Moving fast and navigating uncertainty | Jeremy Henrickson (Rippling, Coinbase)

Jeremy Henrickson: It's very, very tempting to float up here as a leader and say, "Hey, you take that hill over there.

杰里米·亨里克森：作为一个领导者，你会非常非常有诱惑地站到这里并说：“嘿，你占领那边的那座山。

You guys do this over here." When in fact, where you really learn where the challenges are, or the problems or the successes is by just being there with the people in the trenches on one of the things, whichever one seems hardest or most complicated.

你们在这里做这个。”事实上，你真正了解挑战在哪里，或者问题在哪里，或者成功在哪里，只要与人们一起在其中一件事上，无论哪一件看起来最困难或最复杂。

And so I try to do that as often as I can, and I found that I always learn a lot by going through that detailed exercise.

因此，我尝试尽可能多地这样做，我发现通过详细的练习我总是能学到很多东西。

Lenny: Welcome to Lenny's Podcast, for interview world-class product leaders and growth experts, to learn from their hard-won experiences building and growing today's most successful products.

Lenny：欢迎来到 Lenny 的播客，采访世界一流的产品领导者和增长专家，学习他们构建和发展当今最成功产品的来之不易的经验。

Today my guest is Jeremy Henrickson.

今天我的客人是杰里米·亨里克森。

Jeremy is senior vice president of product at Rippling, where he leads the product and design teams.

Jeremy 是 Rippling 的产品高级副总裁，领导产品和设计团队。

Previously, he was chief product officer at Coinbase where he oversaw 10 x growth of the product and engineering organizations and helped scale Coinbase during one of the craziest times in the crypto markets.

此前，他曾担任 Coinbase 的首席产品官，负责监督产品和工程组织 10 倍的增长，并在加密货币市场最疯狂的时期之一帮助 Coinbase 扩大规模。

In our conversation, Jeremy shares his lessons about maintaining velocity at scale, creating a culture of fast decision-making, the importance of product leaders going deep on a problem, and becoming world experts at their domain.

在我们的谈话中，杰里米分享了他的经验教训，包括保持规模化速度、创建快速决策文化、产品领导者深入研究问题的重要性以及成为各自领域的世界专家。

What to look for in product managers you're interviewing, why relying on frameworks can be so detrimental to your success, why you may want to avoid MVPs and instead designed for the most complex use cases first, and tons more.

在你面试的产品经理身上要寻找什么，为什么依赖框架会对你的成功如此不利，为什么你可能想要避免 MVP 而首先针对最复杂的用例进行设计，等等。

Enjoy this episode with Jeremy Henrickson after a short word from our sponsors.

在我们的赞助商发表简短讲话后，请与 Jeremy Henrickson 一起欣赏这一集。

Lenny: Today's episode is brought to you by Miro, an online collaborative whiteboard that's designed specifically for teams like yours.

Lenny：今天的节目是由 Miro 为您带来的，Miro 是一款专为像您这样的团队设计的在线协作白板。

The best way to see what Miro's all about and how we can help your team collaborate better is not to listen to me talk about it, but to go check it out for yourself, go to miro.com/lenny.

要了解 Miro 的全部内容以及我们如何帮助您的团队更好地协作，最好的方法不是听我谈论它，而是亲自检查一下，请访问 miro.com/lenny。

With the help of the Miro team, I created a super cool Miro board with two of my own favorite templates, my one-pager template and my managing up template that you can plug and play and start using immediately with your team.

在 Miro 团队的帮助下，我创建了一个超级酷的 Miro 板，其中包含我自己最喜欢的两个模板，即我的单页模板和我的管理模板，您可以即插即用并立即开始与您的团队一起使用。

I've also embedded a handful of my favorite templates that other people have published in the Miro verse.

我还嵌入了一些我最喜欢的模板，这些模板是其他人在 Miro verse 中发布的。

When you get to the board, you can also leave suggestions for the podcast, answer a question that I have for you, and generally just play around to get a sense of how it all works.

当您到达看板时，您还可以为播客留下建议，回答我为您提出的问题，并且通常只是尝试一下以了解这一切是如何运作的。

Lenny: Miro is a killer tool for brainstorming with your team, laying out your strategy, sharing user research findings, capturing ideas, giving feedback on wireframes, and generally just collaborating with your colleagues.

Lenny：Miro 是一个杀手级工具，可以与您的团队进行头脑风暴、制定策略、分享用户研究结果、捕获想法、提供线框图反馈以及通常与同事合作。

I actually used Miro to collaborate with the Miro team on creating my own board, and it was super fun and super easy.

实际上，我使用 Miro 与 Miro 团队合作创建了我自己的开发板，这非常有趣且非常简单。

Go check it out at miro.com/lenny.

请访问 miro.com/lenny 进行查看。

That's miro.com/lenny.

那是 miro.com/lenny。

This episode is brought to you by Mixpanel.

本集由 Mixpanel 为您带来。

Get deep insights into what your users are doing at every stage of the funnel at a fair price that scales as you grow.

以随着您的成长而扩展的合理价格，深入了解您的用户在渠道每个阶段的行为。

Mixpanel gives you quick answers about your users from awareness to acquisition through retention, and by capturing website activity, add data, and multi-touch attribution, right in Mixpanel, you can improve every aspect of the full user funnel.

Mixpanel 为您提供有关用户的快速答案，从认知到获取再到保留，并且通过在 Mixpanel 中捕获网站活动、添加数据和多点触控归因，您可以改进整个用户渠道的各个方面。

Powered by first-party behavioral data instead of third party cookies, Mixpanel is built to be more powerful and easier to use than Google Analytics.

Mixpanel 由第一方行为数据而非第三方 cookie 提供支持，比 Google Analytics 更强大且更易于使用。

Explore plans for teams of every size and see what Mixpanel can do for you at mixpanel.com/friends/lenny.

访问 mixpanel.com/friends/lenny，探索适合各种规模团队的计划并了解 Mixpanel 可以为您做什么。

And while you're at it, they're also hiring.

当你在做这件事的时候，他们也在招聘。

So check it out at mixpanel.com/friends/lenny.

请访问 mixpanel.com/friends/lenny 进行查看。

Jeremy, welcome to the podcast.

杰里米，欢迎来到播客。

Jeremy Henrickson: Thank you so much for having me.

杰里米·亨里克森：非常感谢您邀请我。

I'm excited to be here.

我很高兴来到这里。

Lenny: So I've heard nothing but amazing things about you and I'm excited to learn from what you've learned from your experience at Rippling, at Coinbase, and all of the products and teams that you've built.

Lenny：所以我只听到了关于你的令人惊叹的事情，我很高兴能从你在 Rippling、Coinbase 以及你建立的所有产品和团队的经历中学到的东西。

And so thank you again for being here.

再次感谢您来到这里。

Lenny: So I want to start with your time at Coinbase where you were chief product officer and you were chief product officer during maybe the craziest time in the crypto markets.

Lenny：所以我想从你在 Coinbase 的经历开始，当时你担任首席产品官，而你在加密货币市场可能最疯狂的时期担任首席产品官。

It was I think 2016, 2018 when I was looking at the Bitcoin prices and it was like it went from a $1000 to $20,000 I think in a matter of months.

我认为是在 2016 年、2018 年，当时我在查看比特币价格，我认为在几个月内它就从 1000 美元涨到了 20,000 美元。

So I'm curious, what was that experience like, and in particular, what was like leading a product team through that experience?

所以我很好奇，那次经历是什么样的，特别是，领导一个产品团队经历那次经历是什么样的？

Jeremy Henrickson: The strongest memories for me are during 2017 where crypto, which had kind of been at its nadir in early 2016 and slowly started climbing out, just kind of took off and became a real thing in the public consciousness.

Jeremy Henrickson：对我来说最深刻的记忆是 2017 年，当时加密货币在 2016 年初曾一度处于最低点，后来慢慢开始回升，然后开始腾飞，并成为公众意识中的真实事物。

And Coinbase, which at the time had an exchange just like on-ramp and off-ramp from fiat to crypto and back experienced over the course of 2017 40 x growth in usage.

Coinbase 当时拥有一个交易所，就像从法币到加密货币的入口和出口一样，在 2017 年期间，其使用量增长了 40 倍。

Lenny: That's like a dream come true for a lot of people.

莱尼：对很多人来说这就像梦想成真。

Jeremy Henrickson: No, I mean it was both a dream and a nightmare and I was incredibly lucky to be working on it with a team of people that I could really trust and could stand shoulder-to-shoulder within the trenches.

杰里米·亨里克森：不，我的意思是，这既是一个梦想，也是一个噩梦，我非常幸运能够与一群我真正信任的人一起工作，并且可以在战壕中并肩作战。

And it was a lot of learning about how you can rapidly scale systems over time and people like to trade crypto on Saturday mornings, so a lot of Saturday mornings just some new thing would break on the edges of the system and we need to get in there and work on it.

随着时间的推移，我们学到了很多关于如何快速扩展系统的知识，而且人们喜欢在周六早上交易加密货币，所以很多周六早上，系统的边缘都会出现一些新的东西，我们需要进入那里并致力于它。

And so it was just a lot of really incredible lessons about who you choose to work with and focus and making sure you have the right people in the room at the right time.

因此，这只是很多非常令人难以置信的课程，关于您选择与谁一起工作和关注的人，以及确保您在正确的时间有正确的人在房间里。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

So let's actually unpack a couple of those.

那么让我们实际拆开其中的几个。

So focus is really interesting and something people always talk about, but hard to actually do.

因此，专注确实很有趣，人们总是谈论它，但实际上很难做到。

I guess how did you keep the team focused?

我想你是如何让团队保持专注的？

I imagine just everyone's getting rich all over the place in crypto.

我想象每个人都在通过加密货币致富。

Lenny: Things are breaking all the time, like how did you maintain focus on your team?

Lenny：事情一直在发生变化，比如你是如何保持对团队的关注的？

Jeremy Henrickson: Well, the first thing is you don't talk about people getting rich.

杰里米·亨里克森：嗯，首先你不要谈论人们致富。

It's a very technical, you talk about like its customers, it's their money, and number one, it had to be secure.

这是一个非常技术性的问题，就像它的客户一样，这是他们的钱，而第一，它必须是安全的。

So there's a guy named Philip Barton, a friend of mine now, and he is just this amazing security leader at Coinbase, and he was able to always put these decisions that we were making extremely quickly in context and say, "Look, these are the kinds of decisions we can make and still have it be secure no matter how fast we need to move." And so security was always the number one thing.

有一个叫 Philip Barton 的人，他是我现在的朋友，他是 Coinbase 的一位出色的安全领导者，他总是能够将我们非常快速地做出的这些决定放在上下文中，并说：“看，这些是我们可以做出的决定，而且无论我们需要采取多快的行动，它仍然是安全的。”因此，安全始终是第一位的。

And then the second thing is focusing on both the kind of immediate nature of the issue.

第二件事是关注问题的直接性质。

Hey, site is down or whatever, and resolving that, but also trying to set those in a context of where we need to go over the next six months.

嘿，网站宕机了或者其他什么情况，解决了这个问题，但也试图将这些问题放在我们未来六个月需要去的环境中。

What are we actually shooting for?

我们拍摄的真正目的是什么？

What do we believe the volumes are going to be?

我们认为销量会是多少？

What's it going to take to have everything from a user experience to the deep back end of the product that what would actually work for them?

怎样才能拥有从用户体验到产品深层后端的一切，真正适合他们？

Lenny: What was maybe the biggest challenge as a product leader trying to keep people focused and everything on the rails as things were going 40 x?

Lenny：作为一名产品领导者，在事情以 40 倍的速度发展时，试图让人们保持专注并让一切都按部就班，这可能是最大的挑战是什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think the biggest challenge was that in crypto there's just so much uncertainty in general, simple questions like, is Ethereum going to be a thing, are the subject of debate.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为最大的挑战是，在加密领域，总体上存在太多的不确定性，简单的问题，比如以太坊是否会成为一个东西，都是争论的主题。

And no one actually at the time had an answer to that question.

当时实际上没有人能回答这个问题。

Lots of really strong opinions and so you have to be able to have those debates because lots is going on, but then you have to be able to come out of those conversations with a clear kind of company point of view that you're all shooting toward.

很多非常强烈的意见，所以你必须能够进行这些辩论，因为很多事情正在发生，但你必须能够从这些对话中得出你所追求的明确的公司观点。

And while there may still be differing points of views and debates that happen on the margins, you go full speed toward this answer until you decide to go full speed toward a different answer.

尽管可能仍然存在不同的观点和争论，但你会全速寻找这个答案，直到你决定全速寻找不同的答案。

And I thought we were pretty successful at that at Coinbase and it wasn't always easy.

我认为 Coinbase 在这方面非常成功，但这并不总是那么容易。

Lenny: Maybe just a last question there.

莱尼：也许只是最后一个问题。

Lenny: Living through a time like that, a lot of people are going through these periods of just intense work and it's like, holy moly, this isn't crazy stressful working, like incredibly long hours, but then you look back at those times, and end up being some most important meaningful periods of your career.

莱尼：生活在这样的时期，很多人都在经历这些紧张工作的时期，天哪，这并不是疯狂的压力工作，比如令人难以置信的长时间工作，但当你回顾那些时期，最终会发现这是你职业生涯中一些最重要、最有意义的时期。

Lenny: I guess one is that, is that your experience too?

莱尼：我想其中之一就是，你的经历也是这样吗？

And then two, I guess is there any advice for someone that's maybe going through something like that of just here's maybe the silver lining of being in a period like that?

然后第二个问题，我想对于那些可能正在经历类似事情的人有什么建议吗？也许这就是处于这样的时期的一线希望？

Jeremy Henrickson: So it's hard, right?

Jeremy Henrickson：所以这很难，对吧？

It wasn't always easy.

这并不总是那么容易。

I had a new daughter who had been born just a few months earlier, really tough to balance those things, but I've always loved the rate of learning.

我有一个刚出生几个月的新女儿，平衡这些事情真的很难，但我一直很喜欢学习的速度。

And so it is those experiences I feel that have most sort of accelerated my own personal growth and personal learnings because it's in the crucible of things being hard.

因此，我认为这些经历在很大程度上加速了我个人的成长和个人学习，因为它是在艰难的考验中进行的。

And so I think when people are going through those times, it's nice to take a step back and talk with friends or whatever about what's really going on and setting it in the context of, hey, three, four or five years now from now when we look back on this, you realize, wow.

所以我认为，当人们经历那些时期时，最好退后一步，与朋友或其他人谈论真正发生的事情，并将其置于嘿，三年、四年或五年后的背景下，当我们回顾这件事时，你会意识到，哇。

A, we did something amazing with that time.

答，那段时间我们做了一些了不起的事情。

And B, we learned a lot and we were able to take that with us into whatever we were doing next after that.

B，我们学到了很多东西，我们能够将这些知识带入我们接下来要做的任何事情中。

Lenny: Before our chat, I'd asked you what people ask you for advice most around, and you said that people often ask you for advice on how to maintain velocity at scale, which is something every founder and product leader is always striving to do.

Lenny：在我们聊天之前，我问过你，人们最常向你寻求什么建议，你说人们经常向你寻求如何保持规模化速度的建议，这是每个创始人和产品领导者一直努力做的事情。

And so what have you learned and what do you tell people about maintaining and maybe even improving velocity as you scale?

那么，您学到了什么？您如何告诉人们如何在扩展过程中保持甚至提高速度？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think there's a lot of different answers here, and I think a lot of them are very specific to the nature of the business that someone's in, like different businesses can maintain velocity in different ways.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为这里有很多不同的答案，而且我认为其中很多答案都针对某人所在业务的性质，就像不同的企业可以以不同的方式保持速度一样。

I think there's kind of a universal truth that you want small teams with clear missions.

我认为有一个普遍的事实：你需要具有明确使命的小团队。

Right?

正确的？

If there's 300 people trying to work on one thing, the just sheer communication challenges, Dunbar's number, all of those things come into play and it's really, really hard to act quickly.

如果有 300 个人试图做一件事，纯粹的沟通挑战、邓巴的数字，所有这些因素都会发挥作用，而且真的很难快速采取行动。

And so having smaller groups of people breaking down what is always a very, very large problem into sufficiently small bits that small groups can attack wholeheartedly and minimize horizontal communication, I think is the first thing.

因此，我认为首先要让较小的群体将一个非常非常大的问题分解成足够小的部分，以便小群体可以全心全意地攻击并最大限度地减少横向沟通。

I think the second thing is that to the extent it's like a technology problem.

我认为第二件事是，在某种程度上，这就像一个技术问题。

The more you can bake into a clear platform, it reduces the decision-making complexity for everyone who's working on the domain part of the problem.

您可以将越多的内容融入到一个清晰的平台中，就可以降低每个处理问题领域部分的人的决策复杂性。

Jeremy Henrickson: And so a clear like a platform with a clear interface easy to use in all the ways that both engineers and product people want it to be easy to use, simplifies the space in which people have to think about these problems.

Jeremy Henrickson：因此，一个清晰的平台具有清晰的界面，易于使用，工程师和产品人员都希望它易于使用，简化了人们思考这些问题的空间。

And that's not always easy.

这并不总是那么容易。

Platforms are not, you can't just write a platform and hope it's going to work for the products.

平台则不然，你不能只编写一个平台并希望它适用于产品。

It's very much an iterative thing, but the more one can invest in that and have the right kinds of people who are capable of doing that sort of both systems thinking and product thinking simultaneously, I think is really important.

这在很大程度上是一件迭代的事情，但我认为，人们在这方面的投资越多，并且拥有能够同时进行系统思考和产品思考的合适人才，这一点就非常重要。

The third thing, just from a leadership point of view is diving deep.

第三件事，仅从领导力的角度来看，就是深入研究。

Right?

正确的？

It's very, very tempting to float up here as a leader and say, "Hey, you take that hill over there, you guys do this over here." When in fact where you really learn where the challenges are or the problems or the successes is by just being there with the people in the trenches on one of the things, whichever one seems hardest or most complicated.

作为一个领导者，你会非常非常想飘到这里并说：“嘿，你们占领那边的那座山，你们就在这里做这件事。”事实上，你真正了解挑战在哪里、问题在哪里、成功在哪里，只需与人们一起在其中一件事上，无论哪一件看起来最困难或最复杂。

Jeremy Henrickson: And so I try to do that as often as I can.

Jeremy Henrickson：所以我会尽可能多地这样做。

And I found that I always learn a lot by going through that detailed exercise.

我发现通过详细的练习我总是能学到很多东西。

And I think the last thing is it's just making sure that teams have the right distribution of experience and seniority.

我认为最后一件事是确保团队拥有正确的经验和资历分配。

Sometimes you get a team started and the team is perhaps doing something that's zero-to-one and they're amazing at all this zero-to-one stuff.

有时，你组建了一个团队，该团队可能正在做一些从零到一的事情，而他们在所有这些从零到一的事情上都表现得令人惊叹。

Jeremy Henrickson: And then two or three years later, those same people are trying to scale the product to millions of people and it turns out that A, they don't like that part of the job as much, and B, maybe they're not as good at it.

Jeremy Henrickson：然后两三年后，这些人试图将产品扩展到数百万人，结果发现 A，他们不太喜欢这部分工作，B，也许他们不擅长。

So I think you constantly look at the team and make sure that a people are doing things that they love and if they're not like, Hey, we've tried this other thing instead and recalibrate the team and make sure the right kind of skill sets are there.

所以我认为你要不断地关注团队并确保人们正在做他们喜欢的事情，如果他们不喜欢，嘿，我们已经尝试了其他事情，并重新调整团队并确保存在正确的技能组合。

And I found if you do all of those things and then have product leadership where we're saying this is what we need to do and very, very clear and precise on what needs to be done, then you can usually actually even accelerate over time because you bake more into this platform, it allows your engineers to do more with less, and that's always pretty amazing.

我发现，如果你做了所有这些事情，然后拥有产品领导力，我们说这就是我们需要做的事情，并且非常非常清楚和精确地说明需要做什么，那么你通常甚至可以随着时间的推移而加速，因为你在这个平台上投入了更多的精力，它允许你的工程师用更少的钱做更多的事情，这总是非常惊人的。

Lenny: Okay, let me dig into a couple of these.

莱尼：好的，让我深入探讨其中的几个。

These are really great.

这些真的很棒。

Lenny: So with the small teams with clear missions, is there an example of that at Rippling or Coinbase where that was a really good example of this being true?

Lenny：那么，对于具有明确使命的小团队来说，Rippling 或 Coinbase 是否有一个很好的例子来证明这一点？

Jeremy Henrickson: One example is maybe three years ago when I was just starting at the company, we decided that we needed to build a time and attendance product, lots of market demand for us and that we hadn't built it yet, something that many customers need.

Jeremy Henrickson：一个例子可能是三年前，当时我刚刚加入公司，我们决定需要开发一款考勤产品，市场对我们有很多需求，但我们还没有开发它，这是许多客户需要的东西。

And so there were a bunch of ways we could have chosen to do that, but the way we did it was to say, look, let's find one engineer, really talented systems engineer who's actually capable of doing kind of product thinking and have Parker, CEO also spend time on it.

因此，我们可以选择很多方法来做到这一点，但我们这样做的方式是说，看，让我们找到一位工程师，真正有才华的系统工程师，他实际上有能力进行产品思考，并且让首席执行官帕克也花时间在这上面。

And you start there and Sachit brought a few people on with him.

从这里开始，Sachit 带来了一些人。

Jeremy Henrickson: And those four people over the course of maybe nine months or so, built a time and attendance product.

Jeremy Henrickson：这四个人在大约九个月的时间里开发了一个考勤产品。

It was the only thing they were doing.

这是他们唯一在做的事情。

They didn't have to worry about what was going on with our payroll product except to the extent they had to integrate with them a little bit.

他们不必担心我们的薪资产品发生了什么，除非他们必须与他们进行一些集成。

They didn't have to worry about what was going on with the benefits team or our IT products.

他们不必担心福利团队或我们的 IT 产品发生了什么。

They were monomaniacally focused on this one thing and then identifying the places where yes, you, there's connectivity to the rest of the suite, and that allowed them to move extremely quickly.

他们偏执地专注于这一件事，然后确定哪些地方是的，你，与套件的其余部分有连接，这使他们能够非常快速地行动。

Lenny: How much of that was Parker being on the team, helping them unblock everything versus being very small and focused?

莱尼：帕克在团队中的作用有多大，帮助他们解除一切障碍，而不是变得很小而专注？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think it was mostly small and focused.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为大部分都是小而集中的。

Obviously, Parker can do things and unblock them in the way that only a CEO can and that helps.

显然，帕克可以用只有首席执行官才能做到的方式做事并解除障碍，这很有帮助。

But the thing is at Rippling, like we've now replicated that a dozen times.

但事情就在 Rippling 上，我们现在已经重复了十几次了。

That's our model for starting new things.

这就是我们开始新事物的模式。

And so it can't just be him unblocking things, though he does unblock things.

因此，尽管他确实解除了封锁，但不能只是他解除封锁。

It's more that this pattern of having these small groups be able to do things and then being able to have go to those people, whether you're Parker or somebody else in the company, and be able to say, Hey, how are things going?

更重要的是，这种模式让这些小组能够做事，然后能够去找这些人，无论你是帕克还是公司中的其他人，并且能够说，嘿，事情进展如何？

Or are we working on the right things?

或者我们正在做正确的事情吗？

Or let's see the latest designs for that thing and comment on it.

或者让我们看看该东西的最新设计并对其进行评论。

Jeremy Henrickson: All of those things can happen just at a much greater tempo than if you're trying to go three layers down into the org and do things.

Jeremy Henrickson：所有这些事情的发生速度都比你尝试在组织中深入三层做事的速度要快得多。

I think that's the other, maybe the key point here that everyone is exposed senior leadership, yes, we have a management structure because you have to, but that management structure does not interfere with the ability of anyone anywhere in the organization to look at what's actually happening.

我认为这是另一个，也许是这里的关键点，每个人都接触到高级领导，是的，我们有一个管理结构，因为你必须这样做，但该管理结构不会干扰组织中任何地方的任何人查看实际情况的能力。

And that happens very directly.

这发生得非常直接。

Lenny: So let's talk about that model you just described.

莱尼：那么我们来谈谈您刚才描述的模型。

So what is that model?

那么那个模型是什么？

So this is how you approach new products, and I know within Rippling there's many, many products and features we're going to talk about this.

这就是您处理新产品的方式，我知道在 Rippling 中有很多很多产品和功能，我们将讨论这一点。

And you're saying that you have kind of an approach to adding a new business unit essentially, or a new product feature.

你说你有一种方法可以本质上添加一个新的业务部门，或者一个新的产品功能。

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah, so the model's quite simple.

Jeremy Henrickson：是的，所以模型非常简单。

In the vast majority of cases, we realize we need to build something and we have the one-page view of what that is.

在绝大多数情况下，我们意识到我们需要构建一些东西，并且我们可以通过一页查看它是什么。

And usually, we're lucky enough that the things we're building sort of exist in some form in the industry today, not in the differentiated way that we can build it, but time and attendance is an example.

通常，我们很幸运，我们正在构建的东西以某种形式存在于当今的行业中，而不是以我们可以构建的差异化方式，但时间和出勤率就是一个例子。

That's a well-known thing in the industry.

这是业内众所周知的事情。

There's whole companies that do only that, right?

有些公司只做这件事，对吧？

So we start there, we find a single engineer who is extremely entrepreneurial, understands what it means to operate at tempo, understands what it means to make decisions with low information, understands how to work very, very quickly with a design partner.

因此，我们从这里开始，我们找到一位非常有创业精神的工程师，了解按节奏运作意味着什么，了解利用少量信息做出决策意味着什么，了解如何与设计合作伙伴非常非常快速地合作。

Jeremy Henrickson: So we have a design partner and we say, "Look, come into Rippling, spend a few months getting to know the platform first of all.

Jeremy Henrickson：所以我们有一个设计合作伙伴，我们说，“看，进入 Rippling，首先花几个月的时间来了解这个平台。

So go work on this other team, understand what's easy for them, what's hard for them, how the platform works, how other products have been built on top of this.

因此，去另一个团队工作，了解什么对他们来说容易，什么对他们来说困难，平台如何运作，以及如何在此基础上构建其他产品。

Go talk with other people who founded products here and understand what their experience is so that you can learn from and iterate on it, get an opinion about your product, and then start building it."

去与在这里创建产品的其他人交谈，了解他们的经验，以便您可以从中学习和迭代，获得对您的产品的意见，然后开始构建它。”

Jeremy Henrickson: And during this intervening time, they're also recruiting a team of usually 2, 3, 4 other engineers who kind of have that same zero-to-one mentality and they start building.

Jeremy Henrickson：在这段时间里，他们还招募了一个通常由 2、3、4 名其他工程师组成的团队，他们也有同样的从零到一的心态，然后开始构建。

And usually over the course of six to nine months, we can get a product from a blank sheet of paper to something that is launched or at least that we're using internally when we dogfood our stuff really heavily.

通常在六到九个月的时间里，我们可以将产品从一张白纸变成可以发布的产品，或者至少是当我们大量测试我们的产品时我们在内部使用的产品。

And then it grows from there.

然后它从那里开始生长。

And then sometimes when you launch one of these products, you get close to launch, you realize, hey, actually a team of five or six people can handle this product ad nauseam.

有时，当您推出其中一款产品时，当您接近推出时，您会意识到，嘿，实际上一个五六个人的团队可以令人厌烦地处理该产品。

Sometimes you have to bump it up.

有时你必须提高它。

It's like, okay, this thing's about to go to production, there's all these other things to do, the team needs now needs to go from 4 to 15 or something like that.

就像，好吧，这个东西即将投入生产，还有所有其他事情要做，团队现在需要从 4 人增加到 15 人或类似的东西。

Really depends on the product, but that's the general life cycle and then you keep growing and scaling it.

确实取决于产品，但这就是一般生命周期，然后你不断增长和扩展它。

Lenny: That is fascinating.

莱尼：这很有趣。

So just so I understand, you find a founder type to take the lead on a new idea and do you recruit them internally or you sometimes find them externally just to focus on this product?

据我了解，你会找到一个创始人类型来带头提出一个新想法，你会在内部招募他们，还是有时会在外部找到他们只是为了专注于这个产品？

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

And then you find a design partner for them to work with to figure out what exactly needs to be built.

然后你找到一个设计合作伙伴，让他们与他们合作，找出到底需要建造什么。

And is it idea pick one design partner or you try to encourage a few?

是选择一个设计合作伙伴还是尝试鼓励几个设计合作伙伴？

Jeremy Henrickson: Usually, it's one.

Jeremy Henrickson：通常是一个。

So there's a designer, so we have a design-

所以有一个设计师，所以我们有一个设计-

Lenny: Oh, design partner, meaning a designer, not a company that is like their partner in design.

Lenny：哦，设计合作伙伴，意思是设计师，而不是像他们设计合作伙伴一样的公司。

Jeremy Henrickson: Oh, no, no, no. Literally, somebody who knows Rippling's products, knows our component library, knows all of that stuff and is skilled and doing UX and interaction and visual design.

杰里米·亨里克森：哦，不，不，不。从字面上看，就是了解 Rippling 产品、了解我们的组件库、了解所有这些内容并且擅长进行用户体验、交互和视觉设计的人。

Lenny: Got it.

莱尼：明白了。

Okay, design.

好吧，设计。

Okay, cool.

好吧，酷。

And then they basically with maybe a couple engineers, just that's the team that initiates a new product line and then launches it, and then as it scales, it maybe grows the team, maybe not.

然后他们基本上可能有几个工程师，这就是启动新产品线然后推出它的团队，然后随着它的扩展，它可能会扩大团队，也许不会。

Jeremy Henrickson: Yep, that's right.

杰里米·亨里克森：是的，没错。

And it's pretty ad hoc, but every couple of weeks or something like that, they're meeting with me or with Parker or whichever one of us is the DRI on it and giving feedback on the designs, having a critical life or like "Oh man, if I were using this as a admin, a small company or an admin at a large company, how would I feel about this?

这是非常临时的，但每隔几周或类似的事情，他们就会与我或 Parker 或我们中的任何一个 DRI 会面，并对设计提供反馈，拥有批判性的生活，或者像“哦，天哪，如果我将其用作管理员、一家小公司或一家大公司的管理员，我对此有何感受？

Would this interface work for me?" And so we were pressure testing it throughout that cycle and trying to get the balance of speed and comprehensiveness, right.

这个界面对我有用吗？”因此，我们在整个周期中对其进行压力测试，并试图在速度和全面性之间取得平衡。

Lenny: This reminds me you're also, I hear not a big fan of MVPs that you building products to further point.

Lenny：这提醒我，我听说你也不是 MVP 的忠实粉丝，因为你构建的产品是为了进一步说明这一点。

Is that true?

这是真的吗？

And then if so, how do you think about the initial version of a product?

如果是这样，您如何看待产品的初始版本？

Jeremy Henrickson: First of all, I don't want to knock on MVPs.

Jeremy Henrickson：首先，我不想批评 MVP。

I think MVPs have their place extremely useful, particularly if you're literally the zero-to-one company that's never done anything before and you don't have clear market validation.

我认为 MVP 的地位非常有用，特别是如果您是一家从零到一的公司，之前从未做过任何事情，并且没有明确的市场验证。

I think in our case specifically for Rippling, a minimum viable product would do a disservice to both our customers and to the very team that was building it.

我认为，在我们专门针对 Rippling 的案例中，最低限度可行的产品会对我们的客户和构建它的团队造成伤害。

And the reason I believe that is that when you design a minimum viable product, you're optimizing for speed.

我相信的原因是，当您设计最小可行产品时，您正在优化速度。

And in that set of optimizations, you are minimizing the deeper product thinking about what can fully differentiate our product based on not only existing kind of capabilities within our products and platform, but based on what it ought to do in the future.

在这一系列优化中，您将最大限度地减少对产品的更深层次思考，即什么可以完全区分我们的产品，不仅基于我们产品和平台中现有的功能，还基于它未来应该做什么。

Jeremy Henrickson: And so it sort of limits product creativity, but worse, it leads to building the wrong thing technically, right?

Jeremy Henrickson：所以这在某种程度上限制了产品的创造力，但更糟糕的是，它会导致在技术上构建错误的东西，对吧？

So if you're only thinking through the simple cases and you're an engineer and no one's pushing you on saying, "Wait, what about that healthcare hospital administration case where it's mission-critical life," then you're going to make a different set of as architectural assumptions, and then you're going to build on those and you're going to build on those for six months, nine months a year, and you'll have dozens or 100s of assumptions built on top of those.

因此，如果你只是思考简单的案例，并且你是一名工程师，没有人催促你说，“等等，那医疗保健医院管理案例怎么样，它是关键任务的生活，”那么你将做出一组不同的架构假设，然后你将在这些假设的基础上进行构建，并且你将在这些假设的基础上构建六个月，每年九个月，你将在这些假设之上构建数十或数百个假设。

Jeremy Henrickson: And it's extremely difficult to unwind those decisions once you've built them into the product.

Jeremy Henrickson：一旦将这些决定内置到产品中，就很难撤销这些决定。

And therefore we believe very deeply it's like, sure, understand those simple cases.

因此，我们深信，理解这些简单的案例是肯定的。

Understand if you're a two-person company, you don't need all of these other things.

了解如果您是一家两人公司，则不需要所有这些其他东西。

And what is the product going to look like for you to approach it but also understand what it would mean to have 10,000 people globally around the world with this ridiculously hard use case?

对于您来说，该产品会是什么样子，既能接近它，又能了解全球有 10,000 名用户使用这个极其困难的用例意味着什么？

What's the model that would support that?

支持这一点的模型是什么？

And let's make sure that as we're doing the technical and product design for this thing, that it accommodates that view, even if we're not going to support it in the first version, even if we make the product decision to say, "Look, we actually don't need to handle that case right now." You still build the product in a way that's not going to prevent you from getting there in the future.

让我们确保，当我们为这个东西进行技术和产品设计时，它能够适应这种观点，即使我们不会在第一个版本中支持它，即使我们做出产品决定说，“看，我们现在实际上不需要处理这种情况。”您仍然以不会妨碍您将来实现目标的方式构建产品。

And does that take a little more time?

这需要更多时间吗？

Sure, yeah.

当然，是的。

But does it save you time in the long run?

但从长远来看，它能节省你的时间吗？

Absolutely.

绝对地。

Right.

正确的。

And so that's our approach.

这就是我们的方法。

Lenny: Is there an example that comes to mind of a product you build at Rippling or Coinbase of just, it could have been this really simple MVP and then ended up being like, no, we did the right thing by building it further along the spectrum.

Lenny：有没有一个例子可以让你想到你在 Rippling 或 Coinbase 构建的产品，它可能是一个非常简单的 MVP，然后最终会变成，不，我们通过进一步构建它来做了正确的事情。

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah.

杰里米·亨里克森：是的。

So I think a great example of this at Rippling is our global payroll product.

所以我认为 Rippling 的一个很好的例子就是我们的全球薪资产品。

We could have said, "Hey, look, we just need to support this one country.

我们可以说：“嘿，看，我们只需要支持这个国家。

We need to support, whatever, the UK," let's say.

无论如何，我们需要支持英国，”我们可以这么说。

So we're going to copy all of our US stuff, just replicate it and change all the things to be UK-like.

因此，我们将复制所有美国的东西，只是复制它并将所有东西更改为英国式的。

That would've been the fastest thing to do to dramatically oversimplify, but that's not what we did.

这本来是最快的方式，但我们并没有这么做。

What we did is we said, look, we need to launch a six countries and these are six super different countries that we want to look at.

我们所做的是我们说，看，我们需要推出六个国家，这是我们想要关注的六个超级不同的国家。

And they're going to have different requirements from an HRIS standpoint, from an employer of record standpoint, from how you pay global contractors, from how payroll works, and we're going to make a system that works for those countries.

从 HRIS 的角度来看，从记录雇主的角度来看，从如何向全球承包商付款、从工资单的运作方式来看，他们会有不同的要求，我们将建立一个适合这些国家的系统。

And there's lots of downstream implications for that.

这对下游有很多影响。

Jeremy Henrickson: But what it means is that now our global payroll system, adding a country is, it's not easy, but it's a lot easier than it would've been if you had to continue to stamp out and replicate and then of course maintain all of these things that have very little underlying connectivity.

Jeremy Henrickson：但这意味着，现在我们的全球薪资系统，添加一个国家，这并不容易，但它比你必须继续消除和复制，然后当然维护所有这些几乎没有底层连接的东西要容易得多。

And instead, what we have is 80% of the system is baked into our global payroll platform, and then the 20% is country-specific.

相反，我们所拥有的是系统的 80% 被纳入我们的全球薪资平台，然后 20% 是针对特定国家/地区的。

And most of that specificity can be handled not by engineers who are very, very expensive to change things that are local specific, but instead can be configured by somebody that's in compliance, by somebody that's in legal that needs to get the right documents into the system.

大多数特殊性不能由工程师来处理，因为改变本地特定的东西非常非常昂贵，而是可以由合规的人、需要将正确的文档输入系统的合法人来配置。

And all of that stuff can be handled by the system, which allows us to move much faster sort of going forward.

所有这些事情都可以由系统处理，这使我们能够更快地前进。

Lenny: I've heard you describe this kind of idea as you encourage teams to design for the most complex use case first.

Lenny：我听说您描述了这种想法，因为您鼓励团队首先针对最复杂的用例进行设计。

Lenny: Is that kind of the instruction you give these teams?

莱尼：这就是你给这些团队的指示吗？

Jeremy Henrickson: 100%, many times.

Jeremy Henrickson：100%，很多次。

And so it's one of these things that until you're here, it's a really difficult thing to kind of grok because A, it's so counterculture to what the background that most people have come from.

所以，在你来到这里之前，这是一件非常困难的事情，因为 A，这与大多数人的背景是非常反主流的。

It's like, no, no, no, don't think about all those things.

就像，不，不，不，不要考虑所有这些事情。

Just zoom in on this one case, use it as a wedge, and then grow from there.

只需放大这一案例，将其用作楔子，然后从那里开始增长。

And this is one of the reasons that we have people, especially new people in these kind of founding roles, come in and spend a few months just absorbing the culture to really learn these lessons.

这就是我们让人们，尤其是担任此类创始角色的新人进来，花几个月的时间吸收文化来真正学习这些教训的原因之一。

And it's one reason that we're extremely high touch with kind of new products in their infancy to make sure that we just don't fall into that trap, right?

这也是我们对处于起步阶段的新产品保持高度关注的原因之一，以确保我们不会陷入这个陷阱，对吗？

Especially because simultaneously with doing this, we're like, "Hey, but we need to ship this as fast as possible." Right?

特别是因为在这样做的同时，我们会想，“嘿，但我们需要尽快发货。”正确的？

And so you want to get the balance of those two things right.

所以你想要在这两件事之间取得正确的平衡。

Lenny: So when I think about Rippling, I think of you got the culture is to do things the hard way and the right way.

莱尼：所以，当我想到瑞波林时，我想到你们的文化是以艰难的方式和正确的方式做事。

And an element of that is there's this concept that I've heard that Rippling is this compound startup?

其中一个要素是，我听说 Ripple 是一家复合型初创公司？

What does that term mean?

这个词是什么意思？

And then how does that approach impact the way you build product and organize teams and all the things you were just talking about of MVPs and build new products?

那么这种方法如何影响您构建产品和组织团队的方式以及您刚才谈论的 MVP 和构建新产品的所有内容？

Jeremy Henrickson: The idea of a compound startup for us is that we're basically a lot of businesses that all work together.

Jeremy Henrickson：对我们来说，复合型初创公司的想法是，我们基本上是很多一起工作的企业。

If you think about the products we offer, we have payroll, well, there's entire companies built just on payroll, insurance, and benefits, entire companies.

如果你考虑一下我们提供的产品，我们有工资单，嗯，整个公司都是建立在工资单、保险和福利之上的，整个公司。

That's our entire life.

这就是我们的一生。

In fact, a fragment of benefits is the entire life cycle of a whole company.

事实上，一个片段的效益就是整个公司的整个生命周期。

Our IT products, device management, and identity management, time and attendance, each of these things are industries into themselves with multi-billion dollar companies serving each of them.

我们的 IT 产品、设备管理、身份管理、时间和考勤，这些东西本身就是一个行业，有价值数十亿美元的公司为它们提供服务。

The insight Parker had before he founded the company was actually the result you get that when you have that is that there's all this data that gets replicated and copied and as impossible to keep in sync everywhere.

帕克在创立公司之前所获得的洞察力实际上是你得到的结果，当你拥有这种洞察力时，所有这些数据都会被复制和复制，而且不可能在任何地方保持同步。

The right answer is to have a single system of record, one place, one database where all of that information is resident so that each of these downstream systems can always have the right data at the right time.

正确的答案是拥有一个记录系统，一个地方，一个数据库，所有信息都驻留在其中，以便每个下游系统始终可以在正确的时间拥有正确的数据。

Jeremy Henrickson: And then you can build on top of that things like workflow and reporting and analytics and permissioning and all these kinds of underlying capabilities.

Jeremy Henrickson：然后您可以在此基础上构建工作流程、报告、分析和许可以及所有这些底层功能。

So the idea of a compound startup is all of these different businesses benefit from being built on top of one platform.

因此，复合型初创公司的理念是，所有这些不同的业务都受益于建立在一个平台之上。

The activation energy for that is extremely high.

其活化能非常高。

So before my time at the company, Parker, Prasanna, the technical founder, and others, built all of the first versions of all these products and it was a minor miracle, they were able to do that.

因此，在我加入公司之前，Parker、技术创始人 Prasanna 和其他人构建了所有这些产品的所有第一个版本，他们能够做到这一点，这是一个小小的奇迹。

But having done it, we then had that platform and we could continue to build new verticals and new startups on top of that foundation.

但完成之后，我们就拥有了这个平台，我们可以在此基础上继续构建新的垂直行业和新的初创公司。

Lenny: This touches on something that comes up a number of times in this podcast, which is the importance of differentiation.

莱尼：这涉及到在这个播客中多次出现的事情，那就是差异化的重要性。

And it feels like this is the differentiator for Rippling.

感觉这就是 Rippling 的与众不同之处。

It's not going to be just a better one of these vertical solutions like the main differentiators, we're going to do it all and everything's going to be so much better because it's all in one platform.

它不会只是像主要差异化因素那样只是这些垂直解决方案中更好的一种，我们将完成这一切，一切都会变得更好，因为一切都在一个平台上。

Is that kind of where the original idea came from or is there a different way to think about that?

这是最初想法的来源还是有不同的思考方式？

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah, I think that's right.

杰里米·亨里克森：是的，我认为这是对的。

So I mean, the fundamental contention is having a single system of record is better for many, many, many reasons, right?

所以我的意思是，根本的争论是，出于很多很多的原因，拥有单一的记录系统更好，对吗？

The most simple of which is there's a single source of truth and all of these other products can rely on it.

其中最简单的是有一个单一的事实来源，所有其他产品都可以依赖它。

But also, unless you start without assumption of everything being in a single system of record, there's a bunch of other things you can't do.

而且，除非您一开始就假设所有内容都在单个记录系统中，否则还有很多其他事情您无法执行。

You can't build out a, I don't know, a permissioning system that looks at the various attributes across all of these products.

我不知道，你无法建立一个查看所有这些产品的各种属性的许可系统。

You now suddenly have to do an integration and each of these products talks different languages.

您现在突然必须进行集成，并且每个产品都使用不同的语言。

You can't do simple things, build a product and say, who is this person's manager?

你不能做一些简单的事情，构建一个产品，然后说，这个人的经理是谁？

Most products, you can't do that.

大多数产品，你无法做到这一点。

Most products you find some system of truth, export everybody's name and email address and a spreadsheet, have another email address or another name, maybe an employee ID of who that person reports to and upload that to another system, which by the way is immediately out of date because organizational structures change all the time.

大多数产品都会找到一些真实的系统，导出每个人的姓名、电子邮件地址和电子表格，还有另一个电子邮件地址或另一个名字，可能是该人的报告对象的员工 ID，并将其上传到另一个系统，顺便说一句，这会立即过时，因为组织结构一直在变化。

Jeremy Henrickson: Whereas with Rippling, it's always correct.

Jeremy Henrickson：而对于 Rippling，它总是正确的。

We are the system of record.

我们是记录系统。

So all of our products, they're like, "Hey, who's that person's manager." And the system immediately knows.

所以我们所有的产品都像，“嘿，那个人的经理是谁。”系统立即知道。

And that's a very, very simple example of something that you can only do if you start with solve it to come back to an earlier point, like solve the most complex use case first, solve the fact that this data all needs to be in the same place.

这是一个非常非常简单的例子，只有当你从解决它开始回到之前的点时，你才能做到这一点，比如首先解决最复杂的用例，解决这些数据都需要位于同一个地方的事实。

And so our ability to differentiate boils down to that one fundamental decision, which just allows us to do things that are literally impossible for any other company to do.

因此，我们的差异化能力归结为一项基本决策，它使我们能够做到任何其他公司实际上不可能做到的事情。

Lenny: What would you say is one of the most unique things about Ripplings culture that maybe you haven't mentioned yet?

Lenny：您认为 Ripples 文化中最独特的、也许您还没有提到过的事情之一是什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: I would say it's fundamental, speed of execution.

Jeremy Henrickson：我想说这是根本，执行速度。

I think in speed of decision-making.

我认为是决策的速度。

It's the thing that is probably the hardest to explain to people before they're here.

这可能是在人们来到这里之前最难向他们解释的事情。

It's hard to understand until you experience it.

除非你亲身经历，否则很难理解。

It's like let's not schedule a meeting for next week or tomorrow or later today.

这就像我们不要安排下周、明天或今天晚些时候的会议。

We're in the middle of a meeting, we need to make a decision.

我们正在开会，我们需要做出决定。

Let's either make the decision or if we can't, let's Slack call in the person that we need in order to make that decision.

我们要么做出决定，要么如果我们做不到，让 Slack 打电话给我们需要的人来做出决定。

And we'll be done with the decision today.

我们今天就会做出决定。

Jeremy Henrickson: And like sure there are irreversible decisions you can't make that way, but for the most part, we really value the tempo of decision-making and the speed of response.

Jeremy Henrickson：当然，有些不可逆转的决定是无法以这种方式做出的，但在大多数情况下，我们非常重视决策的节奏和响应的速度。

And no company I've been at any scale, 5 people, 5,000 people, has ever operated at the tempo this one does.

我所管理过的任何一家公司，无论是 5 人还是 5,000 人，无论规模如何，都没有像现在这样运作过。

And I think that our ability to continue to operate at that tempo, which is partly due to the fact that we are a compound startup and have these small teams independently operating teams and all the rest of that is a really differentiating thing about the culture of the company.

我认为，我们能够继续以这种节奏运营，部分原因在于我们是一家复合型初创公司，拥有这些小团队独立运营的团队，而其他所有这些都是公司文化的真正差异化因素。

Lenny: I'm reading Kevin Kelly's new book where I don't know if you've seen his new book.

莱尼：我正在读凯文·凯利的新书，不知道你是否看过他的新书。

It's all these little tidbits of advice and one of his pieces of advice is that usually the best time to do something is right now.

这些都是一些小建议，他的建议之一是，通常做某事的最佳时机就是现在。

And that feels like that resonates with the way you all think.

这感觉与你们所有人的想法产生了共鸣。

I'm curious just how you create that culture and ability to make decisions fast.

我很好奇你们是如何创造这种文化和快速做出决策的能力的。

Is it purely top-down founder, this is how they behave, or is there something else that you found as effective to create this culture of moving fast, making decisions really quickly?

是纯粹的自上而下的创始人吗？他们就是这样行事的，还是您认为有其他什么东西可以有效地创造这种快速行动、快速决策的文化？

Jeremy Henrickson: Obviously, a huge piece of this is Parker himself.

杰里米·亨里克森：显然，帕克本人是其中很大一部分。

It's an attribute of his personality, he likes making decisions quickly, and it's also a deliberate strategic decision on his part to have a company that makes decisions quickly.

这是他性格的一个属性，他喜欢快速做决定，拥有一家快速做决定的公司也是他深思熟虑的战略决策。

And so he models this constantly, right, in Slack, in conversations in person, and in every way possible.

因此，他不断地在 Slack 中、在面对面的对话中、以各种可能的方式模仿这一点。

And there's an expectation throughout the company.

整个公司都抱有期望。

If you kind of look at our leadership principles, this ability to make decisions quickly is something that kind of everybody promulgates.

如果你看看我们的领导原则，就会发现每个人都具有这种快速决策的能力。

But also I think there's a number of things we've done to bake it in the way that we even do say quarterly planning.

但我也认为我们已经做了很多事情来以我们甚至所说的季度计划的方式来烘焙它。

And the fact that there's this timeline for decision-making that doesn't leave a lot of room in the way that we expect people to know their domains, especially in product, right?

事实上，这个决策时间表并没有给我们期望人们了解他们的领域（尤其是产品领域）留下太多空间，对吗？

Jeremy Henrickson: In product, you don't own little feature, you own your product and you're expected to be the world's foremost expert in it.

Jeremy Henrickson：在产品中，你不拥有小功能，你拥有你的产品，并且你应该成为世界上最重要的专家。

And if you are, what that means is instead of having to come back to people three days later with an answer, just off the top of your head, you can be like, "Yes, this is what I think I should do about that or give me 30 minutes, look something up and I can tell you what we need to do about that." And so all of those things in combination just yield an environment in which these decisions happen very quickly.

如果你是这样，那就意味着你不必在三天后突然想到一个答案，你可以这样说：“是的，这就是我认为我应该做的事情，或者给我 30 分钟，查一下资料，我可以告诉你我们需要做什么。”因此，所有这些因素结合在一起就会产生一个可以快速做出这些决策的环境。

Lenny: You talked about quarterly planning and you're saying that there's like, here's the timelines we need to make decisions on these dates, and there's a culture of just we stay firm to that.

莱尼：你谈到了季度计划，你说的是，这是我们需要在这些日期做出决定的时间表，而且我们有一种文化，就是坚持这一点。

And if you don't, then we're going to move on.

如果你不这样做，那么我们就继续前进。

Jeremy Henrickson: That's right.

杰里米·亨里克森：没错。

And it's shocking to people when we actually move on, right, that haven't been here yet.

当我们真正继续前进时，人们会感到震惊，对吧，那还没有出现。

It's like, no, no, that date passed.

就像，不，不，那个日期已经过去了。

You don't get to retroactively make everybody react to the fact that you didn't operate quickly enough, right?

你不能追溯性地让每个人都对你行动不够快的事实做出反应，对吗？

And it's not a hostile thing, it's just a, people just have to get used to.

这并不是什么敌对的事情，只是人们必须习惯而已。

It's a deep cultural principle.

这是一个深刻的文化原则。

And the fact that everyone stands behind it just means it's gets reinforced on its own, out of its own gravity.

事实上，每个人都支持它，这意味着它会凭借自身的引力而得到加强。

Lenny: Do you have internal values that you've kind of outlined that are a part of this?

莱尼：您是否有概述过的内部价值观是其中的一部分？

Or is that not something that you find super valuable?

或者这不是您认为非常有价值的东西吗？

Jeremy Henrickson: No, actually I find them quite valuable.

Jeremy Henrickson：不，实际上我发现它们非常有价值。

And actually our COO, Matt MacInnis, who joined the company about a year before I did, he has been the one to really drive this and you go to, I can't remember this specific URL, but on Rippling there's a search Rippling leadership principles.

事实上，我们的首席运营官马特·麦金尼斯（Matt MacInnis）比我早一年加入公司，他是真正推动这一切的人，我不记得这个具体的 URL，但在 Rippling 上有一个搜索“Rippling 领导原则”。

There they are.

他们就在那里。

And they are really true to the culture of the company.

他们确实忠于公司文化。

The way we came up with them was to us a couple years ago, to introspect and to what actually made people successful at the company?

几年前，我们提出这些建议的方式是为了反思，到底是什么让人们在公司取得了成功？

Like who's successful, why are they successful?

比如谁成功了，他们为什么成功？

Why do they enjoy being here?

他们为什么喜欢呆在这里？

Or alternatively the opposite, like why people not worked out, why do some people not enjoy it here?

或者相反，比如为什么人们没有锻炼，为什么有些人不喜欢这里？

And those are the things that are differentiating and those are the things that we wrote down.

这些就是与众不同的东西，这些就是我们写下来的东西。

Lenny: Are you hiring or on the flip side, are you looking for a new opportunity?

莱尼：你们是在招聘还是在寻找新的机会？

Well, either way, check out lennysjobs.com/talent.

好吧，无论哪种方式，请查看 lennysjobs.com/talent。

If you're a hiring manager, you can sign up and get access to hundreds of hand-curated people who are open to new opportunities.

如果您是招聘经理，您可以注册并接触数百名精心挑选的对新机会持开放态度的人员。

Thousands of people apply to join this collective.

成千上万的人申请加入这个集体。

And I personally review and accept just about 10% of them.

我个人审核并接受的只有大约 10%。

You won't find a better place to hire product managers and growth leaders.

您找不到比这更好的地方来雇用产品经理和增长领导者了。

Join almost a 100 other companies who are actively hiring through this collective.

加入近 100 家其他公司的行列，通过这个集体积极招聘员工。

And if you're looking around for a newer opportunity actively or passively join the collective, it's free.

如果您正在积极或被动地寻找新的机会加入这个集体，它是免费的。

You can be anonymous and you can even hide yourself from specific companies.

您可以匿名，甚至可以向特定公司隐藏自己。

You can also leave any time and you'll only hear from companies that you want to hear from.

您也可以随时离开，并且您只会收到您想要的公司的消息。

Check out lennysjobs.com/talent.

请访问 lennysjobs.com/talent。

For someone listening that's like, we need to move faster.

对于听的人来说，我们需要更快地行动。

And everyone always feels this, we need to move faster, we make decisions faster.

每个人总是感觉到这一点，我们需要更快地行动，更快地做出决定。

What piece of advice would you give someone for helping them do this at their company?

如果有人在公司帮助他们做到这一点，你会给他们什么建议？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think it's really context-dependent, but I think it starts with whoever is in the role of making the top-level product decisions of them being one extremely clear about what those priorities are and more importantly, extremely clear about what all the priorities aren't.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为这确实取决于具体情况，但我认为，首先，负责制定顶级产品决策的人必须非常清楚这些优先事项是什么，更重要的是，非常清楚所有优先事项不是什么。

Right?

正确的？

There are so many things that could be important or people can make the case for being important or whatever that are fundamentally distracting from the core mission of getting something done.

有太多的事情可能很重要，或者人们可以证明自己很重要，或者任何从根本上分散人们对完成某件事的核心使命的注意力。

Jeremy Henrickson: But secondly, for that person to go all the way to ground on it, we have one of the leadership principles is go and see.

杰里米·亨里克森：但其次，对于那个人要一路走下去，我们的领导原则之一就是去看看。

Right?

正确的？

So to look at the thing and then walk all the way to ground and talk with the engineer who's writing the code on the thing.

因此，要查看这个东西，然后一路走到地面并与正在该东西上编写代码的工程师交谈。

Because inevitably this top-level communication is insufficient to get to the detail of what matters and doesn't matter.

因为这种高层沟通不可避免地不足以了解重要和不重要的细节。

And you don't have to do that everywhere, but if you do it in enough places, what it does is it creates a clear expectation of that kind of clarity across the board and forces everyone to up their game a little bit and just helps people understand what the expectation is.

你不必在所有地方都这样做，但如果你在足够多的地方这样做，它的作用就是创造一种全面清晰的明确期望，迫使每个人都提高一点水平，帮助人们理解期望是什么。

Right?

正确的？

And I think in the absence of those sort of clear expectations, it's difficult for people to perform at their best.

我认为，如果缺乏这些明确的期望，人们就很难发挥出最佳表现。

Right?

正确的？

And so we try to do that pretty frequently.

所以我们经常尝试这样做。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

I definitely want to spend more time on this, but before we get there, so go and see.

我确实想花更多时间在这上面，但在我们到达那里之前，先去看看。

I love that.

我喜欢那个。

And that actually has come up recently on a number of podcasts, just the importance of people continuing to ask questions and going to the end of what's possible.

事实上，最近在许多播客中都出现了这一点，即人们继续提出问题并探索可能性的重要性。

Recent story was IO talking about building the cash card and going to the warehouse and watching the printings of the cards and things like that.

最近的故事是 IO 谈论制作现金卡并前往仓库并观看卡片的印刷以及类似的事情。

Lenny: I guess first of all, do you have a sense of where that came from and why that ended up being so important to y'all?

莱尼：我想首先，你是否知道它从何而来以及为什么它最终对你们如此重要？

And then two is there an example of you doing that or someone you've seen do that and that leading to something really important?

第二个问题是你这样做的例子，还是你见过的人这样做的例子，并且这导致了一些真正重要的事情？

Jeremy Henrickson: In the early days of our global efforts, when we were first trying to figure out what global payroll was, it was really tempting to say, "Oh, well we're going to go into the UK and that's going to be relatively similar to what we're doing in the US." But our kind of head of payroll went in and said, actually, here are the ways in which we knew it was going to be different, but here are the ways in which we didn't anticipate that it was going to be different, which made us realize that we had to completely alter our approach for how we think about learning about each of these countries and going into them and having a fulsome experience.

杰里米·亨里克森（Jeremy Henrickson）：在我们全球努力的早期，当我们第一次试图弄清楚全球薪资是什么时，真的很容易说，“哦，我们将进入英国，这将与我们在美国所做的相对相似。”但我们的工资负责人进来说，实际上，我们知道情况会有所不同，但我们没有预料到情况会有所不同，这让我们意识到，我们必须彻底改变我们对了解每个国家、进入它们并获得丰富经验的看法。

Jeremy Henrickson: And that then backs into things like, well, every country does tax filings, every country does them slightly differently, but how are we going to build a tax filing system that's going to allow us to satisfy the needs of every country in which we're going to run payroll?

杰里米·亨里克森：这又回到了这样的问题，每个国家都会进行纳税申报，每个国家的做法都略有不同，但我们如何建立一个纳税申报系统，使我们能够满足我们要管理工资的每个国家的需求？

And it was only through that very early on deep look at how one country was actually operating and then doing the same thing with the next country that we were able to set in motion, all of those things.

只有通过很早就深入研究一个国家的实际运作方式，然后与下一个国家做同样的事情，我们才能启动所有这些事情。

It's not like we knew all the answers at that point, but it allowed us at a much earlier stage to put in motion a bunch of stuff that we need to do that then got subsequently much more clarified and much more precise over time.

这并不是说我们当时就知道所有的答案，但它使我们能够在更早的阶段启动一些我们需要做的事情，然后随着时间的推移变得更加清晰和更加精确。

Lenny: And so the leader of that team basically just went and studied the tax laws of each-

莱尼：所以那个团队的领导基本上只是去研究每个国家的税法——

Jeremy Henrickson: That's right, went all the way to ground.

Jeremy Henrickson：没错，一直到地面。

It's like, okay, let's go and open up the big old, I mean, it's online these days, the big old textbook and look like it's, or you're in the United States, it's like you have to go look at Ohio or Pennsylvania, which have all these little local city or county based taxes.

就像，好吧，让我们去打开大旧的，我的意思是，这些天它在网上，大旧的教科书，看起来像它，或者你在美国，就像你必须去看看俄亥俄州或宾夕法尼亚州，那里有所有这些基于当地城市或县的税收。

And it's incredibly instructive to look at just a few of those and think, wow, how do I think about configuring these change unannounced?

仅查看其中的几个并思考，哇，我如何考虑在未宣布的情况下配置这些更改，这是非常有启发性的？

Some city administrator or the city legislature, whatever they call them, they decide to change the tax rate.

一些城市管理者或城市立法机关，无论他们如何称呼他们，他们决定改变税率。

Well, how are we going to know about that?

那么，我们怎么知道呢？

How are we going to change it?

我们要如何改变它？

How are we going to change it so it's effective at the right time?

我们要如何改变它才能在正确的时间发挥作用？

Jeremy Henrickson: And you don't think about those things until you've gone all the way to ground and looked at how these things are actually worked, how they're communicated, and how they're thought through.

杰里米·亨里克森：除非你彻底了解这些事情是如何运作的，它们是如何沟通的，以及它们是如何被思考的，否则你不会考虑这些事情。

And I think the same thing is true of every aspect of every product in different ways.

我认为每个产品的各个方面都以不同的方式存在同样的情况。

Right?

正确的？

It might be a technical thing, it might be a design thing, it might be a compliance or a regulatory or a governmental thing, but whatever it is, that detail always exists.

它可能是技术问题，可能是设计问题，可能是合规性、监管或政府问题，但无论是什么，细节总是存在的。

And unless you're getting down there and seeing it and understanding it firsthand, you don't really understand what your product needs to do.

除非您亲临现场亲眼目睹并理解它，否则您无法真正理解您的产品需要做什么。

Lenny: And I think an important element of this that's between the lines maybe is don't delegate this to someone.

莱尼：我认为字里行间的一个重要因素可能是不要将其委托给某人。

You may have a tax expert on the team, and I imagine many leaders would be like, go figure this out and tell me.

你的团队中可能有一位税务专家，我想很多领导都会想，弄清楚这个问题然后告诉我。

And I think what you're saying is you go do that and learn, become the world expert at it.

我认为你的意思是你去做并学习，成为这方面的世界专家。

Jeremy Henrickson: That's right.

杰里米·亨里克森：没错。

That's right.

这是正确的。

You go do it.

你去做吧。

You go learn and then we can make the case for hiring the tax expert, which we do have by the way now.

你去学习，然后我们就可以提出聘请税务专家的理由，顺便说一句，我们现在确实有这样的专家。

That's an incredibly important part of our success is having that specialist but not before somebody with a product mindset.

我们成功的一个非常重要的部分是拥有一位专家，而不是在具有产品思维的人之前。

The tax specialist is amazing at tax, right?

税务专家在税务方面很厉害，对吧？

That's what they're, they love and that's what they do, but that doesn't make them necessarily a great product thinker.

这就是他们的本质、他们所热爱的、他们所做的，但这并不意味着他们一定是一个伟大的产品思考者。

So the person with the product thing has to get into those same weeds first to really understand it.

因此，拥有产品的人必须首先深入了解这些内容才能真正理解它。

Lenny: Do you give any guidance and just how much time to spend on all that stuff versus the regular day-to-day of, say, a product leader on a team, it takes a lot of time to become a world expert on the tax systems of many countries, or is it just there's nothing more important than that, that is your job, and what are you doing not doing that?

Lenny：您是否提供任何指导，以及在所有这些事情上花费多少时间，与团队中的产品负责人的日常工作相比，需要花费大量时间才能成为许多国家税收制度的世界专家，或者只是没有什么比这更重要，这就是您的工作，而您不这样做又在做什么？

How do you think about it?

你觉得怎么样？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think it's equally if a job is 80 hours a week, it's 40 of your hours.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为，如果一份工作每周工作 80 个小时，那么这相当于你的 40 个小时。

I think that you can't really understand a product unless you've gone there.

我认为除非你去过那里，否则你无法真正理解一个产品。

Right?

正确的？

And yes, it takes time and you're right, you can't just ignore the other half of the job of communicating with the engineering team and writing documents or whatever, but what's the point of writing a document if you don't know what you're talking about?

是的，这需要时间，你是对的，你不能忽视与工程团队沟通和编写文档等工作的另一半，但如果你不知道自己在说什么，那么编写文档有什么意义呢？

And so we very deeply value that.

因此我们非常重视这一点。

And it's one of the reasons that we keep, at least at Rippling, our product organization really thin.

这也是我们（至少在 Rippling）产品组织保持精简的原因之一。

We expect a single leader to be able to know the full scope of the product.

我们期望一个领导者能够了解产品的全部范围。

In fact, great product leaders can in fact do that because they have this native curiosity and interest and ability to absorb a lot of stuff.

事实上，优秀的产品领导者确实可以做到这一点，因为他们有天生的好奇心、兴趣以及吸收很多东西的能力。

And it makes, it's a lot of fun because now I have a group of people around me who are all really good at what they do and really understand what they do and that's kind of just an amazing place to be.

这很有趣，因为现在我周围有一群人，他们都非常擅长他们所做的事情，并且真正了解他们所做的事情，这真是一个令人惊奇的地方。

Lenny: I'm looking at this list and I just want to keep asking questions about it.

莱尼：我正在看这份清单，我只是想继续问有关它的问题。

One of the sure principles that I love is it reminds me of Amazon has the same principle I believe, which is leaders are right a lot.

我喜欢的确定原则之一是它让我想起亚马逊也有我相信的相同原则，那就是领导者很多时候都是对的。

Lenny: Why do you find that to be important?

莱尼：为什么你认为这很重要？

I know you weren't necessarily design all these principles, but I imagine that something that you guys follow often and comes up a lot.

我知道你们不一定设计所有这些原则，但我想你们经常遵循并且经常出现的东西。

Jeremy Henrickson: I mean, this is one of my favorite ones because I think particularly for a product org, right?

Jeremy Henrickson：我的意思是，这是我最喜欢的之一，因为我认为特别适合产品组织，对吗？

Because product leaders have to be right most of the time because their decisions reflect across the entire org and their decisions fundamentally spend time and they spend energy.

因为产品领导者在大多数情况下都必须是正确的，因为他们的决策反映了整个组织，而且他们的决策从根本上来说花费了时间和精力。

And if they make good ones, the company does really well.

如果他们做得很好，公司就会做得很好。

And if they make bad ones, the company doesn't.

如果他们生产出了不好的产品，公司也不会这样做。

And one of the things I really value in product leaders are people who can go into an ambiguous information with ambiguous situation, with incomplete information and a complex decision space and can look at that and listen to everybody and read whatever they need to read and say, this is where we need to go.

我真正看重产品领导者的事情之一是，他们能够在模棱两可的情况下、在不完整的信息和复杂的决策空间中进入模棱两可的信息，并且能够观察并倾听每个人的意见，阅读他们需要阅读和说的任何内容，这就是我们需要去的地方。

Jeremy Henrickson: And even if everyone else is like, ah, I don't know, that feels wrong for this reason, this reason if they have the confidence to make that call, and then a year later when you look back on it, for them to have been right, that's extremely valuable.

杰里米·亨里克森：即使其他人都觉得，啊，我不知道，因为这个原因感觉不对，这个原因如果他们有信心做出这个决定，然后一年后当你回顾它时，对他们来说是对的，那是非常有价值的。

And it's one of these things that it's really hard to test for.

这是很难测试的事情之一。

You can get it by talking with people and asking, "Hey, was this person usually right in respect?" And people think about it, but in the context of a given company, just you have to take the time and see if those decisions are largely right.

你可以通过与人交谈并询问“嘿，这个人通常尊重吗？”来得到它。人们会考虑这个问题，但在特定公司的背景下，你必须花时间看看这些决策是否基本正确。

And it's the one value we have.

这是我们唯一的价值观。

It's like you can't really learn it.

就好像你真的学不会一样。

Either you're really, really good at making those kinds of decisions or you're not, right?

要么你真的非常擅长做出此类决定，要么你不擅长，对吧？

It's a very peculiar skill that we really value.

这是一项非常特殊的技能，我们非常重视。

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Shifting a little bit, I know you all are going through this global expansion.

稍微改变一下，我知道你们都在经历这次全球扩张。

We talked about this a little bit.

我们对此进行了一些讨论。

Lenny: And so just a few questions along this lines, because a lot of companies start one country, most companies do, and then they decide let's expand to new markets.

莱尼：所以我想问几个这样的问题，因为很多公司都会在一个国家建立一个国家，大多数公司都会这样做，然后他们决定让我们扩展到新市场。

So I guess first question is just how do you decide which markets to go after?

所以我想第一个问题是你如何决定要关注哪些市场？

And specifically where to start first and then just prioritizing the list of markets?

具体来说，首先从哪里开始，然后优先考虑市场列表？

What's kind of your algorithm for that?

你的算法是什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: So it starts with an assumption that we're going to have to be everywhere ultimately, that you don't actually have to build native global payroll in every country in the world.

Jeremy Henrickson：因此，首先假设我们最终必须遍布各地，实际上您不必在世界上每个国家都建立本地的全球工资单。

Just makes sense to do that every country in the world.

世界上每个国家都这样做是有意义的。

But you definitely want to be able to pay people in any country in the world and you want to be able to have contractors anywhere in the world and have their information be in your HRS anywhere in the world.

但您肯定希望能够向世界上任何国家的人员付款，并且您希望能够在世界任何地方拥有承包商，并将他们的信息保存在您位于世界任何地方的 HRS 中。

And so the decision for us, we were fortunate to, or when we made that decision, to have quite a few customers already, like thousands of customers.

因此，对于我们来说，我们很幸运，或者当我们做出该决定时，已经拥有相当多的客户，例如数千名客户。

And so we knew not only where their kind of US employees were, but by virtue of being an employee system work, we actually knew where they had other employees.

因此，我们不仅知道他们的美国员工在哪里，而且由于是员工系统工作，我们实际上知道他们有其他员工在哪里。

And so it was quite easy for us to say, focusing on US-based companies, which is incomplete data.

所以我们很容易说，专注于美国公司，这是不完整的数据。

Jeremy Henrickson: But if we just look at our US-based companies, we know that there is immediate demand for those people to pay people in countries X, Y, and Z.

Jeremy Henrickson：但如果我们只看一下我们的美国公司，我们就会知道这些人迫切需要向 X、Y 和 Z 国的员工支付工资。

And we just listed those out in raw numerical order.

我们只是按照原始数字顺序列出了这些内容。

And then we kind of looked at, okay, how hard is it to build in these countries and how valuable is it to build in these countries?

然后我们想，好吧，在这些国家建设有多难，在这些国家建设有多大价值？

What is the strategic value of building in the UK or Canada or Germany or India or wherever?

在英国、加拿大、德国、印度或其他地方建设的战略价值是什么？

And then we had a discussion on where is there risk or where is this hard?

然后我们讨论了哪里有风险或者哪里困难？

Where is there a long pull?

哪里有长拉力？

Where does this like, in what countries does it take a long time to get approval or whatever?

这在哪里，在哪些国家需要很长时间才能获得批准等等？

And we just stack-ranked them and then we revisited that decision.

我们只是对它们进行了堆叠排名，然后我们重新考虑了这个决定。

The early decisions that we made on exactly which countries.

我们对哪些国家做出的早期决定。

We have subsequently reordered those over time.

随着时间的推移，我们随后对它们进行了重新排序。

And as we've dove, dived in the countries, and learned more, we rejigger things like a little bit.

当我们深入研究这些国家并了解更多信息时，我们对事情进行了一些调整。

But for the most part, that same basic list we started with is still mostly right.

但在大多数情况下，我们开始时使用的基本列表仍然基本上是正确的。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

And then the other question a lot of founders always struggle with is when is the time to start expanding internationally?

许多创始人一直困扰的另一个问题是何时开始国际扩张？

Because there's pros and cons.

因为有利有弊。

Do you have a sense of what convinced y'all to start going international?

您知道是什么促使你们开始走向国际吗？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think our case is slightly special, but I think the right answer to that question is always before you think you do before you think you need to because there are, it's harder than everyone if they've never done it before, it's harder than you think it is.

杰里米·亨里克森：我认为我们的情况有点特殊，但我认为这个问题的正确答案总是在你认为你需要做之前，因为有，如果他们以前从未做过，那就比每个人都难，它比你想象的更难。

It's more specialized than you think it is.

它比你想象的更专业。

People in the UK really, really care if there is a U in color, just as we care if there's not a U in color.

英国人真的非常关心颜色是否有 U，就像我们关心颜色是否没有 U 一样。

There's just all of these subtle lessons that, like cultural lessons for companies that take a really, really long time to absorb.

所有这些微妙的教训，就像公司的文化教训一样，需要非常非常长的时间才能吸收。

And so my view is you always should do it earlier than you think you should that, than you think you have to.

所以我的观点是，你总是应该比你认为你应该这样做、比你认为必须这样做更早。

In our case, it was always something we knew we had to do.

就我们而言，这始终是我们知道必须做的事情。

In fact, we have a very clear thesis that companies that aren't global, particularly in payroll, but also in kind of insurance and benefits in IT.

事实上，我们有一个非常明确的论点，即非全球化公司，尤其是在工资方面，而且在保险和 IT 福利方面也是如此。

If you're not global, you're just not going to be around in 10 years because companies were becoming global, and then COVID happened and companies became global much faster.

如果你不是全球化的，那么你在 10 年内就不会存在，因为公司正在变得全球化，然后新冠疫情发生了，公司全球化的速度要快得多。

Jeremy Henrickson: It stopped being the province of 100-person companies plus and started filtering down into very, very small companies.

Jeremy Henrickson：它不再是 100 人以上公司的领域，而是开始渗透到非常非常小的公司。

It just became commonplace for small companies to be multi-country.

小公司跨国经营已经变得司空见惯。

And so that very much accelerated our timetable.

这大大加快了我们的时间表。

And then you saw other people noticed that too, and you saw other companies starting to try to address parts of this problem as well.

然后你看到其他人也注意到了这一点，并且你看到其他公司也开始尝试解决这个问题的部分内容。

And so there's this kind of competitive dimension, which is sort of secondary in most ways because we were going to do it anyway, but that also kind of adds a little bit of a fire under the thing.

因此存在这种竞争维度，这在大多数方面都是次要的，因为无论如何我们都会这样做，但这也增加了一点火力。

Lenny: What have you found to be most surprising about expanding internationally to be successful in expansion?

Lenny：在国际扩张中取得成功的过程中，您发现最令人惊讶的是什么？

For folks that are maybe starting down this road of like, oh shoot, we should think about that.

对于那些可能开始走这条路的人来说，天啊，我们应该考虑一下这一点。

Jeremy Henrickson: I think the thing that was most surprising to me the first time I did this back at Guidewire in the and remains the most surprising thing to most people every time I do this again, is that every country is unique.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为，当我第一次在 Guidewire 这样做时，最令我惊讶的是，每个国家都是独一无二的，而且每次我再次这样做时，对大多数人来说仍然是最令人惊讶的事情。

You can't just take your US-based approach and drop it into another country.

你不能只是将美国的做法推广到另一个国家。

Other countries find it insulting.

其他国家则认为这是一种侮辱。

It doesn't matter how much success you've had here.

你在这里取得了多少成功并不重要。

Everyone always believes rightly or wrongly that their local context is special.

每个人总是正确或错误地相信他们的当地环境是特殊的。

And you have to respect that.

你必须尊重这一点。

And it comes down to little things like they're being a you in color or not.

这取决于一些小事情，比如它们是否是你的颜色。

Or if you ever see a demo delivered to somebody in another country where they see a detailed screen about a person and it includes a social security number, it's like that you immediately lose credibility.

或者，如果您看到交付给另一个国家/地区的某人的演示，他们看到有关某人的详细屏幕，其中包括社会安全号码，那么您就会立即失去可信度。

Doesn't matter how good all the rest of your stuff is.

不管你其他的东西有多好。

Jeremy Henrickson: And I think that that is consistently the thing that I think is most surprising to people is the degree to which that's true, which seems obvious in retrospect.

杰里米·亨里克森（Jeremy Henrickson）：我认为，我认为最让人们惊讶的事情是其真实程度，回想起来这似乎是显而易见的。

If you took a German system or something and demoed it in the United States with poorly translated stuff, we would think it would suck too.

如果你采用德国系统或其他东西，并在美国用翻译不佳的东西进行演示，我们会​​认为它也会很糟糕。

But it's not, it's really hard to adapt to that mindset.

但事实并非如此，要适应这种心态确实很难。

And so it takes just a lot of energy to overcome that organizationally.

因此，在组织上克服这个问题需要大量的精力。

Lenny: Makes tons of sense.

莱尼：很有道理。

I'm going to go in a different direction now.

我现在要走向不同的方向。

Lenny: Frameworks.

莱尼：框架。

So I know that you're not a huge fan of frameworks.

所以我知道您并不是框架的忠实粉丝。

We were chatting about this before we started recording.

在开始录制之前我们正在讨论这个问题。

And so I'm curious just to hear your perspective on why you're maybe not a fan of frameworks and then also just how you crystallize processes and concepts for your team if you're not just like, Hey, here's our framework you should use.

因此，我很好奇只是想听听您对为什么您可能不喜欢框架的看法，以及如果您不只是想，嘿，这是您应该使用的我们的框架，那么您如何为您的团队具体化流程和概念。

Jeremy Henrickson: Look, I think frameworks are very helpful.

Jeremy Henrickson：看，我认为框架非常有帮助。

So I'm not exactly anti-framework, but I am anti-process as a substitution for deep product thinking, right?

所以我并不完全反对框架，但我反对将流程作为深度产品思考的替代品，对吧？

So I like to have just enough process to create a frame so that the right decisions can happen and know more.

因此，我希望有足够的流程来创建一个框架，以便做出正确的决策并了解更多信息。

And I think there's a danger, especially as companies scale, that you end up saying, well, if only we categorize everything correctly and Jira, like we will be able to make really good prioritization decisions.

我认为存在一种危险，特别是随着公司规模的扩大，你最终会说，好吧，只要我们正确地对所有内容和 Jira 进行分类，就像我们将能够做出非常好的优先级决策一样。

So I'm like, sure, extremely helpful to have clear categorization and things that Jira doesn't have like data and analysis and to be able to do all of that stuff.

所以我想，当然，拥有清晰的分类和 Jira 没有的东西（例如数据和分析）非常有帮助，并且能够完成所有这些事情。

But what you really need to do is decide important to build and then have a way to build it really efficiently.

但您真正需要做的是确定构建的重要性，然后找到一种真正有效地构建它的方法。

And so I think the right answer, the right amount of process for any given team is like, or the right framework for any team is really just dependent on their specific life cycle.

因此，我认为正确的答案是，对于任何给定团队来说，正确的流程量是这样的，或者对于任何团队来说，正确的框架实际上只是取决于他们特定的生命周期。

Jeremy Henrickson: So you won't see me saying like, oh, we need to use this scrum thing or that combine thing, or whatever the latest, newest thing is.

Jeremy Henrickson：所以你不会看到我说，哦，我们需要使用这个 scrum 东西或那个组合东西，或者任何最新的东西。

It's like, don't care about any of that.

就像，不要关心这些。

What I care is about something that's going to enable this team in this context at this point in their life cycle to build the right thing as efficiently as possible.

我关心的是能够让这个团队在生命周期的这个阶段尽可能高效地构建正确的东西。

And I'm fine if those are different for different teams.

如果不同的团队有不同的情况，我也没关系。

And the only place I care about unification is one on the quarterly planning process.

我唯一关心的统一是季度计划流程。

And two, everything does need in fact to be in Jira because otherwise, you can't rationalize about what's actually getting done in not.

第二，所有事情实际上都需要在 Jira 中，否则，您无法合理解释实际上在 Jira 中完成的事情。

Lenny: Is there a process or framework that you find is counterproductive that you're just stay away from this thing?

莱尼：您是否发现某个流程或框架会适得其反，让您远离这件事？

We've had a lot of trouble with it, or generally, it's like let's just rethink everything ourselves.

我们在这方面遇到了很多麻烦，或者一般来说，就像让我们自己重新思考一切一样。

Jeremy Henrickson: No, I don't find one to be particular, I don't consistently found one to be particularly problematic.

Jeremy Henrickson：不，我不认为有什么是特别的，我也没有一直认为有什么特别有问题。

So I think any framework sort of has its place, the right place, right time.

所以我认为任何框架都有它的位置，正确的位置，正确的时间。

I think there's danger any one time somebody like dogmatically says, I think we should use process X because that's almost never the right answer in my experience.

我认为任何时候有人教条地说，我认为我们应该使用流程 X 时都会存在危险，因为根据我的经验，这几乎从来都不是正确的答案。

I think there are places where that can differ.

我认为有些地方可能有所不同。

Like you start a company on the basis of process X and everyone's bought into that process and everyone understands it.

就像你在流程 X 的基础上创办了一家公司，每个人都认同这个流程并且每个人都理解它。

I think they can be really, really great.

我认为他们可以非常非常伟大。

And on the engineering side, I think this is hugely valuable.

在工程方面，我认为这是非常有价值的。

It's like test driven-development, first line of code's going to be a test, not the actual thing.

这就像测试驱动开发一样，第一行代码将是测试，而不是实际的东西。

Like fantastic, very supportive of all that.

太棒了，非常支持这一切。

I think it's kind of different in the product world.

我认为这在产品世界中有点不同。

Lenny: If you had to compare the way Coinbase builds product process-wise or just product development to Rippling, what would you say are the bigger differences?

Lenny：如果你必须将 Coinbase 构建产品流程或产品开发的方式与 Rippling 进行比较，你认为更大的差异是什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think the differences are largely born of the different domains.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为差异很大程度上源于不同的领域。

So crypto, as we talked about earlier, really hard to predict what's going on.

因此，正如我们之前谈到的，加密货币真的很难预测正在发生的事情。

There's all these questions about what's the future of crypto, what's going to matter, what do we even need to build?

所有这些问题都是关于加密货币的未来是什么、什么是重要的、我们甚至需要构建什么？

What's going to survive?

什么才能生存？

And so the process we had at Coinbase run, having those debates and getting to a decision and disagreeing, committing.

所以我们在 Coinbase 的流程是这样的：进行辩论并做出决定，然后提出不同意见，然后做出承诺。

And then from an execution point of view, being able to move fast.

然后从执行的角度来看，能够快速行动。

That was the trick at Coinbase.

这就是 Coinbase 的伎俩。

Here we know the things that we need to build at a high level.

在这里，我们知道我们需要在高水平上构建哪些东西。

And the trick is how do we really differentiate it on the basis of these amazing platform capabilities we have?

关键是我们如何根据我们拥有的这些令人惊叹的平台功能来真正区分它？

Or how do we have to evolve those platform capabilities in order to continue to build something that's just discontinuously better than everything that's out there?

或者说，我们必须如何发展这些平台功能，才能继续构建比现有产品更好的产品？

And that yields a different decision-making process.

这会产生不同的决策过程。

So for me, it's the mental model is actually of how I approach those things with the same, but they just yield different results in the actual making of the software.

所以对我来说，心理模型实际上是我如何用相同的方法处理这些事情，但它们只是在软件的实际制作中产生不同的结果。

Lenny: What is that actual difference?

莱尼：真正的区别是什么？

Do you find day-to-day?

你找到日常了吗？

Is it timeline differences?

是时间线的差异吗？

Is it how quickly, I don't know the way you structure, how far out you plan, what do you find is the concrete difference as a result?

是多快，我不知道你的结构方式，你的计划有多远，你发现结果的具体差异是什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think the difference is in the day-to-day velocity of decision-making, because we can, Rippling, if you're on, I don't know, pick a random team.

Jeremy Henrickson：我认为区别在于日常决策的速度，因为我们可以，Rippling，如果你在的话，我不知道，随机选择一个团队。

If you're on the device management team, you know what you got to do, right?

如果您是设备管理团队的成员，您知道自己必须做什么，对吗？

There's no ambiguity.

没有任何歧义。

You're not debating about whether Mac or Windows is going to exist in the future.

你并不是在争论 Mac 或 Windows 未来是否会存在。

There's none of that cognitive dissonance.

不存在任何认知失调。

There is, we need to build this.

有，我们需要建立这个。

It's hard to figure out how we need to build this, right?

很难弄清楚我们需要如何构建它，对吗？

Because there's all these different things that we could leverage, but we need to basically get this done.

因为我们可以利用所有这些不同的东西，但我们基本上需要完成这件事。

Jeremy Henrickson: And so the kind of total velocity I would say is higher here, which does not say people work harder or less are at Columbia.

杰里米·亨里克森：所以我想说的总速度在这里更高，这并不是说哥伦比亚大学的人们工作更努力或更少。

Columbia was an amazingly fast environment, but it was also subject to the fact that you just don't know what the crypto markets are going to do, and you have to be incredibly reactive to that.

哥伦比亚是一个令人惊讶的快速环境，但它也受到这样一个事实的影响：你只是不知道加密货币市场将要做什么，而且你必须对此做出令人难以置信的反应。

And so I think maybe that's the one thing, like the reactivity to the environment and the crypto environment, what's going on, and the uncertainty of the regulatory environment, all that stuff.

所以我认为也许这是一件事，比如对环境和加密环境的反应，正在发生的事情，以及监管环境的不确定性，所有这些东西。

We got really, really, really good at handling those things really rapidly, which is something that we need to handle somewhat less .

我们真的非常非常擅长快速处理这些事情，而这是我们需要处理得更少的事情。

Lenny: Sounds quite stressful at Coinbase.

Lenny：听起来 Coinbase 压力很大。

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah, I mean it was fun.

Jeremy Henrickson：是的，我的意思是这很有趣。

Yes, it was stressful.

是的，压力很大。

I mean, every job I've ever had has been stressful, but in its own unique way.

我的意思是，我从事过的每一份工作都充满压力，但压力各有不同。

But all of that stress I think is in the shape of a problem, that's in the context of a problem that's really interesting.

但我认为所有这些压力都是以问题的形式出现的，这是一个非常有趣的问题的背景。

I mean that's why I stayed at these places.

我的意思是这就是我留在这些地方的原因。

But yeah, it's stressful.

但是，是的，压力很大。

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah.

杰里米·亨里克森：是的。

No, there are very good memories.

不，有非常美好的回忆。

I look back, I don't really, I remember the stress, but I don't like re-experience it, right.

我回想起来，我真的不记得了，我记得压力，但我不喜欢重新经历它，对吧。

I remember foraging these relationships and building these amazing products that I've been so lucky to be a part of.

我记得我建立了这些关系并开发了这些令人惊叹的产品，我很幸运能够参与其中。

And so I have almost only good memories of the places I've been.

所以我对去过的地方几乎只有美好的回忆。

Lenny: That's what I find too.

莱尼：我也是这么发现的。

You go through these hardships and then you look back and you're like, wow, that was so cool.

你经历了这些困难，然后回头看，你会想，哇，那太酷了。

But assuming they go well, assuming the company works out and-

但假设他们进展顺利，假设公司运作良好，并且——

Lenny: ...

莱尼：……

it feels like it was successful.

感觉好像成功了。

A lot of times you're at a startup, your life sucks for two years and it doesn't work out and that there is a lot of upside and good memories to that, but it's less glorious.

很多时候，你在一家初创公司，两年的生活很糟糕，但没有成功，虽然有很多好处和美好的回忆，但并不那么光彩。

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah, that's fair though.

Jeremy Henrickson：是的，这很公平。

I mean, the first company I was really at out of school's company called Reactivity back in internet one era, and we were trying to figure out how does this internet thing work and how do we start companies on the basis of these tech new technologies and how do we help other companies build stuff and figure it out?

我的意思是，我在互联网时代真正离开学校的第一家公司叫做Reactivity，我们试图弄清楚这个互联网事物是如何运作的，我们如何在这些新技术的基础上创办公司，以及我们如何帮助其他公司构建东西并弄清楚它？

And that company fundamentally didn't work out, ultimately got kind of spun itself out and got acquired, which was great, but it was this extraordinary set of people that I was so lucky to work with and I loved all the time I spent there and it was foundational to everything else I ever did.

那家公司基本上没有成功，最终被剥离并被收购，这很棒，但我很幸运能与这群非凡的人一起工作，我喜欢在那里度过的所有时间，这是我所做的一切的基础。

And so even though that effort didn't pay off in the traditional set, the value of the learnings I had there and then the people I had a chance to work with was just really exceptional.

因此，尽管这种努力在传统环境中没有得到回报，但我在那里学到的知识以及我有机会与之共事的人的价值确实非常出色。

So I feel very lucky.

所以我感到非常幸运。

Lenny: That's a really good point actually.

莱尼：这实际上是一个非常好的观点。

And I think I should correct even what I said that even when things don't work out, traditionally those experiences end up being incredibly valuable in all these unexpected ways.

我认为我应该纠正我所说的，即使事情没有成功，传统上这些经历最终会以所有这些意想不到的方式变得非常有价值。

Lenny: I want to talk about hiring product managers and interviewing.

Lenny：我想谈谈招聘产品经理和面试的问题。

Lenny: So you've hired a lot of PMs over the years.

Lenny：这么多年来，你们雇佣了很多产品经理。

I'm curious, what's something you've learned about what to look for in product managers and also just in product leaders that other people may not be focused on as enough?

我很好奇，关于在产品经理和产品领导者中寻找什么，你学到了哪些其他人可能没有足够关注的东西？

Jeremy Henrickson: I mean, I don't know that I have any particularly special insight here.

Jeremy Henrickson：我的意思是，我不知道我对此有什么特别的见解。

I think there's a couple things that I do ask that maybe are more of an emphasis because it's Rippling than not.

我认为我确实要求了一些事情，这些事情可能更值得强调，因为它是波纹而不是不。

But the first of those is when people are going through our process, there's a part where they do this case study and an important part of the case study is that it's actually too complex for people to have all of the answers upfront.

但首先是当人们经历我们的流程时，他们会在其中进行案例研究，案例研究的一个重要部分是，对于人们来说，它实际上太复杂了，无法预先获得所有答案。

There's just the space of the problem is too large to do that, which means that in the interview there's a lot of opportunities or in the case study there's a lot of opportunities.

只是问题的空间太大了，无法做到这一点，这意味着在面试中有很多机会，或者在案例研究中有很多机会。

So just ask ad hoc questions or to change one assumption.

因此，只需提出临时问题或改变一个假设即可。

And seeing how people react to that is really indicative of how deeply they understand a new problem or how quickly or how mentally agile they are.

观察人们对此的反应确实表明他们对新问题的理解有多深，或者他们的思维有多快或有多敏捷。

Jeremy Henrickson: And some people are extremely good at that here in assumption and they blink a couple times.

Jeremy Henrickson：有些人在假设方面非常擅长，他们会眨眼几次。

They're like, oh, well that has these 400 implications.

他们就像，哦，这有这 400 个含义。

And they just start rattling them off.

他们就开始滔滔不绝地说出来。

And some people get really flummoxed.

有些人真的很困惑。

I mean obviously for our environment, that former is really, really important to us.

我的意思显然是对于我们的环境而言，前者对我们来说真的非常非常重要。

I think the other thing that really matters to me is the insightfulness of questions that people ask, which is indicative of number one, their actual interest in the job.

我认为对我来说真正重要的另一件事是人们提出的问题的洞察力，这表明了第一，他们对工作的实际兴趣。

Jeremy Henrickson: People tend to ask better questions when they're more excited about working at a place and done their research and are asking people about it.

杰里米·亨里克森：当人们对在一个地方工作更兴奋并完成研究并向人们询问时，他们往往会提出更好的问题。

And also the quality of those questions can vary quite dramatically.

而且这些问题的质量可能差异很大。

And that's okay.

没关系。

I don't expect the quality to be the same all the time, but sometimes people ask a question, I'm like, "Oh man, I would've never thought to ask that question.

我不希望质量始终相同，但有时人们会问一个问题，我会想，“天哪，我从来没有想过要问这个问题。

That's such an insightful question." And then I pause and I have to think about my answer a little bit.

这是一个非常有洞察力的问题。”然后我停了下来，我必须稍微考虑一下我的答案。

And so it kind of pushes me to be a little bit better.

所以这有点促使我变得更好。

And when that happens, I know I usually have pretty good candidate on my hands.

当这种情况发生时，我知道我手上通常有非常好的候选人。

Lenny: Is there an example of someone asking a really good question that comes to mind that you think back to and like, Oh wow, that was great.

莱尼：有没有一个例子，有人问了一个非常好的问题，你回想起来就会觉得，哇，太棒了。

Jeremy Henrickson: I remember about three years ago I was interviewing a guy named Kyle Boston and Kyle is now runs our platform product organization.

Jeremy Henrickson：我记得大约三年前，我正在采访一个名叫凯尔波士顿的人，凯尔现在负责我们的平台产品组织。

And I can't remember the specific question he asked, but it had something to do with, wait a minute, if you have all these products and you have this employee system of record thing underneath it, we be thinking about how to create these various pillars of underlying platform technology, things like all this stuff.

我不记得他问的具体问题，但这与，等一下，如果你有所有这些产品，并且在它下面有这个员工记录系统，我们正在考虑如何创建底层平台技术的各种支柱，诸如此类的东西。

And this was before we fully formalized the concept of our platform beyond the kind of employee system of record.

这是在我们将我们的平台概念完全正式化之前，超越了员工记录系统。

Jeremy Henrickson: And I remember thinking, yes, we should, and that had entered our minds before, but the fact that somebody which who had almost no context on the company, that's what was impressive about this question.

杰里米·亨里克森：我记得我想，是的，我们应该这样做，这之前就已经进入我们的脑海，但事实上，一个对公司几乎一无所知的人，这就是这个问题令人印象深刻的地方。

It's like, man, you've been thinking about Rippling for a couple weeks while you're interviewing with a bunch of other companies or whatever.

就好像，伙计，当你面试其他一些公司或其他公司时，你已经考虑了瑞波币几个星期了。

And you've thought about it deeply enough to have this insight into the nature of the platform that we're building immediately gave me a bunch of confidence in his ability to think through the sorts of things we need him to think through.

你对这个问题的思考足够深入，对我们正在构建的平台的本质有了深入的了解，这让我对他思考我们需要他思考的事情的能力充满信心。

Lenny: And I think it touches on PMs need to be business leaders and great questions are often about the business and the future of the business and how to make it run more efficiently and this, and there's a product org element to it.

Lenny：我认为这涉及到 PM 需要成为业务领导者，重要的问题通常是关于业务和业务的未来，以及如何使其更有效地运行，这其中有一个产品组织元素。

But I find that that's a really underappreciated element of PM interviews, just thinking about the bigger business, not just the PM product.

但我发现这是产品经理面试中一个真正被低估的元素，只是考虑更大的业务，而不仅仅是产品经理的产品。

Jeremy Henrickson: For me it's two things.

Jeremy Henrickson：对我来说有两件事。

It's thinking about the bigger business and having the context around whether it's revenue questions or strategy questions, but also the detailed questions.

它考虑的是更大的业务，并了解收入问题或战略问题的背景，以及详细的问题。

It's like, oh wait a minute.

就像，哦，等一下。

The implication of this thing that I'm getting asked or of this thing with Jeremy that you said earlier is all of these things.

我被问到的这件事或者你之前说的杰里米的这件事的含义就是所有这些事情。

And their ability to understand that this isn't a simple business, it's really hard, it's really complex.

他们有能力理解这不是一个简单的生意，它真的很难，它真的很复杂。

And the ability to have these insights to help them think through those details is really cool.

拥有这些见解来帮助他们思考这些细节的能力真的很酷。

Lenny: You talked about this prompt you give product managers not to give away what you actually asked these days, but is there an example of a prompt that you've given in the past or you think is a good example of a type of prompt to give a product manager candidate.

Lenny：你谈到了你给产品经理的这个提示，不要泄露你这些天实际要求的内容，但是有没有一个你过去给出过的提示的例子，或者你认为这是给产品经理候选人的提示类型的一个很好的例子。

Jeremy Henrickson: In terms of a general kind of approach, I think a prompt should always reflect the actual business that they're going to kind of come into.

Jeremy Henrickson：就一般方法而言，我认为提示应该始终反映他们将要涉及的实际业务。

So when we do, so our process overall is actually quite short.

因此，当我们这样做时，我们的整个流程实际上相当短。

It's basically get in contact with us somehow, eventually get connected with a hiring manager, have a conversation with them.

基本上就是以某种方式与我们联系，最终与招聘经理联系，与他们进行对话。

Then more or less you have a conversation with me, which is a product discussion.

然后或多或少你和我有一个对话，这是一个产品讨论。

And then we have a case study which follows that.

然后我们有一个案例研究。

That's the whole process.

这就是整个过程。

Modulo, other conversations around the edges.

模数，其他边缘对话。

And the questions that matter are around how do people think through that product discussion, which is relevant to our business.

重要的问题是人们如何思考与我们业务相关的产品讨论。

How do people think through that case study?

人们如何看待这个案例研究？

That's number one.

这是第一。

And the second thing is there's always a part of my interview, which is maybe sounds very simple, but it's just like, Hey, what questions do you have for me?

第二件事是我的采访中总是有一部分，这可能听起来很简单，但就像是，嘿，你有什么问题要问我？

Jeremy Henrickson: We actually do that before we do the product discussion.

Jeremy Henrickson：实际上，我们在进行产品讨论之前就这样做了。

And that's an incredibly important question because it is again indicative of these things that people have thought through or not thought through or the depth that they're thinking or their interest in engagement in the role.

这是一个非常重要的问题，因为它再次表明了人们已经思考过或没有思考过的事情，或者他们思考的深度或他们对参与这个角色的兴趣。

And at that second discussion, it doesn't have to be perfect or anything, but it is a very strong signal when people, whether they've thought through a set of questions they want to ask or just on the fly generating them, you learn a lot about how people think about product, about what they're looking for, about what they like doing and not doing, just through those questions.

在第二次讨论中，它不一定是完美的或任何东西，但这是一个非常强烈的信号，当人们，无论他们是否已经思考了一系列他们想要问的问题，或者只是在匆忙中产生这些问题，你可以通过这些问题了解到人们如何看待产品，他们正在寻找什么，他们喜欢做什么和不做什么。

Lenny: For PMs that are maybe in their early career that are listening to this, what advice would you give them to help them accelerate and advance their career most in the early part of their career?

Lenny：对于可能正处于职业生涯早期的产品经理来说，您会给他们什么建议来帮助他们在职业生涯的早期加速和推进自己的职业生涯？

Jeremy Henrickson: Be humble.

杰里米·亨里克森：保持谦虚。

Being a product person means that by definition you're living in a world where no one knows the right answer yet because if somebody did, they would've already built it.

作为一名产品人员意味着，根据定义，你生活在一个没有人知道正确答案的世界，因为如果有人知道，他们就已经构建了它。

And so having, no matter how smart you are, there's a lot of smart people out there.

所以，无论你有多聪明，外面都有很多聪明的人。

There's always stuff you don't know.

总有一些你不知道的事情。

There's always people who are going to know things that you don't know.

总有人会知道你不知道的事情。

And it is only through that acknowledgement that you can actually have the humility to say, I'm open to absorbing all of this stuff, I don't know.

只有通过这种承认，你才能真正谦虚地说，我愿意吸收所有这些东西，我不知道。

And open to synthesizing all this stuff and coming to different conclusions.

并愿意综合所有这些东西并得出不同的结论。

Jeremy Henrickson: And so I found that that humility is one of the biggest differentiators in early career leaders who are able to let go of how awesome they were in school or in their first job or whatever.

杰里米·亨里克森：所以我发现，谦逊是早期职业领导者最大的区别之一，他们能够放弃自己在学校或第一份工作或其他什么方面的出色表现。

I mean, I had to do this and realize the job is always hard and the job is always about discovery every single day.

我的意思是，我必须这样做，并意识到这项工作总是很困难，而且这项工作总是与每天的发现有关。

And if you can maintain that curiosity and elasticity of thought and creativity and light coming solutions could be awesome.

如果你能保持好奇心、思维弹性、创造力和光明的解决方案可能会很棒。

But if you close yourself off to that and think you always have the right answer, then there's like no hope.

但如果你封闭自己并认为自己总是有正确的答案，那么就没有希望了。

Lenny: This touches on another principle that I still have sitting on my screen here, which is great leaders change their minds a lot or just change their minds.

莱尼：这涉及到我屏幕上仍然保留的另一个原则，那就是伟大的领导者会经常改变他们的想法，或者只是改变他们的想法。

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah.

杰里米·亨里克森：是的。

Willing to look at new information and say, my mental model is adjusted by that or I was wrong very simply.

愿意看到新的信息并说，我的思维模式因此而调整，或者我错了。

I mean I think it's also important to be operating in an environment where you're allowed to say that you're wrong, right?

我的意思是，我认为在一个允许你说自己错了的环境中工作也很重要，对吧？

Everyone's wrong sometimes.

每个人都有错的时候。

I mean be right a lot, but everyone's wrong sometimes.

我的意思是很多时候都是对的，但有时每个人都会错。

Right?

正确的？

And being in be able to be an environment where you can just say, yep, I was wrong.

在一个能够让你可以说，是的，我错了的环境中。

Here's the way in which I was wrong.

这就是我错误的方式。

Let's move on, is incredibly powerful.

让我们继续前进吧，它的力量非常强大。

Lenny: The final question you've brought up Parker a number of times and something that is clear about him is that he's a very product-minded founder.

莱尼：您多次提到帕克的最后一个问题是，他是一位非常注重产品的创始人。

He has a lot of strong opinions about what product should be.

他对于产品应该是什么有很多强烈的意见。

And as a product leader with a founder like that is often a challenging place to be similar to being the first PM at a startup and the founder has strong opinions about product.

作为一个拥有这样的创始人的产品领导者，通常是一个充满挑战的地方，就像在初创公司担任第一位产品经理一样，而且创始人对产品有强烈的意见。

So my question is just what have you learned about being successful as a product leader with a founder that has very strong opinions about what the product should be?

所以我的问题是，作为一名产品领导者，如果创始人对产品应该是什么有非常强烈的意见，你学到了什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah, no, that's a great question.

杰里米·亨里克森：是的，不，这是一个很好的问题。

So I think you've got to be adaptable, right?

所以我认为你必须有适应能力，对吗？

It's like any other relationship, right?

就像任何其他关系一样，对吗？

You have to understand what the nature of that relationship is, where that person's going to care, where you're going to care, the ways in which you can challenge each other.

你必须了解这种关系的本质是什么，那个人会关心什么，你会关心什么，以及你们可以互相挑战的方式。

I think fundamentally you need to make sure that person is willing to be challenged, right?

我认为从根本上来说，你需要确保这个人愿意接受挑战，对吧？

So I've seen product leaders or CEOs who are kind of unwilling to be challenged and I wouldn't be able to work with those people.

所以我见过一些不愿意接受挑战的产品领导者或首席执行官，我无法与这些人一起工作。

Jeremy Henrickson: But yeah, Parker is incredibly strongly opinionated, but he's also incredibly informed, which makes for some really, really great debates.

杰里米·亨里克森：但是，是的，帕克非常固执己见，但他也非常博学，这引发了一些非常非常精彩的辩论。

And I've just found that whatever, and it's not even CEO, but whatever a manager's idiosyncrasies are, you have to find a way to work with those.

我刚刚发现，无论如何，甚至不是首席执行官，但无论经理的特质是什么，你都必须找到一种方法来应对这些特质。

And I think that adaptability, like I'm just sort of, I like being a moldable puzzle piece where I can just fit in.

我认为适应性就像我一样，我喜欢成为一块可塑的拼图，我可以融入其中。

I think that's actually one of my core skills.

我认为这实际上是我的核心技能之一。

And so that's worked out for me and Parker and I before I started developing a deep foundation of respect, which is extremely important to building that.

因此，在我开始建立深厚的尊重基础之前，这对我和帕克来说已经解决了，这对于建立尊重非常重要。

And over the years it's just gotten deeper and deeper and we don't always agree, but when we can have a totally reasonable discussion about it, and that's what makes it fun.

多年来，它变得越来越深入，我们并不总是同意，但当我们可以对此进行完全合理的讨论时，那就是它的乐趣所在。

Lenny: Adaptability actually is, I took a strength finder test once of finding my own strengths and that was my number one strength is I'm I think we share that.

莱尼：适应性实际上是，我曾经进行过一次力量发现测试，以发现自己的优势，这是我的第一优势，我认为我们共享这一点。

Lenny: Yeah, seems like an important attribute for being in a place in.

莱尼：是的，似乎是身处某个地方的一个重要属性。

Well with that, we've reached our very exciting lightning round.

好了，我们已经进入了非常激动人心的闪电回合。

I've got six questions for you if you're ready.

如果你准备好的话，我有六个问题要问你。

Lenny: Here we go.

莱尼：我们开始吧。

What are two or three books that you've recommended most to other people?

您向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: Well, first is my favorite series of books ever, which is the Baroque Cycle by Neal Stephenson.

杰里米·亨里克森：嗯，首先是我最喜欢的系列书籍，这是尼尔·斯蒂芬森的《巴洛克周期》。

It's a nine-volume epic or three-volume, nine-book epic depending on how you want to look at it.

这是一部九卷的史诗，或者是三卷、九本书的史诗，这取决于你想如何看待它。

But it's about the time just before and into the enlightenment, historical fiction, a lot of fun.

不过是关于启蒙运动之前的时间，历史小说，很好玩。

And I also love the Culture series by Iain Banks, which is just super fun, far-future sort of universe that I've really enjoyed.

我也喜欢伊恩·班克斯的文化系列，这是我非常喜欢的超级有趣、遥远未来的宇宙。

Lenny: What's a favorite recent movie or TV show?

莱尼：最近最喜欢的电影或电视节目是什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: Watched The Last of Us, was an avid fan of the game and I thought they did a really nice adaptation.

杰里米·亨里克森（Jeremy Henrickson）：观看了《最后生还者》，是这款游戏的狂热粉丝，我认为他们的改编非常好。

Favorite mov, like I guess, recent movie, it's not that recent, but I really like Tenet, which I thought was a, I was impressed with their ability to go there and make that movie and I just really enjoyed it end to end.

最喜欢的电影，就像我猜的那样，最近的电影，它不是最近的，但我真的很喜欢信条，我认为这是一个，我对他们去那里制作那部电影的能力印象深刻，我真的很喜欢它从头到尾。

Lenny: It kind of ended, but we had a drinking game anytime someone mentioned Last of Us, which took over White Lotus.

莱尼：事情就这样结束了，但只要有人提到《最后生还者》，我们就开始喝酒游戏，它接管了白莲花。

I'm going to drink some tea right here.

我要在这里喝点茶。

Jeremy Henrickson: Okay, fair enough.

杰里米·亨里克森：好的，很公平。

I'll try.

我会尽力。

I've only got water normally I got tea, but water today.

平时我只喝水，我喝茶，但今天喝水。

Lenny: That works.

莱尼：那行。

But it's interesting, it hasn't come up often, so I think maybe we end that for now and see what the new pattern emerges.

但这很有趣，它并不经常出现，所以我想也许我们现在就结束它，看看会出现什么新模式。

And then Tenant feels like, I was just thinking it feels like a compound movie, compound startup as a movie, a movie is very complicated too to stay-

然后租户觉得，我只是觉得这感觉像是一部复合电影，复合创业就像一部电影，一部电影也非常复杂，无法留下来——

Jeremy Henrickson: Yeah, That's why I enjoyed it.

Jeremy Henrickson：是的，这就是我喜欢它的原因。

I like trying to figure out the multi-timeline chart in my head as the movie progressed.

随着电影的进展，我喜欢尝试在脑海中找出多时间线图表。

Lenny: The puzzle piece within you trying to find all the puzzle pieces.

莱尼：你内心的一块拼图，试图找到所有的拼图。

Lenny: What is a favorite interview question you like to ask?

莱尼：你最喜欢问的面试问题是什么？

You already maybe answered this, but anything else come to mind?

您可能已经回答了这个问题，但是您还想到了什么吗？

Jeremy Henrickson: I think I did, no, my favorite one is What questions do you have for me by far?

Jeremy Henrickson：我想我做到了，不，我最喜欢的是到目前为止你有什么问题要问我？

Lenny: Great.

莱尼：太好了。

What are some favorite products you've recently discovered that you love?

您最近发现哪些最喜欢的产品？

Jeremy Henrickson: I guess I'll just mention, I don't know if I go as far as I call these favorite products, but there's two that come to mind.

Jeremy Henrickson：我想我只想提一下，我不知道我是否能说出我最喜欢的产品，但我想到了两个。

My wife's computer broke the other day and I realized it was the CPU cooler that went bad and the Corsair H60 CPU cooler was super easy to use and really adaptable to lots of motherboards.

前几天我妻子的电脑坏了，我意识到是 CPU 散热器坏了，而 Corsair H60 CPU 散热器非常易于使用，并且真正适用于很多主板。

I thought that was great.

我觉得那太好了。

My other favorite product is the one I'm wearing in my ears right now, which my first pair of nice headphones I ever bought died late last week, and had to do some really quick research into my new favorite pair of headphones.

我最喜欢的另一个产品是我现在戴在耳朵上的那个，我买的第一副漂亮的耳机上周晚些时候坏了，我不得不对我最喜欢的新耳机做一些非常快速的研究。

And these Focal Bathys are super nice.

这些 Focal Bathy 非常好。

I'm a bit of an audio file.

我是一个音频文件。

I like to listen to classical music and ambient stuff, so we need a lot of dynamic range and noise cancellation and these have been great so far.

我喜欢听古典音乐和环境音乐，所以我们需要大量的动态范围和噪音消除，到目前为止这些都很棒。

Lenny: Okay, so what are they called?

莱尼：好的，那么他们叫什么名字呢？

Jeremy Henrickson: Focal, I think it's Bathys, B-A-T-H-Y-S.

Jeremy Henrickson：Focal，我认为是 Bathys，B-A-T-H-Y-S。

Okay.

好的。

Lenny: And has there a specific model or there's like that one?

莱尼：有没有特定的型号或者类似的型号？

Jeremy Henrickson: You'll know it when you see it.

Jeremy Henrickson：当你看到它时你就会知道。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

We will link to them in show notes, so maybe I'll get one.

我们会在演出笔记中链接到它们，所以也许我会得到一个。

What's something relatively minor you've changed in the way that you built product that has had a lot of impact on your team's ability to execute?

在您构建产品的方式中，有哪些相对较小的改变对团队的执行能力产生了很大的影响？

Jeremy Henrickson: Maybe the most recent innovation sort of at Rippling was the kind of introduction of what I'm calling imperatives.

Jeremy Henrickson：也许 Rippling 的最新创新就是引入我所说的命令。

These things that whether they come bottom up or top down are things that like everybody across the entire product and engineering team needs to do and what's important about that list of things that are not on it.

这些事情，无论是自下而上还是自上而下，都是整个产品和工程团队中的每个人都需要做的事情，以及清单上没有的事情的重要之处。

And in a world where we could choose to do hundreds of things at once, being able to force rank that list of things, draw a line, say these are the ones everyone has to do, has created a lot more focus and clarity than we had before.

在一个我们可以选择同时做数百件事情的世界中，能够强制对这些事情进行排名、划清界限、说这些是每个人都必须做的事情，已经比我们以前创造了更多的焦点和清晰度。

Lenny: So imperatives are essentially here's the priorities for the next, say quarter six months here?

莱尼：所以，当务之急本质上是接下来的优先事项，比如季度六个月？

Jeremy Henrickson: Here are the priorities for everybody and now integrate that into your own team's priorities, right?

Jeremy Henrickson：这是每个人的优先事项，现在将其整合到您自己团队的优先事项中，对吧？

So each team still is building their own priorities, but they have to factor in this set.

因此，每个团队仍在制定自己的优先事项，但他们必须考虑到这一点。

Lenny: How many of those do you usually have?

莱尼：你通常有多少个？

This is awesome.

这太棒了。

I like this tip.

我喜欢这个提示。

Jeremy Henrickson: It depends on what level of granularity you want to talk about them at, like maybe 10, right?

Jeremy Henrickson：这取决于您想以什么粒度级别来讨论它们，比如可能是 10，对吧？

It's a lot.

很多。

We're going through between globalization and large improvements of the platform and a bunch of other large companies.

我们正在经历全球化和平台以及其他一些大公司的重大改进。

All these things, it creates a bunch of things that just have to be cross-team simultaneously.

所有这些事情，它创造了一堆必须同时跨团队的事情。

I think it's pretty natural part of a company's evolution and we're just in that part of the cycle, so-

我认为这是公司发展过程中非常自然的一部分，而我们正处于周期的这一部分，所以-

Lenny: Final question, what's a question I should have asked you that I didn't ask you?

莱尼：最后一个问题，有什么问题是我应该问你但我没有问你的？

Jeremy Henrickson: I guess, what do I do with my kids maybe?

杰里米·亨里克森：我想，我该怎么对待我的孩子呢？

I have two kids, they're nine and-

我有两个孩子，他们九岁了，而且-

Lenny: What do you do with your kids?

莱尼：你和你的孩子们一起做什么？

Jeremy Henrickson: ...

杰里米·亨里克森：……

six.

六。

What do I do with my kids?

我该怎么对待我的孩子？

My son, I'm a big board gamer and while I didn't push it on him, my son, he will play board games morning to night.

我的儿子，我是一名棋盘游戏大玩家，虽然我没有强迫他，但我的儿子，他会从早到晚玩棋盘游戏。

And so we play a lot of European strategy games together and my daughter's now getting old enough that she's getting into them too.

所以我们一起玩了很多欧洲策略游戏，我女儿现在已经长大了，她也开始玩这些游戏了。

And so we just finished as a family playing Pandemic Legacy and the reward tomorrow night as we get to start playing Gloomhaven.

所以我们一家人刚刚完成了《Pandemic Legacy》的游戏，明天晚上我们开始玩《Gloomhaven》时，我们就得到了奖励。

So that's going to be fun.

所以这会很有趣。

Lenny: I don't know either game, sounds very hard and complicated.

Lenny：这两个游戏我都不知道，听起来很困难很复杂。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

Jeremy, we covered a lot of topics.

杰里米，我们讨论了很多话题。

I feel like this is a compound podcast episode and so thank you for spending time with me.

我觉得这是一个复合播客节目，所以感谢您花时间和我在一起。

Thanks for being here.

感谢您来到这里。

Two final questions, working folks, finding online if they want to reach out, learn more, and how can listeners be useful to you?

最后两个问题，上班族，如果他们想接触、了解更多信息，可以在网上寻找，以及听众如何对你有用？

Jeremy Henrickson: Awesome.

杰里米·亨里克森：太棒了。

LinkedIn is the easiest way online and if what I've been talking about today sounds interesting to you, we're definitely hiring like senior entrepreneurial PMs.

LinkedIn 是最简单的在线方式，如果我今天谈论的内容对您来说听起来很有趣，那么我们肯定会招聘高级创业产品经理。

And so if those leadership principles on our website look interesting, I'd love to hear from you.

因此，如果我们网站上的这些领导原则看起来很有趣，我很想听听您的意见。

Lenny: What's the best way to explore those roles and apply?

Lenny：探索和申请这些职位的最佳方式是什么？

The

的

Jeremy Henrickson: The website has by far the best channel.

Jeremy Henrickson：该网站拥有迄今为止最好的渠道。

It gets to this right recruiter who will tell me about it right away.

合适的招聘人员会立即告诉我这件事。

Lenny: Great, surfline.com and there's probably a site for careers.

莱尼：太好了，surfline.com，可能还有一个职业网站。

Jeremy Henrickson: There is a career site on there that you, pretty easy to find.

Jeremy Henrickson：那里有一个职业网站，很容易找到。

Lenny: Okay.

莱尼：好的。

Rolling to that in the show notes.

滚动到演出笔记中的内容。

Jeremy, thank you again for being here.

杰里米，再次感谢你来到这里。

Jeremy Henrickson: Thanks so much for having me.

杰里米·亨里克森：非常感谢您邀请我。

This was a lot of fun.

这很有趣。

Lenny: Hi everyone.

莱尼：大家好。

Thank you so much for listening.

非常感谢您的聆听。

If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcast, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

如果您发现这很有价值，您可以在 Apple Podcast、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。

Also, please consider giving us a rating or a leaving review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.

另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。

You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.

您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。