Driving alignment within teams, work-life balance, and the changing PM landscape | Nikita Miller

Nikita Bier: ...

尼基塔·比尔：...

Honored to be on a product management podcast for a person who doesn't believe product management is real.

很荣幸能够为一个不相信产品管理真实存在的人做产品管理播客。

Lenny Rachitsky: We're already getting into the hot takes.

Lenny Rachitsky：我们已经进入热门话题了。

You launched tbh, went viral, you end up selling it to Facebook.

说实话，你推出了这款产品，迅速走红，最终将其卖给了 Facebook。

What was the insight that helped you come up with this is a big idea that we should try?

是什么洞察力帮助您提出了这个值得我们尝试的好主意？

Nikita Bier: I looked on the App Store and the number one app in the United States was an app called Surah, but the entire app was in Arabic, like the strongest signal that you could ever have that people want something.

Nikita Bier：我查看了 App Store，美国排名第一的应用程序是一款名为 Surah 的应用程序，但整个应用程序都是阿拉伯语的，就像人们想要某样东西的最强信号一样。

Lenny Rachitsky: This is insane.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这太疯狂了。

I did not know this full story.

我不知道这个完整的故事。

Nikita Bier: We launched this app, it immediately took off, servers started crashing.

Nikita Bier：我们推出了这个应用程序，它立即流行起来，服务器开始崩溃。

I looked at our numbers and I'm like, "We will be number one in the United States in six days."

我看着我们的数据，心想：“六天内我们将成为美国第一。”

Lenny Rachitsky: A tip that you're sharing here is look for latent demand

Lenny Rachitsky：您在这里分享的一个技巧是寻找潜在需求

Nikita Bier: Where people are trying to obtain a particular value and going through a very distortive process.

Nikita Bier：人们试图获得特定的价值并经历一个非常扭曲的过程。

If you can actually crystallize what their motivation is, you can have this kind of intense adoption.

如果你能真正明确他们的动机是什么，你就能得到这种强烈的采用。

Lenny Rachitsky: I didn't know you're actually a product manager at Facebook.

Lenny Rachitsky：我不知道你实际上是 Facebook 的产品经理。

Nikita Bier: The thing I didn't realize as a product manager in a large tech company is there is very little product management that you do.

Nikita Bier：作为一家大型科技公司的产品经理，我没有意识到，你所做的产品管理非常少。

They're mainly just writing documents and then being the team secretary and running around getting approvals, but products live and die in the pixels.

他们主要只是写文件，然后担任团队秘书并四处奔波以获得批准，但产品的生死存亡取决于像素。

You should be designing the hierarchy, the pixels, the flows, everything.

你应该设计层次结构、像素、流程，一切。

That's on you.

那是你的事了。

Lenny Rachitsky: At some point you started tweeting like, "Hey, I'm working on new app.

Lenny Rachitsky：在某个时候，你开始发推文，比如“嘿，我正在开发新应用程序。

Everyone was going nuts." I saw a stat that you made $11 million in sales, 10 million downloads.

每个人都疯了。”我看到一个统计数据，你们的销售额为 1100 万美元，下载量为 1000 万次。

Nikita Bier: The thing that is hard to really understand is it is absolute chaos to keep the thing online.

Nikita Bier：真正难以理解的是，让东西保持在线绝对是混乱的。

I was sleeping three hours a day for three months.

三个月来我每天睡三个小时。

Our team was also relentless though.

但我们的团队也很坚持不懈。

They would come over to my house, 9:00 AM, stay until midnight and just do that seven days a week.

他们会早上 9:00 来到我家，待到午夜，每周 7 天都是这样。

Lenny Rachitsky: Is there anything else that's just like this is something that is probably going to help you with your app?

Lenny Rachitsky：还有其他类似的东西可能会对您的应用程序有所帮​​助吗？

Nikita Bier: With certainty, if you're good at your job, you can make an app grow and go viral.

Nikita Bier：可以肯定的是，如果你擅长自己的工作，你就可以让应用程序成长并像病毒一样传播。

Over the years of building all these apps, I've accrued all these growth hacks that still nobody knows about.

在构建所有这些应用程序的这些年里，我积累了所有这些仍然没有人知道的增长技巧。

Lenny Rachitsky: Today, my guest is Nikita Bier.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：今天，我的客人是尼基塔·比尔。

Nikita has built, launched and helped get more apps to the top of the app store than any human I've ever come across.

Nikita 开发、发布并帮助将更多的应用程序推上了应用程序商店的榜首，比我见过的任何人都多。

He sold his first big hit tbh to Facebook for over $30 million.

他以超过 3000 万美元的价格将自己的第一首热门歌曲卖给了 Facebook。

He sold his second big app Gas to Discord for many millions more.

他以数百万美元的价格将他的第二个大型应用程序 Gas 卖给了 Discord。

He did this all with a tiny team and very little funding.

他用一个很小的团队和很少的资金完成了这一切。

He's also helped dozens of founders and apps, and as an advisor or investor to companies like Flow, Citizen, BeReal, LOCKit and Wealthsimple and many more.

他还帮助了数十位创始人和应用程序，并作为 Flow、Citizen、BeReal、LOCKit 和 Wealthsimple 等公司的顾问或投资者。

Today, he spends his time advising companies on viral growth strategies, design feedback, structuring their product development process and a lot more.

如今，他花时间为公司提供有关病毒式增长策略、设计反馈、构建产品开发流程等方面的建议。

Lenny Rachitsky: What I love about Nikita is that he has very strong opinions about how to build successful products that are rooted in him actually doing the work over the past decade to see for himself what works and what doesn't.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢 Nikita 的一点是，他对如何打造成功的产品有非常强烈的见解，这些见解植根于他在过去十年中实际做的工作，亲眼看看什么有效，什么无效。

Nikita has been the single most requested guests on this podcast, and you'll soon see why.

尼基塔是这个播客中最受欢迎的嘉宾，您很快就会明白原因。

This episode is packed with tactics and stories and lessons that I am sure will leave you wanting more.

这一集充满了战术、故事和教训，我相信会让你想要更多。

If you want to work with Nikita on your app, you can actually book his time at intro.co/nikitabier.

如果您想在您的应用程序上与 Nikita 合作，您实际上可以在 intro.co/nikitabier 上预订他的时间。

If you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube.

如果您喜欢这个播客，请不要忘记订阅并在您最喜欢的播客应用程序或 YouTube 中关注它。

It's the best way to avoid missing feature episodes and helps the podcast tremendously.

这是避免错过专题节目的最佳方式，并且对播客有很大帮助。

With that, I bring you Nikita Bier.

接下来，我为您带来尼基塔·比尔。

Nikita, thank you so much for being here.

尼基塔，非常感谢你来到这里。

Welcome to the podcast.

欢迎来到播客。

Nikita Bier: Thanks for having me.

尼基塔·比尔：谢谢你邀请我。

I'm excited to dive in.

我很高兴能潜入其中。

I feel honored to be on a product management podcast for a person who doesn't believe product management is real.

我很荣幸能够为一个不相信产品管理真实存在的人做产品管理播客。

Lenny Rachitsky: We're already getting into the hot takes.

Lenny Rachitsky：我们已经进入热门话题了。

We're definitely going to chat about...

我们肯定要讨论...

Wait, and you said not real.

等等，你说不是真的。

Okay, I thought you were going to say not useful.

好吧，我以为你会说没用。

This is good.

这很好。

Let's put a pin in that.

让我们把它钉进去。

I think we think this, I think everyone already feels this.

我想我们是这么想的，我想每个人都已经感受到了这一点。

I think this is going to be a very special conversation.

我认为这将是一次非常特别的对话。

I've been looking forward to chatting you for a long time and there's so much that I want to ask you.

我期待和你聊天已经很久了，我有很多事情想问你。

The way that I'm thinking we frame this conversation is we go through the story behind the apps that you've built or helped build that have hit the top of the app store, and basically here, the inside story of what it took to build those apps and to make them successful.

我认为我们构建这次对话的方式是，我们回顾一下您构建或帮助构建的应用程序背后的故事，这些应用程序已经登上了应用程序商店的榜首，基本上，这里是构建这些应用程序并使其成功所需的内幕故事。

Then through that, try to extract as many lessons as we can about what it takes to build a successful viral consumer app these days.

然后，尝试从中汲取尽可能多的经验教训，了解如何构建当今成功的病毒式消费者应用程序。

How does that sound to you?

您觉得怎么样？

Nikita Bier: Sounds amazing, and a lot of it was luck, but a lot of it was very, very tactical work that went into it all.

尼基塔·比尔（Nikita Bier）：听起来很神奇，其中很大一部分是运气，但也有很多是非常非常战术性的工作。

Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Webflow.

Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Webflow 为您带来。

We're all friends here, so let's be real for a second.

我们都是这里的朋友，所以让我们现实一点吧。

We all know that your website shouldn't be a static asset.

我们都知道您的网站不应该是静态资产。

It should be a dynamic part of your strategy that drives conversions, that's business 101.

它应该是推动转化的策略的动态部分，这就是业务 101。

Here's a number for you.

这是给你的一个号码。

54% of leaders say web updates take too long.

54% 的领导者表示网络更新时间太长。

That's over half of you listening right now.

现在有超过一半的人在听。

That's where Webflow comes in.

这就是 Webflow 的用武之地。

Their visual-first platform allows you to build, launch, and optimize webpages fast.

他们的视觉优先平台允许您快速构建、启动和优化网页。

That means you can set ambitious business goals and your site can rise to the challenge.

这意味着您可以设定雄心勃勃的业务目标，并且您的网站可以应对挑战。

Learn how teams like Dropbox, IDEO and Orange Theory trust Webflow to achieve their most ambitious goals today at Webflow.com.

立即访问 Webflow.com 了解 Dropbox、IDEO 和 Orange Theory 等团队如何信任 Webflow 来实现他们最雄心勃勃的目标。

Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Vanta.

Lenny Rachitsky：本集由 Vanta 为您带来。

When it comes to ensuring your company has top-notch security practices, things get complicated fast.

当谈到确保您的公司拥有一流的安全实践时，事情很快就会变得复杂。

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现在，您可以使用单一平台 Vanta 评估风险、确保客户信任并自动实现 SOC 2、ISO 27001、HIPAA 等合规性。

Vanta's market leading trust management platform helps you continuously monitor compliance alongside reporting and tracking risks.

Vanta 市场领先的信任管理平台可帮助您持续监控合规性以及报告和跟踪风险。

Plus, you can save hours by completing security questionnaires with Vanta AI.

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加入数千家使用 Vanta 自动化证据收集、统一风险管理和简化安全审查的全球公司行列。

Get $1,000 off Vanta when you go to vanta.com/lenny.

访问vanta.com/lenny，可享受 Vanta 立减 1,000 美元的优惠。

That's vanta.com/lenny.

这是vanta.com/lenny。

First, I want to start with something that I think very few people know about you.

首先，我想从一些我认为很少有人了解您的事情开始。

The first thing that you built, the first product that you built was very different from what you do these days, and it's a product called Politify, which something I actually really want.

你构建的第一件事，你构建的第一个产品与你现在所做的非常不同，它是一个名为 Politify 的产品，这是我真正想要的东西。

It helps you decide who to vote for based on how it would impact your life.

它可以帮助您根据投票对您生活的影响来决定投票给谁。

Can you just share a bit about just that part of your life and why you decided to pivot away from that into consumer apps?

您能否分享一下您生活中的这一部分以及为什么您决定从这部分转向消费者应用程序？

Nikita Bier: When I was in college, I was really interested in this kind of thing that American voters do, which is they vote against their own financial self-interest, like people in New York and San Francisco vote for Democrats for higher taxes.

尼基塔·比尔：当我上大学时，我对美国选民所做的这种事情非常感兴趣，他们投票反对自己的经济利益，就像纽约和旧金山的人们投票支持民主党提高税收一样。

People in Kansas vote for Republicans for low taxes and they make less money, and so fewer government benefits.

堪萨斯州的人们投票支持低税率的共和党人，他们赚的钱更少，政府福利也更少。

I wanted to build this tool that would help communicate the financial impacts of these policy proposals of presidents.

我想构建这个工具来帮助传达总统这些政策提案的财务影响。

I built it in my last year of college and it was just a web app that we put out and it would calculate their tax proposals, the government benefits that they were proposing, and you would enter in your basic personal information, how many kids you have, your age.

我在大学的最后一年建立了它，它只是我们推出的一个网络应用程序，它会计算他们的税收建议、他们提议的政府福利，你会输入你的基本个人信息、你有多少个孩子、你的年龄。

Then it would just tell you in dollars what the impact would be.

然后它只会以美元的形式告诉你影响会是什么。

It'd also tell you, we simulated those policies also against the tax returns of every zip code so you could see how it impacts your community.

它还会告诉您，我们还针对每个邮政编码的纳税申报表模拟了这些政策，以便您可以了解它如何影响您的社区。

Nikita Bier: We went super viral.

尼基塔·比尔（Nikita Bier）：我们非常火爆。

I think very few people thought of politics that way and I think we got 4 million users on it during that season, during that election.

我认为很少有人以这种方式思考政治，而且我认为在那个季节、选举期间，我们有 400 万用户关注政治。

It was just like a project that we raised some grant money for, but it ended up feeding into this company that we spun up and that was called Outline.

这就像我们筹集了一些补助金的一个项目，但它最终流入了我们创办的这家名为 Outline 的公司。

Because we had a bunch of governments reach out to us asking, "Can you build this for our budget?" The governor of Massachusetts actually reached out and I flew out there to meet with them and that was going to be our first customer.

因为有很多政府联系我们询问：“你们能为我们的预算建造这个吗？”马萨诸塞州州长实际上伸出了援手，我飞到那里与他们会面，那将是我们的第一个客户。

We raised some money, we won a government contract and we joined Techstars, the accelerator.

我们筹集了一些资金，赢得了一份政府合同，并加入了加速器 Techstars。

We got a contract in the pipeline with the Obama administration and then we got this contract and we started building it and the government shutdown happened in the middle of like, as we were building it and we had one of our contracts canceled.

我们正在与奥巴马政府签订一份合同，然后我们得到了这份合同，我们开始建造它，政府关门发生在我们建造它的过程中，我们的一份合同被取消了。

Nikita Bier: I realized I actually really don't like selling software to governments and my core competency all along was making things that go viral on the internet.

Nikita Bier：我意识到我实际上真的不喜欢向政府出售软件，而我的核心能力一直是让东西在互联网上病毒式传播。

That was what we had built, not this policy simulation tool.

这就是我们所构建的，而不是这个政策模拟工具。

We went to our investors and we said, "Look, this isn't actually what we're excited about doing anymore." We offered to give the money back and said, "We're going to be building consumer apps and here's a few ideas that we have." None of them took the money back.

我们去找投资者说：“看，这实际上不再是我们感兴趣的事情了。”我们主动提出退还这笔钱，并表示：“我们将开发消费者应用程序，这是我们的一些想法。”他们没有人把钱拿回来。

Then we spent the next four or five years building a variety of different kind of consumer apps.

然后我们花了接下来的四五年时间构建了各种不同类型的消费者应用程序。

We had a few mild successes during the course of those four to five years.

在这四到五年里，我们取得了一些轻微的成功。

One of them was an app called Five Labs that ingested your Facebook posts and determine your personality based on the language you use.

其中之一是一款名为 Five Labs 的应用程序，它会提取您的 Facebook 帖子并根据您使用的语言确定您的个性。

It used this exact same model that Cambridge Analytica used, and that was super viral.

它使用了与剑桥分析公司完全相同的模型，并且非常火爆。

I think we had tens of millions of profiles in it and it went viral in like three days.

我想我们有数以千万计的个人资料，并且在三天之内就疯传了。

Nikita Bier: We raised some more money based off the success of that and we started focusing a lot more on mobile after that first app, Five Labs.

Nikita Bier：基于这一成功，我们筹集了更多资金，并且在推出第一个应用程序 Five Labs 后，我们开始更多地关注移动设备。

We launched basically every type of app you can imagine.

我们基本上推出了您能想象到的所有类型的应用程序。

We launched mapping apps, chat apps, event meetup apps.

我们推出了地图应用程序、聊天应用程序、活动聚会应用程序。

Basically, every consumer app on mobile that you could think of.

基本上，您可以想到的移动设备上的所有消费者应用程序。

That actually helped us build a muscle to understand what people want and how to actually make things grow and how to test them.

这实际上帮助我们增强了理解人们想要什么、如何真正让事物成长以及如何测试它们的能力。

Over time, we started focusing more on teens.

随着时间的推移，我们开始更多地关注青少年。

A lot of people ask why Silicon Valley is so fixated on building apps for teens.

很多人问为什么硅谷如此专注于为青少年开发应用程序。

Nikita Bier: One of the reasons is their habits are pretty malleable.

Nikita Bier：原因之一是他们的习惯具有很强的可塑性。

As we get older, we get fixed into our habits of using certain communication products and we don't really adopt new things.

随着年龄的增长，我们会养成使用某些通讯产品的习惯，而不会真正采用新事物。

Then the other thing that we discovered was that adults don't really invite people to new apps.

然后我们发现的另一件事是成年人并不会真正邀请人们使用新应用程序。

We found that as a user got older from age 13 to 18, the number of people that they invite to an app just declines almost exponentially.

我们发现，随着用户年龄从 13 岁增长到 18 岁，他们邀请使用应用程序的人数几乎呈指数级下降。

Finally, and the most important thing is they see each other every day, and that is so critical.

最后，也是最重要的事情是他们每天都会见面，这一点非常重要。

Consumer app developers sometimes say smokers are great for targeting an audience because they actually hang out serendipitously a lot outside of buildings.

消费者应用程序开发人员有时会说吸烟者非常适合瞄准受众，因为他们实际上经常在建筑物外闲逛。

Not to say social apps are cigarettes, I don't really like that metaphor.

并不是说社交应用程序是香烟，我真的不喜欢这个比喻。

Lenny Rachitsky: Just on the note of you talking about why teens are important, I have this quote actually from you that I love where building on the point you made that for every social app I've ever built and the number of invitations sent per user drops 20% for every additional year of age from 13 to 18.

Lenny Rachitsky：就在您谈论为什么青少年很重要时，我实际上引用了您的一句话，我很喜欢您的观点，即对于我构建的每个社交应用程序，从 13 岁到 18 岁，每增加一岁，每个用户发送的邀请数量就会下降 20%。

If you build for adults, expect to acquire every user with ads, and I love that you have a very clear heuristic of per year, the amount of people they invite to the app is 20% lower.

如果您为成人开发，希望通过广告吸引每个用户，并且我喜欢您每年有一个非常明确的启发式，那么他们邀请使用该应用程序的人数会减少 20%。

Nikita Bier: If your users aren't inviting people to your app, you're going to have to find another way to acquire them, and that most likely means ads.

Nikita Bier：如果你的用户没有邀请人们使用你的应用，你就必须找到另一种方式来获取他们，这很可能意味着广告。

If you're targeting older cohorts like adults, you're going to have to raise a huge amount of venture capital to finance that user acquisition pipeline and it's going to be extraordinarily expensive.

如果你的目标是成年人等老年群体，你将不得不筹集大量风险资本来为用户获取渠道提供资金，而且成本将非常昂贵。

As a seed stage up, it's going to be basically impossible to grow that user base, especially to get density if you need actual network effects among users.

作为种子阶段，基本上不可能扩大用户群，特别是如果您需要用户之间的实际网络效应，则要获得密度。

Lenny Rachitsky: Basically, you're building this help me decide who to vote for app that turned into a real business with government contracts coming to you trying to help you, pushing you to build something that you end up realizing I don't want to be doing this.

Lenny Rachitsky：基本上，你正在构建这个帮助我决定谁投票给应用程序的应用程序，该应用程序变成了一个真正的业务，政府合同来试图帮助你，推动你构建一些你最终意识到我不想这样做的东西。

Why am I building this app selling government contracts.

我为什么要构建这个销售政府合同的应用程序。

What you did is you, and this is a really interesting lesson to take away, is you just realized, I don't want to be doing this.

你所做的就是你自己，这是一个非常有趣的教训，你是否刚刚意识到，我不想这样做。

Investors don't force me to be working on this.

投资者不会强迫我从事这方面的工作。

I'm going to stop this.

我要阻止这一切。

I'm going to go work on some other stuff that I'm actually excited about that I think has a bigger chance of success.

我将去做一些其他让我感到兴奋的事情，我认为这些事情成功的机会更大。

That's where you transition to this startup studio where you're just trying a bunch of apps and I think it was called Midnight Labs, you said, something like that, right?

这就是你过渡到这个初创工作室的地方，在那里你只是尝试一堆应用程序，我认为它被称为“午夜实验室”，你说，类似的东西，对吧？

Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

Basically, I think that's a really interesting insight of just like if you're working on something you don't enjoy, you can change that, you can pivot, you can tell your investors I want to work on something else.

基本上，我认为这是一个非常有趣的见解，就像如果你正在做一些你不喜欢的事情，你可以改变它，你可以调整方向，你可以告诉你的投资者我想做别的事情。

Is there anything there that you want to add along those lines?

您有什么想要补充的吗？

Nikita Bier: It was really hard for us to pivot to mobile.

Nikita Bier：对我们来说，转向移动确实很难。

I think that was one of the most challenging things for me personally because it was a completely different paradigm.

我认为这对我个人来说是最具挑战性的事情之一，因为这是一个完全不同的范例。

I actually have been building web apps since I was 12 years old.

事实上，我从 12 岁起就一直在构建网络应用程序。

I built a full e-commerce business selling pirated games on the web, and I knew everything about growing a website.

我建立了一家完整的电子商务公司，在网络上销售盗版游戏，并且我了解有关发展网站的一切。

As we pivoted to mobile, I had to recalibrate my whole brain on how to do that.

当我们转向移动设备时，我必须重新调整我的整个大脑以了解如何做到这一点。

Mobile apps have such a low margin for error when it comes to designing them.

移动应用程序在设计时的容错率非常低。

Because I have this dogmatic view that every tap on a mobile app is a miracle for you as a product developer because users will turn and bounce to their next app very quickly.

因为我有一种教条主义的观点，即移动应用程序上的每一次点击对于产品开发人员来说都是一个奇迹，因为用户会很快转向并跳转到他们的下一个应用程序。

Nikita Bier: If you actually sit behind someone and watch them use their phone, they actually switch between apps at a pretty high frequency.

Nikita Bier：如果你真的坐在某人后面，看着他们使用手机，你会发现他们实际上以相当高的频率在应用程序之间切换。

Every tap that you get, every single one is so scarce that you should be optimizing everything.

您获得的每一次点击都非常稀缺，因此您应该优化所有内容。

I had to change my whole brain when we started pivoting to mobile and building these mobile apps, and it took a lot of failures.

当我们开始转向移动并构建这些移动应用程序时，我必须改变我的整个大脑，并且经历了很多失败。

14 of the apps that we launched were basically duds, and then we started fixating on teens and building apps for them.

我们推出的 14 个应用程序基本上都是无用的，然后我们开始关注青少年并为他们构建应用程序。

Eventually, we figured out an interesting heuristic for identifying consumer product opportunities that ultimately led us to tbh.

最终，我们找到了一个有趣的启发式方法来识别消费产品机会，最终让我们得出了结论。

Lenny Rachitsky: You spent four or five years trying a bunch of different ideas.

Lenny Rachitsky：你花了四五年时间尝试了一堆不同的想法。

I think people see this headline and we'll get into tbh of just like nine weeks after launch sells for $30 million to Facebook and everyone's like, "Oh, okay, that's amazing.

我认为人们看到这个标题后，我们就会发现，在发布后九周内，Facebook 的售价为 3000 万美元，每个人都会说，“哦，好吧，这太棒了。

I want that for my life." Nobody knows there's this four or five years of trying, you said 15 different apps before you got there, learning the things that actually work and don't work.

我一生都想要这样。”没有人知道有四五年的尝试，你说过 15 个不同的应用程序在你到达那里之前，学习了实际有效和无效的东西。

Nikita Bier: We built 15 apps over the course of that pivot to consumer, and we built apps for every single app, map apps, chat apps, to-do lists.

Nikita Bier：在面向消费者的过程中，我们构建了 15 个应用程序，并且我们为每个应用程序、地图应用程序、聊天应用程序、待办事项列表构建了应用程序。

We just built every type of consumer app you could possibly think of.

我们刚刚构建了您可能想到的每种类型的消费者应用程序。

Also, we built for every audience too.

此外，我们也为每一位观众打造。

We built for college students, we built for post-college.

我们为大学生打造，我们为大学毕业后打造。

It was always very difficult to get the flywheel spinning for anyone after like 22 years old.

对于22岁以后的人来说，让飞轮旋转总是非常困难的。

That was the cutoff of when people just give up on adopting new products.

那是人们放弃采用新产品的截止点。

It took us a few years to really internalize that, a lot of failures to realize no one needs another app after that age.

我们花了几年时间才真正内化这一点，经历了很多失败才意识到在这个年龄之后没有人需要另一个应用程序。

Lenny Rachitsky: The thing that you found there, which is really interesting because most people are building for people older than 22, that's a profound insight you had there.

Lenny Rachitsky：您在那里发现的东西非常有趣，因为大多数人都是为 22 岁以上的人建造的，这是您在那里获得的深刻见解。

Every consumer app I see is trying to build for adults, and your lesson there is basically if you're trying to do that, you're probably going to need to raise money and spend a lot of money on paid ads.

我看到的每一个消费者应用程序都试图为成年人构建，而你的教训基本上是，如果你想这样做，你可能需要筹集资金并在付费广告上花费大量资金。

Nikita Bier: Most likely, you'll never get network effects.

Nikita Bier：很可能，你永远不会获得网络效应。

There's actually an interesting study many years ago that some academics in Spain did, I think it was in Spain, and they looked at how many people you text per year of your life, and it goes up very quickly from 14 to 18.

事实上，很多年前西班牙的一些学者做了一项有趣的研究，我想是在西班牙，他们研究了你一生中每年给多少人发短信，这个数字很快从 14 人增加到 18 人。

It peaks around 21, so it's growing.

21岁左右达到顶峰，所以还在增长。

The number of people you text is growing up until about 21, and then it just falls, it collapses, and then it comes back up at end of life.

你发短信的人数一直在增加，直到 21 岁左右，然后就下降、崩溃，然后在生命结束时又回来。

There's a few reasons all this happens, but basically, once you exit college, you reduce the number of contacts, your daily contacts.

这一切的发生有几个原因，但基本上，一旦你从大学毕业，你的联系数量，你的日常联系就会减少。

Nikita Bier: Once you get married, it's even fewer.

尼基塔·比尔：一旦你结婚了，那就更少了。

Then as you get older and your kids start having kids and you become a grandparent, you start texting again more or you join a retirement home.

然后，随着年龄的增长，你的孩子开始生孩子，你成为祖父母，你又开始更多地发短信，或者加入养老院。

If you're building a product with network effects that's a communication tool, you want to be on that upward curve of adding connections to your social graph because then the urgency to connect is higher.

如果您正在构建具有网络效应的通信工具产品，那么您希望处于向社交图谱添加连接的上升曲线，因为这样连接的紧迫性就会更高。

If you really want to actually innovate at the edges of communication products, you really have to target that cohort that has the highest urgency to communicate, and that's teens.

如果你真的想在通讯产品的边缘进行真正的创新，你真的必须瞄准那些最迫切需要沟通的群体，那就是青少年。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that you found these things out, not through just research and not through just thinking, it was through actual trying things over and over and over and trying different audiences, trying different experiences.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢你发现这些东西，不仅仅是通过研究，不仅仅是通过思考，而是通过一遍又一遍地实际尝试，尝试不同的受众，尝试不同的体验。

A lot of people see your advice and they're like, "How does he know?" It's just you've done all these things yourself.

很多人看到你的建议后都会想：“他怎么知道？”只是这些事情都是你自己做的。

You've seen them, you're sitting there watching teens use these apps.

您已经见过它们，您正坐在那里观看青少年使用这些应用程序。

I think very few people actually do that, and they just come up with these theories that aren't based in empirical evidence.

我认为很少有人真正这样做，他们只是提出了这些没有经验证据的理论。

Nikita Bier: We got pretty good at building these apps.

Nikita Bier：我们非常擅长构建这些应用程序。

I think our first mobile app took us about a year, and then our last one took us about two weeks.

我认为我们的第一个移动应用程序花了我们大约一年的时间，然后我们的最后一个移动应用程序花了我们大约两周的时间。

We also got very good at testing apps.

我们也非常擅长测试应用程序。

The most important thing that I often instruct teams to do is to develop a reproducible testing process, and that will actually influence the probability of your success more than anything.

我经常指导团队做的最重要的事情是开发一个可重复的测试过程，这实际上对你成功的可能性影响最大。

It's so unpredictable whether a consumer product idea will work.

消费产品创意是否有效是无法预测的。

If you actually focus more on your process for taking many shots at bat, that's what actually reduces the risk more than anything.

如果你实际上更多地关注击球多次击球的过程，那么这实际上比任何事情都更能降低风险。

We figured out ways to seed apps into schools.

我们找到了将应用程序植入学校的方法。

We also, during the course of that company, we figured out how to seed it into affinity groups, hobbyists, things like that.

在该公司的发展过程中，我们还想出了如何将其融入亲和团体、业余爱好者等类似的群体中。

We were on app number 15, a lot of failures during the course of this company, and I remember a lot of our team members were like, "I kind of want to leave.

我们当时的应用程序是 15 号，在这家公司的发展过程中经历了很多失败，我记得我们的很多团队成员都说，“我有点想离开。

I think this is it for me."

我想这就是我的目的。”

Nikita Bier: One of our key team members actually put in their two weeks' notice.

Nikita Bier：我们的一位关键团队成员实际上提前两周发出了通知。

The day before we launched our final app, we were getting kind of low on money.

在我们推出最终应用程序的前一天，我们的资金有点不足。

I was tired.

我累了。

I called our lawyer to ask, how do you dissolve a company?

我打电话给我们的律师问，如何解散公司？

I messaged a few mentors saying like, one people that have been through it, and I said, "What are the steps to do this?" Then I had a conversation on the way out with that team member that wanted to leave, and I said, "I understand, but what if the app actually starts charting on the App Store?" He said, "What are the chances of that?

我给几位导师发了信息，其中一位经历过这种情况，然后我说：“要做到这一点有哪些步骤？”然后我在离开的路上与那个想要离开的团队成员进行了交谈，我说：“我理解，但是如果应用程序真的开始在 App Store 上排名怎么办？”他说：“这种可能性有多大？

You know that's not going to happen." I said, "Sure, okay." We launched this app and it was a polling app, tbh, and it immediately took off in the school that we seeded it into, in Georgia.

你知道这不会发生。”我说：“当然可以。”我们推出了这个应用程序，它是一个民意调查应用程序，说实话，它立即在我们播种的佐治亚州学校中流行起来。

We picked the one school that had the earliest start date in the United States because we needed to launch as soon as possible, given the state of the company.

我们选择了美国最早开学的一所学校，因为考虑到公司的状况，我们需要尽快开学。

Nikita Bier: I think it spread to 40% of the school downloaded it in the first 24 hours and it rapidly spread to the neighboring schools.

Nikita Bier：我认为它在最初 24 小时内就传播到了 40% 的学校，并迅速传播到了邻近的学校。

Suddenly, I was like, "Oh, we might have something here." Servers started crashing and watching it climb the charts.

突然，我想，“哦，我们这里可能有东西。”服务器开始崩溃，看着它在排行榜上攀升。

I looked at our numbers and I'm like, "We will be number one in the United States in six days." Then I looked at our Amazon bill and it was like 120,000.

我看着我们的数据，心想：“六天内我们将成为美国第一。”然后我看了看我们的亚马逊账单，大概是12万。

I looked at our bank account, it said 150,000.

我看了看我们的银行账户，上面写着15万。

I'm like, "Okay, these two numbers don't really..." I quickly had to put together a funding round and I told my team, "Can you guys just pause for two months and just really focus on this?

我想，“好吧，这两个数字并不是真的……”我很快就不得不进行一轮融资，我告诉我的团队，“你们能暂停两个月，真正专注于这个吗？

I think I could probably sell this thing." It turned into a pretty competitive bidding process, actually.

我想我可能可以卖掉这个东西。”实际上，这变成了一个竞争相当激烈的投标过程。

There was a really, really great moment where there was one of the acquirers, or one of the bidders was based in LA, had told me to fly down, and they told me to fly down that day.

有一个非常非常伟大的时刻，其中一位收购者或一位位于洛杉矶的竞标者告诉我飞下来，他们那天告诉我飞下来。

Nikita Bier: I got on a plane, went to the airport without a ticket, showed up.

尼基塔·比尔：我上了飞机，没有机票就去了机场，然后就出现了。

When we were rolling out this app, we were doing a state-by-state rollout strategy where every state was geo-fenced.

当我们推出这个应用程序时，我们正在执行逐个州的推出策略，其中每个州都进行了地理围栏。

We hadn't launched California until that morning.

直到那天早上我们才推出《加州》。

I arrived at this company, this founders in LA's house, and he said, "Show me the metrics.

我来到这家公司，这家公司创始人在洛杉矶的家里，他说，“给我看看指标。

You guys are like, what?

你们就像，什么？

Number four or something?" Since we just launched California, it's a big state.

第四还是什么？”由于我们刚刚推出加利福尼亚州，它是一个大州。

I said, "No, we're actually number one.

我说：“不，我们实际上是第一。

We're the number one app in the United States." He said, "Show me the metrics." Our CTO, Erik Hazzard, is a published author in mapping.

我们是美国排名第一的应用程序。”他说，“给我看看指标。”我们的首席技术官 Erik Hazzard 是一位出版过地图的作者。

He created an amazing dashboard that could show real-time installs on a map.

他创建了一个令人惊叹的仪表板，可以在地图上显示实时安装情况。

It was around 4:00 PM and school had just gotten out, so I zoomed in on the block that we were having that meeting, and the entire block was lit up with installs all around us.

当时是下午 4:00 左右，学校刚刚放学，所以我放大了我们正在开会的街区，整个街区都被我们周围的装置照亮了。

Then that's what got the ball rolling on a...

然后这就是让球滚动的原因......

It was a really, really like, cinematic moment of showing something that you created that literally just took over the entire neighborhood around you.

这是一个非常非常像电影的时刻，展示了你所创造的东西，它实际上接管了你周围的整个社区。

Lenny Rachitsky: That's insane.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这太疯狂了。

That's going to be in the movie of Nikita Bier in the future.

这将出现在尼基塔·比尔未来的电影中。

A couple of questions here.

这里有几个问题。

One, you predicted the chart, you would hit number one.

第一，你预测了图表，你会排名第一。

What does it take to hit number one?

想要达到第一需要什么？

What is the number you're looking at?

您正在查看的号码是多少？

Is it some number downloads to get to number one in the App Store?

是否需要一定的下载量才能在 App Store 中排名第一？

Nikita Bier: It fluctuates.

尼基塔·比尔：它会波动。

It used to be like 80 to 100,000 installs, but now you have these companies that are just spending extraordinary amounts on ads and or injecting it into one of their other apps.

过去的安装量约为 80 到 100,000 次，但现在这些公司只是在广告上花费了大量资金，或者将其注入到他们的其他应用程序中。

Between Threads, Temu and all these other apps that are spending on acquisition and all that, some days it's up to 300,000.

在 Threads、Temu 和所有其他花费在收购上的应用程序之间，有时会达到 300,000。

Nikita Bier: At the peak of tbh, we were getting 360,000 per day.

Nikita Bier：说实话，在高峰时期，我们每天的销量为 360,000。

Lenny Rachitsky: The other two things I want to spend a little time on here before we move on to the next app is, what was the insight that helped you come up with this is a big idea that we should try?

Lenny Rachitsky：在我们继续下一个应用程序之前，我想在这里花一点时间讨论的另外两件事是，帮助您提出这个我们应该尝试的伟大想法的见解是什么？

Then what was the insight into how to spread this so virally?

那么，如何将其如此病毒式地传播呢？

I know that one is really close.

我知道这一点非常接近。

Lenny Rachitsky: ...

莱尼·拉奇茨基：……

to how to spread this so virally, and I know that one is really clever.

知道如何像病毒一样传播这一点，我知道这个人真的很聪明。

Nikita Bier: After building all these apps, we had these kind of lingering users that stuck around and would share feedback with us on our next app.

Nikita Bier：在构建了所有这些应用程序之后，我们拥有了一些挥之不去的用户，他们会留下来，并与我们分享关于我们下一个应用程序的反馈。

And so there were a couple, like there's a senior in high school that I would send screenshots of our products.

所以有一些人，比如一位高中生，我会发送我们产品的屏幕截图。

He told me about this trend called TBH that kids were playing on Snapchat, where they would post an image of a bunch of emojis and it would say like, "I like you.

他告诉我，孩子们在 Snapchat 上玩的一种名为 TBH 的趋势，他们会在其中发布一堆表情符号的图像，上面会说，“我喜欢你。

Your smart.

你聪明。

Your style is great." And you would just reply to the story with the emoji of what you felt.

你的风格很棒。”你只需用你的感受的表情符号来回复这个故事。

And I was like, "This is kind of weird.

我当时想，“这有点奇怪。

You post this on your story and then people send you feedback." And I'm like, "So teens are looking for this vehicle for disclosure essentially." And I'm like, "That's kind of cool.

你把这个发布在你的故事上，然后人们给你发送反馈。”我想，“所以青少年本质上正在寻找这种披露工具。”我想，“这有点酷。

I wonder if you could make that into an app." We had sketched some things out.

我想知道你是否可以将其制作成一个应用程序。”我们已经勾画出了一些东西。

As we were sketching things out, I looked on the app store, and the number one app in the United States was an app called Sarahah.

当我们勾勒出事情的轮廓时，我查看了应用程序商店，美国排名第一的应用程序是一款名为 Sarahah 的应用程序。

It was for sending anonymous messages by adding a link to your Snapchat story.

它用于通过添加 Snapchat 故事的链接来发送匿名消息。

Nikita Bier: But the thing that was most interesting was the entire app was in Arabic.

Nikita Bier：但最有趣的是整个应用程序都是阿拉伯语的。

The number one app in the United States was in Arabic.

美国排名第一的应用程序是阿拉伯语的。

And that was one of the most strongest signal that you could ever have that people want something.

这是最强烈的信号之一，表明人们想要某种东西。

And so when I meet with founders, I often tell them like, "The way you should be searching for product ideas is this concept of latent demand where people are trying to obtain a particular value and going through a very distortive process to obtain that value." And if you can actually crystallize what their motivation is and build a product around and clear up what they're trying to actually do, you can have this kind of intense adoption.

因此，当我与创始人见面时，我经常告诉他们，“你应该寻找产品创意的方式是潜在需求的概念，人们试图获得特定的价值，并经历一个非常扭曲的过程来获得该价值。”如果你能够真正明确他们的动机是什么，并围绕他们构建产品并明确他们实际上想要做什么，你就可以得到这种强烈的采用。

Nikita Bier: When we saw what people were doing with Sarahah, I also looked at some of the tweets and comments on it.

Nikita Bier：当我们看到人们对 Sarahah 所做的事情时，我也查看了一些推文和评论。

A lot of people were receiving negative messages.

很多人都收到了负面消息。

And so what I saw with the game that kids were playing on Snapchat TBH and then Sarahah, I realized just people want to know good things about themselves and that they don't want these bullying messages that they're getting on these anonymous apps, and I was like, "Well, what if instead of actually typing what you wanted to say about somebody, you just answered polls and we authored those polls so that we ensured everything would always be positive?"

所以我看到孩子们在 Snapchat TBH 和 Sarahah 上玩的游戏，我意识到人们只是想了解自己的优点，他们不希望在这些匿名应用程序上收到这些欺凌信息，我想，“好吧，如果你不直接输入你想说的关于某人的内容，而是回答民意调查，我们编写了这些民意调查，这样我们就能确保一切都是积极的，那会怎样呢？”

Nikita Bier: I mean, in the back of my head, I always knew anonymous apps go viral, but they always lead to these awful news stories of kids committing suicide, self-harm and all that.

尼基塔·比尔：我的意思是，在我的脑海里，我一直都知道匿名应用程序会像病毒一样传播，但它们总是会导致孩子自杀、自残等可怕的新闻报道。

And so I was like, "I'll never build anything like that." But when we came up with this new mechanic where you could only say positive things through polls, who has the best smile, who's most likely to be president, and then you receive it as anonymous, but your name is selected, what we discovered a couple of things is it made users feel a lot better.

所以我想，“我永远不会建造那样的东西。”但是当我们想出这个新机制时，你只能通过民意调查说出积极的事情，谁有最好的笑容，谁最有可能成为总统，然后你以匿名方式收到它，但你的名字被选择了，我们发现了一些事情，它让用户感觉好多了。

It actually solved what they were trying to do and they also sent a much higher volume of messages.

它实际上解决了他们想要做的事情，并且他们还发送了更多的消息。

And so it was literally explosive adoption.

因此，这确实是爆炸性的采用。

Nikita Bier: One school I was looking at, they sent 450,000 messages in the first seven days of adopting it.

Nikita Bier：我关注过一所学校，他们在采用该系统的前 7 天内发送了 450,000 条消息。

And when you look at day one volume of messages sent on a messaging app, you're lucky if people send three or four or something, but we were sending 60 and we couldn't even handle it, so we had to geofence the app because we needed to scale our servers, which is actually a pretty controversial decision inside of our company, because why would you turn off something that's working?

当你查看第一天在消息应用程序上发送的消息量时，如果人们发送了三四条或类似的消息，那么你很幸运，但我们发送了 60 条，我们甚至无法处理它，所以我们必须对应用程序进行地理围栏，因为我们需要扩展我们的服务器，这实际上是我们公司内部一个非常有争议的决定，因为你为什么要关闭正在运行的东西？

But at my core, I knew if it's working at this many individual schools, we could just relaunch it any time and it'll go viral.

但在我的内心深处，我知道如果它在这么多个别学校中发挥作用，我们可以随时重新启动它，它就会像病毒一样传播开来。

So let's regroup and figure out what's happening here and then relaunch.

因此，让我们重新组合并弄清楚这里发生了什么，然后重新启动。

Lenny Rachitsky: So you keep talking about how went viral and crazy, grew like crazy.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以你一直在谈论如何病毒式传播和疯狂，如何疯狂地发展。

I know that there's a little trick that you came up with to help it spread.

我知道你想出了一个小技巧来帮助它传播。

Can you just briefly talk about what you did there and to help it spread so quickly within a school?

您能简单谈谈您在那里做了什么并帮助它在学校内如此迅速地传播吗？

Nikita Bier: I think you're referring to, there's a memo that was leaked to BuzzFeed while I was at Facebook.

Nikita Bier：我想你指的是，当我在 Facebook 工作时，有一份备忘录被泄露给了 BuzzFeed。

The main thing we found was like, to be convinced to download an app, you need to see it.

我们发现的主要事情是，要说服您下载应用程序，您需要查看它。

You need to see the marketing message three times or so.

您需要查看营销信息三遍左右。

So you basically need to saturate an area with every kind of marketing you can.

因此，您基本上需要在一个区域中进行尽可能多的营销活动。

So we ran ads targeted at a particular school to when we were seeding and testing these apps.

因此，当我们播种和测试这些应用程序时，我们针对特定学校投放了广告。

And we also followed people creating a dedicated Instagram account that went to that school, because we learned that high schoolers identify their school in their bio, so it says RHS on their bio.

我们还跟踪人们创建了一个专门去那所学校的 Instagram 帐户，因为我们了解到高中生在他们的简历中标识了他们的学校，所以他们的简历上写着 RHS。

And so that was how we tried to get the entire school to adopt synchronously.

这就是我们试图让整个学校同步采用的方式。

We'd follow them and then accept the followbacks.

我们会关注他们，然后接受回馈。

Nikita Bier: Big misunderstanding though, and I get this DM a lot of people are like, "I'm trying to replicate your strategy.

尼基塔·比尔：虽然这是一个很大的误解，但我收到很多人的私信，“我正在尝试复制你的策略。

We've just done it at 15 schools and it's not working anymore." This is not the way we grew the app.

我们刚刚在 15 所学校做到了这一点，但它不再起作用了。”这不是我们开发应用程序的方式。

This is how we tested apps.

这就是我们测试应用程序的方式。

Really, it's a little bit nuanced there.

确实，那里有点微妙。

That's an important nuance because you need to get enough intensity of adoption and density for a social network to start to get the flywheel spinning, but the app should grow by itself after that.

这是一个重要的细微差别，因为你需要获得足够的采用强度和密度，社交网络才能开始转动飞轮，但此后应用程序应该自行增长。

And people think we just went from school to school following every kid on it.

人们认为我们只是跟着每个孩子从一个学校到另一个学校。

You can't, that's totally unrealistic.

不能，那是完全不现实的。

But for the first 100 users, yes, that's how we got them.

但对于前 100 位用户来说，是的，我们就是这样获得他们的。

And that allowed us to know whether the product was working or not.

这让我们知道该产品是否有效。

We could get enough people on it and then we could, with conviction, say that whether the app had legs and we wouldn't have this kind of uncertainty like, "Oh, did they add enough friends?

我们可以让足够多的人使用它，然后我们可以坚定地说该应用程序是否有效，我们不会有这种不确定性，例如“哦，他们添加了足够的朋友吗？

Did we get enough people on it?

我们有足够的人来参与吗？

Did they reach the aha moment because you need friends to get on?"

他们是否因为需要朋友相处而达到了恍然大悟的时刻？”

Nikita Bier: So we wanted to eliminate that confounding variable, and so we figured out a way to just get a bunch of people to adopt at once.

Nikita Bier：所以我们想消除这个令人困惑的变量，所以我们想出了一种方法让一群人立即采用。

And that's one thing I encourage a lot of founders to do, is figure out a way to eliminate all those potentially confounding variables so you can know immediately whether something's working or not.

我鼓励很多创始人做的一件事就是找到一种方法来消除所有这些潜在的令人困惑的变量，这样你就可以立即知道某些东西是否有效。

You never want to walk away from an experiment or test and say, "Well, maybe the execution was bad because it takes a lot of energy to mobilize a team to test something," and you really want to make sure your tests actually provide signal.

您永远不想在结束实验或测试时说：“好吧，也许执行得很糟糕，因为动员团队来测试某些东西需要花费大量精力”，并且您确实希望确保您的测试确实提供了信号。

Lenny Rachitsky: So your advice here is when you're testing something, test the best possible version of what that could be, whether it takes manual work or something that is never going to scale, test the ideal.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以你的建议是，当你测试某些东西时，测试可能的最佳版本，无论是需要手动工作还是永远无法扩展的东西，测试理想的版本。

Because that'll tell you, " Even if this could be the best possible version, do people actually care?"

因为这会告诉你，“即使这可能是最好的版本，人们真的关心吗？”

Nikita Bier: Yeah, we would try to get an entire school to adopt, just to know if everyone had 10 friends, would they actually derive value from this app?

Nikita Bier：是的，我们会尝试让整个学校采用，只是想知道如果每个人都有 10 个朋友，他们真的会从这个应用程序中获得价值吗？

We also did other things, and I recommend all companies do this, is put live chat customer support in your app 24 hours a day.

我们还做了其他事情，我建议所有公司都这样做，就是在您的应用程序中每天 24 小时提供实时聊天客户支持。

It sounds insane.

听起来很疯狂。

It's like the whole point of tech is you don't need to do that.

技术的全部意义就在于你不需要这样做。

That's the whole point of a software.

这就是软件的全部意义。

But then users get this white glove experience, and that eliminates another confounding variable, like did they think their problems were solved or they were treated well?

但随后用户获得了这种白手套体验，这就消除了另一个令人困惑的变量，比如他们认为自己的问题得到了解决还是得到了很好的对待？

But most of all, one of the reasons I actually recommend people put live chat in their app is it's the best vehicle for getting feedback and doing user research because users will literally tell you the problem they're having.

但最重要的是，我实际上建议人们在他们的应用程序中放置实时聊天的原因之一是它是获取反馈和进行用户研究的最佳工具，因为用户会直接告诉您他们遇到的问题。

So we had our person that was running this.

所以我们有专人来负责这件事。

He's name is Michael Gutierrez.

他的名字叫迈克尔·古铁雷斯。

He's done it for all my companies actually.

实际上他为我所有的公司都做到了这一点。

He's the community and customer support rep.

他是社区和客户支持代表。

He would paste any interesting feedback into Slack and then we would be like, "Oh, this user has a great idea.

他会将任何有趣的反馈粘贴到 Slack 中，然后我们会说，“哦，这个用户有一个好主意。

We should consider turning that into a feature." So you really want your finger on the pulse as you roll these things out so you can get a sense for what's working, what isn't, and also make users feel great and make sure at the end they promote your app positively to their peers.

我们应该考虑将其变成一项功能。”因此，在推出这些产品时，您确实希望能够掌握脉搏，这样您就可以了解哪些有效，哪些无效，同时让用户感觉良好，并确保最终他们向同行积极推广您的应用程序。

I love that piece of advice.: Okay, so to close out the TBH chapter, is there anything else that you think is important for people to know or any other lasting lessons from that part of your journey that you bring with you to new apps that you're building today?

我喜欢这个建议。：好的，那么，在结束 TBH 章节时，您认为还有什么其他事情是您认为人们需要了解的重要信息，或者您从您今天正在构建的新应用程序中带来的那部分旅程中的任何其他持久的教训吗？

Nikita Bier: I think the thing that is hard to really understand for first-time founders that hit breakout success with a consumer product is how draining and how spread thin you get, because everything breaks.

尼基塔·比尔（Nikita Bier）：我认为，对于首次在消费产品上取得突破性成功的创始人来说，真正难以理解的事情是，你会如何耗尽精力，以及如何分散精力，因为一切都会崩溃。

Everything that you built needs to be substituted almost every three days.

你建造的所有东西几乎每三天就需要更换一次。

Nikita Bier: I can just give you an example.

尼基塔·比尔：我可以举个例子。

We were just talking about this customer support system that we had.

我们只是在谈论我们拥有的客户支持系统。

The first system broke after three days.

第一个系统在三天后崩溃了。

The next one broke seven days later, we had to replace it with a different one that could scale even better.

下一个在 7 天后坏了，我们不得不用另一个可以更好扩展的另一个来替换它。

And if you think about that on every dimension of the company, it is absolute chaos to keep the thing online as it scales up.

如果你从公司的各个方面考虑这一点，就会发现在规模扩大的同时保持在线状态绝对是混乱的。

And so you have to be ruthless with prioritization as something scales up and put out the largest fires first, because that was something that I didn't really fully understand, is how many things go wrong.

因此，当某些事情扩大规模并首先扑灭最大的火灾时，你必须无情地确定优先级，因为我并没有真正完全理解这一点，即有多少事情会出错。

And if we didn't geofence the app, there would be no way we would've been able to keep that thing online because that gave us some slack to control growth.

如果我们不对应用程序进行地理围栏，我们就无法保持该应用程序在线，因为这给了我们一些控制增长的余地。

Lenny Rachitsky: This is a good example of when people ask like, "Hey, does my app have product-market fit?" I think this is an example of this is what it looks like when things are breaking every three days when you have to geofence it to keep it from crashing.

Lenny Rachitsky：这是一个很好的例子，当人们问“嘿，我的应用程序适合产品市场吗？”我认为这就是一个例子，当事情每三天就会发生一次故障时，你必须对其进行地理围栏以防止其崩溃。

Nikita Bier: A lot of people ask me like, "What's the benchmark for product-market fit?" And this founder that I'm friends with, his name's Roger Dickey, he told me this one time, "If your product's working, you'll know.

Nikita Bier：很多人问我，“产品与市场契合度的基准是什么？”我的朋友罗杰·迪基（Roger Dickey）是一位创始人，有一次他告诉我：“如果你的产品有效，你就会知道。

And if there's any uncertainty, it's not working." And it really is a binary when it comes to consumer products.

如果存在任何不确定性，它就不起作用。”对于消费品而言，这确实是一个二元论。

People are going to be fighting to get into it and you'll find new measures that you've never heard of like, "Our metric was hourly actives per day." Not daily active users, hourly active users.

人们会争先恐后地加入其中，你会发现你从未听说过的新衡量标准，比如“我们的指标是每天每小时的活跃度”。不是每日活跃用户，而是每小时活跃用户。

So you'll start seeing that and it'll be abundantly obvious what product-market fit is.

因此，您将开始看到这一点，并且产品与市场的契合度将变得非常明显。

You'll know it when you see it is the bottom line.

当你看到它是底线时你就会知道。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, so you launch TBH, it goes viral, start getting offers from companies.

Lenny Rachitsky：好的，所以你推出了 TBH，它迅速传播开来，开始收到公司的报价。

Nine weeks later after launch, you end up selling it to Facebook.

发布九周后，你最终将其出售给 Facebook。

What was it like selling your company and then what was it like working at Facebook?

出售你的公司是什么感觉？然后在 Facebook 工作又是什么感觉？

Which you worked at for four years.

你在那里工作了四年。

I was not expecting that when I was looking at your LinkedIn.

当我查看你的 LinkedIn 时，我没想到会这样。

So yeah, what was it like selling?

是的，销售感觉如何？

What was it like working at Facebook?

在 Facebook 工作感觉如何？

Nikita Bier: Selling your company is one of the most draining processes you could ever go through as a founder.

尼基塔·比尔（Nikita Bier）：作为创始人，出售公司是你经历过的最耗费精力的过程之一。

When we met with Facebook, they told me they have 80 people assigned to this deal.

当我们与 Facebook 会面时，他们告诉我他们已分配了 80 名人员来负责这项交易。

And I'm like, I have one person, it's just me.

我想，我有一个人，只有我一个人。

They were like the SWAT team of M&A.

他们就像并购特警队。

Nikita Bier: The funniest part was they wanted to meet the team as well.

Nikita Bier：最有趣的是他们也想见见团队。

And so they came out to our office in Oakland, which is a dingy old office that I got for $1,800 a month.

于是他们来到了我们在奥克兰的办公室，那是一间又脏又旧的办公室，我每个月花 1,800 美元买的。

That was our rent for the office.

这是我们办公室的租金。

They arrive and they walk in.

他们到达并走进去。

There's two engineers and one designer and me, and they're just like, "This is the whole company?

有两名工程师、一名设计师和我，他们就像，“这就是整个公司？

This is the number one app in the United States?" I'm like, "Yeah, this is it." And when we went there, when we arrived, we joined the youth team, which was about, I don't know, 150 people just for this one division of Facebook.

这是美国排名第一的应用程序吗？”我想，“是的，就是这个。”当我们去那里时，当我们到达时，我们加入了青年团队，我不知道，Facebook 的这一部门大约有 150 人。

It was my first job effectively that I've ever had.

这是我所从事的第一份有效的工作。

Nikita Bier: When they told me my title, they said I would be a product manager, I was like, "Okay, I don't know exactly what that is, but yeah, I guess that's what I do." I arrive and then I get access to a workplace system where people post all the things they're working on, and I realized it's kind of like this almost academic environment for social networks, like social network development.

尼基塔·比尔：当他们告诉我我的头衔时，他们说我将成为一名产品经理，我当时想，“好吧，我不知道那到底是什么，但是，是的，我想这就是我所做的。”我到达后，我可以访问一个工作场所系统，人们可以在其中发布他们正在做的所有事情，我意识到这有点像社交网络的近乎学术环境，例如社交网络开发。

It's like the Harvard of social networks.

它就像社交网络中的哈佛。

I was reading all these studies that people were doing on like, "Oh, if we change that, this is the impact to retention and DAU." I was so impressed, like, "There's a whole science here."

我正在阅读人们所做的所有这些研究，比如“哦，如果我们改变这一点，这就是对留存率和 DAU 的影响。”我印象深刻，就像，“这里有一整套科学。”

Nikita Bier: A lot of the stuff that we did was learned from first principles, but then we saw it actually turn into systems and processes here.

Nikita Bier：我们所做的很多事情都是从第一原理中学到的，但后来我们看到它实际上变成了系统和流程。

But the thing I didn't realize as a product manager in a large tech company is there is very little product management that you do.

但我没有意识到，作为一家大型科技公司的产品经理，你所做的产品管理非常少。

You're actually not as involved in the product as I had assumed.

实际上你并没有像我想象的那样参与产品。

I thought, "Oh, you're the person who gets in the pixels and designs the flows." Absolutely not.

我想，“哦，你是那个获取像素并设计流程的人。”绝对不是。

You're completely detached from the design process.

你完全脱离了设计过程。

There's a design vertical org that does all that and they don't really want you working on that.

有一个设计垂直组织可以完成所有这些工作，但他们并不真正希望你从事这些工作。

So that was very difficult for me because when people ask me like, "What do you think you're good at?" At the core, I'm a designer.

所以这对我来说非常困难，因为当人们问我“你认为你擅长什么？”本质上，我是一名设计师。

I don't consider myself a product manager.

我不认为自己是产品经理。

I'm great at growing things, looking at mixed panel and then designing the things that make it grow.

我很擅长种植东西，研究混合面板，然后设计让它生长的东西。

But there's a rift between those two things inside of a large tech company.

但在一家大型科技公司内部，这两件事之间存在着裂痕。

Nikita Bier: And so I loved the academic approach to growing, but it was really hard for me personally as I became disconnected from the design process.

Nikita Bier：所以我喜欢学术的成长方法，但这对我个人来说真的很难，因为我与设计过程脱节了。

I think that a lot of my skills atrophied over those four years.

我认为这四年里我的很多技能都退化了。

But I did stick around.

但我确实坚持了下来。

I went through multiple orgs.

我经历过多个组织。

Favorite one at the end was new product experimentation where I worked with other founders, a bunch of legends in Silicon Valley, building zero to one products, standalone apps.

最后最喜欢的一个是新产品实验，我与其他创始人、硅谷的一群传奇人物一起工作，构建从零到一的产品、独立应用程序。

I mean, I was building standalone apps my entire time at Facebook.

我的意思是，我在 Facebook 的整个时间都在构建独立的应用程序。

I think I built probably eight apps while I was at Facebook.

我想我在 Facebook 时大概开发了八个应用程序。

Nikita Bier: But it is much, much more difficult to build apps at a large company.

Nikita Bier：但是在大公司构建应用程序要困难得多。

A lot of the insights that you have are not things that you can necessarily present or put in writing in a VP meeting, like, " We're building an app for teens to flirt." That probably is not what you would present to a bunch of McKinsey consultants at.

您所拥有的许多见解不一定可以在副总裁会议上展示或书面记录，例如“我们正在开发一款供青少年调情的应用程序”。这可能不是你向麦肯锡顾问们展示的内容。

So I think that makes it really difficult to be completely intellectually honest about what you're building.

所以我认为这使得你很难在智力上完全诚实地对待你正在构建的东西。

And when the team isn't honest about it, then it's really hard to iterate toward the right thing in that context.

当团队对此不诚实时，就很难在这种情况下迭代出正确的事情。

Having said that, there's a lot of things you don't have to deal with as a product...

话虽如此，作为产品，有很多事情你不需要处理......

I don't have to deal think about money, I don't have to think about paying legal bills or doing finance and accounting.

我不必考虑金钱的问题，我不必考虑支付法律费用或进行财务和会计工作。

So all that's abstracted away, but there is regulatory stuff that you have to deal with that I had zero exposure to as a founder of a small company.

因此，所有这些都被抽象化了，但是您必须处理一些监管问题，而作为一家小公司的创始人，我对这些问题的接触为零。

Lenny Rachitsky: An insight you're sharing there potentially is the reason a company like Facebook isn't amazing at launching completely new product, zero to one stuff, is they might be a little too risk averse and it's hard to talk about stuff that people actually really, really want deeply.

Lenny Rachitsky：你可能在那里分享的一个见解是，像 Facebook 这样的公司在推出全新产品、零到一的产品方面表现不佳的原因是它们可能有点过于规避风险，而且很难谈论人们真正非常想要的东西。

Is that kind of the sense there?

有这样的感觉吗？

Nikita Bier: It's hard to really verbalize some of the things that motivate us as people.

Nikita Bier：很难用语言来真正描述一些激励我们作为人的事情。

There's a tweet I put out that's kind of dogmatic in terms of how I view why people download apps and it's very simple.

我发布了一条推文，就我如何看待人们下载应用程序的原因而言，它有点教条主义，而且非常简单。

It's like people download apps to make or save money.

这就像人们下载应用程序是为了赚钱或省钱。

Examples of that might be like WhatsApp, where free texting.

例如 WhatsApp，可以免费发短信。

And then the other reason is to find a mate, so maybe like Tinder or Snapchat, find love.

另一个原因是寻找伴侣，所以也许像 Tinder 或 Snapchat 一样，寻找爱情。

And the third is to unplug from reality maybe like Netflix or Fortnite.

第三是脱离现实，比如看 Netflix 或《堡垒之夜》。

There's a bunch of other kind of subcategories that are very utilitarian like movement, Uber or Airbnb, like shelter.

还有许多其他类型的子类别非常实用，例如移动、Uber 或 Airbnb，例如庇护所。

And so I think putting that in a framing document and the particular nuanced reason why people are going to adopt is difficult when you're presenting that to people that are seasoned professionals and care about how something might reflect on them personally.

因此，我认为，当你将其呈现给经验丰富的专业人士并关心某些东西可能如何影响他们个人时，将其放入框架文件中以及人们将采用的特定微妙原因是很困难的。

Nikita Bier: And so that's really difficult inside of a large company.

Nikita Bier：所以在大公司内部这真的很困难。

You'd certainly have distribution advantages.

您肯定会拥有分销优势。

If you want to just inject your app into one of the parent apps and get density within a community, you could do that.

如果您只想将您的应用程序注入其中一个父应用程序并获得社区内的密度，您可以这样做。

But that part I think is probably solvable for a startup if you just want to pay for ads.

但我认为，如果你只想支付广告费用，这部分对于初创公司来说可能是可以解决的。

Getting your app into a dense friend graph is overall trivial.

将您的应用程序纳入密集的好友图表总体来说是微不足道的。

As a founder, you should be able to pull it off after enough tries.

作为创始人，你应该能够在经过足够多的尝试后成功。

So that advantage that a big company brings, I mean it makes it easier, but it's not something that I think is something that a founder can't solve for themselves.

因此，大公司带来的优势，我的意思是它让它变得更容易，但我认为这并不是创始人无法自己解决的问题。

Lenny Rachitsky: So an interesting takeaway it sounds like is many people feel like, "I'm going to build a social app." They probably often hear, "Facebook's going to do that.

Lenny Rachitsky：听起来很有趣，很多人都觉得“我要开发一款社交应用程序”。他们可能经常听到，“Facebook 会这么做。

Instagram's going to copy you.

Instagram 会复制你。

Snap's going to do that." And what I'm hearing here is it's not as easy as many people think, that it might be actually a lot harder for them to try something.

Snap 将会做到这一点。”我在这里听到的是，这并不像许多人想象的那么容易，对他们来说尝试某些事情实际上可能要困难得多。

Nikita Bier: It's not only harder for them to identify these opportunities and to verbalize it internally and align the company around it.

尼基塔·比尔：对他们来说，识别这些机会、在内部表达出来并围绕这些机会调整公司不仅更加困难。

It's also hard to respond to signals in the market.

对市场信号做出反应也很困难。

A lot of people think these incumbents are going to steal your ideas.

很多人认为这些现任者会窃取你的想法。

And for the most part, it takes a pretty long time for them to respond to even the number one app or charting in the app because it'll start charting in the app store, a PM will make a post about it.

在大多数情况下，即使是排名第一的应用程序或应用程序中的图表，他们也需要相当长的时间才能做出回应，因为它将开始在应用程序商店中绘制图表，PM 会发布有关它的帖子。

And then the market's strategy or market research team might do a study to follow up on it.

然后市场的策略或市场研究团队可能会进行研究来跟进。

It'll kind of float around for a few months.

它会漂浮几个月。

They might put together a framing deck saying, "Hey, we should go after this opportunity.

他们可能会整理出一个框架，说：“嘿，我们应该抓住这个机会。

Let's put together this team.

让我们组建这个团队。

It'll go through VP reviews.

它将经过 VP 审查。

And then it'll start development.

然后它就会开始开发。

Development might take six to 12 months." Realistically, I think most companies, large companies take 12 to 24 months to respond to competitive threats in the market.

开发可能需要 6 到 12 个月的时间。”实际上，我认为大多数公司、大公司需要 12 到 24 个月的时间来应对市场上的竞争威胁。

Lenny Rachitsky: Do you think this is solvable?

Lenny Rachitsky：你认为这个问题可以解决吗？

Is there something a company can change to get better at this?

公司可以改变什么来在这方面做得更好吗？

Are there companies that are good at this in your experience, or is this just as you grow, this is just what happens?

根据您的经验，是否有一些公司擅长这方面，或者这只是随着您的成长而发生的？

Nikita Bier: The incentives within large companies make this very difficult, because you don't want to present something that you have a hunch about being a good idea because if there's not market signals already, then it's hard to defend.

尼基塔·比尔：大公司内部的激励措施使这变得非常困难，因为你不想提出一些你预感是个好主意的东西，因为如果没有市场信号，那么就很难辩护。

People in companies are focused on getting their yearly bonus or they're focused on their performance reviews.

公司里的人专注于获得年度奖金或他们的绩效评估。

It's hard to show up into a framing meeting saying like...

很难在一个框架会议上说这样的话……

And a framing meeting is a meeting where you are positioning the opportunity and everything, "Here's what we should go after." It's hard to just say, "Okay, by first principles, this is a good idea and here's some very vague market signals." In reality, you need to walk in and say, "Here's the number one app in the United States and we don't own it." If you present something like that, that's pretty defensible if you fail because there was market evidence.

框架会议是指你定位机会和一切的会议，“这就是我们应该追求的。”很难说，“好吧，根据首要原则，这是一个好主意，但这里有一些非常模糊的市场信号。”事实上，你需要走进去说：“这是美国排名第一的应用程序，但我们不拥有它。”如果你提出类似的东西，即使你失败了，那也是有道理的，因为有市场证据。

But if you fail about something that's more based on kind of vague abstract...

但如果你在一些更基于模糊抽象的事情上失败了......

Nikita Bier: So you have to, generally, the only path is to copy existing products if you want to really get momentum inside of a large organization.

Nikita Bier：所以，一般来说，如果你想在大型组织内部获得动力，唯一的途径就是复制现有产品。

And for completely new concepts, it's I think very difficult to present a lot of those ideas, either to verbalize them into a document or to even get rally the organization around it.

对于全新的概念，我认为提出很多这样的想法是非常困难的，无论是将它们表述成文件，还是让组织围绕它团结起来。

That's a really interesting insight.: This episode is brought to you by Explo, a game changer for customer facing analytics and data reporting.

这是一个非常有趣的见解。：本集由 Explo 为您带来，Explo 是面向客户的分析和数据报告的游戏规则改变者。

Are your users craving more dashboards, reports, and analytics within your product?

您的用户是否渴望在您的产品中提供更多仪表板、报告和分析？

Are you tired of trying to build it yourself?

您是否厌倦了尝试自己构建它？

As a product leader, you probably have these requests in your roadmap, but the struggle to prioritize them is real.

作为产品领导者，您的路线图中可能有这些请求，但确定它们的优先级的困难是真实存在的。

Building analytics from scratch can be time-consuming, expensive, and a really challenging process.

从头开始构建分析可能非常耗时、昂贵，而且是一个非常具有挑战性的过程。

Enter Explo.

输入爆炸。

That's a really interesting insight.: Explo is a fully white-labeled embedded analytics solution designed entirely with your user in mind.

这是一个非常有趣的见解。：Explo 是一个完全白标的嵌入式分析解决方案，其设计完全考虑到您的用户。

Getting started is easy.

入门很容易。

Explo connects to any relational database or warehouse, and with its low-code functionality, you can build and style dashboards in minutes.

Explo 连接到任何关系数据库或仓库，凭借其低代码功能，您可以在几分钟内构建仪表板并设计仪表板样式。

Once you're ready, simply embed the dashboard or report into your application with a tiny code snippet.

准备就绪后，只需使用一小段代码将仪表板或报告嵌入到您的应用程序中即可。

The best part?

最好的部分？

Your end users can use Explo's AI features for their own report and dashboard generation, eliminating customer data requests for your support team.

您的最终用户可以使用 Explo 的 AI 功能来生成自己的报告和仪表板，从而消除对支持团队的客户数据请求。

Build and embed a fully white analytics experience in days.

在几天内构建并嵌入完全白色的分析体验。

Try it for free at explo.co/lenny.

请访问 explo.co/lenny 免费试用。

That's E-X-P-L-O, .C-O/Lenny.

那是 E-X-P-L-O，.C-O/Lenny。

That's a really interesting insight.: Before we move on to the next chapter, I want to come back to the very first thing you said where product management is not real.

这是一个非常有趣的见解。：在我们继续下一章之前，我想回到你所说的第一件事，即产品管理并不真实。

Is there anything else that you can say about your insight there?

关于您的见解，您还有什么可以说的吗？

Or is it basically what you described where PMs aren't actually involved in design and a company like Facebook in your experience?

或者，这基本上就是您所描述的那样，在您的经历中，PM 并没有真正参与设计，而像 Facebook 这样的公司？

Nikita Bier: The functional organization structure of big tech has kind of separated product managers from the product development process in many ways.

Nikita Bier：大型科技公司的职能组织结构在很多方面将产品经理与产品开发过程分开。

They're not looking at data because data scientists are doing that.

他们不看数据，因为数据科学家正在这样做。

They're just parsing some of the reports that they get back.

他们只是解析一些返回的报告。

They're mainly just writing documents and then kind of being the team secretary and running around, getting approvals from each cross-functional team, legal privacy, everything like that.

他们主要只是写文件，然后担任团队秘书并四处奔波，获得每个跨职能团队的批准，法律隐私，诸如此类的事情。

And yeah, you're actually very much separated from the product itself.

是的，你实际上与产品本身是非常分离的。

And so I think what Snapchat has done, and I think Apple too, to the same extent, is that designers run the show.

因此，我认为 Snapchat 所做的事情以及苹果公司所做的事情在某种程度上都是由设计师主导的。

And I think that's led to some very novel-

我认为这导致了一些非常新颖的——

Nikita Bier: And I think that's led to some very novel products coming out from both of those companies.

尼基塔·比尔：我认为这导致这两家公司推出了一些非常新颖的产品。

But I mean that is its own host of problems because actually rolling out a product inside of a large organization, it requires a sheer force of will because it's a lot of work.

但我的意思是，这本身就有很多问题，因为实际上在一个大型组织内部推出一个产品，它需要绝对的意志力，因为它需要大量的工作。

I mean, there's a lot of regulatory scrutiny, scaling it up.

我的意思是，有很多监管审查，并且规模不断扩大。

You do need someone to project manage.

您确实需要有人来进行项目管理。

And so I don't know if it's the silver bullet as to give designers the reign to run the show, but I also don't think the current traditional like Google, Facebook style of being team secretaries is also the best solution.

所以我不知道让设计师掌控全局是否是灵丹妙药，但我也不认为目前像Google、Facebook这样的传统团队秘书风格也是最好的解决方案。

Lenny Rachitsky: To defend product managers, I think many product managers spend a lot of time in design, spend a lot of time with data science.

Lenny Rachitsky：为了捍卫产品经理，我认为许多产品经理在设计上花费了大量时间，在数据科学上花费了大量时间。

I think probably what you saw is like the extreme big, big, big tech version of product management.

我想你所看到的可能就是产品管理的极端大科技版本。

I know even PMs at Facebook can if they want to spend time with design.

我知道，如果 Facebook 的产品经理想花时间进行设计，他们也可以这样做。

I think it's just obviously very different from a startup world where you're just, that's all you're doing.

我认为这显然与初创公司的世界非常不同，在初创公司中你所做的就是这些。

Nikita Bier: Yeah, it's certainly an exaggerated view, but it's particularly relevant I think for all the zero to one initiatives because if you're a product manager on a standalone app inside of a large, like you should be designing the hierarchy, the pixels, the flows, everything.

Nikita Bier：是的，这确实是一个夸张的观点，但我认为这对于所有零到一的计划特别相关，因为如果你是一个大型独立应用程序的产品经理，你应该设计层次结构、像素、流程，一切。

And then yeah, it should be cleaned up prototype by a technical designer, but that's your idea.

然后是的，它应该由技术设计师清理原型，但这是你的想法。

And products live and die in the pixels, like consumer products, so that's on you.

产品的生死存亡取决于像素，就像消费品一样，所以这取决于您。

And that's where I think for maybe larger growth initiatives, yes, you can be a little more detached from the pixels.

这就是我认为对于更大的增长计划来说，是的，你可以更加脱离像素。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that advice.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢这个建议。

Okay, before we move on to the next phase of your journey of starting Gas, I heard there's an interesting story around where you were actually put within the Facebook office physically, where your team was put.

好吧，在我们开始你的 Gas 之旅的下一阶段之前，我听说有一个有趣的故事，关于你实际上被安置在 Facebook 办公室的地方，你的团队被安置在那里。

Is there something there?

那里有什么东西吗？

Nikita Bier: Yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的。

When we joined the new product experimentation group, we were actually seated I think at basically the same desk as Mark Zuckerberg.

当我们加入新产品实验小组时，我认为我们实际上和马克·扎克伯格坐在同一张桌子上。

And that was pretty cool to see how the machine runs from Zuck's view.

从扎克的角度来看机器如何运行真是太酷了。

But we had a few artifacts that we had kept with us from our old office when we were running tbh, and one of them was this kind of pop art painting that I bought on the street when I needed to get something on the walls for our office.

但我们有一些文物是我们在运营时从旧办公室保留下来的，其中之一就是这种波普艺术画，当我需要在我们办公室的墙上贴一些东西时，我在街上买了它。

And it was this giant painting of Tim Cook.

这就是蒂姆·库克的这幅巨画。

We had been carrying it between our orgs at Facebook just because it was a funny painting.

我们在 Facebook 的各个组织之间一直带着它，只是因为它是一幅有趣的画。

And I kind of got it because it was kind of symbolic of who actually controls our destiny, is Apple.

我有点明白了，因为它象征着谁真正控制着我们的命运，那就是苹果。

And so when we relocated to the area where Zuck was sitting, I put up the painting on the wall and it was basically a giant painting of Tim Cook was overlooking Zuck.

因此，当我们搬到扎克坐的地方时，我把这幅画挂在墙上，它基本上是蒂姆·库克俯瞰扎克的巨型画作。

And eventually one of the EAs there said, "Actually, do you think you could take that home?" And it kind of made sense because you can't really have a painting of another big tech executive overlooking us.

最终，其中一位 EA 说道：“实际上，你认为你可以把它带回家吗？”这是有道理的，因为你不可能真正看到另一位大型科技高管俯视我们的画。

Lenny Rachitsky: What does it look like?

莱尼·拉奇茨基：它看起来像什么？

Do you happen to have it?

你碰巧有吗？

Nikita Bier: Yeah, I actually do.

尼基塔·比尔：是的，我确实如此。

Let me go grab it.

让我去抢吧。

Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

Oh, wow.

哦，哇。

That's artistic.

那很艺术。

So that's Tim Cook.

这就是蒂姆·库克。

What is the idea there that he's peeking through this darkness staring at you?

他在黑暗中窥视着你，这是怎么回事？

Nikita Bier: Yeah, yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的，是的。

He's the real boss of all of us.

他是我们所有人真正的老板。

Lenny Rachitsky: I could see why Zuck would not want that staring at him all day.

Lenny Rachitsky：我明白为什么扎克不想让那个人整天盯着他看。

That's amazing.

太棒了。

And I like that you still have that with you.

我喜欢你还带着它。

Nikita Bier: Yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的。

One of the artifacts of that chapter of life.

那一章生命的神器之一。

So good.

太好了。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。

So that was your Facebook journey, those four years.

这就是你的 Facebook 旅程，那四年。

That's wild.

那太疯狂了。

You left Facebook.

你离开了脸书。

At some point, you started, I remember this, you started tweeting like, "Hey, I'm working on new app." Everyone was going nuts.

在某个时候，你开始，我记得这一点，你开始发推文，“嘿，我正在开发新应用程序。”每个人都疯了。

"What are you working on?" And at this point, I think you probably in your mind thought, I am this one-hit wonder, I haven't shown that I can do this again and again.

“你在做什么？”此时此刻，我想你心里可能会想，我就是这个一击奇迹，我还没有证明我可以一次又一次地做到这一点。

And so I think you probably have this motivation.

所以我想你可能有这个动机。

Maybe talk about that, just like this drive of like, hey, I want to do this again.

也许谈论这个，就像这个驱动器一样，嘿，我想再做一次。

Is that where your mind was at?

那是你的心思吗？

Nikita Bier: When that meme started, my intent was to start a venture-backed company and build something that would scale to be a big team and this durable thing that lasted many years and everything.

尼基塔·比尔（Nikita Bier）：当这个模因开始时，我的意图是创办一家风险投资支持的公司，并建立一些可以扩展为一个大团队的东西，并且这个持久的东西可以持续很多年和一切。

And so I just made post that I was leaving Facebook and looking for some teammates.

所以我刚刚发帖表示我要离开 Facebook 并寻找一些队友。

And I shared a couple of ideas with some people privately and there were some really crazy ideas that I shared.

我私下与一些人分享了一些想法，我分享了一些非常疯狂的想法。

I'm not going to get into them, but then people started posting, "Oh my God, I just saw Nikita's app.

我不打算深入讨论它们，但后来人们开始发帖，“天哪，我刚刚看到了尼基塔的应用程序。

It's crazy." And what happened was others saw that and then they started memeing it and it became this massive meme where they're like, "Oh, I just tried Nikita's app, it saved my marriage.

这太疯狂了。”其他人看到了这一点，然后他们开始模仿它，它变成了一个巨大的模因，他们就像，“哦，我刚刚尝试了尼基塔的应用程序，它拯救了我的婚姻。

Oh, I just quit drinking.

哦，我刚刚戒酒了。

My kids returned home after all these like," and it turned into this massive meme.

我的孩子们在经历了这些之后回到了家，”它变成了这个巨大的模因。

And at the time, I didn't even have an app or anything.

当时，我什至没有应用程序或任何东西。

I wasn't even planning to launch it.

我什至没有打算启动它。

It wasn't even an app, some of the ideas I was looking at.

它甚至不是一个应用程序，而是我正在考虑的一些想法。

And so it just turned into this viral moment.

所以它就变成了这个病毒式传播的时刻。

I wasn't even committed to starting another company at that point.

那时我什至还没有决心创办另一家公司。

This was an exploration process.

这是一个探索的过程。

Nikita Bier: But what happened was the market had crashed shortly thereafter, there was kind of the end of the Zerb era.

Nikita Bier：但随后不久市场就崩溃了，Zerb 时代就此结束了。

The Fed started hiking rates.

美联储开始加息。

I think my portfolio was down like 30% or something and I was like, "Damn, this sucks.

我认为我的投资组合下跌了 30% 左右，我当时想，“该死，这太糟糕了。

Maybe I should think about how to make money today." That's the reason we're in startups is to make money.

也许我今天应该考虑一下如何赚钱。”这就是我们创业的原因就是为了赚钱。

And so there was always in the back of my head this question that I had, which was what if we had monetized tbh?

所以我的脑海里总是有一个问题，那就是如果我们真的货币化了怎么办？

Because the number one support message we received was can I pay to reveal who sent me polls?

因为我们收到的第一条支持信息是我可以付费透露谁给我发送了民意调查吗？

It was the number one question.

这是第一个问题。

And it was like, would it have made even more than the acquisition if we just monetized it?

就好像，如果我们只是将其货币化，它的收益会比收购的收益还要多吗？

And I'm like, we could probably build this pretty fast, like probably in a month, month or two.

我想，我们可能可以很快地构建这个，比如可能在一两个月内。

Ended up being a lot longer, but we started rebuilding it.

最终变得更长了，但我们开始重建它。

It was a new team.

这是一支新团队。

It was one of the engineers from a company called Paparazzi.

这是一家名为“Paparazzi”的公司的工程师之一。

His name's Zay Turner, and he started building it in my house and we had tested it to see would this new version of tbh actually resonate with kids five years later?

他的名字叫 Zay Turner，他开始在我家里建造它，我们对其进行了测试，看看五年后这个新版本的 tbh 是否真的能引起孩子们的共鸣？

That was actually the thing I wanted to know most of all was like would an anonymous polling app actually still be relevant five years later?

这实际上是我最想知道的事情，就像五年后匿名投票应用程序实际上仍然具有相关性吗？

And so we dropped it into the school just the same way I've always done it in-

所以我们把它扔进了学校，就像我一直以来做的那样——

Lenny Rachitsky: Was it the Georgia School again?

Lenny Rachitsky：又是佐治亚学校吗？

Nikita Bier: Yes, actually.

尼基塔·比尔：是的，实际上。

We launched at the exact same school that we launched tbh on the exact same day five years later, in fact.

事实上，我们在五年后的同一天推出了我们在同一所学校推出的学校。

And people sent a lot of messages, but it wasn't growing.

人们发送了很多消息，但数量并没有增加。

So let me pedal back here a bit.

让我再踩一下这里。

So tbh grew through variety of things, people sharing their messages to Snapchat and text invites, and that was 2017.

说实话，Tbh 的成长经历了各种各样的事情，人们在 Snapchat 上分享他们的消息并发出短信邀请，那是 2017 年。

And the way you invited your friends on tbh was that you tap their name, your contact name, and there was a button that said Invite and then we used Twilio to send them a text message.

说实话，你邀请朋友的方式是点击他们的名字、你的联系人姓名，然后有一个“邀请”按钮，然后我们使用 Twilio 向他们发送短信。

And the regulatory environment actually had changed a lot over those five years.

这五年来，监管环境实际上发生了很大变化。

You really can't send texts from a server anymore.

您确实无法再从服务器发送文本了。

It has to be sent from the user's device.

它必须从用户的设备发送。

And just the point of clarification is a lot of people clone tbh over the years and they think that when you voted on people in the polls, it sent them a text.

需要澄清的是，多年来很多人都在克隆，他们认为当你在民意调查中投票给某人时，它会向他们发送一条短信。

We never did that.

我们从来没有这样做过。

That's egregiously illegal to do and also unethical at a user experience level to send texts when people don't even know what's happening.

当人们甚至不知道发生了什么时发送短信是极其违法的，而且从用户体验层面来看也是不道德的。

Nikita Bier: But anyway, we couldn't send texts over Twilio anymore, and that led to people not sending as many invites when we created Gas because they had to pop the Compose window and hit Send.

Nikita Bier：但无论如何，我们无法再通过 Twilio 发送短信，这导致人们在我们创建 Gas 时发送的邀请数量减少，因为他们必须弹出“撰写”窗口并点击“发送”。

They're going to just tap Invite on five names.

他们只需点击五个名字的“邀请”即可。

So we actually had to reinvent all the growth systems and it took about I think like nine launches including renaming the app, including features that just never existed on tbh.

因此，我们实际上必须重新发明所有的增长系统，我认为大约需要发布九次，包括重命名应用程序，包括老实说从未存在过的功能。

So it was actually just in many ways like yeah, the concept on the surface was the same, but it was very much a zero to one development cycle of figuring out how to grow this thing again in this climate.

所以实际上在很多方面就像是的，表面上的概念是一样的，但这是一个零到一的开发周期，旨在弄清楚如何在这种气候下再次种植这个东西。

Lenny Rachitsky: I know that point is really important to you.

Lenny Rachitsky：我知道这一点对您来说非常重要。

I think a lot of people are like Nikita just sold the same app twice.

我想很多人都像尼基塔一样，把同一个应用程序卖了两次。

What a guy.

真是个家伙啊。

And the point you're making here is not only was the infrastructure completely different, the team was different, you had to rethink the entire flywheel of how it worked and how it grew.

你在这里要表达的观点是，不仅基础设施完全不同，团队也不同，你必须重新思考整个飞轮的工作方式和增长方式。

Nikita Bier: Yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的。

And there were so many layers of like we validated one thing and then the next thing we got stuck on.

有很多层，就像我们验证了一件事，然后我们陷入了下一件事。

Like, okay, people send a lot of messages.

就像，好吧，人们发送了很多消息。

Cool, great.

很酷，很棒。

The next thing was will it spread within a school?

接下来的问题是它会在学校内传播吗？

That took us a while to get right.

我们花了一段时间才恢复正常。

Will it hop schools?

会跳学吗？

Each of those was a very, very challenging problem in light of the new climate that we were operating in.

鉴于我们所处的新环境，这些都是一个非常非常具有挑战性的问题。

And I always do things by the book when it comes to operating legally within the compliance framework.

当涉及到在合规框架内合法运营时，我总是按章办事。

And that's something when I meet founders and they tell me some growth thing that they're doing, and I'm like, "You can't do that.

当我见到创始人时，他们告诉我他们正在做的一些增长事情，我就说，“你不能那样做。

That's going to cause way more trouble down the line.

这将会带来更多的麻烦。

It's going to burn users too." And so we always wanted to make it abundantly clear how our growth system, how you are inviting friends and all that.

它也会消耗用户。”因此，我们总是希望非常清楚地说明我们的增长系统、如何邀请朋友等等。

You can kind of go on a whole diatribe on that because the thing that I see a lot of founders do is they in the background use user data in ways that it shouldn't be used.

你可以对此进行彻底的谩骂，因为我看到很多创始人所做的事情是他们在后台以不应该使用的方式使用用户数据。

They invite people on your behalf and all that.

他们代表你邀请人们等等。

Nikita Bier: And I have this kind of crazy view that the internet is this living and breathing thing.

尼基塔·比尔：我有一种疯狂的观点，认为互联网是一个活生生的东西。

There's Wikipedia article called the Gaia Hypothesis, which is about biology.

维基百科上有一篇名为“盖亚假说”的文章，是关于生物学的。

And it's basically like the earth is kind of living and breathing and can respond to threats.

基本上就像地球是有生命和呼吸的，可以对威胁做出反应。

Okay?

好吧？

And when you enter the rainforest too deep, Ebola virus will be released.

而当你进入雨林太深时，埃博拉病毒就会被释放出来。

Okay?

好吧？

So I think the internet operates on a similar paradigm here where if you do the wrong thing by users, the internet will come back and get even and defend itself.

因此，我认为互联网的运作模式与此类似，如果用户做了错误的事情，互联网将会回来报复并保护自己。

And so whenever I design products, I try to do right by users because it'll always come back much worse and I think you should always operate above board with how you design your growth systems.

因此，每当我设计产品时，我都会尽力以用户为中心，因为结果总是会更糟，我认为你应该始终光明正大地设计你的增长系统。

And with Gas, we had to do things the right way and we had to figure out at each particular moment or problem that we solve, will it spread within schools?

对于 Gas，我们必须以正确的方式做事，我们必须弄清楚我们解决的每个特定时刻或问题，它会在学校内传播吗？

Will it hop schools?

会跳学吗？

Will people pay for it?

人们会为此付出代价吗？

All of these things was a whole reinvention of the original product.

所有这些都是对原始产品的彻底改造。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that you shared that because I think a lot of people see you from the outside and they think you're doing all kinds of these skeezy growth hacks and making teens do things that aren't really mentally healthy for them.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢你分享的这一点，因为我认为很多人从外面看你，他们认为你正在做各种这些奇怪的成长黑客，让青少年做一些对他们来说心理不健康的事情。

But it's clear that that's the opposite of how you think about it, that you're trying to stay very positive, like you only allow positive communication.

但很明显，这与你的想法相反，你试图保持非常积极的态度，就像你只允许积极的沟通一样。

You do things that as you just said, are going to be good long-term, the internet's not going to come and try to shut you down.

正如你刚才所说，你所做的事情从长远来看是好的，互联网不会来试图阻止你。

Nikita Bier: The point you bring up here about wanting to build a positive thing, some people, sometimes I get criticism.

尼基塔·比尔：你在这里提出的关于想要建立积极的事物的观点，有些人，有时我会受到批评。

It's not actually that often, but they say, "Oh, you're building an app that makes teens feeling insecure or anything." But with Gas, I think we received a message every single day from a user telling us that they reconsidered suicide or other forms of self-harm.

实际上这种情况并不常见，但他们说，“哦，你正在开发一个让青少年感到不安全或其他什么的应用程序。”但对于 Gas，我认为我们每天都会收到用户发来的消息，告诉我们他们重新考虑自杀或其他形式的自残。

The app sent you positive messages and affirmations.

该应用程序向您发送积极的消息和肯定。

It made teens feel really good.

这让青少年感觉非常好。

And I think that is lost on a lot of people.

我认为很多人都忽视了这一点。

Instagram can make you feel jealousy and a lot of other social networks are a mixed bag in terms of impact.

Instagram 会让你感到嫉妒，而许多其他社交网络的影响力参差不齐。

But we were entirely focused on making teens feel better.

但我们完全专注于让青少年感觉更好。

Nikita Bier: And some people might say, "Oh, what if someone doesn't get voted for something?" We actually built a system to ensure everyone got a vote.

尼基塔·比尔：有些人可能会说，“哦，如果有人没有为某件事投票怎么办？”我们实际上建立了一个系统来确保每个人都有投票权。

And what we did was we put your name in polls at a higher frequency if you weren't being voted on recently.

我们所做的是，如果您最近没有被投票，我们会以更高的频率将您的名字放入民意调查中。

So we wanted to spread the love in every way possible, and that's what really motivated me to grow this thing was watching how it was impacting 10 million kids in such a short period of time.

所以我们想以各种可能的方式传播爱，这就是我发展这个东西的真正动力，就是看到它如何在如此短的时间内影响 1000 万孩子。

Lenny Rachitsky: I really appreciate you adding that.

Lenny Rachitsky：我真的很感谢你补充这一点。

I didn't know all those things about the way you thought about these apps.

我不知道您对这些应用程序的看法。

Interestingly, I don't know how much you can go into this, but there is a lot of stuff going on with Gas around human trafficking and all this stuff where people thought people were being kidnapped through Gas, which is yeah, talk about that whatever you can because that's pretty crazy.

有趣的是，我不知道你能对此进行多少探讨，但是 Gas 发生了很多关于人口贩运的事情，以及所有这些人们认为人们通过 Gas 被绑架的事情，是的，尽你所能谈论这个，因为这非常疯狂。

Nikita Bier: We had this hoax started where people were saying the app was used for human trafficking.

Nikita Bier：我们开始了这个骗局，人们说该应用程序被用于人口贩运。

And I was like, "This is so strange." This is a anonymous polling app without messaging and the only thing you could do is send compliments to your friends.

我当时想，“这太奇怪了。”这是一个匿名投票应用程序，没有消息传递，你唯一能做的就是向你的朋友发送赞美。

And I researched into it and I saw that this is actually plaguing a lot of apps and any app that has gone viral in any way has actually had this hoax started.

我对此进行了研究，发现这实际上困扰着许多应用程序，并且任何以任何方式病毒式传播的应用程序实际上都开始了这种骗局。

And part of the reason it happens is it gets you attention if you say that about an app.

发生这种情况的部分原因是，如果你对某个应用程序这么说，它会引起你的注意。

As a teenager, if you say, "Oh, this app is dangerous," and then you get a bunch of followers and who doesn't love followers?

作为一个青少年，如果你说，“哦，这个应用程序很危险”，然后你就会得到一群追随者，谁不喜欢追随者呢？

So it's actually a really viral piece of content if you put it out.

所以如果你把它发布出去，它实际上是一个非常病毒式的内容。

And so we had this hoax started and we were like, "This could kill the company." And I talked to a bunch of founders that it happened to them and they said, "Yeah, we had to shut down because of that."

于是我们就开始了这个骗局，我们当时想，“这可能会毁了公司。”我和一群创始人谈过，这件事发生在他们身上，他们说：“是的，因此我们不得不关闭。”

Nikita Bier: And I was like, "Is this it?

尼基塔·比尔：我当时想，“是这个吗？

Is this the end of the company?" And I remember it hit number one when we started getting a few of these reports in our support channels.

这就是公司的末日吗？”我记得当我们开始在我们的支持渠道中收到一些此类报告时，它就排名第一。

And I was like, "I'm just going to plant the flag on posts that we hit number one in the App Store because this thing's probably going to shut down soon." So I make this announcement on Twitter, "I just made the number one app and I thought it would just be dead in a week." And then I just had this sudden burst of energy and I was like, "I'm going to win.

我当时想，“我只是要在我们在 App Store 中排名第一的帖子上插上旗帜，因为这个东西可能很快就会关闭。”所以我在 Twitter 上宣布：“我刚刚制作了排名第一的应用程序，我以为它会在一周内消失。”然后我突然爆发出一股能量，我心想：“我要赢了。

I'm going to fight this.

我要对抗这个。

This is not true.

这不是真的。

It makes no sense at all."

这根本没有意义。”

Nikita Bier: And so we fought it at every vector possible, this completely made up hoax.

尼基塔·比尔（Nikita Bier）：所以我们用一切可能的方式来对抗它，这完全是编造的骗局。

We met with journalists, reporters to make sure that the number one match every time you search Gas app human trafficking was Gas app is not for human trafficking.

我们会见了记者，确保每次您搜索 Gas 应用程序人口贩运时，排名第一的匹配项是 Gas 应用程序不是用于人口贩运。

And so that ended up being The Washington Post headline.

所以这最终成为了《华盛顿邮报》的头条新闻。

We insisted that that be the headline if we do the interview.

我们坚持认为，如果我们进行采访，这就是头条新闻。

So that was the first thing that showed up on Google anytime someone searched it.

所以每当有人搜索它时，这就是第一个出现在谷歌上的东西。

There were schools and even a police station that posted that this app is used for human trafficking.

有学校甚至警察局发布消息称该应用程序用于人口贩卖。

I called those superintendents, I called those police chiefs and have got them to publicly retract it.

我给那些警长打电话，给那些警察局长打电话，让他们公开撤回它。

And we had some of the reviews on the App Store.

我们在 App Store 上得到了一些评论。

We asked Apple to remove them because we got review bombed.

我们要求苹果删除它们，因为我们的评论遭到轰炸。

Nikita Bier: But the thing that actually was the most impactful was my girlfriend made a video, a TikTok video explaining that it's not true.

尼基塔·比尔：但实际上最有影响力的是我女朋友制作了一个视频，一个 TikTok 视频，解释说这不是真的。

And anytime someone deleted their account, they could watch this video explaining it's not true.

每当有人删除他们的帐户时，他们都可以观看这段视频来解释这不是真的。

And at the peak, we had 3% of users deleting their accounts per day.

在高峰期，我们每天有 3% 的用户删除他们的帐户。

So it was like a catastrophe for an app and we got it down to 0.1% through relentless, relentless effort.

所以这对于一个应用程序来说就像是一场灾难，我们通过不懈的努力将其降低到了 0.1%。

And it was really just an unusual thing that happens when you grow really fast is this human trafficking hoax that starts.

当你成长得非常快时，人口贩卖骗局就开始了，这确实是一件不寻常的事情。

And you don't understand how crazy it is until it happens to your company, but it was kind of hilarious to think about.

除非这种事发生在你的公司，否则你不会明白这有多疯狂，但想想还是有点搞笑。

This app was the most harmless benign thing you could think of.

这个应用程序是你能想到的最无害的良性应用程序。

Lenny Rachitsky: This is insane.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这太疯狂了。

I did not know this full story.

我不知道这个完整的故事。

And you were doing all this while you were trying to scale the app and trying to keep the servers up and try to grow it, right?

当您尝试扩展应用程序并尝试保持服务器正常运行并尝试扩展它时，您正在做这一切，对吧？

What was that like to try to manage all these things at once?

尝试同时管理所有这些事情是什么感觉？

Nikita Bier: I was sleeping three hours a day for three months.

尼基塔·比尔：三个月来我每天睡三个小时。

It was extraordinarily difficult to do it all.

要做这一切是非常困难的。

Our team was also relentless though.

但我们的团队也很坚持不懈。

They would come over to my house 9:00 a.m.

他们会早上 9:00 来我家。

stay until midnight and just do that seven days a week.

待到午夜，每周 7 天都这样做。

So yeah, it was definitely one of the most physically draining things ever, but we were just so tactical.

所以，是的，这绝对是有史以来最消耗体力的事情之一，但我们的战术性很强。

I remember investors were asking to meet with us and I said, "If you can't get a celebrity to post that this isn't true, then we're not interested." But yeah, we went after it on every vector and it ended up being okay.

我记得投资者要求与我们会面，我说：“如果你不能让名人发帖证明这不是真的，那么我们就不感兴趣。”但是，是的，我们在每个向量上都追求它，结果还好。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love how you took your brain to this other completely different problem and thought about all the levers you could use to change the conversation around the app.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢你如何用你的大脑去思考另一个完全不同的问题，并思考你可以使用的所有杠杆来改变应用程序周围的对话。

Nikita Bier: Yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的。

I remember we had these TikTok videos that were made that were saying it was true and I networked my way all the way to the CEO of TikTok and I said, "Can you delete these?" And we got this information deleted.

我记得我们制作了这些 TikTok 视频，这些视频说这是真的，我一路联系 TikTok 的首席执行官，我说：“你能删除这些吗？”我们删除了这些信息。

Yeah, so it was really a whole new test of our team's capacities was fighting.

是的，这确实是对我们团队战斗能力的全新考验。

The key thing that you have to know though when you have a hoax spreading about your app is you really have to make sure the hoax is less viral than your app.

不过，当您的应用程序出现恶作剧传播时，您必须知道的关键一点是，您确实必须确保该恶作剧的病毒传播速度低于您的应用程序。

And at a few points, the hoax was more viral than our app and we had to take this-

在某些时候，这个恶作剧比我们的应用程序更流行，我们不得不接受这个 -

Lenny Rachitsky: That's absurd.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这太荒谬了。

Okay.

好的。

So broadly, you built this app.

总的来说，您构建了这个应用程序。

Again, a big success.

再次取得巨大成功。

I saw a stat that you made $11 million in sales through the app, 10 million downloads.

我看到一个统计数据，您通过该应用程序实现了 1100 万美元的销售额，1000 万次下载。

Is that right?

是这样吗？

Nikita Bier: Yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的。

It was a blowout success in terms of like it grew bigger than tbh.

就其规模而言，这是一次井喷式的成功。

We monetized it.

我们将其货币化。

We ran almost entirely on startup credits, so it was basically-

我们几乎完全依靠启动资金运行，所以基本上是-

Lenny Rachitsky: Like Cloud Credits?

Lenny Rachitsky：喜欢云积分吗？

Like AWS Credits?

喜欢 AWS 积分吗？

Nikita Bier: Yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的。

AWS Credits, Mixpanel.

AWS 积分、Mixpanel。

I remember when I saw the early data, I'm like, "Okay, now it's time for me to negotiate every bill down to the last cent of margin for every vendor." And I got credits everywhere, and so we really were tactical with that.

我记得当我看到早期数据时，我想，“好吧，现在是我为每个供应商谈判每项账单直至最后一分利润的时候了。”我到处都得到了荣誉，所以我们确实对此采取了策略。

And so we ended up being all just pure cashflow for the team.

所以我们最终成为团队的纯粹现金流。

We had no investors.

我们没有投资者。

And it was just so interesting though that the way that I started posting about it on Twitter was it kind of captured the zeitgeist of the internet.

非常有趣的是，我开始在 Twitter 上发布相关内容的方式有点捕捉到了互联网的时代精神。

And we didn't intend on selling it.

而且我们并不打算出售它。

We were just going to let this thing run its course and just be this app that kind of lives in the background of our lives.

我们只是想让这个事情顺其自然，让这个应用程序生活在我们生活的后台。

But once it started capturing the zeitgeist of Twitter, I was like, "Wait a minute, we could probably sell this thing." And that's when we started engaging with some of these, we ended up getting three companies that wanted to buy it.

但一旦它开始捕捉 Twitter 的时代精神，我就想，“等一下，我们可能可以卖掉这个东西。”就在那时，我们开始接触其中的一些公司，最终我们得到了三家想要购买它的公司。

I won't be able to say them, but ultimately we ended up selling to Discord and we joined Discord.

我无法说出这些，但最终我们最终卖给了 Discord，并加入了 Discord。

Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

So before we move on to the next part of the journey and some of the other insights that I want to get into, is there any lasting lessons that you took away from Gas as a product that you take with you to advising startups in terms of building the product design?

因此，在我们进入旅程的下一部分以及我想了解的其他一些见解之前，您从 Gas 作为产品中学到了什么持久的经验教训，可以在构建产品设计方面为初创公司提供建议吗？

I know there's many, but any that stand out most that you think are really interesting to share?

我知道有很多，但是您认为最突出且真正有兴趣分享的是什么？

Nikita Bier: I think I kind of touched on this before, which was trying to validate things in a sequence of like, will people use the core flow?

Nikita Bier：我想我之前接触过这个问题，它试图按顺序验证事物，比如人们会使用核心流程吗？

Will people spread it within their peer group?

人们会在同龄人群体中传播它吗？

Will it hop peer groups?

它会跳过同侪群体吗？

And what I think the most important thing that I learned is that's actually a really great way to do zero to one product development is execute at 100% for the thing you're trying to validate at that specific stage of the product development cycle.

我认为我学到的最重要的事情是，对于您在产品开发周期的特定阶段尝试验证的内容，100% 执行，这实际上是进行零到一产品开发的一种非常好的方法。

And then you can kind of half-ass the rest just so you can get 100% signal on that one part.

然后你可以对其余部分进行一半的处理，这样你就可以在该部分获得 100% 的信号。

Nikita Bier: And so we made the polling experience just perfect.

Nikita Bier：所以我们让投票体验变得完美。

The questions were great.

问题很好。

Push notifications, everything worked.

推送通知，一切正常。

And then the next stage was getting sharing and virality working.

然后下一阶段是让分享和病毒式传播发挥作用。

And so compartmentalizing those things because ultimately you'll have too much scope creep if you try to solve everything at once and validate.

因此，将这些事情分开是因为，如果您尝试立即解决所有问题并进行验证，最终您将有太多的范围蔓延。

And also you're not going to get signal too, like you're trying to test one thing at a time.

而且你也不会收到信号，就像你一次尝试测试一件事一样。

So the way that now I approach a lot of consumer product development is if this is true, then what next needs to be true for this thing to work out?

因此，现在我处理许多消费产品开发的方式是，如果这是真的，那么接下来需要做什么才能让这件事成功？

And these layers of conditional statements.

还有这些层层的条件语句。

And the more layers you have, the higher risk your product is, so you should try to condense it to about like four things that must be true for the thing to work.

层数越多，产品的风险就越高，因此您应该尝试将其压缩为大约四件事，这四件事必须正确才能发挥作用。

Lenny Rachitsky: And this comes back to your advice of the thing you need to get good at is testing and learning and making it really quick.

Lenny Rachitsky：这又回到了你的建议，你需要擅长的是测试和学习，并使其变得非常快。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的。

Maybe one last thing along this thread.

也许是这条线索的最后一件事。

I'm just really curious how this hoax came to be, like who's behind it?

我真的很好奇这个骗局是怎么来的，谁是幕后黑手？

How does this happen?

这是怎么发生的？

Nikita Bier: We got a original support message, which was a screenshot of a story on Snapchat and it said, "Do not download the Gas app.

Nikita Bier：我们收到了一条原始的支持消息，这是 Snapchat 上的一个故事的屏幕截图，上面写着：“不要下载 Gas 应用程序。

It's for human trafficking." Okay?

这是为了贩卖人口。”好的？

And it was a screenshot that had like that mirror effect where you have like 10 people that screenshotted it.

这是一个具有类似镜像效果的屏幕截图，大约有 10 个人对其进行了屏幕截图。

More, like 40 people because it had all the usernames.

更多，比如 40 人，因为它拥有所有用户名。

So I was looking at this and I'm like, "How many people have seen this?" And it looked like a viral thing on Snapchat.

所以我看着这个，我想，“有多少人看过这个？”这看起来就像 Snapchat 上的病毒一样。

And then I went to the App Store page and I saw a review that said this app is for human trafficking.

然后我去了应用商店页面，看到一条评论说这个应用程序是为了人口贩卖。

And I went to my team and I said, "This will probably kill the company.

我对我的团队说：“这可能会毁了公司。

This will kill the product.

这会杀死该产品。

I've seen this before with consumer apps and it's evident to me this is going to be 10 times bigger tomorrow." And they were like, "No. It's just one message.

我以前在消费者应用程序中见过这种情况，对我来说很明显，明天这个规模将会扩大 10 倍。”他们说：“不。这只是一条消息。

What do you mean?" I'm like, "No, no, it's been screenshotted 40 times and now it's on the App Store page." And we got another message four hours later.

你什么意思？”我想，“不，不，它已经被截图了 40 次，现在它出现在 App Store 页面上。”四小时后我们又收到一条消息。

Nikita Bier: And the next day, it was our entire App Store page was just covered with reviews saying that the app's for human trafficking.

Nikita Bier：第二天，我们的整个 App Store 页面都被评论说该应用程序用于人口贩卖。

And we actually had to rebrand the app.

我们实际上必须重新命名该应用程序。

We relaunched it once and we're like, "Let's just call it something different.

我们重新启动了它一次，我们想，“我们就叫它不同的名字吧。

Just relaunch it on the other side of the country." We did that, started going viral again.

只需在国家的另一边重新启动它即可。”我们这样做了，又开始病毒式传播。

And the craziest-

而最疯狂的是——

Nikita Bier: ...

尼基塔·比尔：...

again.

再次。

And the craziest thing was it re-emerged and what happened was one user was friends with another person in another state and they got an invitation.

最疯狂的事情是它重新出现，发生的事情是一名用户与另一个州的另一个人成为朋友，他们收到了邀请。

And that user told them, "Oh, that was in my state.

该用户告诉他们，“哦，那是在我的州。

It's actually for human trafficking." And then it just completely started again and then it was too late at that point to relaunch again.

这实际上是为了贩卖人口。”然后它又完全开始了，那时已经太晚了，无法再次重新启动。

We just realized, " We got to fight this thing." And ultimately, I don't think we'll ever know the true origin, but it was definitely a living, breathing like hoax.

我们刚刚意识到，“我们必须与这件事作斗争。”最终，我认为我们永远不会知道真正的起源，但这绝对是一个活生生的骗局。

Lenny Rachitsky: That is insane.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这太疯狂了。

The story just gets more and more interesting.

这个故事变得越来越有趣。

What were some of the previous names, by the way?

顺便问一下，以前的名字是什么？

Is that something you can share?

这是你可以分享的吗？

Nikita Bier: Yeah, we went through a bunch.

尼基塔·比尔：是的，我们经历了很多。

One of them was called Crush, one of them was called Melt, and another was...

其中一个叫Crush，一个叫Melt，还有一个是……

The interesting thing about Crush is we got a great domain.

Crush 的有趣之处在于我们拥有一个很棒的域名。

We thought this would be the name.

我们认为这就是名字。

This was between some of the re-brands.

这是一些品牌重塑之间的事情。

We tested it and we saw that invitations dropped significantly under the Crush name and we were like, "What's going on here?" And we found that actually when you invite someone to an app, regardless of the app, you generally...

我们对其进行了测试，发现 Crush 名称下的邀请大幅下降，我们就想，“这是怎么回事？”我们发现，实际上，当您邀请某人使用某个应用程序时，无论该应用程序是什么，您通常...

Boys invite boys, girls invite girls to apps.

男孩邀请男孩，女孩邀请女孩使用应用程序。

And boys didn't want to invite their friends to an app called Crush with a pink icon.

男孩们也不想邀请他们的朋友使用带有粉红色图标、名为 Crush 的应用程序。

Nikita Bier: And then we looked at the data and the app.

Nikita Bier：然后我们查看了数据和应用程序。

I mean this was true TBH too, which was the app indexed about 60 to 65% women.

我的意思是说，这也是真的，该应用程序索引了大约 60% 到 65% 的女性。

So we were just like, "Let's make the app more masculine and see what happens.

所以我们就想，“让我们让应用程序变得更加男性化，看看会发生什么。

We need balance on this." So we made the icon black with a flame, called it Gas and the invites rate jumped.

我们需要在这方面取得平衡。”所以我们用火焰将图标变成黑色，称之为 Gas，邀请率猛增。

And you think a name doesn't matter, but right at the moment of sending an invite...

你认为名字并不重要，但就在发送邀请的那一刻......

So that was one of the interesting insights on the naming process.

这是命名过程中有趣的见解之一。

Lenny Rachitsky: Man, there's just endless stories that we could keep getting into, but we've also gone very long, so I'm going to try to move on to another topic.

Lenny Rachitsky：伙计，我们可以继续讨论无穷无尽的故事，但我们也已经讨论了很长一段时间，所以我将尝试转向另一个主题。

So I ask people on Twitter what to ask you?

所以我在推特上问人们该问你什么？

Just that question got a thousand likes just me asking, "What should I ask Nikita?" And the most common question, I'm sure you get this a lot, is just people wondering, do you ever want to build a durable consumer app?

光是这个问题就得到了一千个赞，我问，“我应该问尼基塔什么？”最常见的问题是，我相信您经常遇到这个问题，只是人们想知道，您是否想构建一个耐用的消费者应用程序？

Is it possible to build a durable consumer app?

是否有可能构建一个耐用的消费者应用程序？

Lenny Rachitsky: Scott Belsky asked this, Robert at Figma asked this, and Scott actually had a really nice way of describing it about why are so many quick sensation consumer apps proving to be more akin to summer songs than enduring standalone products and businesses?

Lenny Rachitsky：斯科特·贝尔斯基（Scott Belsky）问过这个问题，Figma 的罗伯特也问过这个问题，斯科特实际上有一个非常好的方式来描述为什么这么多快速感觉的消费者应用程序被证明更类似于夏季歌曲而不是持久的独立产品和业务？

So there's kind of two questions here.

所以这里有两个问题。

One is, do you aim to build a durable consumer app?

一是，您的目标是构建一款耐用的消费者应用程序吗？

And two, how possible is it?

第二，这怎么可能？

Nikita Bier: A lot of the fundamental tools for communicating with our friends either messaging or broadcasting one-to-many like on stories or the incumbents have built pretty large motes in terms of network effects and to provide true an order of magnitude better experience is non-trivial because they've been actually improving these products so much over the years and there's not that many entry points.

尼基塔·比尔：许多用于与朋友交流的基本工具，无论是消息传递还是一对多广播，例如故事或现任者，在网络效应方面都建立了相当大的微尘，并且提供真正一个数量级的更好体验并非易事，因为多年来他们实际上一直在改进这些产品，而且没有那么多切入点。

Nikita Bier: Not to say that it's not impossible.

尼基塔·比尔：并不是说这不是不可能的。

Snapchat was showed that there was style of messaging that people wanted that the incumbents weren't serving.

Snapchat 的表现表明，有一种人们想要的消息传递方式，而现任者却没有提供服务。

But I think there's these kind of edges that you can go after with a much higher probability of success and they might not actually be something that's durable necessarily.

但我认为，你可以以更高的成功概率去追求这些优势，但它们实际上可能不一定是持久的。

And I think finding durability for a communication or social product, that's a black swan event.

我认为寻找通信或社交产品的耐用性，这是一个黑天鹅事件。

Retention for consumer social is there's a tremendous amount of randomness.

消费者社交留存存在巨大的随机性。

There's one every decade.

每十年就有一个。

If it was simple, I would just be printing $1 trillion companies.

如果很简单的话，我只需要打印价值 1 万亿美元的公司。

Nikita Bier: I be printing Facebook's every time I sat down.

Nikita Bier：我每次坐下来都会打印 Facebook 的内容。

But I think it's actually a lot of it is pure randomness.

但我认为实际上很多都是纯粹的随机性。

On the other hand, growing a product can be a science.

另一方面，种植产品可以是一门科学。

With certainty, if you're good at your job, you can make an app grow and go viral.

可以肯定的是，如果您擅长自己的工作，您就可以让应用程序成长并像病毒一样传播。

Now why haven't I tried to take the viral part and build something that has been durable or long-lasting?

现在我为什么不尝试利用病毒式传播的部分来构建一些耐用或持久的东西呢？

I'll tell you a little bit about my motivations.

我会告诉你一些我的动机。

My favorite part about product development is you make this thing through the night.

关于产品开发，我最喜欢的部分是你通宵达旦地完成这件事。

You build it and you watch it take over the internet.

你构建了它，然后看着它占领了互联网。

Nikita Bier: That is the most thrilling drug I think you could ever experience.

尼基塔·比尔：我认为这是你体验过的最令人兴奋的药物。

And just watching it spread all over the country is like you drop an app in the deep south in Georgia and then you look on your analytics dashboard and 40% of the high school down your street in Los Angeles has downloaded it one week later.

仅仅看着它在全国范围内传播，就好像您在佐治亚州的南部腹地扔了一个应用程序，然后您查看分析仪表板，一周后，洛杉矶街道上 40% 的高中都下载了该应用程序。

That's a really profound feeling.

这真是一种很深刻的感受。

It's crazy to have that sort of impact as a three-person team, and I live for that.

作为一个三人团队能产生这样的影响力真是太疯狂了，我为此而生。

Nikita Bier: When I joined Facebook, here's an interesting connection.

Nikita Bier：当我加入 Facebook 时，有一个有趣的联系。

So I joined Facebook and I saw that many of my peers were looking up to VPs and they're like, "That's what I want to make it to one day.

所以我加入了 Facebook，我看到我的许多同事都尊敬副总裁，他们说：“这就是我希望有一天能够实现的目标。

I want to run a large organization.

我想管理一个大型组织。

I want to have lots of reports." And then I met with VPs and they were actually jealous of me because my quality of life was actually pretty cool.

我想要得到很多报告。”然后我会见了副总裁，他们实际上嫉妒我，因为我的生活质量实际上非常酷。

I got to build something high impact that made many teens feel better about themselves, made a decent amount of money.

我必须建立一些具有高影响力的东西，让许多青少年自我感觉更好，赚到可观的钱。

And then I wasn't in charge of this becoming a people manager that has to run this large organization for many years.

然后我就不再负责成为一名必须管理这个大型组织多年的职能经理。

Nikita Bier: I think one day I will run maybe a venture scale business, but I will say that I kind of like the way that I've been doing things so far in terms of quality of life and being fun.

尼基塔·比尔：我想有一天我可能会经营一家风险规模的企业，但我会说，就生活质量和乐趣而言，我有点喜欢迄今为止我所做的事情的方式。

Financially, it's been great.

从财务上来说，这一切都很棒。

So I think that part is what motivates me.

所以我认为这部分是激励我的。

And yeah, I don't think running a large corporation is necessarily what I described as fun.

是的，我并不认为经营一家大公司一定是我所描述的那样有趣。

Lenny Rachitsky: That's amazing, man.

Lenny Rachitsky：太棒了，伙计。

I am really happy we went here.

我真的很高兴我们去了这里。

So much of this resonates with the way I think.

这在很大程度上与我的想法产生了共鸣。

And obviously, a big part of this is also just it's very hard, as you said, to build a consumer app that grows first of all.

显然，正如您所说，其中很大一部分原因是构建一个首先增长的消费者应用程序非常困难。

Second, that actually lasts.

其次，这实际上是持久的。

But that is interesting that you do hope to one day build a venture funded business.

但有趣的是，你确实希望有一天能建立一家风险投资企业。

Nikita Bier: I mean TBH was venture backed, but I just don't...

Nikita Bier：我的意思是说，TBH 得到了风险投资的支持，但我只是不……

I think I'm going to have to...

我想我必须...

Do I want to sign up for 10 years?

我想注册10年吗？

And if you actually look at some of the numbers on the actual proceeds that some of these founders get after an IPO, after seven rounds of dilution, a lot of them are pretty comparable to what we get from our apps for 90 days of work.

如果你真的看一下这些创始人在 IPO 后获得的实际收益的一些数字，经过七轮稀释后，其中很多都与我们 90 天工作从应用程序中获得的收益相当。

So yeah, the trade-offs there are pretty faithful.

所以是的，那里的权衡是相当忠实的。

Lenny Rachitsky: Actually, just on that note, so what would make you actually decide to go venture funded?

Lenny Rachitsky：实际上，就这一点而言，是什么让您真正决定接受风险投资？

You talked about how if you're going more mainstream, non-teens folks after 22 years old, is that why you would go that route?

你谈到如果你在 22 岁之后变得更加主流、非青少年，这就是你会走这条路的原因吗？

Nikita Bier: I don't think that it's necessarily that part.

Nikita Bier：我认为不一定是那部分。

I think if I could keep the team lean and scale up...

我想如果我能让团队保持精简并扩大规模......

I think there's some actual founders that actually operate very lean teams and have reached very large scale in terms of the valuations of the company.

我认为有一些真正的创始人实际上运营着非常精简的团队，并且在公司估值方面已经达到了非常大的规模。

Actually the most iconic example is Elon Musk.

事实上，最具代表性的例子是埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)。

His teams are actually pretty thin overall and he's in the weeds doing product development.

他的团队实际上整体上相当薄弱，而他则忙于进行产品开发。

And so I think, yeah, if I was to ever do it, I would do it under very specific set of operating principles versus turning it into a big tech company.

所以我想，是的，如果我要这么做，我会在一套非常具体的运营原则下做到这一点，而不是把它变成一家大型科技公司。

Lenny Rachitsky: Queue investor is emailing you right now with term sheets.

Lenny Rachitsky：队列投资者现在正在通过电子邮件向您发送投资意向书。

Okay.

好的。

Nikita, this has been amazing.

尼基塔，这太棒了。

There's one last segment I want to spend a little time on, which is just kind of a rapid fire of pieces of advice you've shared that I think is incredibly insightful about how to build a successful consumer app.

我想花一点时间讨论最后一个部分，这是您分享的一系列建议，我认为这些建议对于如何构建成功的消费者应用程序非常有洞察力。

And so I'm thinking I'll just go through three to five and see what you think and see what you can add to the advice.

因此，我想我将只浏览三到五个，看看您的想法，并看看您可以在建议中添加哪些内容。

How does that sound?

听起来怎么样？

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, cool.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：好的，酷。

So the first is just contact permissions in iOS 18 changes the game and how people can grow apps basically makes it harder to invite your friends.

首先，iOS 18 中的联系人权限改变了游戏规则，人们开发应用程序的方式基本上使邀请朋友变得更加困难。

Thoughts on how people should be thinking about this in their products.

关于人们应该如何在他们的产品中考虑这一点的想法。

Nikita Bier: When I first saw it, I was really concerned.

尼基塔·比尔：当我第一次看到它时，我真的很担心。

Lenny Rachitsky: I saw your tweet about it.

Lenny Rachitsky：我看到了你关于此事的推文。

You're like, "That's the end.

你会说：“就这样结束了。

Game over."

游戏结束了。”

Nikita Bier: Just let me frame things up for you.

尼基塔·比尔：让我为你安排一下吧。

The contact permissions screen, you average about 65% approval rate across all apps.

在联系人权限屏幕上，所有应用程序的平均批准率约为 65%。

It's higher for teens, lower for adults, but if you have a 65% consenting to contacts access, then the next step on this new iOS 18 change is you select which contacts you want to allow the app to access.

青少年的比例较高，成人的比例较低，但如果您有 65% 的人同意访问联系人，那么 iOS 18 新变化的下一步就是选择您想要允许应用访问的联系人。

And it's an alphabetical list.

这是一个按字母顺序排列的列表。

And that alphabetical list for me, I have 550 contacts or something.

对于我来说，按字母顺序排列的列表有 550 个联系人之类的。

Nikita Bier: The first 10 contacts are punctuation symbols from whatever dirty entry I put when I was driving or something.

Nikita Bier：前 10 个联系人是我在开车或做其他事情时输入的任何脏条目中的标点符号。

So you have to scroll down and find that name.

所以你必须向下滚动并找到该名称。

So I have to find Lenny.

所以我必须找到莱尼。

I have to add you.

我必须加你。

And what if you're not an app user?

如果您不是应用程序用户怎么办？

So I just added you or three others.

所以我只添加了你或其他三个人。

Assuming users are willing to even do that.

假设用户愿意这样做。

You and then the three others never sign up, but maybe three of your friends do.

你和其他三个人都没有报名，但也许你的三个朋友报名了。

Nikita Bier: But I never get connected to them because there's no over...

尼基塔·比尔：但我从来没有和他们建立过联系，因为没有结束......

So my expectation is it's going to be very difficult to find friends on apps going forward to invite friends on apps going forward.

因此，我的预期是，在未来的应用程序上找到朋友并邀请未来的应用程序上的朋友将会非常困难。

And that founders will need to rethink how they do it.

创始人需要重新思考他们的做法。

And of the companies, I'm working with on intro, we are looking at ways to reinvent what contact sync is or what purpose it served.

在与我合作的公司中，我们正在寻找方法来重新定义联系人同步是什么或它的用途是什么。

It's not promising, but we have some good leads and I think we'll have a whole new set of apps emerging as a consequence.

这前景并不乐观，但我们有一些良好的线索，我认为我们将因此出现一套全新的应用程序。

But if you're betting on contact sync as a company right now, you better start thinking about plan B.

但如果您现在作为一家公司押注于 contact sync，那么您最好开始考虑 B 计划。

Lenny Rachitsky: So what I take away here is just it is now much different and there's an opportunity to think of something really clever that would give you a huge advantage if you can crack it.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以我在这里得出的结论是，现在已经发生了很大的变化，并且有机会想到一些非常聪明的东西，如果你能破解它，它将给你带来巨大的优势。

Nikita Bier: Yes, but most likely I think most apps will not have social graphs going forward and this will entrench incumbents even more.

尼基塔·比尔：是的，但我认为大多数应用程序很可能不会有社交图谱，这将进一步巩固现有应用程序的地位。

I don't think Apple acknowledged that.

我认为苹果并没有承认这一点。

I think the person that designed the feature probably has never built an app or done contact sync before because the flow is egregiously bad and it doesn't actually even, I think, benefit the user's privacy because it just completely eliminates the feature altogether.

我认为设计该功能的人之前可能从未构建过应用程序或进行过联系人同步，因为流程非常糟糕，而且我认为它实际上甚至没有利于用户的隐私，因为它完全消除了该功能。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, next topic.

Lenny Rachitsky：好的，下一个话题。

So you helped this product called Dupe succeed.

所以你帮助这个名为 Dupe 的产品取得了成功。

It's doing incredibly well from what I can see.

从我所看到的来看，它的表现非常好。

And I saw you tweet about one of the key things that you helped them through, which is to invert, I'm reading this quote, "Inverting the time to value so that the user experience is the aha moment in seconds." Talk about that insight and how important that is to building a successful consumer social app.

我看到你在推特上谈到了你帮助他们完成的关键事情之一，那就是反转，我正在读这句话，“反转时间价值，使用户体验在几秒钟内得到顿悟时刻。”讨论这一见解以及它对于构建成功的消费者社交应用程序的重要性。

Nikita Bier: This kind of concept of getting users to the aha moment is something I recurringly bring up to every company I work with.

Nikita Bier：这种让用户顿悟的概念是我反复向我合作的每家公司提出的。

And you have to understand that in 2024, people's attention spans are like three seconds.

而且你必须明白，到了 2024 年，人们的注意力持续时间就像三秒钟。

It's really sad, but we are spread thin through so many notifications, products, everything that if you can't demonstrate value in the first three seconds, it's over.

这真的很伤心，但我们被如此多的通知、产品和一切所分散，如果你不能在前三秒内展示出价值，那就结束了。

And this also leads back to the contact sync question that you talked about was you have to sign up and then the first night you have to see all of your friends on the app and experience it, otherwise you'll churn.

这也回到了你谈到的联系人同步问题，你必须注册，然后第一晚你必须在应用程序上看到你所有的朋友并体验它，否则你会流失。

Nikita Bier: So this idea of inverting the value, when I was working with Dupe, they had this kind of shopping app that had a bunch of different features and there was one feature that I saw that was interesting called Deal Hop and it allowed you to just put in a product page and it would find the cheapest version of it online.

Nikita Bier：所以这个反转价值的想法，当我与 Dupe 合作时，他们有这种购物应用程序，有很多不同的功能，我看到有一个很有趣的功能，叫做 Deal Hop，它允许你只需放入一个产品页面，它就会在网上找到最便宜的版本。

Something I already do through a bunch of duct taped methods of Google image search, Google Lens.

我已经通过一系列谷歌图像搜索、谷歌镜头的管道胶带方法做了一些事情。

And I was like, "That should be a whole company.

我当时想，“那应该是一家完整的公司。

But how are we going to teach users to do it and how do we expose them to that aha moment as fast as possible in a memorable iconic way?"

但我们如何教用户这样做，以及如何以令人难忘的标志性方式让他们尽快体验到那个顿悟时刻？”

Nikita Bier: I had this product I built a while back where you just type the domain in front of an existing URL.

Nikita Bier：我不久前开发了这个产品，您只需在现有 URL 前面输入域名即可。

So I told them, "You should try this.

所以我告诉他们，“你应该试试这个。

It's very marketable, but you need to get a very short domain that matches what you're doing." And so he went out and bought Dupe.com for I don't know how much, but when he bought that I was pretty excited.

它非常有市场，但您需要获得一个与您正在做的事情相匹配的非常短的域名。”所以他出去买了 Dupe.com，我不知道多少钱，但当他买下时我非常兴奋。

I'm like, well, if this doesn't work, I'm going to feel terrible, but if it does work, it's going to be a blowout success.

我想，好吧，如果这不起作用，我会感觉很糟糕，但如果它起作用，那将是巨大的成功。

Nikita Bier: So we put out a couple videos about it and then it was iconic, went viral, the videos.

尼基塔·比尔：所以我们发布了一些关于它的视频，然后这些视频就成为了标志性的病毒。

Users remembered to do it, to type dupe.com in front of a URL.

用户记得这样做，在 URL 前面输入 dupe.com。

Now I think they're making millions in ARR in a matter, and I think under 60 days of launching.

现在我认为他们在 ARR 上赚了数百万美元，而且我认为发布后不到 60 天。

And that was a blowout success.

那是一次巨大的成功。

And of the companies I work with, I would say it happens about 50% of the time we hit that much success, but we hit success.

在与我合作的公司中，我想说，在我们取得如此巨大成功的情况下，大约有 50% 的情况会发生这种情况，但我们还是取得了成功。

I think 50% of the time it's outright failure because consumer is so random.

我认为 50% 的情况下它会彻底失败，因为消费者是如此随机。

Lenny Rachitsky: And so what I'm hearing is a big insight is just ideally get to three seconds time to value.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以我听到的是一个重要的见解，即理想情况下需要三秒钟的时间来实现价值。

Is that the advice?

这是建议吗？

Nikita Bier: Yeah.

尼基塔·比尔：是的。

You really have to craft onboarding everything to ensure that that's where the design part comes in of being a great product person.

你确实必须精心设计一切内容，以确保设计部分成为一名优秀的产品人员。

Lenny Rachitsky: I imagine a big part of this is just cutting things you think...

Lenny Rachitsky：我想其中很大一部分就是削减你认为的东西......

Like killing your darlings, cutting things you think people need and just being really ruthless with that,.

就像杀死你的宝贝，砍掉你认为人们需要的东西，并且对此非常无情。

Nikita Bier: Really ruthless, but also being extraordinarily creative with how you use the tools available to activate a user.

Nikita Bier：非常无情，但在如何使用可用工具来激活用户方面也非常有创意。

I think extraordinary product people are deeply aware of every possible API and how it can be used in non-traditional ways.

我认为杰出的产品人员深刻了解每一种可能的 API 以及如何以非传统方式使用它。

Like this URL trick was something that I think was non-traditional that people adopted very quickly.

我认为这个 URL 技巧是非传统的，人们很快就采用了。

I have a whole laundry list of iOS mechanisms that people use for a certain way today, but you could invert them.

我有一整套 iOS 机制的清单，人们今天以某种方式使用这些机制，但你可以颠倒它们。

Nikita Bier: Contact sync is a great example because you sync your contacts and then it finds all the friends and then ranks the people who are not on the app yet but have a bunch of friends on it.

Nikita Bier：联系人同步是一个很好的例子，因为你同步你的联系人，然后它会找到所有朋友，然后对尚未使用该应用程序但有很多朋友的人进行排名。

So there's a bunch of ways that you can one tap, expose a ton of value to users that I think founders often neglect.

因此，有很多方法可以一键向用户展示大量价值，我认为创始人经常忽视这些价值。

A lot of founders will go and say, "Oh, they can just exchange usernames and that's how they can add each other."

很多创始人会说：“哦，他们可以交换用户名，这样他们就可以互相添加了。”

Nikita Bier: That is the most unrealistic thing ever because that means you have to see the username, type it into the app.

Nikita Bier：这是有史以来最不现实的事情，因为这意味着你必须看到用户名，然后将其输入到应用程序中。

You have to do that what 50 times to get a 50-person friend list.

你必须重复 50 次才能获得 50 人的好友列表。

So we're looking at 10,000 taps versus one.

因此，我们比较的是 10,000 次点击与 1 次点击。

So that's what I mean by trying to get people to the activation moment, the aha moment and get them to value.

这就是我所说的试图让人们进入激活时刻、顿悟时刻并让他们意识到价值的意思。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that advice.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢这个建议。

So maybe as just a last question along these lines.

所以也许这只是最后一个问题。

When you come to a founder, a relationship that you're a startup, you're trying to help, is there one more thing that you find often ends up being really helpful to them?

当你与创始人建立关系时，你是一家初创公司，你试图帮助他们，你是否发现还有一件事最终对他们真正有帮助？

Any common piece of advice that's like, "Oh, this is probably what's going to help you." You talked about this aha moment step, the contact sharing stuff.

任何常见的建议都是这样的：“哦，这可能会对你有所帮助。”您谈到了这个顿悟时刻步骤，即联系人共享内容。

I guess is there anything else that's just like this is something that's probably going to help you with your app?

我想还有其他类似的东西可能会对您的应用程序有所帮​​助吗？

Nikita Bier: Right now, I think I advise around 35, 36 companies and all of them are at different stages of challenges they're facing.

Nikita Bier：目前，我想我为大约 35、36 家公司提供建议，所有这些公司都处于面临挑战的不同阶段。

Some of them are pure at the product concept stage.

其中一些是纯粹处于产品概念阶段的。

Some of them are venture backed billion-dollar companies and each of them faces different problems.

其中一些是风险投资支持的价值数十亿美元的公司，每个公司都面临着不同的问题。

The first thing I often do is I ask them to show me the analytics.

我经常做的第一件事就是要求他们向我展示分析结果。

We look at how people are distributing the app today, what is the milestone that a user must hit to become activated and what's getting in the way of that?

我们看看人们今天如何分发应用程序，用户必须达到什么里程碑才能激活以及是什么阻碍了这一点？

Nikita Bier: I also take a very deep look at every funnel that users come through.

Nikita Bier：我还非常深入地研究了用户经历的每个渠道。

And I think a lot of founders separate marketing and product growth, like top of funnel growth from the actual products growth mechanisms, but they're both the same.

我认为很多创始人将营销和产品增长分开，例如漏斗顶部增长与实际产品增长机制，但它们都是相同的。

They both should be treated as the same.

他们都应该被同等对待。

If you're targeting a community and you want them to all adopt and get saturation, you need to build marketing that shows imagery of that community or whatever.

如果您的目标是一个社区，并且希望他们全部采用并达到饱和，那么您需要建立营销来展示该社区的形象或其他内容。

And then when you get in the app, you have to be able to join that community.

然后，当您进入应用程序时，您必须能够加入该社区。

Nikita Bier: When you invite people from that app, that community needs to be mentioned.

Nikita Bier：当您邀请该应用程序中的人员时，需要提及该社区。

You need to actually cover everything from the ads to the in-app experience.

您实际上需要涵盖从广告到应用内体验的所有内容。

All of that needs to be aligned for a user acquisition and flywheel to spin.

所有这些都需要协调一致才能获得用户并让飞轮旋转。

A lot of people really screw that up.

很多人真的搞砸了。

That's my initial rough approximation of what I do when I come in and try to fix or try to help with some of the challenges these companies are facing.

这是我在尝试解决或帮助这些公司面临的一些挑战时所做的初步粗略估计。

Lenny Rachitsky: So this is actually a great segue to the final thing I want to make sure people understand is you help companies through this.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以这实际上是我想确保人们理解的最后一件事的一个很好的延续，那就是你可以帮助公司渡过难关。

Talk about how you work with companies where they can find you, what kind of companies you're looking to work with and how all that works.

谈论您如何与可以找到您的公司合作，您希望与什么样的公司合作以及这一切是如何运作的。

Nikita Bier: So I work across the gamut.

Nikita Bier：所以我的工作涉及各个领域。

Most of them are consumer mobile companies and there certainly are web ones too, but I work with companies across stages.

其中大多数是消费者移动公司，当然也有网络公司，但我与跨阶段的公司合作。

Typically, I recommend that you don't book me unless you're venture backed because it's a little expensive.

通常情况下，我建议您不要预订我，除非您有风险投资支持，因为它有点贵。

But my main goal when someone does seek my advice through intro is I try to make them 10 times back their money in the first 30 days.

但当有人通过介绍寻求我的建议时，我的主要目标是尝试在前 30 天内让他们收回 10 倍的钱。

And so far I think I've managed to do that with anyone who's met with me.

到目前为止，我想我已经成功地与所有见过我的人做到了这一点。

And that means get all the table stakes, grow things out of the way, at the minimum.

这意味着至少要拿到所有赌注，让事情不再碍事。

Nikita Bier: Then identify two to three step function changes that could change their growth trajectory.

Nikita Bier：然后确定可能改变其增长轨迹的两到三步功能变化。

And these are higher scope fundamental changes to the product.

这些是对产品更大范围的根本性改变。

So I try to couple both, explain to them which direction I believe they should go, and it's a conversation and we talk about it.

所以我尝试将两者结合起来，向他们解释我认为他们应该走哪个方向，这是一次对话，我们会讨论它。

And then once they settle on a direction, I tend to get in the pixels.

一旦他们确定了方向，我就会开始关注像素。

I go into Figma and we do a live session together and clean things up.

我进入Figma，我们一起进行现场会议并清理一切。

I identify, "Oh, that's going to convert at this percent." And then I just manage all that.

我确定，“哦，这将以这个百分比进行转换。”然后我就管理这一切。

But yeah, it's generally post-series A.

但是，是的，通常是在 A 轮融资之后。

Nikita Bier: Some seed stage companies, and it's been really fun.

Nikita Bier：一些种子阶段的公司，这真的很有趣。

It's kept my mind sharp on where the market is headed.

它让我对市场走向保持敏锐。

I've also, over the years of building all these apps, I've accrued all these growth hacks that still nobody knows about.

在构建所有这些应用程序的这些年里，我还积累了所有这些仍然没有人知道的增长技巧。

And so I share those when it's relevant for the company and it's been great.

因此，当这些内容与公司相关时，我就会分享这些内容，这非常棒。

Dupe was one of them.

杜佩就是其中之一。

I was advising Saturn.

我正在给土星提供建议。

I rebuilt their Friend Finder.

我重建了他们的朋友查找器。

I think believe they're number one in the productivity section above ChatGPT as of today.

我认为，截至目前，它们在生产力部分中排名第一，高于 ChatGPT。

But I think I've generally invested in about maybe 10% of the companies that seek out my advice.

但我认为我通常投资了大约 10% 寻求我建议的公司。

Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

Well, I know it feels expensive to some people, but if I were a company with cash, it feels like the best deal I could find someone like you to come in and actually help me think through deeply in the pixels how to make my thing work.

好吧，我知道这对某些人来说感觉很昂贵，但如果我是一家有现金的公司，这感觉就像是最好的交易，我可以找到像你这样的人进来，实际上帮助我深入思考如何让我的东西发挥作用。

So I think you're still undercharging and I hope you keep raising your prices because clearly there's a lot of demand.

所以我认为你们的收费仍然偏低，我希望你们继续提高价格，因为显然需求很大。

Nikita, this was incredible.

尼基塔，这太不可思议了。

I feel like people see you on Twitter and they're like, "Oh, this guy, he's such a jerk sometimes." But meeting you in person and talking to you, it's very clear.

我觉得人们在 Twitter 上看到你时会说，“哦，这家伙，有时他真是个混蛋。”但亲自见到你并与你交谈，这就很清楚了。

You're really a kind dude, really thoughtful.

你真的是一个很善良、很体贴的人。

All your advice is based on real things you have done.

您所有的建议都是基于您所做的真实事情。

It's not just you sitting around pontificating and I think that's incredibly valuable and I'm excited.

不仅仅是你坐在那儿武断，我认为这非常有价值，我很兴奋。

People are tapping that knowledge and you're sharing it with people in a wider scale.

人们正在利用这些知识，而你正在与更广泛的人们分享它。

Nikita Bier: It's been a pleasure.

尼基塔·比尔：很高兴。

Thanks for having me.

谢谢你有我。

We covered a lot and there's plenty more.

我们涵盖了很多，而且还有更多。

I hope to come back after the next viral hit.

我希望在下一次病毒式传播后能回来。

Lenny Rachitsky: Oh man.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：天啊。

So I was going to ask you, is there anything you're working on now or stages, what can you share?

所以我想问你，你现在有什么正在做的事情或者阶段吗，你可以分享什么吗？

.

。

Stay tuned.

敬请关注。

Lenny Rachitsky: Here we go.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我们开始吧。

Amazing.

惊人的。

I always ask people how can listeners be useful to you?

我总是问人们听众如何对你有用？

So let me just ask you that as a final question, how can listeners be useful to you?

那么，作为最后一个问题，我想问您，听众如何对您有用？

Nikita Bier: Follow me on Twitter and enjoy my shit posts.

Nikita Bier：在 Twitter 上关注我并欣赏我的垃圾帖子。

And I hope you have as much fun as me on Twitter.

我希望你和我一样在 Twitter 上玩得开心。

Lenny Rachitsky: I do, man.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我愿意，伙计。

I love your tweets.

我喜欢你的推文。

Nikita, thank you so much for doing this and for being here.

尼基塔，非常感谢你所做的一切并来到这里。

Lenny Rachitsky: Bye, everyone.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：再见，大家。

Thank you so much for listening.

非常感谢您的聆听。

If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.

另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。

You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.

您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。