The art of product management | Shreyas Doshi (Stripe, Twitter, Google, Yahoo)

Lenny: There's no one out there today who shares more wisdom, more consistently on the art of product management than Shreyas Doshi.

Lenny：当今，没有人比 Shreyas Doshi 在产品管理艺术方面分享更多智慧、更一致。

Shreyas came out of nowhere a few years ago and started tweeting gems of insight about building product and the role of product management, and rightfully so, has built a huge following on Twitter.

几年前，Shreyas 横空出世，开始在 Twitter 上发布有关构建产品和产品管理角色的真知灼见，理所当然地在 Twitter 上建立了大批追随者。

What I love about Shreyas is that his insights are often framed in really memorable and interesting ways and they're often contrarian and not ideas that you've heard elsewhere.

我喜欢施瑞亚斯的一点是，他的见解常常以令人难忘和有趣的方式表达出来，而且往往是逆向思维，而不是你在其他地方听到的想法。

Shreyas has worked at some of today's most important tech companies, including Yahoo, Twitter, Google, and most recently Stripe, both as an IC and a manager.

Shreyas 曾在当今一些最重要的科技公司工作过，包括雅虎、Twitter、谷歌以及最近的 Stripe，担任 IC 和经理。

And his advice is always rooted in his real life experiences at these companies.

他的建议始终植根于他在这些公司的现实生活经历。

Lenny: In our chat, we focus on five topics and go deep on them.

Lenny：在我们的聊天中，我们重点关注五个话题并进行深入探讨。

We talk about the power of pre-mortems.

我们谈论事前剖析的力量。

We talk about how to best use your time as a product manager.

我们讨论如何最好地利用你作为产品经理的时间。

We look into the three levels of product work and how getting them wrong often leads to tension on your team.

我们研究了产品工作的三个级别，以及如果它们出错通常会如何导致团队紧张。

We dig into why most execution problems are really strategy problems.

我们深入探讨为什么大多数执行问题实际上都是策略问题。

And we talk about a common pitfall in prioritization.

我们讨论了优先级排序中的一个常见陷阱。

And if you listen to the end, we actually throw in a bonus topic.

如果你听完最后，我们实际上添加了一个奖励主题。

I really appreciate that Shreyas made the time for our chat and I cannot wait for you to hear it.

我真的很感谢 Shreyas 抽出时间来与我们聊天，我迫不及待地想让你听到。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Coda.

莱尼：这一集是由 Coda 为您带来的。

Coda is an all in one doc that combines the best documents, spreadsheets, and apps in one place.

Coda 是一款一体化文档，将最佳文档、电子表格和应用程序整合到一个地方。

I actually use Coda every single day.

事实上我每天都使用 Coda。

It's my home base for organizing my newsletter writing, it's where I plan my content calendar, capture my research and write the first drafts of each and every post.

这是我组织时事通讯写作的大本营，是我规划内容日历、记录我的研究并撰写每一篇文章初稿的地方。

It's also where I curate my private knowledge repository for paid newsletter subscribers.

这也是我为付费时事通讯订阅者整理私人知识库的地方。

And it's also how I manage the workflow for this very podcast.

这也是我管理这个播客工作流程的方式。

Over the years, I've seen Coda evolve from being a tool that makes teams more productive to one that also helps bring the best practices across the tech industry to life with an incredibly rich collection of templates and guides in the Coda Doc Gallery, including resources for many guests on this podcast, including Shreyas, Gokul, and Shishir, the CEO of Coda.

多年来，我见证了 Coda 从一种提高团队工作效率的工具发展成为一种通过 Coda Doc Gallery 中极其丰富的模板和指南，帮助将整个科技行业的最佳实践变为现实的工具，其中包括为该播客的许多嘉宾提供的资源，包括 Shreyas、Gokul 和 Coda 首席执行官 Shishir。

Some of the best teams out there like Pinterest, Spotify, Square, and Uber use Coda to run effectively and have published their templates for anyone to use.

Pinterest、Spotify、Square 和 Uber 等一些最好的团队使用 Coda 来有效运行，并发布了他们的模板供任何人使用。

Lenny: If you're ping ponging between lots of documents and spreadsheets, make your life better and start using Coda.

Lenny：如果您要在大量文档和电子表格之间来回切换，请开始使用 Coda，让您的生活更美好。

You can take advantage of a special limited time offer just for startups, head over to coda.io/lenny to sign up and get a thousand dollars credit on your first statement.

您可以利用专为初创公司提供的特殊限时优惠，前往 coda.io/lenny 进行注册，并在您的第一份账单上获得 1000 美元的积分。

That's C-O-D-A.io/lenny to sign up and get $1 in credit on your account.

注册 C-O-D-A.io/lenny 即可在您的帐户中获得 1 美元的积分。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Productboard.

Lenny：本集由 Productboard 为您带来。

Product leaders trust Productboard to help their teams build products that matter, from startups to Industry Titans.

产品领导者相信 Productboard 可以帮助他们的团队构建重要的产品，从初创公司到行业巨头。

Over 6,000 companies rely on Productboard to get the right products to market faster, including companies like Zoom, Volkswagen, UiPath and Vanguard.

超过 6,000 家公司依靠 Productboard 更快地将合适的产品推向市场，其中包括 Zoom、Volkswagen、UiPath 和 Vanguard 等公司。

Productboard can help you create a scalable, transparent and standardized process so your PMs understand what their customers really need and then prioritize the right features to build next.

Productboard 可以帮助您创建可扩展、透明和标准化的流程，以便您的产品经理了解客户的真正需求，然后优先考虑下一步构建的正确功能。

Stakeholders feel the left too with an easy to view roadmap that automatically updates so everyone knows what you're building and why.

利益相关者也觉得左派有一个易于查看的路线图，该路线图会自动更新，以便每个人都知道您正在构建什么以及为什么。

Make data-driven product decisions that result in higher revenue and user adoption and empower your product teams to create delightful customer experiences.

制定数据驱动的产品决策，从而提高收入和用户采用率，并使您的产品团队能够创造令人愉悦的客户体验。

Visit productboard.com to learn more.

访问productboard.com 了解更多信息。

Lenny: Shreyas, the man, the myth, the legend, thank you so much for joining me and for having this conversation.

莱尼：Shreyas，这个人，一个神话，一个传奇，非常感谢你加入我并进行这次对话。

Lenny: So we strategized about how to make this podcast as concretely useful and actionable for as many people as possible.

莱尼：所以我们制定了策略，如何让这个播客对尽可能多的人来说具体有用且可操作。

And so, we decided to do is instead of a regular interview where we talk about a lot of stuff, instead we're going to go deep on five of your ideas, teachings, lessons that you've shared on Twitter that have stuck with me, and I know have resonated with a lot of other people and we're going to call it the five big ideas from Shreyas Doshi.

因此，我们决定不再进行谈论很多内容的常规采访，而是深入探讨您在 Twitter 上分享的五个想法、教诲和教训，这些想法、教诲和教训一直困扰着我，我知道它们引起了很多其他人的共鸣，我们将其称为 Shreyas Doshi 的五个重要想法。

Does that sound about right?

听起来对吗？

Lenny: Okay, cool.

莱尼：好的，酷。

So before we get into that, before we get into the meat of all this stuff, you share a lot of wisdom on Twitter, but you don't share a ton of about yourself and your background, where you grew up, where you're born and things like that.

因此，在我们深入讨论之前，在我们深入讨论所有这些内容之前，您在 Twitter 上分享了很多智慧，但您没有分享大量有关您自己和您的背景、您成长的地方、您出生的地方以及诸如此类的事情。

So I'd love to learn a little bit more about the human that is Shreyas.

所以我很想更多地了解 Shreyas 这个人。

And so, maybe we start there, where were you born, where'd you grow up, what'd your parents do for work, what did you want to be when you grew up?

所以，也许我们从这里开始，你在哪里出生，你在哪里长大，你的父母做什么工作，你长大后想做什么？

Shreyas Doshi: So I was born in Mumbai, Bombay, India, and I lived there for the first 21 years of my life.

Shreyas Doshi：我出生在印度孟买的孟买，我在那里度过了人生的前 21 年。

I actually did not really even get to see many parts of India while I grew up in India and basically just was in Mumbai the whole time.

事实上，当我在印度长大时，我什至没有真正去过印度的很多地方，基本上一直都在孟买。

And then I moved here to the United States for graduate studies at age 21.

然后我在 21 岁时搬到美国攻读研究生。

My parents, my father was a businessman, and so, he started his own business.

我的父母，我的父亲是一名商人，因此，他开始了自己的事业。

He manufactured spices and marketed them.

他制造香料并将其销售。

So growing up, I saw him work on packaging and pricing.

在成长过程中，我看到他从事包装和定价工作。

And when he was short on staff, I used to be packaging the spices into the little box or creating some marketing material for him, not the creative part, but the grunt work.

当他人手不足时，我常常把香料包装到小盒子里，或者为他制作一些营销材料，不是创意部分，而是繁重的工作。

So I grew up in that environment where the lines between what was my dad's business and our personal lives were very blurred.

所以在我成长的环境中，我父亲的事业和我们的个人生活之间的界限非常模糊。

Shreyas Doshi: My mother just growing up as a homemaker, and so, my dad was largely just busy and all consumed in his business.

Shreyas Doshi：我的母亲只是作为一名家庭主妇长大的，因此，我的父亲基本上很忙，全神贯注于他的生意。

And I ended up spending a lot of time growing up with my mother.

我最终花了很多时间和妈妈一起长大。

And so, both of them have had a pretty significant influence in different ways, but both significant influence on who I am.

因此，他们都以不同的方式产生了相当重大的影响，但都对我是谁产生了重大影响。

When I grew up, I changed that a lot.

当我长大后，我改变了很多。

I think when I was very young, one of my uncle is a doctor, so I saw him and I was like, "Oh, maybe I should be a doctor." And at some point later, I changed that.

我想当我很小的时候，我的一个叔叔是一名医生，所以我看到他，我就想，“哦，也许我应该成为一名医生。”后来的某个时候，我改变了这一点。

In high school, I took French and I ended up being really good at it, surprisingly good at it, and I was very passionate about it.

高中时，我学了法语，结果我真的很擅长，令人惊讶地擅长，而且我对此非常热情。

Shreyas Doshi: So for a while, I was thinking, "Oh, I'll maybe teach French after graduate from college.

Shreyas Doshi：所以有一段时间，我在想，“哦，大学毕业后我可能会教法语。

Maybe I'll go to France, learn the language a little more.

也许我会去法国，多学一点语言。

And maybe I'll teach French." That lasted for a few years and turned out that I ended up not pursuing that, and instead, got a degree in computer engineering.

也许我会教法语。”这种情况持续了几年，结果我最终没有追求这个目标，而是获得了计算机工程学位。

Partly, I think because in India back then, if you were good at science and mathematics, you would usually take up engineering.

我认为部分原因是在当时的印度，如果你擅长科学和数学，你通常会选择工程学。

And so, that's what I ended up doing.

所以，这就是我最终所做的。

I was also quite passionate about computers, so maybe that was part of it.

我也对计算机充满热情，所以也许这是其中的一部分。

But once I started on that path, it became much clearer what I wanted to do.

但一旦我开始走上这条路，我就更清楚自己想做什么。

Shreyas Doshi: Very bad.

Shreyas Doshi：非常糟糕。

Sad to say, my son is now taking French and I am just embarrassed at my inability to assist him in any way, other than to point out some conjugation errors.

遗憾的是，我的儿子现在正在学习法语，我只是感到尴尬，除了指出一些词形变化错误之外，我无法以任何方式帮助他。

Lenny: So you said you studied computer engineering, that's what you moved to the US for, how did you move from that to product?

Lenny：所以你说你学习了计算机工程，这就是你搬到美国的目的，你是如何从计算机工程转向产品的？

Shreyas Doshi: So, I started my career as an engineer, or well, backtracking, so I completed my undergrad in India, came here to the United States to pursue a PhD in computer science.

Shreyas Doshi：所以，我以工程师的身份开始了我的职业生涯，或者说是回溯，所以我在印度完成了本科学业，来到美国攻读计算机科学博士学位。

About one month in, I realized that PhD in academia wasn't for me, so I decided that I was going to drop out of the PhD program.

大约一个月后，我意识到学术界的博士学位不适合我，所以我决定退出博士学位课程。

And once I dropped out, this was like 2001, 2002 so the climate was very different, there were basically no jobs for tech people.

我退学后，就像 2001 年、2002 年一样，气候非常不同，技术人员基本上没有工作。

Certainly there were no jobs for people who required a visa, which I did.

当然，对于那些需要签证的人来说，没有工作可做，而我却做到了。

So it was very difficult, but I ended up working as an engineer at a couple of startups and that started my career in tech.

所以这非常困难，但我最终在几家初创公司担任工程师，并开始了我的科技职业生涯。

I was an engineer for about four or five years.

我当了大约四五年的工程师。

And when I moved here to the San Francisco Bay Area, I got a little taste of product management.

当我搬到旧金山湾区时，我尝到了一点产品管理的滋味。

Shreyas Doshi: So, I was part of this team that used to be Loudcloud, and they were acquired by a larger company EDS at that time, so it was a startup team within a larger organization.

Shreyas Doshi：所以，我是这个团队的一员，这个团队以前是 Loudcloud，当时他们被一家更大的公司 EDS 收购了，所以它是一个更大组织内的初创团队。

And I was an engineer there and I just started doing some product work.

我是那里的一名工程师，我刚刚开始做一些产品工作。

And I found that my managers over the time would send me to customer meetings.

我发现我的经理有时会派我去参加客户会议。

We had an internal product, so these were internal customers.

我们有一个内部产品，所以这些都是内部客户。

And I thought it was a little surprising because I was fairly junior and I was an engineer, but I was like, "Okay, I'll just go to the customer meetings." And I really enjoyed that.

我觉得这有点令人惊讶，因为我相当初级，而且我是一名工程师，但我想，“好吧，我就去参加客户会议。”我真的很喜欢这样。

I really enjoyed understanding what our customers were trying to do, helping them out.

我真的很高兴了解我们的客户想要做什么并帮助他们。

I also enjoyed thinking about creative ways to solve their needs and whatnot.

我也喜欢思考创造性的方法来解决他们的需求等等。

So, that was my taste of product management.

这就是我对产品管理的品味。

Shreyas Doshi: For about a year, I was doing the product job without having the title and I was also the engineer.

Shreyas Doshi：大约一年的时间里，我一直在做产品工作，但没有头衔，而且我还是工程师。

So I was in this great state where I'd figure out what needed to be built and I would just build it myself.

所以我处于一种很好的状态，我会弄清楚需要构建什么，然后我会自己构建它。

So, that's how I started.

所以，我就是这样开始的。

And at some point during that one year, I realized that while I was a good engineer, I was perhaps a top 20% engineer.

在那一年的某个时刻，我意识到，虽然我是一名优秀的工程师，但我可能是一名顶尖的 20% 工程师。

I realized that I would never be a great engineer, that I would never be a top 10% engineer because I saw those engineers, the fortune of working with them, and I just could tell that I couldn't be that.

我意识到我永远不会成为一名伟大的工程师，我永远不会成为前 10% 的工程师，因为我看到了那些工程师，看到了与他们一起工作的财富，我只能知道我不可能成为那样的人。

And I increasingly got interested in this product thing, so I said, "Okay, let's try out this product thing." And so, that's really what started my product career.

我对这个产品越来越感兴趣，所以我说，“好吧，让我们尝试一下这个产品。”所以，这就是我产品职业生涯的真正开始。

And I think what I have to be really thankful and grateful for there is the people who gave me a chance to do the product work and there were many people involved.

我认为我真正要感谢的是那些给了我机会从事产品工作的人，并且有很多人参与其中。

And so, I think without their support, it would've been much harder for me to become a product manager.

所以，我想如果没有他们的支持，我成为一名产品经理会更加困难。

Lenny: I didn't know that you moved from engineering to product and your journey is very similar to mine where I was also an engineer.

Lenny：我不知道你从工程转向产品，而且你的经历与我的经历非常相似，我也是一名工程师。

And once I got to Airbnb, I was like, "Okay, I am not good.

当我到达 Airbnb 后，我就想，“好吧，我做得不好。

And I will not last as an engineer at a company like this.

我不会在这样的公司继续担任工程师。

And I should think about what other options exist." And it worked out great.

我应该考虑还有哪些其他选择。”效果很好。

And so, I wonder how often that happens of PMs moving into PM because they aren't going to make it as an engineer.

因此，我想知道 PM 因无法成为一名工程师而晋升为 PM 的情况经常发生。

Shreyas Doshi: I think it might be a common occurrence because engineering is a really great job, particularly on empowered teams, as an engineer, you can do a lot.

Shreyas Doshi：我认为这可能是一种常见现象，因为工程确实是一项很棒的工作，特别是在授权团队中，作为一名工程师，你可以做很多事情。

You don't have to just write code, but you can do a lot.

您不必只是编写代码，而是可以做很多事情。

And so, I also think it's a great place for people to start their career if they have a technical background and if they enjoy the part about building software.

因此，我也认为，如果人们具有技术背景并且喜欢构建软件的部分，那么这对于他们来说是开始职业生涯的好地方。

Because sometimes people will ask me, "Hey, I'm doing this technical degree, whether it's computer science or something else, but I want my first job to be product management." And I often respond with, "Tryout engineering because, again, in many companies, fortunately these days you can do a lot more than just the core engineering job.

因为有时人们会问我，“嘿，我正在攻读技术学位，无论是计算机科学还是其他专业，但我希望我的第一份工作是产品管理。”我经常这样回答：“尝试一下工程设计，因为在许多公司中，幸运的是，现在你可以做的不仅仅是核心工程工作。

And so you get exposure to many different things.

所以你会接触到许多不同的事物。

And once you do that, you can decide what path to pick."

一旦你这样做了，你就可以决定选择哪条路。”

Lenny: It's such a bonus to have that background as a PM.

Lenny：拥有这样的 PM 背景真是太棒了。

I wanted to go back, so you mentioned that you worked at Loudcloud.

我想回去，所以你提到你在 Loudcloud 工作过。

I had no idea.

我不知道。

That was Marc Andreessen's second company, right?

那是马克·安德森 (Marc Andreessen) 的第二家公司，对吧？

Shreyas Doshi: Yes.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

I joined that team.

我加入了那个团队。

Again, this was a time when there were very scared jobs in the valley and I was interviewing with them for nine months or something like that, and they had just been acquired by EDS.

再说一遍，当时山谷里的工作非常令人恐惧，我对他们进行了九个月或类似的面试，而他们刚刚被 EDS 收购。

So they split into two companies.

于是他们分成了两家公司。

One got acquired by EDS and the other became Opsware, which was the product company.

一家被 EDS 收购，另一家成为 Opsware，即产品公司。

And so, I joined the Loudcloud part of that organization.

因此，我加入了该组织的 Loudcloud 部分。

Lenny: Got it.

莱尼：明白了。

Is there something that you took away from that company?

你从那家公司拿走了什么东西吗？

Was Marc Andreessen still working there?

马克·安德森还在那儿工作吗？

And I think Ben Horowitz also.

我认为本·霍洛维茨也是如此。

Shreyas Doshi: Yeah, they were still there, they were working on the Opsware side.

Shreyas Doshi：是的，他们还在那里，他们在 Opsware 方面工作。

Again, because even though I was hired as an engineer, the non-engineer task I was given was to manage a relationship with Opsware because the way that split worked is EDS would use Opswares data center automation technology, and my team was responsible for deploying and supporting that technology for EDS.

同样，因为即使我被聘为工程师，但我被赋予的非工程师任务是管理与 Opsware 的关系，因为拆分的方式是 EDS 将使用 Opswares 数据中心自动化技术，而我的团队负责为 EDS 部署和支持该技术。

And so, I was given this role of managing the vendor relationship and I have no idea.

因此，我被赋予了管理供应商关系的角色，但我对此一无所知。

I'm in my early 20s, I have no idea how to manage vendor relationships, but I ended up doing that.

我才 20 岁出头，我不知道如何管理供应商关系，但我最终还是这么做了。

Shreyas Doshi: And as part of that, I got an opportunity to work with many folks over at Opsware, including folks on the leadership team there.

Shreyas Doshi：作为其中的一部分，我有机会与 Opsware 的许多人一起工作，包括领导团队的人员。

And that was my first experience of what a really highly talented and energetic team looks like, both on the Opsware side, like I said, I worked with a number of people there, but also on the former Loudcloud side who were my team members.

这是我第一次体验到一个真正才华横溢、充满活力的团队是什么样子，无论是在 Opsware 方面，就像我说的，我与那里的很多人一起工作，而且在前 Loudcloud 方面，他们也是我的团队成员。

And that magic, a very high caliber team, people who really great at their job and brought high degree of energy and collaboration to their work.

神奇的是，这是一支高素质的团队，他们非常擅长自己的工作，并为工作带来了高度的活力和协作。

I was just lucky to have been part of that team early on.

我很幸运能够很早就成为该团队的一员。

Lenny: And then following that, you worked at a bunch of really important well run successful companies, Stripe, Twitter, Google, Yahoo, what's one thing you took away from each of these companies that you've worked at that has stuck with you?

Lenny：接下来，你曾在一些非常重要、运营良好的成功公司工作过，Stripe、Twitter、Google、雅虎，你从你工作过的这些公司中学到的哪一件事让你印象深刻？

You share a lot of this on Twitter, but if you just think about somebody took away from each of these companies or even the founders that ran these companies, what might those be?

你在 Twitter 上分享了很多这样的内容，但如果你想想有人从这些公司甚至经营这些公司的创始人那里被剥夺了，那可能是什么？

Shreyas Doshi: Yeah, let's do this rapid fire style because you know me, I could spend an hour just talking about this topic.

Shreyas Doshi：是的，让我们采取这种快速的方式，因为你了解我，我可以花一个小时来谈论这个话题。

But just starting with Yahoo, I think I learned the importance of building multiple services under a single account.

但从雅虎开始，我想我了解了在单个帐户下构建多个服务的重要性。

I think that was the one Yahoo ID was such a powerful thing.

我认为这就是雅虎 ID 如此强大的地方。

It wasn't easy to pull off back in the day and Yahoo was perhaps the first company that pulled it off really well.

在当时，实现这一目标并不容易，而雅虎可能是第一家真正成功实现这一目标的公司。

And so, that idea of bundling under a single account, which then Google really did extremely well later on was something that I got to experience very first hand because I was working on the identity team at Yahoo.

因此，在单一帐户下捆绑的想法后来 Google 确实做得非常好，这是我亲身经历的事情，因为我在雅虎的身份团队工作。

Google taught me the.

谷歌教我的。

Lenny: Real quick on Yahoo because it makes me think about it.

莱尼：在雅虎上速度很快，因为它让我思考这个问题。

I remember they tried to do that with Flickr and they had a bunch of trouble with that, people on Flickr didn't want to log in with Yahoo, is that right?

我记得他们尝试用 Flickr 来做到这一点，但遇到了很多麻烦，Flickr 上的人不想用雅虎登录，对吗？

Shreyas Doshi: Yes.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

That's the story of every acquisition that are some raving fans of the service that are perhaps not entirely happy about their beloved service being acquired by a large company.

这就是每一次收购的故事，一些该服务的狂热粉丝可能对他们心爱的服务被大公司收购并不完全高兴。

In fact, we encountered this at Google as well.

事实上，我们在谷歌也遇到过这种情况。

If you remember YouTube accounts used to be separate from Google accounts or Gmail accounts.

如果您还记得 YouTube 帐户曾经与 Google 帐户或 Gmail 帐户是分开的。

And at some point, Google decided that you should be able to use your Google account to log into YouTube, and also over time, that everybody who uses YouTube should have a Google account.

在某个时候，Google 决定您应该能够使用 Google 帐户登录 YouTube，并且随着时间的推移，每个使用 YouTube 的人都应该拥有 Google 帐户。

So they went through a multi-year migration of accounts, and they had similar backlash.

因此，他们经历了多年的账户迁移，也遇到了类似的强烈反对。

The interesting part though, is nobody remembers that now, people happily use YouTube.

但有趣的是，现在没有人记得人们高兴地使用 YouTube。

So this is one of those things where sometimes it's painful in the short-term, even though it might actually be the right answer over the long-term.

因此，这是有时在短期内令人痛苦的事情之一，尽管从长远来看它实际上可能是正确的答案。

Lenny: Great advice.

莱尼：很好的建议。

Okay.

好的。

Sorry I cut you off.

抱歉我打断了你。

Google.

谷歌。

Shreyas Doshi: Yes.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

Google, I think the main thing I learned was the power of thinking really big.

谷歌，我认为我学到的主要东西是思考真正大的力量。

And I know it sounds like a platitude, but really big.

我知道这听起来像是陈词滥调，但确实很大。

And I only actually realized that when I left Google and I started working with the other teams and these were all capable teams and I was struck by how many teams just limited the potential of what they could achieve.

我实际上才意识到，当我离开谷歌并开始与其他团队合作时，这些团队都是有能力的团队，但令我震惊的是，有多少团队限制了他们所能实现的潜力。

And I think Google helped people think big by default.

我认为谷歌默认帮助人们大胆思考。

And so, I think the six years I spent at Google really helped me understand that really well and just make it a normal part of how I operated.

因此，我认为我在谷歌度过的六年确实帮助我很好地理解了这一点，并使其成为我运作方式的正常组成部分。

So that was really useful for me.

所以这对我来说真的很有用。

Lenny: Is there an example at Google that some of you worked on that was like, "Holy shit.

莱尼：谷歌有没有你们中的一些人研究过的例子，“天哪。

This was going to be big or let's think bigger about this"?

这将会是一件大事，还是让我们考虑一下更大的事情”？

Shreyas Doshi: Well, as with anything, there's pluses and minuses.

Shreyas Doshi：嗯，就像任何事情一样，都有优点和缺点。

So I worked on the ads team at Google for a number of years and there was this unwritten rule of thumb that, hey, if it's not going to generate more than $100 million in revenue, it's not worth talking about it.

我在 Google 的广告团队工作了很多年，有一条不成文的经验法则：嘿，如果它不会产生超过 1 亿美元的收入，那就不值得谈论它。

Because the ads business was growing so fast and was so large that we would regularly not pursue opportunities that were just quote $100 million.

由于广告业务增长如此之快且规模如此之大，以至于我们通常不会寻求报价仅为 1 亿美元的机会。

So why do that?

那么为什么要这么做呢？

That's because Google had access to billion dollar opportunities for it as business.

这是因为谷歌获得了价值数十亿美元的商业机会。

So they were very clear on pursuing the big opportunities.

因此，他们非常明确要追求巨大的机遇。

And in some cases, these opportunities were not obvious, so we had to create those opportunities.

在某些情况下，这些机会并不明显，因此我们必须创造这些机会。

If you think about some of the innovations Google brought over the years in monetization, including things like video ads and whatnot, those were not obvious opportunities, but Google decided that it wanted to pursue those big opportunities.

如果你想想谷歌多年来在货币化方面带来的一些创新，包括视频广告等，这些都不是明显的机会，但谷歌决定要抓住这些巨大的机会。

Shreyas Doshi: And in order to do that, it had to sometimes just let go of these seemingly smaller opportunities.

Shreyas Doshi：为了做到这一点，有时必须放弃这些看似较小的机会。

So that tendency to think about, well, yes, there is $10 million business here, but can we make it $100 million business?

因此，我们会想，好吧，是的，这里有 1000 万美元的业务，但我们能否使其成为 1 亿美元的业务？

Or there is a $1 million business here, can we make it a $10 million business?

或者这里有一个100万美元的生意，我们能把它变成1000万美元的生意吗？

What does it take to make it bigger is a habit, I think, that got ingrained for me at Google.

我认为，怎样才能让它变得更大，这是我在谷歌根深蒂固的习惯。

Now, of course, there's the other side of it, which is, I think, Google missed out on some trends simply because of this filter or this high bar where sometimes it's not clear if something is $100 million opportunity or $1 billion opportunity.

当然，现在还有另一面，我认为，谷歌仅仅因为这个过滤器或这个高标准而错过了一些趋势，有时并不清楚某件事是 1 亿美元的机会还是 10 亿美元的机会。

So that is a downside of this.

所以这是它的一个缺点。

What I mainly took away is for instance, even at Stripe, when I joined, I was just thinking a lot bigger about the business.

例如，我主要学到的是，即使是在 Stripe，当我加入时，我也只是对业务有更大的思考。

I was responsible for Stripe Connect and that helped us make different decisions about what to prioritize and at what pace to go after it.

我负责 Stripe Connect，这帮助我们做出了不同的决定，决定优先考虑什么以及以什么速度追求它。

So, that was Google.

所以，这就是谷歌。

Shreyas Doshi: Moving on to Twitter.

Shreyas Doshi：转向 Twitter。

I think at Twitter, the main thing that struck me with all the challenges, they had infrastructure challenges and also some challenges around leadership and culture is just the stickiness that comes with combining network effects with core product differentiation, because Twitter had both.

我认为在 Twitter，所有挑战给我留下深刻印象的最重要的事情是，他们面临基础设施方面的挑战，以及领导力和文化方面的一些挑战，这就是将网络效应与核心产品差异化相结合所带来的粘性，因为 Twitter 两者兼而有之。

We talk about network effects all the time and I don't have much more interesting things to add beyond what's already added.

我们一直在谈论网络效应，除了已经添加的内容之外，我没有更多有趣的东西可以添加。

But this combination of core product differentiation, because if you think about it, there's still no product like Twitter, despite now being a long time since the product was launched.

但这种核心产品差异化的结合，因为如果你仔细想想，仍然没有像 Twitter 这样的产品，尽管距该产品推出已有很长时间了。

And that core product differentiation combined with network effects has what enabled Twitter to have the staying power it's had.

核心产品差异化与网络效应相结合，使 Twitter 拥有了持久的力量。

And I think unless something terrible happens, I think Twitter will be around for a really long time.

我认为除非发生可怕的事情，否则 Twitter 将会存在很长一段时间。

So, that's something I got to observe very closely when I worked at Twitter.

所以，这是我在 Twitter 工作时必须密切观察的事情。

Shreyas Doshi: And then at Stripe, I think the main thing I took away was that when you combine high energy sound judgment, low ego and small teams, you just get magic.

Shreyas Doshi：然后在 Stripe，我认为我学到的主要东西是，当你将高能量的正确判断力、低自我意识和小团队结合起来时，你就会获得魔力。

And so, Stripe wasn't by any means flawless, but I saw that combination of high energy sound judgment, low ego and small teams more at Stripe than any other place I've been at.

因此，Stripe 无论如何都不是完美无缺的，但我在 Stripe 比我去过的任何其他地方都看到了高能量的正确判断力、低自我意识和小团队的结合。

And so, that was very impactful and my growth and thinking as a leader.

所以，这对我作为领导者的成长和思考非常有影响力。

And I can go on with the founders, because I know you had asked that question.

我可以继续与创始人讨论，因为我知道你问过这个问题。

Shreyas Doshi: Okay.

施里亚斯·多西：好的。

With regards to the founders and what I learned from the founders, Yahoo, I didn't work much with the founders.

关于创始人以及我从雅虎创始人那里学到的东西，我与雅虎创始人的合作不多。

At Google, I had some interactions.

在谷歌，我有一些互动。

I was in meetings with Larry, Sergey, Eric Schmidt.

我正在与拉里、谢尔盖、埃里克·施密特会面。

And I think particularly if I were to pick one thing, I really appreciated Larry's strategic insight and particularly his ability to simulate the future to make better decisions.

我认为，特别是如果我要选择一件事，我真的很欣赏拉里的战略洞察力，特别是他模拟未来以做出更好决策的能力。

And so Twitter, I just overlapped very briefly with Jack's comeback as CEO back when he came back.

所以 Twitter，当杰克回来担任首席执行官时，我只是非常短暂地与他重叠。

And I think I was struck by his ability to listen and ask great questions in a few meetings that I was with him.

我想我对他在我和他一起参加的几次会议中倾听和提出重要问题的能力感到震惊。

And so, I was really impressed like he would just listen a lot more than you would expect, say, the CEO to listen.

所以，我真的印象深刻，他会听的比你想象的要多得多，比如说，首席执行官会听。

And then he would just ask one vital question and that's something I've tried to use in my leadership style ever since I saw that.

然后他只会问一个至关重要的问题，自从我看到这个问题以来，我一直试图在我的领导风格中使用这一点。

Lenny: Is there an example of that or a story of that happening that you think about?

莱尼：您想到过这样的例子或发生过的故事吗？

Shreyas Doshi: I forget the details and they're not that important anyway.

Shreyas Doshi：我忘记了细节，而且它们也不那么重要。

But there was a time when we were discussing a potential acquisition and I was on the fence on that acquisition, it would be something that my team would acquire, Jack was in the room.

但有一段时间，当我们讨论一项潜在的收购时，我对这次收购持观望态度，这将是我的团队将收购的东西，杰克就在房间里。

And I remember we went through as is common in many corporate settings.

我记得我们经历了许多公司环境中常见的情况。

We went through all the pros and cons and all the intellectual arguments and the strategic arguments and the metrics arguments and all of that.

我们讨论了所有的优点和缺点以及所有的智力论证、战略论证和指标论证等等。

And Jack was just listening through all of that.

杰克只是听着这一切。

And then I remember very distinctly, he asked me one question which was something to the effect of, how does this make our users love Twitter more?

然后我记得很清楚，他问了我一个问题，大意是，这如何让我们的用户更喜欢 Twitter？

Simple question.

简单的问题。

But then at that point I realized, yeah, we never really talked about that because we were so engrossed in all the other stuff.

但那时我意识到，是的，我们从未真正谈论过这一点，因为我们太专注于所有其他事情。

And we talked about it as a proxy because we were talking about metrics and impact and integration and those sorts of things.

我们将其作为代理进行讨论，因为我们正在讨论指标、影响和集成以及诸如此类的事情。

Shreyas Doshi: So I still remember that.

Shreyas Doshi：所以我仍然记得这一点。

I still remember him asking a simple question.

我还记得他问了一个简单的问题。

Frankly at the time I did not have a good answer to that question.

坦白说，当时我对这个问题并没有很好的答案。

So that was a lesson for me to get more rigorous about my own thinking.

所以这对我来说是一个教训，让我更加严格地思考自己的想法。

Lenny: That's a question that a lot of PMs would hear and be like, "Oh my God.

Lenny：这是很多产品经理都会听到的一个问题，并且会说：“天哪。

Come on, man.

来吧，伙计。

We're trying to move some metrics here." But I love that you took that as like, okay, I really find this really important.

我们正在尝试改变一些指标。”但我喜欢你认为，好吧，我真的发现这非常重要。

And this is a really important question to think about and as a lesson of how to approach this kind of stuff.

这是一个非常重要的问题，需要思考，也是如何处理此类问题的一个教训。

So I love that.

所以我喜欢这样。

I think you were going to talk about Stripe too, right?

我想你也会谈论 Stripe，对吧？

Shreyas Doshi: Yes.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

Stripe, I worked a lot with Patrick and John.

Stripe，我和帕特里克和约翰一起工作了很多。

John was my manager for a while.

约翰曾担任过我的经理一段时间。

And from John, I learned a lot about marketing.

从约翰那里，我学到了很多关于营销的知识。

John is a master marketer.

约翰是一位营销大师。

Among many other things that he's absolutely great at, he's just a great marketer.

在他绝对擅长的许多其他事情中，他是一位出色的营销人员。

And I just learned a lot about how to think about talking about the product in terms that, again, obvious stuff, but talking about product in terms that customers really understand.

我刚刚学到了很多关于如何考虑用显而易见的东西来谈论产品，但用客户真正理解的方式来谈论产品。

And then sometimes emphasizing things that we as product people might not think are really important, because maybe we didn't spend much time on building it, and we want to talk about things that we spent a lot of time that are truly innovative, etc., etc. And John would often make, again, these observations about, well, if we just talked about the product in this manner, that will likely resonate a lot more with customers.

然后有时会强调我们作为产品人员可能不认为真正重要的事情，因为也许我们没有花太多时间来构建它，我们想谈论我们花了很多时间真正创新的事情，等等。约翰经常会再次提出这些观察，如果我们只是以这种方式谈论产品，这可能会引起客户更多的共鸣。

Shreyas Doshi: And that got me thinking a lot about how I need to reframe my approach to basically separate the effort involved in building something with the effort you want to put behind talking about said thing.

Shreyas Doshi：这让我思考了很多，我需要如何重新构建我的方法，以基本上将构建某些东西所涉及的努力与你想要在谈论所说的事情背后付出的努力分开。

And that doesn't have to be the same features that you talk about.

这不一定是你所说的相同的功能。

So, that's something I learned a lot working with John.

所以，这是我和约翰一起工作时学到的很多东西。

From Patrick, I think the main thing I learned was just how to think and communicate more clearly.

从帕特里克那里，我认为我学到的主要东西就是如何更清晰地思考和沟通。

Patrick did that extremely well.

帕特里克在这方面做得非常好。

And then overall from both, I learned the importance of setting the culture you want, simply by consistently being an example of the behaviors you want to replicate in the organization.

总的来说，我从这两件事中了解到建立你想要的文化的重要性，只需始终成为你想要在组织中复制的行为的例子。

So instead of talking about values, I saw both of them just live the values that they wanted the company to replicate, especially as the company was scaling.

因此，我没有看到他们谈论价值观，而是只是践行他们希望公司复制的价值观，尤其是在公司规模扩大的情况下。

So, whether it's a culture of being user centric or it's a value around humility, they just lived those values so consistently.

因此，无论是一种以用户为中心的文化，还是一种围绕谦逊的价值观，他们都始终如一地践行着这些价值观。

And I think that consistency spoke louder than anything that you might write on a poster on the office walls.

我认为一致性比你在办公室墙上的海报上写的任何内容都更能说明问题。

Lenny: It's just hearing you describe all these companies and all these founders that you've worked with, it's pretty incredible to set of experiences that you've had and the primordial soup in which you became a PM.

Lenny：只是听到你描述所有这些公司以及所有与你共事过的创始人，你所拥有的经历以及你成为 PM 的原始汤是相当令人难以置信的。

And it explains a lot about how you're able to squeeze so much wisdom and insights about the role of product management and the art and skill of product management, because you've seen so many ways of doing it and so many companies that have done in different ways.

它解释了很多关于你如何能够汲取关于产品管理的作用以及产品管理的艺术和技能的如此多的智慧和见解，因为你已经看到了很多这样做的方法，也看到了很多以不同方式做事的公司。

And so, it's a good segue to shifting to talk about the five big ideas.

因此，现在是一个很好的话题，我们可以转向谈论五个重要想法。

The first is around this concept of pre-mortems, this is something that stuck with me when you tweeted it.

第一个是关于事前剖析的概念，当你发推文时，这让我印象深刻。

I think it was a couple years ago at this point and I see it come up occasionally in your tweets and amongst people chatting your super follower threads.

我想那是几年前的事了，我看到它偶尔会出现在你的推文中以及在与你的超级粉丝聊天的人们中。

And so, I also like that there's something you can actually implement and act on pretty quickly and see impact.

因此，我也喜欢您可以快速实际实施和采取行动并看到影响的东西。

And so, curious to hear your thoughts on this idea of pre-mortem just unpack this idea for folks.

因此，很想听听您对验尸想法的想法，请为人们解开这个想法。

Shreyas Doshi: We're all familiar with a post-mortem or as they call it in the military, I think, after action reviews.

Shreyas Doshi：我们都熟悉事后剖析，或者我认为，在行动审查之后，他们在军队中称之为“事后剖析”。

So every company I've worked at, we've had some form of post-mortem when a launch had problems or an initiative did not go as planned or we suffered an unacceptable system downtime.

因此，我工作过的每家公司，当发布出现问题或计划未按计划进行或我们遭受了不可接受的系统停机时，我们都会进行某种形式的事后分析。

Somebody would say, "Oh, we need to post-mortem that." And over the years, I really saw the effectiveness of a post-mortem.

有人会说：“哦，我们需要进行事后剖析。”多年来，我确实看到了事后剖析的有效性。

Some really great insights came out of a post-mortem about what went wrong and what we could have done better.

事后分析得出了一些非常重要的见解，了解出了什么问题以及我们可以做得更好。

And as I saw the effectiveness of a post-mortem, that's what made me wonder, why do we need to wait until after things go wrong?

当我看到事后剖析的有效性时，这让我想知道，为什么我们需要等到事情出错之后呢？

Because why can't we extract some of these insights before they go wrong?

因为为什么我们不能在这些见解出错之前提取一些见解呢？

And it was around that time that I discovered the idea of a pre-mortem.

就在那时，我发现了事前剖析的想法。

I learned about it from an Harvard business review article written by Gary Cline.

我是从加里·克莱恩（Gary Cline）撰写的哈佛商业评论文章中了解到这一点的。

Shreyas Doshi: And the idea is simple, which is when you are working on an important project or initiative, you get together with your team early on in the products or the projects' life to see in advance what could go wrong.

Shreyas Doshi：这个想法很简单，就是当你正在从事一个重要的项目或计划时，你会在产品或项目生命周期的早期与你的团队聚集在一起，提前看看可能会出现什么问题。

And the way I describe a pre-mortem is that if you do a pre-mortem right, you will not have to do an ugly post-mortem.

我描述事前剖析的方式是，如果事前剖析做得正确，你就不必进行丑陋的事后剖析。

You might still do a post-mortem to learn, but odds are very high that it is not going to be a bad post-mortem.

你可能仍然需要进行事后剖析来学习，但事后剖析的可能性很大，这不会是一个糟糕的事后剖析。

And the genius of the pre-mortem ritual is the initial prompt.

天才的死前仪式就是最初的提示。

So it's not just about like, well, what could go wrong?

所以这不仅仅是像，嗯，可能会出现什么问题？

The initial prompt is the genius, which is the prompt starts with, imagine this project that we are working on has failed six months from now, or this launch we are doing has miserably failed.

最初的提示是天才，这是开始的提示，想象一下我们正在做的这个项目在六个月后失败了，或者我们正在做的这次发布惨败了。

Let's just all imagine that.

让我们大家想象一下。

Now, let's work backwards from there and ask ourselves what went wrong, what could have contributed to this utter failure.

现在，让我们从那里开始倒退，问问自己哪里出了问题，是什么导致了这次彻底的失败。

Shreyas Doshi: And that's how a pre-mortem meeting will start.

Shreyas Doshi：这就是事前剖析会议的开始方式。

The leader will start with this prompt.

领导者将根据此提示开始。

And then the way the meeting goes is you ask your team members to share what could have caused this utter failure, and the magic of this type of approach where you work backwards from a failed outcome.

然后会议的方式是你要求你的团队成员分享可能导致这种彻底失败的原因，以及这种从失败的结果中逆向工作的方法的魔力。

A hypothetical failed outcome is that it just somehow enables two things.

假设的失败结果是，它只是以某种方式实现了两件事。

One is much greater psychological safety for team members to talk about things they're concerned about, but that they were just hesitant to bring up because nobody likes to be negative in modern organizations, everybody wants to be optimistic and positive.

一是团队成员在谈论他们关心的事情时有更大的心理安全感，但他们只是犹豫是否提出，因为在现代组织中没有人喜欢消极，每个人都希望乐观和积极。

So a pre-mortem setting gives everybody the license to actually think about what can go wrong.

因此，事前剖析让每个人都有机会真正思考可能会出现什么问题。

So, that psychological safety is a big, big factor in why a pre-mortem works.

因此，心理安全感是事前剖析发挥作用的一个非常非常大的因素。

Shreyas Doshi: And what I've found is at Stripe, I did this regularly with launches that my team was involved in.

Shreyas Doshi：我发现在 Stripe，我经常在我的团队参与的发布中这样做。

Sometimes some teams or some people were just surprised or skeptical like, how is it really going to work?

有时，一些团队或一些人只是感到惊讶或怀疑，比如，它到底是如何运作的？

And then we go through the pre-mortem meeting and there's a whole process that we can talk about.

然后我们进行事前剖析会议，我们可以讨论整个过程。

But as we complete the meeting, I ask everybody, so how did that go?

但当我们结束会议时，我问大家，进展如何？

And just everybody is smiling, even though we've spent say 30 minutes or an hour, just talking about terrible scenarios of things that could go wrong, but everybody's feeling a little lighter because its great catharsis for them.

每个人都在微笑，尽管我们花了 30 分钟或一个小时，只是谈论可能出错的可怕场景，但每个人都感觉轻松了一些，因为这对他们来说是一种很好的宣泄。

So that becomes really important.

所以这变得非常重要。

Shreyas Doshi: And the last kind of thing I found with pre-mortems now that I've done them with various other companies as well, that I advise and whatnot is the shared vocabulary and the shared vocabulary that you get about being able to talk about things that will fail.

Shreyas Doshi：我在事前剖析中发现的最后一件事是，我也对其他各种公司进行了事前剖析，我建议的是共享词汇，以及关于能够谈论将会失败的事情的共享词汇。

So I have a specific approach, which is I ask the team to talk about three things.

所以我有一个具体的做法，就是我要求团队讲三件事。

Each member on the team should bring up three things.

团队中的每个成员都应该提出三件事。

One is a tiger.

一个是老虎。

So you can bring up tigers in the shared doc that we create.

因此，您可以在我们创建的共享文档中提出老虎。

And a tiger is a threat that will actually kill us, just like a tiger would.

老虎是一种威胁，实际上会杀死我们，就像老虎一样。

So these are actual problematic things that could be really harmful to the product or the project.

因此，这些都是实际有问题的事情，可能对产品或项目确实有害。

So, that's a tiger.

那么，那是一只老虎。

Shreyas Doshi: The other is paper tiger.

Shreyas Doshi：另一个是纸老虎。

So this is a seeming threat that others might be worried about, but you're not worried about.

因此，这是一个其他人可能担心的看似威胁，但你并不担心。

So that's the paper tiger.

这就是纸老虎。

And then the last one, and I think this one was also used at Airbnb in other ways is elephant.

最后一个是大象，我认为 Airbnb 也以其他方式使用了这个。

And the elephant in the room that nobody is talking about.

还有房间里的大象却无人谈论。

So it might not be a tiger, it won't kill us, but you're still worried that we are not seeing reality as it is that.

所以它可能不是老虎，它不会杀死我们，但你仍然担心我们没有看到现实。

And so, an elephant could be like, well, we are assuming that just because we launch this and do a bunch of PR that we'll get users, but are we sure we're going to get users?

因此，大象可能会说，好吧，我们假设仅仅因为我们推出了这个产品并做了一系列公关，我们就会获得用户，但我们确定我们会获得用户吗？

That's the elephant in the room that nobody is talking about that, again, this gives you that psychological safety to bring it up.

这是房间里的大象，没有人在谈论它，这再次给你提供了心理上的安全感来提出它。

Shreyas Doshi: And then what I noticed as I ran pre-mortems is that in future meetings that the team had where I wasn't even present, people started talking about, "Oh, I have this tiger.

Shreyas Doshi：然后，当我进行事前剖析时，我注意到，在我什至不在场的团队未来会议中，人们开始谈论，“哦，我有这只老虎。

Can I bring up this tiger?" And all of a sudden it became okay for people to bring those things up, which I think is perhaps the best part about a pre-mortem is that shared vocabulary.

我可以把这只老虎带起来吗？”突然之间，人们就可以提出这些事情了，我认为这也许是事前剖析最好的部分，那就是共享词汇。

Lenny: Such a simple idea that is clearly going to benefit you and your team.

Lenny：这样一个简单的想法显然会让您和您的团队受益。

And it's interesting that people don't often do this, or haven't even thought about doing this.

有趣的是，人们并不经常这样做，或者甚至没有想过这样做。

And so, just to get a little bit deeper, how do you actually execute this meeting?

那么，为了更深入一点，您实际上是如何执行这次会议的？

Who do you invite?

你邀请谁？

What are the questions you ask?

你问什么问题？

When exactly do you do this, that kind of stuff?

你到底什么时候做这种事啊？

Shreyas Doshi: And so, as I started doing pre-mortem, they got more and more popular at Stripe, other teams started doing them, and then afterwards I helped some startups also do pre-mortems.

Shreyas Doshi：所以，当我开始做事前剖析时，它们在 Stripe 越来越受欢迎，其他团队也开始这样做，然后我帮助一些初创公司也做事前剖析。

And at some point, I decided I should just write down my template for pre-mortems.

在某些时候，我决定写下我的事前分析模板。

So I worked with the folks at Coda to create a Coda doc, which you can find, and we can put in the show notes if possible, basically that's an entire template for how to run pre-mortems using this method that I talked about, including tigers, paper tigers, elephants, all of that.

所以我和 Coda 的人一起创建了一个 Coda 文档，你可以找到它，如果可能的话我们可以放入演示笔记，基本上这是一个完整的模板，说明如何使用我谈到的这种方法进行事前剖析，包括老虎、纸老虎、大象，所有这些。

The main thing about a pre-mortem is to include people from every function that is going to be involved in, say, if you're doing a launch.

事前剖析的主要内容是包括将要参与的各个职能部门的人员，例如，如果您正在进行发布。

And so, if it's a really large launch, sometimes I will separate it into two groups.

因此，如果这是一次非常大型的发布，有时我会将其分为两组。

One is everything related to the engineering side of things.

一是与工程方面相关的一切。

Usually the engineering team is fairly large, so you can bring in every engineer.

通常，工程团队相当大，因此您可以引入每个工程师。

So, that's really important.

所以，这非常重要。

Every engineer needs to be in the meeting, and so, it might be a meeting of 10, 15, 20, whatever engineers, and maybe a PM, maybe a design counterpart, and so on.

每个工程师都需要参加会议，因此，会议可能有 10、15、20 名工程师，可能还有 PM，可能还有设计人员，等等。

Shreyas Doshi: That's just focused on the product engineering side of things like what could go wrong.

Shreyas Doshi：这只是关注产品工程方面的问题，比如可能会出现什么问题。

And then again, for a large launch, I like doing a separate pre-mortem for the go-to-market side.

再说一遍，对于大型发布，我喜欢为进入市场方面进行单独的事前分析。

And so that will involve sales team, support team, marketing team, involve design team.

因此，这将涉及销售团队、支持团队、营销团队、设计团队。

Some of the core engineering leads will also need to be at that meeting.

一些核心工程主管也需要参加该会议。

Over there, we'll talk about more of the go-to-market risks.

在那里，我们将讨论更多的上市风险。

So that's what I like to do for a very large launch.

这就是我喜欢在大型发布中所做的事情。

Shreyas Doshi: For a smaller launch, I just like to do one meeting where everybody is present.

Shreyas Doshi：对于规模较小的发布会，我只想召开一次每个人都在场的会议。

And like I said, start with the prompt of, imagine this has failed.

就像我说的，从提示开始，想象这已经失败了。

So as the pre-mortem meeting leader, it's my responsibility to share the prompt.

因此，作为事前剖析会议的领导者，我有责任分享提示。

And then I like doing these pre-mortems where we alternate between speaking and quiet time.

然后我喜欢做这些事前剖析，我们轮流说话和安静。

So I'll share the prompt and then I'll say, okay, now the next five minutes or the next 10 minutes is quiet time where I already have that template, like the quarter doc where people start entering their own tigers and paper tigers, and elephants in a way that nobody else sees.

所以我会分享提示，然后我会说，好吧，现在接下来的五分钟或接下来的十分钟是安静的时间，我已经有了那个模板，就像季度文档一样，人们开始以其他人看不到的方式输入自己的老虎、纸老虎和大象。

And so, people do that, and then we go around the room and share.

所以，人们这样做，然后我们在房间里走动并分享。

Shreyas Doshi: And the one other innovation I added as I did this often was also, after people shared, I ask people to pick the tiger that they find more scary, but that somebody else mentioned, so not their own tiger, but some other tiger that somebody else mentioned that they found more scary.

Shreyas Doshi：我经常这样做的另一项创新是，在人们分享之后，我要求人们挑选他们认为更可怕的老虎，但其他人提到过，所以不是他们自己的老虎，而是其他人提到的他们发现更可怕的其他老虎。

So, that ends up being people basically are voting.

所以，最终人们基本上都在投票。

And then as the pre-mortem leader, it's my responsibility to take all of that output that the team has generated in this document and then prioritize.

然后，作为事前分析领导者，我有责任获取团队在本文档中生成的所有输出，然后确定优先级。

Because again, the point is not to solve every problem, the point is to identify threats that we are not talking about openly or that we might just be missing, or we might be assuming that somebody else is going to deal with it only to find nobody was thinking about it.

因为，重点不是解决所有问题，重点是识别我们没有公开谈论的威胁，或者我们可能忽略的威胁，或者我们可能假设其他人会处理它，却发现没有人考虑它。

So then I like to create a pre-mortem action plan and then share that with the team and keep myself as the leader accountable for actually making progress on it.

因此，我喜欢制定一个事前行动计划，然后与团队分享，并让自己作为领导者对实际取得的进展负责。

Lenny: Having started doing this, have you noticed a less need for post-mortems, basically projects failing less than having less problems?

Lenny：开始这样做后，您是否注意到对事后分析的需要减少了，基本上项目失败的次数比问题少？

What impact have you seen executing on this idea?

您认为执行这个想法会产生什么影响？

Shreyas Doshi: Absolutely, I've seen us identify certain issues that just wouldn't have come up and likely you can't really run a simulation and see what that actually looked like in real life.

Shreyas Doshi：当然，我已经看到我们发现了某些不会出现的问题，而且您可能无法真正运行模拟并看到现实生活中的实际情况。

But those likely would have resulted in a problematic situation afterwards.

但这些可能会导致事后出现问题。

A great example is sometimes you'll see a company announce something and they have massive backlash.

一个很好的例子是，有时你会看到一家公司宣布了一些事情，但他们却遭到了强烈的反对。

And then one reasonable observer might say, "Well, how did this company miss this?" because what happens is they have the backlash, then the company realizes, "Oh, we have this backlash." Then they start doing damage control.

然后，一位理性的观察者可能会说：“那么，这家公司怎么会错过这一点呢？”因为发生的情况是他们有强烈的反对，然后公司意识到，“哦，我们有这种反对。”然后他们开始进行损害控制。

They sometimes might even backtrack and undo whatever they did.

有时他们甚至可能会后退并撤销他们所做的一切。

They'll say, "Sorry, we didn't think about these issues.

他们会说：“抱歉，我们没有考虑这些问题。

Give us some more time and we'll come back, and we'll perhaps relaunch the feature, but in a better way."

再给我们一些时间，我们会回来的，我们也许会重新推出该功能，但会以更好的方式。”

Shreyas Doshi: To the casual observer, it may seem like that it should have been obvious and sometimes it's not, but oftentimes I agree, it should be obvious to these teams what issues these things are going to cause.

Shreyas Doshi：对于不经意的观察者来说，这似乎应该是显而易见的，有时并非如此，但我经常同意，对于这些团队来说，这些事情将导致什么问题应该是显而易见的。

In fact, it is obvious to some team members, but the problem is that they perhaps haven't created that psychological safety and that vocabulary to be able to talk about it in an objective way and to decide with intent, are we going to solve for this or not?

事实上，这对一些团队成员来说是显而易见的，但问题是他们可能还没有创造出心理安全感和词汇量，以便能够以客观的方式谈论它并有目的地决定，我们是否要解决这个问题？

So I do see a lot of those scenarios in our industry, which end up just actually wasting a lot of time.

所以我确实在我们的行业中看到了很多这样的场景，但最终实际上浪费了很多时间。

Whereas pre-mortem is a very inexpensive way to see these things because all it is is one meeting followed by some work that the leader needs to do to prioritize, followed by some mitigating actions, which you would've had to take anyway.

而事前剖析是查看这些事情的一种非常便宜的方式，因为它只是一次会议，然后是领导者需要做的一些工作来确定优先顺序，然后是一些缓解措施，无论如何你都必须采取这些措施。

So that's why I'm a huge fan of pre-mortems is, it's one of those very low downside, but very high upside things that I've experienced.

这就是为什么我非常喜欢事前剖析，这是我经历过的那些缺点非常低，但优点却非常高的事情之一。

Lenny: I'm excited to see those template, I haven't seen yet.

Lenny：我很高兴看到那些模板，我还没见过。

I don't know that you put one together, so that's awesome.

我不知道你把一个放在一起，所以这太棒了。

And we'll link it in the notes of this episode.

我们将在本集的注释中链接它。

I want to move to our second big idea, which is about something you've called LNO framework, which is all around prioritizing your finite time as a PM and as a team.

我想谈谈我们的第二个重要想法，即所谓的 LNO 框架，该框架的核心是优先考虑作为 PM 和团队的有限时间。

And so, I'll just kind of turn that over to you to share what that's all about.

因此，我会将其转交给您来分享全部内容。

Shreyas Doshi: Yes.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

And so, I'm going to share a short personal anecdote related to the LNO framework, which is that when I just joined Google as a relatively new PM, this is back in 2008, for the first three years, I was overwhelmed and stressed.

所以，我要分享一个与 LNO 框架相关的简短个人轶事，那就是当我作为一个相对较新的 PM 加入 Google 时，那是在 2008 年，在最初的三年里，我感到不知所措和压力。

And that was because, one, I was a new PM in this really high performance environment.

这是因为，第一，我是这个真正高性能环境中的新产品经理。

I was working on some important products and launches and I just had too much to do.

我正在开发一些重要的产品并发布产品，但我有太多事情要做。

And I looked back at that time and it was perhaps the most stressful time of my career, where I would long hours, etc. But even at the end of the day, I'd feel highly dissatisfied because my to-do list was endless and I wasn't able to make a dent on it, and I was also a little bit of a perfectionist, so I was like, "No, no, no, I need to do this well."

我回想那段时间，那可能是我职业生涯中压力最大的一段时间，我会长时间工作等等。但即使在一天结束时，我也会感到非常不满意，因为我的待办事项清单无穷无尽，而我无法在上面做任何事情，而且我也有点完美主义者，所以我想，“不，不，不，我需要把这件事做好。”

Shreyas Doshi: It was just constantly I would come home and talk to my wife and basically just complained to her about how I'm not able to make progress or as much progress as I want, then that was accompanied with not being able to sleep very well because I was concerned about how much output I was producing and whatnot.

Shreyas Doshi：我经常回家和我的妻子交谈，基本上只是向她抱怨我如何无法取得进步或取得我想要的进步，然后伴随着无法睡好，因为我担心我产生了多少产出等等。

And so, again, very stressful time in my career.

因此，这又是我职业生涯中压力非常大的时期。

And then things changed when I discovered the ideas related to this LNO framework in a block post.

然后，当我在一篇文章中发现与这个 LNO 框架相关的想法时，事情发生了变化。

Unfortunately, I can't even find that block post somewhere, but it had some ideas that I took and then created this LNO framework on myself, which is essentially that as a product manager or as anybody in a creative high impact high leverage role, all your tasks are not created equal, there are actually three type of tasks that you end up doing in such a role.

不幸的是，我什至无法在某处找到那个块帖子，但它有一些想法，然后我自己创建了这个 LNO 框架，这本质上是，作为产品经理或任何具有创造性、高影响力、高杠杆作用的角色，你的所有任务都不是平等的，实际上，你最终在这样的角色中完成了三种类型的任务。

Shreyas Doshi: So there are L tasks which are leverage tasks.

Shreyas Doshi：所以有 L 个任务是杠杆任务。

And the L tasks are such that when you put in a certain amount of effort, you get 10X or 100X in return in terms of impact.

L 任务是这样的，当你付出一定的努力时，你会得到 10 倍或 100 倍的回报（影响力）。

So those are L task, leverage tasks.

这些是 L 任务，杠杆任务。

Then there are neutral tasks, so that's N.

然后是中性任务，所以是N。

And those are tasks where you basically get what you put in, or just a little more than that.

在这些任务中，你基本上会得到你投入的东西，或者只是多一点。

So you put in 1X and you get 1.1 X, those are neutral tasks.

所以你投入 1X，你就会得到 1.1X，这些都是中性任务。

And then there are overhead tasks where, again, in terms of impact, you get back a lot less than you actually put in.

还有一些开销任务，就影响而言，你得到的回报比你实际投入的要少得多。

And it turns out that many people who are ambitious or are perfectionists like myself by default treat each of these types of tasks the same way, and therein lies the problem.

事实证明，许多像我一样雄心勃勃或完美主义者默认以相同的方式对待每种类型的任务，这就是问题所在。

So this was the epiphany for me back at Google when I discovered some of these ideas.

所以，当我回到谷歌时，当我发现其中一些想法时，这就是我的顿悟。

Shreyas Doshi: And what I realized is that among the things in my to-do list that are actually only very few L tasks, and so, it made sense for me to focus a lot on those L tasks, to take on those L tasks when I was feeling most productive, most energetic during a certain time of the day.And for the L tasks, let my inner perfectionist shine because I'm going to get so much more in return.

Shreyas Doshi：我意识到，在我的待办事项列表中，实际上只有很少的 L 任务，因此，对我来说，把大量精力集中在这些 L 任务上，在一天中某个时间我感觉最有成效、最有活力的时候承担这些 L 任务是有意义的。对于 L 任务，让我内心的完美主义者闪耀，因为我会得到更多的回报。

It makes sense for me to spend that time on that PRD, for instance, related to an important feature that will meaningfully impact our revenue.

例如，我花时间在 PRD 上是有意义的，因为它与一个将对我们的收入产生重大影响的重要功能相关。

I'm going to spend more time on that than I ordinarily would.

我会比平时花更多的时间在这上面。

So now, where does that more time come from because it cannot come from just working more hours?

那么现在，更多的时间从哪里来，因为它不能仅仅靠工作更多的时间来获得呢？

Well, it comes from spending less time on N tasks and O tasks.

嗯，它来自于在 N 任务和 O 任务上花费更少的时间。

And so, there are some tasks that you do.

因此，您需要执行一些任务。

Classic example of an O task is say an expense report.

O 任务的典型示例是费用报告。

Sounds silly, but I used to try to make my expense report really good.

听起来很傻，但我曾经努力让我的费用报告变得非常好。

Shreyas Doshi: And sometimes that made no sense like, "No, no, no. I need to do that." And again, this is the silliest example, but there are many examples.

Shreyas Doshi：有时这毫无意义，比如“不，不，不。我需要这样做。”再说一遍，这是最愚蠢的例子，但例子有很多。

And something I realized is that the same type of activity can actually be either an L task or an N task or an O task.

我意识到，同一类型的活动实际上可以是 L 任务、N 任务或 O 任务。

So what's an example?

那么什么是例子呢？

So say a classic PM task activity of filing a bug report.

比如说提交错误报告的经典 PM 任务活动。

And so, many companies have these bug templates, etc., etc. that you use to file a bug report.

因此，许多公司都有这些错误模板等，您可以使用它们来提交错误报告。

Well, it turns out that filing a bug report depending on the situation, depending on what type of bug it is can actually be an L task high leverage task, and over there you want to file a very detailed explicit bug report.

好吧，事实证明，根据具体情况、根据错误类型提交错误报告实际上可能是一项 L 任务高杠杆任务，而在那里您想要提交一份非常详细的明确错误报告。

And in other cases, might actually be an O task where you don't fill out the template that diligently and you don't add 15 screenshots with annotations, instead, you just have one screenshot and you hit submit on the bug report.

在其他情况下，实际上可能是一项 O 任务，您没有认真填写模板，也没有添加 15 个带有注释的屏幕截图，相反，您只有一张屏幕截图，然后在错误报告上点击提交。

Shreyas Doshi: So that shift.

Shreyas Doshi：所以这个转变。

Usually for the same type of activity, we provide the same type of engagement.

通常对于相同类型的活动，我们提供相同类型的参与。

The last example I'll use to illustrate this is taking notes.

我用来说明这一点的最后一个例子是做笔记。

It turns out even taking notes, taking notes synthesizing them, and then sharing them can actually be an L task, an N task or an O task, depending on what type of notes they are.

事实证明，甚至记笔记、记笔记综合它们，然后分享它们实际上也可以是 L 任务、N 任务或 O 任务，具体取决于它们是什么类型的笔记。

So, after I understood this, previously, I would just send all notes.

所以，在我理解了这一点之后，以前我只会发送所有笔记。

I tried to make them really good, which took a lot of time.

我试图把它们做得非常好，这花了很多时间。

But then I realized, well, this is a meeting where, yes, I need to send notes, but again, it's like, it's just standard stuff, I just need to quickly list out.

但后来我意识到，嗯，这是一次会议，是的，我需要发送笔记，但同样，这只是标准的东西，我只需要快速列出来。

People need to really know is the three action items that came out of the meetings who owns them, that's it.

人们真正需要知道的是会议中提出的三个行动项目是谁拥有的，仅此而已。

Shreyas Doshi: And it is not about something highly strategic or controversial.

Shreyas Doshi：这不是高度战略性或有争议的事情。

Well, in that case, I'm just going to send the notes out the moment the meeting is over, I'm just going to hit send because I've already taken the action item.

好吧，在这种情况下，我将在会议结束后立即发送笔记，我只需点击发送，因为我已经采取了行动项目。

I'm not going to try to make my notes look great so that others can appreciate, "Oh, Shreyas always sends great notes." On the other hand, if it was a product review with the CEO about a very contentious topic that you have gone back and forth multiple times, and now you made a decision about something, you want to perfect those notes before you send them out, you want to get the language right, you want to be very clear on what the decision is, so there's no room for misinterpretation, so you don't backtrack afterwards or people say, "Well, but I thought we'd said this." That's a case where it's an L task.

我不会试图让我的笔记看起来很棒，以便其他人能够欣赏，“哦，Shreyas 总是发送很棒的笔记。”另一方面，如果是与首席执行官就一个非常有争议的话题进行产品审查，你已经反复讨论了很多次，现在你对某件事做出了决定，你想要在发送之前完善这些说明，你想要正确的语言，你想要非常清楚决定是什么，所以没有误解的余地，所以你不会事后反悔，或者人们说，“好吧，但我认为我们已经说过了。”这是 L 任务的情况。

And I would say just spend an hour or even two hours perfecting those notes because it's an L task.

我想说只需花一个小时甚至两个小时完善这些笔记，因为这是一项 L 任务。

So, hopefully that helps illustrate some of the ideas behind the LNO framework.

因此，希望这有助于说明 LNO 框架背后的一些想法。

Lenny: Yeah.

莱尼：是的。

And that last piece is a really good segue to the next big idea around optics and the important optics.

最后一篇文章非常好地延续了围绕光学和重要光学的下一个伟大想法。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Sprigg.

莱尼：这一集是斯普里格给你带来的。

If you've been a member of my community for a while, you know my user fan and investor in Sprigg.

如果您已经成为我的社区成员一段时间了，您就会认识我在 Sprigg 的用户粉丝和投资者。

Sprigg is a user research platform that makes getting user insights from your product as easy and fast as getting analytics.

Sprigg 是一个用户研究平台，可以像获取分析一样轻松快速地从您的产品中获取用户见解。

The best product and research teams at companies like Loom, Opendoor and Dropbox use Spriggs in product surveys to target specific users, start collecting insights and identify issues and opportunities related to activation, onboarding, engagement .

Loom、Opendoor 和 Dropbox 等公司的最佳产品和研究团队在产品调查中使用 Spriggs 来定位特定用户，开始收集见解并识别与激活、入职、参与相关的问题和机会。

Talk about a platform that pays for itself.

谈论一个可以收回成本的平台。

But I'm perhaps most excited about Sprigg's newest launch, which extends the power of the platform pre-launch and makes it possible to test mockups and prototypes with your own users in minutes.

但最令我兴奋的可能是 Sprigg 的最新发布，它扩展了平台预发布的功能，并使您可以在几分钟内与自己的用户测试模型和原型。

Lenny: The testing interface is super slick and doesn't require any of the typical plugins that make testing with your own users an appealing.

Lenny：测试界面非常流畅，不需要任何典型的插件，这使得与您自己的用户进行测试变得很有吸引力。

And with unlimited seats, you're able to invite anyone from your company to view and use insights generated by Sprigg.

凭借无限的席位，您可以邀请公司中的任何人查看和使用 Sprigg 生成的见解。

If you want to get started, head over to sprigg.com/lenny and mention that I sent.

如果您想开始，请访问 sprigg.com/lenny 并注明我已发送。

Lenny: But before we get to that, I wanted to have one follow-up question.

莱尼：但在我们开始之前，我想问一个后续问题。

What are some classic examples of high leverage tasks that PM should try to do more often and think about?

PM 应该尝试更频繁地执行和思考的高杠杆任务的一些经典示例？

What's in that bucket, generally?

一般情况下，桶里装的是什么？

Even though you pointed out a lot of times they could be in any of the buckets, depending on how you execute them.

尽管您多次指出它们可能位于任何一个桶中，具体取决于您执行它们的方式。

Are there things that are just like, you should probably spend a lot of your time doing X, Y, Z?

有没有类似这样的事情，你可能应该花很多时间做 X、Y、Z？

Shreyas Doshi: Yeah.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

So, turns out that the L tasks, PMs implicitly just deep down they know what their L tasks are, because those are the tasks that are bothering them the most because they are not doing them or because they're not doing them as well as they know they should.

所以，事实证明，L 任务、PM 在内心深处他们知道他们的 L 任务是什么，因为这些任务是最困扰他们的任务，因为他们没有做这些任务，或者因为他们没有按照他们知道应该做的那样去做。

So, the classic example of this is the case where a PM will say, "I know I need to work on getting our strategy right, but I don't have time because I'm busy firefighting.

因此，典型的例子是，产品经理会说：“我知道我需要努力制定正确的策略，但我没有时间，因为我正忙于救火。

I'm busy just dealing with all these execution issues.

我正忙于处理所有这些执行问题。

And I just don't have time to work on the strategy piece." Sometimes we console ourselves by saying, "Yeah.

我只是没有时间研究战略部分。”有时我们会安慰自己说：“是的。

That's because we have all these things going on this month, but trust me, next month, we're going to have ample time and I'm going to just spend a whole week working on strategy." Well, the next month rolls around and it's the same thing, you've got other issues.

那是因为我们这个月要处理所有这些事情，但相信我，下个月，我们将有充足的时间，我将花一整周的时间来制定战略。”好吧，下个月又到了，还是同样的事情，你还有其他问题。

Shreyas Doshi: The reason we procrastinate on these tasks are, one, because we know that they're L tasks, we know the impact they'll have, and we are a little scared.

Shreyas Doshi：我们拖延这些任务的原因是，第一，因为我们知道它们是 L 任务，我们知道它们会产生的影响，而且我们有点害怕。

That's one.

这是一个。

The second is they require dedicated attention.

第二是它们需要专门的关注。

And again, we are afraid about whether we'll have anything interesting to say.

再一次，我们担心我们是否会说一些有趣的事情。

That's the deep fear.

这就是深深的恐惧。

Why many people procrastinate on strategy?

为什么很多人在战略上拖延？

Because deep down, they don't know if they can formulate a good strategy.

因为内心深处，他们不知道自己能否制定出好的策略。

So time becomes a convenient excuse for us where we say, "Well, it's not me.

所以时间就成了我们一个方便的借口，我们可以说：“好吧，这不是我。

It's just, I don't have time to work on it." And by the way, everything I say here, I have been that person.

只是，我没有时间去做这件事。”顺便说一句，我在这里所说的一切，我就是那个人。

So I have been that person who's procrastinated on an L task, whether it's the strategy or whether it's writing the PRD for this really difficult feature, or it is working on aligning two teams where that alignment would create a lot of impact, but it's hard, it's an L task, but I don't do it because I don't want to deal with this other person, this manager I love to collaborate with to make it happen.

所以我一直是那个在 L 任务上拖延的人，无论是策略还是为这个非常困难的功能编写 PRD，或者正在努力协调两个团队，这种协调会产生很大的影响，但这很难，这是一个 L 任务，但我不这样做，因为我不想与另一个人打交道，这个我喜欢与之合作的经理来实现它。

Shreyas Doshi: And perhaps, I don't know if we'll get along.

Shreyas Doshi：也许，我不知道我们是否能相处得好。

I don't know if I can have that tough conversation.

我不知道我是否可以进行如此艰难的谈话。

And so again, it's an L task, but I'll try to apply bandaids instead of just tackling it head on.

再说一次，这是一项 L 任务，但我会尝试使用创可贴，而不是直接解决它。

So, this is tough stuff.

所以，这是一件很难的事情。

And what I've found useful there is two things, two tactics make a huge difference in helping us target L tasks better.

我发现有两件事很有用，两种策略在帮助我们更好地完成 L 任务方面发挥着巨大的作用。

One is the idea of placebo productivity.

一是安慰剂生产力的想法。

So, what I do is before I have to tackle an L task, that couple of days leading up to it, I do all these placebo productivity tasks.

所以，我所做的就是在我必须处理 L 任务之前，在它之前的几天，我会做所有这些安慰剂生产力任务。

Basically, I intentionally do N tasks and O tasks.

基本上，我故意做N个任务和O个任务。

I fill up my day with N and O tasks.

我的一天充满了 N 和 O 任务。

Shreyas Doshi: And I keep reminding myself, "Yeah, you're just doing neutral and overhead tasks." Because then that just tricks me into thinking, "Okay, if I've been doing this placebo productivity task for the last two days, now, it's the right time for me to do this L task." So that's one tactic.

Shreyas Doshi：我不断提醒自己，“是的，你只是在做中立和开销任务。”因为这只会让我思考，“好吧，如果我过去两天一直在做这项安慰剂生产力任务，那么现在是我做这项 L 任务的正确时间了。”这就是一种策略。

The other is change of location.

另一个是换地方。

Nothing, for me, at least fights my procrastination for L tasks better than changing the place from which I'm working.

对我来说，至少没有什么比改变我的工作地点更能对抗我对任务的拖延了。

So if I normally work from this desk, the appointed day I did my couple of days of placebo productivity tasks, and on that appointed day, when I'm slated to do an L task, I will actually go out and work from somewhere else, whether it's a coffee shop or a co-working space or some other space.

因此，如果我通常在这张办公桌上工作，那么在指定的日子里，我会完成几天的安慰剂生产力任务，而在那个指定的日子里，当我计划完成一项 L 任务时，我实际上会出去在其他地方工作，无论是咖啡店、联合办公空间还是其他空间。

And I find that change of place just forces a focus and a shift in mindset that helps me bang out that L task very quickly and do it really well.

我发现，换地方只会迫使我集中注意力，改变心态，帮助我很快完成这项任务，而且做得很好。

Lenny: That are some great advice.

莱尼：这是一些很好的建议。

There's so many layers of advice in that answer.

该答案中有很多层建议。

Your point about the high leverage tasks being the task that you know you should do, but don't want to do, makes me think of a quote that I always come back to that the cave you fear contains the treasure that you seek.

你关于高杠杆任务是你知道你应该做但不想做的任务的观点，让我想起了我总是回到的一句话，你害怕的洞穴里蕴藏着你寻求的宝藏。

And I often find that to be true.

我经常发现这是真的。

And it's this reminder to just wherever the compass is pointing where it's most difficult, it's probably where the biggest opportunity lies.

这提醒我们，无论罗盘指向哪里，最困难的地方，哪里可能就是最大的机会所在。

And so, that's a really good reminder of all that.

所以，这确实是对这一切的一个很好的提醒。

Shreyas Doshi: So wise.

Shreyas Doshi：太明智了。

Yeah, pay attention to your fears because they're telling you something.

是的，注意你的恐惧，因为它们告诉你一些事情。

Lenny: Speaking of fears, our third big idea is around the three levels of product work.

莱尼：说到恐惧，我们的第三个大想法是围绕产品工作的三个层面。

Basically the three things that a PM should be focused on and how often when you're not aligned on what is most important to you and your team, it often leads to conflict.

基本上，PM 应该关注的三件事以及当你在对你和你的团队来说最重要的事情上不一致时，通常会导致冲突。

And so, I'm excited for you to unpack this idea of these three levels of product.

因此，我很高兴您能够解开这三个级别的产品的想法。

We can all share what they are impact, execution and optics.

我们都可以分享它们的影响力、执行力和视觉效果。

And when I saw this for the first time, I always come back to these three things, because it's so simple and so accurate.

当我第一次看到这个时，我总是会回到这三件事，因为它是如此简单和准确。

And so, I'm excited for you to unpack all this.

因此，我很高兴您能解开这一切。

Shreyas Doshi: This idea that there are three levels of product work, impact, execution, and optics.

Shreyas Doshi：这个想法是产品工作分为三个层次：影响力、执行力和视觉效果。

Once you understand it, it explains a lot of what you see on product teams and organizations in general.

一旦你理解了它，它就会解释你在产品团队和组织中看到的很多东西。

And so, perhaps start with an example that most product people, product leaders and founders are used to seeing, and something I've seen dozens of times in my career that there's a product review, say, where you as a PM are presenting to the CEO.

因此，也许可以从大多数产品人员、产品领导者和创始人都习惯看到的例子开始，我在职业生涯中已经见过很多次了，比如，你作为产品经理向首席执行官展示产品评论。

And as you're presenting what the plan is, obviously since this is a real world product, there's going to be some compromises that you're taking.

当您介绍计划时，显然由于这是一个现实世界的产品，因此您将采取一些妥协。

And so, the CEO perhaps asks about, "Okay, well, why is our customer service response time going to be so high in this case?" And you've thought about it, it's like you did not think about that issue, but that is a good reason why.

因此，首席执行官可能会问：“好吧，为什么在这种情况下我们的客户服务响应时间会这么长？”你已经考虑过这个问题了，就像你没有考虑过这个问题一样，但这是一个很好的理由。

You talk to the VP of customer support and they don't have the funding this quarter to support your product fully, which will then result in a poor customer service experience for this kind of new product that you're launching.

您与客户支持副总裁交谈，他们本季度没有资金来全面支持您的产品，这将导致您推出的此类新产品的客户服务体验不佳。

Shreyas Doshi: But then you've agreed.

Shreyas Doshi：但是你已经同意了。

You've used your skills of influence to agree that, okay, next quarter, they're going to allocate a lot more people to your product so that the customer service experience will get better next quarter.

您已经利用自己的影响力技能同意，好吧，下个季度，他们将为您的产品分配更多的人员，以便下个季度的客户服务体验会变得更好。

And so, the CEO asks, "Why is the customer service experience going to be poor here?

因此，首席执行官问道：“为什么这里的客户服务体验会很差？

Or they make a remark like that." And then you reply with all these good reasons.

或者他们会发表这样的言论。”然后你用所有这些充分的理由来回复。

Again, good reasons.

再说一遍，有充分的理由。

And needless to say the rest of the product review doesn't go as well.

不用说，产品评论的其余部分并不顺利。

And after the product review, you wonder what happened.

在产品审查之后，您想知道发生了什么。

Maybe you ask your manager what happened and particularly you're wondering why couldn't the CEO see a very rational argument about why you can't do this at launch.

也许你问你的经理发生了什么事，特别是你想知道为什么首席执行官不能看到一个非常合理的论据来解释为什么你不能在发布时这样做。

Lenny: Never happened to me.

莱尼：从来没有发生在我身上。

Never happened.

从来没有发生过。

Shreyas Doshi: And so, it's like, why doesn't he or she see that?

Shreyas Doshi：所以，就像，为什么他或她没有看到这一点？

And the reason is that you are thinking at different levels.

原因是你们在不同的层面上思考。

So you as a PM perhaps are fixated as you are dealing with this launch or this project, you are fixated on the execution level, which is what does it take to get something done?

所以，作为一名产品经理，当你处理这个发布或这个项目时，你可能会专注于执行级别，即完成某件事需要什么？

And how can I do it?

我该怎么做呢？

How can I hit the next milestone?

我怎样才能达到下一个里程碑？

Those are all the things we tend to think about when we are thinking at the execution level.

这些都是我们在执行层面思考时往往会考虑的事情。

The CEO on the other hand is approaching it from the impact level.

另一方面，首席执行官正在从影响层面接近它。

And particularly perhaps in this case, what is the impact to the customer experience?

尤其是在这种情况下，对客户体验的影响是什么？

And often CEOs are the ones, or founders are the ones that are thinking about, what is the impact to our brand?

通常，首席执行官或创始人正在思考，这对我们的品牌有何影响？

And so the CEO is thinking at the impact level, you're thinking at the execution level, there is that mismatch.

因此，首席执行官在影响层面思考，而你在执行层面思考，这是不匹配的。

Shreyas Doshi: We litigate the minutiae of whatever issue we are discussing, but we never really recognize that it's because we are default thinking at different levels.

Shreyas Doshi：我们对所讨论的任何问题的细节都进行诉讼，但我们从未真正认识到这是因为我们在不同层面上的默认思维。

And so, this realization helped me better understand why there were conflicts between two very smart and well intentioned people or groups within a company.

因此，这种认识帮助我更好地理解为什么公司内两个非常聪明且善意的人或团体之间会发生冲突。

I was myself guilty of this as well earlier on in my career, time and again, I noticed that we can, again, keep litigating the specific issue without understanding that, "Oh no, there's actually just a fundamental mismatch." And it's not like people are stuck at one level and can never think at a different level, it's just that we tend to default to certain levels, and that's like sometimes our preferred level.

在我职业生涯的早期，我自己也对此感到内疚，一次又一次，我注意到我们可以再次就具体问题提起诉讼，而不理解“哦不，实际上只是根本上的不匹配”。这并不是说人们被困在一个层次上，永远不能在不同的层次上思考，只是我们倾向于默认某些层次，就像有时我们喜欢的层次一样。

We can switch levels, but that requires a nudge sometimes.

我们可以切换级别，但这有时需要轻推。

And so, that observation helped explain a lot of things, including what kind of people an organization will promote?

因此，这一观察有助于解释很多事情，包括组织将提拔什么样的人？

Does it promote people who default operate at the impact level?

它是否会促进那些默认在影响水平上运作的人？

Does it promote people more who default operate at the execution level or at the optics level?

它是否会促进更多默认在执行层面或光学层面运作的人？

So, it has very wide ranging impacts on just overall how an organization functions.

因此，它对组织的整体运作方式具有非常广泛的影响。

Lenny: What's an example of optics?

莱尼：光学的例子是什么？

And when optics matters, when you might not be thinking about the importance of that?

当光学很重要时，当您可能没有考虑它的重要性时？

Just impacting that one a little bit.

只是影响了一点点。

Shreyas Doshi: Yes.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

So, optics is about creating awareness of the impact and the execution that you're doing or your team is doing.

因此，光学是为了让人们意识到你或你的团队正在做的影响和执行。

That is the most compact definition I can come up with for optics.

这是我能想到的关于光学的最紧凑的定义。

And optics is a good thing.

光学是个好东西。

So I'm not saying don't think about optics whatsoever, I think it's actually important to think about optics.

所以我并不是说不要考虑光学，我认为考虑光学实际上很重要。

And now I'm talking about just internal optics.

现在我谈论的只是内部光学。

External optics is an entirely different thing and that's like marketing PR and that's definitely highly important.

外部光学器件是完全不同的事情，就像营销公关一样，这绝对非常重要。

But even when we talk about simply we limit scope to internal optics, I'll make the observation that you should be spending some time on internal optics because it creates energy, it creates awareness, it creates excitement, it creates opportunities for feedback.

但即使当我们简单地谈论我们限制内部光学的范围时，我也会观察到你应该花一些时间在内部光学上，因为它创造能量，它创造意识，它创造兴奋，它创造反馈的机会。

Those are all really great things and they will enable greater impact and better execution for you.

这些都是非常伟大的事情，它们将为您带来更大的影响和更好的执行力。

Shreyas Doshi: The challenge with optics is that in certain organizations that balance gets thrown off, where optics sometimes becomes the goal where somehow implicitly the organization or its culture has indicated to it's people that as long as you do the optics well, you are going to be fine, you are going to be appreciated here, you're going to be rewarded here as long as you do the optics fine.

Shreyas Doshi：光学的挑战在于，在某些组织中，平衡被打破，光学有时成为目标，组织或其文化以某种方式隐含地向人们表明，只要你把光学做得好，你就会没事，你会在这里受到赞赏，只要你把光学做得很好，你就会在这里得到奖励。

Shreyas Doshi: And it's not like the organization woke up in the morning and said, 'This is the culture we want to create." It just happens again through little actions that occur every day, it happens through who you hire, who you fire, who you promote and what kinds of things do you appreciate at all hands as the CEO or the founder.

Shreyas Doshi：这并不像组织早上醒来说，‘这是我们想要创造的文化。’它只是通过每天发生的小行动再次发生，它通过你雇用谁、你解雇谁、你提拔谁以及作为首席执行官或创始人你欣赏什么样的事情而发生。

Do you appreciate a launch?

您喜欢发布吗？

Do you appreciate results?

你欣赏结果吗？

Do you appreciate, I don't know, an awesome status update that somebody sent?

我不知道，您是否欣赏某人发送的精彩状态更新？

So a status update doesn't on its own accomplish anything.

因此状态更新本身并不能完成任何事情。

I mean, they are important, but a status update is an optics activity.

我的意思是，它们很重要，但状态更新是一种光学活动。

Now, it is a necessary optics activity, but if you start appreciating the necessary optics activities, constantly, the signal you are sending to people is, 'Oh, you got to focus on this optics activity." So then, that becomes the goal and that can be really harmful.

现在，这是一种必要的光学活动，但如果你开始欣赏必要的光学活动，不断地，你向人们发送的信号是，‘哦，你必须专注于这种光学活动。”那么，这就成为了目标，而这可能是非常有害的。

Lenny: So there's these three levels of product work.

莱尼：产品工作分为这三个级别。

Do you have advice for, should I just default to one of these normally based on just as a PM, I should always be thinking about impact or is it more, just make sure you're aligned with your leader with your team?

您有什么建议吗？我应该默认为其中之一，通常只是作为产品经理，我应该始终考虑影响，还是更多，只是确保您与领导者和团队保持一致？

Is that the more important takeaway?

这是更重要的收获吗？

Shreyas Doshi: Yes.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

I think that's the more important takeaway is again, it's about now we have a vocabulary that we can talk about in an objective manner without pointing fingers.

我认为这又是更重要的一点，现在我们有了一个可以客观地谈论而不需要指责的词汇。

It's like, 'Oh, you tend to be fixated on all these execution details and that's not the right thing." That's the type of feedback sometimes that gets shared.

就像，‘哦，你倾向于关注所有这些执行细节，但这不是正确的事情。’这就是有时会分享的反馈类型。

So now you have vocabulary to talk about this and once you have that, you can, as a team, decide what is most important given your context.

所以现在你有了谈论这个的词汇，一旦你有了这个，你就可以作为一个团队，根据你的背景决定什么是最重要的。

I'll give you an example.

我给你举个例子。

For early stage teams, of course, they need to be thinking about the eventual impact, but what they should actually, I think, most early stage teams should actually optimize for execution.

当然，对于早期团队来说，他们需要考虑最终的影响，但我认为，他们实际上应该考虑的是，大多数早期团队实际上应该针对执行进行优化。

Assuming that they have come up with a reasonable hypothesis about what's going to win, their main emphasis needs to be on execution because you will not see impact readily on a one week horizon or a one month horizon or perhaps even on a quarterly horizon.

假设他们已经提出了关于什么会获胜的合理假设，那么他们的主要重点需要放在执行上，因为你不会轻易看到一周或一个月甚至每个季度的影响。

Shreyas Doshi: So that's an example of a situation where let's be explicit, we need to get great at execution.

Shreyas Doshi：这是一个例子，明确地说，我们需要出色的执行力。

We have a set of core insights that were informed by our desire to make an impact.

我们有一套核心见解，这些见解源于我们想要产生影响的愿望。

But now that we are responsible for converting these insights into a product, let's be largely operating at the execution level, as an example.

但现在我们负责将这些见解转化为产品，举个例子，我们主要在执行级别进行操作。

Say there is a platform team and that platform team has had some issues lately with availability that has disrupted some other teams within the company and their products.

假设有一个平台团队，该平台团队最近在可用性方面遇到了一些问题，这已经扰乱了公司内的其他一些团队及其产品。

Perhaps that platform team should have a conversation that, 'You know what, yes, we need to focus on impact obviously to avoid this negative impact, but also let's pay some more attention to optics because we haven't been communicating with teams as much teams that rely on us.

也许该平台团队应该进行一次对话，‘你知道吗，是的，我们显然需要关注影响，以避免这种负面影响，但也让我们更多地关注光学，因为我们没有像依赖我们的团队那样与团队沟通。

So let's create a better communication channel with them.

因此，让我们与他们建立更好的沟通渠道。

Let's create better status updates for them," and whatnot.

让我们为他们创建更好的状态更新，”等等。

So again, the point is not so much like, "Oh, this is the right level and all other levels are wrong," it's about being sensitive to what's right in this situation.

再说一遍，重点并不是“哦，这是正确的级别，所有其他级别都是错误的”，而是要对这种情况下正确的事情保持敏感。

Lenny: So you talked about execution and how maybe for early stage startups that might be default the most important type of work to be focused on.

莱尼：所以你谈到了执行力，以及对于早期初创公司来说，这可能是默认的最重要的工作类型。

And that's actually a really good lead way to our fourth big idea, which is a provocative tweet that you put out a while ago that you said, "The most execution problems are actually strategy problems or culture problems." And so, I'm excited to hear a little bit more about how you discovered that and what that means and maybe how to address those problems.

这实际上是我们第四个伟大想法的一个非常好的引导方式，这是您不久前发布的一条具有挑衅性的推文，您说：“大多数执行问题实际上是战略问题或文化问题。”因此，我很高兴听到更多关于您如何发现这一点、这意味着什么以及如何解决这些问题的信息。

Shreyas Doshi: And so, I realized this somewhat late in my career as a leader, most execution problems that I encounter in a high performing environment where everybody has the right intentions are actually not execution problems, they are either strategy problems or interpersonal problems or cultural problems.

Shreyas Doshi：所以，我在作为领导者的职业生涯后期才意识到这一点，在每个人都有正确意图的高绩效环境中遇到的大多数执行问题实际上不是执行问题，它们要么是战略问题，要么是人际关系问题，要么是文化问题。

And so, just to illustrate it, I'll make the observation that many leaders are extremely busy in such environments, whether it's a fast growth startup or a fast growth larger company, they're extremely busy, they're usually overwhelmed.

因此，为了说明这一点，我将观察到许多领导者在这种环境中非常忙碌，无论是快速增长的初创公司还是快速增长的大型公司，他们都非常忙碌，他们通常不知所措。

Like I said earlier, I was one of those people.

正如我之前所说，我就是其中之一。

Take a deeper look at what they're engaged in.

更深入地了解他们从事的工作。

And I got a chance to look at it with my peers that I was mentoring or coaching or people on my team, PMs or PM leaders were extremely busy and usually overwhelmed.

我有机会与我指导或指导的同事或我的团队成员、PM 或 PM 领导者一起观察，他们非常忙碌，通常不知所措。

Shreyas Doshi: I noticed two things, that what made them busy is two things.

Shreyas Doshi：我注意到两件事，让他们忙碌的是两件事。

One is that somehow the organization had imposed very high optics requirements.

一是该组织以某种方式提出了非常高的光学要求。

So they had to do a lot of optics related work, show up at certain status meetings and blah, blah, blah.

所以他们必须做很多与光学相关的工作，出现在某些状态会议上等等。

So we talked about that.

所以我们讨论了这一点。

So let's leave that aside.

所以我们先把这个放在一边。

But the other reason they're so overwhelmed is that they're constantly solving execution problems.

但他们如此不知所措的另一个原因是他们不断解决执行问题。

So they solve the most important ones, the new ones come up and they solve those.

所以他们解决了最重要的问题，新的问题出现了，他们就解决了这些问题。

And then there are two new ones to solve and on and on, it's a classic guacamole.

然后还有两个新问题需要解决，等等，这是一个经典的鳄梨酱。

And as I noticed that, and I'll share a concrete example of where this might happen, where an execution, a seemingly execution problem surfaces, so say two teams are misaligned.

正如我注意到的那样，我将分享一个具体的例子来说明这种情况可能发生的地方，在执行中，表面上出现执行问题，所以说两个团队不一致。

They need to work together where they're misaligned.

他们需要在不一致的地方共同努力。

Everybody knows it.

每个人都知道。

And that is affecting our execution.

这正在影响我们的执行力。

That misalignment is affecting our execution.

这种不一致正在影响我们的执行力。

It's affecting our ability to hit our OKRs, it's affecting their ability to hit their OKRs.

它影响我们实现 OKR 的能力，也影响他们实现 OKR 的能力。

Shreyas Doshi: So as a leader or say, you are a director of product or VP of product responsible for one of these teams, you now charge with fixing this execution problem so we can move faster.

Shreyas Doshi：作为一名领导者，或者说，您是负责其中一个团队的产品总监或产品副总裁，您现在负责解决这个执行问题，以便我们可以更快地采取行动。

So you do a dozen meetings to figure out what's going on, you try to diagnose the issue, how to better align.

因此，您召开了十几次会议来弄清楚发生了什么，尝试诊断问题，以及如何更好地协调一致。

And then you talk to your peers on the other side, and then you decide, "Okay, here's what we're going to do to solve this execution problem.

然后你与另一边的同事交谈，然后你决定：“好吧，这就是我们要解决这个执行问题的方法。

We are going to create a new review process." And so, we are going to create this process and we are going to review priorities on a regular basis across these two teams.

我们将创建一个新的审查流程。”因此，我们将创建这个流程，并定期审查这两个团队的优先事项。

And then we are going to also as the managers of these individual teams to do regular one-on-ones so they can stay in sync.

然后，我们还将作为这些单独团队的经理定期进行一对一的交流，以便他们能够保持同步。

So this type of scenario is extremely common, again, especially in high growth organizations that want to accomplish a lot.

因此，这种情况非常常见，特别是在想要完成很多任务的高增长组织中。

Shreyas Doshi: You'll come up with this solution after many meetings and a lot of work, a lot of conversation.

Shreyas Doshi：经过多次会议、大量工作、大量对话后，你会想出这个解决方案。

And so, as I grew as a leader, I got increasingly curious about this type of situation.

因此，随着我作为领导者的成长，我对这种情况越来越好奇。

And when I looked at it more closely, I started realizing that what looked like an execution problem, this misalignment and this causing execution issues wasn't usually an execution problem.

当我更仔细地观察它时，我开始意识到，看起来像执行问题的东西、这种不一致以及导致执行问题的通常并不是执行问题。

Instead, it was a strategy problem in some cases, because the reason we are misaligned is because we are pursuing different strategies or that is more often the cases, the reason we are misaligned is because we don't know what the strategy is.

相反，在某些情况下，这是一个策略问题，因为我们不一致的原因是因为我们追求不同的策略，或者更常见的情况是，我们不一致的原因是因为我们不知道策略是什么。

So, we don't know what the strategy is.

所以，我们不知道策略是什么。

We craft some OKRs based on what makes sense.

我们根据合理的内容制定一些 OKR。

The OKRs are not very well aligned.

OKR 不一致。

We don't have a sense of priorities, and we also don't have a sense of what we do when reality changes.

我们没有轻重缓急的意识，也没有意识到当现实发生变化时我们该做什么。

Shreyas Doshi: This is all stuff that a clear correct strategy should help inform.

Shreyas Doshi：清晰正确的策略应该有助于传达这些信息。

But actually this lack of strategy is what's causing this misalignment, it's not because they're not meeting regularly.

但实际上，缺乏策略才是造成这种不一致的原因，而不是因为他们没有定期开会。

And what happens in these meetings is, again, you're arguing the minutiae of like, "Well, are you going to work on this feature?

在这些会议中发生的事情是，你再次争论诸如“好吧，你打算开发这个功能吗？

I depend on this.

我就靠这个。

Or can you swap two engineers from this team?" All of this stuff that PMs are very familiar with.

或者你能从这个团队中调换两名工程师吗？”所有这些内容都是产品经理非常熟悉的。

You're talking about all the small stuff, but nobody recognizes that like, "Can we fix that?" So, as I started seeing this often was a strategy problem, sometimes it was not a strategy problem, it was a culture problem.

你谈论的是所有小事情，但没有人意识到这一点，比如“我们能解决这个问题吗？”因此，当我开始看到这通常是一个战略问题时，有时这不是一个战略问题，而是一个文化问题。

So, what is a culture problem in this situation where two teams are misaligned?

那么，在两个团队不一致的情况下，什么是文化问题呢？

Shreyas Doshi: It's basically that you have a problem where you have set a culture that you are supposed to mainly optimize for your OKRs.

Shreyas Doshi：基本上，你遇到的问题是你设置了一种主要针对 OKR 进行优化的文化。

In a culture like that, it becomes really hard to allow two teams to work better together because if one of the teams doesn't hit their OKRs, because they were helping rightly for the sake of the company, they were helping this other team that team's manager is going to get his or her wrist lap at the next performance review.

在这样的文化中，让两个团队更好地合作变得非常困难，因为如果其中一个团队没有达到他们的 OKR，因为他们正在为公司提供正确的帮助，那么他们正在帮助另一个团队，而团队经理将在下一次绩效评估中受到惩罚。

Shreyas Doshi: So, that is a culture problem.

Shreyas Doshi：所以，这是一个文化问题。

Now, you can set up the meeting and you can request all the syncs you want between these people, it's not going to solve the culture problem, the execution problem is going to manifest in different ways a month down the road.

现在，您可以设置会议，并且可以请求这些人之间进行所有您想要的同步，这不会解决文化问题，执行问题将在一个月后以不同的方式显现出来。

So that's like an example of a culture problem or it could be an interpersonal problem, and this is actually quite common.

这就像文化问题的一个例子，也可能是人际问题，这实际上很常见。

It's simply that these two people cannot get along.

根本就是这两个人合不来。

The two team managers do not get along and they just constantly might be creating friction.

两位团队经理相处不好，他们可能会不断制造摩擦。

And so, as a leader, it is important for you to spot that and then coach them through their differences, coach one or both of them through that so that they can better work together.

因此，作为一名领导者，重要的是你要发现这一点，然后指导他们克服差异，指导他们中的一个或两个人克服这些差异，以便他们能够更好地合作。

When you solve that, you won't need that monthly review meeting and all these things and 50 other things, because they're not going to work anyway.

当你解决这个问题时，你就不需要每月的审查会议和所有这些事情以及其他 50 件事，因为它们无论如何都不会起作用。

So that's just one concrete example of team misalignment, which is often viewed as an execution problem, but is not an execution problem.

这只是团队失调的一个具体例子，这通常被视为执行问题，但实际上并不是执行问题。

Lenny: Are there signs that tell you where dates are slipping, people are surprised?

莱尼：是否有迹象表明日期正在推迟，人们感到惊讶？

Of execution problems that you have, are there signs that maybe it's one of these other factors?

在您遇到的执行问题中，是否有迹象表明这可能是其他因素之一？

Or is your experience like it's almost always one of these other things?

或者你的经历几乎总是这些其他事情之一？

Shreyas Doshi: So there are some problems that are truly execution problems.

Shreyas Doshi：所以有些问题确实是执行问题。

So, an example of that is say you have infrastructure issues, your infrastructure is just old and it can no longer sustain all the usage that you're getting, that will cause execution problems where you'll move slower or you will have outages or high latencies or whatever the case is.

因此，举个例子，您有基础设施问题，您的基础设施已经过时，无法再维持您所获得的所有使用量，这将导致执行问题，导致您的移动速度变慢，或者出现中断或高延迟或任何情况。

That's an execution problem.

这就是一个执行问题。

Another such example of what is really an execution problem is you have a skills' gap.

另一个真正执行问题的例子是你存在技能差距。

You have say engineers who are not particularly skilled in a certain technology or a certain type of scale that happen to be working in that area, well that is going to create execution issues or you have a PM who is more of a zero to one person, but now you made them responsible for this scale mature initiative, so that's a skill gap and that can cause execution problems.

你可能会说，工程师在某项技术或某类规模上并不是特别熟练，但恰好在该领域工作，这会产生执行问题，或者你有一个从零到一个人的 PM，但现在你让他们负责这个规模成熟的计划，所以这是一个技能差距，可能会导致执行问题。

Shreyas Doshi: So, there are very concrete instances where there is a real execution problem.

Shreyas Doshi：因此，在非常具体的实例中存在真正的执行问题。

It's just that in high performing organizations that are growing really fast, we ignore the other factors that might be at play.

只是在增长非常快的高绩效组织中，我们忽略了可能起作用的其他因素。

And so, now what tells me if something is seemingly an execution problem but not actually an execution problem, a sure far way of identifying those is when you put on a bandaid and the bandaid falls.

所以，现在告诉我，如果某件事看起来是一个执行问题，但实际上不是一个执行问题，识别这些问题的一个确定的方法是当你戴上创可贴并且创可贴掉落时。

So, many organizations that are constantly just solving the same problem over and over again like, "Oh, we can never get along.

因此，许多组织不断地一遍又一遍地解决同一个问题，就像，“哦，我们永远无法相处。

We can never get these two teams to work together.

我们永远无法让这两个团队一起工作。

Shreyas Doshi: This team is always slow." And so you put the bandaid, but the bandaid doesn't work.

Shreyas Doshi：这支球队总是很慢。”所以你贴了创可贴，但创可贴不起作用。

So an organizational memories tend to be surprisingly short.

因此，组织的记忆往往非常短。

So we forget three months ago we put this bandaid and it's no longer working, we just approach it as, "Oh, let's create a new solution." So voila, there's a new meeting.

所以我们忘记了三个月前我们贴了这个创可贴，它不再起作用了，我们只是这样对待它，“哦，让我们创建一个新的解决方案。”瞧，有一个新的会议。

And so that's where that honesty is important.

所以这就是诚实的重要性。

And memory is important, that no, no, no, this is a bandaid we put, but the problem still exists.

而且记忆很重要，不不不，这是我们贴的创可贴，但问题仍然存在。

So it's probably not an execution issue.

所以这可能不是执行问题。

I

我

Lenny: Love that visual of a bandaid falling off.

莱尼：喜欢创可贴脱落的视觉效果。

Okay.

好的。

So, this it's segue to our fifth and final big idea, maybe the most mind bending of all your ideas that I want to talk about.

所以，这就是我们的第五个也是最后一个大想法，也许是我想谈论的所有想法中最令人费解的一个。

And it's about prioritization and you make this really interesting point that instead of thinking about the highest ROI work you should be doing, which is how I've always thought about it, how I think most PMs think about prioritization.

这是关于优先级的，你提出了一个非常有趣的观点，而不是考虑你应该做的最高投资回报率的工作，这就是我一直以来的想法，我认为大多数 PM 都是如何考虑优先级的。

Your point is you should think about it from a minimizing opportunity cost perspective versus an ROI perspective.

您的观点是，您应该从最小化机会成本的角度而不是投资回报率的角度来考虑它。

And so, I'm excited to hear your take on this and where this idea came from.

因此，我很高兴听到您对此的看法以及这个想法的来源。

Shreyas Doshi: Yeah.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

I think I learned this by just observing Patrick at Stripe, particularly over the last couple of years that I was there.

我想我是通过观察 Stripe 的 Patrick 了解到这一点的，尤其是我在那里的过去几年。

And then I encapsulated what I learned and observed in this tweet, which is when you are in a high leverage role, you should stop doing work that simply provides a positive return on investment, ROI.

然后我总结了我在这条推文中学到和观察到的内容，那就是当你处于高杠杆角色时，你应该停止做那些仅仅提供正投资回报率（ROI）的工作。

And you should start focusing on work that minimizes opportunity cost and what drives that is the observation that in a high leverage role, so product management is good example of a high leverage role, founders by definition are in a high leverage role, engineering leaders, design leaders, designers, these are all fairly high leverage roles.

你应该开始关注最小化机会成本的工作，以及驱动这一点的观察，即在高杠杆角色中，因此产品管理是高杠杆角色的一个很好的例子，根据定义，创始人处于高杠杆角色，工程领导者，设计领导者，设计师，这些都是相当高杠杆角色。

And in a high leverage role, there will be hundreds of things that you can do that will provide a positive ROI.

在高杠杆作用中，您可以做数百件事来提供积极的投资回报率。

And what is positive ROI?

什么是正投资回报率？

It's simply that the value created is greater than the value of your time that essentially will ensure positive ROI more than zero.

简单地说，所创造的价值大于您的时间价值，这基本上将确保正投资回报率大于零。

Shreyas Doshi: So, the problem is you should not be doing most of these things.

Shreyas Doshi：所以，问题是你不应该做其中大部分事情。

And the reason this ROI mindset is suboptimal and perhaps even harmful in high leverage roles, the formula for ROIs value created minus cost of your time divided by the cost of your time.

这种投资回报率思维方式在高杠杆角色中不是最理想的，甚至可能是有害的，原因是投资回报率的公式是创造的价值减去你的时间成本除以你的时间成本。

So, the cost of your time is in the denominator.

因此，您的时间成本是分母。

And just for the sake of simplicity, let's just call it time taken.

为了简单起见，我们将其称为所花费的时间。

So when the time taken to do something is in the denominator and whether it's at an individual level or at a team level, what we end up doing to get high ROI on our work is we end up trying to decrease the denominator.

因此，当做某事所花费的时间是分母时，无论是在个人层面还是在团队层面，为了获得高工作投资回报率，我们最终要做的就是努力减少分母。

So when it's a ratio and you decrease the denominator, the value of the ratio grows.

因此，当它是一个比率时，您减少分母，比率的值就会增加。

And so, how do you decrease the denominator in this case where time is the denominator is you start working on things that take less time.

那么，在这种情况下，时间是分母，你如何减少分母，你开始做需要更少时间的事情。

Shreyas Doshi: So you start working on the low hanging fruit.

Shreyas Doshi：所以你开始研究容易实现的目标。

You start prioritizing the quick wins.

你开始优先考虑快速获胜。

And the quick wins are very popular.

快速获胜很受欢迎。

Any team meeting or sprint meeting, "Oh, that's a quick win.

任何团队会议或冲刺会议，“哦，这是一个快速的胜利。

Yeah, let's do it." And I don't have anything against quick wins.

是的，我们就这么做吧。”我并不反对快速获胜。

The problem is we just fill up our plate with quick wins.

问题是我们只是用快速的胜利来填满我们的盘子。

And while that may be fine, in most cases, in most situations in high leverage roles, you miss the upside and you miss the opportunity that you could have gained by focusing on other things.

虽然这可能没问题，但在大多数情况下，在大多数情况下，担任高杠杆角色时，你会错过好处，错过通过专注于其他事情而可以获得的机会。

Let's take opportunity costs now like, how do you calculate opportunity costs?

现在让我们以机会成本为例，如何计算机会成本？

Opportunity cost is simply the value of the optimal option minus the value of the chosen option.

机会成本就是最优选项的价值减去所选选项的价值。

So the difference between what could have been the optimal option to pick and the option you did pick is the opportunity cost.

因此，本来可以选择的最佳选项与您实际选择的选项之间的区别就是机会成本。

So you need to minimize the opportunity cost, meaning you need to be working on the optimal things.

因此，您需要最大限度地减少机会成本，这意味着您需要致力于最佳的事情。

Shreyas Doshi: So when we reprogram ourselves to think in terms of opportunity cost, we are no longer thinking, "Oh, is this a good use of my time?" Instead, you are thinking, "Is this the best use of my time?" And it's a subtle but profound shift in our thinking.

Shreyas Doshi：因此，当我们重新规划自己以考虑机会成本时，我们不再思考“哦，这是对我时间的充分利用吗？”相反，你会想：“这是我时间​​的最佳利用方式吗？”这是我们思维的微妙但深刻的转变。

Because when we think about opportunity cost, we will pick certain things that we would've never picked if we just had it the ROI mindset.

因为当我们考虑机会成本时，我们会选择某些如果我们只考虑投资回报率思维方式就永远不会选择的东西。

And again, this applies equally at the level of individuals of the work we decide to do as individuals on a day-to-day basis and the work we do with our teams, the things we prioritize.

再说一次，这同样适用于我们决定作为个人日常工作的个人层面，以及我们与团队一起做的工作，我们优先考虑的事情。

So that's the basis of this statement that you should try to minimize opportunity costs and focus on those things rather than simply chasing positive ROI.

因此，这就是该声明的基础，即您应该尽量减少机会成本并专注于这些事情，而不是简单地追求积极的投资回报率。

Lenny: Is there an example that comes to mind when you did this or maybe did it the wrong way that helped inspire this idea?

莱尼：当你这样做时，有没有想到一个例子，或者可能是做错了方法，从而激发了这个想法？

Or is this just more of a broad lesson that you've learned over time?

或者这只是您随着时间的推移学到的更广泛的教训？

Shreyas Doshi: Oh, I mean, I saw that all the time, the work I did at pretty much every company.

Shreyas Doshi：哦，我的意思是，我一直都看到这一点，我在几乎每家公司所做的工作都是如此。

And again, I've been guilty of this myself where I think typically the type of situation where I have seen this as an example is you are trying to prioritize the next quarter.

再说一次，我自己也对此感到内疚，我认为典型的情况就是我所看到的例子是你试图优先考虑下个季度的情况。

There are five sure things you can do that will have small to medium impact, and it's very clear.

您可以做五件肯定会产生中小影响的事情，而且这一点非常明确。

And then there are two ambiguous things that perhaps deep down you know you should pursue them, but you don't end up picking them because it's, again, you're satisfying yourself by observing, "Oh, each of these is positive ROI.

然后有两件模棱两可的事情，也许你内心深处知道你应该追求它们，但你最终并没有选择它们，因为你再次通过观察来满足自己，“哦，这些都是积极的投资回报率。

Each of these five things that we can do that are very well defined as positive ROI." And so you don't touch those two things.

我们可以做的这五件事中的每一件事都被明确定义为积极的投资回报率。”所以你不要碰这两件事。

Now, it could be that one of those things could meaningfully change the trajectory of your business, but doing that requires more work to figure that out, to flesh it out.

现在，其中一件事可能会有意义地改变您的业务轨迹，但要做到这一点需要更多的工作来弄清楚并充实它。

Shreyas Doshi: But we convince ourselves that positive ROI is great.

Shreyas Doshi：但我们说服自己，积极的投资回报率是巨大的。

And so we make ourselves busy and this is what I have seen myself do, I've seen other teams do.

所以我们让自己忙碌起来，这就是我所看到的自己所做的事情，我也看到其他团队所做的事情。

And certainly when I sit down with PMs often or even founders, I find that there is this gravitation towards these types of tasks, which are simply providing positive ROI.

当然，当我经常与产品经理甚至创始人坐在一起时，我发现这些类型的任务有这种吸引力，它们只是提供了积极的投资回报率。

So it shows up most often in our planning, essentially.

所以它本质上最常出现在我们的计划中。

And again, I'm not against things that are quick wins or things that provide positive ROI, but I always want to check what are some big opportunities that we are not paying attention to by default and under what scenarios can we start chasing that.

再说一遍，我并不反对快速获胜或提供积极投资回报率的事情，但我总是想检查哪些是我们默认没有关注的重大机会，以及在什么情况下我们可以开始追逐这些机会。

Shreyas Doshi: So when I started working on Stripe Connect, which is a major, major product for Stripe and a large business for Stripe, there was a time when I noticed when I just started working on it, I noticed the team was working on a lot of positive ROI things.

Shreyas Doshi：所以当我开始开发 Stripe Connect 时，这是 Stripe 的一个主要产品，也是 Stripe 的一项大型业务，有一段时间我注意到，当我刚开始开发它时，我注意到团队正在做很多积极的投资回报率的事情。

And I came in and it just simply instigated that like, "Hey, how about we work on this big scary project?

我进来后，它只是简单地煽动了这样的想法，“嘿，我们来做这个可怕的大项目怎么样？

Because I was hearing from customers that there is some need and that the instinct that this need is going to grow over time of being able to manage marketplace payments in a more flexible way." And we wouldn't have looked at it if we were just focused on positive ROI, but as we started looking at it, we realized, "Oh yes, this is a huge opportunity." And we were able to then pursue it because we were of shifting the mindset from just positive ROI to minimizing opportunity cost.

因为我从客户那里听说，存在一些需求，并且本能地认为，随着时间的推移，这种需求将会增长，能够以更灵活的方式管理市场支付。”如果我们只关注积极的投资回报率，我们就不会考虑它，但当我们开始考虑它时，我们意识到，“哦，是的，这是一个巨大的机会。”然后我们能够追求它，因为我们将心态从仅仅积极的投资回报率转变为最小化机会成本。

Lenny: One more question along this line, just tactically, every PM ends up with a spreadsheet of their ideas and ROI and cost and benefit and all that stuff.

Lenny：还有一个问题，从战术上来说，每个产品经理最终都会得到一份包含他们的想法、投资回报率、成本和收益以及所有这些内容的电子表格。

Do you recommend folks create a column for opportunity cost or is this more of a broad thought process you go through when you're looking through your list of ideas?

您是否建议人们创建一个机会成本专栏，或者这更像是您在查看想法列表时经历的广泛思考过程？

Shreyas Doshi: Yeah, it's more the latter.

Shreyas Doshi：是的，更多的是后者。

I do not recommend trying to quantify opportunity costs because it's a lost cost.

我不建议尝试量化机会成本，因为这是损失成本。

Instead, what teams need is just sometimes the freedom and sometimes just permission to explore and attack these things that minimize opportunity costs.

相反，团队有时需要的是自由，有时只是探索和攻击这些事物的许可，以最大限度地减少机会成本。

And so, as leaders, that's the best thing we can do is to give the teams that freedom or the permission to pursue these things and the way it manifests.

因此，作为领导者，我们能做的最好的事情就是给予团队追求这些事情及其表现方式的自由或许可。

And the way I've tried to do it is when we are planning, I often give guidance to the team around what percentage of our time we want to spend on what type of activity.

我尝试这样做的方式是，当我们进行计划时，我经常向团队提供指导，告诉我们我们希望将多少时间花在什么类型的活动上。

And I learned this from Google's classic 70-20-10%, where during its fast growth years, Google had the 70% search and ads, 20% apps, which was things like Gmail and whatnot, and 10% on other big bets.

我从谷歌经典的 70-20-10% 中学到了这一点，在其快速增长的几年里，谷歌拥有 70% 的搜索和广告，20% 的应用程序，比如 Gmail 之类的东西，还有 10% 的其他大赌注。

Shreyas Doshi: So, I have found that approach very useful during planning.

Shreyas Doshi：所以，我发现这种方法在规划过程中非常有用。

Again, depends on the context, but when the team is starting to plan the next quarter or the next half or the next year, my role as a leader is hopefully I've already clarified the strategy so they have that as an input.

同样，这取决于具体情况，但是当团队开始计划下一个季度、下半年或明年时，我作为领导者的角色希望我已经澄清了策略，以便他们将其作为输入。

But the other thing that I see in my role as a leader is to clarify the rough allocation.

但我作为领导者看到的另一件事是澄清粗略的分配。

So what I'll share as a guidance with the team is given our situation and given our strategy and given what's going on in the market, I would like us to target about 60% of our time on incrementals.

因此，我将与团队分享的内容作为指导，考虑到我们的情况、我们的战略以及市场上正在发生的事情，我希望我们将大约 60% 的时间用于增量。

And by that, I mean incremental features that improve users' lives on a day-to-day basis.

我指的是能够改善用户日常生活的增量功能。

So these are actually high ROI things that we do, and again, these numbers are whatever they are, pick whatever is right for you, but 60% I want to go towards incrementals.

因此，这些实际上是我们所做的高投资回报率的事情，而且，这些数字无论是什么，选择适合你的任何数字，但 60% 我想要增量。

30% I want to allocate towards big new initiatives.

我想将 30% 分配给重大的新举措。

Shreyas Doshi: And because it's 30%, it can't be five big new initiatives, it's probably one or two.

Shreyas Doshi：因为它是 30%，所以不可能是五个重大的新举措，可能是一两个。

And then 10% I'd like us to allocate towards stability and infrastructure.

然后我希望我们将 10% 分配给稳定性和基础设施。

So this is the guidance I'll share with the team.

这就是我将与团队分享的指导。

And then I will ask the teams to create their plans and proposals based on this guidance.

然后我将要求团队根据此指导制定他们的计划和建议。

So, this gives people the space to say, "Okay, we do have this 30%, so there's no sense putting in more high ROI tasks in there or quick wins in there." And I think just the simple guidance enables the team to just do the right thing.

因此，这让人们有空间说：“好吧，我们确实有这 30%，所以没有必要在那里投入更多高投资回报率任务或快速获胜。”我认为简单的指导就能让团队做正确的事情。

And I often get surprised with all the awesome stuff they come back with.

我经常对他们带回来的所有很棒的东西感到惊讶。

Lenny: I really like that rule of thumb, what an excellent nugget to include along with this big idea.

莱尼：我真的很喜欢这条经验法则，与这个伟大的想法一起包含着多么出色的金块。

I'm realizing we're going for an hour and a half now, and I don't want to suck up all your time.

我意识到我们现在要花一个半小时，我不想占用你所有的时间。

So there's this idea that I think it might be a really good one to end on.

所以我认为这个想法可能是一个很好的结局。

It'll be a bonus sixth big idea around high agency and the importance of PMs being high agency.

这将是关于高代理性和 PM 具有高代理性的重要性的第六个重要想法。

And the reason that it stuck out to me is this, I found to be really important in my career.

我之所以对它印象深刻，是因为我发现它对我的职业生涯非常重要。

And I think led a lot of the success that I saw along the way is just always feeling like I have agency and feeling ownership of what I was doing and where I was going.

我认为我一路走来所看到的很多成功都是因为我总是感觉自己有代理权，并对自己正在做的事情和要去的地方感到拥有所有权。

And so, I'm curious to hear your take on this and to dive into this trade of high agency and how important that is for PMs.

因此，我很想听听您对此的看法，并深入探讨这一高级代理行业以及这对产品经理来说有多重要。

Shreyas Doshi: I think Eric Weinstein coined this term high agency, which once I discovered it resonated a lot and aligned with some of my ideas and the way I had defined this concept in my head for many years, that high agency is about finding a way to get what you want without waiting for conditions to be perfect or otherwise blaming the circumstances.

Shreyas Doshi：我认为埃里克·温斯坦（Eric Weinstein）创造了“高能动性”这个术语，当我发现它引起了很大共鸣并与我的一些想法以及多年来我在脑海中定义这个概念的方式相一致时，“高能动性”就是找到一种方法来获得你想要的东西，而不是等待条件完美或以其他方式归咎于环境。

And so, we've all seen such people, they just either push through in the face of adverse conditions or often they manage to reverse the adverse conditions to achieve their goals.

所以，我们都见过这样的人，他们要么在逆境中坚持到底，要么常常设法扭转逆境来实现自己的目标。

And so, while this is an important trait for many areas in endeavors, I think this is particularly important for product managers because as product managers, we are constantly fighting adverse conditions, not enough resources, challenges with legacy infrastructure, staffing issues, customer problems, and on and on.

因此，虽然这是许多领域的一个重要特征，但我认为这对于产品经理来说尤其重要，因为作为产品经理，我们不断地与不利条件、资源不足、遗留基础设施的挑战、人员配置问题、客户问题等等作斗争。

There's no dirt of problems to solve as a product manager.

作为产品经理，没有什么问题需要解决。

Shreyas Doshi: And I noticed consistently over the years that as I started thinking about what differentiates the PMs who've had just a large impact and even more important than just impact to the company or to the team, PMs who've surprised me in a positive way, PMs who've really exceeded expectations, exceeded perhaps their own capabilities on paper.

Shreyas Doshi：多年来我一直注意到，当我开始思考那些对公司或团队产生了巨大影响甚至比影响更重要的 PM 的区别时，那些以积极的方式让我惊讶的 PM，那些真正超出预期的 PM，也许超出了他们自己纸面上的能力。

You see somebody's credentials on paper and then you see their work and their impact.

您可以在纸上看到某人的资历，然后您可以看到他们的工作和影响。

And there's a big difference between what you might assume on paper and the impact they're achieving.

您在纸面上的假设与他们所实现的影响之间存在很大差异。

And also, the reverse of that, which is sometimes you have PMs who just have tremendous potential.

而且，相反的是，有时你的产品经理具有巨大的潜力。

They look great on paper and you know when you're working with them or you're managing them that they're not achieving that potential, they're nowhere close to achieving that potential.

他们在纸面上看起来很棒，你知道当你与他们合作或管理他们时，他们没有实现这种潜力，他们距离实现这种潜力还差得很远。

And as I look at both of those situations, it became clear to me that high agency was a big contributor, which is the PMs in this first category were despite all the disadvantages and other things, they just took strong ownership.

当我审视这两种情况时，我清楚地意识到，高级代理机构是一个很大的贡献者，即第一类产品经理尽管有所有缺点和其他因素，但他们只是拥有强大的所有权。

Shreyas Doshi: So ownership is one component.

Shreyas Doshi：所以所有权是其中一个组成部分。

Ownership mindset is one component of high agency.

主人翁心态是高级代理的组成部分之一。

They took strong ownership and then they creatively executed through the challenges.

他们拥有强烈的主人翁精神，然后创造性地应对挑战。

So a creative execution is another aspect of high agency and they did that with a high degree of resilience, which is a third aspect of high agency.

因此，创造性执行是高代理的另一个方面，他们以高度的弹性来做到这一点，这是高代理的第三个方面。

And so, as I realized that it became very clear as to why this was happening.

因此，当我意识到为什么会发生这种情况时，情况就变得非常清楚了。

And then it's one of those things that once you see it, you start seeing it in people much more clearly.

一旦你看到它，你就会开始在人们身上更清楚地看到它。

And so, that's when I wrote about the PM version of high agency, I think that's why it resonated with a lot of people because, again, it gave vocabulary to people for what they already understood and they had seen it, but did not have the words for.

所以，当我写到 PM 版本的高代理时，我认为这就是为什么它引起了很多人的共鸣，因为它再次为人们提供了词汇，表达他们已经理解和看到的东西，但没有词语表达。

Lenny: I think that's a really good way to wrap this up, just leaving people at that point of just the empowerment, basically taking responsibility, feeling high agency resiliency.

莱尼：我认为这是一个非常好的总结方式，让人们处于授权状态，基本上承担责任，感受到高度的机构弹性。

Shreyas, this has been incredibly illuminating.

Shreyas，这非常有启发性。

I suspect this is going to be helpful to a lot of product managers and even non-product managers.

我怀疑这会对很多产品经理甚至非产品经理有所帮助。

And so, just two last questions, where can folks find you online if they want to reach out or learn more and then how can listeners be useful to you?

所以，最后两个问题是，如果人们想联系或了解更多信息，可以在哪里找到您，然后听众如何对您有用？

Shreyas Doshi: Yeah.

施里亚斯·多西：是的。

So follow me on Twitter and just @shreyas.

所以请在 Twitter 上关注我并@shreyas。

If you don't have a Twitter account, follow me on LinkedIn, you can just find me there Shreyas Doshi.

如果您没有 Twitter 帐户，请在 LinkedIn 上关注我，您可以在那里找到我 Shreyas Doshi。

If you really enjoy the tweets and want to see more, then you can super follow me on Twitter.

如果您真的喜欢这些推文并想查看更多内容，那么您可以在 Twitter 上超级关注我。

So this is a smaller community that I'm really enjoying of product managers, founders, product people, designers, engineers, etc. where we go much deeper into these types of topics and more.

所以这是一个我非常喜欢的较小社区，里面有产品经理、创始人、产品人员、设计师、工程师等，我们可以更深入地探讨这些类型的主题等等。

And if you'd like to learn more about my views on various things related to product, super following me perhaps is a great way to do that.

如果您想更多地了解我对与产品相关的各种事物的看法，超级关注我也许是一个很好的方法。

Shreyas Doshi: And in terms of other things I'm working on, I am going to be launching a course on product sense and product management later this year, so be on the lookout for that, if that's of interest.

Shreyas Doshi：就我正在做的其他事情而言，我将在今年晚些时候推出一门关于产品意识和产品管理的课程，所以如果你感兴趣的话，请留意这一课程。

And then lastly, I think the best help I can ask for from listeners is just if any of these ideas resonated with you, share them with others.

最后，我认为我能向听众寻求的最好帮助就是，如果这些想法中的任何一个引起了您的共鸣，请与其他人分享。

And of course, if there are questions, feel free to ask.

当然，如果有疑问，请随时提问。

But I think my mission here is to really help perhaps bring greater clarity on what is going on around us when we are working in teams and working on projects and products.

但我认为我在这里的使命是真正帮助我们在团队合作、开发项目和产品时更清楚地了解我们周围发生的事情。

And so, I really like it when people share the ideas, whether it's on Twitter or publicly, or even with others privately.

因此，我真的很喜欢人们分享想法，无论是在 Twitter 上还是公开的，甚至私下与他人分享。

So that is perhaps the best thing you can do, help me in my mission.

所以这也许是你能做的最好的事情，帮助我完成我的使命。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

What a beautiful way to end it.

这是多么美好的结束方式啊。

Shreyas, thank you so much for this conversation.

Shreyas，非常感谢您的这次谈话。

Shreyas Doshi: Thanks, Lenny.

Shreyas Doshi：谢谢，莱尼。

This was a blast.

这真是太棒了。

Thanks for having me.

谢谢你有我。

It's really a privilege and I am looking forward to another conversation sometime in the future.

这确实是一种荣幸，我期待着将来的另一次对话。

Lenny: 10 big ideas by Shreyas Doshi coming up.

Lenny：Shreyas Doshi 提出了 10 个伟大的想法。

I'm really excited about that, too.

我对此也感到非常兴奋。

Thank you again.

再次感谢您。

Lenny: That was awesome.

莱尼：那太棒了。

Thank you for listening.

感谢您的聆听。

If you enjoy the chat, don't forget to subscribe to the podcast.

如果您喜欢聊天，请不要忘记订阅播客。

You can also learn more at lennyspodcast.com.

您还可以访问 lennyspodcast.com 了解更多信息。

I'll see you in the next episode.

我们下一集见。