Lessons from scaling Ramp | Sri Batchu (Ramp, Instacart, Opendoor)
Sri Batchu: I do think there's actually a general path that most B2B companies take and should take.
Sri Batchu：我确实认为，实际上大多数 B2B 公司都采取并且应该采取一条通用路径。
My view is you start off with founder-led sales, the early team needs to know how to actually sell.
我的观点是，从创始人主导的销售开始，早期团队需要知道如何实际销售。
Then you hire your first couple of salespeople, then you start some very low cost targeted marketing efforts.
然后你雇佣你的第一批销售人员，然后你开始一些成本非常低的有针对性的营销工作。
So whether it's content, community, small scale events, and then PR, after all of that is when you start paid and brand effort and then SEO probably start around the same time that you start paid marketing efforts.
因此，无论是内容、社区、小型活动，还是公关，毕竟当你开始付费和品牌工作时，搜索引擎优化可能会在你开始付费营销工作的同时开始。
The reason for the progression the way I've described it is the channels get more expensive as you go farther along and they get more effective as you understand more about your customers.
我所描述的进展方式的原因是，随着您走得更远，渠道变得更加昂贵，并且随着您对客户的了解越来越多，渠道变得更加有效。
Lenny: Welcome to Lenny's Podcast where I interview world-class product leaders and growth experts to learn from their hard one experiences building and growing today's most successful products.
莱尼：欢迎来到莱尼的播客，我在这里采访了世界一流的产品领导者和增长专家，从他们构建和发展当今最成功产品的艰辛经验中学习。
Today my guest is Sri Batchu.
今天我的客人是 Sri Batchu。
Sri was VP of Ops at Opendoor, then head of growth at Instacart, and currently he's the head of growth at Ramp, which as you'll hear at the top of the episode, is the fastest growing SaaS business and the fastest growing FinTech business in history.
Sri 曾担任 Opendoor 的运营副总裁，然后是 Instacart 的增长主管，目前他是 Ramp 的增长主管，正如您在本集开头所听到的，Ramp 是历史上增长最快的 SaaS 业务和增长最快的金融科技业务。
They hit a hundred million dollar yearly run rate in two years, which is absurd, and in the last year grew 4X during a period where most companies barely grew at all.
他们在两年内达到了 1 亿美元的年运营率，这是荒谬的，并且在去年大多数公司几乎没有增长的时期增长了 4 倍。
I recently did a newsletter post on how Ramp builds product with their VP of product, Geoff Charles.
我最近发表了一篇时事通讯，介绍 Ramp 如何与其产品副总裁 Geoff Charles 一起构建产品。
And in this episode, we zeroed in on Ramp's approach to growth.
在这一集中，我们重点关注 Ramp 的增长方式。
We chat about what Ramp did in the early days to kickstart growth, how they mostly grow these days, how their growth team is structured, their prioritization framework plus their north star metrics.
我们讨论了 Ramp 早期为推动增长所做的事情、他们现在的主要增长方式、他们的增长团队的结构、他们的优先级框架以及他们的北极星指标。
Lenny: Also, how they operationalize velocity, which is at the core of their team culture.
莱尼：另外，他们如何运作速度，这是他们团队文化的核心。
Ramp is a really special company that is clearly on an incredible journey and I am really excited to share this glimpse into how they operate.
Ramp 是一家非常特别的公司，显然正在经历一段令人难以置信的旅程，我很高兴能与大家分享他们如何运作的一瞥。
Enjoy this episode with Sri Batchu after a short word from our sponsors.
在我们的赞助商简短致辞后，请与 Sri Batchu 一起享受这一集。
This episode is brought to you by Attio, a new type of CRM that's powerful, flexible, and built around your data.
本集由 Attio 为您带来，Attio 是一种新型 CRM，功能强大、灵活且围绕您的数据构建。
Traditional CRMs were built for a different era with totally different speed, scale, and data demands.
传统的 CRM 是为不同的时代而构建的，具有完全不同的速度、规模和数据需求。
Attio is different.
阿蒂奥则不同。
It allows you to quickly build a CRM that matches your unique workflows and data structures.
它允许您快速构建与您独特的工作流程和数据结构相匹配的 CRM。
Within minutes of connecting your email and calendar, you'll have a CRM that's already set up complete with customer profiles and automatic data enrichment.
连接电子邮件和日历后几分钟内，您将拥有一个已设置完整的 CRM，其中包含客户资料和自动数据充实。
You'll also have realtime dynamic reporting at your fingertips.
您还可以轻松获得实时动态报告。
No more slow deployments, outdated user experiences or tedious manual data input.
不再有缓慢的部署、过时的用户体验或繁琐的手动数据输入。
Lenny: With Attio, you can build and adapt your CRM on the fly, no matter your business model or company stage.
Lenny：借助 Attio，您可以动态构建和调整您的 CRM，无论您的业务模式或公司处于什么阶段。
Attio is the CRM for fast-growing startups.
Attio 是面向快速成长的初创公司的 CRM。
Get started today and get 15% off your first year at attio.com/lenny.
今天就开始吧，第一年可享受 15% 的折扣，请访问 attio.com/lenny。
That's A-T-T-I-O.com/lenny.
那是 A-T-T-I-O.com/lenny。
This episode is brought to you by Coda.
本集由 Coda 为您带来。
You've heard me talk about how Coda is the doc that brings it all together and how can help your team run smoother and be more efficient.
您已经听过我谈论 Coda 是如何将所有内容整合在一起的文档，以及如何帮助您的团队运行得更顺畅、更高效。
I know this firsthand because Coda does that for me.
我直接知道这一点，因为 Coda 为我做到了这一点。
I use Coda every day to wrangle my newsletter content calendar, my interview notes for podcasts, and to coordinate my sponsors.
我每天都使用 Coda 来整理我的时事通讯内容日历、播客采访笔记，并协调我的赞助商。
Lenny: More recently, I actually wrote a whole post on how Coda's product team operates and within that post they shared a dozen templates that they use internally to run their product team, including managing the roadmap, their OKR process, getting internal feedback, and essentially their whole product development process is done within Coda.
Lenny：最近，我实际上写了一篇关于 Coda 产品团队如何运作的整篇文章，在这篇文章中，他们分享了十几个内部用来运行产品团队的模板，包括管理路线图、OKR 流程、获取内部反馈，基本上他们的整个产品开发流程都是在 Coda 内完成的。
If your team's work is spread out across different documents and spreadsheets and a stack of workflow tools, that's why you need Coda.
如果您的团队的工作分散在不同的文档和电子表格以及一堆工作流程工具中，这就是您需要 Coda 的原因。
Lenny: Coda puts data in one centralized location regardless of format, eliminating roadblocks that can slow your team down.
Lenny：Coda 将数据放在一个集中位置，无论其格式如何，消除了可能拖慢团队速度的障碍。
Coda allows your team to operate on the same information and collaborate in one place.
Coda 允许您的团队在一个地方处理相同的信息并进行协作。
Take advantage of this special limited time offer just for startups.
利用这一专为初创公司提供的特殊限时优惠。
Plan up today at coda.io/lenny and get a thousand dollars startup credit on your first statement.
今天就在 coda.io/lenny 上进行计划，并在您的第一份声明中获得一千美元的启动信用。
That's C-O-D-A.io/lenny to sign up and get a startup credit of $1,000.
注册 C-O-D-A.io/lenny 即可获得 1,000 美元的启动资金。
Coda.io/lenny.
Coda.io/lenny。
Sri Batchu: Thank you, Lenny.
斯里·巴楚：谢谢你，莱尼。
Thanks for having me.
谢谢你有我。
I'm a huge fan and I've been following the podcast and the newsletter.
我是一个超级粉丝，我一直在关注播客和时事通讯。
So excited to be on here.
很高兴来到这里。
Lenny: Really appreciate that.
莱尼：真的很感激。
So let's talk about Ramp.
那么我们来谈谈斜坡。
So Ramp where you lead growth is apparently one of the fastest growing products in history.
因此，引领增长的 Ramp 显然是历史上增长最快的产品之一。
I believe it's the fastest growing SaaS product and business and also the fastest growing FinTech business.
我相信它是增长最快的SaaS产品和业务，也是增长最快的金融科技业务。
So first of all, is that generally true and correct?
首先，这通常是真实和正确的吗？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I mean I'm sure you know of Packy and he's done a great analysis where he shared this work and compared us to a bunch of other companies and when he released this a year ago, we were the fastest growing company to a hundred million dollars of annualized revenue at the time.
Sri Batchu：是的，我的意思是，我相信你知道 Packy，他做了很好的分析，他分享了这项工作，并将我们与其他许多公司进行了比较，当他一年前发布这项工作时，我们是当时增长最快的公司，年收入达到一亿美元。
I don't know if there's been others since, but certainly not in the FinTech category as far as I know.
我不知道此后是否还有其他公司，但据我所知，肯定不属于金融科技类别。
Lenny: Okay.
莱尼：好的。
So you said the fastest growing to a hundred million.
所以你说最快增长到一个亿。
I think it took two years to get to a hundred million and run rate, right?
我想花了两年时间才达到一个亿和运行率，对吧？
Lenny: That's insane because rarely is there all of this money sitting around for a company to just come in and accumulate and grab from people and provide that amount of value.
莱尼：这太疯狂了，因为很少有公司能把所有这些钱都存起来，从人们那里积累和攫取并提供那么多的价值。
So that's an insane stat.
所以这是一个疯狂的统计数据。
Maybe another question along these lines, is there any other just stats you could share, but just the scale of Ramp or just the speed that Ramp has grown?
也许另一个问题是，您是否可以分享任何其他统计数据，但只是斜坡的规模或斜坡增长的速度？
Sri Batchu: We publicly disclosed that last year we grew Forex on top of that, very sizable based from the year prior and Okta actually released some recent stats on fastest growing software companies among SMB and mid-market and Ramp was by far the fastest growing despite the fact that a bunch of others on the list were materially smaller.
Sri Batchu：我们公开披露，去年我们在此基础上实现了外汇业务的增长，与前一年相比非常可观，Okta 实际上发布了一些有关中小型企业和中型市场中增长最快的软件公司的最新统计数据，而 Ramp 是迄今为止增长最快的，尽管事实上名单上的其他公司规模要小得多。
The company's still very lean for the amount of growth.
该公司的增长量仍然非常有限。
We're under 500 people roughly today at that scale and that's definitely have a much higher revenue per employee than some of our other competitors and others in the space.
目前，按这个规模，我们的员工数量大约还不到 500 人，每名员工的收入肯定比我们的其他一些竞争对手和该领域的其他公司高得多。
And yeah, I mean we've got a very thoughtful and smart finance team that I've worked with actually closely our old head of strategic finance at Instacart and they set ambitious goals for us on growth and I'm happy to say we've consistently beat those ambitious goals over the last 16 months or 18 months since I've joined.
是的，我的意思是，我们有一个非常深思熟虑和聪明的财务团队，我实际上与 Instacart 的老战略财务主管密切合作，他们为我们设定了雄心勃勃的增长目标，我很高兴地说，自从我加入以来，我们在过去 16 个月或 18 个月里一直在实现这些雄心勃勃的目标。
Lenny: Which is especially challenging in this environment.
Lenny：在这种环境下这尤其具有挑战性。
So it's extra meaningful.
所以就显得格外有意义了。
Okay, so here's the big question I want to start off with.
好的，这是我想开始的一个大问题。
I know you weren't there at the beginning of Ramp's journey, but from what you know, what do you think the team did early on to seed this level of growth and success other than just building an awesome product that people really love?
我知道你在 Ramp 旅程的开始时并不在场，但据你所知，你认为团队除了构建人们真正喜欢的出色产品之外，早期还做了哪些事情来实现这种水平的增长和成功？
And if that's the answer, that's fine, but usually that's part of it.
如果这就是答案，那很好，但通常这是答案的一部分。
I'm curious just like is there some clever unique tactics that they used to help create that incredible growth from the beginning?
我很好奇他们是否使用了一些巧妙的独特策略来帮助从一开始就实现令人难以置信的增长？
Sri Batchu: I think you're certainly right on the product side.
Sri Batchu：我认为您在产品方面的看法肯定是正确的。
Obviously you've recently written about Ramp's product engine with Geoff and that there's been incredible product market fit because of the product team that deeply understood the customer experience and I think that's certainly helped initial word of mouth.
显然，您最近与 Geoff 一起撰写了有关 Ramp 的产品引擎的文章，并且由于产品团队深入了解客户体验，因此产品具有令人难以置信的市场契合度，我认为这肯定有助于最初的口碑传播。
One thing that I did want to point out that Ramp did that was interesting is obviously Eric and Karim, the co-founders of Ramp, were previous founders of another company that they had a successful exit on.
我确实想指出 Ramp 所做的一件有趣的事情是，Ramp 的联合创始人 Eric 和 Karim 显然是另一家公司的前创始人，他们曾成功退出该公司。
Sri Batchu: So they had a strong reputation as founders and came in with the right set of experience to build Ramp and one of the things that they did is what I call cap table as a growth strategy where they did a great job of getting a large number of early stage founders and other influential operators and advisors onto the cap table at the company.
Sri Batchu：所以他们作为创始人享有很高的声誉，并拥有建立 Ramp 的正确经验，他们所做的一件事就是我所说的股权结构表作为一种增长战略，他们在让大量早期创始人和其他有影响力的运营商和顾问进入公司的股权结构表方面做得很好。
And many of our initial customers were these companies that were on the cap table or the founders were on the cap table for.
我们的许多最初客户都是那些在股权结构表上的公司或创始人在股权结构表上的公司。
And Ramp today is actually not majority startups or tech companies anymore.
如今的 Ramp 实际上不再是大多数初创公司或科技公司。
The vast majority of our customers are mid-market and enterprise.
我们的绝大多数客户是中端市场和企业。
That's where our revenue comes from.
这就是我们的收入的来源。
But there's a lot of love among the tech founder community because of the early days, both the product quality as well as all of these investors that Ramp got.
但由于早期的产品质量以及 Ramp 获得的所有投资者，科技创始人社区中受到了很多人的喜爱。
Lenny: Wow.
莱尼：哇。
I have not heard of this strategy before and I didn't know this was actually a big part of the initial story.
我以前没有听说过这个策略，也不知道这实际上是最初故事的重要组成部分。
So is there examples of folks that they had on their cap table that are examples of folks that helped them grow initially like this?
那么，他们的股权结构表上是否有一些人是帮助他们最初像这样成长的人的例子？
Sri Batchu: One example that I can think of is Eight Sleep founder, he's been very close to the Ramp team, same with the Pod founder and then a bunch of VC firms that are investors in the company are also customers of the company.
Sri Batchu：我能想到的一个例子是Eight Sleep创始人，他与Ramp团队关系非常密切，Pod创始人也是如此，然后一堆作为该公司投资者的风险投资公司也是该公司的客户。
Lenny: Do you know if the strategy there was VCs who connect them to small companies that would use Ramp or is it directly founders of companies that would immediately use Ramp?
Lenny：你知道策略是由风险投资家将他们与将使用 Ramp 的小公司联系起来，还是直接由立即使用 Ramp 的公司创始人来实施？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I'll say it was more founders and executives of customers that can use Ramp.
Sri Batchu：是的，我想说的是，更多的创始人和客户高管可以使用 Ramp。
Certainly we have a fantastic group of very sophisticated investors who have made introductions to Ramp as well and that helped.
当然，我们有一群非常成熟的投资者，他们也向我们介绍了 Ramp，这对我们很有帮助。
But I will say that is not as big of a channel as one might expect because companies have their own decision making frameworks for selecting a product like Ramp and the investor opinion and recommendation matters, but turns out it doesn't matter maybe as much as another customer who's actually used the product that they know or are actually experiencing the product.
但我想说的是，这个渠道并不像人们想象的那么大，因为公司有自己的决策框架来选择像 Ramp 这样的产品，投资者的意见和推荐很重要，但事实证明，这可能并不像另一个实际使用过他们所知道的产品或正在实际体验该产品的客户那么重要。
Lenny: Amazing, awesome tactic.
莱尼：太棒了，太棒了。
I've not heard of that before.
我以前没听说过。
In terms of growth, how much of growth of early Ramp was new customers versus expansion within existing customers?
在增长方面，早期 Ramp 的增长有多少是新客户与现有客户的扩张？
Because what's cool about credit card is people spend more, you make more money because you're taking a piece of that.
因为信用卡的优点在于人们花得更多，你赚的钱也更多，因为你从中分得一杯羹。
So roughly how much of the growth insanity over the first couple of years was from expansion within existing customers?
那么，头几年的疯狂增长大约有多少是来自现有客户的扩张呢？
Sri Batchu: Obviously many of our early customers have grown quite a bit and our whole strategy is to save companies time and money so they can redeploy that in other ways for their own growth or other objectives.
Sri Batchu：显然，我们的许多早期客户已经成长了很多，我们的整体战略是节省公司的时间和金钱，以便他们可以以其他方式重新部署，以实现自己的增长或其他目标。
And we obviously are growing our product suite as well like BillPay, Flex, et cetera, where our customers can spend more money on Ramp and get more value out of Ramp.
显然，我们也在不断发展我们的产品套件，例如 BillPay、Flex 等，我们的客户可以在 Ramp 上花更多的钱，并从 Ramp 中获得更多价值。
Having said all of that, what's interesting is that the vast majority of our growth back then and even to this day is via new customer acquisition.
说了这么多，有趣的是，我们当时乃至今天的大部分增长都是通过新客户获取实现的。
It's just we are adding so many more customers that the growth of our customers while strong and important part of our growth lever is not nearly as material as you might think.
只是我们增加了太多的客户，因此客户的增长虽然是我们增长杠杆的强大而重要的组成部分，但并不像您想象的那么重要。
Lenny: Okay, awesome.
莱尼：好的，太棒了。
So that's a good segue to the next question I had, which is if you're going to create a pie chart of how Ramp grows and ideally if you could even share early on and then now, how does that pie chart look?
因此，这是我提出的下一个问题的一个很好的延续，即您是否要创建一个饼图来显示 Ramp 如何增长，理想情况下，如果您甚至可以尽早分享，然后现在，该饼图看起来如何？
What are the slices of that pie and then what are the rough percentages of where growth comes from for Ramp?
Ramp 的增长大致占了多少比例？
Sri Batchu: Rather than going into the specifics, one thing I'll say about the growth system today is if you were to look at what percentage of our business comes from outbound sales, paid marketing, field, and then a bunch of other channels and then you compare it against industry benchmarks, I think the secret sauce of Ramp is not that we've found a channel that's unique and that we've over-invested or under-invested.
Sri Batchu：今天我要说的关于增长系统的一件事是，如果你看看我们的业务来自对外销售、付费营销、现场以及其他一系列渠道的百分比，然后将其与行业基准进行比较，我认为，Ramp 的秘密武器并不是我们找到了一个独特的渠道，也不是我们投资过度或投资不足。
I don't think our distribution would be not that far off from looking at other companies at our size and stage.
我认为我们的分销与我们规模和阶段的其他公司相差不远。
Sri Batchu: I think what we've done differently is we've really focused on making all of those investments very much driven by technology and data.
Sri Batchu：我认为我们所做的不同之处在于，我们真正专注于让所有这些投资在很大程度上由技术和数据驱动。
And so one example that I'll give you is that our sales teams are actually incredibly efficient by any metric that we look at and we obviously benchmark them.
因此，我给您举的一个例子是，无论从我们观察的任何指标来看，我们的销售团队实际上都非常高效，并且我们显然对他们进行了基准测试。
And the reason for that is because we actually have a growth engineering team that's dedicated to supporting that efficiency but including adjusting third party data and using AI to automate much of their workflow, et cetera.
原因是我们实际上有一个增长工程团队，致力于支持这种效率，但包括调整第三方数据和使用人工智能来自动化大部分工作流程等等。
And we've been doing this well before AI has become the buzzword for a lot of folks, but this is something we've had this team for almost two years now that that's been working on sales automation and data to just make our sales teams more efficient.
在人工智能成为很多人的流行词之前，我们就已经在做这件事了，但我们这个团队已经有近两年的时间了，他们一直致力于销售自动化和数据，以提高我们的销售团队的效率。
That's just one example, but we've got similar types of mandates for every channel that we invest in and thinking about how do we inform this better customer and prospect data and how do we automate and technologize it so that we can build that competitive mode for each channel.
这只是一个例子，但我们对投资的每个渠道都有类似类型的要求，并思考如何提供更好的客户和潜在客户数据，以及如何对其进行自动化和技术化，以便我们可以为每个渠道建立竞争模式。
Lenny: I'd love to learn more about this growth eng team that works with sales.
Lenny：我很想更多地了解这个与销售合作的增长工程团队。
How is that structured maybe as the first question and then just what are their goals?
第一个问题可能是如何构建的，然后他们的目标是什么？
How do you measure their progress and success?
您如何衡量他们的进步和成功？
Sri Batchu: A lot of companies do it differently.
Sri Batchu：很多公司都采取不同的做法。
I think what works really well with Ramp is that we have the same shared goal, which is the pipeline driven and the payback period of the channel.
我认为 Ramp 真正有效的一点是我们有相同的共同目标，即管道驱动和渠道的投资回收期。
It's unique to Ramp where the engineers feel ownership of the quota.
这是 Ramp 的独特之处，工程师感受到配额的所有权。
They're not owning product metrics or what have you, they're obviously of course interim and input metrics that are important, but they really do feel accountable for the pipeline driven and the efficiency driven by that team.
他们不拥有产品指标或其他什么，他们显然是重要的临时和输入指标，但他们确实对团队驱动的管道和效率负责。
And I think that naturally allows them bottom up to come with the right projects that they think will have maximal impact on efficiency and top line.
我认为这自然会让他们自下而上地提出他们认为将对效率和营收产生最大影响的正确项目。
Lenny: So what are the sorts of things they do for a sales team?
莱尼：那么他们为销售团队做了哪些事情呢？
Is it like they help them prioritize leads or is it they help craft their messaging?
他们是帮助他们确定潜在客户的优先顺序还是帮助他们制作消息？
Which parts are maybe most important?
哪些部分可能是最重要的？
Sri Batchu: All of the above, helping find the right prospects, sending them the right messaging as well as prioritizing responses and drafting potential responses for the team as well.
Sri Batchu：以上所有这些，都有助于找到合适的潜在客户，向他们发送正确的消息，以及确定响应的优先级并为团队起草潜在的响应。
Lenny: Fascinating.
莱尼：令人着迷。
How much impact have you seen that has on sales?
您认为这对销售有多大影响？
Sri Batchu: It's incredibly helpful to our sales team and it's one of our most efficient channels as I've mentioned.
Sri Batchu：这对我们的销售团队非常有帮助，正如我提到的，它是我们最有效的渠道之一。
So I think that there is something unique about our ability to bring technology to every channel.
因此，我认为我们将技术引入每个渠道的能力是独一无二的。
Lenny: Super interesting.
莱尼：超级有趣。
Maybe on that topic, can you just talk about how your growth team is structured at Ramp?
也许在这个话题上，您能谈谈您在 Ramp 的增长团队的结构吗？
What are the kind of sub-teams and how do you think about?
子团队有哪些类型？您是如何看待的？
Sri Batchu: We've got an organization today that might evolve and if we get to that topic we can talk about it, but historically the way we've been organized is we've got channel based teams that are deploying spend in a given channel.
Sri Batchu：我们今天的组织可能会发展，如果我们谈到这个话题，我们可以讨论它，但从历史上看，我们的组织方式是我们有基于渠道的团队，在给定的渠道中部署支出。
So we've got a paid marketing team, a lifecycle CRM team, we've got a field marketing team, et cetera.
所以我们有一个付费营销团队、一个生命周期 CRM 团队、一个现场营销团队等等。
And then we've got a product engineering team that is supporting growth and sales and helping each of these channels be more effective that's dedicated to growth.
然后，我们有一个产品工程团队，支持增长和销售，并帮助每个渠道更加有效，致力于增长。
And then separate from that, we've got a small kind of what I call an innovation or skunk work type of team that works on cross-channel.
除此之外，我们还有一小部分我称之为创新或臭鼬工作类型的跨渠道团队。
Just things that don't neatly fit into a box that we think could be cool or fun to try to just do more experimentation that is cross-channel, cross-team.
只是那些我们认为尝试做更多跨渠道、跨团队的实验可能很酷或很有趣的东西并不能完全放入一个盒子中。
Lenny: Definitely sounds like the most fun team.
莱尼：听起来绝对是最有趣的团队。
What are some of the things they've done or work on in the skunk works team?
他们在臭鼬工厂团队中做过或从事过哪些工作？
Sri Batchu: They've done testing of new channels that don't necessarily fit into very...
Sri Batchu：他们已经测试了新渠道，但这些渠道不一定适合......
And that includes new online platforms.
其中包括新的在线平台。
They've done some interesting stuff on TikTok and Reddit and other places, things like that.
他们在 TikTok 和 Reddit 以及其他地方做了一些有趣的事情，诸如此类。
They've focused on referrals and how to make that a more delightful experience for the customers, first party events, things like that.
他们专注于推荐以及如何为客户、第一方活动等提供更愉快的体验。
Things that are often smaller scale and if they work we can invest more and make them larger scale later.
通常规模较小的事情，如果它们有效，我们可以投入更多资金，并在以后扩大它们的规模。
Lenny: I love it.
莱尼：我喜欢。
So the teams roughly is there's a paid growth team that just works on paid growth optimization, lifecycle CRM team basically it's like emails I imagine is a big part of that.
因此，团队大致是有一个付费增长团队，专门致力于付费增长优化，生命周期 CRM 团队基本上就像电子邮件，我认为这是其中的重要组成部分。
Lenny: Then there's a field sales support team and then there's the sales team, kind of eng sales team that you talked about and then I also imagine there's like a self-serve.
莱尼：然后是现场销售支持团队，然后是销售团队，您谈到的那种工程销售团队，然后我也想象有自助服务。
Sri Batchu: Yeah, exactly.
Sri Batchu：是的，完全正确。
There's a self-serve activation eng team as well.
还有一个自助激活工程师团队。
And then of course there's SEO and website and bound lead channel management team.
当然还有搜索引擎优化和网站以及绑定的领先渠道管理团队。
Lenny: And then this awesome skunk works team.
莱尼：然后是这个很棒的臭鼬工作团队。
I love it.
我喜欢它。
Okay, so shifting a little bit, something that comes across often and consistently with Ramp, and this came across very clearly in the post that I did on how Ramp builds product with Geoff is velocity and how important velocity is at Ramp.
好吧，所以稍微改变一下，这是 Ramp 经常遇到且一致的事情，这一点在我关于 Ramp 如何与 Geoff 一起构建产品的帖子中非常清楚地体现了速度，以及速度在 Ramp 的重要性。
There's this awesome quote that I'll read here from Keith Rabois who I think led many of the rounds of Ramp.
我将在这里读到 Keith Rabois 的一段精彩的引言，我认为他领导了 Ramp 的许多回合。
He started Founders Fund, famous investor.
他创办了著名投资家Founders Fund。
He said that, "Ramp's product velocity is absolutely unprecedented in my 21 years working with technology businesses." So here's my question to you.
他表示，“在我从事科技业务的 21 年里，Ramp 的产品速度绝对是前所未有的。”这是我向你提出的问题。
Can you just talk about what that actually looks like and feels like working inside Ramp with this intense velocity?
您能谈谈在 Ramp 内以如此高的速度工作的实际情况和感觉吗？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, it is a great question and Keith is amazing and then probably one of the smartest investors that I've ever had a good fortune of working with both here as well as at Opendoor, and I'll say he's absolutely right about that.
Sri Batchu：是的，这是一个很好的问题，Keith 非常出色，他可能是我在 Opendoor 和这里都有幸合作过的最聪明的投资者之一，我想说他的观点绝对正确。
And what you see internally is what I'll say is razor-sharp focus on reducing cycle time and bias to action and how do we reduce cycle time.
我想说的是，您在内部看到的是，我们非常关注减少周期时间和行动偏差以及我们如何减少周期时间。
I think it's basically the core of it culturally to me is getting people to think about smaller units of time for decision making.
我认为对我来说，文化的核心基本上是让人们考虑更小的时间单位来做出决策。
It seems obvious but I think you really have to reinforce it culturally.
这似乎是显而易见的，但我认为你确实必须在文化上强化它。
So one thing that Eric, our CEO, does, which I don't know if you've heard externally, is we have days.ramp.com where we can see how many days it's been since the founding of Ramp internally and it's day 1,529 at Ramp.
我们的首席执行官埃里克（Eric）做的一件事是，我不知道您是否在外部听说过，我们有 days.ramp.com，我们可以在其中查看自 Ramp 内部成立以来已经有多少天了，现在是 Ramp 的第 1,529 天。
He has that number of days at every board meeting, at every all hands.
他在每次董事会会议、每次全体会议上都有那么多天的时间。
Sri Batchu: It's just to remind people that we don't work in years, quarters, weeks, we work in days.
Sri Batchu：这只是提醒人们，我们不是按年、季度、周工作，而是按天工作。
Each day matters and so never put out something tomorrow that you know can get done today.
每一天都很重要，所以永远不要把你知道今天就能完成的事情明天做。
And that bias to action really permeates not just in the product teams but everywhere.
这种对行动的偏见不仅渗透到产品团队中，而且渗透到任何地方。
So our growth team, which as I've just described, is extremely cross-functional, a lot of marketing folks and other expertise on the team, but we work a lot like a product team, we work on two-week sprints, we cross-prioritize across these teams and we work all together rather than in separate silos within the growth team.
因此，正如我刚才所描述的，我们的增长团队是非常跨职能的，团队中有很多营销人员和其他专业知识，但我们的工作方式很像产品团队，我们进行为期两周的冲刺，我们在这些团队之间交叉确定优先级，并且我们一起工作，而不是在增长团队内各自为政。
Lenny: So I pulled up the site you just mentioned, days.ramp.com, and not only is it days since launch, which is 1,529 when I'm looking at it, there's a many decimal points that are counting up.
Lenny：所以我打开了你刚才提到的网站 days.ramp.com，不仅是距离发布已有天数（我查看的时候已经有 1,529 天了），还有很多小数点正在计算。
1,529.43453142.
1,529.43453142。
Oh my god.
我的天啊。
Okay.
好的。
Is that a new addition, the decimal points?
小数点是新加的吗？
Sri Batchu: No, I think that's always been there.
Sri Batchu：不，我认为那一直存在。
It's just amping it up, how much time is passing.
它只是在加速，时间已经过去了多少时间。
It could be stressful at times, but I think that the mitigating factor is that it's been able, as you know, A players want to work with A players attract A players and retain A players, and Ramp has done a really great job of hiring people that are fantastic that can work in this environment well and are motivated by the success and the winning from this sort of culture.
有时可能会有压力，但我认为缓解因素是，正如你所知，A 级球员希望与 A 级球员合作，吸引 A 级球员并留住 A 级球员，而 Ramp 做得非常出色，聘用了出色的人才，他们能够在这种环境中很好地工作，并受到这种文化的成功和胜利的激励。
Lenny: Yeah, I was actually talking to Eric about it for another piece I'm working on and he was showing me some early board decks in every deck as you said has day 544 of Ramp.
Lenny：是的，我实际上正在和 Eric 谈论我正在制作的另一件作品，他向我展示了每副牌中的一些早期棋盘牌组，正如你所说的《坡道》第 544 天。
So it's very real what you're talking about.
所以你所说的非常真实。
Is there anything else that just as someone that came into Ramp from other traditional companies that also move really fast, Instacart and Opendoor, that is just like holy moly, this is velocity?
还有什么东西可以像从其他移动速度非常快的传统公司（Instacart 和 Opendoor）进入 Ramp 的人一样，就像神圣的钼一样，这就是速度？
You talked about a few things but is there anything just like holy shit?
你谈到了一些事情，但有什么像天哪一样吗？
Sri Batchu: You can see the cycle time thing in terms of responsiveness from everybody at Ramp and I think typically what you tend to see is as companies get bigger, they evolve off of Slack to email and everything just moves a little bit slower and there's process and then there's obviously a lot of good parts of that but Ramp, what I noticed when I joined and true to this day is how quickly people will respond on Slack and jump on things and even if they don't complete it, there's very clear action item on who the owner will be and what the deadline will be even if it's not.
Sri Batchu：你可以从 Ramp 的每个人的响应能力方面看到周期时间的问题，我认为通常你会看到的是，随着公司规模的扩大，他们从 Slack 发展到电子邮件，一切都进展得慢一点，有流程，然后显然有很多好的部分，但是 Ramp，我加入时注意到的，直到今天，人们对 Slack 的响应速度有多快，并立即开始做事情，即使他们没有完成它，也有非常明确的行动项目所有者是谁，即使不是，截止日期也是什么。
And that to me was always very impressive just about...
这对我来说总是令人印象深刻......
And I think it's one of those things we build in public, so everything is very visible so you can see how this is working across teams and I'm glad that we've been able to maintain that culture even as we've gotten much bigger.
我认为这是我们在公共场合建立的东西之一，所以一切都是非常明显的，所以你可以看到这是如何跨团队运作的，我很高兴我们能够保持这种文化，即使我们已经变得更大了。
Lenny: There's two effects of that I imagine.
莱尼：我想这有两个影响。
One is how do you stay in the flow and get work done if you're just expected to constantly respond?
一是如果你只是被期望不断地做出回应，你如何保持流畅并完成工作？
How does that actually work?
这实际上是如何运作的？
Sri Batchu: I don't think the expectation is necessarily that one constantly responds, but it is something that I have seen people are good at.
Sri Batchu：我认为人们不一定要不断地做出回应，但我看到人们擅长这一点。
And so I think one of the things that, again, not like a novel productivity tool, but something that Ramp does do is just trying to think about focus time and response times and using calendar blocking to really effectively manage your time that way.
因此，我认为 Ramp 所做的事情之一并不像一种新颖的生产力工具，而是尝试考虑专注时间和响应时间，并使用日历阻塞来真正有效地管理您的时间。
And then doing calendar audits of yourself as well as of your team to say, okay, what are your highest priorities for this week, this day, this month?
然后对你自己和你的团队进行日历审核，问一下，好吧，本周、这一天、本月你最优先考虑的事情是什么？
And how does your calendar reflect your priorities?
您的日历如何反映您的优先事项？
Because in many ways you ship your calendar and so thinking about how are you spending your time and then blocking your time accordingly.
因为在很多方面你都会发布你的日历，所以要考虑你如何度过你的时间，然后相应地安排你的时间。
Lenny: And is this mostly a cultural just this is how we operate or is there a principles or sorts of processes that are set up to help people do those sorts of things?
莱尼：这主要是一种文化吗？这就是我们的运作方式，还是有一些原则或流程可以帮助人们做这些事情？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, it's cultural in terms of how we operate, but we also have templates.
Sri Batchu：是的，就我们的运作方式而言，这是文化，但我们也有模板。
Our people team has a template on how to do a calendar audit properly and things like that.
我们的人员团队有一个关于如何正确进行日历审核之类的模板。
So we've tried to create some learning materials as well for folks that are new to get into the flow of way of working.
因此，我们也尝试为刚进入工作方式流程的人们创建一些学习材料。
Lenny: Awesome.
莱尼：太棒了。
Okay, so then the other elephant in the room with talking about working really fast and hard and responding really quickly is work-life balance and burnout and things like that.
好吧，那么房间里的另一头大象谈论工作非常快速、努力，反应非常快，那就是工作与生活的平衡和倦怠之类的事情。
One thing I'll say is I believe in working really hard and working long hours as a important ingredient to success.
我要说的一件事是，我相信真正努力工作和长时间工作是成功的重要因素。
I know there's been a bit of a backlash against that and just like, no, you shouldn't work really hard, you can be successful without doing that.
我知道有人对此表示强烈反对，就像，不，你不应该非常努力地工作，不这样做你也可以成功。
I don't think that's true.
我不认为这是真的。
So with that said, I guess what have you learned and what do you think Ramp has learned about how to find that balance and not just-
话虽如此，我想你学到了什么，你认为 Ramp 学到了什么关于如何找到这种平衡，而不仅仅是——
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
I completely agree with you.
我完全同意你的观点。
I do think, especially earlier in your career, hard work is so important both for learning but also impact and it's a tough balance that a lot of successful companies struggle with.
我确实认为，特别是在职业生涯的早期，努力工作对于学习和影响都非常重要，这是许多成功公司都在努力实现的艰难平衡。
I think my biggest learnings is it's, A, some of it is like self-selection, right?
我认为我最大的收获是，A，其中一些就像自我选择，对吗？
You're hiring people that are excited about doing this work and this way of working, but at least I tend to find the people that I've worked with that are highly successful, ours are not the problem.
你雇用的人对这项工作和这种工作方式感到兴奋，但至少我倾向于发现与我共事的人非常成功，我们的不是问题。
It's really autonomy, flexibility, and mission alignment and the general happiness they get from their work.
这实际上是自主性、灵活性、使命一致性以及他们从工作中获得的普遍快乐。
And so that's what I try to focus on, which is not the hours that someone's put in, but quality of the work and the impact.
所以这就是我试图关注的重点，这不是某人投入的时间，而是工作的质量和影响。
And I think a big part of the push to having great results and working hard is really being grateful and appreciating the team when they do push themselves and celebrating wins.
我认为，推动取得伟大成果和努力工作的一个重要部分是，当团队确实推动自己并庆祝胜利时，要感激和欣赏他们。
Sri Batchu: And I think we could always be doing a better job, but I think we've historically done a great job at that, at celebrating wins big and small.
Sri Batchu：我认为我们总是可以做得更好，但我认为我们在庆祝大大小小的胜利方面历来都做得很好。
And I think part of the culture of building in public and open internally helps with that.
我认为公开和内部开放的文化部分有助于做到这一点。
So people are always sharing their wins.
所以人们总是分享他们的胜利。
And then it's a very one funny stat that I don't know if other companies track is we track engagement during all hands on the Zoom to see what percentage people participate.
这是一个非常有趣的统计数据，我不知道其他公司是否跟踪我们在 Zoom 上跟踪所有活动期间的参与度，看看人们参与的百分比。
And it's usually close to a hundred percent, like people are talking, the entire company is talking on the Zoom chat because they're excited about the wins that their friends and colleagues are shipping and the things that we're talking about in the audience.
通常接近百分之一百，就像人们在谈论一样，整个公司都在 Zoom 聊天中谈论，因为他们对他们的朋友和同事所取得的胜利以及我们在观众中谈论的事情感到兴奋。
Lenny: How do you actually track engagement?
Lenny：你实际上是如何追踪参与度的？
Someone sitting there watching who's in the chat?
有人坐在那里看着谁在聊天？
Sri Batchu: No, it must be some tool our IT team can do it.
Sri Batchu：不，这一定是我们 IT 团队可以做到的某种工具。
It can say what percentage of participants chatted or something like that.
它可以说明参与聊天的参与者的百分比或类似信息。
Lenny: I see.
莱尼：我明白了。
So it's not like who's looking at the screen, it's like who's talking in the chat?
所以这不是像谁在看屏幕，而是像谁在聊天中说话？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, exactly.
Sri Batchu：是的，完全正确。
Or reacting in the chat, et cetera.
或者在聊天中做出反应等等。
Lenny: That's awesome.
莱尼：那太棒了。
And it's not like you must engage, it's more just like are we delivering the content.
这并不是说你必须参与，而更像是我们在提供内容。
Sri Batchu: No. And by the way, this is probably the first time I'm sharing this.
Sri Batchu：没有。顺便说一句，这可能是我第一次分享这个。
I don't think brand employees necessarily know this.
我认为品牌员工不一定知道这一点。
I don't think we've actually shared this.
我认为我们实际上并没有分享过这一点。
I just heard it from our IT person recently and I thought that was a fun stat.
我最近刚刚从我们的 IT 人员那里听到这个消息，我认为这是一个有趣的统计数据。
Lenny: I love that because it's more just like are we providing value to people or are they actually excited and interested in this sort of thing?
莱尼：我喜欢这一点，因为这更像是我们为人们提供价值，还是他们真的对这类事情感到兴奋和感兴趣？
I was going to add onto your point about how working hard and working long hours can be seen as this like, "Oh, this sucks.
我想补充一下你的观点，即努力工作和长时间工作可以被视为这样，“哦，这很糟糕。
I wish I was at home watching Netflix," but I find that the most fulfilling parts of my career or where I was just working insanely hard for a long time, as long as that work was meaningful, exactly like you said, it was something that mattered and came out and shipped and people were excited about it and if it wasn't like, "Oh, that was a waste of my life." So that super resonates.
我希望我能在家看 Netflix，”但我发现，在我职业生涯中最有成就感的部分，或者说我疯狂地努力工作了很长一段时间的地方，只要这项工作是有意义的，就像你说的那样，它就是重要的东西，它会问世并发货，人们会对此感到兴奋，如果不是的话，“哦，那是在浪费我的生命。”所以这会引起超级共鸣。
Lenny: I want to come back to growth for a moment.
莱尼：我想暂时恢复成长。
I had a couple more questions I wanted to ask here.
我还有几个问题想在这里问。
You talked about some of these teams that you have around ways you're driving growth.
您谈到了您围绕推动增长的方式拥有的一些团队。
Is there an area you think you're going to be investing more in over time or that you feel is working better?
您是否认为随着时间的推移，您会在某个领域投入更多资金，或者您认为哪个领域效果更好？
I know there's trade secrets here that you don't want to share necessarily, but just anything that you feel is people are maybe under-appreciating or under-investing in that you think you might invest in more?
我知道这里有一些你不想分享的商业秘密，但你认为人们可能低估或投资不足的任何事情，你认为你可能会投资更多？
Sri Batchu: What I'll say on that front is, look, we, like everybody else, are always focused on driving more efficiency in our growth engine.
Sri Batchu：在这方面我要说的是，我们和其他人一样，始终致力于提高增长引擎的效率。
There are some channels that, and we have a diversified portfolio of bets, right?
有一些渠道，而且我们有多元化的投注组合，对吧？
One thing that's interesting about the world of growth today is I think historically people that used to run growth were folks that had a marketing or a product background.
当今增长世界的一件有趣的事情是，我认为历史上曾经负责增长的人都是具有营销或产品背景的人。
And what you're seeing these days I think are more folks like me who actually come from an investor and analytics background to lead growth teams because growth has become more and more about a diversified portfolio of bets at a reasonable ROI and building a system that's designed around experimentation and data-oriented.
我认为你现在看到的是更多像我这样实际上来自投资者和分析背景的人来领导增长团队，因为增长越来越依赖于以合理的投资回报率进行多元化的投资组合，并构建一个围绕实验和面向数据设计的系统。
Sri Batchu: So the reason I say all of that is our goal is to over time, of course, make all of our channels more efficient, but also allocate more to channels that are more efficient as long as they're scalable.
Sri Batchu：所以我说这一切的原因是我们的目标当然是随着时间的推移，使我们所有的渠道更加高效，但只要它们具有可扩展性，也可以向效率更高的渠道分配更多资金。
And so the more that we can push customer awareness via owned and earned media, the better for us.
因此，我们越能通过自有媒体和免费媒体提高客户意识，对我们来说就越好。
And so we've got a few different strategies on that front, but we're also working on making our other channels more efficient by the day.
因此，我们在这方面采取了一些不同的策略，但我们也在努力提高其他渠道的效率。
Lenny: So mysterious, but I appreciate you sharing what you can.
莱尼：很神秘，但我很感谢你分享你能分享的一切。
The point about the portfolio of bets is interesting because if you think about it, most companies initially grow from one.
关于投资组合的观点很有趣，因为如果你仔细想想，大多数公司最初都是从一个公司成长起来的。
You talked about growth engines, that's the same term I use.
您谈到了增长引擎，这与我使用的术语相同。
Usually there's just one thing that helps you grow initially like SEO or word of mouth or maybe paid.
通常只有一件事可以帮助您最初成长，例如搜索引擎优化或口碑或付费。
And then eventually every single company basically ends up doing all the growth channels and then has a team dedicated to just keep optimizing SEO, keep optimizing referrals.
最终，每家公司基本上都会完成所有的增长渠道，然后有一个团队致力于不断优化 SEO，不断优化推荐。
So I think that's a very typical path.
所以我认为这是一条非常典型的道路。
And then it's exactly said, how do we make each of these as efficient as possible?
那么确切地说，我们如何使每一个都尽可能高效？
Lenny: Maybe as another last question around Ramp's growth.
Lenny：也许是关于 Ramp 成长的最后一个问题。
Is there any other just really surprising, interesting, really effective tactics that helped Ramp grow over time?
还有其他真正令人惊讶、有趣、真正有效的策略可以帮助 Ramp 随着时间的推移不断成长吗？
Sri Batchu: I think one thing that's been interesting is Ramp's ability to leverage PR as a growth machine.
Sri Batchu：我认为有趣的一件事是 Ramp 将公关作为增长机器的能力。
And as you've seen, we've got a fantastic PR and comms team and we get a lot of deserved good press through that.
正如您所看到的，我们拥有一支出色的公关和传播团队，我们因此获得了很多当之无愧的好评。
And one thing that's been interesting is our fundraising also as a growth strategy not obviously explicitly we've got very clear goals for our fundraising, but what we have seen is anytime that we've been fundraising and we've been using that as an effective way of creating a market moment, it's driven actually a non-trivial amount of top funnel for us.
有趣的是，我们的筹款也是一种增长战略，虽然我们并没有明确地明确我们的筹款目标，但我们所看到的是，每当我们进行筹款，并且我们一直将其作为创造市场时机的有效方式时，它实际上为我们带来了不小的顶部漏斗数量。
Lenny: People always talk about PR being like, people over overinvest in PR, they think PR is going to be this magical growth lever, but it actually works sometimes and in my opinion, you have to have something really interesting for it to work and obviously you guys do, the company's growing like crazy, which is innately an interesting story.
莱尼：人们总是谈论公关，人们在公关上过度投资，他们认为公关将成为这种神奇的增长杠杆，但它有时确实有效，在我看来，你必须有一些真正有趣的东西才能发挥作用，显然你们就是这么做的，公司疯狂地增长，这本质上是一个有趣的故事。
The founders are really important and rarely is funding like an event anymore for most companies.
创始人确实很重要，对于大多数公司来说，融资已经不再是一件大事了。
So I mean this says a lot that people care about your funding.
所以我的意思是，这充分说明了人们关心你的资金。
Sri Batchu: What you say it is exactly right is you have to be thoughtful about your PR moments.
Sri Batchu：你说的完全正确，就是你必须深思熟虑你的公关时刻。
Everybody wants to announce things about themselves that's not necessarily interesting for the press or for an audience.
每个人都想宣布一些关于自己的事情，而这些事情对于媒体或观众来说不一定有趣。
And so thinking about how do you compile enough value to the general audience.
因此，请思考如何为普通受众提供足够的价值。
So our fundraising announcements usually also have some additional color on something unique about the business that we share to provide more value to readers.
因此，我们的筹款公告通常还会对我们分享的业务独特之处进行一些额外的描述，以便为读者提供更多价值。
Lenny: And then there's also newsletter people like me and Packy you mentioned who wrote about Ramp because it's also just so interesting.
Lenny：还有像我和你提到的 Packy 这样的时事通讯，他们写了关于 Ramp 的文章，因为它也很有趣。
What's your sense of that versus traditional PR?
与传统公关相比，您对此有何看法？
There's this, I don't know, big debate of just traditional media's no longer relevant.
我不知道，关于传统媒体不再相关的大辩论。
All these other people will go through newsletters and podcasts and things like that.
所有其他人都会浏览时事通讯和播客之类的东西。
What's your sense there?
你有什么感觉？
Sri Batchu: It's what are the audiences that you get with each of these tactics.
Sri Batchu：这就是你通过这些策略获得的观众数量。
And so we do both obviously get some earned coverage in these newsletters and other tactics and we pay for some and we advertise in other cases.
因此，我们显然在这些时事通讯和其他策略中获得了一些应得的报道，我们支付了一些费用，并在其他情况下做广告。
And what we tend to find is these are great reach, but they tend to work very well for actually hiring.
我们往往发现这些影响范围很大，但它们往往非常适合实际招聘。
It improves Ramp's reputation as a company for recruiting and hiring, which helps and they help with certain audience of customers, which is typically tech founders and folks close to the tech ecosystem.
它提高了 Ramp 作为招聘公司的声誉，这有助于并且他们也帮助了某些客户受众，这些客户通常是技术创始人和与技术生态系统关系密切的人员。
But as I mentioned, the vast majority of the world is not startups and the majority of Ramp's customers are no longer tech and startups.
但正如我所提到的，世界上绝大多数人都不是初创公司，Ramp 的大多数客户也不再是科技公司和初创公司。
And so as we're thinking about ways to grow.
因此，当我们思考增长方式时。
I think channels like these are one piece of the equation, but I think traditional PR will remain another really important piece because they just target a different audience.
我认为像这样的渠道是其中的一部分，但我认为传统的公关仍然是另一个非常重要的部分，因为它们只是针对不同的受众。
Lenny: As you're talking, I'm watching the days count up on the days that Ramp page still and stressing me out.
莱尼：正如你所说，我看着斜坡页面静止的日子一天天过去，这让我压力很大。
I feel like keeping you from doing work to keep growing Ramp, but let's keep going.
我不想让你继续做让 Ramp 成长的工作，但让我们继续吧。
I'm going to close this tab.
我要关闭这个选项卡。
You talked about growth engines.
您谈到了增长引擎。
I'm curious what you've learned about building a growth engine in a company.
我很好奇你对如何在公司建立增长引擎有什么了解。
And another way to put it is just a repeatable scalable growth process, whether it's at Ramp or Opendoor, Instacart,
另一种说法就是一个可重复、可扩展的增长过程，无论是在 Ramp 还是 Opendoor、Instacart，
Sri Batchu: People talk a lot about what should the right design of the team be or profiles of people on the team, et cetera.
Sri Batchu：人们谈论了很多关于团队的正确设计应该是什么或团队成员的简介等等。
And I'm happy to talk about what are the right profiles of people.
我很高兴谈论什么是正确的人的形象。
I think that's an important conversation.
我认为这是一次重要的谈话。
But I think design of the team, people often...
但我认为团队的设计，人们经常...
I think it's a red herring about team structure and team design and what's the right one, et cetera.
我认为这是关于团队结构和团队设计以及什么是正确的等等的转移注意力的问题。
I think most of that is irrelevant.
我认为大部分都是无关紧要的。
What actually matters is culture and rituals and cadences rather than the team itself.
真正重要的是文化、仪式和节奏，而不是团队本身。
Sri Batchu: And so what a great growth engine and a great growth team is one that where you set the culture, set very simple north star metrics, usually one, at most two.
Sri Batchu：因此，一个伟大的增长引擎和一支伟大的增长团队就是在你设定文化的地方，设定非常简单的北极星指标，通常是一个，最多两个。
And you've created a culture of defining hypotheses that are data driven and a culture where that can be executed quickly and have an MVP mentality for product and non-product projects where people can fail and learn quickly and iterate quickly.
您创建了一种定义数据驱动的假设的文化，以及一种可以快速执行的文化，并且对产品和非产品项目具有 MVP 心态，在这种文化中，人们可以失败，但可以快速学习和快速迭代。
So I think that part of it is more important than the specific people or their functions in many ways to me, especially when you're starting to build a growth engine.
因此，我认为这一部分对我来说在很多方面比特定人员或其职能更重要，特别是当你开始构建增长引擎时。
It's like can you build a set of people that can generate new ideas and evaluate them effectively and move quickly is really what you're trying to design for.
就像你能否建立一批能够产生新想法并有效评估它们并快速行动的人员，这才是你真正想要设计的目标。
Lenny: Let's unpack some of this because this is great.
莱尼：让我们来解开其中一些，因为这太棒了。
So in terms of north star metrics, what are some examples in your experience of good north star metrics?
那么就北极星指标而言，您在良好的北极星指标方面有哪些经验示例？
Revenue is obviously a very common one, but often it is too high level.
收入显然是一个很常见的收入，但往往水平太高。
Do you have a sense of what a good north star metric is?
您知道什么是好的北极星指标吗？
Sri Batchu: I like having two.
Sri Batchu：我喜欢吃两个。
One is something around volume and growth and you want that to be, A, very motivating and intuitive for people to understand and also, B, something that the growth teams can directly impact, right?
一是关于数量和增长的事情，你希望它是，A，非常激励和直观的人们理解，而且，B，增长团队可以直接影响的东西，对吗？
Revenue is, for better or worse, more important to the company, but also much farther down the line of whether or not the growth team can impact that.
无论好坏，收入对公司来说更重要，但也更取决于增长团队是否能够影响这一点。
And so at Instacart, for example, our north star metric for growth was monthly active orders.
例如，在 Instacart，我们的北极星增长指标是每月活跃订单。
And that's what we all rallied around and looked at every day, how are now doing?
这就是我们每天都聚集在一起关注的问题，现在做得怎么样？
And then obviously we had a large growth in consumer engineering team at Instacart, 300 plus people.
显然，Instacart 的消费者工程团队大幅增长，人数超过 300 人。
And so there are people working on every single corner of the app and outside of the app on acquisition to drive growth.
因此，有人致力于应用程序的每个角落以及应用程序之外的收购，以推动增长。
And it's like some of the stuff is minutia, right?
好像有些东西是细节，对吧？
It's making the checkout flow slightly better or faster or something like that.
它使结帐流程稍微好一点或更快一点或类似的东西。
Sri Batchu: So that's a good example.
Sri Batchu：这是一个很好的例子。
It's like, okay, well, so we're going to goal that team on MAO, how are they going to move monthly active orders by making the checkout flow slightly better?
就像，好吧，那么我们将以 MAO 为目标，他们将如何通过稍微改善结帐流程来移动每月的活跃订单？
Maybe they can have an impact or maybe not.
也许它们会产生影响，也可能不会。
And so one of the things that we did is the actual local team has their own metric that they can directly influence.
因此，我们所做的事情之一是实际的本地团队有自己可以直接影响的指标。
You want to actually hold people accountable for things that they can influence.
你想让人们对他们能够影响的事情负责。
And then we created via the finance and data team, a translation layer for every team's metric into MAO.
然后我们通过财务和数据团队创建了一个将每个团队的指标转换为 MAO 的转换层。
Sri Batchu: It would be like if you got one extra weekly order because of your checkout flow from the same customer, it would have point X impact on the company's MAO and then you would just roll up all project plans as well as project impact back into this singular MAO metric.
Sri Batchu：这就像，如果您由于同一客户的结账流程而每周获得一份额外的订单，这将对公司的 MAO 产生 X 点影响，然后您只需将所有项目计划以及项目影响重新汇总到这个单一的 MAO 指标中。
And the other benefit of doing something like that is that it also helps you cross-prioritize much easier.
这样做的另一个好处是，它还可以帮助您更轻松地交叉确定优先级。
Should we add more engineering to this team?
我们应该为这个团队增加更多的工程人员吗？
Should we add more budget to that team?
我们应该为该团队增加更多预算吗？
It's like, okay, well what's the MAO map?
就像，好吧，MAO 地图是什么？
Where is there a more MAO per dollar or per engineer being built?
哪里有更多的 MAO 每美元或每个工程师建造？
And it just really helped us unify and move together.
它确实帮助我们团结一致并共同前进。
Lenny: I have questions about this.
莱尼：我对此有疑问。
This is great.
这太棒了。
By the way, why is it monthly active orders versus just monthly orders?
顺便问一下，为什么是每月活跃订单而不是每月订单？
How can you be an inactive order?
怎么会是非活跃订单呢？
Sri Batchu: So monthly active users basically is what it is, but we call them orders because users can just log in and not order, right.
Sri Batchu：所以每月活跃用户基本上就是这样，但我们称其为订单，因为用户可以只登录而不能订购，对吧。
Sri Batchu: You're actually ordering on the platform.
Sri Batchu：您实际上是在平台上订购的。
Lenny: Yeah, I think there was this backlash against users at Facebook.
莱尼：是的，我认为 Facebook 存在针对用户的强烈抵制。
I think it's monthly active people and so I get it.
我认为这是每月活跃的人，所以我明白了。
Okay, understood.
好的，明白了。
Interesting.
有趣的。
So you find that instead of sub-teams having a different metric that we just know is good.
所以你会发现，我们只知道子团队拥有不同的指标是好的。
That's one of the variables in the formula of monthly active orders.
这是每月活跃订单公式中的变量之一。
You actually have a translation that converts that specific metric moving to the north star metric.
实际上，您有一个翻译，可以将该特定指标转换为北极星指标。
Sri Batchu: The team on their day-to-day for their sprints, whatever are looking at their own metric.
Sri Batchu：团队每天都在进行冲刺，无论什么都在关注自己的指标。
But for the purpose of planning and resource allocation and reporting, we would use the translation layers to actually just look at everything on a MAO basis.
但出于规划、资源分配和报告的目的，我们将使用转换层实际上仅在 MAO 基础上查看所有内容。
Lenny: Knowing those sorts of formulas are often not perfect, how much weight do you put into that formula specifically?
Lenny：知道这类公式通常并不完美，您具体在该公式中投入了多少权重？
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
And I think in general the planning process is not perfect.
我认为总的来说，规划过程并不完美。
You can have a financial plan in Excel and the reality can diverge quite a bit.
您可以在 Excel 中制定财务计划，但实际情况可能会有很大差异。
The only thing you can be certain of is that you're not going to accomplish exactly the plan.
你唯一可以确定的是你不会完全完成计划。
So we did a couple of things to that.
所以我们为此做了一些事情。
One is setting a culture of we know this isn't perfect, this is like 70/30, 80/20, it's to guide.
一是建立一种文化，我们知道这并不完美，就像 70/30、80/20，这是为了指导。
So we wouldn't use the translation factor to make a marginal decision if something is five or 10% off.
因此，如果某件商品有 5% 或 10% 的折扣，我们不会使用换算系数来做出边际决策。
Sri Batchu: Those are done based on judgment because at the end of the day, regardless of what metric framework you use, marginal decisions are marginal for a reason.
Sri Batchu：这些都是基于判断来完成的，因为归根结底，无论你使用什么度量框架，边际决策都是边际的，这是有原因的。
They're really hard things to decide.
它们真的很难决定。
And so the framework helped with just reducing the cognitive overload of decision making to only those that are marginal.
因此，该框架有助于减少决策时的认知负担，仅减少那些边缘性的决策。
So the ones that are obvious that are going to have big impact becomes clear even if the measurement framework isn't perfect.
因此，即使衡量框架并不完美，那些明显会产生重大影响的因素也会变得清晰。
And so that's what we use.
这就是我们所使用的。
And the other thing that we just had as cadence is we would actually update all of the translations every six months for the new planning cycle based on new information that we knew on how moving X impacts MAO.
我们刚刚节奏的另一件事是，我们实际上会根据我们所知道的关于移动 X 如何影响 MAO 的新信息，每六个月更新一次新规划周期的所有翻译。
Lenny: Just to make it even more real, what are some examples of those lower level metrics?
Lenny：为了让它更加真实，这些较低级别的指标有哪些例子？
Is it increased conversion of sign up by X percent?
注册转化率是否提高了 X%？
Sri Batchu: Any number of things.
Sri Batchu：很多事情。
It would be actually load time of the app on open.
这实际上是应用程序打开时的加载时间。
There's a team that's trying to make that faster or more efficient because we know that that impacts whether or not the person actually ends up ordering if it takes five seconds to load versus two seconds to load.
有一个团队正在尝试使其更快或更高效，因为我们知道，如果加载需要五秒而不是两秒，这会影响人们是否真正最终订购。
And so the full customer experience were all segregated into different teams that were optimizing just like how long does it take to open, number of searches that a user does on the app.
因此，完整的客户体验都被分为不同的团队，这些团队正在优化，就像打开需要多长时间，用户在应用程序上进行的搜索数量一样。
We know the people...
我们了解人们...
And number of items that are put into cart, like amount of time from cart to check out, things like that we literally just map out any user's journey throughout the app and have separate engineering teams that are focused on that.
放入购物车的商品数量，例如从购物车到结账的时间量，我们实际上只是在整个应用程序中绘制出任何用户的旅程，并有单独的工程团队专注于此。
Lenny: And there's essentially some kind of regression analysis that tells you here's load times impact on MAOs.
Lenny：本质上有某种回归分析可以告诉您加载时间对 MAO 的影响。
Sri Batchu: Exactly.
斯里·巴楚：没错。
And the other thing that we did is just so we would've these translation factors, but we could also just see what the cumulative impact of all of the work is that Facebook did this too, which is just long-term holdouts for each surface area.
我们所做的另一件事就是我们拥有这些翻译因素，但我们也可以看到所有工作的累积影响是什么，Facebook 也这样做了，这只是每个表面区域的长期坚持。
So the checkout experience team that I've been talking about a lot for some reason would have their own holdout.
因此，出于某种原因，我一直在谈论的结账体验团队也会有自己的抵制。
And so we could see what the cumulative impact of monthly active orders on the people that got last half's experience versus this half's experience on the holdout.
因此，我们可以看到每月活跃订单对获得前一半经验的人与这一半经验对坚持不懈的人的累积影响。
And that would make it very clear.
这会让事情变得非常清楚。
So regression is one way to do it.
所以回归是一种方法。
And then basically effective A/B test, but was a small holdout.
然后 A/B 测试基本有效，但有一小部分人坚持不下来。
Lenny: Is there a holdout for the performance team where someone just has a really slow version of Instacart?
Lenny：性能团队是否会坚持认为有人只有一个非常慢的 Instacart 版本？
Sri Batchu: I wonder actually, but there's holdout for almost everything.
Sri Batchu：其实我也想知道，但几乎所有事情都遭到抵制。
There's a holdout for ads, for example.
例如，广告就遭到抵制。
So there are some lucky Instacart users out there that are not getting ads and they've never gotten ads because they've always been part of Instacart's advertising holding.
因此，有一些幸运的 Instacart 用户没有收到广告，他们也从未收到过广告，因为他们一直是 Instacart 广告控股的一部分。
Lenny: That'll be a great revenue boost whenever they want to kill that holdout.
莱尼：每当他们想消灭那个顽固分子时，这都会带来巨大的收入增长。
Sri Batchu: Can you imagine was a conversation internally on should there be a permanent holdout?
Sri Batchu：你能想象这是一场关于是否应该永久抵制的内部对话吗？
Should it be last year's experience?
应该是去年的经验吧？
How should we think about, especially because it's such a important driver of modernization?
我们应该如何思考，特别是因为它是现代化的重要驱动力？
Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Eppo.
Lenny：这一集是 Eppo 为您带来的。
Eppo's a next generation A/B testing platform built by Airbnb alums for modern growth teams.
Eppo 是由 Airbnb 校友为现代增长团队打造的下一代 A/B 测试平台。
Companies like DraftKings, Zapier, ClickUp, Twitch, and Cameo rely on Eppo to power their experiments.
DraftKings、Zapier、ClickUp、Twitch 和 Cameo 等公司依靠 Eppo 来支持他们的实验。
Wherever you work, running experiments is increasingly essential, but there are no commercial tools that integrate with a modern growth team stack.
无论您在哪里工作，进行实验都变得越来越重要，但是没有可以与现代增长团队堆栈集成的商业工具。
This leads to waste of time building internal tools or trying to run your own experiments through a clunky marketing tool.
这会导致浪费时间构建内部工具或尝试通过笨重的营销工具进行自己的实验。
Lenny: When I was at Airbnb, one of the things that I loved most about working there was our experimentation platform where I was able to slice and dice data by device types, country, user stage.
Lenny：当我在 Airbnb 工作时，我最喜欢在那里工作的事情之一就是我们的实验平台，我可以在其中按设备类型、国家/地区、用户阶段对数据进行切片和切块。
Eppo does all that and more delivering results quickly, avoiding knowing prolonged analytic cycles and helping you easily get to the root cause of any issue you discover.
Eppo 可以完成所有这些任务，并快速提供结果，避免延长分析周期，并帮助您轻松找到所发现问题的根本原因。
EPO lets you go beyond basic clickthrough metrics and instead use your north star metrics like activation, retention, subscription and payments.
EPO 允许您超越基本的点击率指标，而是使用您的北极星指标，例如激活、保留、订阅和付款。
Eppo supports, test on the front end, on the backend, email marketing, even machine learning claims.
Eppo 支持前端测试、后端测试、电子邮件营销，甚至机器学习声明。
Check out Eppo at getE-P-P-O.com.
请访问 getE-P-P-O.com 查看 Eppo。
That's geteppo.com and 10X your experiment velocity.
这就是 geteppo.com，并且是您实验速度的 10 倍。
Lenny: Maybe just one last question along this specific thread is this framework of having everything translated into a north star metric something you bring to every place you work now?
莱尼：也许这个特定线索的最后一个问题是，将所有内容转化为北极星指标的框架，你将其带到你现在工作的每个地方？
And is this just something you recommend?
这只是你推荐的吗？
For example, does Ramp approach things this way as well?
例如，Ramp 也是这样处理事情的吗？
Sri Batchu: I think it depends on the size of the company.
Sri Batchu：我认为这取决于公司的规模。
I think this actually becomes much more important as companies get bigger because there's more teams to prioritize and more resources to cross-allocate.
我认为，随着公司规模的扩大，这一点实际上变得更加重要，因为有更多的团队需要优先考虑，并且有更多的资源需要交叉分配。
And having a common currency makes that a lot easier.
拥有共同货币会让这变得容易得多。
And so we do something similar at Ramp as well where we have translation factors for all of the various things that the teams are doing that translate back to the north star for Ramp.
因此，我们在 Ramp 也做了类似的事情，我们对团队正在做的所有各种事情都有转换因素，这些因素可以转化为 Ramp 的北极星。
Lenny: Cool.
莱尼：酷。
And then are you up for sharing the Ramp's north star metric or do you want to keep that part?
那么您愿意分享坡道的北极星指标还是想要保留该部分？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I mean I can tell you what we used to do in the recent past we're evolving some things and in the recent past it was for the growth team, the north star was dollars of SQL pipeline.
Sri Batchu：是的，我的意思是我可以告诉你我们最近所做的事情，我们正在发展一些东西，最近它是针对增长团队的，北极星是 SQL 管道的美元。
So anything anybody did, we would try to estimate the impact into what would be the dollars of sales qualified lead pipeline generated for Ramp.
因此，任何人所做的任何事情，我们都会尝试估计对 Ramp 产生的销售合格潜在客户渠道的影响。
So if the website team wanted to change language on the card's landing page, their direct impact would be conversion rate of email submission or something like that would be what they would be optimizing for.
因此，如果网站团队想要更改卡片登陆页面上的语言，他们的直接影响将是电子邮件提交的转化率或类似的东西，这将是他们要优化的目标。
And then we would have, okay, what does two bips of conversion rate mean for dollars of SQL pipeline?
然后我们就会知道，两个 bips 的转换率对于 SQL 管道的美元意味着什么？
A lot or not a lot?
很多还是不多？
And depending on that, it's like, "All right, don't waste your time doing that project.
根据这一点，就像是，“好吧，不要浪费时间做那个项目。
Let's do something else instead." So that just helps us score and prioritize efforts.
让我们做点别的事吧。”因此，这只会帮助我们对工作进行评分和优先排序。
Lenny: Here's a fun story.
莱尼：这是一个有趣的故事。
I actually tried to sign up for Ramp when I was starting this newsletter and business and it didn't let me because I had a Gmail-
事实上，当我开始这份时事通讯和业务时，我尝试注册 Ramp，但它不允许我注册，因为我有 Gmail-
Lenny: So I moved on and that would've been such a huge revenue opportunity.
莱尼：所以我继续前进，这将是一个巨大的收入机会。
I'm just joking.
我只是开玩笑。
Sri Batchu: I know, I know.
斯里·巴楚：我知道，我知道。
And I'm glad you brought that up because we are obviously aware of it and we are working on something for users that have put in a personal email address.
我很高兴您提出这个问题，因为我们显然已经意识到了这一点，并且我们正在为已输入个人电子邮件地址的用户做一些事情。
in terms of how to reengage that.
就如何重新参与这一点而言。
Lenny: You're about to 5X growth because I had no other domain at that point.
Lenny：您即将实现 5 倍的增长，因为当时我没有其他域名。
Now I have Lenny's newsletter and stuff, so it's like, "Shit, I'm stuck."
现在我有了莱尼的时事通讯之类的东西，所以这就像是，“糟糕，我被困住了。”
Sri Batchu: By the way, for anybody else that has that problem, they can just reach out to me, we'll figure it out.
Sri Batchu：顺便说一句，对于其他遇到此问题的人，他们可以联系我，我们会解决的。
The reason we don't allow personal emails is because it's just typically very low in tech users that are coming to the website that are putting in personal emails.
我们不允许使用个人电子邮件的原因是，访问该网站并输入个人电子邮件的技术用户通常很少。
Lenny: Makes sense.
莱尼：有道理。
I totally get it.
我完全明白了。
I was not offended.
我没有被冒犯。
I just like, all right.
我就是喜欢，好吧。
I had no way around it.
我没有办法解决这个问题。
That's the problem.
这就是问题所在。
So I like that you guys are adding some path around it and you're saying email you or reach out to you.
所以我喜欢你们在周围添加一些路径，并且说给您发电子邮件或与您联系。
Sri Batchu: You can find me on Twitter or email me.
Sri Batchu：你可以在 Twitter 上找到我或给我发电子邮件。
I'm just as sribatchu@ramp.
我就像 sribatchu@ramp 一样。
Lenny: All right.
莱尼：好吧。
You're going to have the most sales leads of any person at Ramp when this comes up.
当这种情况出现时，你将是 Ramp 中拥有最多销售线索的人。
Okay.
好的。
One other thing I wanted to touch on is success metrics.
我想谈的另一件事是成功指标。
You talked about one of the keys to success and this repeatable growth engine is clear success metrics.
您谈到了成功的关键之一，这种可重复的增长引擎是明确的成功指标。
Is there any just learnings and tips you have for people when they're thinking about success metrics?
当人们考虑成功指标时，您有什么值得学习的经验和建议吗？
Sri Batchu: Finding the right success metric, there usually should be two.
Sri Batchu：找到正确的成功指标，通常应该有两个。
There should be one on volume and another one on efficiency.
应该有一个关于数量的问题，另一个关于效率的问题。
And we can talk about what are good efficiency metrics and what are good volume metrics.
我们可以讨论什么是好的效率指标以及什么是好的数量指标。
On volume, I think the right success metric has a couple things that are important.
就数量而言，我认为正确的成功指标有几个重要的因素。
One is there's a clear linkage to value creation for the business.
一是与企业价值创造存在明确的联系。
So if I move this metric that will drive revenue and which will drive equity value for the business or whatever it is that this particular.
因此，如果我改变这个指标，这将推动收入，并将推动企业的股权价值或任何特定的东西。
Metrics and for Facebook it was MAU, for Instacart, it was effectively monthly active orders, and it's something that we know is important that will really drive the value for the business, but it needs to have the other component of it, which is it's very intuitive for all of the people working internally to the company.
对于 Facebook 来说，它是 MAU，对于 Instacart 来说，它实际上是每月的活跃订单，我们知道它很重要，它将真正推动业务价值，但它需要有其他组成部分，这对于公司内部的所有人员来说都是非常直观的。
Sri Batchu: And it's also clear, if they're working on some minutiae, how that can impact and actually move the main metric.
Sri Batchu：而且很明显，如果他们正在处理一些细节，这会如何影响并实际改变主要指标。
So it's usually you have to find something that's somewhere in between, not too far, too lag, towards revenue and value creation, but also not something that's actually translatable to the efforts of various teams.
因此，通常你必须找到一些介于两者之间的东西，既不能太远，也不能太滞后，以实现收入和价值创造，但也不能真正转化为各个团队的努力。
Lenny: Is there an example of a good success metric that just comes to mind to make this a little bit concrete for people?
莱尼：有没有一个好的成功指标的例子可以让人们更具体地想到？
Sri Batchu: It just depends on what goal at any given time is.
Sri Batchu：这取决于特定时间的目标是什么。
Sometimes you're trying to drive more users, sometimes you're trying to drive more engagement and you can reorient the company on what you're trying to do as the north star for growth during that period of time.
有时，您试图吸引更多用户，有时您试图吸引更多参与度，并且您可以根据您作为该时期增长北极星所做的事情来重新定位公司。
So users, obviously we've talked about as a good one.
所以用户，显然我们已经谈论过这是一个好用户。
For engagement, I've often found what really helps is, and you've done actually really good benchmarking at some point, the escape velocity metric for growth for a company, I think.
对于参与度，我经常发现真正有帮助的是，你在某个时候实际上做了很好的基准测试，我认为是公司增长的逃逸速度指标。
Sri Batchu: I don't think you phrased it that way, but that's for a given user, which is what does it take for somebody to become an engaged and active user or customer of a platform?
Sri Batchu：我不认为您是这样表述的，但这是针对特定用户的，即某人如何才能成为平台的活跃用户或客户？
And at Facebook, it was 10 friends the first seven days.
在 Facebook，前 7 天就有 10 个朋友。
At Instacart, it was three orders in the first month.
在Instacart，第一个月就收到了三个订单。
And at Ramp, for our activation, I mean it's very specific to Ramp, but we've got four events that the customer needs to do in the first 30 days.
在 Ramp，对于我们的激活，我的意思是它是针对 Ramp 的，但我们有客户需要在前 30 天内完成的四项活动。
And if they do that, they have a high likelihood of being activated and successful.
如果他们这样做了，他们就很有可能被激活并取得成功。
So our activation team focuses on that.
所以我们的激活团队专注于此。
Lenny: The framework you just described reminds me Gibson Biddle has this really simple framework of gem where you can basically prioritize one of three things, growth, engagement, or monetization.
Lenny：你刚才描述的框架让我想起 Gibson Biddle 有一个非常简单的 gem 框架，你基本上可以优先考虑三件事之一：增长、参与度或货币化。
And his advice is always just all of them are great, just make sure you're all aligned on which one matters most at the time.
他的建议总是，所有这些都很棒，只要确保你们在当时最重要的一个上达成一致即可。
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
And it is very similar to, we used to have this at Opendoor, and I think DoorDash also uses a similar framework, which is speed, quality, and cost.
而且它非常相似，我们以前在 Opendoor 就有这个，我认为 DoorDash 也使用类似的框架，即速度、质量和成本。
All three are important, but it's very hard to optimize all three at the same time.
这三者都很重要，但同时优化这三者是非常困难的。
So you need to have a particular prioritization.
所以你需要有一个特定的优先顺序。
And I think growth teams can also use that as, okay, I think the way I about the growth team's journey is step one is build a system that can move fast and then work on improving the quality and then work on optimization of cost after.
我认为增长团队也可以利用这一点，好吧，我认为我关于增长团队旅程的方式是第一步是构建一个可以快速移动的系统，然后致力于提高质量，然后致力于优化成本。
So you pick which phase you're on because you can't do all three at the same time, whether it's growth, engagement, monetization, or just the other way of framing on it.
因此，你可以选择自己所处的阶段，因为你无法同时完成这三个阶段，无论是增长、参与度、货币化，还是其他框架方式。
Lenny: Speaking of metrics, I have this note here that you're a big fan of payback period for measuring investment ROI versus CAC.
Lenny：说到指标，我在这里有一条说明，您非常喜欢用投资回收期来衡量投资 ROI 与 CAC。
Can you talk about why that is?
你能谈谈这是为什么吗？
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
CAC obviously gets thrown around a lot and a lot of people are like, "Okay, you have to be reducing your CAC, CAC, CAC, CAC." There's a fundamental flaw to it which obviously is that you're focusing on cost and not the value derived.
CAC 显然被广泛讨论，很多人都会说，“好吧，你必须减少你的 CAC，CAC，CAC，CAC。”它有一个根本性的缺陷，显然是你关注的是成本而不是所产生的价值。
And so when you focus on CAC and reducing CAC, what tends to happen is you actually might be doing something very damaging where you're succeeding in reducing CAC, but you're actually bringing in customers that are less valuable because those are the ones that you're able to attract with a lower CAC.
因此，当您专注于 CAC 并减少 CAC 时，往往会发生的情况是，您实际上可能会在成功减少 CAC 的情况下做一些非常具有破坏性的事情，但您实际上引入了价值较低的客户，因为这些客户是您能够通过较低 CAC 吸引的客户。
And so reframing it away from CAC towards LTV is helpful and that's better.
因此，将其从 CAC 转向 LTV 是有帮助的，而且效果更好。
So thinking about for better customers that are bigger, we want to spend more.
因此，考虑到为了更大的更好的客户，我们希望花更多的钱。
So you might think, okay, well, LTV to CAC might be a better way of looking at that.
所以你可能会想，好吧，好吧，LTV 到 CAC 可能是一个更好的看待这个问题的方式。
I think the challenge with LTV to CAC especially for a lot of, even Ramp, it's only four years old, is it's really hard to predict LTV.
我认为 LTV 对 CAC 的挑战是，特别是对很多人来说，即使是 Ramp，它只有四年的历史，是很难预测 LTV。
Sri Batchu: It's like a DCF, it's extremely assumption laden and it's hard to know what the final value will be.
Sri Batchu：这就像 DCF，充满了假设，很难知道最终值是多少。
And especially if you think your churn is low and your LTV is very high, you might end up spending a lot of money because you're like, "Oh, my LTV to CAC is great." And then a year or two into the business, you realize actually your churn is higher than you thought.
尤其是如果您认为您的客户流失率很低并且您的生命周期价值非常高，那么您最终可能会花费很多钱，因为您会想，“哦，我对 CAC 的生命周期价值非常高。”然后进入该行业一两年，您意识到实际上您的客户流失率比您想象的要高。
Your initial customers aren't representative of your long-term retention and all of a sudden you've destroyed a lot of value by looking at LTV to CAC, which is why I'm a big, big fan of payback period and actually being really thoughtful about that using contribution margin, not revenue or gross margin, like how long of contribution margin from this customer does it take to payback their cost?
你最初的客户并不能代表你的长期保留，突然间你通过查看生命周期价值（LTV）到客户获得成本（CAC）破坏了很多价值，这就是为什么我非常非常喜欢投资回收期，并且实际上非常认真地考虑使用边际贡献，而不是收入或毛利率，比如这个客户的边际贡献需要多长时间才能偿还他们的成本？
And setting this obviously is typically a mandate from the executive and board level on what is the payback period that we're comfortable with, and then just orienting everybody towards driving that blended payback period down as much as possible.
显然，设定这一点通常是执行官和董事会层面的一项任务，要求我们确定我们满意的投资回收期，然后引导每个人尽可能缩短混合投资回收期。
Lenny: For folks that aren't familiar with the concept of payback period or contribution margin, could you just briefly describe what those mean for listeners?
Lenny：对于那些不熟悉投资回收期或贡献边际概念的人，您能否简要描述一下这些对听众意味着什么？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, so contribution margin is basically the profit that you make on a given customer after you take into account all of the variable costs.
Sri Batchu：是的，边际贡献基本上是考虑到所有可变成本后，您从特定客户身上获得的利润。
So including the cost of production as well as any other variable costs to serve that customer.
因此包括生产成本以及为该客户提供服务的任何其他可变成本。
So that might include support and other things that scale with your revenue.
因此，这可能包括支持和其他与您的收入相关的内容。
And then payback period is literally just how many months of that profit would it take to pay for?
那么投资回收期实际上就是需要多少个月才能收回利润？
Let's say it costs you $5,000 to acquire this customer and your estimated profit per month on the customer is 500.
假设您花费 5,000 美元来获取该客户，并且您每月从该客户身上获得的预计利润为 500。
That is a 10-month payback period.
这是 10 个月的投资回收期。
So as I say that, I'm sure you've heard, you still have to make assumptions for payback period, but at least they're more based in recency and you can evaluate them more quickly.
因此，正如我所说，我相信您已经听说过，您仍然需要对投资回收期做出假设，但至少它们更多地基于新近度，并且您可以更快地评估它们。
Lenny: Awesome.
莱尼：太棒了。
Thank you for doing that.
谢谢你这么做。
Just a couple more questions around growth specifically.
还有几个关于增长的具体问题。
So there's a lot of ways to grow through the history of a company.
因此，在公司的历史中，有很多方法可以实现发展。
You can invest in SEO, you can invest in paid and sales and referrals and influencer marketing, brand marketing, billboards, all these things.
你可以投资搜索引擎优化，你可以投资付费、销售、推荐和影响者营销、品牌营销、广告牌，所有这些东西。
Do you have an opinion on how to sequence these sorts of bets for a company, especially in B2B?
对于如何为一家公司（尤其是 B2B）排序这些赌注，您有什么看法吗？
Sri Batchu: Of course, a lot depends on who your customers are, what your unique value propositions are and how competitive the space that you're in.
Sri Batchu：当然，很大程度上取决于您的客户是谁、您独特的价值主张是什么以及您所在领域的竞争程度。
But I do think there's actually a general path that most B2B companies take and should take frankly, which is my view is you start off with founder-led sales, like the early team needs to know how to actually sell, then you hire your first couple of salespeople, then you start some very low cost targeted marketing efforts.
但我确实认为，实际上大多数 B2B 公司都采取并且应该坦率地采取一条通用路径，我的观点是，你从创始人主导的销售开始，就像早期团队需要知道如何实际销售一样，然后你雇佣第一批销售人员，然后你开始一些成本非常低的有针对性的营销工作。
So whether it's like content, community, small scale events, and then PR.
无论是内容、社区、小型活动还是公关。
After all of that is when you start paid and brand efforts.
毕竟这就是你开始付费和品牌努力的时候。
And then SEO probably start around the same time that you start paid marketing efforts.
然后搜索引擎优化可能会在您开始付费营销工作的同时开始。
Sri Batchu: The reason for the progression the way I've described it is the channels get more expensive as you go farther along and they get more effective as you understand more about your customers and they're more scalable as well as you go farther along the list that I've described.
Sri Batchu：我所描述的进展方式的原因是，当你走得更远时，渠道变得更加昂贵；当你更多地了解你的客户时，它们变得更加有效，并且它们更具可扩展性，以及你沿着我所描述的列表走得更远。
And so that's the intention behind sequencing in that way.
这就是这种排序背后的意图。
SEO is a bit unique.
SEO有点独特。
The reason I recommend it later rather than earlier, even though it's not necessarily that expensive, is just take some time to build.
我之所以晚点而不是早点推荐它，尽管它不一定那么贵，只是需要一些时间来构建。
And without domain authority or backlinking or any media presence, you can end up just flailing with SEO, creating content and not getting any actual traction for a long time.
如果没有域名授权、反向链接或任何媒体存在，您最终可能会在搜索引擎优化、创建内容方面陷入困境，而在很长一段时间内得不到任何实际的吸引力。
So there's usually a good inflection point for your company to double down on SEO efforts.
因此，通常会有一个很好的拐点让您的公司加倍努力进行 SEO。
And it's somewhat a little bit later than some of the other times.
而且比其他一些时间要晚一些。
Lenny: This touches on a great line that you have around experimentation where you talk about how you don't want to just fail fast with an experiment.
莱尼：这涉及到你在实验方面的一条重要路线，你谈到你如何不想在实验中快速失败。
You want to fail conclusively, if that's the word.
你想要彻底失败，如果这是这个词的话。
Is that right?
是这样吗？
And then can you talk about that?
然后你能谈谈这个吗？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I talk a lot about that with my teams both here and other places, which is we celebrate failure.
Sri Batchu：是的，我在这里和其他地方与我的团队谈论了很多这件事，那就是我们庆祝失败。
Growth experiments in my history are typically 30%-ish success rate.
我经历过的增长实验通常成功率在 30% 左右。
So the vast majority of things that you try don't work.
所以你尝试的绝大多数事情都不起作用。
And so you want to create a culture where people aren't afraid to take risks and aren't afraid to fail.
因此，你想要创造一种人们不害怕冒险、不害怕失败的文化。
And for me, failure is not that you didn't drive revenue, failure is not learning.
对我来说，失败并不是没有增加收入，而是没有学习。
So it's really important that you learn when you fail.
因此，在失败时学习非常重要。
And so we celebrate failure as long as you're learning and you can only learn if you've designed the right test and you failed conclusively because otherwise, I think many of us have been in situations where there's intuition that something might work and it doesn't work, and then you end up doing it over and over for years because every time a new executive or somebody else has the same idea, you try it again and it's because you haven't been able to design the test to fail conclusively, and it's hard to do.
因此，只要你在学习，我们就庆祝失败，只有当你设计了正确的测试并且最终失败时，你才能学习，因为否则，我认为我们中的许多人都曾经历过这样的情况，直觉认为某些东西可能有效，但它不起作用，然后你最终会一遍又一遍地重复多年，因为每次新高管或其他人有相同的想法时，你都会再次尝试，这是因为你无法设计最终失败的测试，这很难。去做。
Sri Batchu: But at the end of the day, there's only two ways to make an experiment successful.
Sri Batchu：但归根结底，只有两种方法可以使实验成功。
Either you have a very large M or have a very significant treatment, which is what you're doing in the experiment itself.
要么你有一个非常大的 M，要么有一个非常显着的治疗，这就是你在实验本身中所做的。
And in B2B, you don't usually have the luxury of large M, which you do in consumer.
在 B2B 中，你通常不会像在消费者中那样拥有大 M 的奢侈。
Facebook can get stats taken in two hours.
Facebook 可以在两小时内获得统计数据。
A B2B company could take two years to get the same number of touch points.
B2B 公司可能需要两年时间才能获得相同数量的接触点。
And so to counteract that, I recommend people just trying to maximize the treatment effect, which is if you have a hypothesis that you're testing, just throw all of the possible tactics and resources that you think would move that needle because you can always cost rationalize later if it works.
因此，为了抵消这一点，我建议人们尝试最大化治疗效果，也就是说，如果你有一个正在测试的假设，只需投入你认为可以推动这一目标的所有可能的策略和资源，因为如果它有效的话，你总是可以在以后进行成本合理化。
Sri Batchu: And so just maximize the treatment effect.
Sri Batchu：所以只是最大化治疗效果。
And if with all of that it didn't work, then you can say, "Hey, we're not going to try this again because we literally did try everything that we could to test this hypothesis." And if it doesn't work in the best version and it's expensive as it is, this is not worth spending more time on.
如果所有这些都不起作用，那么你可以说，“嘿，我们不会再尝试这个，因为我们确实已经尽了一切努力来检验这个假设。”如果它不能在最好的版本中工作并且它本身很昂贵，那么就不值得花费更多时间。
But if it does work, great, then you do another version of the test with half the tactics or whichever tactics you think work better or worse and you optimize over time.
但如果它确实有效，那就太好了，那么您可以使用一半的策略或您认为效果更好或更差的策略进行另一个版本的测试，并随着时间的推移进行优化。
Lenny: Is there an example you could share when you did that?
Lenny：当你这样做时，有什么例子可以分享吗？
Sri Batchu: I mean, account based marketing is something that is very common in enterprise software where you've selected certain customers that you think are high priority and you're saying, "I want to touch them in as many nuanced ways possible to see if that drives conversion." And this is something I've seen tried many times where people do it, but they do it halfway where they're like, "Okay, tried these three things.
Sri Batchu：我的意思是，基于帐户的营销在企业软件中非常常见，您选择了您认为具有高优先级的某些客户，然后说：“我想以尽可能多的细致入微的方式接触他们，看看这是否会推动转化。”我见过人们多次尝试这样做，但他们做得一半，他们会说：“好吧，尝试了这三件事。
Conversion of the control group wasn't higher.
对照组的转化率并不高。
And so we think this is not going to work."
所以我们认为这是行不通的。”
Sri Batchu: And then a new go-to market executive comes and they have to do it again.
Sri Batchu：然后一位新的市场主管来了，他们必须再做一次。
They have to do it again.
他们必须再做一次。
They have to do it again.
他们必须再做一次。
It's a very common one wherever this happens.
无论发生在哪里，这种情况都很常见。
And so when we did it at Ramp, we did exactly what I just described, which is let's really be thoughtful about the experiment design, both in terms of maximizing the number of people as well as maximizing the number of ways and types of ways that we're effectively touching these target customers to show the value one way or the other.
因此，当我们在 Ramp 这样做时，我们正是按照我刚才描述的那样进行的，即让我们认真考虑实验设计，既要最大限度地增加人员数量，又要最大限度地增加我们有效接触这些目标客户的方式和类型的数量，以某种方式展示价值。
Lenny: So what it sounds like is the hypothesis isn't like this email will have a big impact on conversion.
莱尼：听起来好像是假设这封电子邮件不会对转化产生重大影响。
It's like this strategy of coming after customers is what we're testing.
我们正在测试这种追求客户的策略。
Sri Batchu: That's the example there.
Sri Batchu：这就是那个例子。
And I think for example, this kind of framework is more important for cross-functional, larger scale, bigger tests rather than an email modification.
我认为，例如，这种框架对于跨职能、更大规模、更大的测试比电子邮件修改更重要。
But we could even use it on a micro example, like an email modification where you are like, okay, I think this particular email is underperforming because it's not talking to this part of the customer's pain point or journey or what have you.
但我们甚至可以在一个微观示例中使用它，例如电子邮件修改，您会说，好吧，我认为这封特定的电子邮件表现不佳，因为它没有涉及客户的痛点或旅程或您所拥有的这部分内容。
And the simplest test would be, okay, let me make some tweaks to the text and edit that, and that could be the end of that test.
最简单的测试是，好吧，让我对文本进行一些调整并编辑它，这可能是测试的结束。
Sri Batchu: And if that doesn't work, you're like, "Oh, maybe those weren't the right text edits.
Sri Batchu：如果这不起作用，你会说，“哦，也许这些不是正确的文本编辑。
Let me do a different text edits or whatever." And that's fine, that's low cost.
让我做一些不同的文本编辑或其他什么。”这很好，成本很低。
It's not the end of the world for you to be wrong there.
你在那里犯错并不是世界末日。
But an alternative that you could do is like, oh, what are all of the things that I could change about this email in the same test?
但是您可以做的另一种选择是，哦，在同一测试中我可以对这封电子邮件进行哪些更改？
Is it the trigger of the email?
这是电子邮件的触发因素吗？
Is it the text content of the email?
是邮件的正文内容吗？
Is it additional personalization?
这是额外的个性化吗？
Is it the design of the email?
这是电子邮件的设计吗？
Trying to think of what are all of the various levers that you think could be wrong and put them all together to test your hypothesis of this touchpoint is wrong and how do I improve that.
尝试思考您认为可能错误的各种杠杆是什么，并将它们放在一起来检验您对此接触点的假设是否错误，以及我该如何改进。
Lenny: Well, obviously the downside of that is if it doesn't work, you don't know if it's like, oh, maybe it was this thing could have worked in the subject-
莱尼：嗯，显然这样做的缺点是，如果它不起作用，你不知道它是否会像，哦，也许这个东西可以在这个主题中起作用-
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
So there's always trade-offs on this.
所以这方面总是需要权衡。
But what you're hoping is you've done a complete refresh where you did all the things that you thought were intuitive that should work.
但您希望的是您已经完成了一次彻底的刷新，完成了您认为直观且可行的所有操作。
And if it doesn't work, then you're like, "Okay, maybe my hypothesis is wrong." But you're right.
如果它不起作用，那么你会说，“好吧，也许我的假设是错误的。”但你是对的。
There's always going to be a challenge if maybe the execution is wrong and I did too many things potentially in that case.
如果执行可能是错误的，并且在这种情况下我可能做了太多的事情，那么总是会遇到挑战。
Lenny: How does that go with the velocity culture?
莱尼：这与速度文化有何关系？
Is it just do those things real fast even though it's not like micro optimize, it's like go bigger but do them fast?
它是否只是快速地做这些事情，即使它不像微观优化，它就像更大但做得更快？
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
Yeah.
是的。
So that's why I think it's important to frame where this matters.
这就是为什么我认为确定这一点很重要。
And so I think I'm less worried about failing conclusively for things that you can fail really, really fast and just redo, right?
所以我认为我不太担心最终失败的事情，因为你可以非常非常快地失败并且只需重做，对吗？
Things like website conversion, email, et cetera.
诸如网站转换、电子邮件等。
I'm more worried about that for things that take a while to plan and cost money, et cetera.
我更担心那些需要一段时间来计划并且需要花钱的事情，等等。
Lenny: Got it.
莱尼：明白了。
Okay.
好的。
Great.
伟大的。
Maybe one last question around growth specifically.
也许最后一个问题是专门关于增长的。
What are some of your favorite tools for the growth team, either internally, whatever you can share, or externally that just allow you to operate efficiently and effectively?
对于增长团队来说，您最喜欢的一些工具是什么，无论是内部工具（您可以分享的任何工具）还是外部工具（可以让您高效且有效地运营）？
Sri Batchu: A couple of things that we've used, I mean, one simple thing is for sprint planning, actually, we use Airtable because the planning process and the scoring is so much more analytical and the translation layer.
Sri Batchu：我们使用了一些东西，我的意思是，一件简单的事情是冲刺计划，实际上，我们使用 Airtable，因为计划过程和评分更具分析性和翻译层。
So we've got a template on how we do our sprint planning and how we translate the various impact metrics into the common currency, which I enjoy, but I don't see it has to be Airtable.
因此，我们有一个关于如何进行冲刺计划以及如何将各种影响指标转化为通用货币的模板，我喜欢这个模板，但我不认为它必须是 Airtable。
It's just some form of organization that works well for that.
这只是某种形式的组织可以很好地实现这一点。
In terms of a very tactical growth tool that we've enjoyed recently is we used this company called Mutiny, which is also around customer, which is a tool for website copy, personalization.
就我们最近喜欢的一个非常战术性的增长工具而言，我们使用了一家名为 Mutiny 的公司，它也是围绕客户的，这是一个用于网站复制、个性化的工具。
So they hook up with our third party data sources that we pay for, and based on what we know about the customer as they're landing on our page, we can personalize, copy, and design based on that.
因此，他们与我们付费的第三方数据源连接起来，并根据我们对客户登陆我们页面时的了解，我们可以据此进行个性化、复制和设计。
And that's had material impact and allowed us to scale website experimentation.
这产生了重大影响，使我们能够扩大网站实验规模。
Lenny: Amazing.
莱尼：太棒了。
And then are there internal tools you've built to help with experimentation or I don't know, sharing data, dashboard?
然后，您是否构建了内部工具来帮助进行实验，或者我不知道，共享数据、仪表板？
I don't know, is there anything else that's just like, wow, this really helps us move fast?
我不知道，是否还有其他类似的事情，哇，这确实可以帮助我们快速行动？
Sri Batchu: Eric, our CEO, has publicly talked about this.
Sri Batchu：我们的首席执行官埃里克（Eric）已公开谈论过这一点。
I think we as a company are very thoughtful about what we build in-house versus what we buy externally.
我认为，作为一家公司，我们对于内部构建的产品和外部购买的产品非常谨慎。
I think a lot of engineering teams are often excited about building things in-house where there's off the shelf products that could basically work externally.
我认为很多工程团队常常对在内部构建东西感到兴奋，其中有现成的产品基本上可以在外部工作。
And Ramp has historically been good at not falling into that trap.
从历史上看，Ramp 一直善于避免陷入这个陷阱。
And we use third party tools for a lot of our growth and experimentation for things that are not proprietary, strategic, et cetera, obviously.
显然，我们使用第三方工具来进行许多非专有、战略等方面的发展和实验。
Some of the automation stuff that we've talked about, we've built all of that in-house in terms of prospecting, lead scoring, and how we talk to our customers.
我们已经讨论过的一些自动化东西，我们已经在内部构建了所有这些内容，包括勘探、潜在客户评分以及我们如何与客户交谈。
But for the most part, we use external tools.
但在大多数情况下，我们使用外部工具。
Instacart and Opendoor were not like that.
Instacart 和 Opendoor 不是这样的。
We built our own internal experiment tracking systems, A/B testing frameworks and all of that in-house.
我们在内部构建了自己的内部实验跟踪系统、A/B 测试框架以及所有这些。
Lenny: That's what I would've guessed about Ramp that it's with speed, you got to not build stuff you don't have to build.
Lenny：这就是我对 Ramp 的猜测，它与速度有关，你不能建造你不需要建造的东西。
So that makes a lot of sense.
所以这很有意义。
Okay.
好的。
Maybe one last topic to talk about.
也许是最后一个要讨论的话题。
I want to talk about hiring.
我想谈谈招聘的事。
You have some really interesting approaches to how to think about hiring.
对于如何考虑招聘，您有一些非常有趣的方法。
One is I think you have a really interesting strategy for how to find the best companies and also the best people at each of those companies to go after if you're hiring for specific role.
一是我认为你有一个非常有趣的策略，如果你正在招聘特定的职位，如何找到最好的公司以及每个公司中最好的人才。
Can you talk about how you think about that?
您能谈谈您对此的看法吗？
Sri Batchu: Gokul on Twitter has talked about some of those, which is there's two ways to go about hiring great people.
Sri Batchu：Gokul 在 Twitter 上谈到了其中一些问题，即有两种方法可以雇用优秀人才。
One way is basically a very thoughtful and tactical network search where let's say you're hiring for a head of SEO, you go ask your network of who is the best SEO person you know, get introduction to each of those folks, and then ask them who the best person that they know is.
一种方法基本上是一个非常深思熟虑和战术性的网络搜索，假设您正在招聘 SEO 主管，您去询问您的网络谁是您认识的最好的 SEO 人员，了解每个人的介绍，然后问他们谁是他们认识的最好的人。
And you have a mapping of where are the best SEO teams and why.
您可以了解哪里最好的 SEO 团队以及原因。
If you can't get one of those people, 20, 30 people on your target list, you go down the list of, okay, what is the next best person?
如果你无法在你的目标名单上找到 20、30 个人中的一个，那么你就沿着名单往下看，好吧，下一个最好的人是谁？
And you typically want to limit it to companies that are one to two stages of growth after you.
您通常希望将其限制在比您落后一到两个增长阶段的公司。
So you want somebody that has seen your stage of growth and beyond at a company that has a reputation for craft and the field that you're looking for.
因此，您希望有人在一家在工艺和您正在寻找的领域享有盛誉的公司中看到您的成长阶段并超越您的成长阶段。
So that's a very classic way of doing that, and I think that works really well for people and companies that are really well-connected.
所以这是一种非常经典的方法，我认为这对于人脉广泛的个人和公司来说非常有效。
Sri Batchu: So there's another approach that I've actually used successfully is much more kind of data driven and external and not as network based, which is you can often look up data.
Sri Batchu：所以，我实际上成功使用的另一种方法是更多数据驱动和外部的方法，而不是基于网络的方法，即您可以经常查找数据。
is a lot of it is somewhat public, right?
很多都是公开的，对吗？
So you can look up information on which companies might be doing well.
因此，您可以查找有关哪些公司可能表现良好的信息。
So for example, I'll just pick like if you're looking for great email marketing folks like CRM marketing lead or something like that, you can actually look up on similar web, what percentage of traffic shows up via email to companies websites.
例如，如果您正在寻找优秀的电子邮件营销人员，例如 CRM 营销主管或类似的人员，我会选择，您实际上可以在类似的网站上查找，通过电子邮件显示到公司网站的流量百分比。
So you've got your target list of companies that are one or two stage beyond you that you respect as general companies.
因此，您已经获得了您作为一般公司所尊重的、比您高一到两个阶段的公司的目标列表。
And you can go and see, okay, which ones of these are actually really effective at driving web traffic or app traffic or app downloads via their email.
您可以去看看，好吧，其中哪些实际上在通过电子邮件推动网络流量或应用程序流量或应用程序下载方面真正有效。
And then go try to source from those teams and companies.
然后尝试从这些团队和公司那里获取资源。
And I think people under-utilize that even though it's very intuitive, it's just not something that occurs to people to do.
我认为人们没有充分利用这一点，尽管它非常直观，但人们并没有想到去做。
Lenny: I love that.
莱尼：我喜欢这个。
I've not heard that tip right there.
我没有听到那个提示。
The first piece, Google definitely recommends this, and I think the core part of that is the core theme here is find the companies that are the best at the thing you're trying to hire for, and then figure out who at the company is the best once you start talking to people.
第一部分，谷歌肯定推荐这个，我认为其中的核心部分是这里的核心主题是找到在你想要招聘的事情上最优秀的公司，然后一旦你开始与人们交谈就找出公司里谁是最好的。
I love it.
我喜欢它。
Another strong opinion that I think you have is around paying people and how much to pay the best.
我认为您的另一个强烈观点是关于向员工支付薪水以及向最好的人支付多少钱。
Can you talk about that?
你能谈谈吗？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I think there's a lot of conversation around compensation is very much focused on equality and narrowing the gap and bands for compensation.
Sri Batchu：是的，我认为关于薪酬的很多讨论都非常关注平等和缩小薪酬差距和范围。
And I think personally, I know it's a bit of a spicy take maybe, but I think it's the exact opposite direction of the conversation that companies should be having about compensation, which is I strongly, strongly believe that small teams of successful people can drive a lot more impact than larger teams of mediocre people.
我个人认为，我知道这可能有点辣眼睛，但我认为这与公司应该就薪酬进行讨论的方向完全相反，我坚信，由成功人士组成的小团队可以比由平庸人士组成的大型团队产生更大的影响力。
Sri Batchu: And so I strongly believe you have to design a system where you're able to reward 10X operators with 10X the comp.
Sri Batchu：所以我坚信你必须设计一个系统，能够以 10 倍的报酬奖励 10 倍的操作员。
You certainly see that at the executive level.
你当然可以在执行层面看到这一点。
So if you look at the same executive at different companies at similar stages, the comp can be widely different based for a variety of reasons.
因此，如果你观察处于相似阶段的不同公司的同一位高管，由于各种原因，其薪酬可能会有很大差异。
But one of them is the perception of performance and potential by the management team.
但其中之一是管理团队对绩效和潜力的看法。
And I think people need to be thinking about how to do that across more levels, which is if you can do that, and if you do that well, I think you're able to differentially hire and retain the best talent.
我认为人们需要考虑如何在更多层面上做到这一点，也就是说，如果你能做到这一点，如果你做得好，我认为你能够以差异化方式聘用和留住最优秀的人才。
And that'll be a great competitive advantage for companies that can do that well.
对于能够做到这一点的公司来说，这将是一个巨大的竞争优势。
Lenny: And do you think about this within a team pay the best people the most, or is it more only hire these 10X people and then pay everyone the most?
Lenny：你认为在一个团队中，是给最优秀的人支付最多的薪水，还是只雇佣这 10 倍的人，然后给每个人支付最多的薪水？
Sri Batchu: People think of the talent density of your company as dependent on hiring.
Sri Batchu：人们认为贵公司的人才密度取决于招聘。
And that's obviously true.
这显然是真的。
It's an important part of the ecosystem and the first part, but it's equally dependent on retention and performance management.
它是生态系统的重要组成部分，也是第一部分，但它同样依赖于保留和绩效管理。
A lot of companies can be good at hiring, but hiring has pretty high rate of false positive.
很多公司都擅长招聘，但招聘的误报率相当高。
Interview is the worst, best way to hire somebody.
面试是最差也是最好的聘用方式。
And then there's lots of ways you can make the interviewing process better, make it more interactive, make it more effective, but at the end of the day, you still don't know about someone until you really work closely with the new team, with the new mandate at your company.
然后有很多方法可以让面试过程变得更好、更具互动性、更有效，但最终，你仍然不了解某人，直到你真正与新团队、公司的新任务密切合作。
Sri Batchu: So I think it's not about necessarily hiring operators, obviously you're looking for that, but it's also about investing in people that are doing really well and accelerating their growth and rewards based on impact once they're there and as well as managing out people directly that didn't work out.
Sri Batchu：所以我认为这不一定是雇佣运营商，显然你正在寻找这一点，但它也涉及投资那些做得很好的人，并根据他们到达那里后的影响力加速他们的成长和奖励，以及直接管理那些表现不佳的人。
And I typically think it's almost never when I've had to part ways with people is because someone's a bad actor.
我通常认为，当我不得不与人分道扬镳时，几乎从来都不是因为某人是一个坏演员。
It's almost always that it just wasn't the right fit for whatever reason, for their skillset, for their life goals or whatever it may be.
几乎总是，无论出于什么原因，对于他们的技能、他们的人生目标或其他任何原因，它都不适合。
And it just wasn't a fit for that role.
而且它不适合这个角色。
And I think a lot of companies are hesitant to make those changes, and I think that's how they bring their talent bar down, frankly.
我认为很多公司都对做出这些改变犹豫不决，坦率地说，我认为这就是他们降低人才标准的方式。
Lenny: Absolutely agree.
莱尼：绝对同意。
Sri, is there anything else that you wanted to touch on before we get to our very exciting lightning round?
斯里，在我们开始激动人心的闪电回合之前，您还有什么想谈的吗？
Sri Batchu: I don't know how many people will use this.
Sri Batchu：我不知道有多少人会使用这个。
I'm still surprised when new folks come to me and it's like I need to write, by the way, a document of how do you work with me?
当新人来找我时，我仍然感到惊讶，就像我需要写一份文件，说明你如何与我合作？
Because I know it's a lot of people have been talking about, I think Johnson's talked about it too, but I say that my love languages are spreadsheets and frameworks.
因为我知道很多人都在谈论它，我想约翰逊也谈论过它，但我说我喜欢的语言是电子表格和框架。
And one very simple one that I've always liked that sometimes people surprised to hear, but it's most consultants know is what we call MECE, mutually exclusive, collectively exhausted set of things.
有一个非常简单的问题，我一直很喜欢，有时人们听到会感到惊讶，但大多数顾问都知道，这就是我们所说的 MECE，相互排斥、集体耗尽的一组东西。
So whenever you're trying to attack a problem and trying to brainstorm solutions or what have you, I really like to remind the teams to think about MECE because when you think about that and evaluate your set of solutions with that framework in mind, I think you tend to find that you've catch more potential solutions and also you'll feel comfortable that you've been comprehensive in your solution development.
因此，每当你试图解决一个问题并集思广益解决方案或其他什么时，我真的很想提醒团队考虑 MECE，因为当你考虑这一点并用该框架评估你的解决方案集时，我认为你往往会发现你已经找到了更多潜在的解决方案，而且你也会因为自己在解决方案开发中的全面性而感到放心。
So anyway, just a little thing for people that are earlier in their careers to not forget.
所以无论如何，对于职业生涯早期的人来说，这只是一件不要忘记的小事。
Lenny: So let's make it a little bigger than a little thing.
莱尼：所以我们让它比一个小东西更大一点。
So MECE, mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive.
所以 MECE，相互排斥，集体详尽。
Is there an example of what that may look like and or visualize for people to think about what this means in practice?
是否有一个例子可以让人们思考这在实践中意味着什么？
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
I mean, I'll give it really dumb example, but that will make the point hopefully.
我的意思是，我会举一个非常愚蠢的例子，但这有望说明这一点。
It's like, okay, our profitability or our revenue growth has slowed down is the problem that you're trying to solve.
就好像，好吧，我们的盈利能力或收入增长放缓就是你要解决的问题。
And so okay, you start with, okay, what does this mean?
好吧，你开始说，好吧，这是什么意思？
You've got revenue per user has gone down, or customer has gone down, or number of customers have slowed down.
每个用户的收入下降了，或者客户数量减少了，或者客户数量减少了。
Okay, that's step one of the MECE framework.
好的，这是 MECE 框架的第一步。
Then it's like, okay, where does the revenue come from?
那么问题来了，好吧，收入从哪里来？
What are all the various products that revenue could be coming from?
收入可能来自哪些产品？
Has it changed on any one of them?
其中任何一个发生了变化吗？
And then customers, why have customers gone down?
然后是客户，为什么客户减少了？
Is it new customer acquisition?
是新客户获取吗？
Is it activation of customers that have signed up?
是激活已注册的客户吗？
Is it retention?
是保留吗？
And just breaking that problem.
刚刚解决了这个问题。
So at each layer you've collectively exhausted all of the possible ways that this problem could have arrived.
因此，在每一层，您都已经穷尽了该问题可能出现的所有可能方式。
And just having that framework whenever you approach every problem will prevent you from missing something important.
每当你处理每个问题时只要拥有这个框架就会防止你错过一些重要的事情。
And also just more generally give you an others' confidence that you're being comprehensive in your solution development.
而且更广泛地说，还可以让其他人相信您在解决方案开发方面是全面的。
Lenny: Got it.
莱尼：明白了。
So one way to think about this in this specific case is just make a formula of all of the variables that play into the question you're trying to answer.
因此，在这种特定情况下考虑这个问题的一种方法就是为您要回答的问题中的所有变量制定一个公式。
Lenny: Awesome.
莱尼：太棒了。
Well, Sri, with that, we've reached our very exciting lightning round.
好吧，斯里，我们已经进入了非常激动人心的闪电回合。
Are you ready?
你准备好了吗？
Lenny: What are two or three books that you've recommended most to other people?
莱尼：你向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？
Sri Batchu: I tend to find most business books can be decks, but one that I really like actually is Never Split The Difference by Chris Voss.
Sri Batchu：我倾向于发现大多数商业书籍都可以是套牌，但我真正喜欢的一本是 Chris Voss 的《Never Split The Difference》。
It's a negotiation book, find it super helpful for negotiation, but also for a lot of business decision making generally, to be honest, and life.
这是一本谈判书，发现它对谈判非常有帮助，而且说实话，它对很多商业决策和生活也很有帮助。
And then I'm a big fan of sci-fi short stories, so anything by Ted Chiang or Ken Liu, I highly recommend.
然后我是科幻短篇小说的忠实粉丝，所以我强烈推荐特德·蒋或刘宇昆的任何作品。
Lenny: I love those both.
莱尼：我两个都喜欢。
On the first one I'm actually in the process of listening to it on audio and every time I'm in a place where I can negotiate something, I never remember anything that I've learned.
在第一个过程中，我实际上正在听音频，每次我在可以协商某些事情的地方时，我都不会记得我学到的任何东西。
Is there one thing that you've taken away from that book that stuck with you of like I use this?
有没有一件事是你从那本书中拿走的，让你印象深刻，就像我用的这本书一样？
Sri Batchu: I think that the core of the book really is about listening behind the problem of negotiation and what is the person really asking for.
Sri Batchu：我认为这本书的核心实际上是倾听谈判问题背后的声音以及对方真正的要求是什么。
So his example of if you're always trying to split things evenly, you'll end up with one brown shoe, one black shoe, where neither of you are happy.
所以他的例子是，如果你总是试图平均分配东西，你最终会得到一只棕色的鞋子，一只黑色的鞋子，你们都不满意。
And so rather than thinking about BATNA and ZOPA and all the other business school frameworks on negotiation, I think focus on deep down what does this other person want and how can I change the conversation about that rather than the thing that we're arguing over.
因此，我认为，与其考虑 BATNA 和 ZOPA 以及所有其他商学院关于谈判的框架，不如重点关注对方内心深处想要什么，以及我如何才能改变有关该问题的对话，而不是我们正在争论的事情。
Lenny: Awesome.
莱尼：太棒了。
Great.
伟大的。
Next question.
下一个问题。
What's a favorite recent movie or TV show?
最近最喜欢的电影或电视节目是什么？
Sri Batchu: I mean, obviously it won the Oscar, but I really enjoyed Everything Everywhere All at Once.
Sri Batchu：我的意思是，显然它赢得了奥斯卡奖，但我真的很喜欢“一切都在同时”。
I thought it was such a wonderful story and really I think it's one of those...
我认为这是一个非常精彩的故事，而且我真的认为这是其中之一......
It's funny.
很有趣。
The movie can also be, I think, everything because there are just so many different reads that you can get about that.
我认为这部电影也可以是一切，因为你可以得到很多不同的读物。
It's about family, it's about immigration, it's about love.
这关乎家庭，关乎移民，关乎爱情。
There's a lot of really interesting themes explored via one movie.
一部电影探索了很多非常有趣的主题。
Lenny: What's a favorite interview question you like to ask?
莱尼：你最喜欢问的面试问题是什么？
Sri Batchu: I was going to say, oh, I like to ask other people.
Sri Batchu：我想说，哦，我喜欢问其他人。
Lenny: You like to ask.
莱尼：你喜欢问。
What did you think I was going to ask?
你以为我要问什么？
Sri Batchu: Oh, I thought what was my favorite interview question that you've asked or others have asked?
Sri Batchu：哦，我想你或其他人问过的我最喜欢的面试问题是什么？
Lenny: Oh, I got to clarify this.
莱尼：哦，我得澄清一下。
Both are acceptable answers.
两者都是可以接受的答案。
Sri Batchu: I was going to cheat on that one and say the one that you asked me right before, because I'm a big fan of actually movies and TV shows and people rarely ask about that interviews like this, but favorite interview that I'd like to ask candidates actually is what's something that you're really bad at but you still do and why?
Sri Batchu：我本来想欺骗一下你之前问我的那个问题，因为我实际上是电影和电视节目的忠实粉丝，人们很少问这样的面试，但我最想问候选人的面试实际上是你真正不擅长的事情是什么，但你仍然做，为什么？
Lenny: What do you look for in their answer when you ask them?
莱尼：当你问他们时，你会从他们的答案中寻找什么？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, a lot of people actually struggle with that question and can't answer anything that they do that they're bad at, which is a little bit of a yellow flag, which means that they're only used to doing things that they're successful at and they haven't cultivated interests that are not correlated to their own success at doing something.
Sri Batchu：是的，很多人确实在这个问题上挣扎，无法回答他们不擅长的任何事情，这有点黄旗，这意味着他们只习惯做他们成功的事情，而没有培养与自己成功做某事无关的兴趣。
And they haven't taken the time to do that.
他们还没有花时间这样做。
And folks like that are going to run at the first sign of trouble and be like, "Oh, I'm not successful at this, so I'm going to move on." And what I really want to see is people that show examples of things that they're not successful at that they do for other motivations and goals and interests.
像这样的人一遇到麻烦就会逃跑，然后说：“哦，我在这方面没有成功，所以我要继续前进。”我真正希望看到的是人们展示他们出于其他动机、目标和兴趣而做但没有成功的事情的例子。
And so if you can tell me a compelling story like that, it's usually a winning answer so to speak.
因此，如果你能告诉我一个像这样引人入胜的故事，那么可以说这通常是一个成功的答案。
Lenny: What is a favorite product or two that you've recently discovered that you love?
莱尼：您最近发现自己最喜欢的一两个产品是什么？
Sri Batchu: Carrie mentioned Eight Sleep once in this call.
Sri Batchu：Carrie 在这次通话中提到过一次“八睡”。
I love my Eight Sleep.
我爱我的八睡。
I'm a big fan and they're Ramp customers as well.
我是 Ramp 的忠实粉丝，他们也是 Ramp 的客户。
And so that's been a great pandemic purchase.
因此，这是一次伟大的大流行购买。
So I guess maybe not as recent.
所以我想也许不是最近的。
And then maybe another one is Fellow coffee, their kettles I think just designed so beautifully.
也许另一款是 Fellow Coffee，我认为他们的水壶设计得非常漂亮。
I don't drink coffee, I drink tea, but I use my Fellow kettle for tea, and I think it's just a delightful product to use.
我不喝咖啡，我喝茶，但我用我的 Fellow 水壶泡茶，我认为这是一个令人愉快的产品。
Lenny: I got a Fellow kettle from my tea also, and I found that the flow of the water was too slow and it's just standing here pouring this pour over.
莱尼：我还买了一个Fellow水壶来泡茶，我发现水流太慢了，就站在这里倒水。
Sri Batchu: Yeah.
斯里巴楚：是的。
Yeah.
是的。
So they do have a non-pour over kettle, which is what I have, which makes it easier.
所以他们确实有一个不可倒的水壶，这就是我所拥有的，这使得它更容易。
Lenny: Okay.
莱尼：好的。
My mistake.
我的错误。
Next question.
下一个问题。
What is something relatively minor you've changed in your product development process that you found to have a big impact on your ability to execute?
您在产品开发过程中进行了哪些相对较小的更改，但您发现这些更改对您的执行能力产生了重大影响？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I mean, I don't know if this is minor or not, but one of the things that on the growth side, we used to have separate sprint planning for the product team, for the marketing teams, and each team had their own planning cycles.
Sri Batchu：是的，我的意思是，我不知道这是否是次要的，但在增长方面，我们曾经为产品团队和营销团队制定单独的冲刺计划，每个团队都有自己的计划周期。
And one of the things that we did is we brought them all together into one.
我们所做的一件事就是将它们整合为一。
So the lifecycle marketers joined the product activation team sprint cycles, and so their projects and work are very tightly aligned and work in the same pace and system as the rest of the product team.
因此，生命周期营销人员加入了产品激活团队的冲刺周期，因此他们的项目和工作非常紧密地结合在一起，并以与产品团队其他成员相同的节奏和系统工作。
And that's had tremendous impact in our ability to work together.
这对我们的合作能力产生了巨大影响。
Lenny: Final question, Ramp is all about helping people save money.
Lenny：最后一个问题，Ramp 的宗旨是帮助人们省钱。
I'm curious if you have any tips on just saving money.
我很好奇您是否有任何省钱的秘诀。
Sri Batchu: I mean, it seems obvious, and I think I feel like negotiation's already been the theme of this lightning round, but everything is negotiable when it comes to contracts.
Sri Batchu：我的意思是，这似乎是显而易见的，我认为谈判已经成为这一轮闪电轮的主题，但当涉及到合同时，一切都是可以谈判的。
People think contracts are standardized for software and usually not.
人们认为合同是软件标准化的，但通常情况并非如此。
People are trying to sell you something they're trying to grow too.
人们试图向你推销他们也想种植的东西。
They have their quotas to meet, they have their goals to hit.
他们有自己的配额要完成，他们有自己的目标要实现。
So I mean, Ramp obviously has a service for this if you wanted to scale these Ramps, but you can do this on your own.
所以我的意思是，如果您想扩展这些 Ramp，Ramp 显然可以为此提供服务，但您可以自己完成此操作。
Always try to negotiate, be mindful of quarter ends for salespeople.
始终尝试谈判，留意销售人员的季末情况。
And so if you can push something out till near the end of the quarter, you can ask for, "Hey, I'll sign it by the end of the month if you give me a 10% discount," will often work.
因此，如果你可以将某些东西推迟到接近季度末，你可以要求“嘿，如果你给我 10% 的折扣，我会在月底之前签署它”，这通常会奏效。
So there's tips like that you can do, but remember that you can always negotiate.
因此，您可以采取一些类似的技巧，但请记住，您始终可以进行谈判。
Sri Batchu: And then the second one is, I would say is just hire slower.
Sri Batchu：第二个是，我想说的是，只是招聘速度较慢。
I'm a big believer in, and Geoff talks about this too in your other interview, hiring based on slope rather than intercept, I think will work well for you and only hiring when people and teams are really stretched.
我非常相信这一点，杰夫在你的另一次采访中也谈到了这一点，根据斜率而不是截距进行招聘，我认为这对你来说会很有效，并且只有在人员和团队确实捉襟见肘时才进行招聘。
I think this will serve you well both on cost and on impact.
我认为这对您在成本和影响方面都有好处。
There'll be plenty of scope for the people that you hire, and as I said, I'm a big believer in small teams accomplishing more like Ramp being like a fraction of the size of some of our competitors with similar orders of revenue.
你雇佣的人会有很大的发挥空间，正如我所说，我坚信小团队能够取得像 Ramp 这样的成就，其规模只是我们一些收入相似的竞争对手的一小部分。
Lenny: Sure.
莱尼：当然。
We've covered velocity, growth, hiring.
我们讨论了速度、增长和招聘。
So many topics, everything I was hoping we touch on.
这么多的话题，我希望我们能触及的一切。
Two final questions, where can folks find you if they want to reach out and learn more and how can listeners be useful to you?
最后两个问题，如果人们想要接触并了解更多信息，可以在哪里找到您，以及听众如何对您有用？
Sri Batchu: Yeah, I'm a big fan of the fun place of the cesspool of Twitter, so I have a public Twitter account that you can DM me.
Sri Batchu：是的，我非常喜欢 Twitter 污水池这个有趣的地方，所以我有一个公共 Twitter 帐户，你可以私信我。
My DMs are open, it's just my name's sri_batchu.
我的私信是开放的，只是我的名字是 sri_batchu。
And in terms of listeners can be useful, honestly, I think I really enjoy meeting like-minded folks, and as I may have mentioned in other places, Ramp is growing incredibly well and we're constantly looking to hire and we're still hiring.
就听众而言，老实说，我认为我真的很喜欢结识志同道合的人，正如我在其他地方提到的那样，Ramp 发展得非常好，我们一直在寻找人才，而且仍在招聘。
So if you know best in class growth in marketing folks that they can recommend that we hire at Ramp, I'd love to hear.
因此，如果您最了解营销人员的班级成长，他们可以推荐我们在 Ramp 雇用，我很乐意听到。
Lenny: And I think the URL is ramp.com/careers.
莱尼：我认为网址是 Ramp.com/careers。
I just pulled it up.
我刚把它拉起来。
Lenny: All right, Sri, well thank you again so much for being here and for sharing so much.
莱尼：好的，斯里，再次非常感谢你来到这里并分享了这么多。
Lenny: Bye, everyone.
莱尼：再见，大家。
Thank you so much for listening.
非常感谢您的聆听。
If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.
如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。
Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.
另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。
You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.
您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。
See you in the next episode.
下一集见。