5 essential questions to craft a winning strategy | Roger Martin (author, advisor, speaker)

Lenny Rachitsky: Why are so many people bad at strategy?

莱尼·拉奇茨基：为什么这么多人不擅长战略？

Roger Martin: What's taught now in business schools generally sucks.

罗杰·马丁：现在商学院所教授的内容通常很糟糕。

People aren't prepared educationally, and they sure don't get prepared for it in companies.

人们在教育上没有做好准备，在公司里也肯定没有做好准备。

It's intellectually challenging and it's emotionally intimidating.

它在智力上具有挑战性，在情感上也令人生畏。

Lenny Rachitsky: You have something you call the strategy choice cascade.

Lenny Rachitsky：你有一种称为策略选择级联的东西。

Roger Martin: You have to have answers to five questions.

罗杰·马丁：你必须回答五个问题。

What's your winning aspiration?

你的获胜愿望是什么？

Where to play?

去哪里玩？

How can you win?

你怎么能赢呢？

What capabilities do you have to have that your competitors don't?

您必须具备哪些竞争对手所不具备的能力？

And then, what enabling management systems do you have to put in place?

那么，您必须建立哪些支持管理系统？

For the most part, in the leading business schools, it's illegal to teach that.

在大多数情况下，在领先的商学院中，教授这些内容是违法的。

Lenny Rachitsky: Playing to win, you talked about, and there's kind of these two routes.

Lenny Rachitsky：你谈到了为胜利而战，有两种路线。

Roger Martin: You have to be either differentiated or low cost, there's no way to protect yourself if you're not one of those two.

罗杰·马丁：你必须要么差异化，要么低成本，如果你不是这两者之一，就没有办法保护自己。

Lenny Rachitsky: Is there anything else you wanted to just leave listeners with?

Lenny Rachitsky：您还有什么想留给听众的吗？

Roger Martin: I have never met this mythical beast called a great natural strategist.

罗杰·马丁：我从未见过这种被称为伟大的天生战略家的神兽。

Great strategists have all one thing in common, they just practice.

伟大的战略家有一个共同点，那就是练习。

Lenny Rachitsky: Today, my guest is Roger Martin.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：今天，我的客人是罗杰·马丁。

Roger is one of the world's most trusted strategy advisors.

罗杰是世界上最值得信赖的战略顾问之一。

He's professor emeritus at the Rotman School of Management, at the University of Toronto, where he served as dean for five years.

他是多伦多大学罗特曼管理学院的名誉教授，并担任院长五年。

In 2013, he was named Global Dean of the Year, and in 2017 he was named the world's number one management thinker by Thinkers50.

2013年，他被评为全球年度院长，2017年，他被Thinkers50评为全球第一管理思想家。

He's also the author of what many listeners consider their favorite book on strategy, called, Playing to Win.

他还是许多听众认为他们最喜欢的战略书籍《Playing to Win》的作者。

I've gotten a lot of requests to get Roger on this podcast, and I can now see why.

我收到了很多让罗杰加入这个播客的请求，我现在明白为什么了。

This is the most tactical and fascinating conversation I've had on this podcast about developing a strategy, and that is a really high bar.

这是我在这个播客上关于制定战略的最具策略性和最引人入胜的对话，这是一个非常高的标准。

Lenny Rachitsky: We delve into the five questions that you need to answer to help you craft your strategy.

Lenny Rachitsky：我们深入研究了您需要回答的五个问题，以帮助您制定策略。

How Hamilton Helmer, Michael Porter, and Richard Rumelt's work fits into his framework and worldview, what people most often get wrong when they're developing their own strategy, the two options you have for how to win with your strategy, a very tactical and simple trick for getting started, thinking through your strategy, and so much more.

汉密尔顿·赫尔默（Hamilton Helmer）、迈克尔·波特（Michael Porter）和理查德·鲁梅尔特（Richard Rumelt）的工作如何融入他的框架和世界观，人们在制定自己的战略时最常犯的错误是什么，如何通过战略取胜的两种选择，一个非常战术性和简单的入门技巧，思考你的战略等等。

This episode is for anyone who is trying to build their strategic thinking muscle.

本集适合任何试图增强战略思维能力的人。

If you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app, or YouTube, it's the best way to avoid missing future episodes, and it helps the podcast tremendously.

如果您喜欢这个播客，请不要忘记在您最喜欢的播客应用程序或 YouTube 中订阅并关注它，这是避免错过未来剧集的最佳方式，并且它对播客有很大帮助。

With that, I bring you Roger Martin.

接下来，我为您带来罗杰·马丁。

Lenny Rachitsky: Roger, thank you so much for being here, and welcome to the podcast.

Lenny Rachitsky：罗杰，非常感谢您来到这里，欢迎来到播客。

Roger Martin: It's great to be here, Lenny, thanks for having me.

罗杰·马丁：很高兴来到这里，莱尼，谢谢你邀请我。

Lenny Rachitsky: What I want to try to do with our time together is to help people that are on the ground at a company, say, like the product manager, designer, engineer, data scientists, folks that aren't necessarily the CO, or the founder or exec at company get better at product strategy.

Lenny Rachitsky：我想尝试利用我们在一起的时间来帮助公司的实际人员，比如产品经理、设计师、工程师、数据科学家、不一定是 CO、公司创始人或高管的人员，更好地制定产品战略。

At crafting a strategy, evaluating strategy, developing a strategy.

制定战略、评估战略、制定战略。

Because it feels like there's always tons of advice for the leaders of a company, but less for people on the ground doing the thing.

因为感觉总是有很多给公司领导的建议，但给基层做事的人的建议却很少。

And I feel like, luckily, your stuff applies to everyone.

幸运的是，我觉得你的东西适用于每个人。

So, how does that sound as a lens for-

那么，这听起来怎么样——

Roger Martin: That sounds great, and can I tell us a little story to that end?

罗杰·马丁：听起来不错，为此我可以给我们讲一个小故事吗？

Roger Martin: So, recently there was a newspaper article saying that, pointing out that 10% of the S&P 500 CEOs, 10% are ex Proctor and Gamble people.

罗杰·马丁：所以，最近有一篇报纸文章指出，标普500强公司的首席执行官中有10%，其中10%是前宝洁公司的人。

It's an amazing number, like a stunningly high, high number.

这是一个惊人的数字，一个高得惊人的数字。

Why would that possibly be?

为什么会这样呢？

I believe it's because at Procter and Gamble there is a view that people way down the organization, like let's just say the head and shoulders brand franchise leader, who reports to the head of shampoos and conditioners, who reports to the head of beauty care, who reports to the CEO, so at least four levels down in the organization, in the guts of the organization, Proctor understands that that individual, not the CEO, not the global president of beauty care, not the head of haircare, not the head of shampoos and conditioners, the brand manager makes super important strategic choices, and if they don't make them well, the brand does terribly.

我相信这是因为在宝洁公司，有一种观点认为，组织中的高层人员，比如海飞丝品牌特许经营负责人，向洗发水和护发素主管汇报，向美容护理主管汇报，向首席执行官汇报，所以在组织中至少有四个级别，在组织的内部，普罗克特明白那个人，不是首席执行官，不是美容护理全球总裁，不是护发主管，不是洗发水主管和护发素，品牌经理会做出非常重要的战略选择，如果他们做得不好，品牌就会表现得很糟糕。

And so, I believe...

所以，我相信...

And not many companies have enough of that attitude.

没有多少公司有足够的这种态度。

Roger Martin: So, I'm a big believer that people down organization have to make really important strategic choices or bad things are going to happen, if they make really great ones, good things are going to happen, and they get trained to be a CEO someday.

罗杰·马丁：所以，我坚信组织下层的人必须做出非常重要的战略选择，否则糟糕的事情就会发生，如果他们做出真正伟大的选择，好事就会发生，并且他们有一天会接受培训成为首席执行官。

So, I'm with your thesis.

所以，我同意你的论文。

But yours is counter, what I would say is normal.

但你的说法是反的，我说的是正常的。

What is most normal is people at the top do strategy, and people down below do something, and it's usually called execution, and I hate that, I hate that term of art, for what it's worth.

最正常的是高层的人做策略，下面的人做一些事情，这通常被称为执行，我讨厌这个，我讨厌这个艺术术语，无论它的价值如何。

And so, I think you and I are singing from a bit of the same songbook, even if it's a minority songbook.

所以，我认为你和我正在唱同一本歌集的一部分，即使它是一本少数族裔歌集。

Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Webflow.

Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Webflow 为您带来。

We're all friends here, so let's be real for a second.

我们都是这里的朋友，所以让我们现实一点吧。

We all know that your website shouldn't be a static asset, it should be a dynamic part of your strategy that drives conversions.

我们都知道您的网站不应该是静态资产，它应该是推动转化的策略的动态部分。

That's business 101.

那是商业101。

But here's a number for you, 54% of leaders say web updates take too long.

但这里有一个数字，54% 的领导者表示网络更新时间太长。

That's over half of you listening right now.

现在有超过一半的人在听。

That's where Webflow comes in.

这就是 Webflow 的用武之地。

Their visual first platform allows you to build, launch, and optimize webpages fast.

他们的视觉优先平台允许您快速构建、启动和优化网页。

That means you can set ambitious business goals and your site can rise to the challenge.

这意味着您可以设定雄心勃勃的业务目标，并且您的网站可以应对挑战。

Learn how teams like Dropbox, IDEO, and Orangetheory trust Webflow to achieve their most ambitious goals today, at Webflow.com.

访问 Webflow.com，了解 Dropbox、IDEO 和 Orangetheory 等团队如何信任 Webflow 来实现他们最雄心勃勃的目标。

Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Work os.

Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Work os 为您带来。

If you're building a SaaS app, at some point your customers will start asking for enterprise features, like SAML authentication, and SCIM provisioning.

如果您正在构建 SaaS 应用程序，那么您的客户有时会开始要求企业功能，例如 SAML 身份验证和 SCIM 配置。

That's where WorkOS comes in, making it fast and painless to add enterprise features to your app.

这就是 WorkOS 的用武之地，它可以快速、轻松地将企业功能添加到您的应用程序中。

Their APIs are easy to understand so that you can ship quickly and get back to building other features.

他们的 API 易于理解，因此您可以快速交付并继续构建其他功能。

Today, hundreds of companies are already powered by WorkOs, including ones you probably know, like Vercel, Webflow, and Loom.

如今，数百家公司已经由 WorkO 提供支持，其中包括您可能知道的公司，例如 Vercel、Webflow 和 Loom。

WorkOS also recently acquired Warrant, the fine-grained authorization service.

WorkOS 最近还收购了细粒度授权服务 Warrant。

Warrant's product is based on a groundbreaking authorization system called Zanzibar, which was originally designed for Google to power Google Docs and YouTube.

Warrant 的产品基于名为 Zanzibar 的突破性授权系统，该系统最初是为 Google 设计的，旨在为 Google Docs 和 YouTube 提供支持。

This enables fast authorization checks at enormous scale, while maintaining a flexible model that can be adapted to even the most complex use cases.

这可以实现大规模的快速授权检查，同时保持灵活的模型，可以适应最复杂的用例。

If you're currently looking to build role-based access control, or other enterprise features like single sign-on, SCIM, or user management, you should consider WorkOs.

如果您当前正在寻求构建基于角色的访问控制或其他企业功能（例如单点登录、SCIM 或用户管理），您应该考虑 WorkO。

It's a drop-in replacement for auth zero, and supports up to 1 million monthly active users for free.

它是 auth Zero 的直接替代品，并免费支持多达 100 万的每月活跃用户。

Check it out at Workos.com to learn more.

请访问 Workos.com 了解更多信息。

That's Workos.com.

那是 Workos.com。

Lenny Rachitsky: I just want to ask this broad question about strategy, why is strategy so hard?

Lenny Rachitsky：我只是想问这个关于战略的广泛问题，为什么战略如此困难？

Why are so many people bad at strategy?

为什么这么多人不擅长战略？

Roger Martin: Perhaps the thing that makes it intellectually hardest is that it is an integrative activity.

罗杰·马丁：也许智力上最困难的事情是它是一项综合活动。

It answers to a bunch of questions that have to fit together and reinforce one another.

它回答了一系列必须相互配合、相互强化的问题。

So, that just makes it a little more complicated, it's not like saying, Lenny, what do you want for lunch?

所以，这只会让事情变得更加复杂，这并不是说，莱尼，你午餐想吃什么？

It's saying, Lenny, what kind of diet do you want that'll keep you healthy?

它是在说，莱尼，你想要什么样的饮食才能保持健康？

And that includes breakfast, lunch, dinners, snacks, a whole bunch of other things that you got to fit together.

这包括早餐、午餐、晚餐、零食以及一大堆其他你必须搭配在一起的东西。

So, it makes that harder to do intellectually.

因此，这使得理智地做到这一点变得更加困难。

Another aspect of it is, it is intimidating.

它的另一个方面是，它令人生畏。

Strategy involves making choices to do some things and not other things, and it is often intimidating to say, oh dear, I have to cut these things off, and not do them, and actually make a decision that I'll be held accountable for potentially, or I'll even hold myself accountable for.

战略涉及选择做一些事情而不是其他事情，而且常常会令人生畏地说，天哪，我必须砍掉这些事情，而不是做它们，并且实际上做出了一个我可能要承担责任的决定，或者我什至要让自己负责。

Roger Martin: So, that's a second thing.

罗杰·马丁：所以，这是第二件事。

It's harder emotionally, not harder intellectually.

情感上更难，理智上更难。

And then, there's the training aspect of it, the knowledge aspect of it, which is, what's taught now in strategy in business schools generally sucks.

然后，还有培训方面、知识方面，也就是说，现在商学院的战略课程通常很糟糕。

It's gone on a crazy theoretical bend, the strategy academy as a whole has fallen in love with a theory called the resource-based theory of the firm, that silly and nobody uses it out in the world.

它已经进入了一个疯狂的理论弯道，整个战略学院已经爱上了一种称为公司资源基础理论的理论，这种理论很愚蠢，世界上没有人使用它。

And so, students are no longer trained on useful strategy.

因此，学生不再接受有用策略的培训。

And the other feeder into people learning strategy were the strategy consulting firms, but the strategy consulting firms, the so-called strategy consulting firms, do almost no strategy anymore because it's a little business compared to post-merger integration, digital transformation, and a bunch of other things.

另一个让人们学习战略的地方是战略咨询公司，但是战略咨询公司，即所谓的战略咨询公司，几乎不再做战略了，因为与合并后的整合、数字化转型和其他一些事情相比，战略只是小事一桩。

So, people aren't prepared educationally for it, and if they're not prepared educationally for it, then they sure don't get prepared for it in companies.

因此，人们没有为此做好教育准备，如果他们没有为此做好教育准备，那么他们在公司中肯定也没有做好准备。

It's intellectually challenging and it's emotionally intimidating.

它在智力上具有挑战性，在情感上也令人生畏。

Lenny Rachitsky: On this point, you made about how schools are teaching strategy wrong, how do you describe what the wrong approach is?

Lenny Rachitsky：在这一点上，您提到学校的教学策略是错误的，您如何描述错误的方法是什么？

Roger Martin: It's a theory that's sort of taken over, called the resource-based view of the firm, that was...

罗杰·马丁：这是一种已经被采用的理论，称为公司基于资源的观点，那就是……

In the world of academics, there's a weird place where the number one emotion is jealousy, and people were massively jealous of Mike Porter, who created many of the most important concepts of strategy when he wrote a book, Competitive Strategy, in 1980.

在学术界，有一个奇怪的地方，第一情感是嫉妒，人们非常嫉妒迈克·波特，他在 1980 年写了一本书《竞争战略》时创造了许多最重要的战略概念。

And so, they needed to counter him because they just didn't like the fact that he was so prominent, and they decided they would say he was about positioning.

因此，他们需要反击他，因为他们只是不喜欢他如此突出的事实，他们决定说他是关于定位的。

So, they called his the positioning school, and they caricatured what he said, which he never did, but they said he said it's all about finding a place that is structurally attractive, and then milking it for everything you can.

所以，他们称他为“定位学校”，他们讽刺了他所说的话，但他从未这样做过，但他们说他说这一切都是为了找到一个结构上有吸引力的地方，然后竭尽全力地榨取它。

Roger Martin: We at the resource-based view of the firm think that strategy is all about building resources.

罗杰·马丁：我们从公司以资源为基础的观点来看，战略就是建立资源。

And if you build resources, it's almost like if you build it, they will come.

如果你建立了资源，就好像你建立了资源，它们就会来一样。

And that's what you should pay attention to.

这就是你应该注意的。

Now, the problem is, any resource that may be useful somewhere is not necessarily useful elsewhere.

现在的问题是，任何可能在某个地方有用的资源在其他地方不一定有用。

So, it begs the question, how would you think through what resources to invest in building?

那么，这就引出了一个问题，您将如何考虑投资哪些资源来建设？

What would be a way of doing that, investing here, versus here, versus here?

在这里投资、在这里投资、在这里投资，该怎么做？

It's silent on that because it's a dumb theory, and it doesn't have anything useful to say, in my view, about that.

它对此保持沉默，因为这是一个愚蠢的理论，而且在我看来，对此没有任何有用的说法。

Roger Martin: And so, when the students go out and say to their company, I'm going to do a VRIO analysis, or a VRIN, some people just roll their eyes at them, and so it doesn't get used.

罗杰·马丁：所以，当学生们出去对他们的公司说，我要进行 VRIO 分析或 VRIN 时，有些人只是对他们翻白眼，所以它没有被使用。

I've only seen it used, I've been in consulting companies for 42 years, and I've seen it used once.

我只见过它被使用过，我在咨询公司工作了 42 年，我只见过它被使用过一次。

And the trust, as is usually the case, is that it's both.

正如通常的情况一样，信任是两者兼而有之。

And that's why the model I use for strategies says a lot about where you play is important, that's one of the key questions, and your capabilities are important, and you've got to link those things together.

这就是为什么我用于策略的模型说了很多关于你玩的地方很重要，这是关键问题之一，你的能力很重要，你必须将这些东西联系在一起。

But that's, for the most part in the leading business schools, it's illegal to teach that.

但在大多数领先的商学院中，教授这一点是违法的。

Lenny Rachitsky: Illegal to teach your approach.

Lenny Rachitsky：教授你的方法是非法的。

Roger Martin: Yes.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

I couldn't teach my approach at my own business school.

我无法在自己的商学院教授我的方法。

Roger Martin: But when I was dean, the most powerful person, the departments, or areas as we call it, like strategic management is an area, they have 100% control over what's taught in strategic management, in finance, et cetera.

罗杰·马丁：但是当我担任院长时，最有权势的人、部门或我们所说的领域，比如战略管理是一个领域，他们对战略管理、金融等方面的教学内容拥有 100% 的控制权。

The dean may be the most powerful person in the school, and I happened to be a super successful dean, so if anything, I was a super powerful dean, and students would beg me, they'd say, "Roger, you have 20 years of experience, you're sort of a famous consultant in strategy, and you've got these theories, please teach a course in it." Nope.

院长可能是学校里最有权势的人，而我恰好是一位超级成功的院长，所以如果有的话，我是一位超级有权势的院长，学生们会求我，他们会说，“罗杰，你有20年的经验，你是一位著名的战略顾问，你有这些理论，请教一门课程。”没有。

I did do extracurricular stuff, where I had practice of one Saturday a year, teaching everything I knew to anybody who wanted to show up.

我确实做了一些课外活动，每年一个周六进行练习，向任何想参加的人传授我所知道的一切。

But for credit, I was not allowed.

但为了信用，我不被允许。

And if you try to get a job at any business...

如果你想在任何企业找到工作......

The only exception might be Harvard Business School, maybe.

唯一的例外可能是哈佛商学院。

But if you took the 49 other top business schools in America, and if asked the question, do you swear allegiance to the resource-based view of the firm?

但如果你考察了美国其他 49 所顶尖商学院，如果被问到这个问题，你会宣誓效忠公司基于资源的观点吗？

If you don't answer an enthusiastic yes, you have no chance of being hired, zero.

如果你不热情地回答“是”，你就没有被录用的机会，零。

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：哇。

This academia drama, I had no idea.

这部学术剧，我完全不知道。

Lenny Rachitsky: This is unreal.

Lenny Rachitsky：这是不真实的。

Makes me even more excited to dive into your world, and your ways of seeing things.

让我更加兴奋地深入你的世界，以及你看待事物的方式。

Before we do that, just we've had a few other strategy people on the podcast, it might be helpful to frame where they fit in the spectrum that you're describing.

在我们这样做之前，我们在播客上还有一些其他策略人员，这可能会有助于确定他们在您所描述的范围中的位置。

So-

所以——

Roger Martin: Oh, okay.

罗杰·马丁：哦，好吧。

I may not know all of them, but you give me-

我可能不认识所有这些，但你给了我-

Lenny Rachitsky: I imagine you do.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我想你会的。

So, we've had a Hamilton Helmer on the podcast, and then Richard Rumelt on the podcast.

所以，我们的播客上有汉密尔顿·赫尔默，然后是理查德·鲁梅尔特。

How do they relate, just for people to get into your stuff versus this dogma?

他们如何联系起来，只是为了让人们了解你的东西与这个教条？

Roger Martin: So, one of them is an academic, and one of them is a quasi-academic, or non-academic, like me.

罗杰·马丁：所以，其中一个是学者，另一个是准学术或非学术人士，就像我一样。

I was a tenured professor for many years, but don't consider myself an academic guy.

我担任终身教授多年，但并不认为自己是一个学者。

I don't think Hamilton does, though I've never asked him-

我不认为汉密尔顿会这么做，尽管我从来没有问过他——

Roger Martin: ...

罗杰·马丁：...

that question.

这个问题。

Yeah.

是的。

So, he's written a very, I think, useful book that would in some sense fit into my how to win box, right?

所以，我认为他写了一本非常有用的书，在某种意义上适合我的“如何获胜”框，对吗？

I say strategies about how to win, and he has a, what I call, a categorical model.

我说的是如何取胜的策略，他有一个我所说的分类模型。

Here are categories of things that you should think about.

以下是您应该考虑的几类事情。

If you're trying to win, here are seven ways of winning, and I categorize him as a non-academic practical strategy guy.

如果你想获胜，这里有七种获胜方法，我将他归类为非学术实用策略的人。

Richard Rumelt is a now retired Tuck professor, and he is this hyper competition thing that he does.

理查德·鲁梅尔特 (Richard Rumelt) 是一位现已退休的塔克大学教授，他所做的就是激烈的竞争。

He also is of the, I'm jealous of Mike Porter kind of thing.

他也是我嫉妒迈克·波特之类的人。

So, I've got to say, Mike Porter is wrong, and here's how I am so right, and the competition doesn't take place in the way Mike says, where it's really stable, and whatever, it's really hyper competition, Mike Porter never in his entire life has said competition is stable, he's repeatedly said the opposite.

所以，我必须说，迈克·波特是错的，而我是这样正确的，而且竞争并不像迈克所说的那样发生，它真的很稳定，无论如何，这真的是一场激烈的竞争，迈克·波特一生中从未说过竞争是稳定的，他一再说过相反的话。

Roger Martin: But in order to say I'm not like Mike Porter, and in fact, I distinguish myself by saying he's wrong, and I'm right, and so...

罗杰·马丁：但是为了说我不像迈克·波特，事实上，我通过说他错了而我是对的来区分自己，所以......

I don't know.

我不知道。

He seemed like a fine guy.

他看起来是个好人。

I don't think that he, like most business academics, he doesn't know much about business.

我不认为他像大多数商业学者一样对商业了解不多。

He hasn't gone out and practiced a lot.

他没有出去练习过很多次。

He came to our school, and gave a lecture because people loved hyper competition because he would blast Mike Porter, and he gave a example of Proctor and Gamble, I've been consulting at Proctor and Gamble, and know everything about Procter and Gamble, basically.

他来到我们学校，做了一次演讲，因为人们喜欢激烈的竞争，因为他会抨击迈克·波特，他举了宝洁公司的例子，我一直在宝洁公司做咨询，基本上了解宝洁公司的一切。

Roger Martin: And what he said about Proctor and Gamble had zero to do with reality, like zero.

罗杰·马丁：他所说的宝洁公司与现实的关系为零，就像零一样。

It was just completely, utterly, absolutely wrong.

这是完全、完全、绝对错误的。

And I asked him afterwards, just sort of like, "Why do you say that?" And he said, "Well, I think that's the way it worked." Are you kidding me?

后来我问他，“你为什么这么说？”他说：“嗯，我认为这就是它的运作方式。”你在开玩笑吧？

So, I'm not a fan of that piece of work.

所以，我不是那部作品的粉丝。

I would say it doesn't fit nicely into research-based view of the firm versus Mike Porter, it's sort of like, here's another lens to take on the world, and I'm going to take that lens, everything's hyper-competitive, and here's how you think about hyper-competition.

我想说，这不太符合基于研究的公司与迈克·波特的观点，这有点像，这是看待世界的另一个镜头，我将采用这个镜头，一切都超级竞争，这就是你对超级竞争的看法。

Lenny Rachitsky: This is fascinating.

Lenny Rachitsky：这很有趣。

I love that we're spending some time on this, this is really helpful to hear the landscape of strategy minds.

我喜欢我们在这方面花费一些时间，这对于了解战略思想的情况确实很有帮助。

Okay, let's dive into your worldview, and maybe the simplest way is just, how do you define strategy?

好吧，让我们深入探讨一下您的世界观，也许最简单的方法就是，您如何定义战略？

What is a strategy?

什么是策略？

Roger Martin: Strategy is an integrated set of choices that compels desired customer action.

罗杰·马丁：战略是一套综合的选择，迫使客户采取所需的行动。

So, the way I think about it is, there's a whole bunch of things a company controls, how many factories to build, how much R&D to do, in what areas, and how much advertising to do, how many people to hire, what to pay them, blah, blah, blah...

所以，我的想法是，公司控制着一大堆东西，要建多少工厂，要做多少研发，在哪些领域，要做多少广告，要雇用多少人，付给他们什么工资，等等，等等，等等......

Those are all the things under our control.

这些都是我们可以掌控的事情。

What, Lenny, is the thing we have almost no control over?

莱尼，什么是我们几乎无法控制的事情？

What, if we're a company?

如果我们是一家公司呢？

Roger Martin: Yeah.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

We would like them to take some of these out of their pocket and give them to us, can we make them?

我们希望他们从口袋里拿出一些给我们，我们可以制作吗？

No, we can't.

不，我们不能。

So, essentially, the job of strategy is to make decisions on the things we do control that will compel, we can't force, but it'll compel them.

因此，从本质上讲，战略的作用是对我们确实控制的事情做出决策，这些决策将迫使他们，我们不能强迫，但它会迫使他们。

They'll say, gosh, I should take my hard-earned cash, and whether it's a company or an individual, I should take my hard-earned cash and give it to you, rather than give it to nobody, if there's no product now, or give it to a competitive product.

他们会说，天哪，我应该拿我的血汗钱，无论是公司还是个人，我都应该把我的血汗钱给你，而不是给任何人，如果现在没有产品，或者给有竞争力的产品。

So, the important pieces of it is integrated, it's the whole set of choices that has that one outcome, that it compels desired customer action.

因此，它的重要部分是集成的，它是具有一个结果的整套选择，它迫使客户采取所需的行动。

Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

And to help people define their strategy, you have something you call the strategy choice cascade, which is basically five questions that you need to answer to help you think trough strategy.

为了帮助人们定义他们的策略，你可以使用所谓的策略选择级联，它基本上是你需要回答的五个问题，以帮助你通过策略进行思考。

Can you talk through this?

你能谈谈这个吗？

Roger Martin: Yeah.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

And this is the fruits of many, many years of doing strategy work, and trying to figure out, how do you do this thing?

这是很多很多年做战略工作的成果，并试图弄清楚如何做这件事？

Because the fun thing was, I was in the era, I started in strategy in 1981, and that was early in the era, strategy was born in 1963 with the founding of Boston Consulting Group by Bruce Henderson, who was the father of strategy in my view, of practical commercial strategy.

因为有趣的是，我在那个时代，我从 1981 年开始从事战略，那是在这个时代的早期，战略诞生于 1963 年，布鲁斯·亨德森 (Bruce Henderson) 创立了波士顿咨询集团，在我看来，他是战略之父，实用商业战略之父。

So, it was still in the early days, and Bruce Henderson had a theory of how strategy should...

所以，当时还处于早期阶段，布鲁斯·亨德森（Bruce Henderson）有一个关于战略应该如何……的理论。

What result it should produce for you.

它应该为您产生什么结果。

Mike Porter then came along in 1980, so '63 Bruce Anderson, and '80 Porter, the two most important figures in the history of strategy, came along and said, a strategy has to look like this.

然后迈克·波特在 1980 年出现了，所以 63 年的布鲁斯·安德森和 80 年的波特，战略史上最重要的两个人物，出现并说，战略必须是这样的。

It has to have this as its output.

它必须将此作为其输出。

But neither of them was very good on, because again, it was early, they can't do everything right away, of, well, how would you get one of those?

但他们俩都不是很好，因为再说一次，时间还早，他们不能立即做所有事情，或者，你怎么能得到其中一个呢？

Roger Martin: So, Mike Porter says you have to be either differentiated or low cost.

罗杰·马丁：所以，迈克·波特说，你必须要么差异化，要么低成本。

Good.

好的。

And if you look through competitive strategy as landmark seminal book, to say, how would you do that?

如果您将《竞争战略》视为具有里程碑意义的开创性著作，那么您会怎么做？

There is no answer.

没有答案。

And because Monitor Company, the firm I was one of the leaders of for a decade and a half, was founded essentially to commercialize Mike Porter's work, customers would ask us, they'd say, well, we like Mike Porter, and we'd like to have one of those.

因为 Monitor Company（我在这家公司领导了十五年）的成立主要是为了将迈克·波特的作品商业化，所以客户会问我们，他们会说，好吧，我们喜欢迈克·波特，我们希望拥有其中之一。

We can look at ourselves under his framework, and we can say we're stuck in the middle, and he said, that's bad, and he said, good is this or this.

我们可以在他的框架下审视自己，我们可以说我们被困在中间，他说，那不好，他说，这个或这个好。

How do we think through creating one of those?

我们如何思考创建其中之一？

We didn't actually have an answer.

我们实际上没有答案。

Roger Martin: And it turned out, because I was the most, I don't know, intellectually engaged on this, and didn't mind the hard work of product development from about 1987, when we discovered we really didn't know that, and clients really wanted us to tell them that.

罗杰·马丁：事实证明，因为我是最，我不知道，从智力上参与这件事，并且不介意从 1987 年开始产品开发的艰苦工作，当时我们发现我们真的不知道这一点，而客户真的希望我们告诉他们这一点。

Between 1987 and 1995, I did all this work on, well, how could you develop a process for getting yourself one of those, one of those excellent strategies?

1987 年到 1995 年间，我做了所有这些工作，嗯，你如何开发一个流程，让自己成为其中之一，那些优秀的策略之一？

And I came to the view that you have to have answers to five questions.

我认为你必须回答五个问题。

You have to have an answer to the question of, what's your winning aspiration?

您必须回答以下问题：您的获胜愿望是什么？

What are you trying to accomplish?

你想实现什么目标？

Because it'll help contextualize the kinds of choices you could make.

因为它将有助于您了解可以做出的各种选择。

Then there's a where to play, on what playing field, or if you're like military stuff, battlefield, are you going to plop yourself down on?

然后还有一个可以玩的地方，在什么比赛场地上，或者如果你喜欢军事方面的东西，战场，你会趴在地上吗？

You're not going to play everywhere, in every product, at every vertical stage around the world, you're going to pick someplace, and in that place, how can you be either better than competitors, in terms of creating customer value, or lower cost than those competitors?

你不会在世界各地、每个产品、每个垂直阶段都发挥作用，你会选择某个地方，在那个地方，你如何才能在创造客户价值方面比竞争对手更好，或者比那些竞争对手更低的成本？

Roger Martin: To win there, where you've chosen to play to meet your winning aspirations, what capabilities do you have to have that your competitors don't, that would enable you to win that way?

罗杰·马丁：为了在那里获胜，在你选择比赛来满足你获胜愿望的地方，你必须具备哪些你的竞争对手没有的能力，才能让你以这种方式获胜？

And then, what management systems, enabling management systems, do you have to put in place to make sure you build and maintain those must have capabilities to win, where you've chosen to play, to meet your winning aspiration?

然后，您必须实施哪些管理系统，即支持性管理系统，以确保您建立和维护那些必须具有获胜能力的系统，无论您选择在哪里玩，以满足您的获胜愿望？

And so, I came to the conclusion, actually it was in 1995, the end of an eight-year journey, I came to the conclusion those were the five, and you had to do them together, and that is the essence of producing a strategy that compels desired customer action.

所以，我得出的结论是，实际上是在 1995 年，八年旅程的结尾，我得出的结论是这五个，你必须一起做它们，这就是制定迫使客户采取所需行动的策略的本质。

Lenny Rachitsky: I want to go through an example of a company, but before we do that, something I think that's important to talk about is, if your book is called Playing to Win, you talked about this idea of you need to play to win, and you argue that a lot of people are just playing to play, they're playing to play the game.

Lenny Rachitsky：我想举一个公司的例子，但在我们这样做之前，我认为有必要讨论的是，如果你的书名为《Playing to Win》，你谈到了你需要通过游戏来获胜的想法，并且你认为很多人只是为了玩而玩，他们是为了玩游戏而玩。

I'm guessing most people listening, and most people developing a strategy, don't think they're doing that, they don't think they're just playing to play the game.

我猜大多数人在听，大多数人在制定策略，他们并不认为他们正在这样做，他们不认为他们只是为了玩游戏而玩。

They think they're playing to win.

他们认为他们是为了胜利而打球。

I'm curious what are signs that you're not actually playing to win?

我很好奇什么迹象表明你实际上并不是为了赢而玩？

Roger Martin: It would be mainly signs given to you by customers.

罗杰·马丁：主要是顾客给你的标志。

So, if you say, we're the most innovative company in our industry, and customers...

所以，如果你说，我们是行业中最具创新性的公司，而客户......

And let's say the industry distributes through a given channel, and customers come into that channel and they look at the two products and say, I could flip a coin on this one, you are not effectively playing to win.

假设该行业通过给定的渠道进行分销，客户进入该渠道，他们查看这两种产品并说，我可以在这一款产品上掷硬币，你并没有有效地赢得胜利。

Maybe you thought you were winning, but customers don't think you are better.

也许你认为自己赢了，但客户并不认为你更好。

Or if your competitor lowers their price compared to your price, and you say to yourself, oh my God, if we lowered our price, we would make no money, but your competitor keeps on pricing there, you may think you have the low cost position, but they do, and you have to give them whatever share they desire at that lower price because you can't compete there.

或者，如果你的竞争对手比你的价格降低了他们的价格，你对自己说，天啊，如果我们降低价格，我们就赚不到钱，但你的竞争对手继续在那里定价，你可能认为你拥有低成本地位，但他们确实如此，你必须以较低的价格给予他们他们想要的任何份额，因为你无法在那里竞争。

Roger Martin: So, you'll know you're playing to play if you're not aiming to, and accomplishing, having either an offer where Lenny walks into the store, whatever kind of store it is, and says to the person in the store, I want that brand.

罗杰·马丁：所以，如果你没有达到目标，或者没有实现，让莱尼走进商店，无论它是什么类型的商店，并对商店里的人说，我想要那个品牌，你就会知道你是在玩游戏。

An example, Lego, one of the companies I've worked with for a long time, great company.

举个例子，乐高，我长期合作的公司之一，很棒的公司。

It turns out that if you do market research on kids, a store that purports to be a toy store but that doesn't have Lego is not a toy store.

事实证明，如果你对儿童进行市场调查，一家声称是玩具店但没有乐高的商店就不是玩具店。

They would define it as not a toy.

他们将其定义为不是玩具。

Mom, why are we here?

妈妈，我们为什么在这里？

I wanted to go to a toy store.

我想去玩具店。

And she said, but it says toys on here.

她说，但上面写着玩具在这里。

And the kids said, uh-huh.

孩子们说，嗯。

That's an insane brand.

这是一个疯狂的品牌。

That's an insane, insane, insane brand.

这是一个疯狂、疯狂、疯狂的品牌。

Roger Martin: And it has a price premium for anything, over any of its competitors by a long shot.

罗杰·马丁：它的任何产品的价格都比任何竞争对手都高。

It keeps growing, it actually for most years in the last decade it has had 80 or 90% of the entire category growth is Lego.

它一直在增长，实际上在过去十年的大部分时间里，整个品类增长的 80% 或 90% 都是乐高。

And so, they're playing to win, to be distinctive in the minds of consumers.

因此，他们的竞争是为了取胜，为了在消费者心目中脱颖而出。

But Vanguard has got $9 trillion of assets under management last time I checked.

但我上次检查时，先锋集团管理着 9 万亿美元的资产。

Does it do anything distinctive?

它有什么独特之处吗？

Not really.

并不真地。

The customer bought, do they have the lowest cost position so they can charge the lowest AUMs?

客户购买后，他们是否拥有最低的成本位置，以便可以收取最低的 AUM？

Absolutely.

绝对地。

And so, there's different kinds of ways, but you'd know by the actions that customers take.

因此，方法有很多种，但你可以通过客户采取的行动来了解。

Lenny Rachitsky: So, essentially, to mirror back what you're saying, to win, there's kind of these two routes you talk about.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以，本质上，为了反映你所说的，为了获胜，你谈到了这两条路线。

One is you're the lowest cost option, the second is you're differentiated.

一是您是成本最低的选择，二是您具有差异化优势。

You have a differentiated brand, where it's not a coin flip, it's like, oh, I really need that for this reason.

你有一个与众不同的品牌，这不是抛硬币，而是，哦，因为这个原因我真的需要它。

Lenny Rachitsky: And if you can't do that, then the advice you share is go find a different playing field.

Lenny Rachitsky：如果你做不到这一点，那么你分享的建议是寻找不同的竞争环境。

Roger Martin: Well, or get out of business, whatever...

罗杰·马丁：好吧，或者退出这个行业，无论如何......

It's only a matter of time until you're dead, is the sad truth of the matter, which is the competitors in your industry, who are either low cost or differentiated, can essentially jerk you around as much as they want.

可悲的事实是，你的死亡只是时间问题，你所在行业的竞争对手要么是低成本的，要么是差异化的，他们基本上可以随心所欲地欺骗你。

It's like Southwest Airlines, right?

好像是西南航空吧？

Southwest Airlines was just a tiny little airline that flew Austin, Houston, Dallas, and now it's number one in passenger seat miles in America, and the only airline that's earned its cost of capital over the last half century, all the rest are losing money for their shareholders over time.

西南航空只是一家很小的航空公司，飞往奥斯汀、休斯顿、达拉斯，现在它是美国乘客座位里程数第一的航空公司，也是过去半个世纪中唯一一家实现资本成本盈利的航空公司，随着时间的推移，其他所有航空公司都在为股东亏损。

They have good cycles and bad cycles.

它们有好的周期，也有坏的周期。

How did that happen?

这是怎么发生的？

Well, it's just the other airlines had to step aside whenever Southwest came into a route, the other airlines just had to say, well, I guess you're going to get your 30 share, or 35 share of passengers on this route, welcome to town.

好吧，只是每当西南航空进入一条航线时，其他航空公司就不得不让开，其他​​航空公司只能说，好吧，我猜你会在这条航线上获得 30 份或 35 份乘客份额，欢迎来到城里。

That's all they can do.

这就是他们所能做的。

Roger Martin: They just have to seed position.

罗杰·马丁：他们只需要获得种子位置即可。

And that's what happens, if you play to play, you'll end up just being...

这就是发生的事情，如果你为了玩而玩，那么你最终会......

It's literally like having a bully who can just shove you, and you take one step back, then they shove you, and you take another step back, and they shove you, and you take another step back.

这就像一个恶霸可以推你，你后退一步，然后他们推你，你又后退一步，他们推你，你又后退一步。

There's no way to protect yourself if you're not one of those two.

如果您不是这两者之一，就没有办法保护自己。

You cannot bully Vanguard, you cannot bully Southwest, you cannot bully Proctor and Gamble, you cannot bully Lego.

你不能欺负先锋集团，你不能欺负西南航空，你不能欺负宝洁公司，你不能欺负乐高。

That's the way the business world works.

这就是商业世界的运作方式。

Lenny Rachitsky: And in the case of Southwest, the reason they couldn't be bullied is they were the low cost provider and the other airlines couldn't meet their prices.

Lenny Rachitsky：就西南航空而言，他们之所以不会被欺负，是因为他们是低成本提供商，而其他航空公司无法满足他们的价格。

So, they're like, all right, there's nothing we can do.

所以，他们说，好吧，我们无能为力。

Roger Martin: So, while I was living in Boston, they entered the Boston to Chicago route, which was a duopoly of American and United at the time, and the price was about, in those days, a $1000 for a round trip because it was a nice duopoly.

罗杰·马丁：所以，当我住在波士顿时，他们进入了波士顿到芝加哥的航线，当时这是美国航空和联合航空的双头垄断，当时的价格大约是往返 1000 美元，因为这是一个不错的双头垄断。

When Southwest come in, they say, we're going to fly Providence to Midway, not Logan to O'Hare, and it's going to be $200.

他们说，当西南航空加入时，我们将飞往普罗维登斯飞往中途岛，而不是从洛根飞往奥黑尔，票价为 200 美元。

And they had great advertising, I always loved the advertising that they had when they entered the, they did maps of Boston, and said, if you live in any of these places, kind of the south, the west of Boston, it takes you less time to get from your house to the gate than it does to go to Logan.

他们有很棒的广告，我一直很喜欢他们进入时的广告，他们制作了波士顿地图，并说，如果你住在这些地方中的任何一个，比如波士顿的南部、西部，从你家到大门的时间比去洛根的时间要少。

Roger Martin: Because at Logan, you park in a parking garage, and then walk a half an hour, and then when you get through security, you still have to walk 20 minutes...

罗杰·马丁：因为在洛根，你把车停在停车场，然后步行半小时，然后当你通过安检时，你还得步行20分钟......

Blah, blah, blah.

巴拉，巴拉，巴拉。

And at Providence, if you've ever flown out of Providence, you can park about 100 yards from the gates.

在普罗维登斯，如果您曾经飞出普罗维登斯，您可以将车停在距登机口约 100 码的地方。

And so, they just had to say, we can't stop that, not everybody's going to do it, but a whole bunch of people are, and there's nothing we can do to stop that.

所以，他们不得不说，我们无法阻止这种情况，不是每个人都会这样做，但很多人都会这么做，我们无能为力阻止这种情况。

Lenny Rachitsky: What I love is we're already diving into these five questions.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢的是我们已经深入研究了这五个问题。

So we've been mostly talking about how we will win, basically, here's your options to win.

所以我们主要讨论的是我们将如何获胜，基本上，这是你获胜的选择。

Low cost provider, or be differentiated, or find a different place to win.

低成本提供商，要么脱颖而出，要么找到不同的地方来取胜。

Let me summarize the five again.

让我再次总结一下这五个。

What is our winning aspiration?

我们获胜的愿望是什么？

Where will we play?

我们去哪里玩？

How will we win?

我们将如何获胜？

What capabilities must we have in place to win?

我们必须具备哪些能力才能获胜？

And what management systems are required to make sure the capabilities are in place?

需要哪些管理系统来确保这些能力到位？

Roger Martin: You're a very quick study my friend.

罗杰·马丁：我的朋友，你学得很快。

Lenny Rachitsky: I got some notes here.

Lenny Rachitsky：我在这里得到了一些笔记。

So, coming back to the how will we win?

那么，回到我们如何获胜？

Because I think everyone's listening to this, okay, cool, we got two ways to win, we're going to be the cheapest or we're going to differentiate, okay.

因为我认为每个人都在听这个，好吧，酷，我们有两种获胜方式，我们将成为最便宜的，或者我们将差异化，好吧。

Okay, how do we differentiate?

好吧，我们如何区分？

Is there a taxonomy of options that you think about or tell people, what are the ways and options for exploring, here's how we will be different?

您是否考虑或告诉人们有一个选项分类，探索的方式和选项是什么，这就是我们将如何与众不同？

Roger Martin: It is mainly understanding customers, as well as you can, and then saying, is there a way to be distinctive against that?

罗杰·马丁：主要是尽可能地了解客户，然后说，有没有办法做到与众不同？

And there are lots of ways to do it, but it's tied very closely to the capabilities, which is, if you have a way of winning, you say, my where to play is I'm going to sell pet food on the internet, and my how to win is I'm going to be the best.

有很多方法可以做到这一点，但它与能力密切相关，也就是说，如果你有一种获胜的方法，你会说，我的玩法是我要在互联网上销售宠物食品，而我的获胜方法是我将成为最好的。

But it turns out that anybody who can build a website can sell pet food on the internet, and in fact, 20 of them do it almost immediately, and they all go bust.

但事实证明，任何能建立网站的人都可以在互联网上销售宠物食品，事实上，其中 20 个网站几乎立即就做到了，但他们都破产了。

You don't have the capability, so you've got to ask yourself the question, can I serve a particular customer need with a set of capabilities that are going to be hard to replicate by my competitors?

你没有这个能力，所以你必须问自己这个问题，我能否用一系列竞争对手难以复制的能力来满足特定客户的需求？

They either can't do it, or they won't do it.

他们要么做不到，要么不会做。

And both are important questions because sometimes it won't.

这两个问题都很重要，因为有时不会。

Roger Martin: Do you really think Walmart couldn't have built as good a website as Amazon, and at massive scale?

罗杰·马丁：你真的认为沃尔玛无法建立像亚马逊一样好的大规模网站吗？

I think they could have, right?

我想他们可以有，对吧？

Roger Martin: Did they?

罗杰·马丁：是吗？

They didn't.

他们没有。

They said, I hope this online thing doesn't really take off because that would be a pisser because we've got 5,000 stores across America, and we've got all that, and that would be a bummer.

他们说，我希望这种网上生意不会真正流行起来，因为那会让人生气，因为我们在美国有 5,000 家商店，而且我们拥有所有这些，那将是令人失望的。

And so, they don't do anything for 10 years, giving Amazon the scale, so that Amazon then has this huge scale advantage on this, and network effects, and voila, you've got a competitive advantage that you didn't necessarily completely deserve.

因此，他们在 10 年里没有做任何事情，给亚马逊带来了规模，这样亚马逊就在这方面拥有了巨大的规模优势，以及网络效应，瞧，你已经获得了你不一定完全应得的竞争优势。

You needed the help of the player who stood to lose the most to hope that it wasn't going to happen.

你需要输得最多的玩家的帮助来希望这种情况不会发生。

Same with Tesla, Tesla got a 10 year headstart, not because the OEMs couldn't, they could have, and of course GM did many, many years ago, create a fully functioning electric vehicle.

与特斯拉一样，特斯拉领先了 10 年，不是因为原始设备制造商不能，而是因为他们可以，当然通用汽车在很多年前就做到了，创造了一款功能齐全的电动汽车。

But they couldn't figure out how the hell you make a buck on it, and so they didn't do it, giving Tesla the ability to establish a brand that people associate with that, electric vehicle equals Tesla, and allow them to jump way ahead, and then have the scale that is hard to hard for others to match.

但他们不明白你到底是怎么赚钱的，所以他们没有这样做，让特斯拉有能力建立一个人们与之联系在一起的品牌，电动汽车等于特斯拉，让他们遥遥领先，然后拥有其他人难以匹敌的规模。

Lenny Rachitsky: You said something that's really interesting that I think is also really important, which is, you said that just being the best or better is not a solution.

Lenny Rachitsky：你说了一些非常有趣的事情，我认为也非常重要，也就是说，你说仅仅成为最好或更好并不是解决方案。

You can have a better pet food, you implied that's not going to get you there.

你可以吃更好的宠物食品，你暗示这不会让你达到目标。

Can you talk a bit about that?

你能谈谈这个吗？

Roger Martin: Yeah.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

You have to answer a second question I guess, which is, here's the way I'm going to be better, and here's the way somebody else isn't going to be able to simply replicate that quickly.

我想你必须回答第二个问题，那就是，这就是我会变得更好的方法，而这就是其他人无法简单地快速复制的方法。

One of my favorite businesses, because I was on the board of Thomson Reuters for 14 years, it was Thomson first and then they bought Reuters, so Thomson Reuters.

我最喜欢的企业之一，因为我在汤森路透董事会任职了 14 年，首先是汤森路透，然后他们收购了路透社，所以汤森路透。

Best business is a business called Westlaw, and it's the dominant provider of online legal searches.

最好的企业是一家名为 Westlaw 的企业，它是在线法律搜索的主要提供商。

So, if you're a litigator, and you're trying to, you're getting ready for a case, and you need to know what are the important precedents for this case, you go on to Westlaw, and put in some search terms using a Westlaw keyword system to help with it, and you get the five cases that really matter.

因此，如果您是一名诉讼律师，并且您正在尝试这样做，那么您正在为案件做好准备，并且您需要知道该案件的重要先例是什么，您可以继续使用 Westlaw，并使用 Westlaw 关键字系统输入一些搜索词来帮助解决，然后您就会得到真正重要的五个案例。

You can Google it, and do the same thing, and you'll get the 500 cases that might matter.

你可以用谷歌搜索，然后做同样的事情，你会得到 500 个可能重要的案例。

Roger Martin: How does Westlaw do that?

罗杰·马丁：韦斯特洛是如何做到这一点的？

Well, for now over 100 years, they've taken every case that's come out of the US legal system, had a lawyer, a Westlaw lawyer, write a head note that summarizes what's in the case, using these keywords so that they were searchable, and today, to do 2024, takes 1500 full-time lawyers.

嗯，100多年来，他们接手了美国法律体系中出现的每一个案件，聘请了一位律师，一位Westlaw律师，写了一份摘要，总结了案件的内容，使用这些关键词，以便可以搜索到，而今天，到2024年，需要1500名全职律师。

So, if somebody else said, this Westlaw business is incredibly profitable, and it keeps growing, and it's awesome, I'd like to be in that business...

所以，如果有人说，Westlaw 的这个业务非常有利可图，而且还在不断增长，非常棒，我就想从事这个业务……

All they'd have to do is hire 150,000 lawyers full time, and you'd have to create a numbering system and a keyword system that's different than Westlaw's, and then you'd have to do what Westlaw has done for the past 50 years, which is give it free to law schools so that they teach their students before they even get out how to use Westlaw, and all...

他们所要做的就是雇用 150,000 名全职律师，你必须创建一个与 Westlaw 不同的编号系统和关键字系统，然后你必须做 Westlaw 过去 50 年所做的事情，即免费向法学院提供该系统，以便他们在学生学会如何使用 Westlaw 之前就教他们，所有......

Roger Martin: No probs.

罗杰·马丁：没问题。

That'll be easy, right?

那很容易，对吧？

Nobody's even tried.

甚至没有人尝试过。

Why bother?

何苦呢？

Life's too short.

生命太短了。

And that's the kind of capabilities you need to be able to say we'll win by having the searches that make the lawyer's job the most effective.

这就是你需要的那种能力，你才能说我们将通过使律师的工作最有效的搜查而获胜。

And if it saves them time, it saves them money.

如果这可以节省他们的时间，那就可以节省他们的钱。

And you don't need a huge law library.

而且您不需要庞大的法律图书馆。

Law firms used to have these huge law libraries, you don't need one, you need a terminal, or actually, now it's on everybody's PC.

律师事务所过去有这些巨大的法律图书馆，你不需要一个，你需要一个终端，或者实际上，现在它在每个人的电脑上。

And you don't need a bunch of librarians to go and find the cases that you need, they pop up on your screen.

而且您不需要一群图书管理员去寻找您需要的案例，它们会弹出在您的屏幕上。

That's a great case of competitive advantage.

这是竞争优势的一个很好的例子。

Lenny Rachitsky: Today's episode is brought to you by Cycle, the AI-powered feedback platform for product teams.

Lenny Rachitsky：今天的节目是由 Cycle 为您带来的，Cycle 是一个面向产品团队的人工智能反馈平台。

Is your customer feedback a tangled mess of Slack threads, survey responses and overflowing inboxes?

您的客户反馈是否由 Slack 线索、调查回复和过多的收件箱组成，杂乱无章？

Wish that you could know what your customers really need?

希望您能知道客户真正需要什么？

Cycle unifies all of your customer interactions, from support chats, to user research, gong calls, and app store reviews into one neat collaborative space.

Cycle 将所有客户交互（从支持聊天到用户研究、锣呼叫和应用商店评论）统一到一个整洁的协作空间中。

Cycle's AI then extracts actionable insights on autopilot.

然后，Cycle 的人工智能会提取有关自动驾驶仪的可行见解。

Cycle will learn what you're building so that it can label incoming feedback automatically.

Cycle 将了解您正在构建的内容，以便它可以自动标记传入的反馈。

That means you'll get a full voice of customer report without manually triaging feedback.

这意味着您将获得完整的客户声音报告，而无需手动分类反馈。

Then simply use Cycle Ask to dig deeper into any topic, and generate custom AI generated summaries across your entire feedback repository.

然后，只需使用 Cycle Ask 深入挖掘任何主题，并在整个反馈存储库中生成自定义 AI 生成的摘要。

Lenny Rachitsky: What makes Cycle different is the way that it lets you close feedback loops in each release.

Lenny Rachitsky：Cycle 的不同之处在于它允许您在每个版本中关闭反馈循环。

Feedback is not used just as a way to prioritize what to build, but also as a tool that creates trust with all stakeholders.

反馈不仅可以用作确定构建内容优先级的方式，还可以用作与所有利益相关者建立信任的工具。

Sign up for a free Cycle trial today, at Cycle.app/Lenny, and put your feedback on autopilot.

立即在 Cycle.app/Lenny 上注册免费的 Cycle 试用版，并将您的反馈反馈到自动驾驶仪上。

That's C-Y-C-L-E.app/Lenny.

那是 C-Y-C-L-E.app/Lenny。

Lenny Rachitsky: So, essentially, we're talking about moats.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以，本质上，我们谈论的是护城河。

What are some moat that you can create where people can't just copy what you're doing?

您可以创造哪些护城河，让人们无法复制您正在做的事情？

Roger Martin: And Warren Buffett likes that terminology, right?

罗杰·马丁：沃伦·巴菲特喜欢这个术语，对吗？

That's what he says, he invests in moats.

这就是他所说的，他投资护城河。

Lenny Rachitsky: I'll find the quote we used in a recent podcast episode, but he's like, castles with moats.

Lenny Rachitsky：我会找到我们在最近的播客节目中使用的引言，但他就像，有护城河的城堡。

And maybe along those lines, is there a way you think about types of barriers to recreate capabilities?

也许沿着这些思路，您是否有办法思考重建能力的障碍类型？

It's like, here's the options we have, is it like...

就像，这是我们拥有的选择，是不是……

Essentially, the seven powers I think talks about this.

本质上，我认为七大力量都在讨论这个问题。

Roger Martin: Yeah.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

Yeah.

是的。

That's why I like Helmer, because he categorizes them.

这就是我喜欢赫尔默的原因，因为他对它们进行了分类。

And I've got to look into it some more because I haven't studied it to say whether I would concur that there are just seven, or there are more.

我必须进一步研究它，因为我还没有研究过它来表明我是否同意只有七个，或者还有更多。

My suspicion might be that there are more, but there may not be.

我怀疑可能还有更多，但也可能没有。

They may be all clustered, there may be variants that cluster behind those.

它们可能全部聚集在一起，也可能有聚集在这些后面的变体。

But I don't, myself, have a categorization scheme that says, here's how you search for the moat.

但我自己并没有一个分类方案来说明，这就是你寻找护城河的方式。

Lenny Rachitsky: Great.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

That would be nice.

那太好了。

So, here's the quote from Buffet, by the way, "I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable moats."

顺便说一下，这是巴菲特的一句话：“我寻找有坚不可摧的护城河保护的经济城堡。”

Roger Martin: I like that.

罗杰·马丁：我喜欢这样。

And he's smart, he's consistent.

而且他很聪明，而且始终如一。

Though, everybody makes mistakes, right?

不过，每个人都会犯错误，对吧？

And he did too.

他也这么做了。

Solomon Brothers, US Air...

所罗门兄弟、美国航空...

Anybody who thinks they can be perfect on strategy is delusional.

任何认为自己能够在战略上做到完美的人都是妄想。

And so, even the very, very best, like a Warren Buffet, who's outstanding, arguable genius, is going to sort of think, I think this is a moat, and it's going to be ephemeral.

因此，即使是最优秀的人，比如沃伦·巴菲特，他是杰出的、可以说是天才的人，也会想，我认为这是一条护城河，而且它将是短暂的。

But any of us should be pleased to have a track record that would be anywhere close to that, on really identifying moats, because he has.

但我们任何人都应该很高兴在真正识别护城河方面拥有接近这一记录，因为他已经做到了。

Lenny Rachitsky: We talked about that with Hamilton Helmer, that every startup deck has, here's our moats, here's how we're going to have barriers to entry, and they're all delusional, rarely is there ever an actual moat, especially in the early stages.

Lenny Rachitsky：我们与 Hamilton Helmer 讨论过，每个创业公司都有这样的护城河，这就是我们将如何设置进入壁垒，他们都是妄想，很少有真正的护城河，尤其是在早期阶段。

Lenny Rachitsky: Let's go back to the five questions again, because that's so core to the way you think about strategy.

Lenny Rachitsky：让我们再次回到这五个问题，因为这是您思考战略的方式的核心。

What do you think about using, say this FigJam as an example, as a hypothetical, just to think through questions that they might ask to think about strategy, and I can describe what FigJam is so you -

你认为使用 FigJam 作为一个例子，作为一个假设，只是为了思考他们可能会问的问题来思考策略，我可以描述 FigJam 是什么，所以你 -

Roger Martin: Sure, sure.

罗杰·马丁：当然，当然。

I do not know that product-

我不知道该产品-

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。

It's basically a visual whiteboard collaboration tool, where people can put in sticky notes, and put little mocks, and kind of play around with all the cursors.

它基本上是一个可视化白板协作工具，人们可以在其中放置便签，放置小模拟，以及使用所有光标。

Lenny Rachitsky: And so, it's for brainstorming, and ideation, and things like that, and laying out concept.

Lenny Rachitsky：因此，这是为了集思广益、构思以及类似的事情，并提出概念。

Roger Martin: Gotcha.

罗杰·马丁：明白了。

Okay, that would make sense for Figma.

好吧，这对 Figma 来说是有意义的。

Roger Martin: Right.

罗杰·马丁：对。

Okay.

好的。

So, you'd asked the question, what are we trying to accomplish?

那么，您问了这样一个问题：我们要实现什么目标？

Are we attempting to create something where nothing digital exists, people do this in pen and paper, and so we're trying to invent a category and then be transformative by making the user experience better?

我们是否试图创造一些没有数字化存在的东西，人们用笔和纸来做这件事，所以我们试图发明一个类别，然后通过改善用户体验来进行变革？

Is that what we're trying to do?

这就是我们想要做的吗？

Or are there players already doing this and they're just not doing it very well?

或者是否有玩家已经这样做了，但他们只是做得不太好？

You'd want to say, well, what are we trying to accomplish?

你可能想说，好吧，我们要实现什么目标？

And I don't spend a whole lot of time on that because you got to toggle back and forth between those five questions, but you have to have a reason for searching in a given space for where to play, how to win.

我不会花太多时间在这上面，因为你必须在这五个问题之间来回切换，但你必须有一个理由在给定的空间中搜索在哪里玩、如何获胜。

What do you think their reason for thinking FigJam is worth investing in is?

您认为他们认为 FigJam 值得投资的原因是什么？

What do you think it is?

你认为它是什么？

Is it white space, or is it crummy offerings in the market currently?

是空白，还是目前市场上的产品很糟糕？

Lenny Rachitsky: If I had to get to it, I think they're trying to expand their market and they have a stronghold in design tooling, and there's this adjacent market for product teams broadly to be using Figma more.

Lenny Rachitsky：如果我必须谈到这一点，我认为他们正在努力扩大市场，并且他们在设计工具方面拥有据点，并且有一个相邻的市场可供产品团队广泛更多地使用 Figma。

And there are existing tools similar to that, that are good.

现有的类似工具也很好。

Roger Martin: Okay.

罗杰·马丁：好的。

So, I don't love it to start.

所以，我一开始就不喜欢它。

Roger Martin: So, there's a big market over there, we'd like to get some, is a terrible reason in my view.

罗杰·马丁：所以，那里有一个很大的市场，我们想得到一些，在我看来这是一个可怕的原因。

The reason should be, customers are bereft, customers are lacking something that we can provide.

原因应该是，客户失去了，客户缺少我们可以提供的东西。

This is why I hate...

这就是我讨厌...的原因

And most entries by foreign companies into China, they get their faces shot off.

大多数外国公司进入中国后，都会被打掉脸。

And the reason is the rationale is, it's big, we could get some of that.

原因是，它很大，我们可以得到一些。

So, I don't love it, for starters.

所以，首先，我不喜欢它。

And I'm not saying that that'll guarantee failure, but if somebody gave me a review of a pitch deck for that, I would not invest .

我并不是说这一定会失败，但如果有人给我一份融资方案的审查，我就不会投资。

Lenny Rachitsky: Well, I imagine you can also frame it in other terms, like our customers are demanding more ways to work within Figma with their teams, and there's these-

Lenny Rachitsky：嗯，我想你也可以用其他术语来表达它，就像我们的客户要求更多的方式在Figma 中与他们的团队合作，还有这些——

Roger Martin: Yeah.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

So, that would be a better one.

所以，那会是一个更好的。

And you're speculating, I've asked you to speculate, so we don't know.

你在猜测，我让你猜测，所以我们不知道。

But I like that one better, which is, what's our aspiration?

但我更喜欢这一点，那就是我们的愿望是什么？

It's to satisfied core customers, who love what we do, but think it's too narrow, that if we could broaden that for them, into this market, our customers would be very happy.

这是为了满足核心客户的需求，他们喜欢我们所做的事情，但认为它太狭窄了，如果我们能够为他们扩展这个市场，我们的客户会非常高兴。

Lenny Rachitsky: That is really cool.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这真的很酷。

And so, you want to frame it in the words of how customers would benefit, essentially.

因此，您希望用客户将如何受益的方式来描述它，本质上是这样。

Roger Martin: I just think those tend to be stronger, strongest, if there's a link.

罗杰·马丁：我只是认为，如果有联系的话，它们往往会更强大、最强。

Because remember, what is strategy about?

因为请记住，战略是什么？

Compelling desired customer action.

吸引客户所需的行动。

So, everything ties back to that.

所以，一切都与此相关。

So, then the where to play would be, you just want to say, okay, what customers are we talking about, or what parts of our current customers that we don't serve are we attempting to serve with that?

那么，接下来的重点是，你只想说，好吧，我们正在谈论哪些客户，或者我们正在尝试服务哪些当前客户中我们不服务的部分？

And with what product?

以及用什么产品？

Is it a finished product?

是成品吗？

Is it a component of a product?

它是产品的组成部分吗？

Through what distribution channel would we sell this?

我们将通过什么分销渠道销售这个产品？

This is another self-serve type product.

这是另一种自助式产品。

I think Figma is mainly self-serve, right?

我觉得Figma主要是自助式的吧？

And so, you choose that where, and then say, how can we solve the problem?

所以，你选择那个地方，然后说，我们如何解决这个问题？

Lenny Rachitsky: Before we get to that, before we get to that real quick-

Lenny Rachitsky：在我们开始之前，在我们真正快速开始之前-

Roger Martin: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, please.

罗杰·马丁：哦，是的，是的，是的，拜托。

Please.

请。

Lenny Rachitsky: So, the things you mentioned there is who specifically are the customers?

Lenny Rachitsky：那么，您提到的客户具体是谁？

So, in this case it'd be like product managers, engineers, and other functions, and then there's the distribution channels, how we'd actually get to them?

那么，在这种情况下，就像产品经理、工程师和其他职能部门一样，然后是分销渠道，我们实际上如何接触到他们？

Lenny Rachitsky: And then, what other questions are there within this where we will play?

Lenny Rachitsky：那么，我们将要玩的地方还有哪些其他问题？

Roger Martin: To what extent is it a finished product or a component?

罗杰·马丁：它在多大程度上是成品还是组件？

Because sometimes it could be, we'd like to supply this component that could be integrated into other people's products.

因为有时可能是这样，我们希望提供可以集成到其他人的产品中的组件。

That's what Apple apps are, right?

这就是苹果应用程序，对吧？

Roger Martin: We don't sell them an iPhone, we sell them a component within the iPhone, a customer's iPhone, is that what we're doing here?

罗杰·马丁：我们不向他们出售 iPhone，我们向他们出售 iPhone 内的一个组件，即客户的 iPhone，这就是我们在这里所做的吗？

Because then you have to ask questions about, well, how does it fit in with the rest?

因为那时你必须问一些问题，嗯，它如何与其他部分相适应？

Lenny Rachitsky: So, the where also implies where in the product it lives?

Lenny Rachitsky：那么，“where”也意味着它位于产品的哪个位置？

Where-

哪里——

Roger Martin: At what vertical stage?

罗杰·马丁：处于哪个垂直阶段？

Is it an integrated product, where it's the whole thing from soup to nuts?

它是一个完整的产品吗？

Is it some upstream pieces that some people downstream?

是一些上游的部分，一些人下游了？

Do we take pieces from other people and assemble them?

我们是否从其他人那里拿来碎片并将它们组装起来？

So, we're the integrator?

那么，我们是集成商？

Those are all important where to play choices, from my view, because those make a big difference.

在我看来，这些都是重要的比赛地点选择，因为它们会带来很大的不同。

Like Four Seasons chose...

就像四季选择的那样...

Four Seasons the hotel company, luxury hotel, chose a completely different choice on the vertical stage where to play, back in the 80s, they said we're going to get out of real estate development...

四季酒店公司，豪华酒店，在垂直舞台上选择了完全不同的选择去发挥，早在80年代，他们就说我们要退出房地产开发……

So buying land and getting it zoned for hotels.

因此，购买土地并将其划为酒店。

We're going to get out of construction, building hotels.

我们将摆脱建筑业，建设酒店。

We're even going to get out of the business of owning the land or the hotel, so that we can be awesome at hotel management.

我们甚至要放弃拥有土地或酒店的业务，这样我们就可以在酒店管理方面表现出色。

Roger Martin: Rich people, like Michael Dell, and David Thompson, and Bill Gates will own the hotels, as an investment, and they will be happy to have Four Seasons brand on their hotel, and we will charge a management fee.

罗杰·马丁：像迈克尔·戴尔、大卫·汤普森和比尔·盖茨这样的富人将拥有这些酒店，作为投资，他们会很高兴在他们的酒店上拥有四季品牌，我们将收取管理费。

That is a where to play choice.

这是一个在哪里玩的选择。

Even though somebody could say, well, you're a luxury hotel, you're like the other luxury hotels who serve luxury customers at a high price.

尽管有人可能会说，好吧，你是一家豪华酒店，但你就像其他以高价格服务豪华客户的豪华酒店一样。

Oh no, no, no, no, no, they do it with a stack this thick, we do it with a stack this thin.

哦，不，不，不，不，不，他们用这么厚的堆栈来做，我们用这么薄的堆栈来做。

Lenny Rachitsky: So, it's like a value chain question.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以，这就像一个价值链问题。

Where in the value chain are you going to play?

您将在价值链的哪个环节发挥作用？

Roger Martin: Value chain.

罗杰·马丁：价值链。

Yeah.

是的。

Where in the value chain?

处于价值链的哪个位置？

That's exactly right.

完全正确。

And everybody has value chain questions.

每个人都有价值链问题。

They often complain, after the fact, like all the apps complain about what cut Apple is taking, but they made a choice, a value chain choice.

他们经常在事后抱怨，就像所有应用程序抱怨苹果正在削减什么一样，但他们做出了选择，价值链的选择。

We are going to design something that will appear on an iPhone, or an Android device, if it's that case, and then good luck to you.

我们将设计一些会出现在 iPhone 或 Android 设备上的东西（如果是这种情况的话），然后祝你好运。

You can complain like crazy that they're taking so much of it, and this is unfair, and they've got to duopoly...

你可以疯狂地抱怨他们拿走了这么多，这是不公平的，他们必须双寡头垄断......

Yeah, but you guys cooperated 100% in building that.

是的，但是你们在建造这个项目的过程中百分百合作。

100%, never complained about it, until you wanted a bigger piece of the pie.

100%，从不抱怨，直到你想要一块更大的蛋糕。

That was a vertical stage, a value chain stage, that you chose, willingly.

那是一个垂直阶段，一个价值链阶段，是你自愿选择的。

Nobody forced you to do it.

没有人强迫你这样做。

Lenny Rachitsky: And Apple's not playing ball, giving it back too easily.

Lenny Rachitsky：苹果并没有参与其中，很容易就将其归还。

Roger Martin: No. No. And do I love just how controlling and everything Apple is?

罗杰·马丁：不，不。我喜欢苹果公司的控制力和一切吗？

Do I?

我是吗？

No, but would I say, oh, those poor apps, right?

不，但我会说，哦，那些糟糕的应用程序，对吧？

Yeah, no, get your own distribution channel, buddy.

是的，不，建立你自己的分销渠道，伙计。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, so we've talked about the winning aspirations, so for FigJam, it would be satisfy customers that are trying to work with their team in these different ways, and make sure they're staying, make sure they get what they need out of Figma, versus go maybe to other tools.

Lenny Rachitsky：好的，我们已经讨论了获胜的愿望，因此对于 FigJam 来说，它将满足那些试图以不同方式与团队合作的客户，并确保他们留下来，确保他们从 Figma 中获得所需的东西，而不是转向其他工具。

And then, where will we play?

然后，我们去哪里玩？

Let's say, engineers, product managers is trying to target them, distribution through the existing product, and so it's like a feature of the existing product.

比方说，工程师、产品经理正试图以他们为目标，通过现有产品进行分发，所以这就像现有产品的一个功能。

And then, it's how will we win?

然后，我们将如何获胜？

How do you think about that?

您对此有何看法？

Roger Martin: Yeah, yeah.

罗杰·马丁：是的，是的。

Well, you ask the question, how can we solve...

好吧，你问这个问题，我们该如何解决...

Well, how can we either solve that problem at a much lower cost, so we can always be a sharper price point than them?

那么，我们怎样才能以低得多的成本解决这个问题，这样我们就能始终比他们拥有更清晰的价格点呢？

So, if there are solutions, but they cost 50,000 a user because their costs are 30,000 a user, we can do this for $15 a user, and so we can charge $100 per seat, and absolutely annihilate the competitor by figuring out a less costly way to do it.

因此，如果有解决方案，但每个用户的成本为 50,000 美元，因为每个用户的成本为 30,000 美元，我们可以以每个用户 15 美元的价格做到这一点，因此我们可以向每个席位收取 100 美元，并通过找出成本更低的方法来绝对消灭竞争对手。

Or there are other selections, but they make the user do all these things, and it's ponderous, and it takes a long time...

或者还有其他选择，但它们让用户做所有这些事情，而且很繁琐，而且需要很长时间......

We have shortcuts, we use AI to, you just say a few words into it, and they say, oh yeah, I know what you mean, and here it goes in the workflow.

我们有捷径，我们使用人工智能，你只需对它说几句话，他们就会说，哦，是的，我知道你的意思，这就是工作流程。

Roger Martin: Or we're more integrated, like Thomson Reuters, the company I was on the board of, our advantage was we were better integrated into the workflow.

罗杰·马丁：或者我们更加整合，就像汤森路透（我曾担任该公司的董事会成员）一样，我们的优势是我们可以更好地融入工作流程。

You didn't have to get out of your workflow to go use this product, and then you get back in, we just said, what's your workflow?

您不必退出工作流程即可使用该产品，然后再返回，我们刚才说，您的工作流程是什么？

Oh, well, integrated.

嗯，集成了。

Is it better integrated into their workflow that makes their life easier?

它是否可以更好地融入他们的工作流程，让他们的生活更轻松？

It would be questions, possibilities like that that I would be asking.

我会问这样的问题和可能性。

Essentially, you've got to have a theory there, of how are you going to be better or lower cost.

本质上，你必须有一个理论，关于如何变得更好或降低成本。

Lenny Rachitsky: On the lower cost front, I think generally the advice is you don't want to go that route, that's a very difficult route.

Lenny Rachitsky：在降低成本方面，我认为一般建议是您不想走那条路，那是一条非常困难的路线。

What's your thinking of just when to go that route that you might actually win at lower costs?

您认为什么时候应该走这条可能以更低的成本赢得胜利的路线？

Roger Martin: That's not advice I give.

罗杰·马丁：这不是我给出的建议。

I think they're both completely legitimate strategies.

我认为它们都是完全合法的策略。

They have implications.

它们有影响。

So, if you want to be the cost leader, it is rare that you can be the cost leader without having dominant scale in the territory in which you're operating.

因此，如果您想成为成本领先者，那么如果您在经营区域内不具备主导规模，那么您就很难成为成本领先者。

So, if you want to be a niche cost leader, good luck to you, that's almost never going to happen.

因此，如果您想成为利基成本领先者，祝您好运，这几乎永远不会发生。

So, Vanguard had to make a race to, we're going to do index mutual funds, and it doesn't exist now, we're going to do it and we're going to get gigantic, and we can't let anybody get close to us in size because we want to have the lowest cost position.

因此，先锋集团必须进行一场竞赛，我们要做指数共同基金，它现在还不存在，我们要做，我们将变得巨大，我们不能让任何人在规模上接近我们，因为我们希望拥有最低的成本头寸。

And so, they are the world's biggest mutual fund company, and you have to do that, and same with Southwest, to really make that model work, they had to keep expanding and expanding to get bigger.

因此，他们是世界上最大的共同基金公司，你必须这样做，与西南航空一样，为了真正使这种模式发挥作用，他们必须不断扩张并扩大规模。

Roger Martin: M&M Mars...

罗杰·马丁：M&M 玛氏巧克力...

It takes an enormous amount of commitment to say, we're going to go, and we're just going to keep charging ahead on this.

我们需要做出巨大的承诺才能说，我们要去，而且我们将继续前进。

Whereas, in differentiation, I think you can differentiate sometimes at lower scale, and build yourself slowly towards higher scale.

然而，在差异化方面，我认为有时你可以在较低规模上实现差异化，然后慢慢地向更高规模发展。

But the business world is just getting so much more scale sensitive.

但商业世界对规模变得越来越敏感。

When you think about the costs of differentiation, it's often spending on branding, spending on R&D, R&D innovation.

当你考虑差异化成本时，通常是品牌建设、研发、研发创新方面的支出。

Those two are of the most scale sensitive elements of anybody's cost structure.

这两个是任何人的成本结构中对规模最敏感的因素。

And so, being a niche-y differentiator is getting harder and harder in my view.

因此，在我看来，成为一个利基市场的差异化者变得越来越难。

Lenny Rachitsky: I think it's also important to say, either path is very hard, it's very hard to build a business that makes money and is profitable and survives just broadly.

Lenny Rachitsky：我认为同样重要的是，无论哪一条路都非常艰难，建立一家能够赚钱、盈利并广泛生存的企业非常困难。

Lenny Rachitsky: And you're not going to have this formula of how to win, okay, we got it.

Lenny Rachitsky：你不会有如何获胜的公式，好吧，我们知道了。

We got a big business.

我们有一笔大生意。

Roger Martin: I agree.

罗杰·马丁：我同意。

I agree.

我同意。

And that's why, if I looked at 100 strategies of major companies, I'd say I didn't like 90 of them very much.

这就是为什么，如果我看一下大公司的 100 种策略，我会说其中 90 种我不太喜欢。

Lenny Rachitsky: And then, the other nine out of 10 probably look good, but also don't work out.

Lenny Rachitsky：然后，十分之九的其他可能看起来不错，但也行不通。

Roger Martin: Yes.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

Yeah, no, that's true.

是的，不，确实如此。

There's lots of spaghetti thrown at lots of walls in the world of business.

在商业世界里，有很多意大利面被扔到墙上。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。

So, now we're at the capability step of trying to figure out what capabilities you need to win.

所以，现在我们正处于能力阶段，试图找出你需要赢得哪些能力。

Can you talk about, say with FigJam, what are the sorts of things you think about here?

您能通过 FigJam 谈谈您在这里想到的事情吗？

Roger Martin: Well, I guess I'd ask myself questions, like, is there a learning curve to this, where we could have better capabilities because we started earlier than anybody else, and have more essentially cumulative experience?

罗杰·马丁：嗯，我想我会问自己一些问题，比如，这是否有一个学习曲线，我们可以拥有更好的能力，因为我们比其他人更早开始，并且拥有更多本质上积累的经验？

Is there a way that we've figured out how to serve customers that make them feel tended to better by us?

我们是否找到了一种方法来为客户提供服务，让他们感觉我们得到了更好的照顾？

So, we've got helpline...

所以，我们有求助热线...

We figured out how to do the helpline, because if it's self-serve and that's how they get the product, and then they've got issues with how to use it, they feel that we're just better.

我们弄清楚了如何使用帮助热线，因为如果它是自助服务，这就是他们获得产品的方式，然后他们遇到如何使用它的问题，他们会觉得我们更好。

We're the best of all their providers at that.

在这方面我们是他们所有供应商中最好的。

How to win is a theory of how customers are going to perceive us better, if we're differentiated.

如何取胜是一个关于如果我们与众不同的话客户如何更好地看待我们的理论。

And then, it's what capabilities would we have to have to make that theory come true, rather than just be a wish.

然后，我们需要具备哪些能力才能使该理论成为现实，而不仅仅是一个愿望。

So, if we want them to feel like we're the easiest to deal with, we have to have capabilities to do that.

所以，如果我们想让他们觉得我们是最容易对付的，我们就必须有能力做到这一点。

Roger Martin: It's just like again, Four Seasons said the reason they're by far and away the most successful, profitable, best in all fronts, luxury hotel chain in the world...

罗杰·马丁：就像四季酒店所说的那样，他们是迄今为止世界上最成功、最赚钱、各方面最好的豪华连锁酒店......

Biggest, best, most profitable, best employee rankings, best guest rankings, all of those.

最大、最好、最赚钱、最佳员工排名、最佳宾客排名，所有这些。

Well, their how to win was they said, people, if you talk to people who are in luxury hotels, they'd rather not be there.

好吧，他们的获胜方法是，人们，如果你和豪华酒店里的人交谈，他们宁愿不在那里。

You'd say, wow, they're in the lap of luxury, why would that be?

你会说，哇，他们正处于奢侈的境地，为什么会这样呢？

Where do you think they'd prefer to be, Lenny?

你认为他们更愿意去哪里，莱尼？

Roger Martin: Yeah.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

Dominantly at home, for their segment, which was high-end business travelers.

他们的细分市场主要是在国内，即高端商务旅行者。

They've traveled, they've stayed in one luxury hotel too many 20 years ago.

20 年前，他们旅行过，住过太多豪华酒店。

And so, we're going to have luxury defined as not grand architecture and decor and service, but rather, we're going to define it as a service that makes up for what you left at home or at the office.

因此，我们将奢侈品定义为不是宏伟的建筑、装饰和服务，而是将其定义为一种服务，可以弥补您在家里或办公室留下的东西。

Roger Martin: Because people would rather be, if they have to not be at home, they'd rather be at the office than in a hotel because they can be more productive.

罗杰·马丁：因为人们宁愿，如果他们不得不不在家，他们宁愿在办公室而不是在酒店，因为这样可以提高工作效率。

So, we need capabilities, we need staff that can deliver on that capability.

因此，我们需要能力，我们需要能够提供这种能力的员工。

What's the problem, for that?

有什么问题吗？

The problem is turnover in the hotel industry globally is 80% a year, which means that the average person you meet, the average staff person you meet in the average hotel, is on their way to a 16-month career at that hotel chain.

问题是全球酒店业的人员流动率为每年 80%，这意味着您遇到的普通人，您在普通酒店遇到的普通员工，即将在该连锁酒店工作 16 个月。

So, how do you deliver that really cool special kind of service with that?

那么，您如何提供这种非常酷的特殊服务呢？

The answer is...

答案是……

And now I'm skipping ahead to enabling management systems.

现在我将跳到启用管理系统。

Roger Martin: You have to have a different way of recruiting, a different way of onboarding, a different way of career development.

罗杰·马丁：你必须有不同的招聘方式、不同的入职方式、不同的职业发展方式。

And if you do all of those things, you end up with a 10% turnover rate, so that your people are there 10 years on average, and you can then get them trained up to deliver that kind of service.

如果你做了所有这些事情，你最终会得到 10% 的流动率，这样你的员工平均在那里工作 10 年，然后你可以对他们进行培训，以提供这种服务。

So, that's the capability that you build, and the people, to be able to take more decision-making at a lower level, and treat the guests in a customized way that makes them feel that this wasn't by the book, some rule book, that this person just said, no, this is a good solution for my guest.

所以，这就是你和员工建立的能力，能够在较低级别做出更多决策，并以定制的方式对待客人，让他们觉得这不是按书本、某些规则书，这个人只是说，不，这对我的客人来说是一个很好的解决方案。

Lenny Rachitsky: It's interesting that these capabilities and even the management systems, which is step five, relate to your moat.

Lenny Rachitsky：有趣的是，这些功能甚至管理系统（第五步）都与你的护城河有关。

Which is the thing you need to achieve, also, ideally is the thing that other people, it'll make it hard for them to do.

这是你需要实现的事情，而且，理想情况下也是其他人要做的事情，这会让他们很难做到。

Roger Martin: Yep.

罗杰·马丁：是的。

So, you're exactly right.

所以，你是完全正确的。

You can call if you want, how to win, moat, right?

如果你愿意，你可以打电话，如何获胜，护城河，对吗？

Definition of your moat.

护城河的定义。

And so, capabilities and management systems are what both build and maintain the moat, and the maintaining is an important part because if you are the most successful, people are going to say, I want to do that too.

因此，能力和管理系统是构建和维护护城河的要素，维护是重要的一部分，因为如果你是最成功的，人们会说，我也想这样做。

But here's where there's this modern, unfortunately, bull shitty thing that says, oh, competitive advantage is fleeting in this modern hyper-competitive world, and you can't have long-term advantage anymore.

但不幸的是，这就是现代的、牛逼的东西，它说，哦，在这个竞争激烈的现代世界，竞争优势转瞬即逝，你不可能再拥有长期优势了。

And I just say, oh, I see.

我只是说，哦，我明白了。

So, Four Seasons, I guess that isn't very long-term, that has only been 45 years now, since they...

所以，《四季》，我想这并不是很长的时间，距今只有 45 年了，因为他们......

No, 35 years I should say.

不，我应该说是 35 年。

Don't exaggerate.

别夸大其词。

Since they went to that strategy.

自从他们采取了那个策略以来。

Oh, and Tide.

哦，还有潮汐。

So, 77 years isn't a long time, I guess either, because they've been the number one detergent for 77 consecutive years.

所以，我想，77 年也不算长，因为它们已经连续 77 年成为排名第一的洗涤剂了。

I guess you're right, it's fleeting.

我想你是对的，它转瞬即逝。

Roger Martin: It's not.

罗杰·马丁：不是的。

But what makes it fleeting is when you have one thing, and one thing only.

但当你拥有一件事，而且只有一件事时，它就会转瞬即逝。

So, let's say you build the biggest polyethylene plant in the world, near a good feedstock source, and you have the low cost position, what's somebody else going to do when they see how much money you make doing that?

那么，假设您在良好的原料来源附近建造了世界上最大的聚乙烯工厂，并且您拥有低成本地位，那么当其他人看到您这样做赚了多少钱时会做什么？

Build a polyethylene plant beside yours, twice the size, and then you're toast.

在你的旁边建一个聚乙烯工厂，大小是你工厂的两倍，然后你就完蛋了。

Why?

为什么？

Because the competitive advantage was too simple.

因为竞争优势太简单了。

But at Four Seasons, you got to sell off all your hotels, you got to fire all the people involved in hotel development and everything, and actually, the people in the business like doing that, you have to essentially get rid of your entire staff, start from scratch, paying them more than you do now by far, giving them more career security, giving them more training, giving them better uniforms, whatever, spending 10 times as much hiring them, with the hopes that maybe someday you'll be able to produce the kind of services Four Seasons does.

但在四季酒店，你必须卖掉所有的酒店，你必须解雇所有参与酒店开发的人员和一切，实际上，业内人士喜欢这样做，你必须从根本上摆脱你的整个员工，从头开始，支付比现在更高的工资，给他们更多的职业保障，给他们更多的培训，给他们更好的制服，无论如何，花十倍的钱雇用他们，希望有一天你能够提供四季酒店那种服务确实如此。

Roger Martin: The competitors basically say, life's too short.

罗杰·马丁：竞争对手基本上都在说，生命太短暂了。

Do they give up and die?

他们会放弃并死去吗？

No, there are other great chains, Mandarin Oriental, my wife loves staying in Mandarin Oriental, even more than Four Seasons often.

不，还有其他很棒的连锁酒店，文华东方酒店，我妻子很喜欢住在文华东方酒店，甚至比四季酒店还多。

But they've not said, we will replicate Four Seasons, they've said, we'll pick a different where, and a different how, and that's, in the end, what you want.

但他们没有说，我们会复制《四季》，他们说，我们会选择不同的地点和不同的方式，这就是你想要的。

Is rather than complete overlap, where you've got concentric circles of people picking the same where, you convince people to pick different wheres.

不是完全重叠，你有同心圆的人们选择相同的地方，你说服人们选择不同的地方。

That's why people sort of say, Roger, how to win, that's so impolitic, because you're producing losers, and then there's victims, and all that.

这就是为什么人们会说，罗杰，如何获胜，这太不政治了，因为你会产生失败者，然后就会出现受害者，等等。

There's oppressor and oppressive.

有压迫者和压迫者。

It fits in the modern dialogue.

它适合现代对话。

And I say, no, what I want to do is encourage them to find someplace else to prosper, rather than smash on top of us.

我说，不，我想做的是鼓励他们去其他地方发展，而不是压垮我们。

Roger Martin: And so, if you have completely different capabilities and management systems, it'll encourage people to choose a different where to play, how to win.

罗杰·马丁：所以，如果你有完全不同的能力和管理系统，它会鼓励人们选择不同的比赛地点和获胜方式。

If your capabilities and management systems are very similar to your competitors, and you're succeeding with your chosen where to play, how to win, what are they going to do?

如果您的能力和管理系统与您的竞争对手非常相似，并且您在选择的竞争地点、如何获胜方面取得了成功，那么他们会做什么？

They're going to drive straight to your where to play and try to win exactly the same place and wreck your market for both of you.

他们会直接开车到你比赛的地方，并试图赢得完全相同的位置，从而破坏你们俩的市场。

That's what you don't want.

那就是你不想要的。

And the more complicated, in some sense...

从某种意义上说，更复杂的是......

I shouldn't use complicated.

我不应该使用复杂的。

The more nuanced and multifaceted your capabilities and management systems are, the more likely they're going to say life's too short.

你的能力和管理系统越细致、越全面，他们就越有可能说生命太短暂。

That's what everybody says about Southwest.

大家都这么说西南航空。

So, if you're the only airline in the United States that's earning its cost of capital for 50 years, wouldn't you say, gee, I'd love to be like that?

所以，如果您是美国唯一一家连续 50 年盈利的航空公司，您会不会说，天啊，我很想成为那样的人？

But what does it mean?

但这意味着什么呢？

Roger Martin: Well, it means selling off most of your aircraft, so that you can have only one kind of aircraft, 737.

罗杰·马丁：嗯，这意味着卖掉你的大部分飞机，这样你就只能拥有一种飞机，737。

Tearing up your entire root structure, your entire hub and spoke structure, and make it point to point.

撕毁你的整个根部结构，你的整个轮毂和辐条结构，并使其点对点。

Changing your complete labor relations strategy, from fighting the unions to paying them a lot, as long as they're highly flexible.

改变你的整个劳资关系策略，从与工会作斗争到向他们支付高额工资，只要他们高度灵活。

People think Southwest is non-union, it's not unionized , but they do different...

人们认为西南航空没有工会，也没有加入工会，但他们的做法不同......

You have to essentially fire all your travel agents, and convince your customers to book online, by themselves, to save more money.

您必须解雇所有旅行社，并说服您的客户自行在线预订，以节省更多钱。

Life's too short, it's just too short.

生命太短了，实在是太短了。

So, they try things like Continental Light, or Ted, that do half the things that Southwest does, and then you're what?

所以，他们尝试了像大陆之光（Continental Light）或泰德（Ted）这样的公司，它们做的事情只有西南航空一半，然后你呢？

A crappy Southwest.

糟糕的西南。

So, to me, that's the ultimate.

所以，对我来说，这就是终极的。

The ultimate is, it's like the ultimate weapon is the one you never use.

终极是，就像终极武器是你从未使用过的一样。

The ultimate way to compete to win is to never actually be forced to compete.

竞争获胜的最终方法是永远不要真正被迫竞争。

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow, that's a great quote.

Lenny Rachitsky：哇，这句话说得很好。

This story about Southwest makes me think about Hamilton Helmer's counter-positioning, I don't know if you've heard that term, but basically, you position yourself in a way where the competitor can't do the thing that you're doing because of the way their business is already structured.

这个关于西南航空的故事让我想到了汉密尔顿·赫尔默的反定位，我不知道你是否听说过这个词，但基本上，你对自己的定位是竞争对手无法做你正在做的事情，因为他们的业务已经结构化了。

Roger Martin: Ah, that's sounds right.

罗杰·马丁：啊，听起来不错。

The can't.

不能。

Roger Martin: The can't thing.

罗杰·马丁：这是不可能的事。

Awesome.

惊人的。

Yeah, and Mike Porter, and he may quote Mike on that, Mike was very big on that.

是的，还有迈克·波特，他可能会引用迈克的话，迈克对此非常重视。

He said, it's fault lines.

他说，这是断层线。

You're trying to find fault line, where it is so painful for your competitor to come across that fault line, into your side.

你试图找到断层线，而你的竞争对手越过这条断层线进入你的身边是非常痛苦的。

And so, a great example of that would be Olay, at P&G, and it's in the book, when we did the repositioning of that.

因此，一个很好的例子就是宝洁公司的玉兰油，当我们对其进行重新定位时，它就在书中。

The competitor that could have killed us, absolutely killed us, was Estée Lauder with Clinique.

雅诗兰黛（Estée Lauder）和倩碧（Clinique）可能会杀死我们，绝对会杀死我们。

If they would've brought Clinique into the mass channels...

如果他们将倩碧带入大众渠道......

Because we were doing a Clinique kind of thing, in the mass channels, rather than the prestige.

因为我们是在大众渠道做倩碧那样的事情，而不是为了声望。

Prestige is like the first four of the department stores, which or Sephora, or Ulta.

Prestige就像百货公司中的前四家，或者丝芙兰，或者Ulta。

If Estée Lauder would've taken their Clinique brand and brought it into mass, they would've killed what we were doing.

如果雅诗兰黛采用他们的倩碧品牌并将其推向大众，他们就会扼杀我们正在做的事情。

Simple as that.

就这么简单。

Roger Martin: And in fact, Clinique was the biggest brand in all of skincare, we became the biggest brand in all of skincare, and they didn't do it.

罗杰·马丁：事实上，倩碧是所有护肤品中最大的品牌，我们成为所有护肤品中最大的品牌，但他们没有这么做。

Why?

为什么？

Are they idiots?

他们是白痴吗？

No, they're not, Estée Lauder's super smart.

不，他们不是，雅诗兰黛非常聪明。

But Estée Lauder also has Bobby Brown, and Mac, and the Estée Lauder, its own brand, and a half a dozen more, all in prestige, and the prestige channel, if they'd have taken Clinique, and taken it over into mass, would've done what?

但雅诗兰黛也有鲍比·布朗(Bobby Brown)、Mac、雅诗兰黛(Estée Lauder)、自己的品牌，还有六个其他品牌，全都是有声望的，还有声望渠道，如果他们收购了倩碧，并将其带入大众市场，会做什么呢？

Shot them in the face.

朝他们的脸开枪。

Killed them, right?

杀了他们吧？

They would've been just apoplectic.

他们肯定会气愤不已。

And so, Estée Lauder had to stay...

因此，雅诗兰黛不得不留下来……

If that's counter-positioning by Helmer's terms.

如果按照赫尔默的说法，这是相反的定位。

They had to stay there.

他们必须留在那里。

Was that stupid?

那是愚蠢的吗？

No, they're still, with all of their brands combined, the biggest in skincare.

不，将所有品牌加在一起，他们仍然是护肤品领域最大的品牌。

But Clinique has lost leadership to our brand that they would've considered kind of nothing.

但倩碧已经失去了我们品牌的领导地位，他们认为这个品牌没什么。

Oil of Olay became Olay Olay ProV, Regenerist, all of these higher priced products than they could ever imagine being sold in the mass channel.

Oil of Olay 变成了 Olay Olay ProV、Regenerist，所有这些产品在大众渠道销售的价格都超出了他们的想象。

But our biggest friend was, in some sense, their distribution channel, which would've killed them if we...

但从某种意义上说，我们最大的朋友是他们的分销渠道，如果我们......

Literally.

从字面上看。

They would've just punished them so, so, so bad that they didn't do it.

他们只会惩罚他们如此、如此、如此严厉，以至于他们不这样做。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that I'm learning all this strategic thinking about makeup and skincare, I also love just the idea of you leading strategy for skincare and makeup brands.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢学习有关化妆品和护肤品的所有战略思维，我也喜欢您领导护肤和化妆品品牌战略的想法。

Roger Martin: Yeah, no, I got Proctor & Gamble into color cosmetics.

罗杰·马丁：是的，不，我让宝洁公司涉足彩妆领域。

Lenny Rachitsky: So funny.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太有趣了。

love that.

喜欢那个。

I don't know if you're following the AI Google stuff that's happening, where there's search engines competing with Google by just answering the question versus giving you a bunch of blue links?

我不知道你是否关注正在发生的人工智能谷歌的事情，那里的搜索引擎通过回答问题而不是给你一堆蓝色链接来与谷歌竞争？

Lenny Rachitsky: And there's this question of, we'll Google Shift because people seem to really like it, versus they're making trillions of dollars running ads when they share blue links, and it's this super innovator's dilemma position they're in.

Lenny Rachitsky：有这样一个问题，我们将使用 Google Shift，因为人们似乎真的很喜欢它，而不是当他们共享蓝色链接时通过投放广告赚取数万亿美元，这就是他们所处的超级创新者的困境。

Roger Martin: Yeah, no, no, I am very interested in what's going on in AI, and I'm writing some stuff on that.

罗杰·马丁：是的，不，不，我对人工智能领域正在发生的事情非常感兴趣，我正在写一些相关的东西。

But it's hard.

但这很难。

I've seen the inside of this for many of my clients, it is super hard when the guts of how you make money is under threat, and you just don't want that thing to go away.

我已经为我的许多客户看到过这件事的内部情况，当你赚钱的勇气受到威胁时，这是非常困难的，而你只是不希望这种事情消失。

The big auto OEMs make money selling cars with ice engines, it's simple as that.

大型汽车原始设备制造商通过销售配备冰发动机的汽车来赚钱，就这么简单。

And there's no surprise, they've been doing it for 100 years, they're way down the learning curve, they have scale, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.

毫不奇怪，他们已经这样做了 100 年，他们的学习曲线很靠后，他们有规模，等等，等等，等等。

And so, these damn electric vehicles are kind of no fun.

所以，这些该死的电动汽车一点也不好玩。

And so, the Google situation you've described, I think it's similar.

所以，你所描述的谷歌的情况，我认为是相似的。

But my general advice is always the same, which is, it can take a while, but in the end the customers will triumph.

但我的一般建议始终是相同的，那就是，这可能需要一段时间，但最终客户会取得胜利。

And A.G.

还有 A.G.

Lafley, my friend who I co-wrote the book with, great CEO, was very good on this.

与我共同撰写这本书的朋友雷富礼（Lafley）是一位伟大的首席执行官，他在这方面非常擅长。

And one of his big customers, big customers came to him and said, if you don't stop cooperating with Amazon, we're going to de-list all your products.

他的一个大客户，大客户来找他说，如果你不停止与亚马逊的合作，我们就要下架你所有的产品。

Roger Martin: Big threat.

罗杰·马丁：巨大的威胁。

Big threat.

大威胁。

And A.G.

还有 A.G.

just said, "If customers want to shop there, we just can't not be where our customers want to shop.

只是说，“如果顾客想在那里购物，我们就不能不在顾客想要购物的地方。

And so, if you feel you need to do that, you're going to have to, because customers want to shop there, and we are not doing that.

所以，如果你觉得你需要这样做，你就必须这样做，因为顾客想在那里购物，而我们不会这样做。

But what are you offended by, that we're doing there?" And they said, "Well, you are allowing them to ship products to their customers from your distribution centers." And A.G.

但我们在那里做什么，让你生气了？”他们说：“好吧，你允许他们从你的配送中心将产品运送给他们的客户。”还有 A.G.

just said, "Yeah?

只是说：“是吗？

Do you want to too?" And they were like...

你也想吗？”他们就像...

And he just said, "We don't do anything special for them that we wouldn't do for you, they ask for things that you don't ask for because of their business model.

他只是说，“我们不会为他们做任何我们不会为你做的特别的事情，他们会要求你因为他们的商业模式而不会要求的东西。

But if you come to us with ideas of how we can help you serve our joint customers better, we're all in.

但如果您向我们提出如何帮助您更好地服务我们的共同客户的想法，我们将全力支持。

But we're not boycotting a place that customers have shown they want to shop," as long as it's an honest, if Amazon was sleazy and dishonest or whatever, but an honest, upstanding place where customers can get our products.

但我们并不是抵制顾客表现出想要购物的地方，”只要它是一个诚实的地方（如果亚马逊是卑鄙和不诚实的或其他什么的话），而是一个诚实、正直的地方，顾客可以在那里购买我们的产品。

Roger Martin: And so, that's where I'm at, which is, you may have to scramble like hell, you may have to suffer from economic downturn, but if you think you can...

罗杰·马丁：所以，这就是我的处境，也就是说，你可能不得不拼命挣扎，你可能不得不遭受经济衰退的痛苦，但如果你认为你可以......

I always think of it, I don't know if you did this as a kid, Lenny, but when we went to the beach on family trips, we would, I have four brothers, we would build...

我一直在想，我不知道你小时候是否这样做过，莱尼，但是当我们全家去海滩旅行时，我们会，我有四个兄弟，我们会建造......

Plus then a baby girl later.

再后来又生了一个女婴。

But we would build sand castles and try to hold back the tide, this would be in Florida or California, and we'd try and hold back the tide, and we'd come the next morning to see if our castle...

但是我们会建造沙堡并试图阻止潮汐，这将在佛罗里达州或加利福尼亚州，我们会尝试阻止潮汐，第二天早上我们会来看看我们的城堡是否......

And it was always gone.

但它总是消失了。

It's gone.

它消失了。

But we'd keep trying doing it, and it's sort of like, you can't hold back the tide.

但我们会继续尝试这样做，这有点像，你无法阻止潮流。

Maybe you can for a while, but you can't forever.

也许你可以暂时，但你不能永远。

So, you just have to figure out where are the customers going.

因此，您只需弄清楚客户要去哪里。

And if they're going someplace...

如果他们要去某个地方...

Roger Martin: And Vanguard did this, Jack Bogle, the late Jack Bogle, he died now, a couple of years ago now, he did not like ETFs.

罗杰·马丁：先锋集团做到了这一点，杰克·博格尔，已故的杰克·博格尔，他现在去世了，几年前，他不喜欢 ETF。

He said ETFs are not as good for customers as mutual funds.

他表示，ETF 对客户来说不如共同基金。

And he had all sorts of good reasons for that, but the index ETF business started to grow like crazy, and Jack had to relent and say, I don't think it's good for them, but they want it, and so they went whole hog into it, and are the leading index ETF provider, as well as the index mutual fund provider.

他有各种各样的充分理由，但指数 ETF 业务开始疯狂增长，杰克不得不放宽态度，说，我不认为这对他们有好处，但他们想要它，所以他们全力投入，成为领先的指数 ETF 提供商，以及指数共同基金提供商。

But for a while they weren't, but he realized it was the tide, and he was attempting to hold back the tide.

但有一段时间他们没有，但他意识到这是潮流，他正试图阻止潮流。

So, good luck.

所以，祝你好运。

Good luck to you on that.

祝你好运。

So, to me, if Google thinks they can, because of their power and the fact they've got a multi-trillion dollar market cap, and they've got a near monopoly position on something, they can hold back the tide.

因此，对我来说，如果谷歌认为他们可以，因为他们的力量和他们拥有数万亿美元的市值，并且他们在某些方面拥有近乎垄断的地位，他们就可以阻止这股潮流。

Roger Martin: You see, the water finds a way to flow.

罗杰·马丁：你看，水找到了流动的方式。

Think about Microsoft and its monopoly on PC operating systems, or it's near monopoly on PC operating systems.

想想微软及其对 PC 操作系统的垄断，或者说它对 PC 操作系统的垄断。

And I would argue that they abuse that kind of monopoly.

我认为他们滥用了这种垄断。

I often asked people, when's the last Windows update that got you as a customer excited?

我经常问人们，最近一次让您作为客户感到兴奋的 Windows 更新是什么时候？

Roger Martin: The answer, I think is really clear, Windows 95, right?

罗杰·马丁：我认为答案非常明确，Windows 95，对吧？

Roger Martin: Because that's when he took the graphical user interface that he bought rights to from Steve Jobs and put it on, so you didn't have to do backslash backslash...

罗杰·马丁：因为那时他从史蒂夫·乔布斯那里购买了图形用户界面的版权并安装了它，所以你不必做反斜杠反斜杠......

You could actually point and click.

您实际上可以指向并单击。

That's a long time ago, last time I checked, that's now almost 30 years.

那是很久以前的事了，上次我检查时，现在已经快30年了。

And so, they just abused their customer.

所以，他们只是虐待他们的顾客。

Is their share of PC operating systems much lower than it was then?

他们的 PC 操作系统份额是否比当时低很多？

No. But that's not the right measure of share.

不。但这不是正确的份额衡量标准。

The right measure of share in my view in that industry is your share of minutes spent staring at a smart screen.

在我看来，衡量该行业份额的正确标准是你盯着智能屏幕的分钟数。

That's what the share of operating systems that you should care about.

这就是您应该关心的操作系统份额。

And so, what kind of smart screens do people now stare at most?

那么，现在人们最关注什么样的智慧屏呢？

Most?

最多？

And what other one do a lot of people stare at who really like them?

还有哪一个让很多人盯着真正喜欢他们的人看呢？

Pads.

护垫。

And so, if you added up all those and said, what do you think...

所以，如果你把所有这些加起来并说，你觉得怎么样......

So, what's their share of smartphone operating systems?

那么，他们在智能手机操作系统中的份额是多少？

Microsoft?

微软？

Roger Martin: Last time I checked it was 0.4 of 1%.

罗杰·马丁：上次我检查的时候是 1% 的 0.4。

Yeah, so effectively zero.

是的，所以实际上为零。

How about pads?

垫子怎么样？

Apparently it's 4% there.

显然是4%。

So, their share of people staring at a smart screen has plummeted.

因此，盯着智能屏幕的人数比例大幅下降。

Plummeted.

暴跌。

Why?

为什么？

Because water finds its own level.

因为水有自己的水平。

People said, there are these other ways of getting around this, and I'm going to take those ways.

人们说，还有其他方法可以解决这个问题，我将采用这些方法。

And I think the degree to which people use their smartphone for more things, as the function of that smartphone is advanced so much faster than your PC operating system, because more people are using it.

我认为人们使用智能手机做更多事情的程度，因为智能手机的功能比 PC 操作系统进步得快得多，因为更多的人在使用它。

So, that's what I'd say to Google.

所以，这就是我想对谷歌说的话。

I don't care how painful it is, water flows downhill, the tide comes in, and you cannot stop that, even if you're one of the most powerful three firms on the face of the planet.

我不管有多痛苦，水往低处流，潮水涌来，你无法阻止它，即使你是地球上最强大的三个公司之一。

Lenny Rachitsky: And it may take time, but eventually the customer tide pulls, that's a, I think that's really important.

Lenny Rachitsky：这可能需要时间，但最终客户潮会拉动，我认为这非常重要。

Roger Martin: But yeah, start now.

罗杰·马丁：但是，是的，现在就开始吧。

If you don't start now, it's too late.

如果你现在不开始，那就太晚了。

Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：是的。

I want to end with one very tactical question for people, that may feel overwhelmed, they're just like, oh my God, I don't know what we're going to do, this is so hard, all strategy stuff.

我想向人们提出一个非常战术性的问题，他们可能会感到不知所措，他们就像，天哪，我不知道我们要做什么，这太难了，都是策略性的东西。

You have this really cool idea called betterment, I think you wrote a media post about it, thinking betterment over perfection.

你有一个非常酷的想法，叫做“改善”，我想你写了一篇关于它的媒体文章，认为改善而不是完美。

And it gives you a first step of like, okay, here's a way to move forward.

它给了你第一步，好吧，这是前进的方法。

Can you just talk about that approach?

您能简单谈谈这种方法吗？

Roger Martin: So, for me, strategy, this thing called strategy, with people, oh my God, oh my God, how am I going to do strategy?

罗杰·马丁：所以，对我来说，策略，这个叫做策略的东西，与人们一起，天啊，天啊，我该如何制定策略？

Whatever.

任何。

I just think of it as a problem solving tool.

我只是将其视为解决问题的工具。

And what problem should you attempt to solve?

您应该尝试解决什么问题？

You should attempt to solve something where your current outcomes that you're getting are lower than the outcomes you wish you were getting.

您应该尝试解决当前获得的结果低于您希望获得的结果的问题。

That's what I call a gap.

这就是我所说的差距。

There's a gap between those two.

这两者之间是有差距的。

And you should just conceptualize it as, your current outcomes are a natural result of all the choices you've made interacting with the competitive environment.

你应该将其概念化为，你当前的结果是你在竞争环境中做出的所有选择的自然结果。

And so, you should reasonably assume that probably those outcomes aren't going to get a whole lot better, because they are the way they are for a good reason.

因此，您应该合理地假设这些结果可能不会变得更好，因为它们是有充分理由的。

So, you're going to need to make a different set of choices to make that gap go away.

因此，您将需要做出一组不同的选择来消除这种差距。

That's what I would work on.

这就是我要努力的事情。

Roger Martin: I would just ask the question, what is the single most painful gap currently that I'm facing?

罗杰·马丁：我只想问一个问题，我目前面临的最痛苦的差距是什么？

Customers used to do this, and they're doing this, I can't find this kind of resources, our distribution channel has abandoned us...

客户以前这样做，他们现在这样做，我找不到这种资源，我们的分销渠道已经抛弃了我们......

Whatever is the most painful thing, and then just tackle that.

无论什么是最痛苦的事情，然后解决它。

And say, what different choices could I make?

并说，我可以做出哪些不同的选择？

And I'd say, use my cascade.

我想说，使用我的级联。

Could I change where I'm playing?

我可以改变我玩的地方吗？

Could I change how I'm winning?

我可以改变我获胜的方式吗？

Could I change my capabilities?

我可以改变我的能力吗？

Could I change my manage systems, in order to achieve a different aspiration?

我可以改变我的管理系统，以实现不同的愿望吗？

And so, don't try to solve the problems of the world, or even all the problems of your company, that's perfection.

所以，不要试图解决世界上的问题，甚至是你公司的所有问题，那就是完美。

Betterment is making that gap go away.

改善正在消除这种差距。

And guess what happens if you make that gap go away?

猜猜如果你让这个差距消失会发生什么？

You can turn your attention to the next gap, and the next gap, and the next gap.

你可以把注意力转向下一个间隙、下一个间隙、下一个间隙。

Roger Martin: And if you do that all the time, you're always working on the next gap, the next...

罗杰·马丁：如果你一直这样做，你就会一直在努力解决下一个差距、下一个……

They'll get smaller and smaller over time.

随着时间的推移，它们会变得越来越小。

I don't know if this is a great analogy, but I was dean of a business school for 15 years, the guy who won the professor of the year award more times than anybody else, and did it sort of teaching tough courses, often executive MBA courses, and the like, had a simple formula for doing it.

我不知道这是否是一个很好的类比，但我曾担任商学院院长 15 年，他获得年度教授奖的次数比其他任何人都多，并且教授难度较大的课程，通常是高管 MBA 课程等，有一个简单的公式可以做到这一点。

Which is, he taught second-year courses, and second-year courses happened to be 13 two hour lectures, or sessions, or another.

也就是说，他教授第二年的课程，而第二年的课程恰好是 13 个两小时的讲座，或者课程，或者其他。

He just polled the students on what they thought of each session as they went along, and regardless of the reason, regardless of anything else, simply chopped number 13 every year.

他只是在学生们进行的过程中对他们对每节课的看法进行民意调查，不管出于什么原因，不管其他什么，每年只是砍下第13名。

Roger Martin: Because in some sense, it's the biggest gap, the gap between what the customers, students, wished for, and were getting.

罗杰·马丁：因为从某种意义上说，这是最大的差距，是客户、学生想要的和得到的之间的差距。

And he would just replace it with something.

他只会用一些东西代替它。

He would try something else, and replace it with that.

他会尝试别的东西，然后用那个东西代替。

And you'd say, and that gets you professor of the year every year?

你会说，这让你每年都成为年度教授？

And the answer is yes, betterment.

答案是肯定的，就是进步。

Because if you're teaching for 25 years and you just keep doing that every year, every year, the course keeps getting better and better and better and better and better and better.

因为如果你教了 25 年，并且年复一年地这样做，那么课程就会变得越来越好、越来越好、越来越好。

So, betterment, it doesn't make purists feel awesome, but I'm not here to make purists feel awesome, I'm here to help people get better.

所以，改善，它不会让纯粹主义者感觉很棒，但我来这里不是为了让纯粹主义者感觉很棒，我来这里是为了帮助人们变得更好。

Lenny Rachitsky: This makes me think about your water metaphor too, of just water eventually finding a way through.

Lenny Rachitsky：这也让我想到了你的水比喻，水最终会找到出路。

iterating, things better.

迭代，事情变得更好。

Roger Martin: Yeah, lots of what I think about in strategy is natural, if you will.

罗杰·马丁：是的，如果你愿意的话，我对战略的很多思考都是自然的。

I try to ask, how does the world generally operate, and is what we're doing consistent with the way the world generally operates or not?

我试着问，这个世界一般是如何运作的，我们所做的是否与世界一般运作的方式一致？

Lenny Rachitsky: Roger, this was so much fun, we covered everything I was hoping we'd get through.

Lenny Rachitsky：罗杰，这太有趣了，我们涵盖了我希望能够完成的所有内容。

I think we're going to help a lot of people with the way they think about strategy.

我认为我们将帮助很多人改变他们对战略的思考方式。

Is there anything else you wanted to just leave listeners with, or say before we wrap up and let you go?

在我们结束并让你离开之前，你还有什么想留给听众的，或者说的吗？

We covered a lot, so there may not be anything left.

我们涵盖了很多，所以可能没有留下任何东西。

Roger Martin: Well, on strategy, there's one piece of advice I'd say.

罗杰·马丁：嗯，关于策略，我有一个建议。

People often ask me about people who are natural strategists, or they say, I'm not naturally good at that, I'm more of an operational guy or gal.

人们经常问我哪些人是天生的战略家，或者他们说，我天生不擅长战略家，我更像是一个善于操作的人。

And what I tell them is, I have never met this mythical beast called a great natural strategist.

而我告诉他们的是，我从来没有见过这种被称为天生纵横家的神兽。

And they often throw back in my face, Lafley.

他们经常当着我的面反击，雷富礼。

They say, look, Lafley, he was known as a strategy genius.

他们说，看，雷富礼，他被称为战略天才。

And I say, yeah, but when I interviewed him in depth about his background, for a paper I was writing, what I discovered was when he was in the Navy, as a whatever, I don't know, probably 25-year-old in the Navy, he had a job where he had to think about strategy, and was testing things out, and doing things, and the like.

我说，是的，但是当我为我正在写的一篇论文深入采访他的背景时，我发现他在海军时，我不知道，可能是 25 岁的海军，他的工作必须考虑战略，并且正在测试事情，做事情等等。

And then, I realized that he had been practicing strategy for decades before he became the CEO, decades.

然后，我意识到，在成为首席执行官之前，他已经练习战略几十年了。

Roger Martin: And so, he just had more reps when he became CEO than almost anybody else that I've ever met.

罗杰·马丁：所以，当他成为首席执行官时，他的代表数量几乎比我见过的任何人都多。

There's another guy, , ex-CEO, now he's gone on to a higher level of Lego brand group, would be similar.

还有另一个人，前首席执行官，现在他已经进入乐高品牌集团的更高级别，也会类似。

So, great strategists that I have met have all one thing in common.

因此，我遇到的伟大战略家都有一个共同点。

They just practice.

他们只是练习。

And anybody, there's no such thing as a person who is willing to practice strategy, who will end up saying, I'm operational, I don't do strategy well.

对于任何人来说，没有一个愿意实践战略的人最终会说，我是可操作的，我不擅长战略。

Which links to our last thing about betterment.

这与我们关于改善的最后一件事有关。

Just work on making different choices to solve problems.

只是努力做出不同的选择来解决问题。

Not problems that I say, I'm not going to define your gap, it's one that you feel in your heart, I wish this were better.

不是我说的问题，我不会定义你的差距，而是你内心的感受，我希望这更好。

Work on it, if you do that, you'll be a great strategist.

努力吧，如果你做到了，你就会成为一名伟大的战略家。

So, be encouraged, don't be discouraged.

所以，要鼓励，不要灰心。

And the worst thing to do is to wait.

最糟糕的事情就是等待。

People say, well, I've got all these operational concerns right now, and then I'll get to strategy later.

人们说，好吧，我现在有所有这些运营问题，然后我会稍后讨论策略。

You'll never amount to anything.

你永远一事无成。

Nobody who says that ever amounts to anything.

说这句话的人没有任何意义。

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：哇。

I love this, I love how empowering it is, I love the real talk.

我喜欢这个，我喜欢它的力量，我喜欢真实的谈话。

Roger, you're awesome.

罗杰，你太棒了。

Thank you so much for being here.

非常感谢您来到这里。

Roger Martin: You're most welcome.

罗杰·马丁：不客气。

Thank you for making it a fun journey for me.

感谢您让我的旅程变得有趣。

Lenny Rachitsky: I learned a ton, and that's always a good sign, and it was a lot of fun.

Lenny Rachitsky：我学到了很多东西，这总是一个好兆头，而且很有趣。

Lenny Rachitsky: Thank you so much for listening, if you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

Lenny Rachitsky：非常感谢您的收听，如果您觉得本文有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.

另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。

You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at Lennyspodcast.com.

您可以在 Lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。