that last event happened, they were below and now they're above, but they're just above.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：所以他们的意图是处于绝对最低阈值，在最后一个事件发生之前，他们低于，现在他们高于，但他们只是高于。

The specificity of their intent like, "I need to get Taylor Swift concerts for this date at this venue." Is also very low, because they're like, "It's a work thing.

他们的意图很具体，比如“我需要在这个场地举办泰勒·斯威夫特的演唱会。”也非常低，因为他们会说，“这是工作的事情。

I'm not sure it's a spreadsheet or a calendar or exactly what it is." So they were coming in at 0.1% over these critical thresholds.

我不确定它是电子表格还是日历，或者到底是什么。”因此，他们的收入比这些关键阈值高出 0.1%。

What was the challenge?

挑战是什么？

It wasn't friction, because it's not like they were aiming for something and they knew what they were aiming for and they were just trying to get themselves to that point.

这不是摩擦，因为这并不是说他们的目标是什么，他们知道自己的目标是什么，他们只是试图让自己达到那个目标。

Stewart Butterfield: What we had to worry about was creating comprehension and in two senses, what is this thing?

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我们必须担心的是创造理解力，从两个意义上来说，这是什么东西？

And what am I supposed to do next?

接下来我应该做什么？

And that creation of comprehension in the sense of explaining stuff, that creation of comprehension in the sense of the design of the UI, of the screen, of the page or whatever, and the visual hierarchy and the affordances that are there and the indication of things to interact with and which thing should be the next thing to do and all that stuff, that becomes really critical.

在解释事物的意义上创建理解，在 UI、屏幕、页面或其他任何设计的意义上创建理解，以及视觉层次结构和可供性，以及要与之交互的事物的指示，以及下一步应该做的事情以及所有这些东西，这变得非常关键。

Stewart Butterfield: And I think very, very few people recognize that.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我认为很少有人认识到这一点。

They're like, "I want to get people who come to my webpage to the sign up form as quickly as possible." But if they don't know what they're signing up for and they don't know what it's going to do after, is it going to spam them?

他们就像是，“我想让访问我网页的人尽快填写注册表单。”但如果他们不知道自己要注册什么，也不知道注册后会做什么，它会向他们发送垃圾邮件吗？

They don't know, "Am I going to have to pay on the next step or what?" Then they're just going to back out.

他们不知道，“我是否需要为下一步付费或者什么？”然后他们就会退出。

And this was a lifelong battle because the remove friction orientation is so deep in people.

这是一场终生的战斗，因为消除摩擦的取向在人们心中根深蒂固。

Again, it really makes a difference in those cases where people do have an intent and they do know what they're trying to do is a poor approach when the challenge is really comprehension, and I think the secret is most, 70%, 80% or whatever of a product design is in that comprehension step because people, if they do ever open the preferences tab and look at all the options, rarely have an idea.

再说一遍，在人们确实有意图并且他们确实知道自己正在尝试做的事情是一种糟糕的方法的情况下，当挑战真正是理解时，这确实会产生影响，我认为产品设计的大部分（70%、80% 或其他）都在该理解步骤中，因为人们，如果他们打开首选项选项卡并查看所有选项，很少有想法。

Stewart Butterfield: And if you can't teach them or make it possible for them to discover what the capabilities are, then they're not going to take advantage of them and they're not going to get as much out of it.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：如果你不能教他们或让他们发现能力是什么，那么他们就不会利用这些能力，也不会从中获得太多好处。

And I think that the trick is for most of the unique parts of any application, most of the specific things that your app, your product, your software does are areas where the challenge is going to be comprehension inside of friction.

我认为，对于任何应用程序的大多数独特部分，您的应用程序、您的产品、您的软件所做的大多数具体事情都是挑战在于理解摩擦的领域。

It really could be anything Shopify, the purpose of the service for its end users is generally going to be kind to clear.

它实际上可以是任何 Shopify，其最终用户的服务目的通常都很明确。

But most people, most first-time store openers don't know that they can get reports or if they know that they can get reports, they don't know what kinds of reports.

但大多数人，大多数第一次开店的人不知道他们可以获得报告，或者即使他们知道他们可以获得报告，他们也不知道是什么样的报告。

And if they know what kinds of reports they can get, they don't know how they can tweak them and what the timing should be and which things that are more important to display.

即使他们知道可以获得哪些类型的报告，他们也不知道如何调整这些报告、应该在什么时间以及哪些内容更需要显示。

Stewart Butterfield: And I could go on and on and on and on, and people just don't recognize that.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我可以一直说下去，但人们就是不认识这一点。

So I want to see if this is still true.

所以我想看看这是否仍然正确。

I'm just going to open my phone and clock app.

我要打开我的手机和时钟应用程序。

And they had the craziest description for alarms.

他们对警报有最疯狂的描述。

It's a little bit different, but people can look at their own phone.

有点不同，但人们可以查看自己的手机。

So I have, it says alarms and it says sleep and a vertical bar, wake up and says, no alarm, and a button that says change.

所以我有，它说闹钟，它说睡眠，还有一个垂直条，醒来后说，没有闹钟，还有一个说改变的按钮。

And then if you hit it, it says sleep is off.

如果你点击它，它就会说睡眠已关闭。

In order to automatically turn on sleep features and edit your schedule, you need to turn sleep on.

为了自动打开睡眠功能并编辑您的日程安排，您需要打开睡眠。

So obviously sleep was a good name for this thing if you already had a way of getting people to understand it.

因此，如果你已经有办法让人们理解它，那么显然“睡眠”是这个东西的一个好名字。

If you don't, it's ungrammatical and incomprehensible and why would you ever do it?

如果你不这样做，那就不符合语法且难以理解，你为什么要这样做呢？

And I got to guess, it's been like this for years, 90 plus percent and maybe 98% of people just do what I do, which is that you just create, "I want the alarm on and I'm going to set the time for it."

我猜，多年来一直都是这样，90%以上，甚至98%的人都会做我所做的事情，也就是说，你只需创建，“我想要闹钟响，我要为其设置时间。”

Stewart Butterfield: And I don't know what turning sleep on does, but it's just the lack of comprehension prevents people from getting the value.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我不知道打开睡眠会带来什么影响，但正是缺乏理解才阻碍了人们获得其价值。

And I'm sure that there's a bunch of value behind turning sleep on, whatever that means and people spend a lot of time on those features and it integrates with biometrics and your watch or who knows.

我确信打开睡眠背后有很多价值，无论这意味着什么，人们会花很多时间在这些功能上，它与生物识别技术和你的手表集成在一起，谁知道呢。

Again, I still don't know because turning sleep on is like, what does that do?

再说一次，我仍然不知道，因为打开睡眠就像，那有什么作用？

And what is it going to cost me?

我要付出什么代价？

And what impact it's going to have?

它将产生什么影响？

Those examples are just to me all over the place.

这些例子到处都是对我来说的。

And the reason I don't use most software where there was an actual choice point or the reason I don't use most features where there was a choice point for me is because I didn't understand what they were going to do and I don't give a shit.

我不使用大多数有实际选择点的软件，或者我不使用大多数有选择点的功能的原因是因为我不明白他们要做什么，而且我不在乎。

And if there is one mantra that I would use to replace that it's, Don't Make Me Think, I don't know if you remember that book.

如果我要用一个口头禅来代替的话，那就是“别让我思考”，我不知道你是否还记得那本书。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

And honestly, it's been many more than 10 years since I read it, so I don't even remember all of the examples in the book, but as a mantra that was up there with utility curves because for two reasons.

老实说，我读这本书已经有十多年了，所以我什至不记得书中的所有例子，但作为一个口头禅，它与效用曲线并列，因为有两个原因。

One is it's just like it's expensive to make a decision.

一是做出决定的成本很高。

You literally burn glucose.

你实际上燃烧了葡萄糖。

There's a metabolic action.

有新陈代谢作用。

There's ATP created in the mitochondria and your neurons and a bunch of stuff is happening and people do get decision fatigue and there is cognitive cost of all these things.

线粒体和神经元中会产生 ATP，并且正在发生很多事情，人们确实会感到决策疲劳，所有这些事情都会产生认知成本。

But also there's an emotional aspect, which is, if your software stops me a second and asks me to make a decision and I don't really understand it, you make me feel stupid.

但还有一个情感方面，那就是，如果你的软件让我停下来并要求我做出决定，而我并不真正理解它，你会让我觉得自己很愚蠢。

I'm like, "I don't understand this."

我想，“我不明白这一点。”

Stewart Butterfield: Some people, maybe their orientation is, "Okay, the software is stupid." But I think most people are like, "Oh, I'm dumb." And if you ever talk to people who aren't especially technologically savvy, the canonical example is people who are under 50 talking to their parents about using some piece of software and what they're supposed to do, the parents always feel stupid like they're the ones that are wrong.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：有些人，也许他们的取向是，“好吧，这个软件很愚蠢。”但我认为大多数人都会说：“哦，我很蠢。”如果你曾经和那些不太懂技术的人交谈过，典型的例子就是 50 岁以下的人与他们的父母谈论使用某种软件以及他们应该做什么，父母总是觉得自己很愚蠢，好像他们是错的人。

And so if you're causing people to think, in the best case, it's unnecessary use of their biological resources, and in the worst case you've now made them feel bad, emotionally bad, and they're going to associate that with the product forever.

因此，如果你让人们认为，在最好的情况下，这是不必要地使用他们的生物资源，而在最坏的情况下，你现在让他们感觉不好，情绪不好，他们会永远将其与产品联系起来。

And these are things that are just kind of rolling one into the other.

这些东西只是一种互相滚动的东西。

Stewart Butterfield: So I'm going to keep going with one last thing, because they just kind of come together, which is along with reduced friction, it's like reduce the number of clicks or taps it takes for someone to accomplish something which is almost always exactly the wrong thing.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：所以我将继续做最后一件事，因为它们只是聚集在一起，这会减少摩擦，就像减少某人完成某件事所需的点击或点击次数，而这几乎总是完全错误的事情。

It's the easiest way you could make any action in your app, a single click or tap by just exposing every single possibility on one screen that scrolls for thousands and thousands and thousands and thousands of pages.

这是您在应用程序中执行任何操作的最简单方法，只需单击一下或点击，即可在滚动数千页的屏幕上显示每一种可能性。

And obviously that's terrible.

显然这很糟糕。

So why do people think that a little bit of that is good?

那么为什么人们认为其中一点点是好的呢？

And here's an example.

这是一个例子。

You open a menu, there's 14 things that people might want to do.

你打开一个菜单，里面有 14 件人们可能想做的事情。

Stewart Butterfield: Level one is group them into like items and put a vertical, sorry, horizontal divider between them so at least people can kind of chunk and see what there is.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：第一级是将它们分成相似的项目，并在它们之间放置一个垂直的，抱歉，水平的分隔线，这样至少人们可以分块并看到有什么。

Step two is present the two or three most common things or the five most common things, whatever and then have some form of other and then you go to a sub menu that has more items and the decision of how to tune that becomes incredibly important.

第二步是呈现两个或三个最常见的事物或五个最常见的事物，无论什么，然后有某种形式的其他事物，然后您进入一个包含更多项目的子菜单，并且决定如何调整它变得非常重要。

I'm going to pick on Google again just because it is, I feel like I'm Donald Trump here, but I'm going to interrupt myself again with a story.

我会再次选择谷歌，因为它是，我觉得我是唐纳德·特朗普，但我会再次用一个故事打断自己。

It's-

这是——

Stewart Butterfield: At some conference or event, I don't remember what it was, and this is probably eight years ago and we're in the bar after the sessions ended at this thing.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：在某些会议或活动中，我不记得那是什么，这可能是八年前，会议结束后我们在酒吧里。

John Collison from Stripe is there and Sundar, CEO of Google is there.

Stripe 的约翰·科里森 (John Collison) 和谷歌首席执行官桑达尔 (Sundar) 也在场。

And John, sorry, Patrick goes up to Sundar and they can talk about anything.

约翰，抱歉，帕特里克去找桑达尔，他们可以谈论任何事情。

Stripe wasn't the behemoth, it was now at that point, but it was still a significant company, was up and coming.

Stripe 还不是庞然大物，但它仍然是一家重要的公司，正在崛起。

And what does Patrick want to talk to the Sundar about?

帕特里克想和桑达尔谈什么？

It's in the Gmail app, the dragging of people.

就是在Gmail应用里，拖人。

When you reply all to a message, you often want to change the two recipient to CC and move someone from CC to two or something like that.

当您回复所有邮件时，您通常希望将两个收件人更改为抄送，并将某人从抄送更改为两个或类似的操作。

And just how physically the degree of dexterity that's required to do that inside of the Gmail app is very high.

在 Gmail 应用程序内部执行此操作所需的灵活性非常高。

Stewart Butterfield: It still hasn't been fixed, but it really struck me that Patrick could have asked for anything.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：这个问题还没有得到解决，但帕特里克可以提出任何要求，这让我印象深刻。

It could have been any talk, it could have been a partnership.

可以是任何谈话，也可以是伙伴关系。

It was so irritating to him that it worked like this, he couldn't quite get over it.

这样的事情实在是太让他恼火了，他根本无法释怀。

So anyway, back to bashing on Google, who in many respects do an incredible job and there's all kinds of amazing stuff they do on blah, blah, blah, but the Gmail actions on an individual email are broken into two very long menu items that are different.

无论如何，回到对谷歌的抨击，谷歌在很多方面都做了令人难以置信的工作，他们在诸如此类的事情上做了各种各样令人惊奇的事情，但是针对单个电子邮件的 Gmail 操作被分成了两个非常长的不同菜单项。

And one of them doesn't exist on either menu.

其中一个在两个菜单上都不存在。

There is an unlabeled icon is the only way to do it, and that's to mark something as unread once it's read.

有一个未标记的图标是唯一的方法，那就是在阅读后将其标记为未读。

I have no idea why some of the actions are in one menu and some of the actions are in another menu.

我不知道为什么某些操作位于一个菜单中，而某些操作位于另一个菜单中。

I think it's because some of them have to do with an individual email and some of them have to do with the whole thread, but it doesn't seem very consistent.

我认为这是因为其中一些与单个电子邮件有关，有些与整个线程有关，但看起来不太一致。

Stewart Butterfield: Every possible thing is listed there in one place.

Stewart Butterfield：所有可能的事情都列在一个地方。

And so it becomes incredibly difficult to use because sometimes you have to tap in both menus, read all of the options, and say, "Okay, I've used the process of elimination and it's not here, so it must be there." Uber doesn't work like this anymore, but when I first brought this up to people inside of Slack, there was a moment when the Uber app, when you opened it was just, "Where would you like to go?" And other.

因此它变得非常难以使用，因为有时你必须点击两个菜单，阅读所有选项，然后说：“好吧，我已经使用了消除过程，但它不在这里，所以它一定在那里。” Uber 不再这样工作了，但当我第一次向 Slack 内部的人提出这个问题时，有那么一刻，当你打开 Uber 应用程序时，它只是问：“你想去哪里？”还有其他。

And other was everything like change your payment method, set your location, anything you could do in Uber.

其他就是更改您的付款方式、设置您的位置，以及您可以在 Uber 中执行的任何操作。

And that was perfect because almost all the time people just wanted to choose where they wanted to go.

这是完美的，因为几乎所有时候人们只想选择他们想去的地方。

Sometimes you wanted to change where your pickup was because you weren't there yet or whatever.

有时您想更改上车地点，因为您尚未到达那里或其他什么原因。

And that was just like, what could be simpler than, "I'm going to tell you where I want to go or I'm going to achieve something else."?

就像，还有什么比“我要告诉你我想去哪里或者我要实现其他目标”更简单的呢？

Stewart Butterfield: I really tried to push people to what is the thing that people, or what is the two things or what is maybe three things that people could want to do here and then put everything behind other.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：我真的试图推动人们了解人们想做的事情是什么，或者人们可能想做的两件事是什么，或者可能是三件事，然后把一切都放在其他事情后面。

And then if it takes them eight clicks or taps to do something, but every single one is trivially easy, that's great.

然后，如果他们需要点击八次才能完成某件事，但每一次都非常简单，那就太好了。

If you reduce that to two clicks or taps, but every part of it is this fraught decision where I'm opening all of the menus and trying to figure out which thing is the right thing, and the more, comparing three things to each other is this difficult four things, it's kind of geometrically more expensive to compare 15 different options all to the other to see if this is the one that you might want.

如果你把它减少到两次点击或敲击，但它的每个部分都是这个令人担忧的决定，我打开所有菜单并试图找出哪一个是正确的，而且，将三件事相互比较是这四件困难的事情，从几何意义上讲，将 15 个不同的选项与其他选项进行比较，看看这是否是你可能想要的，成本要高得多。

That just becomes impossibly expensive.

这变得极其昂贵。

So to me, those are all really connected.

所以对我来说，这些都是相互关联的。

And if people could get over the idea of reducing friction as the or reducing the number of clicks or taps to do something and instead focus on how can I make this simple?

如果人们能够克服减少摩擦或减少点击或点击次数来完成某事的想法，而专注于如何使这一切变得简单？

How do I prevent people from having to think in order to use my software?

如何防止人们在使用我的软件时不得不思考？

How can I make this trivially easy?

我怎样才能让这件事变得简单呢？

One last example, because this was really influential for me.

最后一个例子，因为这对我来说确实有影响。

So I was going back and forth in Vancouver in San Francisco at the time when we were talking about all this inside of Slack, and I was behind a teenager in line aboard the plane and it was like, we're on the jet way.

所以当我们在 Slack 内部谈论这一切时，我正在温哥华和旧金山之间来回穿梭，我站在一个在飞机上排队的青少年后面，就像我们正在飞机上一样。

It took a long time.

花了很长时间。

And I was watching her use Snapchat and it was insane.

我看着她使用 Snapchat，这太疯狂了。

Stewart Butterfield: She was tapping at least four times a second, sometimes six or seven times a second.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：她每秒至少敲击四次，有时每秒敲击六七次。

It was like dismissing stories and doing stuff.

这就像忽略故事并做事。

But there was a fluidity to it because everything was like, do I want to see this again?

但它有一种流动性，因为一切都像，我想再次看到这个吗？

Do I want to see the next story from this person?

我想看这个人的下一个故事吗？

Do I want to switch to a different person?

我想换一个人吗？

Instead, a notification came up, she answered someone's thing, she took a selfie of herself and everything was just like...

相反，出现了一条通知，她回复了别人的事情，她给自己拍了一张自拍照，一切就像……

So she was tapping four times a second for six minutes.

所以她每秒敲击四次，持续六分钟。

I mean, probably there was some breaks in there.

我的意思是，那里可能有一些中断。

And that was the highest and best use of Snapchat for a 15 year old girl in 2016 or whenever that was.

这是 2016 年或任何时候 15 岁女孩对 Snapchat 的最高和最好的使用。

And imagine if the goal was to try to make her tap less, how much of an impediment it would've been to the experience that both her and Snapchat wanted to create?

想象一下，如果目标是减少她的点击次数，这会对她和 Snapchat 想要创造的体验造成多大的障碍？

Lenny Rachitsky: It's so fun to listen to this and the examples you gave of, it gives us a lot of insight into the way your mind works of just constantly unsatisfied with the way other products work with your product.

Lenny Rachitsky：听这个和你给出的例子真是太有趣了，它让我们深入了解你的思维方式，因为你总是对其他产品与你的产品的配合方式不满意。

And I think that's core.

我认为这是核心。

Patrick is a good example of Stripe.

帕特里克是 Stripe 的一个很好的例子。

I feel like that's a recurring theme with very successful product leaders is just constantly unsatisfied and unhappy with how things work.

我觉得这是一个反复出现的主题，非常成功的产品领导者总是对事情的运作方式不满意和不满意。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love just even the way you summarize this, just a really good reframing of, instead of obsessing with reducing friction and reducing steps, instead think, how do I reduce the amount of thinking the user has to do?

Lenny Rachitsky：我什至喜欢你总结这一点的方式，这是一个非常好的重构，而不是沉迷于减少摩擦和减少步骤，而是思考，如何减少用户必须做的思考量？

I've never heard of it described as, you have to think about the ATP and glucose being used to actually think, and your goal is to reduce that versus let's just reduce friction, reduce clicks.

我从来没有听说过它被描述为，你必须考虑 ATP 和葡萄糖用于实际思考，你的目标是减少它，而不是让我们减少摩擦，减少点击。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

I think in my more cynical examples, I would say to people, " Stop what you're doing for a second, close-"

我认为在我更愤世嫉俗的例子中，我会对人们说，“暂时停止你正在做的事情，关闭-”

Stewart Butterfield: Stop what you're doing for a second.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：暂时停止你正在做的事情。

Close your eyes, take a couple of deep breaths, and then pretend that you're an actual human being.

闭上眼睛，深呼吸几次，然后假装自己是一个真正的人。

And open their eyes again, and then look at this thing and see, can you figure out what it's supposed to do or say.

再次睁开他们的眼睛，然后看看这个东西，看看，你能弄清楚它应该做什么或说什么。

Or what action you're supposed to take or what the impact will be if you take that action.

或者你应该采取什么行动，或者如果你采取该行动将会产生什么影响。

There's a whole nother related cycle.

还有一个完整的另一个相关循环。

But before I get into it, I know that I am verbose.

但在我开始讨论之前，我知道我很啰嗦。

I want to wrap up your last example of people being unsatisfied.

我想结束你最后一个关于人们不满意的例子。

Stewart Butterfield: So here's the quote that I was trying to find.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：这是我试图找到的引言。

This is 2014, so like that was the year that Slack actually launched officially in February.

现在是 2014 年，Slack 于 2 月份正式推出。

And this is now near the end of the year.

现在已经接近年底了。

I was interviewed by MIT Technology Review and asked if we were working to improve Slack.

我接受了《麻省理工科技评论》的采访，并询问我们是否正在努力改进 Slack。

I said, "Oh God, yeah.

我说：“天哪，是的。

I try to instill this into the rest of the team, but certainly I feel like what we have right now is just a giant piece of shit.

我试图将这一点灌输给团队的其他成员，但我当然觉得我们现在所拥有的只是一大堆狗屎。

It's just terrible and we should be humiliated that we offer this to the public.

这太可怕了，我们应该为向公众提供这个而感到羞辱。

Not everyone finds that motivational though."

但并不是每个人都认为这具有激励性。”

Stewart Butterfield: So I came into the office the next day and people had printed out on like 40 pieces of 8.5 by 11 paper that quote, and pasted it up on the wall.

Stewart Butterfield：第二天我走进办公室，人们把这句话打印在大约 40 张 8.5 x 11 的纸上，然后贴在墙上。

But to me that was like, you should be embarrassed by it.

但对我来说，你应该为此感到尴尬。

It should be a perpetual desire to improve.

这应该是一种永恒的进步愿望。

You should probably be like, "Oh, this is great," and you could be proud of individual pieces of work.

你可能会说，“哦，这太棒了”，你可以为个人的作品感到自豪。

But in the aggregate, if you can't see almost limitless opportunities to improve, then you shouldn't be designing the product, or you shouldn't be in charge of the company, or you shouldn't almost nothing.

但总的来说，如果你看不到几乎无限的改进机会，那么你就不应该设计产品，或者你不应该负责公司，或者你不应该什么都不做。

Stewart Butterfield: Again, you could reduce it down to a tiny feature is anywhere close to perfect.

Stewart Butterfield：同样，您可以将其缩小到接近完美的微小功能。

And if A, that's acknowledged freely inside the organization.

如果是 A，则组织内部会自由地承认这一点。

And B, people think about continually improving as the goal.

B，人们将持续改进作为目标。

And that could be like Six Sigma Toyota, Kaizen, that kind of side of thing.

这可能就像丰田六西格码、Kaizen 之类的事情。

Or it could be that story that...

或者这可能是那个故事……

I can't remember his name right now.

我现在记不起他的名字了。

The guy who started Bridgewater tells about Michael Jordan-

创办桥水基金的人讲述了迈克尔·乔丹——

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah, Ray Dalio in his book talks about Michael Jordan learning to ski.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的，雷·达利奥在他的书中谈到了迈克尔·乔丹学习滑雪。

Every time he messed up, he wanted the ski instructor to tell him exactly what he was doing wrong.

每次他搞砸了，他都希望滑雪教练确切地告诉他他做错了什么。

Because to him, every one of those was a gem that he could collect, and he could actually become a good skier.

因为对他来说，每一件都是他可以收集的宝石，他实际上可以成为一名优秀的滑雪者。

And what he wanted to do was become a good skier.

他想做的就是成为一名优秀的滑雪运动员。

That requires a lot of trust inside the organization.

这需要组织内部高度信任。

Stewart Butterfield: But if you can get to the point where like, "Hey, we are trying to find improvements.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但是如果你能达到这样的地步，“嘿，我们正在努力寻找改进。

We're trying to be critical because you're trying to make this as great as it can possibly be." And not always, not with every person, but most of the time with most people, you can get them to the point where that really direct criticism is actually motivational.

我们试图保持批判性，因为你正在努力让这一切变得尽可能伟大。”并不总是，不是每个人，但大多数时候，对大多数人来说，你可以让他们达到真正直接的批评实际上是激励人心的程度。

It is like people are grateful to have the feedback, whether that's coming from their peers inside the company or from end users of the product.

人们似乎很感激获得反馈，无论是来自公司内部的同事还是来自产品的最终用户。

Because you realize, oh yeah, that is bad and we should fix it.

因为你意识到，哦，是的，这很糟糕，我们应该解决它。

Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Lovable.

Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Lovable 为您带来。

Not only are they the fastest growing company in history, I use it regularly and I could not recommend it more highly.

他们不仅是历史上发展最快的公司，而且我经常使用它，我强烈推荐它。

If you've ever had an idea for an app but didn't know where to start, Lovable is for you.

如果您曾经对应用程序有过想法，但不知道从哪里开始，那么 Lovable 适合您。

Lovable lets you build working apps and websites by simply chatting with AI.

Lovable 让您只需与 AI 聊天即可构建可用的应用程序和网站。

Then you can customize it at automations and deploy it to live domain.

然后，您可以在自动化中对其进行自定义并将其部署到实时域。

It's perfect for marketers, spinning up tools, product managers prototyping new ideas, and founders launching their next business.

它非常适合营销人员、开发工具、设计新想法原型的产品经理以及推出下一项业务的创始人。

Lenny Rachitsky: Unlike NoCo Tools, Lovable isn't about static pages.

Lenny Rachitsky：与 NoCo Tools 不同，Lovable 与静态页面无关。

It builds full apps with real functionality, and it's fast.

它构建具有实际功能的完整应用程序，而且速度很快。

What used to take weeks, months, or years, you can now do over a weekend.

过去需要数周、数月或数年才能完成的事情，现在只需一个周末即可完成。

So if you've been sitting on an idea, now is the time to bring it to life.

因此，如果您一直有一个想法，那么现在就是将其变为现实的时候了。

Get started for free at Lovable.dev.

从 Lovable.dev 免费开始使用。

That's lovable.dev.

那是可爱的.dev。

This makes me think about, let's call it a rant that you have about how it takes a lot of work to make anything work at all.

这让我思考，让我们称之为你对如何需要大量工作才能使任何事情发挥作用的咆哮。

That just the default state is not working.

只是默认状态不起作用。

Can you just share what you share there.

你能分享一下你在那里分享的内容吗？

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

I mean, so this is a lot to do with, and maybe this is more recently, it shows up in politics a lot for me.

我的意思是，这与很多有关，也许这是最近的事，它对我来说经常出现在政治中。

But by the way, if anyone listening to this can help me find this tweet store from somewhere between 2016 and 2020, I don't have a precise idea.

但顺便说一句，如果有人听这个可以帮助我找到这个 2016 年到 2020 年之间的推文商店，我没有一个确切的想法。

And it was this guy's thread about how hard it was to get a stop sign set up.

这家伙的帖子讲述了设置停车标志有多么困难。

And I believe it was in response to someone claiming that Bitcoin is going to replace US dollars, something about crypto.

我相信这是对有人声称比特币将取代美元的回应，这是关于加密货币的。

And his point was like, here's what happened when we tried to get a stop sign put up on a residential street in my neighborhood.

他的观点是，当我们试图在我家附近的一条住宅街道上竖起停车标志时，发生了这样的事情。

And the literal years it took, and the number of agencies that were involved.

以及所花费的实际年数，以及涉及的机构数量。

Stewart Butterfield: Like the engineering department, traffic planners, the HOA, and...

Stewart Butterfield：比如工程部门、交通规划人员、HOA 和……

I don't remember all of the organizations because, and I did that I could search better and find this again.

我不记得所有的组织，因为我这样做了，我可以更好地搜索并再次找到它。

Because it was truly a masterpiece of how difficult it is to get a stop sign put up in most places.

因为这确实是一部杰作，展示了在大多数地方设置停车标志是多么困难。

The message that I hear from most politicians, and unfortunately this works really well, is things should be good.

我从大多数政客那里听到的信息是，事情应该是好的，不幸的是，这确实很有效。

But they're not because someone is doing something bad, which is preventing the goodness.

但这并不是因为有人做了坏事，从而阻碍了善良。

Stewart Butterfield: So billionaires are making things unaffordable.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：所以亿万富翁正在让人们变得难以承受。

Or immigrants are taking your jobs.

或者移民正在抢走你的工作。

Or lazy freeloaders are sucking off a government tea, and causing us all have to pay more taxes, or something like that.

或者懒惰的贪图便宜者正在吸食政府的茶，导致我们所有人都必须缴纳更多的税，或者类似的事情。

The reality is almost nothing works.

现实是几乎没有任何效果。

It's actually another call.

这实际上是另一个电话。

I said in this case, John has a great encapsulation of this and I'm sure you're familiar with it, like that.

我说过，在这个例子中，约翰对此进行了很好的概括，我相信您对此很熟悉，就像这样。

It ends with the world as a museum of passion projects.

它以一个充满激情项目的博物馆的世界结束。

Because for anything to get done at all requires not just the resources and effort required to instantiate that thing in the real world, but all of the politicking and the sociology and the convincing.

因为要完成任何事情，不仅需要在现实世界中实例化该事物所需的资源和努力，还需要所有的政治、社会学和说服力。

Stewart Butterfield: And there's a book called Why Nothing Works Recently, which is like, it's not an...

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：有一本书叫《为什么最近什么都不起作用》，这本书就像是，这不是......

I'm sorry to the author, if they...

我对作者表示抱歉，如果他们...

I doubt they're listening, but just it's not like an amazingly written book.

我怀疑他们在听，但这并不像一本写得令人惊叹的书。

I found it a little bit repetitive, but the content was really incredible, just explaining why it's so hard.

我发现它有点重复，但内容确实令人难以置信，只是解释了为什么这么难。

And how there's this progressive increase in the number of vetoes that are available for any kind of course of action and how difficult it is...

任何行动方针的否决权数量如何逐渐增加以及它有多困难......

And this shows up in permitting for new construction and stuff like that.

这体现在允许新建筑和类似的事情上。

But also shows up obviously inside of organizations.

但也明显出现在组织内部。

Stewart Butterfield: And the challenge is that people, A, I think this is evolutionary biological.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：挑战是人们，A，我认为这是进化生物学。

It's hard for us to understand the world, except by anthropomorphizing it.

除非将世界拟人化，否则我们很难理解世界。

And so if it didn't rain this year, it's because a God is mad, and probably because we didn't sacrifice enough goats or something last year.

所以如果今年没有下雨，那是因为上帝生气了，也可能是因为我们去年没有牺牲足够的山羊或其他东西。

It's hard for people to understand just that, wow, weather is incredibly complex and chaotic, and ecosystems and climatology, and all that.

人们很难理解，哇，天气极其复杂和混乱，生态系统和气候学等等。

Stewart Butterfield: Same thing with the world.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：世界也是如此。

Like if I am struggling to pay all of my bills and be able to afford a little bit of luxury in the sense of location or a present for my kids or whatever, it's got to be somebody's fault.

就像如果我正在努力支付所有账单，并且能够负担得起一点奢侈的位置或给我的孩子的礼物或其他什么，那一定是某人的错。

There has to be a decision that's made somewhere.

必须在某个地方做出决定。

And the reality is everything is so complicated.

而现实是一切都是如此复杂。

Everything is so multivariate, it's not satisfying.

一切都是如此多元，并不令人满意。

It's a terrible political message.

这是一个可怕的政治信息。

Stewart Butterfield: It's much easier to say that there is like, oh, we understand why things are bad in the way that you're concerned about.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：更容易说的是，哦，我们理解为什么事情会像你所担心的那样糟糕。

And it's turns out that it's some someone's decision, and because of them it's bad.

事实证明，这是某人的决定，而且因为他们，这很糟糕。

And so if we got rid of them or were able to overcome their decision, overturn it, and institute our own thing, then things would be good for you.

因此，如果我们摆脱了他们，或者能够克服他们的决定，推翻它，并建立我们自己的东西，那么事情会对你有好处。

And this really to me shows up inside of those organizations as well.

对我来说，这也确实体现在这些组织内部。

I'll pause there.

我会在那里暂停。

Lenny Rachitsky: I know kind of along those lines, you're a big believer in something called Parkinson's Law.

Lenny Rachitsky：我知道您是帕金森定律的忠实信徒。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

So the original of that is, I think it's 1956.

所以它的原文是，我认为是 1956 年。

It's an article in The Economist by Parkinson.

这是帕金森在《经济学人》上发表的一篇文章。

And the Maxim is work expands to fill the time available for its completion.

Maxim 的工作会不断扩展，以填补可用的完成时间。

And the way that it shows up, this is a little bit subtle.

它的表现方式有点微妙。

So like one of the things I found, since I don't have a job is there's much less time pressure.

就像我发现的一件事一样，因为我没有工作，所以时间压力要小得多。

And that maxim, like if you want something done, give it to a busy person.

还有那句格言，就像如果你想要完成某件事，就把它交给忙碌的人。

The inverse is also true that like, if you're not that busy, wow, basic things take a really long time.

反之亦然，如果你不那么忙，哇，基本的事情需要很长时间。

Stewart Butterfield: And so Parkinson actually starts out with his example of writing and posting a letter.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：帕金森实际上是从写信和寄信的例子开始的。

And I don't remember who he used with the first example, but someone who's incredibly busy and has all these things they have to respond to.

我不记得他在第一个例子中使用了谁，但记得一个非常忙碌并且有所有这些他们必须回应的事情的人。

And then another case like a retired robot who has all the time in the world.

还有另一个例子，比如一个退休的机器人，他拥有世界上所有的时间。

It takes her a long time to write the letter.

她花了很长时间才写这封信。

It takes her a long time to put it in the envelope, and then you go to the post office and post it.

她花了很长时间才把它放进信封，然后你去邮局寄出去。

Stewart Butterfield: But the real meat of it is, for me later when he talks about the size of the organization, and he uses a bunch of examples.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但对我来说，真正的实质是，当他稍后谈到组织的规模时，他使用了一堆例子。

This is again 1950s, and he's British, so he's looking at the Royal Navy.

这又是 20 世纪 50 年代，他是英国人，所以他关注的是皇家海军。

And specifically he's looking at a chart that shows the relationship between the number of capital ships in the Navy, the number of sailors, and the number of administrators.

具体来说，他正在查看一张图表，该图表显示了海军主力舰数量、水手数量和管理员数量之间的关系。

And very familiar graph for people looking at any part of government.

对于关注政府任何部门的人们来说，这是非常熟悉的图表。

Any part of the relationship between the number of administrators at a university and the number of students and faculty, teaching faculty.

大学管理人员数量与学生和教师、教学人员数量之间关系的任何部分。

Where it's like, okay, the number of ships goes like this and the number of sailors is looking right along with it.

就好像，好吧，船的数量是这样的，水手的数量也随之而来。

And the number of administrators goes like this.

管理员的数量是这样的。

Stewart Butterfield: And the reason this ties into the work expands to fill the time available for its completion is people hire, and they train.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：这与工作扩展以填补完成可用时间的原因是人员雇用和培训。

And here's the sad truth for anyone running a company is there are exceptions.

对于任何经营公司的人来说，有一个可悲的事实：凡事都有例外。

There's certain types of engineers that are an exception to this.

某些类型的工程师是例外。

But the overwhelming majority of people you hire want to hire more people who report to them.

但你雇用的绝大多数人都希望雇用更多向他们汇报的人。

And it's not because they're evil, and it's not because they're stupid.

这并不是因为他们邪恶，也不是因为他们愚蠢。

In fact, they're smart because everyone knows that the number of people who report to you correlates with your career trajectory, the amount of money that you're paid.

事实上，他们很聪明，因为每个人都知道向你汇报的人数与你的职业轨迹、你的薪水金额相关。

The amount of authority you have inside the organization and on and on and on.

你在组织内部拥有的权力大小等等。

Stewart Butterfield: So we would hire 27 Royal product managers in Slack who immediately want to hire someone.

Stewart Butterfield：因此，我们会在 Slack 中雇用 27 名皇家产品经理，他们会立即想雇用某人。

It's like, what the hell?

就像，到底是什么？

What would that person do?

那个人会做什么？

And they articulate it this way, but essentially it's like, "Well, that person would do the product management and then I would do strategy."

他们以这种方式表达它，但本质上就像是，“好吧，那个人会做产品管理，然后我会做战略。”

Stewart Butterfield: It's really, I think the essential thing to understand about this is it's not because people are evil, and it's not because they're stupid.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：确实，我认为理解这一点的重要一点是，这并不是因为人们是邪恶的，也不是因为他们是愚蠢的。

And it's to me, very related to everything is complex.

这对我来说，与一切都很复杂密切相关。

And if maybe this is my butterfly's law, I haven't thought about this way before.

如果这也许就是我的蝴蝶定律，我以前从未想过这种方式。

But I tweeted this a very, very long time ago like if you...

但我在很久很久以前就发过这条推文，就像如果你……

Everything is simple if you have no idea what you're talking about.

如果你不知道自己在说什么，一切都很简单。

So the other side of that is like if something seems simple, probably you don't understand it.

所以另一方面，如果某件事看起来很简单，你可能不理解它。

And there's obvious exceptions to that.

当然也有明显的例外。

Stewart Butterfield: But for anything that involves a large organization or a lot of human beings, if the problem seems simple, you don't get it.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但是对于任何涉及大型组织或很多人的事情，如果问题看起来很简单，你就不会明白。

So every budget process, no head of engineering know, head of sales, no CFO, no GC, who's ever going to come back and say, "Oh, I've actually think next year we can just hire fewer people.

因此，每一个预算流程，没有工程主管、销售主管、首席财务官、总顾问知道，他们都会回来说：“哦，我实际上认为明年我们可以雇佣更少的人。

Or we're going to keep it flat or we're going to shrink through attrition because we don't need any more people to do what we're doing." Not because they're evil, not because they're stupid, but it's almost overpowering impulse inside the organization that often leads to disastrous results.

或者我们将保持平稳，或者我们将通过人员流失而缩小规模，因为我们不需要更多的人来做我们正在做的事情。”不是因为他们邪恶，也不是因为他们愚蠢，而是组织内部几乎压倒性的冲动常常导致灾难性的结果。

And so there's an...

所以有一个...

Stewart Butterfield: I'll give one example from Slack's history, and I have tried in the past to disguise this example so that no one feels bad about it but I...

Stewart Butterfield：我将举一个 Slack 历史上的例子，我过去曾尝试掩盖这个例子，这样就不会有人对此感到难过，但我......

Unfortunately, the specifics are so important to the example that it's not disguised and so I'll just reiterate that the people involved aren't stupid or evil.

不幸的是，细节对于这个例子来说是如此重要，以至于它没有被掩盖，所以我只是重申，所涉及的人并不愚蠢或邪恶。

And one example that's from the outside.

还有一个来自外部的例子。

So the example inside of Slack was we introduced threads, which was the ability to reply to a message inside of a channel.

Slack 内部的例子是我们引入了线程，这是在通道内回复消息的能力。

And let's say you, Lenny, post a message.

假设你，莱尼，发布了一条消息。

I, Stewart reply to it.

我，斯图尔特回复它。

You will automatically get a notification.

您将自动收到通知。

And now Sarah later on replies to the same message.

现在莎拉后来回复了同一条消息。

Both you and I, as people who have push in that thread will receive a notification that there's been more activity, and so on.

你和我，作为推送该线程的人，都会收到一条通知，表明有更多活动，等等。

So like every single time anyone replies to it.

就像每次有人回复它一样。

Stewart Butterfield: So when the feature first was released or like when we did the final product review before it was released, the input box was pre-populated with at the person before you in the thread.

Stewart Butterfield：因此，当该功能首次发布时，或者就像我们在发布之前进行最终产品审查时一样，输入框已预先填充在线程中您之前的人中。

And I was using the feature and I would put the insertion point there, select all delete, and then start writing my message.

我正在使用该功能，我会将插入点放在那里，选择所有删除，然后开始编写我的消息。

And even if I wanted to add someone specifically, I almost never wanted to start my sentence with at that, because it just made it hard to reference what they were saying before.

即使我想特别添加某人，我也几乎不想以此开始我的句子，因为这使得很难引用他们之前所说的内容。

So I said, "Get rid of this because, A, I think most people won't use it.

所以我说，“摆脱这个，因为，A，我认为大多数人不会使用它。

Or if they did want to add someone, they're not going to want to do it at the beginning of the sentence.

或者，如果他们确实想添加某人，他们不会想在句子的开头这样做。

Stewart Butterfield: And by the way, you're teaching them to use the product wrong.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：顺便说一句，你正在教他们错误地使用产品。

Because it's important that everyone understand that every previous poster in this thread will automatically receive a notification unless they've figured it."

因为重要的是，每个人都明白，该线程中之前的每个发帖者都会自动收到通知，除非他们已经弄清楚了。”

Stewart Butterfield: So okay, we release it.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：好吧，我们发布它。

Six months goes by and suddenly the at thing comes back.

六个月过去了，突然那件事又回来了。

And so I messaged someone around the team and I said, "Hey, there's been a regression.

所以我给团队里的某个人发了消息，我说：“嘿，情况出现了倒退。

This is super weird.

这太奇怪了。

I don't know what happened.

我不知道发生了什么事。

But the at thing came back." And they said, "Oh no, this is on purpose.

但那个东西又回来了。”他们说：“哦不，这是故意的。

We did a bunch of research." And so I was like, "What?" And I went through this and it was, if I recall correctly, it wasn't even P-95 certainty on this analysis.

我们做了很多研究。”所以我想，“什么？”我经历了这个，如果我没记错的话，这个分析甚至不是 P-95 的确定性。

But it was something like when we do this, threads are 2.17 messages long, versus 2.14 messages long on average for when we don't do it.

但当我们这样做时，线程的平均长度为 2.17 条消息，而当我们不这样做时，线程的平均长度为 2.14 条消息。

Stewart Butterfield: And so first of all, why is a longer thread better?

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：首先，为什么线程越长越好？

Like maybe a shorter thread is better?

也许线越短越好？

It can be fewer messages that people have to go back and forth.

人们必须来回传递的消息可能会更少。

Also, that's such a tiny difference.

而且，这差距实在是太小了。

Also, again, I don't remember the actual statistical analysis, so I'm not going to claim that it was incorrect.

另外，再说一次，我不记得实际的统计分析，所以我不会声称它是不正确的。

But I'm pretty sure this was outside the bounds of certainty that they can have.

但我很确定这超出了他们的确定范围。

But the real thing was, oh my God, so you guys put flags into the product, you A-B tested it.

但真正的事情是，天哪，所以你们把标志放入产品中，你们对它进行了 A-B 测试。

You did the instrumentation.

你做了仪器。

You created tables in the database or whatever we're using to record all of that.

您在数据库或我们用来记录所有这些的任何内容中创建了表。

Stewart Butterfield: You wrote queries to pull that.

Stewart Butterfield：您编写了查询来实现这一点。

You created charts based on that data.

您根据该数据创建了图表。

You had meetings to discuss it.

你们开会讨论这个问题。

And just kind unpacking all of the things that would've had to happen for this to come back.

并简单地解开所有必须发生的事情才能让这一切回来。

And it's like thousands of person hours at a minimum, because any feature change at that scale of organization, it's involving like a dozen people.

至少需要数千个工时，因为在这种规模的组织中任何功能更改都涉及十几个人。

Engineering, QA, analytics teams, project managers, user research and stuff like that.

工程、质量保证、分析团队、项目经理、用户研究等等。

The problem with that, so I think it was a bad idea, right?

问题在于，所以我认为这是一个坏主意，对吧？

But the problem with that was the difference that you could possibly achieve between having this feature and not having this feature is like this much whatever units you want.

但问题是，拥有此功能和不拥有此功能之间可能实现的差异就像你想要的任何单位一样。

The cost of doing the analysis was this much.

进行分析的成本就是这么多。

So it's guaranteed to be a loser.

所以注定是个失败者。

Stewart Butterfield: Like there's just, there's no world in which anyone could imagine putting the at previous respondent in the thread at the beginning of the message could possibly make that much of a difference to the quality of Slack, and how much utility it provides for people and all of that.

Stewart Butterfield：就像，没有人可以想象将前一个受访者放在消息开头的线程中可能会对 Slack 的质量以及它为人们提供多少实用性产生如此大的影响。

But you know that to put the feature flags in, to ship new versions of the product, to put the instrumentation in.

但您知道要放入功能标志、发布产品的新版本、放入仪器。

To have it all the API calls to record every action that people take to do all the analytics, to create the dashboard.

拥有所有 API 调用来记录人们为进行所有分析而采取的每个操作，以创建仪表板。

To put paste a screenshot of that into a Google Slides presentation.

将其屏幕截图粘贴到 Google 幻灯片演示文稿中。

To send the invitations to the meeting, to reschedule the meeting because someone couldn't make it.

发送会议邀请，因有人无法出席而重新安排会议。

To have everyone sit down and look at the thing.

让每个人都坐下来看看这个东西。

Like guaranteed loser.

就像注定的失败者一样。

Stewart Butterfield: And I know that Fareed told you to ask me about this hyper realistic work-like activities.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我知道法里德让你向我询问这种超现实的类似工作的活动。

And so here's my grand theory.

这就是我的宏伟理论。

Hyper realistic work-like activities goes along with this other concept called known valuable work to do.

超现实的类似工作的活动与另一个称为已知有价值的工作的概念相一致。

And when I say known, I mean both you know what it is and you know that it's valuable.

当我说已知时，我的意思是你知道它是什么并且知道它很有价值。

And the problem with almost every organization at the very beginning, you have an enormous amount of work that you know what to do, and you know that it's going to be valuable.

几乎每个组织在一开始都会面临的问题是，你有大量的工作，你知道该做什么，而且你知道这将是有价值的。

So like starting a business, open a bank account.

就像创业一样，开立银行账户。

Because there's almost infinite general value of opening a bank account.

因为开设银行账户的一般价值几乎是无限的。

You have to do it.

你必须这么做。

It's very simple to do.

做起来非常简单。

Stewart Butterfield: And so at the very beginning of any startup, they're like, "I'm creating a user's table, and I'm doing sorting passwords," and you're doing all the things that are kind of absolutely necessary.

Stewart Butterfield：所以在任何初创公司一开始，他们都会说，“我正在创建一个用户表，我正在对密码进行排序”，而你正在做所有绝对必要的事情。

And everyone knows exactly what they are.

每个人都知道它们是什么。

And so everyone's going to work in the morning and they're like right on.

所以每个人早上都会去工作，而且他们就像是马上开始工作。

And I have 10 things to do, and every single one of them is something I know how to do.

我有 10 件事要做，每一件都是我知道该怎么做的。

And it's definitely going to be valuable.

而且它肯定会很有价值。

Time goes on.

时间继续。

And the relationship between the supply of work to do and the demand for doing work just starts to change.

工作供给与工作需求之间的关系才刚刚开始发生变化。

Stewart Butterfield: More and more people get hired.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：越来越多的人被雇用。

Every product manager wants to hire a junior product manager.

每个产品经理都想聘请一名初级产品经理。

Every new person, the first person you bring in on the risk and compliance team is like, "Oh my God, there's so many risks and things we have to be compliant with.

每个新人，即你引入风险和合规团队的第一个人，都会说：“天哪，我们必须遵守这么多的风险和事情。

We better hire more people on my team to do more risk and compliance work." Which probably to some degree is right.

我们最好在团队中雇佣更多的人来做更多的风险和合规工作。”这在某种程度上可能是正确的。

But we're going to have more and more of those people and they're going to call meetings with each other.

但我们将会有越来越多的人，他们将互相召开会议。

Stewart Butterfield: And now suddenly you have all these people with work to do and you've done all the easy obvious stuff.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：现在突然之间，所有这些人都有工作要做，而你已经完成了所有简单明显的事情。

And now your questions are like, "God, should we do FedRAMP high and make a Slack version?

现在你的问题就像是，“天啊，我们应该把 FedRAMP 做得高一点并制作一个 Slack 版本吗？

Which is going to require us to have wholly separate physical infrastructure for the hardware that runs the software?

这将要求我们为运行软件的硬件拥有完全独立的物理基础设施？

And also a whole different operations team, which has only US citizens on it?

还有一个完全不同的运营团队，其中只有美国公民？

What is the possible number of dollars that we could make from doing this?

这样做我们可以赚多少钱？

And how much complexity is going to be when we want to do updates to the software because we update two totally separate independent systems and rec."

当我们想要对软件进行更新时，会变得多么复杂，因为我们更新了两个完全独立的独立系统和记录。”

Stewart Butterfield: It just gets out of whack, and so people end up...

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：事情变得不正常，所以人们最终......

Like if you hire 17 product marketers, you're going to have 17 product marketers worth of demand for work to do.

就像如果您雇用 17 名产品营销人员，那么您将有 17 名产品营销人员的工作需求。

And if you don't have sufficient supply of product marketing work to do, they're just going to do other stuff.

如果你没有足够的产品营销工作要做，他们就会做其他事情。

Again, very important, not because they're stupid, not because they're evil.

再说一遍，非常重要，不是因为他们愚蠢，也不是因为他们邪恶。

But because they're like, I'm a product marketer and I want to be recognized for my work.

但因为他们说，我是一名产品营销人员，我希望我的工作得到认可。

And my spouse has criticized me because they take, I should have already got promoted in the last cycle, and they really got to demonstrate some wins here and whatever it is.

我的配偶批评了我，因为他们认为，我应该在上一个周期就已经晋升了，他们真的必须在这里展示一些胜利，无论是什么。

Stewart Butterfield: And so people are like calling meetings with their colleagues to preview the deck that they're going to show in the big meeting to get feedback on whether they should improve some of the slides.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：因此，人们就像与同事召开会议来预览他们将在大型会议上展示的幻灯片，以获得关于是否应该改进某些幻灯片的反馈。

And that hyper-realistic work-like activity is superficially identical to work.

这种超现实的类似工作的活动表面上与工作相同。

Like we are sitting in a conference room and there's something being projected up there, and we're all talking about it.

就像我们坐在会议室里，上面有一些东西正在投影，我们都在谈论它。

And that's exactly what work is.

这正是工作的意义。

Hopefully not all of work for everyone inside of your company.

希望不是所有工作都适合公司内部的每个人。

But that's exactly what we do when we're working.

但这正是我们工作时所做的。

Stewart Butterfield: But this is actually a fake bit of work, and it's so subtle that I'll do it.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但这实际上是一个假的工作，而且它是如此微妙，所以我会做它。

Our board members will do it.

我们的董事会成员会这么做。

Every executive will do it.

每个高管都会这样做。

And the further you are from having all of the context and all of the information and the decision-making authority and stuff like that, the easier it is to get trapped in this stuff.

你离拥有所有背景、所有信息、决策权和类似的东西越远，你就越容易陷入这些东西中。

And people will just perform enormous amounts of hyper-realistic work-like activities, and have no idea that that's what they're doing.

人们只会执行大量超现实的类似工作的活动，并且不知道这就是他们正在做的事情。

And the result of that, I guess, is that if you are a leader, if you're manager, director, an executive, you're the CEO, it's on you to ensure that there is sufficient supply of known valuable work to do.

我想，这样做的结果是，如果你是一个领导者，如果你是经理、董事、高管，你是首席执行官，你就有责任确保有足够的已知有价值的工作要做。

And there almost always is, but it's creating the clarity around that.

几乎总是存在的，但它正在围绕这一点创造清晰度。

Creating the alignment.

创建对齐。

Making sure everyone understands it, but that's what they're supposed to be doing, and then obviously doing it.

确保每个人都理解它，但这就是他们应该做的，然后显然就是这样做的。

Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

I could listen to Stewart's rants all day.

我可以整天听斯图尔特的咆哮。

Hyper- realistic work-life activities.

超现实的工作生活活动。

We need to coin this-

我们需要创造这个-

Stewart Butterfield: Unfortunately, it doesn't make a good acronym.

Stewart Butterfield：不幸的是，它并不是一个很好的缩写词。

It's pretty ugly.

这是相当难看的。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。

it a try.

尝试一下。

And just to close the loop on that, the solution is the leader recognizing this is happening and stopping it.

为了结束这个循环，解决方案是领导者认识到这种情况正在发生并阻止它。

Telling people why are we spending time on this thing that is not going to get us anywhere?

告诉人们为什么我们要花时间在这件事上，而这件事不会给我们带来任何好处？

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

And what you just said probably isn't the best way because that sounds like you're chiding them, and they're dumb.

你刚才所说的可能不是最好的方法，因为这听起来像是你在责备他们，而他们很愚蠢。

When it's actually your responsibility to make sure that there's sufficient clarity around what the priorities are, and explicitly saying no to things upfront and stuff like that.

当你实际上有责任确保优先事项足够清晰时，并明确对预先的事情和类似的事情说不。

Rather than merging and say like, "Hey, you guys are a bunch of idiots wasting your time on this thing that doesn't matter." Whose fault is it?

而不是合并并说，“嘿，你们是一群白痴，把时间浪费在无关紧要的事情上。”到底是谁的错呢？

It's the manager's fault.

这是经理的错。

It's the VP of whatever's fault.

无论如何，这都是副总裁的错。

It's the CX, whatever, it's the C...

这是CX，无论如何，这是C......

Ultimately, it's the leader of the organization that has the responsibility to make sure that there is sufficient known-valuable work to do.

最终，组织的领导者有责任确保有足够的已知有价值的工作要做。

And that's actually harder than it might appear.

这实际上比看起来更难。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。

Before we run out of time, I want to touch on two other topics.

在时间耗尽之前，我想谈谈另外两个话题。

One is, when people think of Stewart Butterfield, I think a lot of people think of, We Don't Sell Saddles Here.

一是，当人们想到斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德时，我想很多人都会想到，我们这里不卖马鞍。

Your legendary Medium post that is just, I don't know, it's become a historic piece of literature in the annals of product building and in startups.

我不知道，你的传奇 Medium 帖子已经成为产品构建和初创公司编年史中的历史性文献。

I haven't heard people ask you much about this recently.

我最近没听到有人问过你这个问题。

So let me just ask a couple of questions.

让我问几个问题。

What was the reason you put that out?

你把它放出来的原因是什么？

What was the backstory on writing that memo?

写这份备忘录的背景故事是什么？

Why was it necessary?

为什么有必要？

Stewart Butterfield: Well, it really was an internal memo.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：嗯，这确实是一份内部备忘录。

Lenny Rachitsky: ...

莱尼·拉奇茨基：……

Memo.

备忘录。

Why was it necessary?

为什么有必要？

Stewart Butterfield: Well, it really was an internal memo and there's a bit of a digression.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：嗯，这确实是一份内部备忘录，有一点题外话。

One of the crappy things about Slack is if all your corporate communication is on email, depending on exactly how it works and what system you use, you probably walk away with an archive of everything you said at Company X.

Slack 的糟糕之处之一是，如果您所有的公司沟通都通过电子邮件进行，那么您可能会带着在 X 公司所说的所有内容的存档，具体取决于它的工作原理和您使用的系统。

If it's Slack, once you're turned off, you lose access to all that history.

如果是 Slack，一旦关闭，您将无法访问所有历史记录。

And so it's kind of like, "Oh, man.

所以有点像，“哦，伙计。

If I had only exported all of my messages before I left, I would have all this stuff," but that was absolutely verbatim.

如果我在离开之前导出所有消息，我就会拥有所有这些东西，”但这绝对是逐字的。

I did not change a word of what I said inside the company.

我在公司内部所说的话没有任何改变。

Well, I think we were still eight people.

嗯，我想我们还是八个人。

Maybe at most 10, but I think it was eight people.

也许最多十个人，但我认为是八个人。

Lenny Rachitsky: It was before Slack launched even.

Lenny Rachitsky：那是在 Slack 推出之前。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah, it was before Slack launched.

Stewart Butterfield：是的，那是在 Slack 推出之前。

It was when we're doing private beta.

那是我们进行内测的时候。

And the point of it was to start to instill those ideas as early as possible and really create this alignment inside of that small team so that it could persist to survive as we grew and scaled.

重点是尽早开始灌输这些想法，并在这个小团队内部真正建立这种一致性，以便随着我们的成长和规模扩大，它能够持续生存。

Yeah, that was the idea.

是的，就是这个想法。

Lenny Rachitsky: And the gist, just for people that aren't super familiar with it, but we'll link to it, is just it's not enough just to build a great product.

Lenny Rachitsky：对于不太熟悉它的人来说，要点是，仅仅构建一个伟大的产品是不够的，但我们会链接到它。

You just as much have to put effort into communicating what this does for them, the problem this is solving for them, the outcome this is going to achieve for them.

您同样必须付出努力来传达这对他们有什么作用，这为他们解决的问题，这将为他们实现的结果。

Is that a good way to think about it?

这是一个好的思考方式吗？

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

And again, comparing it to beer or cars, beer goes back to pre-civilization.

再次，与啤酒或汽车相比，啤酒可以追溯到文明之前。

Cars were obviously , but at some point you had to convince people why they would want a car instead of a horse.

汽车显然是，但在某些时候你必须说服人们为什么他们想要一辆汽车而不是一匹马。

For your new AI-based recruiting tool or your calendar app or whatever, there's some reason why you think that people should use yours instead of the thing that they're using now, which might be a wholesale one-for- one replacement, or more often is a change in the way that you're working that has a bunch of other adjacencies and you want to expand into these other categories.

对于你新的基于人工智能的招聘工具或你的日历应用程序或其他什么，你认为人们应该使用你的工具而不是他们现在正在使用的东西，这可能是大规模的一对一替代品，或者更常见的是你的工作方式发生了变化，有很多其他的邻接，你想扩展到这些其他类别。

You're not just responsible for creating the product, but also, to a certain degree, creating the market.

你不仅要负责创造产品，而且在某种程度上还要创造市场。

Stewart Butterfield: There's this book, Positioning, which is an absolute classic.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：有本书《定位》，绝对是经典。

It's very short.

它很短。

I would recommend everyone read it, where the point of it is, from my perspective, it's almost impossible to create a new idea in someone's head.

我建议每个人都读一下它，它的重点是，从我的角度来看，在某人的头脑中创造一个新的想法几乎是不可能的。

It's much easier to take a couple of existing ideas and put them together.

将几个现有的想法组合在一起要容易得多。

So it's much easier to say it's like Jaws meets Star Wars, or it's Uber for Pets or something like that, than to come up with an actual new idea.

因此，说它就像《大白鲨》遇上《星球大战》，或者是《宠物优步》之类的东西，比提出一个实际的新想法要容易得多。

But you have to do that because if your thing is different in any significant way from the alternatives, you're not just creating the product.

但你必须这样做，因为如果你的产品与其他产品有任何显着的不同，那么你就不仅仅是在创造产品。

You're creating the market.

你正在创造市场。

They're really kind of one and the same.

他们确实是一体的。

Lenny Rachitsky: The reason I wanted to touch on it is I think still people continue to not listen to this advice and continue to over-invest in more features, more products, things like that.

Lenny Rachitsky：我想谈及这个问题的原因是，我认为人们仍然不听这个建议，并继续过度投资于更多功能、更多产品等。

Just the specific example of, "We don't sell saddles here," just to quickly communicate this to folks, and correct me if I'm missing anything, is just instead of, "Hey, look at this amazing saddle we've bought," which you want to communicate as, "Here, go horseback riding.

举个具体的例子，“我们这里不卖马鞍”，只是为了快速向人们传达这一点，如果我遗漏了什么，请纠正我，而不是“嘿，看看我们买的这个令人惊叹的马鞍”，你想传达的意思是，“在这里，去骑马。

Look at this incredible experience you can have." And then they decide, "Oh, shit.

看看你可以获得的这种令人难以置信的体验。”然后他们决定，“哦，该死。

I need to go buy a saddle to do that."

我需要去买一个马鞍才能做到这一点。”

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

And 100%, that aspect of it is not original because I think that's something that marketers have done for a long time, certainly in the marcom and advertising.

100%，这方面并不是原创的，因为我认为这是营销人员长期以来所做的事情，尤其是在营销传播和广告领域。

If you want to sell Harley-Davidson's, there are people who are going to geek out on the engines and stuff like that and the quality of the leather and stuff like that.

如果你想卖哈雷戴维森，就会有人对发动机之类的东西以及皮革的质量之类的东西感兴趣。

But when you're selling the motorcycle, you're selling the open road and freedom and the wind in your hair.

但当你出售摩托车时，你就是在出售开阔的道路、自由和头发中的风。

And if you're Lululemon, you are obviously selling yoga pants, but you're also selling health and aspiration and being the best version of yourself and a bunch of other stuff.

如果你是 Lululemon，你显然是在销售瑜伽裤，但你也在销售健康和愿望，以及成为最好的自己和其他一些东西。

Oh my God, I forgot the classic version of it.

天哪，我忘了经典版了。

Stewart Butterfield: You're selling the screwdriver.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：你在卖螺丝刀。

Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, we missed that one.

Lenny Rachitsky：是的，我们错过了那个。

Well, there's the one I think about is instead of trying to convince men to build a ship, instill a yearning for the sea.

嗯，我想到的一个是，与其试图说服人们建造一艘船，不如灌输对大海的向往。

Stewart Butterfield: Yes.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

Exactly.

确切地。

That's something that goes back in history.

这是可以追溯到历史的事情。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。

Let me ask you about pivoting.

我想问一下关于旋转的问题。

You are potentially the king of pivots.

你有可能成为枢轴之王。

You started two companies both famously pivoted, both from video games, which is why I asked you about that at the beginning, into very successful companies.

您创办了两家公司，两家公司都以电子游戏为主导，这两家公司都以电子游戏为核心，这就是为什么我一开始就问您这个问题，后来都发展成为非常成功的公司。

I imagine many people come to you for advice on pivoting.

我想很多人都会向您寻求有关转型的建议。

Let me just ask when folks come to you asking, "Should I stick with my idea?

当人们来问你“我应该坚持我的想法吗？”时，我想问一下。

Should I pivot?" what sort of advice do you find most helps them?

我应该转向吗？”您认为哪种建议对他们最有帮助？

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah, I mean, I think it's partly an intuition because obviously the decision is about, "Have you exhausted the possibilities?" and in the case where we were working on Glitch, this game where we used IRC for internal communication and we added a bunch of IRC which became the Proto Slack.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的，我的意思是，我认为这部分是一种直觉，因为显然这个决定是关于“你是否已经用尽了可能性？”在我们开发 Glitch 的情况下，我们使用 IRC 进行内部通信，并添加了一堆 IRC，这成为了 Proto Slack。

I think Slack had an enormous advantage in the fact that we are working on this for several years without actually explicitly working on it and only doing the minimum number of features that were absolutely guaranteed to be successful in the sense that it was so irritating that we couldn't stand it anymore or such an obvious improvement that we couldn't help but take advantage of it.

我认为 Slack 有一个巨大的优势，因为我们已经为此工作了好几年，但没有真正明确地致力于它，只做了绝对保证成功的最少数量的功能，因为它是如此令人恼火，以至于我们无法再忍受它，或者如此明显的改进，以至于我们忍不住要利用它。

We still had $ 9 million left and everyone still liked the game and we were all happy working on it, but I think by that point I had exhausted every non-verdiculous long shot idea to make it commercially successful, and so I decided to abandon it.

我们还剩下 900 万美元，每个人都仍然喜欢这款游戏，我们都很高兴为它工作，但我认为到那时我已经用尽了所有非危险的远景想法以使其在商业上取得成功，所以我决定放弃它。

Stewart Butterfield: But the default advice for anyone in anything is persevere.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但对任何人做任何事情的默认建议都是坚持。

It's like a kitten hanging off the branch and a poster says, "Hang in there." There's so many stories of, "So-and-so started out going door-to-door and was rejected by everyone and then suddenly there was Nike," or something like that and just, "If you stick with it long enough, you'll eventually be successful." I think you have to really be coldly rational.

这就像一只小猫挂在树枝上，海报上写着：“坚持住。”有很多这样的故事，“某某开始挨家挨户推销，被所有人拒绝，然后突然出现了耐克”，或者类似的故事，“如果你坚持足够长的时间，你最终会成功。”我认为你必须非常冷静地理性。

Some of this shows up in the book Thinking in Bets.

其中一些内容出现在《赌注思考》一书中。

Some of it's in Annie Duke's second book, the title of which I'm forgetting right now, but someone will know it.

其中一些内容在安妮·杜克的第二本书中，我现在忘记了书名，但有人会知道。

Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, Thinking in Bets, and then what was the second?

Lenny Rachitsky：是的，《思考投注》，那么第二个是什么？

I forget.

我忘记了。

Stewart Butterfield: She actually uses Glitch and Slack as an example of a smart fold basically.

Stewart Butterfield：她实际上使用 Glitch 和 Slack 作为智能折叠的示例。

My expected value here has diminished to the point where this alternative looks more attractive.

我在这里的预期价值已经降低到这个替代方案看起来更有吸引力的地步。

And the reason I say you have to be coldly rational about it is because it's fucking humiliating.

我之所以说你必须对此保持冷静的理性，是因为这实在是太丢脸了。

I convinced so many and you have to convince so many people to get a company off the ground.

我说服了很多人，你也必须说服很多人才能让公司起步。

You have to go to investors.

你必须去找投资者。

You have to go to early employees and say, "You should leave your other job and come work for this because here's the incredible feature we're imagining." You have to go to the press and you have to make all these promises and you have users and you've committed things to the users and you've convinced them to give up their time for this thing.

你必须对早期员工说：“你应该辞去其他工作，来此工作，因为这是我们正在想象的令人难以置信的功能。”你必须向媒体做出所有这些承诺，你有用户，你已经向用户承诺了一些事情，你已经说服他们放弃他们的时间来做这件事。

And so I think for a lot of people, it feels better to just keep doing it until it dies of suffocation due to lack of capital or something like that.

所以我认为对于很多人来说，最好继续这样做，直到由于缺乏资金或类似的原因而窒息而死。

Then just to admit, "Okay, I was wrong.

然后承认，“好吧，我错了。

This didn't work," and it's humiliating.

这不起作用”，这是一种耻辱。

It's painful.

很痛苦。

It's wrenching.

这很痛苦。

It has a bad impact.

有不好的影响。

Stewart Butterfield: When we shut down Glitch, there was a lot of people who loved it and would spend all of their free time and couldn't wait to get home from work to go play it more.

Stewart Butterfield：当我们关闭 Glitch 时，有很多人喜欢它，并会花掉所有的空闲时间，迫不及待地想下班回家继续玩它。

And that was their community and the community just disappeared, all these people and all these identities that have been created.

那是他们的社区，而这个社区刚刚消失了，所有这些人和所有这些身份都被创造出来了。

And obviously, people lost their jobs and people who had moved their families to a different city in order to take this job now weren't going to have a job anymore.

显然，人们失去了工作，而那些为了接受这份工作而举家搬到另一个城市的人现在将不再有工作了。

So pivots aren't something I take lightly.

所以我不会轻视枢轴。

I think it's very different to be like, "There's three of us and we started making this app and then we pivoted to a different app." That doesn't even really count.

我认为“我们三个人开始制作这个应用程序，然后转向另一个应用程序”是非常不同的。这根本不算数。

If you're six months into something, you're still messing around.

如果你已经做了六个月的事情，你仍然在胡闹。

You're trying to figure out what it is that you're building.

你试图弄清楚你正在构建的是什么。

It's not really a pivot.

这并不是真正的枢轴。

Obviously in this case, it worked out great and there's survivorship bias and that doesn't mean that everyone should pivot all the time.

显然，在这种情况下，它的效果很好，并且存在幸存者偏差，这并不意味着每个人都应该一直进行调整。

But I think creating the distance so that you can make an intellectual, rational decision about it rather than an emotional decision is essential.

但我认为创造距离，以便你能够做出理智、理性的决定，而不是感性的决定，这是至关重要的。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love, also, your piece of advice of just exhaust.

Lenny Rachitsky：我也喜欢你关于排气的建议。

Once you've exhausted all the ideas, that's a really good time to see what else is out there.

一旦你用尽了所有的想法，那就是看看还有什么其他的好时机。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah, just all the good ideas.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的，就是所有的好主意。

Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：是的。

The point you made about just kind of persevering, I just had Melanie Perkins, CEO of Canva, in the podcast.

关于你所说的坚持不懈的观点，我刚刚在播客中邀请了 Canva 首席执行官梅兰妮·帕金斯 (Melanie Perkins)。

100 investors rejected her before somebody finally decided to invest and she just kept pushing.

在有人最终决定投资之前，有 100 名投资者拒绝了她，而她只是不断推动。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

I think that's a slightly different example, right?

我认为这是一个稍微不同的例子，对吧？

She eventually believed in the concept of the product and in the vision.

她最终相信了产品的概念和愿景。

It was just trying to figure out the right articulation to get investors who ended up being obviously very, very happy.

它只是试图找出正确的表达方式，让投资者最终明显非常非常高兴。

Lenny Rachitsky: Extremely happy.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：非常高兴。

Oh, geez.

哦，天啊。

Okay.

好的。

Maybe a final topic depending on how time goes.

也许是最后一个主题，具体取决于时间的推移。

I want to talk about generosity.

我想谈谈慷慨。

I talked to a bunch of people, as I said, that have worked with you and the number one theme that came up again and again and again when I asked them about you and what has stuck most with them is just generosity.

正如我所说，我和一群曾与你共事过的人交谈过，当我向他们询问有关你的情况时，他们一次又一次地提到的第一个主题是最让他们印象深刻的就是慷慨。

So I'm going to read a few examples that I heard from folks that are examples of your generosity over the years.

因此，我将读一些我从人们那里听到的例子，这些例子是你们多年来的慷慨之举。

Lenny Rachitsky: So one person shared that he needed a little money before Christmas and he said, "Stewart literally walked me out of the building, went to the cash machine, handed me $500, told me to go home to my family." Other folks shared that, when you talked about Glitch just recently when you had to lay people off, you cried real tears when you were laying people off and then you spent an incredible amount of time helping them find new jobs and extending their severance pay and just taking it extremely, extremely seriously, much more than I think most people feel like CEOs do.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以有人说他在圣诞节前需要一点钱，他说，“斯图尔特真的带我走出大楼，走到提款机前，递给我 500 美元，告诉我回家和家人在一起。”其他人分享说，当你最近谈到 Glitch 时，当你不得不裁员时，你在裁员时流下了真正的眼泪，然后你花了令人难以置信的大量时间帮助他们找到新工作并延长他们的遣散费，并且非常非常认真地对待这件事，比我认为大多数人认为首席执行官所做的要严重得多。

Someone else shared that you paid 100% of employees health insurance to give them just fewer things to think about.

还有人说，你为员工支付了 100% 的健康保险，只是为了让他们少考虑一些事情。

Lenny Rachitsky: When you went public, you basically created the best possible situation for employees, no lockup, direct listing.

Lenny Rachitsky：当你上市时，你基本上为员工创造了最好的环境，没有禁售，直接上市。

Also, with the structure of the Slack deal, people said that acquisition was very employee friendly.

此外，从 Slack 交易的结构来看，人们表示此次收购对员工非常友好。

That's employees.

那是员工。

There's also just the way you thought about customers.

还有你对客户的看法。

A few examples: You gave free credits to businesses who were struggling to pay the bills during COVID.

举几个例子：您向在新冠疫情期间难以支付账单的企业提供了免费信贷。

You released this fair billing, which I think was very innovative at the time, where you stopped charging people for seats they weren't using, even though they signed a deal to charge for those seats.

你们发布了这个公平计费，我认为这在当时非常创新，您停止向人们收取他们不使用的座位的费用，即使他们签署了一项对这些座位收费的协议。

A lot of times, you slipped release schedules because you just wanted to make features better and better for people.

很多时候，你推迟了发布时间表，因为你只是想让功能变得越来越适合人们。

And I'll end with this quote: "Stewart is a leader who takes the responsibility he feels for his employees personally, and to which he extends the most generous circumstances he could muster.

我将以这句话结束：“斯图尔特是一位领导者，他个人对员工负有责任，并为此提供了他所能提供的最慷慨的环境。

That feels worth celebrating."

这感觉值得庆祝。”

Lenny Rachitsky: So first of all, I just want to celebrate you.

Lenny Rachitsky：首先，我想为你庆祝。

I think it's really rare and inspiring to meet a leader like that.

我认为遇到这样的领导者真的很罕见，也很鼓舞人心。

Clearly, you've had a lot of impact on a lot of people.

显然，你对很多人产生了很大的影响。

I don't know exactly the question I want to ask, but I guess in what part is this intentional, just like, "This is how we win.

我不知道我到底想问什么问题，但我猜想这在哪一部分是故意的，就像，“这就是我们获胜的方式。

I'm going to be very generous and help people because I know this will help long-term"?

我会非常慷慨地帮助人们，因为我知道这会带来长期的帮助”？

How much of this is just a and it's just the way you are as a person?

这其中有多少只是你作为一个人的方式？

Stewart Butterfield: I think a lot of it is just the way I am as a person and I had wonderful parents who raised me right, but I think there is a little bit of a lesson there and I'm just going to assume people's familiarity with the prisoner's dilemma.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我认为这很大程度上取决于我作为一个人的方式，我有很好的父母，他们正确地养育了我，但我认为这其中有一些教训，我只是假设人们熟悉囚徒困境。

The acts of generosity to me are, "Oh, I am demonstrating that I am going to cooperate as we iterate in this game." And if you do that, then people will also cooperate and you both benefit.

对我来说慷慨的行为是，“哦，我正在证明我将在我们迭代这个游戏时进行合作。”如果你这样做，人们也会合作，你们都会受益。

Whereas if you never really know if the other person is going to defect at the first opportunity, then your best bet is to defect.

然而，如果你永远不知道对方是否会一有机会就背叛，那么你最好的选择就是背叛。

And so there's a game theoretic aspect, usually in games that are much, much, much more complicated than the prisoner's dilemma.

因此，存在博弈论方面的问题，通常在比囚徒困境复杂得多的游戏中。

Stewart Butterfield: I think one thing I didn't touch on before, but to me was important enough, is that at more than one company all hands, I made everyone in the company repeat this as a chant.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我认为有一件事我以前没有提到过，但对我来说足够重要，那就是在不止一家公司全体员工中，我让公司里的每个人都重复这句话作为口号。

It was, "In the long run, the measure of our success will be the amount of value that we create for customers." And I wanted to be super clear and explicit about that because it should be if anything you're doing feels like a little bit shady, a little bit cheating, a little bit maximizing at the wrong moment or taking advantage of a customer or anything like that, definitely shouldn't do it.

“从长远来看，衡量我们成功的标准将是我们为客户创造的价值。”我想对此说得非常清楚和明确，因为如果你所做的任何事情感觉有点阴暗、有点作弊、在错误的时刻有点最大化或利用客户或类似的事情，那么绝对不应该这样做。

Because to me, I mean I think it's literally true, but it's also an ethical way to run a business.

因为对我来说，我的意思是我认为这确实是正确的，但这也是一种经营企业的道德方式。

And it's not just that the ethics are good.

这不仅仅是道德良好。

It's like there's advantages for you.

好像对你有好处一样。

You're able to attract a better class of employees.

您能够吸引更优秀的员工。

If all your employees are ethical, then it's going to be a better place for everyone to work and you're going to be happier and you're going to have fewer internal problems and all that stuff.

如果你所有的员工都是有道德的，那么这将成为每个人工作的更好场所，你也会更快乐，内部问题和所有这些问题也会更少。

Stewart Butterfield: But I think it really is true that especially in the long run, you can't destroy value for your customers and expect to be successful.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但我认为确实如此，尤其是从长远来看，你不能破坏客户的价值并期望获得成功。

You have to actually make their lives better.

你必须真正让他们的生活变得更好。

And you could put effort into pointing it out to them and demonstrating that you have created this value and stuff like that, but there's no substitute for actually having created it.

你可以努力向他们指出这一点，并证明你已经创造了这个价值和类似的东西，但没有什么可以替代实际创造它。

And I think that is incredibly important and that implies a real generosity, whether that's in negotiating terms with an enterprise deal or that's policy decisions.

我认为这非常重要，这意味着真正的慷慨，无论是在与企业交易的谈判中还是在政策决策中。

One time that it blew up in our face was our SLA was like, "For any downtime, you get 100 times your money back." Because from my perspective, it's like if we're down for two minutes, it's like pennies.

有一次，我们的 SLA 就这样让我们大吃一惊：“对于任何停机时间，您都可以获得 100 倍的退款。”因为从我的角度来看，如果我们情绪低落两分钟，就相当于损失了几分钱。

It doesn't really make any difference.

这并没有什么区别。

If we're down for 10 hours or something like that, then we have bigger problems than paying back people.

如果我们停工了 10 个小时或类似的情况，那么我们就会遇到比偿还员工工资更大的问题。

Stewart Butterfield: Fast-forward, we now have hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue and we've gone public.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：快进，我们现在拥有数亿美元的收入，并且已经上市。

And shortly after we go public, we have one of the biggest outages we ever had.

在我们上市后不久，我们遇到了有史以来最严重的停电之一。

I don't remember how long it was, but it was many hours.

我不记得那是多久，但那是好几个小时。

But by the time we got that scale, 100 times the money back for the third of a day that we were down was $8 million or something like that.

但当我们达到这个规模时，我们在一天三分之一的时间里亏损的100倍退款是800万美元或类似的东西。

It didn't cost us any money because we just gave it to people in the form of credits, but it meant that a bunch of revenue that we had already anticipated for the next quarter wasn't going to show up because people's credits were going to offset what they would've otherwise paid us.

它没有花费我们任何钱，因为我们只是以积分的形式将其提供给人们，但这意味着我们已经预计的下个季度的大量收入不会出现，因为人们的积分将抵消他们本来支付给我们的费用。

And so we definitely changed the terms of service after that because being a public company is a little bit different.

因此，在那之后我们肯定改变了服务条款，因为作为一家上市公司有点不同。

But in every other respect, I think they were all really important decisions that were helpful in us becoming successful.

但在其他方面，我认为它们都是非常重要的决定，有助于我们取得成功。

Lenny Rachitsky: Was that policy ...

Lenny Rachitsky：那项政策是......

It was automatic?

是自动的吗？

You didn't even have to claim it.

你甚至不必声称它。

It was just automatically you get this credit?

你是自动获得这个信用的吗？

Stewart Butterfield: And the default is you don't have to pay if you let us know.

Stewart Butterfield：默认情况下，如果您告知我们，则无需付款。

This was, "We will automatically, proactively, preemptively without any input from you ..."

这就是，“我们将自动、主动、先发制人，无需您的任何输入……”

Stewart Butterfield: "Apply this credit to your account, and just send you a message that it happened.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德（Stewart Butterfield）：“将这笔积分存入你的帐户，然后向你发送一条消息，告诉你这件事发生了。

And by the way, we will do it on the aggregate for downtime, even if the issue didn't affect you as a customer."

顺便说一句，即使这个问题没有影响您作为客户，我们也会在停机期间进行总体处理。”

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：哇。

Too generous.

太慷慨了。

You found the edge of where you want to be.

你找到了你想去的地方的边缘。

Lenny Rachitsky: What was that mantra again that you had the company chant?

Lenny Rachitsky：你们让公司高喊的口号又是什么？

I think this is a really nice way to end it.

我认为这是一个非常好的结束方式。

Stewart Butterfield: It was, "In the long run, the measure of our success will be the amount of value we create for customers."

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：“从长远来看，衡量我们成功的标准将是我们为客户创造的价值。”

Lenny Rachitsky: Incredible.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：难以置信。

I'm just trying to picture the entire team at Slack reciting this mantra.

我只是想想象 Slack 的整个团队都在背诵这句口头禅。

Stewart Butterfield: It was hundreds of people.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：有数百人。

It felt very like, Kim Jong-Un or Stalin or something like that.

感觉很像金正恩或斯大林之类的。

Lenny Rachitsky: Well, on that note, most people don't know this about you, but your actual name when you were born was not Stewart.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：嗯，在这一点上，大多数人都不知道你的这一点，但你出生时的真实名字不是斯图尔特。

It was Dharma.

这就是佛法。

Lenny Rachitsky: And this all makes sense as you learn that.

Lenny Rachitsky：当你了解这一点时，这一切都有意义。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

My name is Dharma Jeremy Butterfield, so my parents named me.

我的名字叫 Dharma Jeremy Butterfield，是我父母给我起的名字。

And when I was 12, I changed it because I just really wanted to be normal and for some reason I thought Stewart was a normal name.

当我 12 岁的时候，我改变了它，因为我真的想变得正常，并且出于某种原因我认为斯图尔特是一个正常的名字。

And by the way, you'll notice this now that I said it.

顺便说一句，既然我这么说了，你就会注意到这一点。

Any character except for Stuart Little the mouse, anytime you see a character in a movie, a novel, TV show or whatever, there's only the loser Stewart and the asshole Stewart.

除了老鼠斯图尔特·利特尔之外的任何角色，任何时候你在电影、小说、电视节目或其他任何东西中看到的角色，都只有失败者斯图尔特和混蛋斯图尔特。

It's obviously, in the collective consciousness, a terrible name and I shouldn't have chosen it and I regret it.

显然，在集体意识中，这是一个可怕的名字，我不应该选择它，我很后悔。

But by the time I realized that, Dharma and Greg had already come out and it would've seemed like I was bandwagon jumping.

但当我意识到这一点时，达玛和格雷格已经出来了，我看起来就像是在跟风。

And people thought it was a girl's name, even though in India it's obviously only a boy's name.

人们认为这是一个女孩的名字，尽管在印度这显然只是一个男孩的名字。

Stewart Butterfield: I'm going to add just one last little tidbit because I forgot about this earlier on and I think it helps tie things together, and it's called the owner's delusion.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：我要添加最后一个小花絮，因为我早些时候忘记了这一点，我认为它有助于将事情联系在一起，这被称为所有者的错觉。

And this is based on something I posted on Twitter.

这是基于我在 Twitter 上发布的内容。

The person who came up with the name later deleted their account and so I have no idea who it was and who to credit for this.

提出这个名字的人后来删除了他们的帐户，所以我不知道是谁以及谁应该为此负责。

But what I had posted was, and this was a long time ago when restaurant websites have gotten better and it doesn't really matter because Google Local was taking over everything, but this is, let's say, 10 years ago.

但我发布的是，这是很久以前的事了，当时餐厅网站已经变得更好了，这并不重要，因为 Google Local 正在接管一切，但这是，比如说，10 年前。

Stewart Butterfield: There's five things you could possibly want when you go to a restaurant's website and it's their street address, their phone number, the menu, the hours of operation ...

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：当你访问一家餐厅的网站时，你可能会想要五件事，那就是他们的街道地址、电话号码、菜单、营业时间......

Oh my God, I'm forgetting the fifth thing.

天哪，我忘了第五件事了。

Oh, and making a reservation, how to make a reservation.

哦，还有预约，如何预约。

And again, this problem has to some extent taken care of it's itself or at least improved, but what you would get was this super slow loading photo, the Ken Burns effect as it ...

再说一遍，这个问题在某种程度上已经得到了解决，或者至少得到了改善，但你会得到的是这张加载速度超慢的照片，肯·伯恩斯效果......

Stewart Butterfield: And then fading in and then some music starts playing.

Stewart Butterfield：然后淡入，然后开始播放一些音乐。

And then if they show you the phone number, it's not clickable.

然后，如果他们向您显示电话号码，则该号码不可点击。

Stewart Butterfield: It's not even text that you can copy because yes, it's an image.

Stewart Butterfield：它甚至不是可以复制的文本，因为是的，它是图像。

And they don't have the hours.

而且他们没有时间。

They don't put the address or whatever and it's just like, "What?" For sure, whoever made this website for the restaurant owner and the restaurant owner themselves have definitely been in the position where they went to somebody else's restaurant website because they wanted to get the address or the opening hours or the phone number or whatever.

他们不会写地址或其他什么，就像“什么？”当然，无论谁为餐厅老板制作这个网站，以及餐厅老板自己，他们肯定会访问别人的餐厅网站，因为他们想获取地址、营业时间、电话号码或其他任何信息。

So why does it end up like this and what should we call this?

那么为什么会变成这样呢？我们该怎么称呼它呢？

Stewart Butterfield: And whoever replied to the tweet, she said, "We should call it the owner's delusion," and I was like, "Oh my God.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：无论谁回复了这条推文，她都说，“我们应该称其为所有者的错觉”，我当时想，“天哪。

That's perfect." And I think that is incredibly powerful and what ends up with the result, like Apple naming whatever that feature is called Sleep, which it's too hard to understand what that can possibly mean.

那太完美了。”我认为这是令人难以置信的强大以及最终的结果，就像苹果将任何该功能命名为“睡眠”一样，很难理解这可能意味着什么。

And that's why people anticipate, despite the fact that when they get to your website for the first time, their intent is absolutely the minimum number of micro points above the threshold required from them to actually take that action.

这就是为什么人们预计，尽管当他们第一次访问您的网站时，他们的意图绝对是高于他们实际采取该行动所需的阈值的最小微点数量。

Stewart Butterfield: You're like, "All right.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：你会说，“好吧。

Welcome to my website," and there's a bunch of BS and there's a bunch of stuff that doesn't make any sense and the buttons are inscrutable.

欢迎来到我的网站”，里面有一堆废话，还有一堆没有任何意义的东西，而且按钮也难以理解。

And it's unclear what to do next because I think that my thing is so important and I don't recognize that you are at work and you were late this morning and you have to go to the bathroom and you're just a regular human being who has stuff going on, that you're concerned that your kid is a fuck-up and they're getting in trouble at school and stuff like that.

现在还不清楚下一步该做什么，因为我认为我的事情非常重要，我没有意识到你在工作，今天早上迟到了，你必须去洗手间，你只是一个有事情发生的普通人，你担心你的孩子是个混蛋，他们在学校遇到麻烦等等。

They're not subjects who paid money to go to your play and are sitting in the audience and waiting for that curtain to go out.

他们不是花钱去看你的戏剧并坐在观众席上等待幕布落下的主体。

They're people who are going to bounce in a fraction of a second.

他们是会在几分之一秒内弹起的人。

And so everyone should always be conscious of the owner's solution.

因此，每个人都应该始终了解所有者的解决方案。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢这个。

What's the solution?

解决办法是什么？

Is it have other people look at it and give you feedback?

是否有其他人查看并给您反馈？

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah, and recognize it.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的，并且认识到这一点。

And unfortunately, it's one of those things like Murphy's Law.

不幸的是，这是墨菲定律之一。

Stewart Butterfield: Even you can go wrong even when you take into account Murphy's Law.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：即使考虑到墨菲定律，你也可能会出错。

Stewart Butterfield: But if you don't name it and recognize it and discuss it and train yourself to think that way, take a breath, pretend you're a regular person, and then look at this again and see if it makes sense, then you're screwed.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：但如果你不说出它的名字、认识它、讨论它并训练自己以这种方式思考，深吸一口气，假装你是一个普通人，然后再看一遍，看看它是否有道理，那么你就完蛋了。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢这个。

I love that you threw this in here.

我喜欢你把这个扔在这里。

I have a billion other questions I'm going to ask you in part two when we do this someday.

当我们有一天这样做时，我将在第二部分中问你十亿个其他问题。

Stewart, thank you so much for doing this.

斯图尔特，非常感谢你所做的一切。

Thank you so much for being here.

非常感谢您来到这里。

Stewart Butterfield: Yeah.

斯图尔特·巴特菲尔德：是的。

Thank you for having me, Lenny.

谢谢你邀请我，莱尼。

I really enjoyed it.

我真的很喜欢它。

Lenny Rachitsky: Same here.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这里也一样。

Bye, everyone.

再见，大家。

Thank you so much for listening.

非常感谢您的聆听。

If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.

另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。

You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.

您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。