'Building product at Stripe: craft, metrics, and customer obsession | Jeff Weinstein (Product lead)'

Lenny Rachitsky: Watching you operate on Twitter, you're just breaking this wall between the PM and the customer.

Lenny Rachitsky：看着你在 Twitter 上操作，你只是打破了产品经理和客户之间的这堵墙。

Jeff Weinstein: The moment the customer felt compelled enough to go out of their way to talk about some problem, that's a unbelievable gift.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：当客户感到有必要不遗余力地谈论某些问题时，这是一份令人难以置信的礼物。

I will leave a meeting to just get one message back to them.

我会离开会议，只给他们回复一条消息。

If you're text message friendly with five or 10 of those, you are going to have so much direct signal that is infectious.

如果你对其中的五到十条短信很友好，那么你就会收到很多具有感染力的直接信号。

Lenny Rachitsky: Many people told me I need to ask you about picking metrics.

Lenny Rachitsky：很多人告诉我，我需要问你有关选择指标的问题。

Jeff Weinstein: Well, what was the value that we're trying to produce for the customer and can we measure it from their perspective?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：嗯，我们试图为客户创造什么价值？我们可以从他们的角度来衡量它吗？

And okay, how do you know you have product market fit?

好吧，你怎么知道你的产品适合市场呢？

Charts that showcase things are going up into the right on one hand and then tweets on the other.

展示事物的图表一方面上升到右侧，然后另一方面上升到推文。

Lenny Rachitsky: You started at Stripe something called study groups.

Lenny Rachitsky：你在 Stripe 创办了一个叫做学习小组的组织。

Jeff Weinstein: We show up four to eight people total pretend to be some company with some outcome problem.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们总共出现了四到八个人，假装是某个有结果问题的公司。

Rule one is you do not work at Stripe and rule two is we're not here to solve any problems.

第一条规则是你不在 Stripe 工作，第二条规则是我们来这里不是为了解决任何问题。

This is just about practicing empathy for the customer.

这只是为了练习对客户的同理心。

Lenny Rachitsky: Today my guest is Jeff Weinstein.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：今天我的嘉宾是杰夫·韦恩斯坦。

Over the course of his six plus years at Stripe, Jeff was the product lead for Stripe's payment infrastructure teams.

在 Stripe 的六年多时间里，Jeff 担任 Stripe 支付基础设施团队的产品负责人。

We helped scale Stripe payments to hundreds of billions of dollars in volume a year.

我们帮助 Stripe 的支付额达到了每年数千亿美元。

He also led PMs and Teams on a number of zero to one bets at Stripe, and most recently took on the scaling of Stripe Atlas, which as of the day this podcast launches allows you to incorporate a new company in a single day, including handling 83B elections, incorporation documents, getting your EIN, share purchases, and all the things that used to take weeks or months before a company could begin operating.

他还带领 PM 和团队在 Stripe 进行了一系列从零到一的赌注，最近还负责 Stripe Atlas 的扩展，从播客推出之日起，您就可以在一天之内组建一家新公司，包括处理 83B 选举、公司注册文件、获取 EIN、股票购买以及所有过去需要数周或数月才能开始运营的事情。

At this point, one in six new Delaware corporations are started on Stripe Atlas, which blows my mind.

目前，特拉华州六分之一的新公司都是在 Stripe Atlas 上成立的，这让我大吃一惊。

This episode ended up being the longest in my podcast history because I wanted to basically do an archeology of an incredibly effective and admired product leader.

这一集最终成为我播客历史上最长的一集，因为我基本上想对一位非常有效且令人钦佩的产品领导者进行考古学。

Lenny Rachitsky: We spent the entire conversation digging deep into the many skills that Jeff has built that enable him to consistently build successful and beloved products.

Lenny Rachitsky：我们在整个谈话中深入挖掘了 Jeff 所掌握的许多技能，这些技能使他能够持续打造成功且受人喜爱的产品。

We get into his go-go- go plus optimism, long-term compounding philosophy of building products, how to think about and operationalize product craft and quality.

我们了解他的乐观主义、长期复合的产品制造理念，以及如何思考和实施产品工艺和质量。

He shares a popular program that he started at Stripe called Stripe Study Groups that I think you should steal.

他分享了他在 Stripe 启动的一个名为 Stripe Study Groups 的流行项目，我认为你应该借鉴它。

We also talk about how to effectively talk to customers, how to know if you have product market fit for your new product, how to pick great metrics for your team, what he's learned about getting shit done at a big company.

我们还讨论了如何有效地与客户交谈，如何知道您的新产品是否有适合您的产品市场，如何为您的团队选择优秀的指标，以及他在大公司中学到了什么。

Also, advice that he's gotten from the founders of Stripe and so much more.

此外，他还从 Stripe 创始人那里得到了建议等等。

This episode is for anyone who's looking to level up their product building chops in every way.

本集适合任何希望以各种方式提升产品构建水平的人。

If you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube.

如果您喜欢这个播客，请不要忘记订阅并在您最喜欢的播客应用程序或 YouTube 中关注它。

It's the best way to avoid missing future episodes and it helps the podcast tremendously.

这是避免错过未来剧集的最佳方式，并且对播客有很大帮助。

With that, I bring you Jeff Weinstein.

接下来，我为您带来杰夫·韦恩斯坦。

Jeff, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.

杰夫，非常感谢您来到这里，欢迎来到播客。

Jeff Weinstein: Thank you Lenny of Lenny's Podcast.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：谢谢莱尼播客的莱尼。

I knew what to expect, but it's fun to see the first name and the podcast all line up.

我知道会发生什么，但看到名字和播客排列在一起很有趣。

I really appreciate you asking.

我真的很感谢你的提问。

Lenny Rachitsky: So I wanted to start with a quote that I found from you that I think gives a little perspective into how you think and how you approach the world.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以我想以我从你那里找到的一句话开始，我认为这可以让你了解你如何思考以及如何对待世界。

So here's the quote.

这是引用。

"Very frequently I would do poorly on tests in school and then the professor would say very reasonably, 'Hey, I think you should bump down a level to the previous semester's pace,'" and you said, "I actually know that, that's why I'm in this class.

“很多时候，我在学校的考试成绩很差，然后教授会非常合理地说，‘嘿，我认为你应该把水平降低到上学期的速度，’”你说，“我实际上知道这一点，这就是我在这门课上的原因。

I want to be in the class that I'm potentially the worst at." This isn't how most people think.

我想进入我可能表现最差的班级。”大多数人并不是这样想的。

This isn't how most people operate.

这不是大多数人的运作方式。

Usually people want to get good grades, they want to be at the top of their class.

通常人们都想取得好成绩，他们想在班上名列前茅。

Clearly you have a different approach and a different mindset.

显然你有不同的方法和不同的心态。

Where did this come from for you and how did this shape the way you think about product and the work that you do?

这对你来说是从哪里来的？这如何影响了你对产品和所做工作的思考方式？

Jeff Weinstein: Some of it was just the fact that I wasn't particularly good at the class and had to rationalize it for myself in some form.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：部分原因是我在这门课上表现不是特别好，必须以某种形式为自己合理化。

So in retrospect that sounds highfalutin, but at the time I just wasn't particularly good at the classes I was in.

回想起来，这听起来很冠冕堂皇，但当时我只是不太擅长我所上的课程。

But I think it comes from growing up.

但我认为这来自于成长。

I went to a pretty hippy-dippy K through 12 school in Baltimore, Maryland where we were really asked to think about why we were in school and to pick any of the courses that were of interest to us outside of AP programs or grades or any particular requirements.

我去了马里兰州巴尔的摩一所非常嬉皮士风格的 K 至 12 学校，在那里我们真的被要求思考我们为什么上学，并选择 AP 课程、成绩或任何特定要求之外我们感兴趣的课程。

You really got to choose your own path.

你真的必须选择自己的道路。

And I recall one particular class in high school, which was somewhat a science class, but it was called the History of Science, and we actually walked through and studied all of the, at the time, best understood ways the world worked in science, but then later were turned out to be wrong, right?

我记得高中时有一门特殊的课程，有点像科学课，但它被称为科学史，我们实际上走过并研究了当时世界在科学中最容易理解的所有方式，但后来证明是错误的，对吗？

Jeff Weinstein: In the 1500s we believed X, Y, and Z.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：在 1500 年代，我们相信 X、Y 和 Z。

In the 1600s we believed A, B and C.

在 1600 年代，我们相信 A、B 和 C。

just very confidently.

只是非常自信。

In 1500s we thought something and then the 1600s we thought something very different.

1500 年代我们的想法和 1600 年代的想法截然不同。

And so this class was quite impactful on me where we spent an entire year studying things that are not true.

所以这门课对我影响很大，我们花了整整一年的时间研究不真实的东西。

It was fascinating.

这很令人着迷。

That particular teacher employed another trick on us during that class, which was it took the tuition fee of our school and divided it by the number of hours and wrote the cost on a ticket and then handed us in the beginning of the year.

那个老师在那堂课上还对我们耍了一个花招，就是把我们学校的学费除以学时数，写在一张票上，然后在年初交给我们。

Tickets for every single one of the classes and he would stand at the door and you would have to give him a ticket at the end of the class that he thought it was worth it.

每节课的门票，他会站在门口，你必须在课程结束时给他一张他认为值得的门票。

And just like that practice of deep intellectual understanding of how people evaluated something at the time and choosing for yourself to spend the time on it by just the physical act of handing that ticket to the teacher.

就像对当时人们如何评价某件事进行深刻的智力理解的做法一样，并通过将罚单交给老师的实际行动来选择自己花时间在这件事上。

Jeff Weinstein: That really clicked for me.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这对我来说真的很有意义。

And so when I got to college and it was a real college university, people are coming from often quite more rigorous backgrounds of things that were true.

因此，当我进入大学时，这是一所真正的大学，人们通常来自更严格的真实背景。

I was a bit unprepared and I remember actually taking a microeconomics class that was quite advanced and had a close friend and we studied exactly the same information.

我有点没有准备，我记得实际上参加了一门相当高级的微观经济学课程，并且有一个亲密的朋友，我们研究了完全相同的信息。

We sat and looked at the same cheat sheets, we practiced the same quizzes, we read the same books, and he got the top grade in the class and I got the bottom and that's from where that quote came from where the professor said, I think you should bump, potentially bump down.

我们坐下来，看同样的备忘单，练习同样的测验，读同样的书，他在班上得了最高分，我得了最低分，这就是那句话的出处，教授说，我认为你应该突破，可能会落后。

I was like, "I already know that stuff.

我当时想，“我已经知道那些东西了。

I'm interested in this topic.

我对这个话题很感兴趣。

I'm going to try to improve, but look just because I'm significantly worse than the other kids in the class that has little to do with if I should leave." And he was particularly cool with it.

我会努力进步，但看起来只是因为我比班上其他孩子差得多，这与我是否应该离开无关。”他对此特别冷静。

Lenny Rachitsky: This episode is brought to you by Pendo, the only all-in-one product experience platform for any type of application, tired of bouncing around multiple tools to uncover what's really happening inside your product?

Lenny Rachitsky：这一集是由 Pendo 为您带来的，Pendo 是唯一适用于任何类型应用程序的一体化产品体验平台，您是否厌倦了在多种工具之间来回切换以揭示产品内部到底发生了什么？

With all the tools you need in one simple to use platform, Pendo makes it easy to answer critical questions about how users are engaging with your product and then turn those insights into action.

Pendo 在一个简单易用的平台中提供了您所需的所有工具，让您可以轻松回答有关用户如何与您的产品互动的关键问题，然后将这些见解转化为行动。

Also, you can get your users to do what you actually want them to do.

此外，您还可以让用户做您真正希望他们做的事情。

First, Pendo is built around product analytics, seeing what your users are actually doing in your apps so that you can optimize their experience.

首先，Pendo 围绕产品分析构建，了解用户在应用程序中实际执行的操作，以便您可以优化他们的体验。

Next, Pendo lets you deploy in-app guides that lead users through the actions that matter most.

接下来，Pendo 允许您部署应用内指南，引导用户完成最重要的操作。

Lenny Rachitsky: Then Pendo integrates user feedback so that you can capture and analyze what people actually want.

Lenny Rachitsky：然后 Pendo 会整合用户反馈，以便您可以捕获和分析人们真正想要的东西。

And the new thing in Pendo, session replays, a very cool way to visualize user sessions.

Pendo 中的新功能是会话重播，这是一种非常酷的可视化用户会话的方式。

I'm not surprised at all that over 10,000 companies use it today.

如今有超过 10,000 家公司在使用它，我对此并不感到惊讶。

Visit Pendo.io/Lenny to create your free Pendo account today and start building better experiences across every corner of your product.

立即访问 Pendo.io/Lenny 创建免费 Pendo 帐户，并开始在产品的各个角落打造更好的体验。

PS: you want to take your product-led know-How a step further, check out Pendo's lineup of free certification courses led by talk product experts and designed to help you grow and advance in your career.

PS：如果您想进一步了解以产品为主导的专业知识，请查看 Pendo 的一系列免费认证课程，这些课程由演讲产品专家主导，旨在帮助您在职业生涯中成长和进步。

Learn more and experience the power of the Pendo platform today at Pendo.io/Lenny.

立即访问 Pendo.io/Lenny 了解更多信息并体验 Pendo 平台的强大功能。

Lenny Rachitsky: Today's episode is brought to you by Cycle.

Lenny Rachitsky：今天的节目是由 Cycle 为您带来的。

The AI-powered feedback platform for product teams.

面向产品团队的人工智能反馈平台。

Is your customer feedback, a tangled mess of Slack threads, survey responses and overflowing inboxes?

您的客户反馈是由 Slack 线程、调查回复和溢出的收件箱组成的混乱的混乱吗？

Wish that you could know what your customers really need?

希望您能知道客户真正需要什么？

Cycle unifies all of your customer interactions from support chats to user research, gong calls and app store reviews into one neat collaborative space.

Cycle 将所有客户互动（从支持聊天到用户研究、锣呼叫和应用商店评论）统一到一个整洁的协作空间中。

Cycle's AI then extracts actionable insights on autopilot.

然后，Cycle 的人工智能会提取有关自动驾驶仪的可行见解。

Cycle will learn what you're building so that it can label incoming feedback automatically.

Cycle 将了解您正在构建的内容，以便它可以自动标记传入的反馈。

That means you'll get a full voice-of-customer report without manually triaging feedback.

这意味着您将获得完整的客户之声报告，而无需手动分类反馈。

Then simply you Cycle Ask to dig deeper into any topic and generate custom AI-generated summaries across your entire feedback repository.

然后，您只需循环询问即可深入挖掘任何主题，并在整个反馈存储库中生成人工智能生成的自定义摘要。

What makes Cycle different is the way that it lets you close feedback loops in each release.

Cycle 的不同之处在于它允许您在每个版本中关闭反馈循环。

Feedback is not used just as a way to prioritize what to build, but also as a tool that creates trust with all stakeholders.

反馈不仅可以用作确定构建内容优先级的方式，还可以用作与所有利益相关者建立信任的工具。

Sign up for a free cycle trial today at cycle.app/Lenny and put your feedback on autopilot.

立即在cycle.app/Lenny 上注册免费自行车试用，并将您的反馈意见提交到自动驾驶仪上。

That's C-Y-C-L-E.app/Lenny.

那是 C-Y-C-L-E.app/Lenny。

Lenny Rachitsky: It's really interesting that you went to this liberal artsy hippy dippy school as you described, which a lot of people bash on.

Lenny Rachitsky：真的很有趣，正如你所描述的，你去了这所文科嬉皮士学校，很多人都抨击它。

Why spend all this college money and time on a liberal artsy education and you ended up being really successful in a very technical, highly analytical data-driven company, and it's interesting that that experience still helped you succeed in this other path.

为什么要把所有大学的钱和时间花在文科教育上，而你最终在一家技术性很强、高度分析的数据驱动公司中取得了真正的成功，有趣的是，这段经历仍然帮助你在另一条道路上取得了成功。

Jeff Weinstein: It did take a change though because I started in...

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：不过，这确实发生了变化，因为我开始于……

English was my selected major in school, but then I kept playing with computers and I kept liking math and I looked at the roles of the backgrounds of the people who were running the types of companies I loved.

英语是我在学校选择的专业，但后来我一直玩电脑，我一直喜欢数学，我研究了那些经营我喜欢的公司的人的背景角色。

At the time Facebook was getting super phenomenally successful.

当时 Facebook 取得了巨大的成功。

Apple was already on their up and up again and everyone who was leading those places had technical backgrounds and I liked computers a lot, so I added computer science as an engineering degree midway through school.

苹果已经在不断崛起，每个领导这些地方的人都有技术背景，而且我非常喜欢计算机，所以我在学校中途添加了计算机科学作为工程学位。

So I had to take the real science classes with the pre-med kids and the rest of it, and I did similarly poorly, but I did end up with a computer science degree and a liberal arts degree.

所以我必须和医学预科生一起参加真正的科学课程和其他课程，我的成绩同样很差，但我最终获得了计算机科学学位和文科学位。

So it was a journey, but I had to make a pretty big switch in the middle to get on that path.

所以这是一段旅程，但我必须在中间做出很大的转变才能走上这条路。

Lenny Rachitsky: I asked you if there was one thing that you'd love to get across in this podcast.

Lenny Rachitsky：我问你是否想在这个播客中传达一件事。

I asked you what would it be and here's what you said.

我问你会是什么，这就是你所说的。

Here's the first item on this list that you sent me, "Go, go, go ASAP plus optimistic comma, long-term compounding approach." Can you just talk about what you mean by that?

这是你发给我的清单上的第一项，“走，走，尽快走，加上乐观逗号，长期复利方法。”您能简单谈谈您的意思吗？

Jeff Weinstein: Yeah, there's two things going on here.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：是的，这里发生了两件事。

So I see the world as immediately we have just such opportunity to take action in front of us.

因此，我认为世界立即就有这样的机会在我们面前采取行动。

We can be optimistic and go, go, go as soon as possible.

我们可以乐观一点，走走走，尽快走。

I think that a lot of life is you get as much furniture as you've room in the house.

我认为，生活的大部分内容就是你拥有与房子里的空间一样多的家具。

We will do the work the night before it's due, so let's just make it due tomorrow.

我们将在截止日期前一天晚上完成这项工作，所以我们明天就截止吧。

Can we turn tomorrow into today?

我们可以把明天变成今天吗？

So just optimistically seeing if we can just inject energy to go, go, go has produced surprising results and I think it ignites in other people that same interest and then it feeds off each other.

因此，只要乐观地看看我们是否能够注入能量去走、走、走，就会产生令人惊讶的结果，我认为它会激发其他人同样的兴趣，然后相互促进。

And that's I think really in my bones from growing up.

这就是我从小到大一直在骨子里思考的。

And then I added over time, had to learn this longer term, compounding, more strategic mindset where some of the things we want to accomplish, be it at my startups in the past or at Stripe, they can't be solved in an afternoon.

然后我补充说，随着时间的推移，必须学习这种更长期、更复杂、更具战略性的思维方式，我们想要完成的一些事情，无论是在我过去的初创公司还是在 Stripe，都无法在一个下午解决。

Jeff Weinstein: They're going to require layers of infrastructure and services and applications and UI and partnerships that really look like that iceberg drawing you see where you just see the top, but then there's the whole thing underneath and I've had to learn over time to pair my instinct of like, "Let's get it done today, let's move forward, let's see what we can get done.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：他们将需要多层基础设施、服务、应用程序、用户界面和合作伙伴关系，这些看起来真的就像你看到的冰山图，你只看到顶部，但下面还有整个事情，我必须随着时间的推移学习将我的直觉结合起来，“让我们今天完成它，让我们继续前进，让我们看看我们能完成什么。

Let's make some mistakes, let's try it out." With, "Where are we going?

让我们犯一些错误，然后尝试一下。”与，“我们要去哪里？

What needs to be true over time?

随着时间的推移，什么必须是真实的？

Where can we always invest?

我们可以在哪里投资？

What will we never regret spending time in?" We'll never regret spending time making the latency of our payments APIs at Stripe faster.

什么是我们永远不会后悔花时间的事情？”我们永远不会后悔花时间加快 Stripe 支付 API 的延迟。

We'll never regret making it more reliable to send 83B election mails to the IRS.

我们永远不会后悔让向 IRS 发送 83B 选举邮件变得更加可靠。

Like we'll never regret those things.

就像我们永远不会后悔这些事情一样。

So let's just always compound those capabilities over time.

因此，让我们随着时间的推移不断复合这些功能。

Then the trick is how do you mix this go, go, go attitude with a long-term compounding?

那么关键是如何将这种“继续、继续、继续”的态度与长期复利结合起来？

That's something I still struggle with, but I try to purposely balance it more than I used to.

这是我仍然在努力解决的问题，但我比以前更努力地平衡它。

Lenny Rachitsky: It's such a good way of summarizing just how to be successful in a lot of things.

Lenny Rachitsky：这是总结如何在很多事情上取得成功的好方法。

Go, go, go ASAP, stay optimistic.

走吧，走吧，尽快走，保持乐观。

Focus on long-term compounding growth.

注重长期复合增长。

Is there an example of that in action?

有实际的例子吗？

I know we're going to talk about Atlas a bunch, but I guess is there an example of that working for you or a product you worked on?

我知道我们会大量讨论 Atlas，但我想是否有适合您或您开发的产品的示例？

Jeff Weinstein: I work at Stripe, which is a infrastructure company.

Jeff Weinstein：我在 Stripe 工作，这是一家基础设施公司。

We build things that help businesses do online commerce in various forms, and I've had a few roles at Stripe.

我们构建的东西可以帮助企业以各种形式进行在线商务，我在 Stripe 担任过一些职务。

I'm in our beautiful office here in South San Francisco, one of which was the product person that helped us decide how we were going to go global and how we were going to offer multiple ways for people to pay.

我在南旧金山美丽的办公室里，其中一位产品人员帮助我们决定如何走向全球以及如何为人们提供多种支付方式。

It turns out there's more than just credit cards in the world.

事实证明，世界上不仅仅有信用卡。

There's small hundreds of ways that people will naturally want to pay for things online and as a business you're going to, of course, just want to accept whatever it is people want to pay with.

人们自然会希望通过数百种方式进行在线支付，作为一家企业，您当然只想接受人们想要支付的任何东西。

And for the first seven or eight years of Stripe, well prior to my being here, the incremental country ads and the incremental new payment methods was relatively flat over time and that was surprising to all of us who worked here because the world wanted it and we had a lot of people working on it and we were working very hard, but it wasn't producing returns in the way that we wanted.

在 Stripe 的前七、八年里，早在我来到这里之前，随着时间的推移，增量国家广告和增量新支付方式相对平稳，这让我们所有在这里工作的人感到惊讶，因为世界想要它，我们有很多人在努力，我们非常努力，但它并没有以我们想要的方式产生回报。

Jeff Weinstein: And so actually the optimistic as soon as possible go-go attitude was not working.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：实际上，乐观的尽快行动的态度并没有发挥作用。

No matter how much energy we poured into building Thailand payment methods or UK bank transfers or an in-person payment system in Latin America, we just couldn't rack up points and get it done.

无论我们投入多少精力来建立泰国支付方式或英国银行转账或拉丁美洲的面对面支付系统，我们都无法积累积分并完成它。

So we had to step back and say, "Well, what is the world going to look like in 10 years?

所以我们不得不退后一步说：“那么，10 年后世界会是什么样子？

What was going to need to be true and how can we start to go there now?" Which meant going a lot slower, building internal platforms, sending people around the world to start to build these payment methods, uproot their lives, pay for their apartments, get them on airplanes, start using these payment methods actually in the world.

需要什么是真实的，我们现在怎样才能开始实现这一点呢？”这意味着要慢得多，建立内部平台，让世界各地的人们开始建立这些支付方式，改变他们的生活，支付他们的公寓费用，让他们登上飞机，开始在世界各地实际使用这些支付方式。

And so it really our line flat line for a while and we're like, "Okay, is this strategy working?

所以我们的路线确实有一段时间持平，我们会想，“好吧，这个策略有效吗？

Is it not working?" But then over time we start to see it switch to nonlinear again and go from whatever it was, 10 payment methods at the time.

是不是不行了？”但随着时间的推移，我们开始看到它再次转向非线性，并从当时的 10 种支付方式转变为非线性支付方式。

Jeff Weinstein: And now Stripe accepts over 100.

Jeff Weinstein：现在 Stripe 接受超过 100 个。

So we got to 50 really quickly and then skyrocketed to 100.

所以我们很快就达到了 50 个，然后飙升到 100 个。

And I remember there being a meeting where we said, "Well, maybe we should just lock everyone in the basement and see if we can get from 10 to 50." That would be the intensity startup go attitude.

我记得有一次会议我们说，“好吧，也许我们应该把每个人都锁在地下室里，看看是否可以从 10 人到 50 人。”这就是强度启动的态度。

But we looked at the individual components of what it meant to get this done and how long we wanted this to be true for and we had to go a lot slower.

但我们研究了完成这项工作的各个组成部分，以及我们希望这种情况持续多久，因此我们必须放慢速度。

That was a very formative decision where you had to mix the go, go, go with the long-term compounding.

这是一个非常具有影响力的决定，你必须将“继续、继续、继续”与长期复利结合起来。

Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

Okay, so let's start to delve deeper into some of the specific seals that I hear you're incredible at and that I've seen you be incredible at on Twitter and LinkedIn and things like that.

好吧，让我们开始更深入地研究一些特定的印章，我听说你很擅长这些，并且我在 Twitter 和 LinkedIn 等类似的事情上看到你很擅长。

So the first is craft, craft and quality.

所以首先是工艺、工艺和品质。

I'm told by many people that you have a very strong obsession with craft and user experience and quality and even more so I'm told that you teach people at Stripe how to be obsessed with craft and quality and user experience in a very systematic way.

很多人告诉我，您对工艺、用户体验和质量有着非常强烈的痴迷，更重要的是，您告诉 Stripe 的人们如何以非常系统的方式痴迷于工艺、质量和用户体验。

I feel like this is something a lot of people are starting to realize is really important and or are trying to get better at, either personally or at their company.

我觉得很多人开始意识到这一点非常重要，并且或者正在努力改进，无论是个人还是公司。

So first of all, let me just ask why is this so important to you?

首先，我想问一下为什么这对您如此重要？

Why do you think craft and experience and quality is so important?

为什么您认为工艺、经验和质量如此重要？

Why do you put so much emphasis on it yourself?

为什么你自己这么重视呢？

Jeff Weinstein: I think I'm really working backwards from failures in the past and avoiding them.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我认为我确实是在从过去的失败中倒退并避免它们。

And so maybe just a quick story.

所以也许只是一个简短的故事。

I started a company several years ago based on just a personal pet peeve of mine, which was I was a SQL analyst.

几年前，我创办了一家公司，只是因为我个人的烦恼，那就是我是一名 SQL 分析师。

Many you listening might have written SQL in the past, maybe the robots write the SQL for you now, but you still need to write SQL yourself.

很多你听的人可能以前写过SQL，也许现在机器人帮你写SQL，但你仍然需要自己写SQL。

And every single time I wrote a SQL query, I wanted to run the same subsequent analysis.

每次我编写 SQL 查询时，我都想运行相同的后续分析。

I wanted great version control, I wanted all the cool stuff that GitHub had for code but for writing data code.

我想要出色的版本控制，我想要 GitHub 为代码提供的所有很酷的东西，但用于编写数据代码。

And so my friends and I built a little Python tool which basically let you run our style queries.

因此，我和我的朋友构建了一个小型 Python 工具，它基本上可以让您运行我们的样式查询。

It lets you draw charts and pivot tables quickly and sharing all this modern SaaS application stuff.

它可以让您快速绘制图表和数据透视表并共享所有这些现代 SaaS 应用程序内容。

But applied to SQL a few years ago and we turned that into a company.

但几年前应用于 SQL，我们将其变成了一家公司。

Jeff Weinstein: We got some progress, but then there was this moment one day where we had maybe a couple 100 customers and we had an error where we basically by accidentally shut down the service and it was bricked for 10 or 20 minutes.

Jeff Weinstein：我们取得了一些进展，但有一天，我们可能有 100 名客户，我们遇到了一个错误，我们基本上不小心关闭了服务，导致服务瘫痪了 10 或 20 分钟。

And at the time we were hustling in our little dinky office to get the application back online.

当时我们在狭小的办公室里忙着让应用程序重新上线。

And we really were proud of ourselves about how reasonably quickly we did and people went back to using it.

我们真的为自己感到自豪，我们的速度相当快，人们又重新开始使用它。

It wasn't a super long outage and we didn't lose any data.

这不是一次超长时间的中断，我们没有丢失任何数据。

We were just high-fiving each other.

我们只是互相击掌。

And we went about our day and about a year later I realized that that was a...

我们度过了我们的一天，大约一年后我意识到那是......

Jeff Weinstein: I missed a huge moment that I should have pounced on, which is that during those 20 minutes, our customers weren't furious.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我错过了一个我应该抓住的重要时刻，那就是在那 20 分钟内，我们的客户并没有感到愤怒。

They weren't emailing us like crazy, they weren't texting us, they weren't trying to find us on Google Maps and knock on our door and say, "Hey, I need this thing back online immediately." We heard a couple comments from them, it was little murmurs.

他们没有疯狂地给我们发电子邮件，没有发短信，也没有试图在谷歌地图上找到我们，然后敲我们的门说：“嘿，我需要这个东西立即恢复在线状态。”我们听到了他们的一些评论，只是一些小抱怨。

And I didn't realize at the time that was the signal that we did not have product market fit.

当时我没有意识到这是我们的产品不适合市场​​的信号。

And I ended up wasting many more years on that project.

我最终在这个项目上浪费了很多年。

And wasting is a big word.

浪费是一个大词。

We built amazing software, people liked it, we were able to sell the company.

我们开发了令人惊叹的软件，人们喜欢它，我们能够卖掉公司。

Jeff Weinstein: It helped many of us learn how to really build software.

Jeff Weinstein：它帮助我们许多人学习如何真正构建软件。

But I'm really trying to avoid that situation again.

但我真的很想避免再次出现这种情况。

And I think craft is a dessert that you get after the meal of does your thing solve a real problem in the world and are people clamoring, needing it badly?

我认为手工艺是你饭后得到的甜点，你的东西能解决世界上的真正问题吗？人们是否强烈需要它？

And that's really my obsession is in finding problems in which people will pause their entire day to solve.

我真正痴迷的是寻找人们愿意停下来解决的问题。

They will leap through the computer to be like, "Oh my God, I have that problem.

他们会跳进电脑，说：“天啊，我遇到了这个问题。

Do you have a solution?"

你有解决办法吗？”

Jeff Weinstein: And if you focus on that style of product development and we can get into just how do you listen for that and then turn that into product.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：如果你专注于这种产品开发风格，我们可以探讨你如何倾听这种风格，然后将其转化为产品。

Later, you might get the opportunity to really provide craft and beauty and touches and moments and delight.

之后，你可能有机会真正提供工艺、美丽、触感、时刻和快乐。

But certainly there is no amount of craft, there is no amount of beauty, there's no amount delight or touches you can add to a thing that will solve the problem we had at our startup, which is that people didn't really need this.

但可以肯定的是，无论有多少工艺，没有多少美丽，没有多少快乐或感动，你都可以添加到一个东西来解决我们在初创公司遇到的问题，那就是人们并不真正需要这个。

And that's the biggest error is picking something in which people don't really need it.

最大的错误就是选择了人们并不真正需要的东西。

And then going through these practices of trying to make it great when maybe it shouldn't exist in the first place.

然后经历这些尝试让它变得伟大的实践，尽管它本来就不应该存在。

Lenny Rachitsky: I think a lot of people see all these tweets and messages about just obsessed with the craft of what you're building and you can easily lose sight of...

Lenny Rachitsky：我认为很多人看到所有这些推文和消息都只是沉迷于你正在构建的东西的工艺，而你很容易忽视......

Nobody even cares about what you're building.

甚至没有人关心你正在构建什么。

It could be the most incredible experience ever designed, but if it's not something anyone ever wants, it doesn't really matter.

这可能是有史以来最令人难以置信的设计体验，但如果这不是任何人想要的东西，那也没关系。

Jeff Weinstein: People don't really get out of bed for their second problem.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：人们并不会真正因为第二个问题而起床。

They get out of bed for their first problem.

他们起床解决第一个问题。

And you have to carefully listen and not pitch your customer or your prospective customer as you're trying to figure this out.

当你试图解决这个问题时，你必须仔细倾听，而不是推销你的客户或你的潜在客户。

And I think this advice, not even advice just style applies to small companies, big companies, anyone which is people don't want to be pitched.

我认为这个建议，甚至不仅仅是风格上的建议，适用于小公司、大公司，以及任何人们不想被推销的人。

I'm sometimes on a UXR call with a very well-meaning person or a founder who has a new product that they want advice on or they want to find customers.

有时，我会与一位善意的人或一位创始人进行 UXR 通话，他们有新产品需要建议或想要寻找客户。

And the first thing that they start talking about when we get on the call is, "Hi, I'm the CEO of X, Y, and Z company.

当我们接到电话时，他们开始谈论的第一件事是：“嗨，我是 X、Y 和 Z 公司的首席执行官。

We do one, two, and three.

我们做一、二、三。

I want to show you a demo." It's like, "Hold up, I'm a customer.

我想给你看一个演示。”就像，“等一下，我是顾客。

I have..." What a wasted opportunity you've just done here.

我已经……”你刚才在这里浪费了多么好的机会啊。

Jeff Weinstein: I have so many problems, you're guessing ahead of time, what is my top problem and now that you've anchored and limited to the pitch you're going to miss, you very likely going to miss the burning problem that they have on the top of their mind.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我有很多问题，你提前猜测我的首要问题是什么，现在你已经锚定并限制在你将错过的范围内，你很可能会错过他们最关心的紧迫问题。

And it's not the customer's job to interrupt you and say, "Hey, could you stop your pitch?

客户没有责任打断你并说：“嘿，你能停止你的推销吗？

I want to tell you about my top problem." And you can see this down the stream, which then companies who launch things, put craft, have a great launch, raise money are then later gone.

我想告诉你我最关心的问题。”你可以看到这一点，然后那些推出产品、投入工艺、进行一次伟大的发布、筹集资金的公司后来就消失了。

And it's because they built something that wasn't solving a burning need.

这是因为他们构建的东西并不能解决迫切的需求。

And I think you can stem it all the way back to they were just pitching rather than sitting in silence and just waiting for their customer to just open their heart out about what's the most burning thing.

我认为你可以将其追溯到他们只是在推销，而不是默默地坐着等待客户敞开心扉谈论最燃烧的事情。

Jeff Weinstein: And sometimes I'll prompt our customers, I'll say, "Hey, do you mind just opening up your email?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：有时我会提示我们的客户，我会说：“嘿，你介意打开你的电子邮件吗？

What's in there?" Or, "If you weren't talking to me right now, what would you be working on?" Or, "Hey, last week, what grinds your gears?

里面有什么？”或者，“如果你现在不跟我说话，你会做什么？”或者，“嘿，上周，是什么磨碎了你的齿轮？

What are you not looking forward to?" Or magic wand, "What do you wish you could just have off your plate immediately?

你还有什么不期待的？”或者魔杖，“你希望什么可以立即从你的盘子里拿走？

Forget Stripe, forget about thing, work on just in your whole life.

忘记 Stripe，忘记其他事情，一生只为工作而努力。

What is it that you do not want to be doing?" Or, "A massive opportunity you wish was just one door away?" And it's a little awkward because they don't know why you're asking that kind of question, but then you just sit there in silence.

你不想做什么？”或者，“你希望的巨大机会就在眼前？”这有点尴尬，因为他们不知道你为什么问这样的问题，但你只是默默地坐在那里。

And for the most part, if you have amazing customers who are smart and ambitious and are trying to build their own business, they're going to want to offload their hardest thing to somebody else.

在大多数情况下，如果您拥有出色的客户，他们聪明、雄心勃勃，并且正在尝试建立自己的业务，那么他们会希望将最困难的事情交给其他人。

Jeff Weinstein: If you've earned trust along the way, and certainly not pitching is a great way of earning trust.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：如果你一路走来赢得了信任，那么当然，不推销是赢得信任的好方法。

You're just listening.

你只是在听。

We've learned a lot at Stripe from that.

Stripe 从中我们学到了很多东西。

And that's where you can start to find adjacencies, right?

这就是你可以开始寻找邻接关系的地方，对吧？

"Well, hey, I don't know if Stripe could really help me with this, but wouldn't it be cool if we could identify if the person signing up on our site wasn't fraudulent or is who they say they are or isn't a bot, or are they really a dog on the internet?" And we're like, "We keep this as the major complaint from all of our customers, but we're not an identity company." It's like, "Well, I guess now we are because all of our customers who are trying to build their business all have this problem." And so via silence, you can just create your roadmap pretty quickly and drop a lot of the long UXR, long survey, long build cycle approach.

“好吧，嘿，我不知道 Stripe 是否真的可以帮助我解决这个问题，但是如果我们能够识别在我们网站上注册的人是否是欺诈者，或者他们是否是他们所说的人，或者他们是否真的是互联网上的狗，那不是很酷吗？”我们就像是，“我们将此作为所有客户的主要投诉，但我们不是一家身份识别公司。”就像，“好吧，我想现在我们是因为我们所有试图建立业务的客户都遇到了这个问题。”因此，通过沉默，您可以非常快速地创建路线图，并放弃大量冗长的 UXR、冗长的调查、冗长的构建周期方法。

Lenny Rachitsky: So I love where we're going with this.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以我喜欢我们的发展方向。

This is where I was going to actually talk about next is just your ability to talk to customers and user research.

这就是我接下来要真正谈论的就是与客户交谈和用户研究的能力。

It feels very unique, watching you operate on Twitter, you're just sharing your email constantly, getting on calls with people constantly.

这感觉非常独特，看着你在 Twitter 上操作，你只是不断地分享你的电子邮件，不断地与人们接听电话。

There's this, you're breaking this wall between...

就是这样，你正在打破这堵墙......

That a lot of people imagine there is between the PM and the lead of a team and the customer.

很多人认为 PM 和团队领导与客户之间存在着某种联系。

You're not relying easy research.

你不依赖简单的研究。

You're not waiting for someone else to do this work for you.

您不会等待其他人为您完成这项工作。

Talk about just why and how you do this.

谈谈你这样做的原因和方式。

I think there's so much to learn from just how you operate in finding opportunities, picking problems to solve by talking to customers.

我认为，通过与客户交谈寻找机会、选择问题来解决的运作方式，有很多值得学习的地方。

Jeff Weinstein: It's where the business comes from is customers.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：客户是业务的来源。

It is not a long shot hypothesis about why to talk to them.

关于为什么要与他们交谈并不是一个长期的假设。

It's like if they love your stuff, they will tell their friends and pay fair prices for the product.

就像如果他们喜欢你的东西，他们会告诉他们的朋友并为该产品支付公平的价格。

We're so fortunate through the internet that people announced themselves as being interested in a topic.

我们很幸运，通过互联网，人们宣布自己对某个话题感兴趣。

Sometimes they're interested in it by posting on Reddit a long thread or a screenshot of a customer service interaction that bugged them or hopeful that from their dorm room in country X, someone else in the world has solved the same problem.

有时，他们对此感兴趣，会在 Reddit 上发布一条困扰他们的长帖子或客户服务交互的屏幕截图，或者希望世界上其他人在 X 国的宿舍里解决了同样的问题。

And the internet has given us all this absolutely magical forum that you can just yell out the window and then billions of people could actually listen to what you said out the window.

互联网为我们提供了这个绝对神奇的论坛，你可以在窗外大喊，然后数十亿人可以真正听到你在窗外所说的话。

Now, that's not all the time true for all people in all situations, but dramatically more true now than ever before in human history.

现在，这对于所有情况下的所有人来说并不总是如此，但现在比人类历史上的任何时候都更加真实。

Jeff Weinstein: And so the fact that people wouldn't be listening to their customers and really jumping through the computer to talk to them surprises me.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：因此，人们不会倾听客户的意见，也不会真正跳到电脑上与他们交谈，这让我感到惊讶。

It's like I always sometimes think, "Do they have some other strategy?

就像我有时总是想，“他们还有其他策略吗？

Are they so confident in what they're building that they don't need to hear directly from the people who will be using it?" And I think some of it is my own fear that I'm going to make the same mistake I've made in the past, which is build something that people like they're using but isn't solving a burning enough problem such that they're going to stop their day, they're going to tell their friends, we're going to be able to sustain the company economically over a long period of time.

他们是否对自己正在构建的产品如此有信心，以至于不需要直接听取使用它的人的意见？”我认为部分原因是我自己担心我会犯过去犯过的同样的错误，即构建人们喜欢使用的东西，但没有解决足够紧迫的问题，以至于他们会停止他们的一天，他们会告诉他们的朋友，我们将能够在很长一段时间内维持公司的经济发展。

And that really just comes from hearing people's most burning problems and then just jumping through the computer and talking to them takes a little bit of nervous gumption, like walking up to a person at a bar or cocktail party and saying, "Hi, my name is Jeff."

这实际上只是来自于听到人们最紧迫的问题，然后跳到电脑上与他们交谈需要一点紧张的进取心，就像在酒吧或鸡尾酒会上走到一个人面前说：“嗨，我叫杰夫。”

Jeff Weinstein: It can be a little awkward, but then you get it.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这可能有点尴尬，但你就会明白了。

It's a rush once it starts to work.

一旦开始工作就很匆忙。

And once you get the iterative loop that they're excited to talk to you, they have problems, they see you as a trusted, not salesy, not pitching, not narrow-minded to just my product and my position, but I'm here to hear about all of your problems and see where we can help.

一旦你得到了他们很高兴与你交谈的迭代循环，他们就会遇到问题，他们认为你是一个值得信赖的人，不是推销员，不是推销员，不是狭隘的只关注我的产品和我的立场，但我来这里是为了听听你所有的问题，看看我们可以在哪里提供帮助。

Not promising we can help solve everything, but let's listen.

不承诺我们可以帮助解决所有问题，但让我们倾听。

That is infectious, both between the customers and internally.

无论是在客户之间还是在内部，这都是具有感染力的。

And so I'm able to bring more people into that practice.

所以我能够让更多的人参与到这种实践中。

At Stripe, I'm able to quickly grab an engineer and hop on a call.

在 Stripe，我能够快速找到工程师并接听电话。

I can forward a message over to a Slack group.

我可以将消息转发到 Slack 群组。

And they know that because the customer's speaking directly, it somewhat trumps everything that's happening during the day.

他们知道，由于客户直接讲话，因此在某种程度上胜过了白天发生的一切。

We could go to our meeting where we're going to guess what the customer wants or we could talk to them directly.

我们可以去参加会议，猜测客户想要什么，或者我们可以直接与他们交谈。

Jeff Weinstein: And you have to use a little bit of art to decide which customers you want to listen the closest to.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你必须运用一点艺术来决定你最想倾听哪些客户的声音。

But even at Stripe's scale, where we're dealing with many millions of businesses and many hundreds of millions of consumers on the other end of those businesses, you can pattern match relatively quickly.

但即使在 Stripe 的规模上，我们与数百万企业以及这些企业另一端的数亿消费者打交道，您也可以相对快速地进行模式匹配。

What are the styles of customers that represent where the world is going, the most ambitious, the most technical, the fastest growing, the most detailed.

客户的哪些风格代表了世界的发展方向，最雄心勃勃、最具技术性、发展最快、最细致。

And you don't need 10,000 of those people to talk to.

而且你不需要与其中的 10,000 个人交谈。

If you're text message friendly with five or 10 of those, you are going to have so much direct signal about where to go that you forget how you did it in the past.

如果你对其中的 5 个或 10 个短信很友好，那么你将会收到太多关于要去哪里的直接信号，以至于你会忘记你过去是如何做到的。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love these.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢这些。

So I'd love to learn more about these tactics that you've found helpful.

因此，我很想了解更多有关您认为有用的策略的信息。

So you've shared this idea of silence, talking to someone and just being silent, and I forget the phrase you used, but just like ideas emerge, like your whole road map can emerge from that silence.

所以你分享了这种沉默的想法，与某人交谈并保持沉默，我忘记了你使用的短语，但就像想法浮现一样，就像你的整个路线图可以从这种沉默中浮现出来一样。

So let me share a few of the things you shared so far and I'm curious what else.

因此，让我分享一些您迄今为止分享的内容，我很好奇还有哪些内容。

Two is tweeting just like, "Hey, I'm looking to improve Atlas right now.

二号在推特上写道：“嘿，我现在正在寻求改进 Atlas。

What bugs do you have?

你有什么bug？

Here's my email address." You talked about text messaging, just like, "Hey, can I get your number?

这是我的电子邮件地址。”你谈到短信，就像，“嘿，我可以得到你的电话号码吗？

And I'll just text you when I have questions." If there's anything else to add to these, that'd be awesome.

当我有疑问时，我会给你发短信。”如果还有什么可以添加到这些，那就太棒了。

And then what else have you found?

然后你还发现了什么？

Just ways to actually get to a customer and find opportunities that are important.

只是真正接触客户并找到重要机会的方法。

Jeff Weinstein: Speed is an important one, which is just reducing the time between the moment the customer felt compelled enough to go out of their way to talk about some problem.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：速度是一个重要因素，它只是缩短客户感到有必要不遗余力地谈论某些问题之间的时间。

They're busy, there are snacks to eat, they have families, they have other things to do.

他们很忙，有零食吃，有家人，有其他事情要做。

There's a lot going on in the world, a lot.

世界上发生了很多事情，很多。

Your dumb product, it's amazing that they would spend any of their time discussing it at all.

你这个愚蠢的产品，令人惊讶的是他们竟然会花时间讨论它。

I mean, most of the time if you don't like something, you just move along.

我的意思是，大多数时候，如果你不喜欢某件事，你就会继续前进。

You just apathetically, silently move forward in the world.

你只是冷漠地、默默地在这个世界上前行。

And so the fact that someone took their finite time to succinctly with curiosity, communicate to the world or you about your product, that's a unbelievable gift.

因此，有人带着好奇心，花有限的时间，简洁地向世界或您传达您的产品，这是一份令人难以置信的礼物。

Jeff Weinstein: That should be P-zero alert level intensity.

Jeff Weinstein：这应该是 P-0 警报级别强度。

And so I will leave a meeting, I will change what I'm doing to just get one message back to them.

所以我会离开会议，我会改变我正在做的事情，只给他们回复一条消息。

Even if it's, "Hey, I got this.

即使它是：“嘿，我明白了。

I'm about to go to dinner.

我正要去吃晚饭。

Can I hit you up tomorrow?" They're like, "Oh yeah, thank you.

明天我可以去找你吗？”他们就像，“哦，是的，谢谢你。

Awesome.

太棒了。

I can't even believe you responded." That puts us in the camp of on the right trajectory where they're going to feel that they have a almost secret portal between this big brand of a company and another human who's just actually curious...

我什至不敢相信你竟然做出了回应。”这让我们处于正确的轨道上，他们会觉得他们在这个大品牌的公司和另一个真正好奇的人之间有一个几乎秘密的门户......

Jeff Weinstein: ...

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：...

brand of a company and another human who's just actually curious what's going on, that's night and day.

一家公司的品牌和另一个人，他们只是真正好奇正在发生什么，无论是白天还是黑夜。

And it's also, fun fact, tip, when people are really hot on an issue and it could blow up on social or they're going to start becoming a detractor, we make mistakes, we have SLA breaches, we have errors, you're going to want to get on that stuff fast.

这也是一个有趣的事实，提示，当人们对某个问题非常热衷并且它可能会在社交媒体上爆发或者他们将开始成为批评者时，我们会犯错误，我们会违反 SLA，我们会出现错误，您会想要快速解决这些问题。

And in those situations, my bar for how we will respond to those folks is not to just solve the problem, but it is to turn them into a promoter, and most of the time we're able to, even if there was a pretty relevant issue.

在这种情况下，我对如何回应这些人的标准不仅仅是解决问题，而是将他们变成推动者，而且大多数时候我们能够做到，即使存在非常相关的问题。

Jeff Weinstein: I remember one time at Atlas, we had this bug in which for a handful of our legal docs, they were handing out let's say, 25 shares rather than 25% of the shares.

Jeff Weinstein：我记得有一次在 Atlas，我们遇到了一个错误，其中我们的一些法律文件，他们分发了 25 股，而不是 25% 的股份。

We dropped the percentage sign, and thankfully a founder noticed this in the docs and tweeted about it.

我们放弃了百分号，值得庆幸的是，一位创始人在文档中注意到了这一点，并发布了相关推文。

My heart paused and I was like, "Oh no, this could be a really serious issue." And we were able to fix it and regenerate the documents relatively quickly for everyone that was impacted.

我的心停了下来，我想，“哦，不，这可能是一个非常严重的问题。”我们能够修复它并相对快速地为每个受影响的人重新生成文档。

And I was thinking to myself, "Wow, we really let this person down.

我心里想：“哇，我们真的让这个人失望了。

We have one job to do, which is to get their company right and we didn't."

我们有一项工作要做，那就是让他们的公司走上正轨，但我们没有。”

Jeff Weinstein: And that person was incredibly gracious about the situation and said, "Anytime you want me to just read your docs, I'd be happy to.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：那个人对这种情况非常仁慈，他说：“任何时候你想让我读你的文档，我都很乐意。

I have a law degree.

我拥有法律学位。

I care about this topic.

我很关心这个话题。

I want to brainstorm with you about ways that Atlas could do more document creations." I was like, "Wow, I can't believe I was in this sort of defense position, and now we've gained a friend in the world who can be eyes and ears and brainstorm with us." And the team maintains a really close relationship with that person as they do with many, many founders who use Atlas.

我想与您集思广益，讨论 Atlas 可以如何创建更多文档。”我当时想，“哇，我不敢相信我处于这种防御地位，现在我们在世界上有了一位朋友，他可以成为我们的眼睛和耳朵，并与我们进行头脑风暴。”团队与该人保持着非常密切的关系，就像他们与许多使用 Atlas 的创始人保持着非常密切的关系一样。

Jeff Weinstein: And so, just again, we're so quick to put the outside world in this other camp where we need to touch it with kid gloves and treat it as a big blob and a cohort and a statistic, when it is a human with a problem who likes snacks, who is busy, and it's fun to do and it turns out to be an incredibly easy, fast way to figure out what to build.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以，再说一次，我们很快就把外部世界放在另一个阵营中，我们需要小心翼翼地对待它，把它当作一个大斑点、一个队列和一个统计数据，当它是一个有问题的人，喜欢零食，很忙，做起来很有趣，而且事实证明这是一种非常简单、快速的方法来弄清楚要构建什么。

Lenny Rachitsky: There's a bunch of stuff I want to follow up here.

Lenny Rachitsky：我想跟进很多事情。

One is, people may be hearing this and like, "Oh my God, I'd be overwhelmed with feedback and people to fix problems for and bugs and texting of people." They're just like, "There's so many people that potentially I'd have to be interacting with." How do you try to narrow that down?

一是，人们可能会听到这样的话，“天哪，我会被反馈、解决问题、错误和短信的人淹没。”他们就像是，“我可能必须与很多人互动。”你如何尝试缩小范围？

I know Atlas is a very highly adopted product.

我知道 Atlas 是一款非常受欢迎的产品。

There's a ton of people, there's probably bugs, often people sending you feedback.

有很多人，可能存在错误，经常有人向您发送反馈。

How do you pick the people to zero in on?

你如何挑选要归零的人？

Jeff Weinstein: I think there are two parts to this.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我认为这有两个部分。

One, what a problem to have.

一，有什么问题。

Of all the problems in the world, "I'm overwhelmed by customer interest," is on the top list of problems I want to have.

在世界上所有的问题中，“我对客户的兴趣感到不知所措”是我最想解决的问题之一。

I think most entrepreneurs would purchase that problem as a state.

我认为大多数企业家都会将这个问题作为一个国家来解决。

And so, if you're in it, I think, take a deep breath and look at the sunrise or sunset and just enjoy the fact that you've built something that is meaningful enough that people would spend their time.

所以，如果你身处其中，我想，深吸一口气，看看日出或日落，享受你所建造的东西足够有意义，人们会花时间的事实。

Again, there are amazing snacks that they could be spending the time on otherwise, so that's a huge deal.

再说一次，他们可以把时间花在其他令人惊叹的零食上，所以这是一件大事。

And then two, you need the art.

第二，你需要艺术。

There's an art and science to picking where to go deep.

选择深入的地方是一门艺术和科学。

I will happily respond to folks with, "I really appreciate that.

我会很高兴地回应人们：“我真的很感激。

Do you mind sending me a screenshot or a video?" And some of them don't.

你介意给我发一个截图或者视频吗？”而有些则不然。

Okay, that's fine.

好吧，没关系。

Jeff Weinstein: You kind of get a sense of quickly looking at how they wrote about it or just pattern matching how detailed they were, or how much they seem that they want to engage and kind of balance it that way.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你可以快速查看他们如何写这件事，或者只是模式匹配他们的详细程度，或者他们看起来有多么想要参与并以这种方式平衡它。

Otherwise, you can tell folks, "This is really awesome.

否则，你可以告诉人们，“这真的太棒了。

Do you mind sending me an email with three to five bullet points about the details of how you got to this issue?" And that's not a 30-minute meeting.

您介意向我发送一封电子邮件，其中包含三到五个要点，详细说明您如何解决此问题的详细信息吗？”这不是一个 30 分钟的会议。

You don't need to blow up your whole life to get on the phone with them.

你不需要为了和他们通电话而耗尽你的一生。

It's not a huge homework assignment to them, but it's enough structure that it will self-select those who want to go deep, and then from there, you really do owe it to them to follow up if they're going to be that detailed.

对他们来说，这并不是一项巨大的家庭作业，但它的结构足够了，它会自行选择那些想要深入研究的人，然后从那里开始，如果他们要那么详细，你真的应该跟进他们。

And at that point, you really have made a product friend for life and you'll kind of continuously go back to them.

到那时，你就真正成为了终生的产品朋友，并且你会不断地回到他们身边。

So you have to kind of tune it.

所以你必须对其进行调整。

Jeff Weinstein: I also will bound some of these efforts, so I'll just completely make up one day a program.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我也会限制其中一些努力，所以有一天我会完全编写一个程序。

So, "Hi, Stripe's doing a bug-finder program." I made that up as I was driving to work one morning, tweeted it, was curious if anyone would send anything.

所以，“嗨，Stripe 正在开发一个错误查找程序。”一天早上我开车去上班时编造了这个，发了推文，很好奇是否有人会发送任何东西。

"We'll be taking videos for the next three days to go super deep." And people are like, "Oh my goodness, I would love to be part of the Stripe bug-finder program.

“我们将在接下来的三天内拍摄视频，以进行超深入的研究。”人们会说，“天哪，我很想成为 Stripe 错误发现程序的一部分。

May I apply?" I'm like, "Oh, it's very selective.

我可以申请吗？”我想，“哦，这是非常有选择性的。

But yes, of course for you." It's just giving people permission through a program, even if it is deeply arbitrary, I find helps with bounding it, and then later I can follow up with the world, "Hey, we ran our first program, we got 65 videos," which we did.

但是，是的，当然是为了你。”它只是通过一个程序给予人们许可，即使它是非常任意的，我发现可以帮助限制它，然后我可以跟进世界，“嘿，我们运行了我们的第一个程序，我们得到了 65 个视频，”我们做到了。

"We found dozens of issues," which we did.

“我们发现了数十个问题”，我们确实做到了。

It was an incredibly valuable use of our time and it really came from just a single tweet.

这是对我们时间的一次极其宝贵的利用，而且它实际上只来自一条推文。

Lenny Rachitsky: Something I saw you mention somewhere is that you only pay attention to feedback from people that are paying customers and ignore everything else.

Lenny Rachitsky：我看到你在某处提到过，你只关注付费客户的反馈，而忽略其他一切。

Can you talk about that?

你能谈谈吗？

Jeff Weinstein: People who build things for people tend to be empathetic and interested and curious folks who have friends, and then those friends want to use your stuff because they know you and they like you and they'll have good feedback.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：为人们创造东西的人往往是有同理心、感兴趣和好奇的人，他们有朋友，然后这些朋友想要使用你的东西，因为他们了解你并且喜欢你，他们会得到很好的反馈。

But you need to figure out, is that actually your customer, or is that your friend trying it?

但你需要弄清楚，这实际上是你的客户，还是你的朋友在尝试？

Who is actually your target customer exactly?

谁实际上是您的目标客户？

Not a company or a segment, not digital natives that are X big.

不是一家公司或一个细分市场，也不是 X 大的数字原住民。

I'm talking about Sarah in this department, who has these tabs open and just faced this problem and needs to solve it by 4:00 PM.

我说的是这个部门的 Sarah，她打开了这些选项卡，刚刚遇到了这个问题，需要在下午 4:00 之前解决它。

That level of specificity.

那种程度的特异性。

If that's your customer, and I'm talking mostly about B2B, which is where I spend a lot of my time as the social network, B2C stuff I have less intuition on, they're very willing to exchange money for solving their problems, incredibly so.

如果那是你的客户，我主要谈论的是 B2B，这是我作为社交网络花费大量时间的地方，我对 B2C 的东西缺乏直觉，他们非常愿意用金钱来解决他们的问题，令人难以置信。

Oftentimes, if you listen with enough silence, they might even say, "I'll pay you money to solve, blah." If you sit there long enough in silence.

通常，如果你足够安静地倾听，他们甚至可能会说，“我会付钱给你解决问题，等等。”如果你静静地坐在那里足够长的时间。

Jeff Weinstein: And so, you could listen to your friendly friend who you got to play with your beta version and they'll say they liked it and they will click around.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以，你可以听听你的友好朋友的意见，他们会说他们喜欢它并且会点击。

But that is extremely different from Sarah, who has the actual problem and is willing to pay.

但这与莎拉截然不同，莎拉有实际问题并且愿意付出代价。

And it is so tempting to go down the first path with the friend group that I sort of needed a rule, which was like, "Okay, rather than..." I was like, "Well, don't pay attention to that quite as much.

与朋友团体一起走第一条路是如此诱人，以至于我需要一条规则，就像，“好吧，而不是……”我当时想，“好吧，不要太关注这一点。

Really pay attention to, who is your target customer and are you in a fast iteration cycle for them and are they telling their friends?"

真正关注谁是你的目标客户，你是否处于他们的快速迭代周期中，他们是否告诉他们的朋友？”

Jeff Weinstein: But that wasn't enough, because people are so drawn, myself included, drawn to the friendliness that I just set a rule, which is, "We discount all of that feedback from our friends to zero." That is not of interest to us.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：但这还不够，因为人们，包括我自己，都被友善所吸引，我刚刚制定了一条规则，即“我们将朋友的所有反馈打折为零”。我们对此不感兴趣。

We don't even write it down.

我们甚至不把它写下来。

It's just not part of what we're talking about at all.

这根本不是我们正在讨论的内容的一部分。

We are only interested in Sarah, our target customer, and can we get her to solve whatever the problem is as quickly as possible, as jangly as possible and go from there?

我们只对我们的目标客户莎拉感兴趣，我们能否让她尽快、尽可能快速地解决问题并从那里开始？

Jeff Weinstein: And then the paying part is a forcing function because again, even with Sarah, because you're paying attention to her and solving her problem a bit, she'll say, "Of course, oh, this is great.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：然后付费部分是一种强迫功能，因为即使是莎拉，因为你关注她并解决了她的问题，她会说，“当然，哦，这太棒了。

I want feature X, Y and Z.

我想要特征 X、Y 和 Z。

Can it do one, two, and three?" Naturally, she would say that.

能做到一、二、三吗？”她自然会这么说。

But if you said, "And by the way, this thing is $10,000.

但如果你说：“顺便说一句，这个东西价值 10,000 美元。

We'll happily refund your money 100% the second you don't like it," she might say, "Whoa, whoa, wait a second.

一旦您不喜欢，我们很乐意 100% 退款，”她可能会说，“哇，哇，等一下。

Yeah, I like this thing, but not $10, 000.

是的，我喜欢这个东西，但不是 10, 000 美元。

For $10,000, it would need to solve X." And you're like, "Oh, there it is." That was actually what the thing that was of value, and we were all kind of dancing around this.

对于 10,000 美元，它需要解决 X。”你会说，“哦，就在那里。”这实际上才是有价值的东西，我们都围绕着它跳舞。

It's useful, we're on the right track, and because I've fallen down that path myself so many times, I just set a rule.

这很有用，我们走在正确的轨道上，而且因为我自己已经多次跌倒在这条路上，所以我只是制定了一条规则。

Lenny Rachitsky: This is great.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这太棒了。

I was actually going to ask.

我其实正想问。

This technique of using silence, to help people actually practice it, you just shared this quote of, "For you to pay $10,000 it would've to do X." That's a really cool line to use.

这种使用沉默的技巧，为了帮助人们实际练习它，你刚刚分享了这句话，“如果你支付 10,000 美元，它就必须做 X。”这是一条非常酷的线路。

Is there any other advice there of just how to practice this idea of creating silence to help a potential customer share what they actually need?

对于如何实践这种创造沉默的想法来帮助潜在客户分享他们真正需要的东西，还有其他建议吗？

Jeff Weinstein: I encourage people to take an improv training class or two, just to get people out of their skin a bit.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我鼓励人们参加一两门即兴培训课程，只是为了让人们摆脱困境。

By the way, this advice applies to big companies also, not just small ones.

顺便说一句，这个建议也适用于大公司，而不仅仅是小公司。

And we have issues, and I hear other larger companies have issues where a big company will say, "Hey, we're an enterprise and we're going to pay you this big contract.

我们有问题，我听说其他大公司也有问题，大公司会说，“嘿，我们是一家企业，我们将向你支付这份大合同。

All you need to do is build features one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and go through security steps, A, B, C, D, E, F, G." And this siren song of the big three-year contract of your first enterprise buyer, even when you're already big, you can go from Fortune 1000 to Fortune 500 to Fortune 10 to Fortune 1.

您需要做的就是构建功能一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九，并执行安全步骤 A、B、C、D、E、F、G。”而你的第一个企业买家的三年大合同的诱惑之歌，即使你已经很大了，你也可以从财富 1000 强到财富 500 强，再到财富 10 强，再到财富 1 强。

There's always more.

总是有更多。

There are so many stories of the rug being pulled in the middle and they never actually use it and the contract never lands.

有很多关于地毯被拉到中间的故事，但他们从未真正使用它，合同也从未落地。

Jeff Weinstein: Same in partnerships.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：合作伙伴关系也是如此。

And so, I would say the same thing, which is, "If we're super serious about this, send us $1 million.

所以，我会说同样的话，那就是，“如果我们非常认真地对待这件事，请给我们寄 100 万美元。

Wire us $1 million.

电汇 100 万美元。

We'll happily wire it back anytime you need it, but let's actually put some stake in the ground about the value." And I find that in the cases in which they're like, "Whoa, wait a second, no, absolutely not.

我们很乐意在您需要时将其回电，但让我们实际上就其价值埋下一些赌注。”我发现，在某些情况下，他们会说：“哇，等一下，不，绝对不是。

We can't commit here." That's really a good signal because you're about to spend a huge amount of time building something that might not ever be used, and that's the majority case I hear.

我们不能在这里做出承诺。”这确实是一个很好的信号，因为您将花费大量时间来构建可能永远不会使用的东西，这是我听到的大多数情况。

Or you might get the opposite, which is, "Sounds great.

或者你可能会得到相反的结果，即“听起来不错。

Let's make sure our teams are trained on it faster.

让我们确保我们的团队更快地接受这方面的培训。

How can we get you to our office to explain it?

我们怎样才能让您到我们办公室解释一下？

We need it to really work with this system we haven't talked about yet.

我们需要它真正与我们尚未讨论过的系统一起工作。

And now that we're paying, we want it even faster."

现在我们已经付款了，我们希望速度更快。”

Jeff Weinstein: And so, I find that it puts a fork in the road towards faster success or avoiding the non-success case.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以，我发现它为更快的成功或避免不成功的情况设置了岔路。

And even at Stripe scale, I've heard our founders somewhat push this methodology on us, where one from the outside might think, "Well, it's a 8,000 person company.

即使在 Stripe 规模上，我也听说我们的创始人在某种程度上将这种方法强加给我们，外部人士可能会想：“嗯，这是一家拥有 8,000 名员工的公司。

Surely they have just regular ways of building things for larger customers, and we too need these style of commitments if we're going to go off roadmap."

当然，他们有为大客户构建产品的常规方法，如果我们要偏离路线图，我们也需要这些类型的承诺。”

Lenny Rachitsky: So a big lesson you're sharing here is essentially, make sure people are ready to pay for something that they're asking for.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以你在这里分享的一个重要教训本质上是，确保人们准备好为他们所要求的东西付费。

That is the ultimate sign that they-

这是他们的最终标志——

Jeff Weinstein: And by the way, ready to pay is different than paying.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：顺便说一句，准备付款与付款不同。

Significantly different, significantly different.

显着不同，显着不同。

I've also thought of, "Well, as long as they're ready to pay and they said they would pay and they look at the contract, we should feel good." That is not the same as paying.

我也想过，“好吧，只要他们准备好付款并且他们说会付款并且他们会查看合同，我们应该感觉良好。”这和付钱不一样。

Paying is an independent group of people saying, "My problem is burning enough that I'm willing to exchange something I have that has value for the promise of what you're going to do." And now it's a real commitment.

付费是一群独立的人说：“我的问题已经足够严重，我愿意用我所拥有的东西来交换你将要做的事情的承诺。”现在这是一个真正的承诺。

That is extremely different than ready to.

这与准备好的情况截然不同。

So I will often be on the phone or video, whatever with a founder and I will have them practice charging me.

所以我会经常通过电话或视频，无论是与创始人，还是让他们练习向我收费。

I'll just say, "Hey, I'm just a friend.

我只会说：“嘿，我只是一个朋友。

I'm trying to help you out.

我正在尽力帮助你。

It's a little bit self-serving because I work at Stripe and I want to get feedback on our products."

这有点自私，因为我在 Stripe 工作，我想获得有关我们产品的反馈。”

Jeff Weinstein: I'll say, "Feel free to sign up for any invoicing or payment service.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我会说，“请随意注册任何发票或付款服务。

I don't really care which one.

我真的不在乎哪一个。

You're welcome to choose Stripe if it's easy enough for you, I'd love to hear your two cents, and send me an invoice or a payment link for $1 right now, right now.

如果您觉得 Stripe 足够简单，欢迎您选择 Stripe，我很想听听您的两分钱，并立即向我发送 1 美元的发票或付款链接。

That way, when it comes time to actually charge your first customer, it won't be your first time.

这样，当您真正向第一个客户收费时，这将不是您的第一次。

It won't feel weird.

不会感觉奇怪。

You'll have already done this, you already have a dollar in your account, you already have your logo on the top right of the invoice.

您已经完成了此操作，您的帐户中已经有一美元，您的徽标已经出现在发票的右上角。

It'll feel great." And I probably could go through my email inbox and just see $1 receipts to random people because I'm just so convinced that the difference between paying and willing, ready, I thought they would pay is night and day different.

感觉棒极了。”我可能会浏览我的电子邮件收件箱，随机看到一些人收到的 1 美元收据，因为我非常确信付费和愿意付费之间的区别，准备好，我认为他们会付费是白天和黑夜的不同。

Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah, there's this term, willingness to pay that I feel like it should change, as you're saying, to just cross that willingness to even just-

Lenny Rachitsky：是的，有一个术语，支付意愿，我觉得它应该改变，正如你所说，只是跨越这种意愿，甚至只是 -

Jeff Weinstein: Yeah.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：是的。

And we can refund the money.

我们可以退钱。

There's no issue at all.

完全没有问题。

Just other tricks on how to get people going is, ask them about their regular life as a human, "What did you do yesterday?" And they'll be like, "Oh, at work?" I'm like, "Or not.

如何让人们继续前进的其他技巧是，询问他们作为人类的日常生活，“你昨天做了什么？”他们会说，“哦，在工作吗？”我想，“或者不是。

Whatever." And people, they'll start to spill, they'll just start to spill and eventually they'll get to their biggest problem pretty quickly.

不管怎样。”而人们，他们会开始泄漏，他们只会开始泄漏，最终他们很快就会遇到最大的问题。

Lenny Rachitsky: Let's talk about metrics, going in a different direction.

Lenny Rachitsky：让我们从不同的方向来谈谈指标。

Many people told me I need to ask you about picking metrics and the importance of metrics and how you think about metrics.

许多人告诉我，我需要询问您有关选择指标的问题以及指标的重要性以及您如何看待指标。

So let me just maybe start with a question of, just why do you think picking the right metric and why are metrics so important in building successful products?

因此，让我从一个问题开始，您认为为什么选择正确的指标以及为什么指标对于构建成功的产品如此重要？

Jeff Weinstein: I somewhat walk around with the belief that the product manager's responsibility is to produce product market fit.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我在某种程度上相信产品经理的责任是生产适合市场的产品。

And okay, how do you know you have product market fit?

好吧，你怎么知道你的产品适合市场呢？

Charts that showcase things are going up into the right on one hand, and then tweets on the other.

展示事物的图表一方面上升到右侧，然后另一方面上升到推文。

So metrics like quantitative and qualitative, and I really see them as deep siblings and equals, you really need both.

因此，定量和定性等指标，我确实将它们视为深厚的兄弟姐妹和平等者，你确实需要两者。

It's not oh, OKRs versus something.

这不是 OKR 与其他什么东西的对抗。

There are some things you want the texture of the person on video showing how complicated a thing was.

有些事情你希望视频中人物的纹理显示出事情的复杂程度。

And then also, we're trying to make an economically viable system that we can run at large scale and you can't keep all that stuff in your head and need to measure it.

此外，我们正在尝试建立一个经济上可行的系统，我们可以大规模运行，但你不能把所有这些东西都记在脑子里，需要对其进行测量。

And so, I think metrics at their best are a numerical representation of the value we're providing for the customer.

因此，我认为最好的指标是我们为客户提供的价值的数字表示。

Jeff Weinstein: One could measure anything.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：人们可以衡量任何事物。

You can just start counting events and log lines.

您可以开始计算事件和日志行。

We've made it incredibly cheap to count stuff.

我们已经让计数变得极其便宜。

And so, now we have this big privilege of choosing what to measure.

因此，现在我们拥有选择测量内容的巨大特权。

And I really just try to map it all the way back to, "Well, what was actually the value that we're trying to produce for the customer and can we measure it from their perspective?" Whereas I think it's natural, both because when you work inside of a company, you're just thinking internally, but also the way that the metrics are collected inside your application to be more internal-oriented.

我真的只是尝试将其一直映射到“好吧，我们实际上试图为客户创造的价值是什么？我们可以从他们的角度来衡量它吗？”然而我认为这是很自然的，不仅因为当您在公司内部工作时，您只是在内部思考，而且还因为在应用程序内部收集指标的方式更加面向内部。

How many people logged in?

有多少人登录？

Okay, that's a fine measure, but how many people accomplished what they were trying to do after they logged in, is not just necessarily sitting there as a single event in your database.

好的，这是一个很好的衡量标准，但是有多少人在登录后完成了他们想要做的事情，并不一定只是作为数据库中的单个事件存在。

You have to think about it a bit.

你必须考虑一下。

Another reason why I spend a lot of time crafting a small number of these metrics is, they force trade-offs and decisions.

我花费大量时间制定少量这些指标的另一个原因是，它们迫使人们进行权衡和决策。

Jeff Weinstein: So we could all sit around all day and say, "Hey, I heard all these customer problems, we should build X, Y, and Z." And another person could absolutely reasonably say, "Well, I heard from these customers, we should build one, two and three." And they're all true.

Jeff Weinstein：所以我们可以整天坐着说：“嘿，我听到了所有这些客户问题，我们应该构建 X、Y 和 Z。”另一个人绝对可以合理地说：“好吧，我从这些客户那里听说，我们应该建造一个、两个和三个。”它们都是真的。

We could have a lot of success in both, but the majority case is that we don't build either and we sit around and argue and bicker and we go slowly.

我们可以在这两方面都取得很大的成功，但大多数情况是我们都不建造任何一个，我们只是坐在一起争论和争吵，而且进展缓慢。

"What are we going to do to naturally, organically every day, orient a larger group of people in the right direction and see if our tactics are generating progress over time for a customer from their perspective?" And metrics on the left and a series of tweets on the right is a pretty great combo.

“我们每天要做什么，才能自然、有机地引导更多的人朝着正确的方向前进，并看看我们的策略是否会随着时间的推移从客户的角度为他们带来进步？”左边的指标和右边的一系列推文是一个非常好的组合。

Jeff Weinstein: Here's an example.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这是一个例子。

A couple years ago I had been working in our payments group at Stripe for a bit, and then I started working on some of our banking and incorporation services.

几年前，我在 Stripe 的支付团队工作了一段时间，然后开始从事我们的一些银行和公司服务。

In Atlas, when I started working on it, it had had some success.

在 Atlas 中，当我开始研究它时，它已经取得了一些成功。

It had already existed for four or five years prior to me spending time on it.

在我花时间研究它之前，它已经存在了四五年了。

But when I started to look at the support tickets, people were pretty unhappy frequently.

但当我开始查看支持票时，人们经常表现得很不高兴。

They had a DocuSign stuck in their email box.

他们的电子邮箱里藏着一个 DocuSign。

They needed a co-founder's address, but they didn't know their co-founder's address.

他们需要联合创始人的地址，但他们不知道联合创始人的地址。

They couldn't log into the dashboard to figure out their 83(b) manual filing instructions.

他们无法登录仪表板来了解 83(b) 手动归档说明。

And we saw this basically in the first week of spending time on Atlas.

我们基本上在使用 Atlas 的第一周就看到了这一点。

I was just like, "Just show me all the support tickets.

我当时想，“只要给我看所有的支持票就可以了。

Are they happy support tickets?

他们对支持票满意吗？

People writing in being like, 'Oh, I love this service, it's absolutely fantastic.

人们写道，‘哦，我喜欢这项服务，这真是太棒了。

Can you just do A, B, C more for me?' Or are they sad support tickets?" And they're like, "Oh my God, they're all sad support tickets."

你能为我多做 A、B、C 吗？或者他们是悲伤的支持票？”他们就像，“天哪，他们都是悲伤的支持票。”

Jeff Weinstein: And so, we're just asking ourselves, "Well, why would someone recommend Atlas to a friend?" I was like, "Well, it would have to accomplish A, B and C activities for them.

Jeff Weinstein：所以，我们只是问自己，“那么，为什么有人会向朋友推荐 Atlas？”我当时想，“好吧，它必须为他们完成 A、B 和 C 活动。

It would have to get their company, it would have to handle getting their tax ID from the IRS.

它必须让他们的公司，它必须处理从国税局获取他们的税号。

It'd have to handle all the downstream administrivia." But surely, if they had a bunch of support tickets at the end, they're not going to go tell their friends to use this thing.

它必须处理所有下游管理事务。”但是可以肯定的是，如果他们最后有一堆支持票，他们不会去告诉他们的朋友使用这个东西。

We could measure all of the intermediate parts, we could measure the success rate and the frequency of incorporation services and we do all those things, but if you looked at the support tickets, there's just no way if you had a support ticket, you would recommend it to a friend.

我们可以衡量所有中间部分，我们可以衡量注册服务的成功率和频率，我们会做所有这些事情，但是如果您查看支持票证，那么如果您有支持票证，您就不可能将其推荐给朋友。

And so, we suggested this metric to ourselves, companies that have no support tickets through the incorporation service.

因此，我们向自己（那些没有通过公司注册服务获得支持票的公司）建议了这个指标。

Jeff Weinstein: The whole process, from the moment you start the application open, actually the first page load at the very beginning, all the way through the process waiting for the government, waiting for the IRS, and we give you two more weeks to write into support.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：整个过程，从你开始打开申请的那一刻起，实际上是一开始加载第一页，一直到等待政府、等待国税局的整个过程，我们再给你两周的时间来写信支持。

We give an extra buffer two weeks.

我们给予额外两周的缓冲时间。

And if you get through that whole thing with no support tickets, that's a yes.

如果您在没有支持票的情况下完成了整个过程，那就是了。

If you have any number of support tickets, that's a no. And we just looked at the percentage of founders that were going through the service with zero support tickets, which is very different than looking at an average, right?

如果您有任意数量的支持票，那就是“不”。我们只是查看了以零支持票通过服务的创始人的百分比，这与查看平均值有很大不同，对吗？

You could have the average as 0.3, but that doesn't necessarily mean that they're getting to 0.2 is going to cause them to tell their friends more.

您可以将平均值设为 0.3，但这并不一定意味着达到 0.2 后他们就会向朋友透露更多信息。

And we looked, and only 15% of founders were getting through Atlas with zero support tickets through that metric.

我们发现，只有 15% 的创始人通过 Atlas 获得了零支持票。

Jeff Weinstein: And I just thought, "Okay, well let's just drive that number way up, and let's look at the support tickets aside what people are needing and we'll bake it into the product, and presumably it'll fix it.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我只是想，“好吧，让我们把这个数字推高，让我们看看支持票，除了人们需要什么，我们会把它融入到产品中，想必它会解决这个问题。

People will like that more and then tell their friends." And over about 18 months, we took that number from 15% to 85.

人们会更喜欢这个，然后告诉他们的朋友。”在大约 18 个月的时间里，我们把这个数字从 15% 提高到了 85%。

We basically just flipped it.

我们基本上只是翻转了它。

And you can look at the market share plotted on the same timeframe and it's the same shape.

您可以查看在同一时间范围内绘制的市场份额，它的形状相同。

And I think you have to find a measure by which it speaks directly to what the customer wanted, and that if you accidentally leaked your dashboard to them, your customer would be ecstatic to learn that that's what you were measuring the whole time.

我认为你必须找到一种衡量标准，直接表达客户的需求，如果你不小心将仪表板泄露给他们，你的客户会欣喜若狂地得知这就是你一直在衡量的东西。

If we were to showcase the internal Atlas metrics, which we often just screenshot and publish, I think they'd be pretty happy to hear that we were spending all of our time making sure that none of them had support tickets.

如果我们要展示内部 Atlas 指标（我们通常只是截图并发布），我想他们会很高兴听到我们花费所有时间来确保他们都没有支持票。

Jeff Weinstein: And it was incredibly encouraging and motivating to the engineers on the team because we could just assign them a topic.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这对团队中的工程师来说是令人难以置信的鼓励和激励，因为我们可以为他们分配一个主题。

"Hey, look at all these support tickets.

“嘿，看看这些支持票。

Why don't you come up with the product spec, the scope, the solution?

为什么不提出产品规格、范围和解决方案？

Oh, want to learn more?

哦，想了解更多吗？

Just reply to the support ticket email, figure out what they need." And so, we kind of turned all of the engineers on the team into PMs to go and one issue at a time, figure out what needed to change and build products for it.

只需回复支持票电子邮件，弄清楚他们需要什么。”因此，我们将团队中的所有工程师都变成了产品经理，一次只处理一个问题，找出需要更改的内容并为其构建产品。

And that's where we pushed forward on 83(b) elections, automating it, sending in the mail for folks.

这就是我们推动 83(b) 选举的地方，将其自动化，为人们发送邮件。

We built our own signing service.

我们建立了自己的签名服务。

Jeff Weinstein: We turned everything into a click.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们把一切都变成了一次点击。

We did just did sort of the obvious things we saw in the tickets, but as the PM, I was able to just sort of, not on autopilot, but really sit back and have content full conversations with engineers who were bringing solutions and ideas for product, rather than one person going through all of the potential ideas, scoping them and assigning them.

我们只是做了一些我们在票证中看到的显而易见的事情，但作为产品经理，我能够不是自动驾驶，而是真正坐下来与为产品带来解决方案和想法的工程师进行内容充分的对话，而不是一个人仔细检查所有潜在的想法，确定它们的范围并分配它们。

And because it was based in what people were saying and wanted, it was very motivating for everyone on the team.

因为它是基于人们的言论和愿望，所以这对团队中的每个人都非常有激励作用。

So somewhat long answer, but figuring out something in which every day we can wake up and look at the same metric and with some confidence know what to do, is so much better than, "Let's figure out what to do each month, and starting from scratch."

答案有点长，但找出一些让我们每天醒来都能看到相同指标并有信心知道该做什么的东西，比“让我们弄清楚每个月要做什么，然后从头开始”要好得多。

Lenny Rachitsky: I think this is amazing and important advice, just the power of a single metric that everyone on the team can understand, rally around and use to prioritize the work they're doing.

Lenny Rachitsky：我认为这是令人惊奇且重要的建议，团队中的每个人都可以理解、团结并使用单一指标的力量来确定他们正在做的工作的优先级。

I've seen exactly the same sort of impact.

我已经看到了完全相同的影响。

Funny enough, Airbnb, one of the teams actually had a metric sort of like this, basically reducing the people contacting Airbnb with support issues.

有趣的是，Airbnb 的一个团队实际上有一个类似这样的指标，基本上减少了因支持问题而联系 Airbnb 的人。

But what ended up happening is, their team started just making it harder to contact support because they're like, "Maybe they don't need to contact support about all these trivial issues, so maybe let's encourage them to figure it out themselves." Is there anything you've learned about to try to avoid these kind of second order effects that are of perverse incentives of a metric?

但最终发生的事情是，他们的团队开始让联系支持人员变得更加困难，因为他们会想，“也许他们不需要就所有这些琐碎的问题联系支持人员，所以也许让我们鼓励他们自己解决这个问题。”您是否学到了一些知识来尝试避免这些因指标的不当激励而产生的二阶效应？

Jeff Weinstein: We look at multiple metrics, but we will optimize around one and you have to use your own judgment to look at some of these countermeasures and pick them.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们会考虑多个指标，但我们会围绕一个指标进行优化，你必须使用自己的判断来查看其中一些对策并选择它们。

We would also, that would sort of be our overarching metric for a year, but then we would pick specific tactical metrics about how we would accomplish it.

我们也会，这将是我们一年的总体指标，但随后我们会选择关于如何实现这一目标的具体战术指标。

So just an example that both is how we solved a problem, but also it's just a style of metric that was useful to us.

举个例子，这既是我们解决问题的方法，也是对我们有用的一种度量方式。

Of course, some of these support tickets included things like, "I'm waiting to hear back from Atlas about, if they're going to approve my application because Stripe is required for very good reasons to evaluate certain business types, or sanctions, lists and the worldwide products." So there is some, should be incredibly quick, but there is a bit of a review process, and of course if you were not hearing back from us, you would be upset because you're trying to make your company immediately, "This is ridiculous.

当然，其中一些支持票包括诸如“我正在等待 Atlas 的回复，他们是否会批准我的申请，因为有充分的理由需要 Stripe 来评估某些业务类型、制裁、名单和全球产品。”所以有一些，应该是非常快的，但是有一些审查过程，当然，如果你没有收到我们的回复，你会感到不安，因为你试图立即让你的公司成立，“这太荒谬了。

Let's get back to us quickly."

让我们尽快回到我们身边。”

Jeff Weinstein: And so, we knew that one of the reasons that people were writing to support was like, "Hey, what's up with my review?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以，我们知道人们写信支持的原因之一是，“嘿，我的评论怎么样？

What's going on?" And we knew that our tactic was just to drive up how quickly we got to a final decision on folks and to reduce the number of overturned rejections, where someone writes back in saying, "Hi, come on, I'm totally just making something reasonable.

发生了什么事？”我们知道我们的策略只是为了加快我们对人们做出最终决定的速度，并减少被推翻的拒绝的数量，有人回信说：“嗨，来吧，我只是在做一些合理的事情。

What's up?

这是怎么回事？

Why did you reject me?" And so, we would pick these overarching single metric, which was the companies with zero support tickets, but then we would have a specific KR that was owned by an engineer, which is the tactic that we're going to do.

你为什么拒绝我？”因此，我们会选择这些总体单一指标，即零支持票的公司，但随后我们会有一个由工程师拥有的特定 KR，这就是我们要做的策略。

And so, we would not allow ourselves the perverse tactics to sort of just casually exist.

因此，我们不会允许自己的不正当策略随意存在。

We would choose which tactics we're going to do and then set a metric for it.

我们会选择要采取的策略，然后为其设置一个指标。

Jeff Weinstein: And the other reason I love this metric is, it's a cohort metric by which you're trying to drive something up into the left.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我喜欢这个指标的另一个原因是，它是一个队列指标，通过它你可以试图将某些东西推向左边。

Sometimes people will get excited about a chart that goes up into the right, it's kind of a meme, "Oh, that's going up to the right." I'm really excited about charts that go up into the left.

有时人们会对向右上方的图表感到兴奋，这是一种模因，“哦，那是向右上方。”我对左侧的图表感到非常兴奋。

So you have to figure out some optimization that you're trying to maximize.

因此，您必须找出一些您想要最大化的优化。

And so, in this particular case of this risk review, we would look at, "Hey, for the cohort of customers that started last month, how quickly did we get them to their final risk review by number of days since they submitted?" And so, you want a chart that looks a lot like, "Here we go, right up to the top." Because you want 100% of your customers to get their final decision as quickly as possible.

因此，在这种风险审查的特殊情况下，我们会考虑，“嘿，对于上个月开始的客户群体，我们多久能让他们按照提交后的天数进行最终风险审查？”因此，您想要一个看起来很像“我们开始，一直到顶部”的图表。因为您希望 100% 的客户尽快做出最终决定。

Jeff Weinstein: Wouldn't you know it, when we looked at the chart, it was doing this.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你不知道吗，当我们查看图表时，它正在这样做。

And so, each month we would just make it a little better, a little better, a little up and to the left, up and to the left, up and to the left.

因此，每个月我们都会让它变得更好一点，更好一点，向左向上一点，向左向上一点，向左向上一点。

And now basically 100-ish percent of people get their risk review within an hour, from a long tail taking a long time.

现在基本上 100% 的人在一小时内就得到了风险评估，因为长尾需要很长时间。

And so, we would constrain the tactic through a metric and then watch it through an optimization function.

因此，我们将通过指标来约束策略，然后通过优化函数来观察它。

And then when we got to a point where we were happy with the target, we could put down the tactic.

然后，当我们对目标感到满意时，我们就可以放弃该策略。

That's another really useful thing about metrics, you can decide when to stop a tactic because you get to some level of success that you're comfortable with and you can always choose to pick it back up later.

这是关于指标的另一个非常有用的事情，您可以决定何时停止某种策略，因为您已经取得了令您满意的成功程度，并且您随时可以选择稍后再恢复。

Lenny Rachitsky: So there's some really cool lessons here of just how to pick a good metric.

Lenny Rachitsky：这里有一些非常酷的课程，教我们如何选择一个好的指标。

Just to kind of maybe summarize what I'm hearing is, you kind of worked backwards from essentially NPS, like, "Why aren't people recommending Atlas?" You found, "Okay, well people that are complaining and having issues with support and running into problems, most likely are going to be detractors, not going to want to recommend Atlas, so let's have those really ambitious goals.

只是为了总结一下我所听到的，你有点从 NPS 本质上倒退了，比如，“为什么人们不推荐 Atlas？”您发现，“好吧，好吧，那些抱怨、遇到支持问题并遇到问题的人，很可能会成为批评者，不会想要推荐 Atlas，所以让我们制定那些真正雄心勃勃的目标。

Eventually nobody has a support ticket/let's just track how many people have zero issues." And then you identify, "Okay, what's driving a lot of these support tickets?

最终没有人有支持票/让我们跟踪有多少人遇到零问题。”然后您确定，“好吧，是什么推动了这么多支持票？

It looks like this risk timeline till they get to this certain milestone, let's make that our goal for the next quarter or whatever, and let's focus there and then make an impact." And then I imagine move on to other levers within this bucket of zero context.

看起来就像这个风险时间表，直到他们达到这个特定的里程碑，让我们把它作为下个季度或其他目标的目标，让我们集中在那里，然后产生影响。”然后我想象在这个零背景下转向其他杠杆。

Jeff Weinstein: You have to pick the right metric for your audience in...

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你必须为你的受众选择正确的指标......

I wouldn't wouldn't fully export that metric to everyone.

我不会不将该指标完全导出给每个人。

That was not a terrible one to export, but in the founders choosing where to get started mindset, again, this isn't just deeply spending time listening to your customers.

这并不是一个糟糕的出口，但在创始人选择从哪里开始的心态中，这不仅仅是花时间倾听客户的意见。

They all ask their friends, "Hey, how did you start your company?" They want to talk to an older sibling of sorts about how it went.

他们都问他们的朋友：“嘿，你是怎么创办你的公司的？”他们想和年长的兄弟姐妹谈谈事情的经过。

And so, we decided that our go-to-market strategy would be to delight our current customers such that they would tell their friends.

因此，我们决定我们的进入市场策略是取悦我们现有的客户，以便他们会告诉他们的朋友。

And other businesses, that's always somewhat useful, but you can also reach people with billboards and Google ads and other types of upsells.

对于其他企业来说，这总是有点用处，但您也可以通过广告牌、Google 广告和其他类型的追加销售来吸引人们。

That's very difficult in the moment that someone is starting a company that's sort of a National Geographic, can you get the picture of the bird at exactly the right time?

当有人创办一家类似于《国家地理》的公司时，这是非常困难的，你能在正确的时间拍到这只鸟的照片吗？

Jeff Weinstein: How are you even supposed to go find people who are about to start companies?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你该如何去寻找即将创办公司的人呢？

Thankfully, they have this practice of just asking their friends.

值得庆幸的是，他们有这种只询问朋友的习惯。

And so, if their friends loved it, they're going to just recommend it.

因此，如果他们的朋友喜欢它，他们就会推荐它。

And that has the metric and the tactic and the go-to-market all lined up, rather than sometimes in cases you might hear someone say, "Well, let's make the product quality better." Well, we all make the product quality better, but why?

而且指标、策略和进入市场都已排列整齐，而不是有时您可能会听到有人说：“好吧，让我们提高产品质量。”好吧，我们都让产品质量变得更好，但是为什么呢？

Why is this actually going to move what our customers want, and the business board?

为什么这实际上会改变我们的客户和业务委员会的需求？

And when you can line them all up, it can be quite beautiful, especially when you can see it month-over-month for a long period of time.

当你把它们全部排列起来时，它会非常漂亮，尤其是当你可以在很长一段时间内逐月看到它时。

One other metric I think that I would export to anybody, is if you are unsure what to measure, we have this, I don't know if we stole it from somebody else or if we came up with internally, whatever, is just users having a bad day, where we will just emit a log line anytime we think that a user bumped into a problem.

我认为我会向任何人导出的另一个指标是，如果您不确定要衡量什么，我们有这个，我不知道我们是否从其他人那里窃取了它，或者我们是否在内部想出了它，无论如何，只是用户度过了糟糕的一天，每当我们认为用户遇到问题时，我们都会发出一条日志行。

Jeff Weinstein: So maybe they hit a 404, or maybe their payout was one day after the ETA, or they had more than 10 payment declines, you can kind of brainstorm again or just listen to customers, what would cause you to personally have a bad day, and then just emit an event when that occurs.

Jeff Weinstein：所以也许他们遇到了 404，或者他们的付款是在预计到达时间后一天，或者他们有超过 10 次付款被拒绝，你可以再次集思广益或只是听客户的意见，什么会导致你个人度过糟糕的一天，然后在发生这种情况时发出一个事件。

And then you could just make a stacked bar chart of all the bad day reasons and the frequency by which they're happening, and it's eye-opening to see those frequencies.

然后你可以制作一个堆积条形图，列出所有糟糕的一天的原因以及它们发生的频率，看到这些频率令人大开眼界。

And it's kind of a metric I hadn't thought about until Stripe's scale, in which you just don't know what's happening until you emit the log line and count it.

在 Stripe 的规模之前，我从未考虑过这是一种指标，在这种规模中，在发出日志行并对其进行计数之前，您根本不知道发生了什么。

The frequencies could be...

频率可能是...

Jeff Weinstein: ...

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：...

emit the log line and count it.

发出日志行并对其进行计数。

The frequencies could be kind of mind-blowing.

这些频率可能会令人兴奋。

And I think for almost any scale business, if you are bored one day and you're not sure what to measure, just make a user having a bad day chart, emit a log line and count it as a bar chart and then anybody else can add their own bar chart on top of it.

我认为对于几乎任何规模的业务，如果有一天你感到无聊并且不确定要衡量什么，只需让用户拥有糟糕的一天图表，发出一条日志线并将其算作条形图，然后其他任何人都可以在其上添加自己的条形图。

And so, it's become a way for teams to scale their understanding of users through metrics by just saying, "Hey, look, anytime anybody has an idea about why a customer is having a bad day, just emit a log line, put it on this chart, and then we can choose over time which bad day reasons we want to burn down and hopefully just eradicate them, not just minimize them.

因此，这已经成为团队通过指标来扩展对用户理解的一种方式，只需说：“嘿，看，任何时候任何人都知道为什么客户今天过得很糟糕，只需发出日志行，将其放在此图表上，然后我们就可以随着时间的推移选择我们想要消除哪些糟糕的原因，并希望将其根除，而不是最小化它们。

Jeff Weinstein: But it gave us kind of a background noise counting system for where there are problems and anytime there's an incident or some customer issue, the first thing I think is, "Ooh, I wonder if we have a bad day reason for this." And if we do, I actually feel okay.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：但它为我们提供了一种背景噪音计数系统，可以在出现问题的地方以及每当发生事件或客户问题时，我首先想到的是，“哦，我想知道我们是否有一个糟糕的一天原因。”如果我们这样做，我真的感觉很好。

I'm like, "Oh yeah, it is a bad day for this customer." I wish I didn't have it, but at least we're aware and we can evaluate it against other bad days that we want to burn down.

我想，“哦，是的，这对这位顾客来说是糟糕的一天。”我希望我没有它，但至少我们知道并且我们可以将它与我们想要烧毁的其他糟糕的日子进行评估。

What does sometimes a little bit grind my gears or gives us an opportunity is like when we didn't know about that bad day.

有时有点磨我的齿轮或给我们一个机会，就像我们不知道那糟糕的一天一样。

And it's a surprise to us too, that is for me is immediate action.

这对我们来说也是一个惊喜，对我来说就是立即采取行动。

It's like, okay, cool.

就像，好吧，很酷。

We have to figure out a way to count this bad day.

我们必须想出一种方法来计算这糟糕的一天。

We got to get it on the chart.

我们必须把它写在图表上。

That way we can make an informed decision about when to invest improving it.

这样我们就可以就何时投资改进它做出明智的决定。

Lenny Rachitsky: And I love this idea.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢这个想法。

I haven't heard this before.

我以前没听说过这个。

So the idea is just make a list of what happens to a potential customer that would cause them to have a bad day.

因此，我们的想法就是列出一个清单，列出潜在客户身上发生的事情，这些事情会导致他们度过糟糕的一天。

What are some examples for Striper Atlas that you guys have?

你们有哪些 Striper Atlas 的例子？

Jeff Weinstein: Are you a Stripe customer, Lenny?

Jeff Weinstein：Lenny，你是 Stripe 的客户吗？

Lenny Rachitsky: I am with my newsletters.

Lenny Rachitsky：我和我的时事通讯在一起。

The payments go through Stripe.

付款通过 Stripe 进行。

I check my dashboard every day.

我每天都会检查我的仪表板。

Jeff Weinstein: Cool.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：酷。

So what would be a bad day for you?

那么，什么日子对你来说会是糟糕的一天呢？

Lenny Rachitsky: Oh, I see some silence happening here.

Lenny Rachitsky：哦，我看到这里有些沉默。

It not loading.

它没有加载。

The numbers taking a long time to show up.

这些数字需要很长时间才能显示。

Something being completely off in there, not being able to log in.

那里完全出问题了，无法登录。

The silence is good.

沉默是好的。

I just want to keep going.

我只想继续前进。

Jeff Weinstein: The question is how much to the audience is how much of the silence will we edit out before it goes live?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：问题是，对于观众来说，我们在节目上线前会剪掉多少沉默内容？

But this is what I'm talking about, right, is I could guess them, right?

但这就是我说的，对吧，我能猜到他们，对吗？

And as you were saying those, I know the URL of those charts.

正如你所说，我知道这些图表的 URL。

I know the login one because I feel that too.

我知道登录那个，因为我也有这种感觉。

So I play with Stripe all the time and then you get a two FA too frequently and come on, I had the same cookie.

所以我一直在玩 Stripe，然后你太频繁地得到两个 FA，来吧，我有同样的 cookie。

I was just here yesterday.

我昨天才来过这里。

So we count all that stuff and try to make it better over time.

因此，我们会计算所有这些内容，并尝试随着时间的推移使其变得更好。

But I'm so excited when someone brings me a new bad day I hadn't thought about yet because that's like product cabinet.

但当有人给我带来了我还没有想到的新的糟糕的一天时，我感到非常兴奋，因为那就像产品柜一样。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love it.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢它。

And your advice here is this doesn't necessarily have to be your goal or metric.

您的建议是，这不一定是您的目标或指标。

It's just watching this thing that could lead to a lot of interesting ways of operating.

只要观察这个东西就可能会产生很多有趣的操作方式。

Jeff Weinstein: A couple other just like quick metrics things because it's a bit of a...

杰夫·韦恩斯坦（Jeff Weinstein）：其他一些就像快速指标一样，因为它有点......

I don't know, some people like cycling or something.

我不知道，有些人喜欢骑自行车什么的。

I guess, I like metrics.

我想，我喜欢指标。

People get a really nice bike.

人们得到了一辆非常好的自行车。

I want a really great metric.

我想要一个非常好的指标。

Picking metric titles that make you feel something.

选择让你有感觉的度量标题。

So we could have called that measure of companies, number of companies that do not send a support ticket over X period and Y period with min...

因此，我们可以将这种公司衡量标准称为在 X 期间和 Y 期间未发送支持请求的公司数量，且最少...

You sometimes see these charts where the metric itself named itself.

有时您会看到这些图表，其中指标本身是自行命名的。

This is just companies with zero support, that's it.

这只是零支持的公司，仅此而已。

And the brevity and the focus and the customer mindset built into the chart name can become currency inside the company.

图表名称中包含的简洁、重点和客户心态可以成为公司内部的货币。

It's like, oh, I'm working on making this chart go up and it feels good to just say the name out loud rather than some complicated underscores and mins and maxes and the database field name is still in the chart title.

就像，哦，我正在努力让这个图表上升，大声说出名字而不是一些复杂的下划线、最小值和最大值感觉很好，而且数据库字段名称仍然在图表标题中。

Jeff Weinstein: These are aesthetic choices, but I think make dramatic differences in the cultural willingness for people to buy in and get excited about it and reduce the need of a product person to just remind everyone every day why they're doing it.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这些都是审美选择，但我认为，人们购买产品并对此感到兴奋的文化意愿存在巨大差异，并减少了产品人员每天提醒每个人为什么这样做的需要。

It's like the metric is motivating us because it's a motivating thing to talk about.

就像这个指标正在激励我们，因为它是一件值得讨论的激励性事情。

And then lastly on metrics is there's just good hygiene that people should bring to their measures.

最后关于指标，人们应该在衡量指标时保持良好的卫生习惯。

Percentages shouldn't have 41 significant digits if only two of the digits are relevant.

如果只有两位数字相关，则百分比不应有 41 位有效数字。

You should keep all the measures of your dashboard on the same X-axis.

您应该将仪表板的所有度量保持在同一 X 轴上。

These are just stylistic things that increase the frequency that people want to just wake up every day and open the dashboard and look at it.

这些只是风格上的东西，增加了人们想要每天醒来并打开仪表板并查看它的频率。

And that is so powerful if your whole team is looking at the same set of information that has the heartbeat of the customer every single day.

如果您的整个团队每天都在查看与客户相关的同一组信息，那么这一点就会非常强大。

Jeff Weinstein: In fact, we can measure at Stripe the usage of our dashboards by team, and so we can see which teams are themselves looking at their own metrics and that is an incredibly useful predictor of how on the same page they are and how customer obsessed they are.

Jeff Weinstein：事实上，我们可以在 Stripe 衡量团队对仪表板的使用情况，这样我们就可以看到哪些团队自己正在查看自己的指标，这是一个非常有用的预测指标，可以预测他们在同一页面上的情况以及他们对客户的痴迷程度。

So I just think it's not an area that's sort of behind the scenes, bean counting reliability is the machine hot.

所以我只是认为这不是一个幕后领域，咖啡豆计数的可靠性才是最热门的。

You can make metrics that mean something to the customer and you would be proud if they were to be screenshot and put on the internet and be like, "Wow, I feel like that company is taking their promise to me seriously.

你可以制定对客户有意义的指标，如果将它们截图并放在互联网上，你会感到自豪，“哇，我觉得那家公司正在认真对待他们对我的承诺。

And I can see myself on those metrics as a customer." That's where we're really shooting for.

作为客户，我可以根据这些指标来看待自己。”这就是我们真正的目标。

Lenny Rachitsky: So back what you just said there, which I think is a subtle point potentially, is just making the dashboard look nice, like the hygiene of the naming conventions and the decimal points and the chart.

Lenny Rachitsky：所以回到你刚才所说的，我认为这可能是一个微妙的点，只是让仪表板看起来不错，就像命名约定、小数点和图表的卫生一样。

In your experience, you find that really powerful and important.

根据您的经验，您会发现这确实强大且重要。

Jeff Weinstein: A couple of years ago, Stripe did internal work to make an internal metrics kind of dashboard system.

Jeff Weinstein：几年前，Stripe 进行了内部工作，制作了一种内部指标仪表板系统。

And we have a special place called Go Metrics.

我们有一个特殊的地方，叫做 Go Metrics。

Many people use a go/service where you can just quickly go to a URL.

许多人使用 go/service，您可以在其中快速访问某个 URL。

And again, I have to sometimes do a rule rather than a policy.

再说一遍，有时我必须制定规则而不是政策。

My rule is if it's not on Go Metrics, I'm not going to look at it.

我的规则是，如果它不在 Go Metrics 上，我就不会看它。

So if people can send me one-off queries or charts or screenshots or presentations or emails of charts and data, but that is in the wind, we can't interrogate the query metrics are almost always wrong.

因此，如果人们可以向我发送一次性查询、图表、屏幕截图、演示文稿或图表和数据的电子邮件，但这是在风中，我们无法询问查询指标几乎总是错误的。

For many weeks, we didn't quite get the definition correctly.

好几个星期以来，我们都没有完全正确地理解这个定义。

You have to live in the metric for quite a while before you really believe in it.

在你真正相信它之前，你必须在这个指标中生活相当长一段时间。

And so, if you're always looking at some one-off version, it's just very difficult for it to rise up to the level of importance that is a thing we should trust to help us decide what to do.

因此，如果你总是关注某个一次性版本，那么它就很难上升到我们应该信任的重要程度，以帮助我们决定要做什么。

That's an incredibly high bar.

这是一个令人难以置信的高标准。

And so, I just find you have to look at it frequently enough.

所以，我发现你必须经常查看它。

Jeff Weinstein: And if you're going to look at it frequently enough, it means it needs to be in a discoverable place.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：如果你要经常查看它，这意味着它需要位于一个容易发现的地方。

You almost go through a couple stages of grief about it because we'll kind of put a metric up in a place and everyone initially is like, "Wow, this is great.

你几乎会经历几个阶段的悲伤，因为我们会在一个地方放置一个指标，每个人最初都会说，“哇，这太棒了。

I was so excited to finally see this." And then a couple of days later, "I don't quite understand it.

我很高兴终于看到这个。”几天后，“我不太明白。

What does it actually mean?

它到底意味着什么？

I saw this other metric from this other angle that kind of makes it feel counterintuitive that it's like this." And then you kind of look into it, "Wait a second, we've been counting it wrong the whole time.

我从另一个角度看到了另一个指标，这让人感觉有点违反直觉。”然后你会调查一下，“等一下，我们一直都算错了。

Oh, no." And then you look at it the third week and it's a completely different version and then you hope that we forget about it and maybe we'll go onto something else and nope, we're not going to forget about it.

哦，不。”然后你在第三周看到它，这是一个完全不同的版本，然后你希望我们忘记它，也许我们会继续做其他事情，不，我们不会忘记它。

Week four comes around, you're like, "Wait a second.

第四周快到了，你会说，“等一下。

Okay, this is..." Then the team meeting starts, "Hey, just a reminder, let's just bring up the metric again, not a screenshot of it.

好吧，这是......”然后团队会议开始，“嘿，只是提醒一下，我们再次提出这个指标，而不是它的屏幕截图。

Go to the URL."

转到网址。”

Jeff Weinstein: And just that level of frequency and specificity and ritual around it is what brings it into the decision-making culture.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：正是围绕它的频率、特异性和仪式水平将其带入了决策文化。

And again, we treat it the exact same as we do tweets.

再说一遍，我们对待它与对待推文完全相同。

It's the quantitative and qualitative right next to each other.

这是紧邻的定量和定性。

And because you're putting that amount of attention to it, you can't have a 1,000 metrics.

因为你投入了大量的注意力，所以你不可能有 1,000 个指标。

We just don't physically have time the day to bring that level of care and understanding to so many things.

我们只是没有时间对很多事情给予如此程度的关心和理解。

So then it forces you to know so many things you could care about down to a small number of things that you really must care about.

因此，它迫使你了解很多你可能关心的事情，甚至是你真正必须关心的一小部分事情。

And again, that practice goes back to do you really understand what your customer wants?

再说一遍，这种做法可以追溯到你真的了解客户想要什么吗？

And so, for all these tactics, it's about finding out what your customer wants and then different versions of how do we sort of know it's true over time and our tactics improving?

因此，对于所有这些策略，都是为了找出客户想要什么，然后我们如何随着时间的推移知道它是真实的以及我们的策略改进的不同版本？

Lenny Rachitsky: It sounds so simple when you describe it that way.

Lenny Rachitsky：当你这样描述时，听起来很简单。

This episode is brought to you by Anvil.

本集由 Anvil 为您带来。

Their document SDK helps product teams build and launch software for documents fast.

他们的文档 SDK 可帮助产品团队快速构建和启动文档软件。

Companies like Carta and Vouch Insurance use Anvil to accelerate the development of their document workflows.

Carta 和 Vouch Insurance 等公司使用 Anvil 来加速文档工作流程的开发。

Getting to market fast is a top priority for product teams.

快速进入市场是产品团队的首要任务。

And the last thing that you or your developers want is to build document workflows from scratch.

您或您的开发人员最不想看到的就是从头开始构建文档工作流程。

It's time-consuming, expensive and distracts from core work.

它既耗时又昂贵，而且会分散核心工作的注意力。

You could stitch together multiple tools and manage those integrations.

您可以将多个工具组合在一起并管理这些集成。

Or you can use an all-in-one document SDK.

或者您可以使用一体化文档 SDK。

Most product managers will tell you paperwork sucks.

大多数产品经理会告诉你文书工作很糟糕。

Anvil's document SDK helps teams get to market fast, incorporate your brand style and give you back time to focus on your company's core differentiated features.

Anvil 的文档 SDK 可帮助团队快速进入市场、融入您的品牌风格，并让您有时间专注于公司的核心差异化功能。

Lenny Rachitsky: For your users, paperwork often starts with an AI powered web form styled and embedded in your application.

Lenny Rachitsky：对于您的用户来说，文书工作通常从人工智能驱动的 Web 表单开始，该表单的样式和嵌入到您的应用程序中。

From there, you can route data to your backend systems and to the correct fields in your PDFs via API.

从那里，您可以将数据路由到后端系统并通过 API 路由到 PDF 中的正确字段。

Complete the process with a white labeled e-signature.

使用白色标签的电子签名完成该过程。

The best part about Anvil is the level of customization their SDK provides.

Anvil 最好的部分是其 SDK 提供的定制级别。

Non-technical folks love Anvil's Dragon Drop Builder and developers love their flexible APIs and easy to understand documentation.

非技术人员喜欢 Anvil 的 Dragon Drop Builder，开发人员喜欢其灵活的 API 和易于理解的文档。

Build documents software fast with Anvil, that's useanvil.com/lenny to learn more or start a free trial.

使用 Anvil 快速构建文档软件，请访问 useanvil.com/lenny 了解更多信息或开始免费试用。

That's useanvil.com/lenny.

那是 useanvil.com/lenny。

Kind along these same lines, there's something that I've learned you started at Stripe to help people obsess with user experience and get quality to where it needs to be and move a lot of these metrics, something called Study Groups.

类似地，我了解到您在 Stripe 开始做一些事情，帮助人们关注用户体验，将质量提高到需要的水平，并移动许多这些指标，称为“研究组”。

Talk about what that is.

谈谈那是什么。

I'm very curious.

我很好奇。

Jeff Weinstein: Okay, let's imagine we understand our customer, we've understand their burning problem.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：好吧，让我们想象一下我们了解我们的客户，我们已经了解他们的紧迫问题。

We've built a solution that's in their hands, they're using, it's hopefully better than their alternatives and they're starting to use it and we have some real traction.

我们已经构建了一个在他们手中、他们正在使用的解决方案，希望它比他们的替代方案更好，他们已经开始使用它，我们有一些真正的吸引力。

You could still measure the success, you could still look at the tweets and then, of course, you go to pick it up yourself and you're like, "Wait a second, this thing is horrible.

你仍然可以衡量成功，你仍然可以查看推文，然后，当然，你自己去拿它，你会说，“等一下，这件事太可怕了。

How did it get so bad?" Anyone who's built a product that has gone over the horizon of it's actually in production and being used for a year or more as you go to iterate on it, especially when you're in a larger company and there's multiple teams and multiple products going on, there's just some entropy in the world that causes these things to go bad.

怎么变得这么糟糕了？”任何人如果构建的产品已经超出了实际生产的范围，并且在迭代它时会使用一年或更长时间，尤其是当你在一家较大的公司并且有多个团队和多个产品正在开发时，世界上只是存在一些熵导致这些事情变坏。

I actually have a hard time naturally explaining it.

我实际上很难自然地解释它。

Jeff Weinstein: You kind of think to yourself, well, it's code.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你会想，好吧，这就是代码。

It just must be running the same every day.

它必须每天都以相同的方式运行。

But somehow you do enough things in a row.

但不知怎的，你连续做了足够多的事情。

And what was once a smooth end-to-end flow for accomplishing a test or a customer is all of a sudden some Byzantine complicated broken mall where all the doors are busted and you have to know exactly the way to get through the dashboard to solve your problem.

曾经用于完成测试或客户的流畅的端到端流程突然变成了拜占庭式复杂的破碎购物中心，所有的门都被打破了，你必须确切地知道如何通过仪表板来解决你的问题。

"Wait a second, I thought this was great just a second ago." And many of us have experienced that.

“等一下，我刚才还觉得这很棒。”我们很多人都有过这样的经历。

Now, okay, what are we going to do about it?

现在，好吧，我们该怎么办呢？

Well, one is it is really difficult to take time during the day to allow yourself to even know that this is true.

嗯，其中一个是，白天花时间让自己知道这是真的，真的很困难。

Because if you're working on one particular team, you're going to have some next thing you're shipping, you're going to have your customers, you're going to be doing great product work.

因为如果你在一个特定的团队工作，你将会有一些你要交付的下一件产品，你将会拥有你的客户，你将会做出出色的产品工作。

Jeff Weinstein: Meanwhile, your current thing kind of starts to rot in the world and decrease all the trust you've earned to build what you're building now.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：与此同时，你现在的东西开始在世界上腐烂，并减少了你为构建现在正在构建的东西而赢得的所有信任。

It is actually difficult to decide, well, what hours during the week am I going to block off from my future progress to see it from the customer's perspective today?

事实上，很难决定，我要在一周中的哪些时间段中保留未来的进度，以便今天从客户的角度来看待它？

And there are various techniques to try to incentivize or to structure a group of people to do that.

有多种技术可以尝试激励或组织一群人来做到这一点。

Stripe has a thing called friction logs as well, which is a single individual will pretend to be a customer and go through a product experience end-to-end and write it down.

Stripe 还有一种叫做摩擦日志的东西，它是一个人假装成客户，端到端地体验产品体验并将其写下来。

And that has been quite successful at Stripe for very motivated people who can block off the time and have the wide enough context to do a complicated thing end-to-end and have the time to write it up and the position the company to send it out as a critique potentially to not just your own team but in a whole organization.

对于那些非常积极主动的人来说，这在 Stripe 是相当成功的，他们可以抽出时间，拥有足够广泛的背景来端到端地完成一件复杂的事情，并有时间把它写下来，并让公司将其作为批评发送给你自己的团队，甚至整个组织。

Jeff Weinstein: So that's actually a pretty high bar to crossover.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以这实际上是一个相当高的跨界门槛。

So I was kind of brainstorming what could we do to make this more fun and have the frequency which we're looking at our own products dramatically increase?

所以我在集思广益，我们可以做些什么来让这变得更有趣，并让我们查看自己产品的频率大幅增加？

And we kind of iterated few through ideas.

我们几乎没有通过想法进行迭代。

And I landed on this thing called Study Group, which is basically a random group of people inside the company.

我找到了一个叫做“学习小组”的组织，它基本上是公司内部随机组成的一群人。

They might not work on any particular team.

他们可能不为任何特定团队工作。

They might not all be PMs, just like literally anyone who wants to sign up, a support person, a sales person, someone who's on our events team, an engineer and our infrastructure stack.

他们可能并不都是产品经理，就像任何想要注册的人一样，包括支持人员、销售人员、我们活动团队的成员、工程师和基础设施堆栈。

Anybody can sign up for a Study Group.

任何人都可以报名参加学习小组。

We show up maybe four to eight people total.

我们总共可能会出现四到八个人。

We pretend to be some company with some outcome problem.

我们假装是一家有一些结果问题的公司。

Maybe we want to accept money in person at an upcoming farmer's market, or we want to run a multi-country global business where we have software that another business would use to run their business.

也许我们想在即将到来的农贸市场上亲自收款，或者我们想经营一家跨国全球企业，我们拥有其他企业可以用来经营其业务的软件。

If it was something quite complicated.

如果这是一件相当复杂的事情。

Jeff Weinstein: We could pick any motivating goal.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们可以选择任何激励目标。

And there are two rules to Study Group rule one is you do no longer work at Stripe.

学习小组有两条规则，第一条是你不再在 Stripe 工作。

You do not work at Stripe, not pretend, don't work at Stripe, not try to forget you do not work at Stripe, you've never worked at Stripe.

你不在 Stripe 工作，不是假装，不在 Stripe 工作，也不是试图忘记你不在 Stripe 工作，你从来没有在 Stripe 工作过。

You work at...

你工作于...

And we make up a name of the company, Dolphin Aquarium Industries, and we will pick a CEO of the company from the group amongst us.

我们给公司取了一个名字，海豚水族馆工业公司，我们将从我们当中挑选一位公司的首席执行官。

And okay, Jenny is the CEO.

好吧，珍妮是首席执行官。

"Hey, Jenny, what do you want to do today?" "Well, I want to sell in-person tickets to the Dolphin Aquarium." It's like, "Cool, where would just start?" So we actually embody the customer.

“嘿，珍妮，你今天想做什么？” “嗯，我想卖海豚水族馆的门票。”就像，“酷，从哪里开始？”所以我们实际上体现了客户。

We will not break character, it's a little bit of the improv thing and as the kind of maestro of Study Group, I will firmly but kindly, if I hear you use any internal Stripe knowledge, which is natural to do, because, well, you worked on a team and you know where that button really is.

我们不会破坏性格，这只是一点即兴的事情，作为学习小组的大师，如果我听到你使用任何内部 Stripe 知识，我会坚定但友善地这样做，这是很自然的，因为，嗯，你在一个团队中工作，你知道那个按钮到底在哪里。

Jeff Weinstein: And the docs link goes a little bit to the wrong place, but if you click the other link, you'll get to it.

Jeff Weinstein：文档链接有点错误，但如果您单击另一个链接，您就会到达它。

If I can see you use any internal Stripe knowledge, I'll just pause and say, "Hey, let's redo the sentence or redo what we did with no Stripe knowledge.

如果我看到你使用任何内部 Stripe 知识，我会停下来说：“嘿，让我们重做这句话，或者重做我们在没有 Stripe 知识的情况下所做的事情。

As a reminder, you don't work at Stripe." And it takes us a couple of times, but people really get into it and all of a sudden we'll start making up characters and the CEO will be like, "Oh, Tim, you're our designer.

提醒一下，你不在 Stripe 工作。”我们花了好几次时间，但人们真的很投入，突然我们就会开始创造角色，首席执行官会说，“哦，蒂姆，你是我们的设计师。

Where are we going to get the color palette?" All of a sudden there's a person who's not a designer in real life is now all of a sudden having to practice the empathy to be in a customer's position.

我们去哪里得到调色板？”突然间，现实生活中一个不是设计师的人突然必须练习同理心才能站在客户的立场上。

And because we're going to be doing it for an hour, hour and a half at a time, you actually start to believe that you don't work at Stripe and you work at Dolphin Aquarium Industries and you start to really feel it.

因为我们一次要做一个小时、一个半小时，所以你实际上开始相信你不在 Stripe 工作，而是在 Dolphin Aquarium Industries 工作，你开始真正感受到这一点。

Jeff Weinstein: So that's rule one.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这是第一条规则。

You don't work at Stripe.

你不在 Stripe 工作。

And rule two is we're not here to solve any problems.

第二条规则是我们来这里不是为了解决任何问题。

We're not here to critique, we're not here to solution or suggest, we're not here to file bugs.

我们不是来批评的，我们不是来解决问题或建议的，我们不是来报告错误的。

All of those things is recorded.

所有这些事情都被记录下来。

We can do that later, whatever.

无论如何，我们可以稍后再做。

This is just about practicing empathy for the customer and going through the product.

这只是练习对客户的同理心并仔细研究产品。

And we have done more than 25 of these at Stripe thus far in just this year, last few months of 2024, more than 250 people have participated in the Study Group.

到目前为止，仅在今年，也就是 2024 年的最后几个月，我们在 Stripe 就已经完成了超过 25 项此类工作，已有超过 250 人参加了该研究小组。

And it is deeply eyeopening for those involved.

这让参与者大开眼界。

The responses are sort of business emotional, not super emotional, but just, "Wow, I can't believe how hard it was to accomplish X, Y and Z.

这些反应有点商业情感，而不是超级情感，而只是，“哇，我不敢相信完成 X、Y 和 Z 是多么困难。

I thought we were amazing at blah." It's like, "Well, we actually are still pretty good, but we need to get back towards amazing" or Wow, "I didn't even know that internally people wouldn't know that our products did 1, 2, and 3."

我觉得我们在废话方面很棒。”就像，“好吧，我们实际上仍然相当不错，但我们需要回到令人惊叹的状态”或者哇，“我什至不知道内部人员不会知道我们的产品做到了 1、2 和 3。”

Jeff Weinstein: And this has become so internally popular that teams have adopted for themselves.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这在内部变得如此流行，以至于团队都为自己采用了。

And so, we've kind of franchised Study Group internally already where different teams will run it.

因此，我们已经在内部建立了特许经营研究小组，由不同的团队来管理。

But I think we're going to continue it because I think a little bit is coming out of the pandemic.

但我认为我们会继续下去，因为我认为疫情已经带来了一些成果。

People just want more group activities.

人们只是想要更多的团体活动。

I think some of it is the slowness by which we do it.

我认为部分原因是我们行动缓慢。

We're not rushing through it.

我们并不急于完成它。

Which another reason I appreciate your podcast as well is let's really get into the details and not be rushed for time.

我也欣赏你的播客的另一个原因是让我们真正深入了解细节，不要着急。

You forget that you have a meeting at the end kind of amount of time.

你忘记了在最后一段时间你还有一个会议。

No one is to blame or defensive because it's not your product at all.

没有人应该责备或防御，因为它根本不是你的产品。

It's a random group of people.

这是一群随机的人。

We don't even introduce ourselves about what team we worked on.

我们甚至不自我介绍我们在哪个团队工作。

We're just all here as participants to embody the customer.

我们只是作为参与者来体现客户。

And then I think lastly, a reason why it's worked, and these are many of these just been actually super surprising to me.

最后我想，这是它起作用的一个原因，其中很多对我来说实际上是非常令人惊讶的。

Jeff Weinstein: I wouldn't have been able to prick ahead of time, is it's just fun.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我不可能提前刺痛，因为这很有趣。

People want to make up the name of the company.

人们想为公司起个名字。

They're excited about what Dolphin Industries would sell.

他们对海豚工业公司将出售的产品感到兴奋。

A person who's not a CTO in real life gets to pretend to be a CTO and there's little theatrics to it, but it has been different enough from our other approaches for a company like Stripe, which is already pretty focused on this topic, that we think that there's enough legs here that we're going to keep it and kind invest in groups pretending to be the customer and going through it painstakingly slowly rather than only demos or only writing, which has other benefits, but misses the participation of a larger group and more fresh eyes.

现实生活中不是 CTO 的人可以假装自己是 CTO，这没什么戏剧性的，但对于像 Stripe 这样的公司来说，这与我们的其他方法有很大不同，Stripe 已经非常关注这个主题，我们认为这里有足够的基础，我们将保留它，并投资于假装成客户的团体，并煞费苦心地慢慢地完成它，而不仅仅是演示或只写，这有其他好处，但错过了参与更大的群体和更多新鲜的目光。

So it's been fun and we named it Study Group.

这很有趣，我们将其命名为“学习小组”。

I guess, I named it Study Group because I wasn't sure it would be initially.

我想，我将其命名为“学习小组”是因为我最初不确定它会是这样。

So I just came up with something that sounded cutesy, but gave me enough leeway that we could kind of adjust it over time.

所以我只是想出了一些听起来很可爱的东西，但给了我足够的余地，我们可以随着时间的推移进行调整。

And this is where we've landed.

这就是我们着陆的地方。

Lenny Rachitsky: It's fascinating that there's so much theatrics and ceremony necessary for a product team and a company to find out these things about their product.

Lenny Rachitsky：令人着迷的是，产品团队和公司需要进行如此多的表演和仪式才能了解有关其产品的这些信息。

You would think people are like, "Oh, we know how onboarding looks.

你可能会认为人们会说，“哦，我们知道入职流程是什么样的。

We know all these things," but basically what you're saying is you don't, and you need to do these sorts of things in order to really know what your product is like these days.

我们知道所有这些事情，”但基本上你所说的是你不知道，你需要做这些事情才能真正了解你的产品现在是什么样的。

Jeff Weinstein: The customer does not live in our walls.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：顾客不住在我们的围墙里。

They aren't.

他们不是。

They're not here.

他们不在这里。

They don't know our lingo.

他们不懂我们的行话。

And it is just so natural for our internal mindset and lingo to flow into the application over time.

随着时间的推移，我们的内部思维方式和行话很自然地流入应用程序中。

And you need some counterbalance to get there.

你需要一些平衡才能到达那里。

And I think it has to be an unnatural counterbalance.

我认为这一定是一种不自然的平衡。

It used to frustrate me actually more like, "Wow, why aren't we doing this?" Well, we're actually doing great work to move something forward and we have our local optimizations.

它曾经让我感到沮丧，实际上更像是，“哇，我们为什么不这样做呢？”好吧，我们实际上正在做伟大的工作来推动某些事情的发展，并且我们进行了本地优化。

It'd be difficult to get to this level of specialization that multi-product companies are trying to do without that level of focus on a per team basis, but then you need something unnatural to help us bring it back.

如果没有对每个团队的关注，就很难达到多产品公司试图达到的专业化水平，但随后你需要一些不自然的东西来帮助我们恢复这种水平。

Jeff Weinstein: And so, I'm constantly looking for non-punitive fun ways objectively to get more perspectives from the outside in.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以，我一直在客观地寻找非惩罚性的有趣方式，以从外到内获得更多观点。

If it's breaking the fourth wall to get on the phone on Twitter, if it's looking at a metric of users having a bad day, which is just like counting what's happening, you can't argue with that.

如果它打破了第四堵墙，在 Twitter 上打电话，如果它正在查看用户度过糟糕一天的指标，这就像计算正在发生的事情一样，你无法否认这一点。

Or a random group of people just kind of scratching their head trying to find a button, those are truths in the world that we're trying to make sure are inputs to all of our teams.

或者一群随机的人只是挠头试图找到一个按钮，这些都是世界上的事实，我们试图确保它们成为我们所有团队的输入。

And if you don't have those inputs, I can totally naturally see where the entropy of the world leads you to have Frankenstein bad products, even when all the individual parts are well oiled and run by great people.

如果你没有这些投入，我完全可以自然地看到世界的熵会导致你生产出弗兰肯斯坦的糟糕产品，即使所有单独的部分都经过良好的润滑并由伟大的人经营。

So you need something unnatural.

所以你需要一些不自然的东西。

Lenny Rachitsky: There's an interesting trend and thread through our talk so far broadly, there's just an obsession with making something great and awesome.

Lenny Rachitsky：到目前为止，我们的谈话中有一个有趣的趋势和线索，就是对创造伟大和令人敬畏的东西的痴迷。

And then a layer below is just an obsession with the user experience being as great as possible.

下面的一层只是对尽可能好的用户体验的痴迷。

And for a lot of PMs, there's not a direct line between make the experience as amazing as possible to growth and revenue and success and things like that.

对于很多产品经理来说，尽可能提供令人惊叹的体验与增长、收入和成功之类的事情之间并没有直接的联系。

And it feels like for you and for Stripe broadly, there's this innate implication.

对于您和 Stripe 来说，感觉就像是有这种与生俱来的含义。

If we're making the experience better and better and better, we will grow.

如果我们让体验变得越来越好，我们就会成长。

You're nodding your head a little sideways a little bit, so I'd love to hear just your thoughts on just this obsession with experience and user issues.

您正在点点头，所以我很想听听您对这种对体验和用户问题的痴迷的想法。

But we also have to go to the business.

但我们也必须去做生意。

What are the metrics are moving?

哪些指标正在发生变化？

Jeff Weinstein: If someone else has a strategy for moving revenue that isn't getting it from customers, I want to know about it because it's so hard to get it from customers.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：如果其他人有一个转移收入的策略，但不是从客户那里获得的，我想知道它，因为从客户那里获得它是如此困难。

If there's some faster path, please tweet me and tell me about it because this is very hard, a lot of work to do.

如果有更快的路径，请发推文告诉我，因为这非常困难，有很多工作要做。

So if there's something else, I want it on the table, but I often find it's part of the product experience.

因此，如果还有其他东西，我希望它摆在桌面上，但我经常发现它是产品体验的一部分。

So maybe it's internal sales tools.

所以也许它是内部销售工具。

We can do a Study Group about our internal sales tools process and our deal desk and our margin structure.

我们可以就我们的内部销售工具流程、交易台和利润结构建立一个研究小组。

We can do a friction log on our third party vendor process or a migration service or the way an ecosystem partner helps deploy our services into a big enterprise.

我们可以对第三方供应商流程或迁移服务或生态系统合作伙伴帮助将我们的服务部署到大型企业的方式进行摩擦日志。

Nothing is sort of off limits from product.

产品没有任何限制。

In fact, I was chatting with a friend who runs the company and they were small company on the verge of product market fit starting to feel, customers starting to pull and they're like, "Oh, but our self-service funnel, it's so leaky and we have all this support coming through self-service."

事实上，我正在与一位经营该公司的朋友聊天，他们是一家处于产品市场契合边缘的小公司，开始感觉到，客户开始拉动，他们会说，“哦，但是我们的自助服务漏斗，它太漏洞了，我们通过自助服务获得所有这些支持。”

Jeff Weinstein: First of all, congratulations, unbelievable that they're going through your product, even attempting self-service and contacting you.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：首先，恭喜你，令人难以置信的是他们正在检查你的产品，甚至尝试自助服务并与你联系。

The majority case would be no one tries or they try and fail and don't contact you.

大多数情况是没有人尝试，或者他们尝试但失败并且不联系您。

So again, what a problem to have.

再说一次，这是一个多么大的问题啊。

And two, they wanted to minimize the support.

第二，他们想尽量减少支持。

In that particular case, it's like, "Well, what's actually in those support tickets?

在这种特殊情况下，就像是，“那么，这些支持票中实际上包含什么？

What's in those sales?

这些销售中有什么？

Those are really sales contacts." They're like, "Oh, they want to learn more about how they get started." They want to know the expertise about...

这些都是真正的销售联系人。”他们会说，“哦，他们想更多地了解如何开始。”他们想了解有关...的专业知识

This is a particular company, it's a healthcare related company.

这是一家特殊的公司，是一家医疗保健相关公司。

They wanted to know the healthcare choices available.

他们想知道可用的医疗保健选择。

They wanted to know how to migrate from some old system they had to it.

他们想知道如何从他们拥有的一些旧系统迁移到它。

Jeff Weinstein: I was like, "That's the product.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我当时想，“这就是产品。

The thing you're talking about is the product." Turn those moments during your self-serve process into not self-serve and make the product experience be let's get you on the phone.

你所说的就是产品。”将自助服务过程中的这些时刻变成非自助服务，让产品体验成为“让我们通过电话为您服务”。

And now when they get on the phone, they know the first name of the person they're talking to because they have it from the onboarding forum and all of a sudden it feels like you are still in the product, but it's not software.

现在，当他们打电话时，他们知道正在交谈的人的名字，因为他们从入职论坛获得了这个名字，突然间感觉你仍在产品中，但它不是软件。

Now it's a person, but it's a person backed by internal software, which knows as much as they can about the customer and what they want.

现在它是一个人，但它是一个由内部软件支持的人，该软件尽可能多地了解客户及其需求。

And I was really inspired by Fidelity, which is a big financial institution where many people listening might have switched jobs and had to move their 401(k) or something like this from job A to job B.

我真的受到了富达的启发，这是一家大型金融机构，很多听的人可能已经换了工作，不得不将他们的 401(k) 或类似的东西从工作 A 转移到工作 B。

Maybe in some universe it'll be three clicks, but not today or certainly not when I tried a couple of years ago.

也许在某些宇宙中只需点击三下，但今天不行，或者当我几年前尝试时肯定不行。

You got a call and go on a phone tree and all the shenanigans, and then I got on the line with someone from Fidelity.

你接到一个电话，然后在电话树上进行所有恶作剧，然后我与富达的某人接通了电话。

They're like, "Hi, Jeff.

他们就像，“嗨，杰夫。

They knew about the old company.

他们了解这家老公司。

They confirmed my address." They said, "By the way, this is not a digital process yet.

他们确认了我的地址。”他们说：“顺便说一句，这还不是一个数字化过程。

We're going to FedEx you an envelope and inside it is going to be the thing for you to sign.

我们将向联邦快递寄给您一个信封，里面有您需要签名的东西。

Here's going to be exactly where to sign.

这里就是签名的确切位置。

Here's a picture we're going to sign.

这是我们要签名的照片。

We've put another envelope inside that envelope ready to go.

我们已将另一个信封放入该信封内，准备出发。

And so, you just take the papers from envelope one, sign them where it says and put them in envelope two and put it back to the ."

因此，您只需从第一个信封中取出文件，在上面注明的地方签名，然后将它们放入第二个信封中，然后将其放回。”

Jeff Weinstein: It's like, "Wow, that is product." That is a product experience where I think some people would say, "Oh look, the product experience has to only be in software." So I feel when people think, oh, product quality and craft has some limit towards business value, there's some asymptote that you have to be like, well, kind of product plate time quality is over.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：就像，“哇，这就是产品。”这是一种产品体验，我想有些人会说，“哦，看，产品体验只能在软件中。”所以我觉得当人们认为，哦，产品质量和工艺对商业价值有一定限制时，你必须有一些渐近线，好吧，产品板时间质量已经结束了。

We need to talk about business.

我们需要谈谈生意。

It's like, let's figure out exactly what is causing the business to happen and make a product, even if it doesn't look naturally the same as our SaaS, software, browser, mobile, whatever versions.

就像，让我们弄清楚到底是什么导致业务发生并制作产品，即使它看起来与我们的 SaaS、软件、浏览器、移动设备或任何版本并不相同。

I think we can see the entire experience as it.

我想我们可以看到整个体验。

And from there, I include the sales process, I include the support process, I include tools that help with compliance and everything else.

从那里开始，我包括销售流程、支持流程、有助于合规性和其他一切的工具。

And again, if people have a way to make all those things bad and lead to great increasing revenue over time in sustainable ways, I want to know about that because that sounds so much easier than the version that we're trying.

再说一遍，如果人们有办法让所有这些事情变得糟糕，并以可持续的方式随着时间的推移带来收入的大幅增加，我想知道这一点，因为这听起来比我们正在尝试的版本容易得多。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that and clearly it's worked for Stripe.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢这一点，而且显然它对 Stripe 很有效。

Just one last question.

只是最后一个问题。

I want to talk about Atlas and dive into just like what is Atlas and how is it doing and things like that.

我想谈谈 Atlas，并深入探讨 Atlas 是什么、它是如何运作的等等。

I know there's some new stuff coming that you're going to share, but one last question about Study Groups.

我知道您将要分享一些新内容，但最后一个问题是关于学习组的。

How do you decide what product you're going to pick to do a Study Group on?

您如何决定选择哪种产品来开展研究小组？

And then what is the expectation with the result?

那么对结果的期望是什么？

I imagine there's a PM sitting around like, "Oh my God, I just got this 10 page report on all the problems."

我想象有一位产品经理坐在那里，说道：“天哪，我刚刚收到了这份关于所有问题的 10 页报告。”

Jeff Weinstein: So initially, I just made up a list of stuff that I thought would be fun to Study Group to kind of kick it off.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以最初，我只是列出了一份我认为对学习小组来说会很有趣的内容清单，以开始它。

And now, because it has a bit of an internal brand and it's exciting, and people who have gone to a Study Group say nice things about Study Group there, they actually proactively say, "Hey, we should Study Group blah," or "We're launching something next week.

现在，因为它有一些内部品牌，而且很令人兴奋，去过学习小组的人都对那里的学习小组赞不绝口，他们实际上主动说，“嘿，我们应该学习小组等等”，或者“我们下周要推出一些东西。

We should Study Group it before it goes out the door." Or now I actually just have a huge backlog of things to Study Group based on what people want.

我们应该在它问世之前对它进行研究。”或者现在我实际上只是根据人们的需求向学习小组积压了大量的东西。

And now we're again franchising it.

现在我们再次对其进行特许经营。

So we're going to have Study Group captains and people run their own Study Groups, and so we can really scale this behavior.

因此，我们将让研究组队长和人们管理自己的研究组，这样我们就可以真正扩展这种行为。

But we did our first Study Group of an internal tool recently.

但我们最近做了第一个内部工具研究组。

And so, that I think is going to catch on just anything at all can be Study Group.

因此，我认为任何事情都可以流行起来，那就是学习小组。

It just takes about an hour and a couple of people and you open up the Zoom and that's it.

只需要几个人大约一个小时，然后你打开 Zoom 就可以了。

Jeff Weinstein: And then for expectation wise, look, it is so tempting to put more regulation on something.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：然后，从期望的角度来看，对某些事物施加更多监管是非常诱人的。

Okay, well, everything coming out of this program needs to be scored and rubricked and have SLAs.

好吧，这个计划中产生的所有内容都需要进行评分、红砖化并具有 SLA。

That is extremely reasonable.

这是极其合理的。

As some of these next steps, we do notice things that are of serious issues and we have some formal processes inside of Stripe for elevating bugs to certain priority levels that get tagged and have SLAs for teams to acknowledge and review.

作为后续的一些步骤，我们确实注意到了一些严重的问题，并且我们在 Stripe 内部有一些正式的流程，用于将错误提升到某些优先级，这些优先级会被标记，并有 SLA 供团队确认和审查。

And so we kind of funnel the outputs of a Study Group into our already existing formal processes rather than having some new special thing that's going to bother a particular team.

因此，我们将研究组的成果汇集到我们现有的正式流程中，而不是拥有一些会困扰特定团队的新的特殊事物。

I will say though that it is difficult to watch one of these Study Groups and if you are the team involved in some piece of it and not want to act on it, because seeing your fellow teammates struggle to use your thing in some way is more motivating than the customer because you can kind of always say to the customer, " Well, they didn't really know," or "They have some special setup."

我想说的是，观看这些研究小组中的一个是很困难的，如果你是参与其中某个部分的团队并且不想采取行动，因为看到你的队友努力以某种方式使用你的东西比客户更有动力，因为你总是可以对客户说，“好吧，他们真的不知道”，或者“他们有一些特殊的设置。”

Jeff Weinstein: Well, they didn't really know or they have some special setup.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：嗯，他们真的不知道，或者他们有一些特殊的设置。

You probably shouldn't say those things, but you can kind of rationalize it, whereas a group of people incentivized to have actually accomplished it, who got together to do so painstakingly slowly not being able to do so if that's not what excites you as a product person to want to solve, this thing's not for you.

你可能不应该说这些话，但你可以合理化它，而一群人被激励去实际完成它，他们聚在一起费力地慢慢地做，但无法做到这一点，如果这不是让你作为一个产品人员想要解决的问题，那么这件事不适合你。

But then again, you have your own organization system, you have your own things you need to ship and study group doesn't have a mandate that comes from it.

但话又说回来，你有自己的组织系统，你有自己需要运送的东西，而研究小组没有来自它的授权。

We have our own.

我们有自己的。

It's more of a cultural piece of information that is very high signal and then people tend to use that high signal for good prioritization.

它更像是一种具有非常高信号的文化信息，然后人们倾向于使用该高信号来进行良好的优先级排序。

I will say though, that we have added the SLAs to certain bug levels that begin to match a bit of our incident process.

不过，我要说的是，我们已将 SLA 添加到某些错误级别，这些级别开始与我们的事件流程相匹配。

Jeff Weinstein: So in an incident strike, like in many companies, pencils down, fix the problem, severity levels, non-negotiable Slack rooms happen, war rooms, all that stuff.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：因此，在事件罢工中，就像在许多公司一样，用铅笔记下问题，解决问题的严重程度，出现不可协商的 Slack 室、作战室，所有这些东西。

You don't want to do that with every single bug, but we have a rubric of craft related tags for our bug system.

您不想对每个错误都这样做，但我们的错误系统有一个与工艺相关的标签的标题。

And if it is a sort of a P0 bug, which is not an incident, right, it doesn't mean to put down your pencils.

如果它是一种 P0 bug，这不是一个事件，对吧，这并不意味着要放下你的铅笔。

You do need to acknowledge it at Stripe within seven days.

您确实需要在 7 天内在 Stripe 确认。

And even if it doesn't mean to fix it, it's like a person looks at it and says, "Hey, we're going to do it or not do it." That's a still pretty strong bar for a non-incident related craft issue.

即使它并不意味着要修复它，就像一个人看着它并说：“嘿，我们要么做要么不做。”对于非事故相关的工艺问题来说，这仍然是一个相当强的标准。

Lenny Rachitsky: It feels just at Stripe, there's this cultural focus on we want to make the product great, we want to make the experience as great as possible.

Lenny Rachitsky：感觉在 Stripe，我们的文化重点是我们希望让产品变得更好，我们希望让体验尽可能地棒。

A lot of companies, it's just teams.

很多公司，只是团队。

We have this goal.

我们有这个目标。

We're not going to do anything that isn't driving this metric and goal that we have.

我们不会做任何不推动我们所制定的指标和目标的事情。

And I think for teams like that, it's hard to hear just like, oh, someone's going to send you all of these problems that you experience.

我认为对于这样的团队来说，很难听到这样的声音，哦，有人会向你发送你遇到的所有这些问题。

There's the negative version where the founders goes through the product like a CO of a larger company, just, oh my God, look at all these problems.

还有一种消极的版本，创始人像一家大公司的 CO 一样检查产品，只是，天哪，看看所有这些问题。

You need to fix these immediately.

您需要立即修复这些问题。

And a lot of times it's completely distracting from the things they need to do, the goals they're trying to drive, things that really, really matter that the CO may not be thinking about.

很多时候，这完全分散了他们需要做的事情、他们试图实现的目标、以及 CO 可能没有考虑到的真正非常重要的事情的注意力。

And it feels like you're trying to find this balance of here's problems that exist.

感觉就像你正在努力找到现有问题的平衡。

You don't need to fix them.

你不需要修复它们。

You probably should.

你可能应该。

Here's the most important stuff.

这是最重要的事情。

But also there's often you find a correlation between make the experience better, you're going to do better.

但你也经常会发现，让体验变得更好与你会做得更好之间存在关联。

Jeff Weinstein: There's a huge amount of trust here involved in your colleagues, which is we want to provide teams great information and the best teams welcome that information.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你们的同事对我们非常信任，我们希望为团队提供重要的信息，而最好的团队也欢迎这些信息。

It doesn't mean that it comes with a auteur opinion from the outside world that says you must do X.

这并不意味着它带有来自外界的作者观点，说你必须做某事。

We have a rubric on some of the craft related bugs, but again, we let the teams relabel them.

我们对一些与工艺相关的错误有一个标题，但我们再次让团队重新标记它们。

And so maybe it's actually not a P0 from their eyes and that's the trust we put in the teams.

所以也许在他们眼里这实际上并不是 P0，这就是我们对团队的信任。

I think that the failure mode is when you don't look.

我认为失败模式是当你不看的时候。

And so we need unnatural, safe, fun lore that gets us out of our chair and into the customer's mindset.

因此，我们需要非自然、安全、有趣的知识，让我们从椅子上站起来，进入客户的思维模式。

Best is if it's you and you're your own customer, okay.

最好的是如果是你并且你是你自己的客户，好吧。

Second best would be sitting right next to the customer in the outside world and then like, okay, fine, I'll take a third best, which is pantomime the customer and enforcing you don't use any internal knowledge.

第二个最好的方法是在外部世界中坐在客户旁边，然后，好吧，好吧，我会采取第三个最佳方法，这是对客户的哑剧，并强制你不要使用任何内部知识。

If you have practices in those three categories, I'm comfortable with the failure modes.

如果您有这三个类别的实践，我对失败模式感到满意。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love that.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢这个。

This is definitely going to be the longest episode I've ever done, which is exactly what I expected and I'm happy that we're doing this.

这肯定是我做过的最长的一集，这正是我所期望的，我很高兴我们正在这样做。

Jeff Weinstein: Everyone go 1.75X or something.

Jeff Weinstein：每个人都会选择 1.75 倍左右。

Lenny Rachitsky: I like when people are like, oh, this episode is really good.

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢人们说，哦，这一集真的很棒。

I had to slow down to 1.75 or something.

我不得不放慢速度到 1.75 左右。

How are you even listening at that speed?

这么快的速度你怎么听得懂？

No, it's 1.0 speed.

不，它是 1.0 速度。

That's what this episode needs to be.

这就是这一集所需要的。

There's two more areas I want to spend some time on.

我还想花一些时间在两个领域。

One is Atlas.

其一是阿特拉斯。

We've talked a lot about on the surface of Atlas.

我们已经在 Atlas 的表面上讨论了很多。

I want to help people understand what the hell it is and the stuff that's happening there.

我想帮助人们了解这到底是什么以及那里正在发生的事情。

And two, I want to talk about getting stuff done at a big company, something that you've done at Stripe and I hear you have a lot of good advice on.

第二，我想谈谈在一家大公司完成工作，这是你在 Stripe 所做的事情，我听说你有很多好的建议。

So first of all, what is Atlas?

首先，什么是Atlas？

We've talked a bit about it.

我们已经谈过一些了。

What's the best way to understand what Atlas is and who it's for?

了解 Atlas 是什么以及它的用途的最佳方式是什么？

Jeff Weinstein: In 2016, a bunch of Stripes were traveling the world, Stripes is what we call teammates here, and they're just hearing stories from entrepreneurs around the world.

Jeff Weinstein：2016 年，一群 Stripes 正在世界各地旅行，Stripes 就是我们这里所说的队友，他们只是听到世界各地企业家的故事。

And you would hear this unbelievable story from incredible entrepreneurs who have a laptop, which is that they'd have to fly to the United States on an airplane to make a US company in order to get access to use financial system, to raise money from US or global investors, often to take USD or to charge US customers.

你会从拥有笔记本电脑的令人难以置信的企业家那里听到这个令人难以置信的故事，那就是他们必须乘飞机飞往美国创建一家美国公司，才能使用金融系统，从美国或全球投资者那里筹集资金，通常是为了接受美元或向美国客户收费。

And you could have sat around and said, huh, is that illegal?

你本可以坐下来问，嗯，这是违法的吗？

They don't live in the US.

他们不住在美国。

Can they have a US company?

他们可以拥有一家美国公司吗？

Absolutely.

绝对地。

The US loves this.

美国就喜欢这个。

It is incredibly encouraged for people from around the world to make a US company and many people do.

我们非常鼓励世界各地的人们创建一家美国公司，而且很多人都这么做了。

Jeff Weinstein: Now, why did it require an airplane, right?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：现在，为什么需要飞机，对吧？

And so you start to hear that kind of thing at a coffee shop amongst someone with a laptop who has access to the whole internet.

所以你开始在咖啡店里听到这样的事情，周围有人拿着笔记本电脑可以访问整个互联网。

And that is a burning problem.

这是一个紧迫的问题。

Right.

正确的。

That is not a tier three issue.

这不是第三层问题。

I am not able to run my business without getting on an airplane should be sending alerts off in your whole psyche that you have discovered something important.

如果不上飞机我就无法经营我的生意，我应该向你的整个心灵发出警报，告诉你你发现了一些重要的事情。

And so I wasn't at Stripe at the time, but I'm very thankful that, I was running my own startup at the time.

所以我当时并不在 Stripe，但我非常庆幸，当时我正在经营自己的初创公司。

I was very thankful that the people at Stripe decided to try to tackle that problem.

我非常感谢 Stripe 的人们决定尝试解决这个问题。

And so Atlas is a way to start a company in a few clicks, and we think that's an incredibly big deal because while there are smart humans across the whole planet, the opportunity that they have is not uniform.

因此，Atlas 是一种只需点击几下鼠标即可创办公司的方式，我们认为这是一件非常大的事情，因为虽然整个地球上都有聪明的人，但他们拥有的机会并不均匀。

But it's a little strange because it's all the same MacBooks and it's a little strange because it's all the same IP addresses and we all have plenty of bandwidth and smarts.

但这有点奇怪，因为都是相同的 MacBook，而且有点奇怪，因为都是相同的 IP 地址，而且我们都有足够的带宽和智能。

Jeff Weinstein: And so what can we do to dramatically lower the barrier to great people solving problems?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：那么我们可以做些什么来大幅降低优秀人才解决问题的障碍呢？

And we've found over and over again that increasing the ease and simplicity and decreasing the cost and complexity tends to lead to just more of that thing.

我们一次又一次地发现，提高易用性和简单性并降低成本和复杂性往往会带来更多的好处。

And we have a fundamental belief that there should be more startups and they're not finite.

我们有一个基本信念，那就是应该有更多的初创公司，而且它们不是有限的。

And that belief comes from both just a core hope because there are so many problems in the world that don't seem to be being solved fast enough by our current institutions and larger companies that we think will actually, we need entrepreneurial energy to tackle them.

这种信念来自于两者的核心希望，因为世界上有很多问题似乎没有被我们现有的机构和大公司足够快地解决，而我们认为实际上会解决这些问题，我们需要创业能量来解决这些问题。

And then it's also comes from experience of seeing it happened.

然后它也来自于看到它发生的经验。

Instacart signed up for Stripe with a Gmail address and then Covid happened and they delivered critical food to everyone when people were reasonably not allowed to go to the grocery store easily.

Instacart 使用 Gmail 地址注册了 Stripe，然后 Covid 发生了，当人们被合理禁止轻易去杂货店时，他们向每个人提供了重要的食物。

Jeff Weinstein: So you just don't know what the next Gmail address is going to do.

Jeff Weinstein：所以你只是不知道下一个 Gmail 地址会做什么。

And so in Atlas, we radically try to simplify the process of getting a company started and that mission has taken us to just solve more of the problem over time.

因此，在 Atlas 中，我们从根本上尝试简化公司创办的流程，随着时间的推移，这一使命要求我们解决更多问题。

And so over the last few years, for those who have either used Atlas or have started a company or maybe follow along on Twitter a bit, you might've seen just a progression of complexity that used to exist being automated.

因此，在过去的几年里，对于那些使用过 Atlas 或已经创办了一家公司，或者可能在 Twitter 上关注过一点的人来说，您可能已经看到了过去存在的复杂性的不断自动化。

And so a big one that we did about a year ago was this 83(b) election, which is this absolutely Byzantine silliness system by which you have 30 calendar days to send a one-page document to the IRS that could radically change the economics of how you are incentivized as a founder.

因此，我们大约一年前所做的一件大事就是这次 83(b) 选举，这绝对是拜占庭式的愚蠢制度，通过该制度，你有 30 个日历日向 IRS 发送一页文件，这可能会从根本上改变你作为创始人的激励方式的经济学。

And this is not one of these greedy loophole.

这不是这些贪婪的漏洞之一。

The IRS in the 1980s made this IRS rule in order to spur more entrepreneurship.

20 世纪 80 年代，美国国税局 (IRS) 制定了这条国税局规则，以刺激更多的创业精神。

Jeff Weinstein: They want this.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：他们想要这个。

And the only issue is they made it extremely difficult to accomplish.

唯一的问题是他们让它变得极其难以完成。

You have to send a snail mail in to an IRS address in a particular format, in a particular way with no verification that it happened at all.

你必须以特定的格式、特定的方式向国税局地址发送一封蜗牛邮件，而根本不验证它是否发生。

And if you do it 31 calendar days, there's no redo.

如果您在 31 个日历日内执行此操作，则无需重做。

Okay.

好的。

Now again, if you're a product person, you hear the founders terrified all day long about this same issue, just alarm bells in your head whole time.

现在，如果你是一名产品人员，你会听到创始人整天对同样的问题感到恐惧，就像你脑子里一直敲响的警钟。

And so I had experienced it for myself as a founder several times, and I also just heard story after story and I just put on my to-do list for the team, we are going to solve this 83(b) election thing.

作为创始人，我自己已经经历过好几次了，我也只是听到了一个又一个的故事，我刚刚为团队列出了我的待办事项清单，我们将解决这个 83(b) 选举问题。

And there are very good reasons not to do it because it comes with potential huge liability.

并且有充分的理由不这样做，因为它可能带来巨大的责任。

Don't want to screw it up, it's snail mail.

不想搞砸了，这只是普通邮件。

Jeff Weinstein: You're really going to monetize this.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你真的要把这个货币化。

It's a competitive advantage to do it.

这样做是一种竞争优势。

You can kind of argue yourself not to do it in a million ways.

你可以用一百万种方式说服自己不要这样做。

But again, back to the mission of just taking all of this complexity and turning into a single click.

但再次回到将所有这些复杂性转化为一次点击的使命。

It was obvious to us and we got started on it.

这对我们来说是显而易见的，我们就开始了。

Infrastructurally, we've been automating these steps and when this podcast airs, I guess today, it will be true that when you go to start a company on Atlas, it will just be a single click.

在基础设施方面，我们一直在自动化这些步骤，当这个播客播出时，我想今天，当你在 Atlas 上创办一家公司时，只需单击一下即可。

Jeff Weinstein: You go to type in your friend's names, what the name of the company will be, it'll tell you if it's available automatically or not.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你去输入你朋友的名字，公司的名称是什么，它会告诉你它是否自动可用。

You can split the company up 50, 50 or whatever you want to do, fill out a few things and you click go and then like a burrito coming to you, like a pizza tracker, we will just handle all of the downstream activities that used to be, hey, remember to come back in and purchase your shares.

你可以将公司分割成 50 份、50 份或任何你想做的事情，填写一些内容，然后点击“开始”，然后就像墨西哥卷饼来到你身边，就像披萨追踪器一样，我们将处理所有过去的下游活动，嘿，记得回来购买你的股票。

Why am I purchasing my shares?

我为什么要购买我的股票？

I'm just getting started.

我才刚刚开始。

Why am I writing a check for $10 and putting into a bank account that I can't even open yet?

为什么我要写一张 10 美元的支票并存入我还无法开设的银行账户？

And then I have to wait for that to be done to get the 83(b) .

然后我必须等待完成才能获得 83(b) 。

All of those steps are now just handled in the background so that we can get you ready for business in a day or two.

所有这些步骤现在都在后台处理，以便我们可以在一两天内让您做好业务准备。

Jeff Weinstein: And so this is our vision.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这就是我们的愿景。

So you can quit your job on a Sunday night, get the Sunday scaries, I'm done with this thing, and on Monday morning fill out this form and the next day be able to run a billion-dollar business because we will have automatically handled getting you access to banking systems, to payment systems, to handling all the equity paperwork, filing your 83(b) election where you can just shift from having worrying about the company starting process to just building and shipping.

所以你可以在周日晚上辞去工作，接受周日的恐惧，我已经完成了这件事，周一早上填写这张表格，第二天就能够经营价值十亿美元的业务，因为我们将自动处理让你访问银行系统、支付系统、处理所有股权文件、提交 83(b) 选举，这样你就可以从担心公司启动流程转向只关心建设和运输。

Jeff Weinstein: And you'll just get kind updates in the background.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：您只会在后台收到友善的更新信息。

Cool, the IRS is giving you a tax ID.

太棒了，国税局正在为您提供税号。

Cool, your 83(b) election is filed.

太棒了，您的 83(b) 选举已提交。

Cool, all the founders have their equity and you're ready to go on the cap table.

太酷了，所有创​​始人都有自己的股权，你已经准备好进入股权结构表了。

And we've done this by deeply integrating with the governments and deeply integrating with banking partners where we can get you access to the financial system before the IRS and the other governments come back with their sort of official yeses because we take care of the problem in the background by which we're faxing, phone calling, filling out forms on your behalf.

我们通过与政府和银行合作伙伴的深度整合来做到这一点，我们可以让您在国税局和其他政府正式表示同意之前进入金融系统，因为我们会在后台处理问题，我们会代表您发送传真、打电话、填写表格。

And so we just want to take all that complexity and just erase it so that you get the same thing the YC group gets when they start, that checklist that they go through.

因此，我们只想消除所有复杂性，这样你就可以得到 YC 团队在开始时所得到的同样的东西，即他们要经历的清单。

We just have the robot do exactly the same thing.

我们只是让机器人做同样的事情。

Jeff Weinstein: And so in some ways it is a really big deal in a big ship because it completely automates the company starting process.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：从某些方面来说，这对于一艘大船来说确实是一件大事，因为它完全自动化了公司的启动过程。

But in other ways it's an incredibly incremental step that it's taken us three years to get to where we had to systematically automate the internal steps, each one and now we've done the work to wrap it all up into one button.

但从其他方面来说，这是一个令人难以置信的渐进步骤，我们花了三年的时间才达到必须系统地自动化内部步骤的程度，每一个步骤现在我们已经完成了将其全部包装到一个按钮中的工作。

And you can just watch how your company's doing in the dashboard.

您可以在仪表板上查看您公司的表现。

Lenny Rachitsky: Well, first of all, congrats Jeff and the Atlas team on shipping this.

Lenny Rachitsky：首先，祝贺 Jeff 和 A​​tlas 团队交付了这个。

I know this is a big milestone and it's been a long time coming.

我知道这是一个重要的里程碑，而且已经等了很长时间了。

Jeff Weinstein: Yeah, Atlas was actually a little reasonable before we decided to do all this work.

Jeff Weinstein：是的，在我们决定做所有这些工作之前，Atlas 实际上是有点合理的。

It's like why do this next step of completely automating it when it was actually fairly straightforward before.

这就像为什么要进行完全自动化的下一步，而之前实际上相当简单。

Atlas has above 80 NPS, which is quite high.

Atlas 的 NPS 超过 80，这是相当高的。

Apple is in the low 60s, AirPods is 75.

苹果已经是 60 多岁了，AirPods 已经是 75 岁了。

I love my AirPods.

我喜欢我的 AirPods。

So Atlas in the 80s with almost 50% response rate is quite high.

所以Atlas在80年代几乎有50%的回复率是相当高的。

And so we still chose to do another year of work to automate all of this work behind the scenes because we see that companies are charging their customers sooner when they go through this automated process versus waiting.

因此，我们仍然选择再做一年的工作，在幕后自动化所有这些工作，因为我们看到，公司在完成这个自动化流程时会更快地向客户收费，而不是等待。

And it's a little strange.

这有点奇怪。

You just started your company.

你刚刚创办你的公司。

Well, what does it really matter to wait an extra seven days or 20 days before you can really get going on business?

那么，多等 7 天或 20 天才能真正开始营业又有什么关系呢？

Those are really fragile days which you're building.

你正在建设的那些日子真的很脆弱。

And to some of our conversation earlier, that amazing feeling of getting your first customer and being in it with them and money actually exchanging hands and getting that relationship.

对于我们之前的一些谈话，获得第一个客户并与他们一起参与的那种令人惊奇的感觉，以及金钱实际上交换了手并建立了这种关系。

Jeff Weinstein: If we can slide that forward in the world by a couple of days or weeks, which we're seeing, like half the time it takes to get to your first customer, just shave a whole week off of your company and you can kind of see GDP being born sooner.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：如果我们能够将这一速度向前推进几天或几周，就像我们看到的那样，就像到达第一个客户所需的时间的一半一样，那么只需将您的公司节省整整一周的时间，您就可以看到 GDP 更快诞生。

And went my whole life knowing that okay, GDP is not finite and it can grow, but I've never really seen it and now I've actually seen it grow faster, sooner.

我一生都知道，好吧，GDP 不是有限的，它可以增长，但我从未真正见过它，现在我实际上看到它增长得更快、更快。

And I think anything we could do to just move that forward is going to inspire and lower the bar for more people to be an entrepreneur because they'll see how satisfying that can be.

我认为，我们为推动这一目标所做的一切都将激励并降低更多人成为企业家的门槛，因为他们会看到这有多么令人满意。

Jeff Weinstein: And another stat, which really was interesting to me recently is that we have seen since doing much of this automation work, that more solo founders are using Atlas than ever before.

Jeff Weinstein：另一个统计数据，最近让我真正感兴趣的是，自从进行了大部分自动化工作以来，我们发现使用 Atlas 的独立创始人比以往任何时候都多。

And I think it's because you can just do a lot more on the internet as a founder with no-code tools and everything else and get going.

我认为这是因为作为创始人，你可以使用无代码工具和其他一切在互联网上做更多事情，然后继续前进。

Very cool to see that bringing the best of the internet and making it available worldwide can be correlated with more people becoming entrepreneurs.

很高兴看到，将互联网的精华带到全世界并使其在全球范围内使用可以与更多的人成为企业家相关联。

And I think we should just keep doing that.

我认为我们应该继续这样做。

Lenny Rachitsky: It's incredibly inspiring and I think this is going to be a huge deal.

Lenny Rachitsky：这非常鼓舞人心，我认为这将是一件大事。

It's hard to think about how many, what sorts of changes in tech could transform how many companies are started and how many companies not just started but actually happen because to your point, you may start and they're like, nah, nevermind a few days later if it's still stuck in some queue.

很难想象有多少、什么样的技术变革可以改变有多少家公司成立，有多少家公司不仅刚刚成立，而且实际上已经发生了，因为就你的观点而言，你可能会开始，而他们会说，不，几天后，如果它仍然停留在某个队列中，没关系。

Jeff Weinstein: Totally.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：完全可以。

And then you don't know where these things are going to go.

然后你不知道这些东西会去哪里。

We have the sort of cohort of 2024 startups in Atlas got to $50 million in revenue twice as quickly as the cohort in 2023.

Atlas 中 2024 年初创公司的收入达到 5000 万美元的速度是 2023 年初创公司的两倍。

And so we kind of also think sometimes, oh, it was the pandemic that pushed everything online.

所以有时我们也会想，哦，是大流行把一切都推到了网上。

It's like we're seeing the earliest cohort charts of new startups just cracking up into the right.

就好像我们看到了最早的新初创公司的队列图表刚刚进入右侧。

And that's very exciting because you also hear sometimes, well the funding market is down and valuations and this and that and the other.

这是非常令人兴奋的，因为有时你也会听到，融资市场下跌，估值等等。

That is much more of a point in time capital analysis and much less business, like just how businesses are working day to day.

这更多的是一个时间点的资本分析，而不是业务，比如企业的日常运作方式。

It's really in the revenue that is representative of their futures and that looks amazingly bright.

收入确实代表了他们的未来，而且看起来非常光明。

Jeff Weinstein: And then of course these companies go off to do pretty wild things.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：当然，这些公司会去做一些非常疯狂的事情。

Companies that have started through Atlas, there's been 55,000 of them to date are doing $5 billion a year in revenue.

迄今为止，通过 Atlas 起步的公司已有 55,000 家，每年的收入达到 50 亿美元。

I think it actually resets their expectations of what other tools will be in the future.

我认为这实际上重新设定了他们对未来其他工具的期望。

It's like, well, if it was so easy for me to get my company started, well why is it so hard to do banking?

就像，如果我创办公司这么容易，为什么做银行业这么难呢？

Well, thankfully there are some great services for it, but I think if we can push people towards expectations higher, then they will want to make their companies better and we'll just all benefit from that.

好吧，值得庆幸的是，有一些很棒的服务，但我认为，如果我们能够提高人们的期望，那么他们就会希望让他们的公司变得更好，我们都会从中受益。

Lenny Rachitsky: How much of this is based on you guys sending faxes and sending mail yourself, like I don't know how much you can talk about the behind the scenes, but is there a lot of, through this ops element to automating some of this?

Lenny Rachitsky：其中有多少是基于你们自己发送传真和发送邮件，就像我不知道你们能谈论多少幕后故事，但是是否有很多，通过这个操作元素来自动化其中一些？

Jeff Weinstein: Atlas is in total 10 people, which is I think a relatively small group for the role that it plays in the wider startup ecosystem.

Jeff Weinstein：Atlas 总共有 10 个人，我认为对于它在更广泛的创业生态系统中扮演的角色来说，这是一个相对较小的群体。

And we just don't pick up work we can't automate because we know that we need the leverage.

我们只是不接受无法自动化的工作，因为我们知道我们需要杠杆。

And so we're not going to put ourselves in situations in which we have to compete to be the best.

因此，我们不会将自己置于必须竞争才能成为最好的境地。

We're going to put ourselves in situations where we can automate it and be the only, and that's a different mindset.

我们将把自己置于可以实现自动化并成为唯一的情况，这是一种不同的心态。

So in terms of why we picked up 83(b) election as a topic, when we made that decision, we made a commitment that we're going to do this forever.

因此，就我们为什么选择 83(b) 选举作为主题而言，当我们做出该决定时，我们承诺我们将永远这样做。

We're going to do this forever.

我们将永远这样做。

This is a piece of infrastructure for the rest of the internet.

这是互联网其余部分的基础设施。

That is a very high bar to set as the thing you're going to do.

这是你要做的事情的一个非常高的标准。

Jeff Weinstein: And so we're happy to take our time.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以我们很乐意慢慢来。

This is part, versus like go-go-go versus the long-term compounding.

这是一部分，与“go-go-go”与“长期复利”不同。

Go-go-go was when we assigned one engineer, hey, it's your job today to send one piece of paper to the office with this third party mail service.

当我们指派一名工程师时，嘿，今天你的工作就是通过第三方邮件服务将一张纸发送到办公室。

Why?

为什么？

Doesn't matter.

没关系。

Today, just send a single piece of paper to the office and an incredible engineer, and she went on to lead all of 83(b) election work.

今天，只需向办公室发送一张纸，一位令人难以置信的工程师，她就会继续领导 83(b) 的所有选举工作。

She sent it.

她寄来了。

And the proof of just receiving the piece of paper at the office that we had just sent yesterday is incredible proof.

昨天我们刚刚在办公室收到的那张纸的证明就是令人难以置信的证据。

Right.

正确的。

We're like, well look.

我们就像，好吧，看看。

I mean, the 83(b) election is just sending this piece of paper to the IRS, like we just did it.

我的意思是，83(b) 选举只是将这张文件发送给 IRS，就像我们刚刚所做的那样。

Right.

正确的。

Jeff Weinstein: That go-go-go as soon as possible was extremely useful because it's just like, look, this exists.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：尽快的“走走走”非常有用，因为它就像，看，这个存在。

We can do it.

我们能做到。

Come on.

快点。

On the long-term compounding part, we were extremely serious about how we picked our third party vendors, and backup vendors, and what promises, and SLAs, and reporting systems, and alerts, and playbooks, and backup processes, like it's in a very intense amount of internal structure we use.

在长期复合部分，我们非常认真地考虑如何选择第三方供应商和备份供应商，以及什么承诺、SLA、报告系统、警报、剧本和备份流程，就像我们使用的大量内部结构一样。

But again, we have to look at where the value is.

但同样，我们必须看看价值在哪里。

The value is in making sure it happens.

价值在于确保它发生。

Does it need to be us sending the mail?

需要我们发邮件吗？

Does it need to be us talking to government?

我们需要与政府对话吗？

Not necessarily.

未必。

And we have chosen to work with third parties and many backup third parties as well because one, there's expertise in the world of physically printing and sending mail that the 10 of us are not going to today become experts in.

我们选择与第三方以及许多备份第三方合作，因为其一，在物理打印和发送邮件领域拥有专业知识，但我们 10 个人今天不会成为专家。

And two, I think it also causes us to build better software in that we now need to evaluate if something's actually working because it's happening externally.

第二，我认为这也促使我们构建更好的软件，因为我们现在需要评估某些东西是否真正有效，因为它是在外部发生的。

Jeff Weinstein: Whereas when you build it yourself, again, you have this natural feeling, well, we built it.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：而当你自己建造它时，你会再次有一种自然的感觉，嗯，我们建造了它。

It must be working.

它一定有效。

Oh, later we'll add alerts.

哦，稍后我们会添加警报。

Later when there problems, we'll figure out playbooks.

稍后出现问题时，我们会找出剧本。

Well look, when it's a third party building it, you're like, wait a second.

好吧，当它是第三方构建时，你会想，等一下。

What happens if they screw up?

如果他们搞砸了怎么办？

Like cool, we better figure that out.

很酷，我们最好弄清楚这一点。

We better OCR all the results.

我们更好地 OCR 所有结果。

We better do all these check sums, we better...

我们最好做所有这些检查和，我们最好......

And it would be awesome if we could always treat our internal work that way, but because it was external, it forced us to be more rigid where we needed to be rigid and create interfaces and kind of commitments.

如果我们能够始终以这种方式对待我们的内部工作，那就太棒了，但由于它是外部的，它迫使我们在需要严格并创建界面和某种承诺的地方变得更加严格。

And again, we work with a bunch of great third parties and back up third parties to execute this.

同样，我们与许多优秀的第三方合作并支持第三方执行此操作。

And each year we write a document called Should We Do This Ourselves?

每年我们都会写一份名为“我们应该自己做吗？”的文件。

And we look at the other nine of us around the room and go, of course we shouldn't.

我们看看房间里的其他九个人，然后就走了，当然我们不应该。

Let's go on to something else.

让我们继续说别的吧。

So again, we're just really stitching it together, but ensuring that it happens.

再说一遍，我们只是将其真正缝合在一起，但确保它发生。

Lenny Rachitsky: Awesome.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

Okay.

好的。

I was imagining fax machines just,-

我只是想象传真机，-

Jeff Weinstein: There are fax machines occurring.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：传真机正在出现。

There are fax machines occurring,-

有传真机出现，-

Jeff Weinstein: And there are phone calls being made and there are robots waiting on phones on hold as well.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：有人打电话，也有机器人在等待电话。

Lenny Rachitsky: AI is here.

Lenny Rachitsky：人工智能就在这里。

I saw a stat that one in six new Delaware corporations are now started on Stripe Atlas.

我看到一项统计数据，特拉华州六分之一的新公司现在是在 Stripe Atlas 上成立的。

That's absurd.

这太荒谬了。

Jeff Weinstein: Yep.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：是的。

I'm very excited to tell you when it's one in five, but it is not today.

当这一比例达到五分之一时，我很高兴地告诉你们，但不是今天。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, sounds like we're close.

Lenny Rachitsky：好的，听起来我们已经很接近了。

Lenny Rachitsky: Sounds like we're close.

Lenny Rachitsky：听起来我们已经很接近了。

The other stat I have here is that the fastest growing cities for startups.

我这里的另一个统计数据是初创企业发展最快的城市。

Here's what I have, I don't know if you know this, but Boulder, Shenzhen, and Las Vegas.

这是我所掌握的，我不知道你是否知道这一点，但是博尔德、深圳和拉斯维加斯。

Jeff Weinstein: They're everywhere.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：他们无处不在。

One of the, it's like stat we kind of came up with a little bit last year that I'm just personally deeply obsessed with is founding teams in which the co-founders are in multiple countries.

其中之一，就像去年我们想出的一些统计数据一样，我个人非常着迷的是联合创始人来自多个国家的创始团队。

So we kind of nickname this.

所以我们给这个起了个昵称。

Again, it's like giving things a good title, headlines.

再说一遍，这就像给事情起一个好标题，头条新闻。

Cross-Border Founders.

跨境创始人。

Wow.

哇。

More than 20% of multi-founder teams have at least one founder from another country.

超过 20% 的多创始人团队至少有一名来自其他国家的创始人。

That is astounding to me, that the internet could bring people together like that.

令我震惊的是，互联网可以将人们聚集在一起。

And I think that's going to provide more perspectives, more solutions will be local and global.

我认为这将提供更多的视角，更多的本地和全球解决方案。

Just all perspectives are great.

所有的观点都很棒。

And again, I think the Atlas team itself represents this.

再说一遍，我认为 Atlas 团队本身就代表了这一点。

We were very intentional of how we built the Atlas team.

我们非常用心地打造 Atlas 团队。

It's majority women and we have more diversity to hire, but we're just very intentional to make it a team that had diverse perspectives.

其中大多数是女性，我们有更多的多样性来雇用，但我们非常有意使其成为一个具有不同观点的团队。

You've been on teams that don't have diverse perspectives of any type.

你所在的团队没有任何类型的多元化观点。

They are so much worse.

他们太糟糕了。

There's no real science necessary here.

这里不需要真正的科学。

We just enforce that.

我们只是强制执行。

We had the opportunity to build this team that way.

我们有机会以这种方式建立这个团队。

Jeff Weinstein: And it was really important to me that it represented a world we wanted things to look like and to represent.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：对我来说非常重要的是，它代表了一个我们希望事物看起来像并代表的世界。

And it just had to be very intentional about it because I've made mistakes in my career previously where my startup was all men when we sold to box one of them.

这必须是非常有意的，因为我之前在职业生涯中犯过错误，当我们卖掉其中一家公司时，我的初创公司都是男性。

And on each hire it was harder and harder and harder to hire someone of a different background.

每次招聘时，聘用不同背景的人都变得越来越难。

Just naturally folks didn't want to join that type of team.

人们很自然地不想加入那种类型的团队。

And that was the last time I've ever going to make that mistake, which is that early the candidate poll must match where you want the team to go.

那是我最后一次犯这样的错误，即早期的候选人民意调查必须符合你希望团队去往的方向。

It's not a down funnel problem, it is an up funnel problem.

这不是一个向下漏斗问题，而是一个向上漏斗问题。

And where you have to just make sure that for each role you're comfortable with the distribution of people and backgrounds in your candidate pool and go from there.

您必须确保对于每个职位，您对候选人库中人员和背景的分布感到满意，然后从那里开始。

And I think that is one of the reasons why that 10 person group is so effective, is it has just a lot of diversity and perspective.

我认为这就是 10 人小组如此有效的原因之一，因为它具有丰富的多样性和视角。

Lenny Rachitsky: Another skill Jeff Weinstein is incredible at that I wasn't even aware of.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：杰夫·韦恩斯坦的另一项令人难以置信的技能我什至没有意识到。

We're going to add them to the list and I actually saw a photo of the team and I noticed that.

我们将把他们添加到列表中，我实际上看到了团队的照片，我注意到了这一点。

And so great work.

如此出色的工作。

Is there anything else on Atlas that you wanted to share before I get into how you actually made Atlas happen at a company like Stripe that has a billion things to do?

在我介绍您如何在像 Stripe 这样有十亿件事要做的公司中实际实现 Atlas 之前，您还有关于 Atlas 的其他内容想分享吗？

Jeff Weinstein: We just want to hear about what's hard for you.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们只是想听听您遇到的困难。

If you look back in your emails and if you started a company recently, you're starting a company right now, the whole world is counting on you to pick a customer, solve their problem 10 times better than their alternative, get it to them, charge for it, become economically viable and build a great business that provides great services.

如果你回顾你的电子邮件，如果你最近创办了一家公司，那么你现在就正在创办一家公司，全世界都指望你选择一个客户，比他们的替代方案更好地解决他们的问题 10 倍，把它交给他们，收费，变得经济可行并建立一个提供优质服务的伟大企业。

We are not counting on you to become experts at this silliness of administratively running your company.

我们并不指望您成为管理公司这种愚蠢行为的专家。

Imagine life without Google Docs where you'd have to hire an IT person to run your IT back end on employee three.

想象一下没有 Google Docs 的生活，您必须雇用一名 IT 人员来运行第三名员工的 IT 后端。

You'd have an IT person or imagine the world without AWS for EC2 or S3 or any of these cloud services and you're racking computers yourself.

您拥有一名 IT 人员，或者想象一下没有 AWS 的 EC2 或 S3 或任何这些云服务的世界，并且您自己在架设计算机。

Jeff Weinstein: You're just absolutely not going to try as many things.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：你绝对不会尝试那么多事情。

We just see the company structure, the structure, bringing people together to be like that, and we want to automate more and more and more of it and turn it into software.

我们只是看到公司的结构，结构，将人们聚集在一起，就像这样，我们希望自动化越来越多的东西，并将其转化为软件。

So we're looking for the next things to work on.

所以我们正在寻找接下来要做的事情。

We have a couple ideas, but we expect to turn more of groups of people working together, that administration into software.

我们有几个想法，但我们希望将更多的人一起工作，将管理转变为软件。

And I think it's just going to unlock huge amount more people choosing to do it.

我认为这只会让更多的人选择这样做。

Lenny Rachitsky: Interesting.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：有趣。

I'm so curious what that ends up being.

我很好奇最终会是什么。

If you really think about what you're doing here, if you believe that entrepreneurship and innovation and technology make the world better, you're creating such an unlock to allow more of that.

如果你认真思考你在这里所做的事情，如果你相信创业、创新和技术让世界变得更美好，那么你正在创造这样的解锁以允许更多的事情发生。

And like I said, I think it's hard to imagine and think of other examples that could be as transformative and impactful as just making this process.

就像我说的，我认为很难想象和想到其他例子可以像制定这个过程一样具有变革性和影响力。

Jeff Weinstein: It's funny because I go back to again, I also hear from founders, entrepreneurs like, oh, I can't think of an idea.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这很有趣，因为我又回去了，我也听到创始人、企业家说，哦，我想不出一个主意。

Like, ah, I need a startup idea.

就像，啊，我需要一个创业想法。

And yet everything in the world is broken.

然而世界上的一切都已破碎。

And I also recall my first startup early 2010, 2012 ish, I joined a friend's company.

我还记得我第一次创业是在2010年初，2012年左右，我加入了一个朋友的公司。

That was started at the same time that the Stripe founders started Stripe.

这是在 Stripe 创始人创建 Stripe 的同时开始的。

And that is, I think about that a lot because with the same information, knowing how hard it was to accept online payments, I chose to work on something else where they didn't.

也就是说，我经常思考这一点，因为有了相同的信息，知道接受在线支付有多困难，我选择从事其他他们不做的事情。

They worked on making it easy in seven lines of code to accept payments online, which turned out to be really useful.

他们致力于通过七行代码轻松接受在线付款，结果证明这非常有用。

Jeff Weinstein: So I really encourage people to be very sensitive to the problems that they see and just not let any little hiccup go unnoticed.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：所以我真的鼓励人们对他们看到的问题非常敏感，不要让任何小问题被忽视。

And I think Atlas is really a manifestation of that, which is, let's actually look at every single thing.

我认为阿特拉斯确实是这一点的体现，也就是说，让我们实际看看每一件事。

You went from hobby to economically successful operation and which of any moment along the way you shouldn't have had to do.

你从爱好变成了经济上成功的经营，而在此过程中的任何时刻你都不应该这样做。

And we think those things are a fair game to play with in any topic.

我们认为这些东西在任何主题中都是一个公平的游戏。

I think that there are many more gigantic businesses, important things to be solved sitting in plain sight.

我认为还有更多巨大的业务、更重要的事情需要解决。

I can't see them always, but when you hear, if you sit in enough silence and you hear the same people complain about problems, you too might find something as big as online payments are hard, which was sitting right in front of all of us.

我不能总是看到他们，但是当你听到时，如果你坐得足够安静，并且你听到同样的人抱怨问题，你也可能会发现像在线支付很难这样大的事情就摆在我们所有人面前。

Lenny Rachitsky: And I think it's important to note, it doesn't necessarily have to be a venture-backed, venture scale company.

Lenny Rachitsky：我认为值得注意的是，它不一定是一家由风险投资支持的、风险规模的公司。

Right.

正确的。

There are many, most businesses in the world are non venture-backed, venture scale billion-dollar companies.

世界上有很多、大多数企业都是非风险投资支持的、风险投资规模达数十亿美元的公司。

You can build a profitable company.

您可以建立一家盈利的公司。

Jeff Weinstein: It's kind of funny.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这有点有趣。

We've all put this badge of honor of giving away a lot of your company.

我们都把这枚荣誉徽章送给了你们公司。

People really love owning a lot of their company and being successful.

人们真的很喜欢拥有自己的公司并获得成功。

So you just got to pick the right capital structure for your business.

因此，您只需为您的企业选择正确的资本结构即可。

Lenny Rachitsky: And again, the amount of money that has been generated of the companies that started through Atlas, you said $5 billion, basically that's the GDP of Atlas.

Lenny Rachitsky：再说一次，通过 Atlas 创办的公司所创造的资金数额，你说的是 50 亿美元，基本上这就是 Atlas 的 GDP。

That Atlas is,-

那个阿特拉斯是——

Jeff Weinstein: And that's like revenue per year and that's growing,-

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这就像每年的收入，而且还在增长，-

Lenny Rachitsky: Yeah.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：是的。

And obviously a lot of it would've happened anyway, but still it accelerated.

显然，无论如何，很多事情都会发生，但它仍然在加速。

It's probably growing faster.

可能会增长得更快。

A lot of it probably never would've happened otherwise.

否则的话，很多事情可能永远不会发生。

Yeah.

是的。

Jeff Weinstein: We ran a survey a little bit ago, we need to rerun this, where we just asked people would they have started their business without Atlas.

Jeff Weinstein：我们不久前进行了一项调查，我们需要重新进行这项调查，我们只是询问人们如果没有 Atlas，他们是否会开始自己的业务。

And about 20% of people said they wouldn't have or wouldn't had then.

大约 20% 的人表示他们当时不会或不会这样做。

Right.

正确的。

And it's not all Google employees leaving their job to the build something.

并不是所有谷歌员工都会辞去工作去创造一些东西。

It's people from every possible background, every possible role, every possible job, every possible age group who see problems and can solve it.

来自各种可能的背景、每种可能的角色、每种可能的工作、每种可能的年龄组的人们都能看到问题并能够解决问题。

So it's dramatically more fragile than people think.

所以它比人们想象的要脆弱得多。

Lenny Rachitsky: Well, great work, Jeff, and team Atlas and Stripe in general.

Lenny Rachitsky：嗯，Jeff 以及 Atlas 和 Stripe 团队的工作都做得很好。

Lenny Rachitsky: Let's talk about one last thing.

Lenny Rachitsky：让我们谈谈最后一件事。

There's so many more things I still want to talk about.

我还有很多事情想讲。

Maybe we'll have a,-

也许我们会有一个，-

Jeff Weinstein: We can go quick.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们可以快点。

Yeah, we can .

是的，我们可以。

Lenny Rachitsky: Make it 2X speed.

Lenny Rachitsky：将速度提高 2 倍。

So Atlas is basically a zero to one product.

所以Atlas基本上是一个从零到一的产品。

I know you didn't start initially, it was there, but you took it from, I don't know, maybe you took it from 0.5 or something to one in 100 now, and a lot of people struggle with starting things like this within larger companies.

我知道你不是一开始就开始的，它就在那里，但你把它从，我不知道，也许你把它从 0.5 或大约现在的百分之一，很多人在大公司内开始做这样的事情而挣扎。

Like Stripe's a large company, right?

Stripe 是一家大公司，对吧？

It's like a very innovative, well run company, but it's also a large company.

它就像一家非常创新、经营良好的公司，但它也是一家大公司。

And clearly you made shit happen, you and your team.

显然，你和你的团队让事情发生了。

What kind of things have you learned?

你学到了哪些东西？

Actually, let me read a quote.

实际上，让我读一下引文。

Here's a quote that kind of describes you being good at this from one of your former colleagues who will go unnamed.

以下是一位未透露姓名的前同事的话，描述了您在这方面的擅长。

"Jeff is really good at cutting through the BS.

“杰夫真的很擅长消除废话。

You hear so much about frameworks and all this complicated stuff that people talk about, NPM circles, one of the most straightforward, obvious things probably right.

你听到了很多关于框架和人们谈论的所有这些复杂的东西，NPM 圈子，最直接、最明显的事情之一可能是正确的。

I get so annoyed after calls with Jeff sometimes because I know he's right about something.

有时在和杰夫通电话后我会很生气，因为我知道他在某些事情上是对的。

I banged my head against the wall for months." And so talk about just what you've done, what you've learned about getting stuff done.

几个月来我一直用头撞墙。”所以谈谈你所做的事情，以及你在完成工作方面学到了什么。

Lenny Rachitsky: Talk about what you've done, what you've learned about getting stuff done at a large company.

Lenny Rachitsky：谈谈你所做的事情，以及你在大公司完成工作时学到的东西。

What do you need to do?

你需要做什么？

Jeff Weinstein: Not having things be your idea I think is really powerful.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我认为不让事情成为你的想法真的很强大。

I just talked to 50 customers who all yelled the same thing.

我刚刚和 50 位顾客交谈过，他们都喊着同样的话。

Here they are in varieties of quotes and forms and the rest of it, and you put some three bullet points of strategy around why it's important, it's going to help you win more market share, and the rest of it and how you can do it well.

这里有各种各样的报价和形式以及其余部分，您可以围绕为什么它很重要、它将帮助您赢得更多市场份额以及其余部分以及如何做好它提出一些战略要点。

Cool.

凉爽的。

What else could we want to do?

我们还想做什么？

Maybe somebody has something where 51 people have the same burning thing, but the majority failure mode is we do nothing.

也许有人有 51 个人都有同样的问题，但大多数失败模式是我们什么也不做。

That's the majority failure mode.

这是大多数故障模式。

So one, aligning people with deep customer stories story boarding some solution visually with a Sharpie and not a pencil, not Figma initially, not high or low fidelity.

因此，第一，将人们与深入的客户故事结合起来，用 Sharpie 而不是铅笔，最初不是 Figma，不是高保真度或低保真度，以视觉方式编写一些解决方案。

I can never remember which one is the detailed one, but Sharpie.

我永远记不起哪一张是详细的，但记号笔。

What is the unconstrained perfect solution to this burning problem?

对于这个燃烧问题，无约束的完美解决方案是什么？

Jeff Weinstein: That's Pixar-style storyboard.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这是皮克斯风格的故事板。

You don't need to be a designer.

你不需要成为一名设计师。

You can just draw stick figures on a piece of paper or whimsical or whatever you want to do.

你可以在一张纸上画简笔画，或者异想天开，或者任何你想做的事情。

And with those things, if you're not asking for the sun and the moon on headcount and team size to make some forward progress, who could stop you?

有了这些，如果你不要求日月在人数和团队规模上取得一些进步，谁能阻止你呢？

Let's get some first version working.

让我们让第一个版本运行起来。

It was very motivating to get that single piece of paper in the mail, which was blank, to kick us off on the 83(b) election.

在邮件中收到那张空白的纸，让我们开始 83(b) 选举，这是非常有动力的。

Again, by the time this podcast airs, we'll have crossed 10,000 83(b) elections filed, and we will have done them all 100.00% on time.

同样，到本播客播出时，我们将已提交 10,000 份 83(b) 选举，并且我们将按时 100.00% 完成所有这些选举。

With the burning use case, why customers are going to need it, why we can do it cheaply, effectively, safely over a long period of time, and here's the way to get tangible, forward progress quickly against the stick figure vision, but with something in the browser or one version of it.

有了紧迫的用例，为什么客户会需要它，为什么我们可以在很长一段时间内以廉价、有效、安全的方式做到这一点，这就是根据简笔画愿景快速获得切实、向前进展的方法，但可以在浏览器中或它的一个版本中使用某些东西。

Let's just get one thing working one time.

让我们一次只做一件事。

Jeff Weinstein: I find proof of existence to be an incredibly powerful proof, rather than proof by theory or proof by debate.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我发现存在证明是一个非常强大的证明，而不是理论证明或辩论证明。

It's like, "Look, we did it one time.

就像是，“看，我们曾经做过一次。

Hey, I'm holding the piece of paper." Pretty motivating.

嘿，我拿着那张纸。”非常激励人心。

If we just printed out the right information, we'd be done.

如果我们打印出正确的信息，我们就完成了。

You're like, "Okay, actually there's a lot to do other than just that," but it really pushed us forward.

你会说，“好吧，实际上除了这些之外还有很多事情要做”，但这确实推动了我们前进。

Cutting through a little bit of the red tape is about momentum and making each step not such a big deal and asking for less permission.

减少一点繁文缛节是为了动力，让每一步都不那么重要，并且要求更少的许可。

Then of course, once you have a little bit of that under your belt, you're going to naturally be trusted with taking more of those kinds of bets.

当然，一旦你掌握了一些这样的知识，你自然就会被信任接受更多此类赌注。

Jeff Weinstein: Paired with some of the things we talked about earlier of everyone's looking at the same place about the metrics, everyone can watch the success.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：结合我们之前讨论过的一些事情，每个人都在关注相同的指标，每个人都可以看到成功。

We don't need to do big, internal updates with long-winded PowerPoint presentations and scrambles the night before.

我们不需要在前一天晚上进行冗长的 PowerPoint 演示和杂乱的大型内部更新。

You can just go to the metrics page and see how we're doing.

您只需转到指标页面即可查看我们的表现。

That brings so much trust to the group that people start going from, "Why do we have this Atlas thing that doesn't really produce so much money.

这给团队带来了如此多的信任，以至于人们开始思考，“为什么我们有这个 Atlas 东西，但并没有真正产生那么多钱。

It's charging companies when they don't have money.

当公司没有钱时，它就会向他们收费。

We're a big payments business.

我们是一家大型支付企业。

How do you even compare these things?" To "Wow, look at the progress that they're making against the mission, and look at its impact on the curves." And you start to root for it more.

你如何比较这些事情？”到“哇，看看他们在任务中取得的进展，看看它对曲线的影响。”然后你开始更加支持它。

Jeff Weinstein: I think that's how we got it there.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我想这就是我们取得成功的原因。

I will say one other thing, which is that making something economically viable is extremely important.

我还要说另一件事，那就是让某些事情在经济上可行是极其重要的。

I am probably the fourth person to run Atlas, and it's quite a pantheon of people prior to me, including the founder of Mozi, which is a compliance startup, Watershed, which is this amazing climate reporting tool, also led Atlas, Patrick McKenzie, patio11, for many folks who

我可能是第四个运行 Atlas 的人，在我之前有很多人，包括 Mozi 的创始人，这是一家合规初创公司，Watershed 是一个令人惊叹的气候报告工具，也领导了 Atlas，帕特里克·麦肯齐 (Patrick McKenzie)、patio11，对于许多人来说

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow, what an alumni group, this collection.

Lenny Rachitsky：哇，这个系列真是一个校友团体。

Jeff Weinstein: We owe ourselves a dinner.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们欠自己一顿晚餐。

We owe ourselves a dinner.

我们欠自己一顿晚餐。

Quite a group.

真是一群。

And now we have a new person.

现在我们有了一个新人。

I technically no longer lead Atlas, so we've hired up a whole team, which is really exciting.

从技术上讲，我不再领导 Atlas，所以我们雇佣了整个团队，这真的很令人兴奋。

And Hayley Halvarsson, who's joined us about a year or two ago, she leads Atlas now and you can find her on Twitter.

Hayley Halvarsson 大约在一两年前加入我们，现在领导 Atlas，您可以在 Twitter 上找到她。

She's fantastic.

她太棒了。

We swap jobs over a course of a year, just one month at a time, the roles.

我们在一年的时间里交换工作，一次只交换一个月。

And so she worked for me, then I worked for her, and she's gone off to hire some amazing people to run Atlas.

所以她为我工作，然后我为她工作，然后她就去聘请一些了不起的人来运营阿特拉斯。

So it's really quite a privilege to have these people lead it over time.

因此，让这些人长期领导它确实是一种荣幸。

Jeff Weinstein: But it was really important for us to communicate why we were going to run this in an economically viable way, and I think that applies to all products and all businesses.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：但对我们来说，传达为什么我们要以经济上可行的方式运营这一点非常重要，我认为这适用于所有产品和所有业务。

It's like, "Look, if you're a customer acquisition-style product, showcase why this is the best customer acquisition for the dollar for the company.

就像，“看，如果你是一个客户获取型产品，请展示为什么这是公司最好的客户获取方式。

If you are a margin-generating, moat-creating, ecosystem-growing portion of the business, then your metrics have to show it." So you can't just have half the story of just the product quality and the tweets.

如果你是企业中创造利润、创造护城河、发展生态系统的部分，那么你的指标必须表明这一点。”因此，你不能只了解产品质量和推文的一半故事。

You have to have the economics.

你必须有经济能力。

Who else is going to put this much energy into this style of product and that gives us confidence that we should invest it in the long term?

还有谁会在这种类型的产品上投入如此多的精力，这让我们有信心进行长期投资？

Because alternatives can come and go, and I super encourage there to be more Atlas alternatives.

因为替代品可以来来去去，我超级鼓励有更多的 Atlas 替代品。

That'd be great for founders, but I think over the long term, it'll be difficult to do so because of the business model.

这对创始人来说是件好事，但我认为从长远来看，由于商业模式的原因，很难做到这一点。

Lenny Rachitsky: There actually was an alternative at one point, AngelList, and then they're like, "No, Stripe is killing it.

Lenny Rachitsky：实际上曾经有过一种替代方案，AngelList，然后他们会说，“不，Stripe 正在扼杀它。

Let's just send everyone to Atlas."

让我们把所有人都送到阿特拉斯吧。”

Jeff Weinstein: I had worked on Stripe payments for a while, and I had just started on Atlas, and I think that same month AngelList announced that they were doing incorporation and banking and cap table all together, which was exactly what I wanted to do.

Jeff Weinstein：我曾在 Stripe 支付领域工作过一段时间，而且刚刚开始做 Atlas，我想同月 AngelList 宣布他们正在一起做公司注册、银行业务和股权结构表，这正是我想做的。

I was like, "Oh shoot, did I sign up for the wrong thing?

我当时想，“天啊，我是不是注册错了？

AngelList is such a smart group of people, so customer-oriented, great brand, I love many of the people that work there, they work with some of the best legal minds, and they have the RUV setup.

AngelList 是一群如此聪明的人，如此以客户为导向，伟大的品牌，我喜欢在那里工作的许多人，他们与一些最优秀的法律人才合作，并且他们拥有 RUV 设置。

There's so much awesomeness here." I was like, " Should we really compete?

这里有太多令人敬畏的事情了。”我当时想，“我们真的应该竞争吗？

What should we do here?" And we thought about it more and more like, "Look, in the very long term, this company-starting process is going to become a efficiency cost problem, and there's so much long tail complexity with dealing with multiple financial institutions, multiple government processes, all of this legal complexity, and it's difficult to charge a lot of money for it because it's hard to charge people money when they haven't even started the business yet."

我们应该在这里做什么？”我们越来越多地思考这个问题，“看，从长远来看，这个公司创办过程将成为一个效率成本问题，而且与多个金融机构、多个政府流程以及所有这些法律复杂性打交道存在如此多的长尾复杂性，并且很难为此收取很多费用，因为当人们甚至还没有开始业务时就很难向他们收取费用。”

Jeff Weinstein: We looked at it and said, "Look, we're going to keep this long-term, compounding approach because we think that this is where it's going to go." And it was a zero interest rate environment at the time.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我们看了之后说，“看，我们将保持这种长期的、复合的方法，因为我们认为这就是它的发展方向。”当时是零利率环境。

AngelList built a phenomenal product.

AngelList 打造了一款非凡的产品。

I looked at it with nothing but admiration and happiness, but it also smarted and hurt.

我看着它，只有钦佩和幸福，但也有痛苦和伤害。

We kept building, kept building, kept building, and I got a phone call one night, on my wife's birthday before we sat down for dinner, and it was Dan at AngelList, I hope he'd be comfortable telling the story, who I love.

我们不断地建设，不断地建设，不断地建设，有一天晚上，在我妻子的生日那天，我们坐下来吃晚饭之前，我接到了一个电话，是 AngelList 的丹打来的，我希望他能轻松地讲述这个我爱的故事。

Incredible product mind and he led product over AngelList for startups.

令人难以置信的产品思维，他领导了初创公司 AngelList 的产品。

He said, "We're going to get out of incorporation.

他说：“我们将退出公司。

This is not going to be our focus going forward.

这不会是我们未来的重点。

Do you want the business?"

你想要生意吗？”

Jeff Weinstein: That was like a year and a half after they had really gone out, or maybe two years after they'd gone out, or something like this.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：那大约是他们真正出去一年半后，或者可能是他们出去两年后，或者类似的事情。

I was like, "Wow." We had kept such an open relationship with them.

我当时想，“哇。”我们与他们保持着开放的关系。

We had paired with them on legal constructs.

我们与他们在法律结构上进行了合作。

We had discussed 83(b) election openly.

我们公开讨论了 83(b) 选举。

A lot of people were like, "I can't believe you're talking to the competitor." Look, we all share the same mission here.

很多人都说，“我不敢相信你正在和竞争对手交谈。”看，我们都在这里承担着相同的使命。

Yes, we're competing, but are we really all better off from treating each other at arm's distance?

是的，我们在竞争，但彼此保持距离真的会更好吗？

We had a shared Slack channel.

我们有一个共享的 Slack 频道。

We discussed when the Delaware was slow on incorporation.

我们讨论了特拉华州合并进程缓慢的情况。

One time is because they were playing softball and they had an afternoon off.

有一次是因为他们在打垒球，所以下午休息了。

That's a real story, and we've discussed it.

这是一个真实的故事，我们已经讨论过。

AngelList was incredible in how they evaluated it.

AngelList 他们的评估方式令人难以置信。

We're evaluating different partners, but because of our working relationship and the quality of your product, and they saw we were going with 83(b) election and the intensity of that, they just put up a webpage that said to get started with AngelList, if you need a company, go right over to Atlas.

我们正在评估不同的合作伙伴，但由于我们的工作关系和你们产品的质量，他们看到我们正在进行 83(b) 选举及其强度，他们只是贴了一个网页，说要开始使用 AngelList，如果你需要一家公司，请直接转到 Atlas。

Jeff Weinstein: That was a really amazing moment because I respected them so much and I looked up to them so much that they would mutually beneficially choose to do that.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：那真是一个令人惊奇的时刻，因为我非常尊重他们，非常仰慕他们，以至于他们会选择这样做，这对双方都有利。

And everybody was excited and happy, and customers are happy, and it's been an incredible relationship since, in which you can start on AngelList, go through Atlas, and then all of your information is automatically populated into AngelList automatically.

每个人都感到兴奋和高兴，客户也很高兴，从那时起，这是一种令人难以置信的关系，您可以从 AngelList 开始，浏览 Atlas，然后您的所有信息都会自动填充到 AngelList 中。

We've since rolled that out with several other partners, Mercury, Carta, others, but AngelList really led the way there, and we maintain a great relationship with the team.

此后，我们与其他几个合作伙伴（Mercury、Carta 等）一起推出了该服务，但 AngelList 确实在这方面处于领先地位，并且我们与团队保持着良好的关系。

It took a while, but it really reproved to me that they're not competitors.

虽然花了一段时间，但这确实向我证明了他们不是竞争对手。

It's alternatives, and if you care about your customer, you care about their alternatives, and if you care about the mission, you need to all work together.

这是替代方案，如果你关心你的客户，你就会关心他们的替代方案，如果你关心使命，你就需要共同努力。

Look, there's some friendly competition, of course.

看，当然有一些友好的竞争。

We all want to win, but in the long term, I think all parties are significantly better off.

我们都想赢，但从长远来看，我认为各方的情况都会好得多。

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow, that is an awesome story.

Lenny Rachitsky：哇，这是一个很棒的故事。

I don't know if you've shared that anywhere else.

我不知道你是否在其他地方分享过。

There's so many lessons there that I could spin off on and...

那里有很多课程可供我借鉴，并且......

Not worrying about competition, staying heads down, just solving customer problems, staying close to your competition, not being afraid to talk to them, sharing advice with each other, just building the best possible product.

不担心竞争，保持低调，只是解决客户问题，与竞争对手保持密切联系，不害怕与他们交谈，互相分享建议，只是打造最好的产品。

I don't know, there's a ton there that's super interesting.

我不知道，那里有很多非常有趣的东西。

Jeff Weinstein: I couldn't really draw it up any better, and I think the world is better off with more specialization, and it's a pain in the butt to do these incorporations.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦（Jeff Weinstein）：我真的无法把它画得更好，我认为世界更加专业化会更好，而进行这些合并是一件痛苦的事情。

I think you want more specialization and more partnership, and I think a lot of companies are starting to do that now.

我认为你想要更多的专业化和更多的合作伙伴关系，我认为很多公司现在都开始这样做了。

Lenny Rachitsky: Let me go back to the lessons you shared on how to build something new at a big company, then we can wrap up.

Lenny Rachitsky：让我回顾一下您分享的有关如何在大公司创建新事物的课程，然后我们就可以结束了。

I took a bunch of notes here, and these are awesome and they actually resonate a lot with Mihika, who came on the podcast, who's at Figma, been the person building a lot of zero-to-one stuff.

我在这里记下了一堆笔记，这些笔记非常棒，它们实际上引起了 Mihika 的共鸣，Mihika 参加了播客，在 Figma 工作，是构建了很多从零到一的东西的人。

So it's nice that there's these trends that are coming up again and again.

所以很高兴这些趋势一次又一次地出现。

Lenny Rachitsky: One tip is storyboard the ideal.

Lenny Rachitsky：其中一个建议是故事板是理想的选择。

With a Sharpie, draw out, "Here's this exciting vision of what this could be if we were to pull it off without constraints." Unconstrained, powerful vision.

用记号笔画出，“这是一个令人兴奋的愿景，如果我们不受限制地实现它，将会发生什么。”无拘无束，视野强大。

Two is solve a burning use case.

二是解决紧迫的用例。

Make it clear this is a huge problem for a lot of people.

明确这对很多人来说是一个大问题。

There's probably stories you share there.

那里可能有您分享的故事。

Show tangible forward progress like, "Look at this, we made this progress, we made this progress.

展示切实的进展，例如，“看看这个，我们取得了这一进步，我们取得了这一进步。

Sent ourselves a piece of blank paper.

给我们自己发了一张白纸。

Look at this, it's a huge milestone." And have momentum, and Mihika talked about this.

看看这个，这是一个巨大的里程碑。”并且要有动力，美希卡谈到了这一点。

Keep the fire alive.

让火继续燃烧。

Keep the fire alive, show momentum.

保持火势旺盛，展现动力。

We're making progress.

我们正在取得进展。

This metrics moving up into the right.

该指标向右上方移动。

Then there's a milestone...

然后就有了一个里程碑...

Felt like you had an early milestone of like, "Look, we made progress," and then also, have the business case, basically.

感觉就像你有一个早期的里程碑，比如“看，我们取得了进展”，然后基本上还有业务案例。

"Look how much we could make and look what this could be if we were to succeed." Anything you'd add there?

“看看我们能赚多少钱，看看如果我们成功的话会是什么样子。”您有什么要添加的吗？

Anything you'd correct?

你有什么要纠正的吗？

Jeff Weinstein: Bringing the earliest customers into the room with your team as soon as humanly possible.

Jeff Weinstein：尽快将最早的客户带入您的团队。

We would just invite a founder to the team meeting.

我们只会邀请创始人参加团队会议。

We would pipe all their feedback into a Slack channel automatically.

我们会将他们的所有反馈自动传输到 Slack 通道中。

We have all the NPS scores going to a channel, and anytime it's not a 10 for 10, we follow up directly.

我们将所有 NPS 分数发送到一个渠道，只要不是 10 对 10，我们就会直接跟进。

Constant engagement with a customer creates the momentum where it doesn't need to be the product person or some other leader saying, "We need to do this.

与客户的持续互动创造了动力，不需要产品人员或其他领导者说：“我们需要这样做。

Follow me." It's, "Oh my gosh, the world needs this.

跟我来。”它是，“天哪，世界需要这个。

Let's figure out how to do it even faster."

让我们想想如何更快地做到这一点。”

Jeff Weinstein: And a tip that the team has tried, and this is well since I've been involved day-to-day, is literally inviting customers in to design the product, which I'd actually never heard of.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：团队尝试过的一个技巧是邀请客户参与设计产品，这是我每天都参与其中以来的结果，而我实际上从未听说过。

"Hey, we're thinking about what happens after incorporation now and what can we do to help founders after they've set up their company?

“嘿，我们现在正在考虑公司成立后会发生什么，以及在创始人成立公司后我们可以做些什么来帮助他们？

What would be magical there?" We just invite founders in, into a Whimsical, a piece of software I love.

那里会有什么神奇的东西？”我们只是邀请创始人加入我喜欢的一款异想天开的软件。

It's a really easy learning curve to create visual diagrams.

创建可视化图表的学习曲线非常简单。

And rather than doing a UXR about it, we just say, "What would you hope this dashboard would have?" And they'd grab a thing, and they start typing, and they start drawing what they want their dashboard to be.

我们并没有对此进行 UXR，而是说：“您希望这个仪表板有什么？”他们会抓起一个东西，然后开始打字，然后开始绘制他们想要的仪表板。

Why were we guessing beforehand?

为什么我们要事先猜测？

I now scratch my head.

我现在挠头。

I'm several years into a decade-plus building things and I was like, "I doing this by myself.

我已经进行了十几年的建筑工作，我当时想，“我自己做这件事。

Why didn't I just assign it to the people who are going to use it in the first place?"

为什么我不把它分配给首先要使用它的人呢？”

Jeff Weinstein: Now look, that doesn't always work because not all of your customers are going to be product designers at heart, but more of them than you think, and I think it's giving your customers write access, and not just read access, to your company is incredibly powerful.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：现在看，这并不总是有效，因为并非所有客户本质上都是产品设计师，但他们的数量比你想象的要多，而且我认为为你的客户提供对你公司的写访问权限，而不仅仅是读访问权限，这是非常强大的。

I think I had not quite seen it so directly where you just actually designed what they want, but I saw a diagram of something we're working on right now.

我想我还没有那么直接地看到它，你实际上只是设计了他们想要的东西，但我看到了我们现在正在研究的东西的图表。

I was like, "Wow, we haven't even had design look at it." They're like, "No, actually the customer drew it." Great.

我当时想，“哇，我们甚至还没有对其进行设计。”他们会说，“不，实际上是顾客画的。”伟大的。

Why were we guessing?

我们为什么要猜测？

Lenny Rachitsky: I think you have an unfair advantage where your customers are founders and oftentimes have product skills and design skills, but I love that .

Lenny Rachitsky：我认为您拥有不公平的优势，因为您的客户是创始人，并且通常拥有产品技能和设计技能，但我喜欢这一点。

Jeff Weinstein: It's true, but I will really push, because you don't need a hundred of them and you'll find somebody somewhere who knows.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这是真的，但我会真正推动，因为你不需要一百个，你会在某个地方找到知道的人。

You just got to sit in a little more silence.

你只需再安静地坐着。

They'll raise their hand.

他们会举手。

Lenny Rachitsky: There's a quote you shared somewhere that relates to what you just said that your dad once said, "You can screw up a sentence if it begins with 'The customer.'"

Lenny Rachitsky：你在某处分享过一句话，与你刚才所说的话有关，你父亲曾经说过，“如果一个句子以‘顾客’开头，你可能会搞砸。”

Jeff Weinstein: That's true.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：确实如此。

Yeah, my dad runs an IT business in Baltimore to help other businesses with their computer systems.

是的，我父亲在巴尔的摩经营一家 IT 企业，帮助其他企业使用计算机系统。

Growing up, I would literally, physically clean the keyboards of his employees and dust the mice.

在成长过程中，我确实会亲自清洁他员工的键盘并除尘鼠标。

But yeah, he's very, very customer-oriented, where I get a lot of it from, and my mom's a painter, so I think there's some combination of talents or interests there.

但是，是的，他非常非常以客户为中心，我从那里得到了很多，而且我妈妈是一名画家，所以我认为那里有一些才能或兴趣的结合。

He would take it one step further, and he sometimes physically bring a chair over in a meeting and say, "The customer is sitting here," and you'd have to pretend.

他会更进一步，有时他会在会议上亲自拿一把椅子过来并说：“顾客坐在这里”，而你必须假装。

Then he would fake talk to the invisible customer.

然后他会假装与隐形顾客交谈。

"Based on what you've seen today at the meeting..." I saw him do this one time.

“根据你今天在会议上看到的情况……”我有一次看到他这样做。

"Based on what you've seen today at the meeting, are you more likely to pay your bill or less likely to pay your bill based on what you witnessed?"

“根据你今天在会议上看到的情况，根据你所目睹的情况，你更有可能支付账单还是不太可能支付账单？”

Jeff Weinstein: That's a little intense on the pantomime, but I think the point gets across that...

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这部哑剧有点激烈，但我认为重点是……

Again, because it's so natural to think internal, if you begin the sentence physically with "The customer" then start your sentence, you just have a much better shot at it.

再说一次，因为内部思考是很自然的，所以如果你用“客户”开始句子，然后再开始你的句子，你就会有更好的机会。

Lenny Rachitsky: That's an amazing story.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：这是一个了不起的故事。

Very a study group-ish, like an early prototype.

非常像一个研究小组，就像早期的原型一样。

Jeff, we've covered so much ground.

杰夫，我们已经讨论了很多内容。

I have two hours more worth of questions, but we need to-

我还有两个小时的问题要问，但我们需要——

Lenny Rachitsky: We need to cut it off, I think.

Lenny Rachitsky：我认为我们需要切断它。

Is there anything else you wanted to share or leave listeners with before we get to a very exciting lightning round?

在我们进入激动人心的闪电回合之前，您还有什么想与听众分享或留给听众的吗？

Jeff Weinstein: Really excited about whatever you're building out there, thinking of building.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：对于你正在构建的任何东西，以及正在考虑构建的东西，我感到非常兴奋。

My email address is incredibly easy to find.

我的电子邮件地址非常容易找到。

My Twitter handle is incredibly easy to find.

我的 Twitter 账号非常容易找到。

Do not hesitate to send me cold emails.

请随时向我发送冷电子邮件。

My love language is Loom videos of bugs, but feel free to send anything you have off the top of your head.

我喜欢的语言是 Loom 的错误视频，但请随意发送您想到的任何内容。

I respond to good cold emails.

我回复好的冷邮件。

Don't hesitate.

不要犹豫。

Lenny Rachitsky: What's the email, real quick, for people?

Lenny Rachitsky：发给人们的电子邮件是什么？

Jeff Weinstein: If finding my email address is your issue?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：如果找到我的电子邮件地址是您的问题吗？

It can't possibly be, but it is my first initial and last name at basically everything in the world, though my handle on Twitter is jeff_weinstein, but gosh, if you can't find my email address then you got a bigger problem.

这不可能，但它是我在世界上几乎所有事物的名字首字母和姓氏，尽管我在 Twitter 上的昵称是 jeff_weinstein，但是天哪，如果你找不到我的电子邮件地址，那么你就会遇到更大的问题。

Lenny Rachitsky: Okay, we'll link to it in the show notes, as well.

Lenny Rachitsky：好的，我们也会在演出笔记中链接到它。

With that, we've reached our very exciting lightning round.

至此，我们进入了非常激动人心的闪电回合。

Are you ready?

你准备好了吗？

Here we go.

开始了。

What are two or three books you've recommended most to other people?

您向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？

Jeff Weinstein: I know a lot of people on this podcast recommend high-output management, but it should be swap the Bible out for it at all the hotels in the world, in the little drawer.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我知道这个播客上的很多人都推荐高产出管理，但世界上所有酒店的小抽屉里都应该把《圣经》换成它。

Put it everywhere.

把它到处放。

You can't go wrong, though.

不过，你不会出错。

It is an incredible clarity of how to spend your time as a leader, a manager of other people, a very high bar for how evaluating your work as the sum everyone around you.

作为一个领导者、其他人的管理者，你如何度过自己的时间是非常清晰的，对于如何评估你周围每个人的工作总和来说，这是一个非常高的标准。

That was very clarifying to me that it's not an individual effort, it is the sum of everything I'm involved in is how to measure it.

这对我来说非常清楚，这不是个人的努力，而是我所参与的一切的总和，如何衡量它。

So that's definitely up there.

所以这肯定是在那里。

A nice pair to that book, as a amuse-bouche afterwards, is Orbiting the Giant Hairball: A Corporate Fool's Guide to Surviving with Grace, I think, is the full exact title by Gordon MacKenzie, which is the story of a illustrator at Hallmark, the greeting card company, and it turns out to be a, again, bureaucratic, slow-moving organization that, over time, added rules and policies and rules and policies and quelled creativity and innovation, which is surprising at a greeting card company, but it existed.

与那本书相配的书，作为后来的开胃小菜，是《绕着巨型毛团：一个企业傻瓜优雅地生存指南》，我想，它是戈登·麦肯齐（Gordon MacKenzie）的完整书名，它讲述了贺卡公司霍尔马克（Hallmark）一位插画家的故事，事实证明，它又是一个官僚主义、行动缓慢的组织，随着时间的推移，它增加了规则和政策，并压制了创造力和创新，这是在一家贺卡公司令人惊讶，但它确实存在。

So this is his incredibly well-drawn book, as you'd imagine, with beautiful illustrations about how he orbited the hairball of the organization to inspire others, keep himself engaged, and to bring creativity and excitement and trying to pull people off the hairball as he orbited it.

正如你所想象的那样，这是他精心绘制的一本书，其中有精美的插图，讲述了他如何围绕组织的毛团来激励他人，让自己保持参与，并带来创造力和兴奋，并试图在他围绕组织的毛团时将人们从毛团中拉出来。

So I think it's a fun afternoon read with beautiful illustrations about how to stay sane at big companies and where to be a little goofy and take the advantage and gravity of the hairball, but not be succumbed by it and to be able to orbit it.

所以我认为这是一个有趣的下午，阅读精美的插图，了解如何在大公司保持理智，以及如何变得有点傻，利用毛球的优势和重力，但不被它屈服，并能够围绕它运行。

Jeff Weinstein: Those two are really fun.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这两个人真的很有趣。

I will say one other one I like...

我就说另外一首我喜欢的吧...

Because we haven't talked about strategy here, there's been more getting stuff done and some other tactical things, but 7 Powers, and I know you had the author recently on, which was awesome.

因为我们在这里没有讨论策略，所以有更多的工作要做和其他一些战术性的事情，但是 7 Powers，我知道你最近有作者，这太棒了。

I won't explain the book, you just watch the podcast of it, but it walks through many of the business powers and moats a company can have.

我不会解释这本书，你只需观看它的播客，但它介绍了公司可以拥有的许多商业权力和护城河。

I ran into the author...

我遇到了作者...

Jeff Weinstein: Hamilton Helmer, yes, thank you.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：汉密尔顿·赫尔默，是的，谢谢。

Jeff Weinstein: Very cool name.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：非常酷的名字。

Alliterative.

头韵。

At the Box lunchroom one time, where I worked at Box, they acquired one of our companies, and I was like, "Any luck finding the eighth power?" He was like, "I'm looking, I'm looking," as he ran off with his sandwich.

有一次，我在 Box 工作的 Box 餐厅里，他们收购了我们的一家公司，我当时就想，“能找到八次方吗？”他一边说：“我在看，我在看。”然后他就拿着三明治跑开了。

One other funny, somewhat embarrassing moment about that book is when I was applying to work at Stripe, I was in some email conversation with our CEO, Patrick Collison, who is quite well-read and enjoys books, and I was trying to showcase, " I like books a little bit," though not at any level of him.

关于这本书的另一个有趣、有点尴尬的时刻是，当我申请在 Stripe 工作时，我与我们的首席执行官帕特里克·科里森 (Patrick Collison) 进行了一些电子邮件交谈，他博览群书并且喜欢书籍，我试图展示“我有点喜欢书籍”，尽管不是他的任何级别。

And I had mentioned I just finished reading 7 Powers, and I recommended it to him, but it joke's on me because he's quoted in the foreword that I had skipped.

我提到我刚刚读完《七种力量》，我向他推荐了这本书，但这对我来说是个笑话，因为我跳过了前言中引用了他的内容。

So he was very kind to let me know that he had read it and he is quoted in it, so I was like, "Oh shoot, maybe I won't get the job." But I got through that part, at least.

所以他非常友善地让我知道他已经读过这本书并且其中引用了他的话，所以我当时想，“哦天啊，也许我不会得到这份工作。”但至少我完成了那部分。

So those books have spoken to me.

所以那些书对我说话了。

Do you have a favorite power, by the way, Lenny?

顺便问一下，莱尼，你有最喜欢的力量吗？

Do you have a favorite power?

你有最喜欢的力量吗？

Lenny Rachitsky: His favorite power is counter-positioning.

Lenny Rachitsky：他最喜欢的力量是反定位。

I also like that power a lot because I think it's the one you can that really changes everything about how you build your company, so that's the one that always stands out to me.

我也非常喜欢这种力量，因为我认为这种力量可以真正改变你如何建立公司的一切，所以这对我来说总是很突出。

How about you?

你呢？

Jeff Weinstein: I like counter-positioning also, and Atlas with going cheap and that audience is counter-positioning, but I really enjoy process, the process power, because it is very difficult to, as an organization, get good at anything, and if you could do that over a long period of time in a sustainable way, you have a power.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我也喜欢反定位，Atlas 的价格很便宜，观众也很反定位，但我真的很喜欢过程，过程的力量，因为作为一个组织，很难做好任何事情，如果你能在很长一段时间内以可持续的方式做到这一点，你就有力量。

Lenny Rachitsky: This is the nerdiest chat I've ever had.

Lenny Rachitsky：这是我经历过的最书呆子式的聊天。

Which is your favorite 7th Power?

你最喜欢哪一个第七次方？

I love it.

我喜欢它。

But on that power, I asked him about it.

但关于这个权力，我问过他。

He makes a really strong point there, that rarely is it actually a power for people.

他在那里提出了一个非常重要的观点，即它很少真正成为人们的力量。

They think the way we execute is going to be our advantage and rarely is it actually a power.

他们认为我们的执行方式将成为我们的优势，但实际上很少是一种力量。

Usually people can copy it, but when you nail it...

通常人们可以复制它，但是当你钉住它时......

Jeff Weinstein: That's even better, because then if your competition thinks they have it-

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：那更好，因为如果你的竞争对手认为他们拥有它-

Jeff Weinstein: They won't invest than the other one.

杰夫韦恩斯坦：他们不会比另一家投资。

So I like it even more, for that reason.

因此，我更喜欢它。

Lenny Rachitsky: I love it.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：我喜欢它。

But I was going to say with Patrick Collison being quoted in the book, not only was he wrote part of the forward or was quoted, he basically credited 7 Powers of helping build Stripe.

但我想说的是，书中引用了帕特里克·科里森（Patrick Collison），他不仅写了部分前言或被引用，而且基本上归功于他帮助建立 Stripe 的 7 个力量。

No big deal.

没什么大不了的。

Lenny Rachitsky: This lightning around is going great.

Lenny Rachitsky：周围的闪电进展顺利。

This is a very microcosm of our whole chat so far.

这是我们迄今为止整个聊天的一个缩影。

Second question, do you have a favorite recent movie or TV show?

第二个问题，你最近有最喜欢的电影或电视剧吗？

Jeff Weinstein: How To with John Wilson.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：如何与约翰·威尔逊相处。

It's on HBO.

HBO 播出。

For those who haven't seen it, not really giving away anything because it's just wild when you watch it.

对于那些还没有看过它的人来说，并没有真正放弃任何东西，因为当你观看它时，它只是很疯狂。

You can't give it away.

你不能把它放弃。

This videographer has found footage where he's just walking through Manhattan, and other parts of the country, but mostly New York, with a camera for 10 years, just filming intensely weird things.

这位摄像师发现了他在曼哈顿和美国其他地方行走的镜头，但主要是在纽约，他带着相机 10 年，只是拍摄了非常奇怪的事情。

And if you've spent any time in New York, there's plenty to film.

如果您在纽约待过一段时间，这里有很多值得拍摄的地方。

Then has put together this narrative afterwards about certain topics like how to make risotto or how to take out the trash or how to...

然后将有关某些主题的叙述放在一起，例如如何制作意大利调味饭或如何倒垃圾或如何......

Jeff Weinstein: It's a way of seeing life through the eyes of these vignettes, diving down and really understanding people, and he does it through this incredibly dry humor of stitching together this video footage to tell a different narrative.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这是一种通过这些小插曲的眼睛来看待生活、深入了解并真正理解人们的方式，他通过这种令人难以置信的冷幽默将这段视频片段拼接在一起来讲述不同的故事。

And I think some of it is that we used to live in New York, and I love living in California, but I miss that frequency of strangeness, and you can see that through that TV show.

我认为其中一些原因是我们曾经住在纽约，我喜欢住在加利福尼亚，但我怀念那种陌生的频率，你可以通过那个电视节目看到这一点。

Fantastic.

极好的。

Jeff Weinstein: Movie?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：电影？

I recently watched The Quiet Girl, which is a film about a young Irish girl who is from a dysfunctional home and has this opportunity to live with a family friend who have more opportunity for her, more empathetic to her, and it showcases, again, how fragile things are.

我最近看了《安静的女孩》，这部电影讲述了一个年轻的爱尔兰女孩的故事，她来自一个功能失调的家庭，有机会和一个家庭朋友住在一起，朋友对她有更多的机会，对她更有同情心，这再次展示了事物是多么脆弱。

It's a very intense film, but there's something beautiful in how much opportunity was in front of this young girl.

这是一部非常紧张的电影，但在这个年轻女孩面前有如此多的机会，这是一件美丽的事情。

It is a tearjerker, but a great one.

这是一部催人泪下的电影，但却是一部很棒的电影。

Lenny Rachitsky: Do you have a favorite product you have recently discovered that you love?

Lenny Rachitsky：您最近发现有最喜欢的产品吗？

Jeff Weinstein: I love my computer.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我爱我的电脑。

I'm fast at my computer.

我用电脑速度很快。

Being fast at my computer helps me just go from intention to just out in the world.

快速使用电脑可以帮助我从有意向走向世界。

I've fallen back in love with Raycast, which is an automation tool for those who have watched the journey of Spotlight and Quicksilver and Alfred and all these automator services.

我重新爱上了 Raycast，它是一个自动化工具，适合那些观看了 Spotlight、Quicksilver 和 Alfred 以及所有这些自动化服务的历程的人。

Raycast seems to have cracked the nut on automation, nerd complexity, but also UI ease and some nice touches and loads quickly, does the basics.

Raycast 似乎已经解决了自动化、书呆子复杂性、UI 易用性和一些不错的触摸和快速加载的问题，完成了基础知识。

It's fully programmable, extensible, just a huge fan of Raycast.

它是完全可编程的、可扩展的，是 Raycast 的忠实粉丝。

And then I think for product people, if you don't have CleanShot installed for screenshots, you're behind the curve.

然后我认为对于产品人员来说，如果您没有安装 CleanShot 来进行屏幕截图，那么您就落后了。

Being able to take a screenshot and blur particular things or point at stuff or have arrows and lines and have that be second nature, fast, instantaneous is so useful to be able to communicate what you're seeing.

能够截取屏幕截图并模糊特定的事物或指向某物或使用箭头和线条并使其成为第二天性，快速，即时，对于能够传达您所看到的内容非常有用。

When I get a new laptop, it's Raycast first and CleanShot second.

当我买了一台新笔记本电脑时，首先是 Raycast，其次是 CleanShot。

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow, I am going to download CleanShot immediately.

Lenny Rachitsky：哇，我要立即下载 CleanShot。

Lenny Rachitsky: I've not heard of it.

Lenny Rachitsky：我没听说过。

I've been using Skitch as my blurrings.

我一直在使用 Skitch 作为我的模糊效果。

Jeff Weinstein: As much as I appreciate the Skitch folks, CleanShot is an incredible piece of software.

Jeff Weinstein：尽管我很欣赏 Skitch 的工作人员，但 CleanShot 是一款令人难以置信的软件。

Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

I'm going to do that.

我要这么做。

All right, two more questions.

好吧，还有两个问题。

Do you have a favorite life motto that you often come back to, share with friends or family, find useful in work or in life?

您是否有一条最喜欢的人生格言，您经常回顾并与朋友或家人分享，并发现它对工作或生活有用？

Jeff Weinstein: I don't even realize I say "Go Go Go" a lot, but I do.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我什至没有意识到我经常说“Go Go Go”，但我知道。

I actually say it and write it so people I hear that they'll later say, "Go Go Go" back to me.

事实上，我这么说并写下来，是为了让我听到的人稍后会对我说“Go Go Go”。

I'm like, "Huh?

我想，“啊？

Don't I say that sometimes?" "Yes, you say it a lot." So apparently, "Go Go Go" is one of them.

我不是有时候也会这么说吗？” “是啊，你说了很多。”显然，“Go Go Go”就是其中之一。

I also-

我也——

Jeff Weinstein: Say, "Let's make some mistakes," when we're brainstorming something or sitting at a sushi restaurant and talk sushi guy or gal, to showcase, "Let's be creative.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：当我们集思广益或坐在寿司店与寿司师傅或女孩交谈时，说“让我们犯一些错误”，以展示“让我们发挥创造力。

Do whatever you want.

做任何你想做的事。

No pretense.

没有假装。

I'm not evaluating anything.

我不评价任何东西。

Let's make some mistakes." It's just a weird thing.

让我们犯一些错误吧。”这只是一件奇怪的事情。

Lenny Rachitsky: They're so good.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：他们太棒了。

I'm going to use that for my podcast guests.

我将把它用于我的播客嘉宾。

"Let's just make some mistakes.

“让我们犯一些错误吧。

Don't worry about it."

别担心。”

Jeff Weinstein: At that point, everyone's like, "What?

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：那时，每个人都会说，“什么？

Okay, fine.

好吧，好吧。

Sure.

当然。

Cool."

酷。”

Lenny Rachitsky: I like the combo of those two, "Go go go, let's just make some mistakes while we're going."

Lenny Rachitsky：我喜欢这两者的组合，“走走走，让我们在前进的过程中犯一些错误。”

Jeff Weinstein: You have to use it in certain circumstances and not for the five nines of reliability on our API, but it does have its place.

Jeff Weinstein：您必须在某些情况下使用它，而不是为了我们 API 的五个 9 的可靠性，但它确实有它的地位。

Lenny Rachitsky: Final question.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：最后一个问题。

You worked with Patrick Collison and John Collison for many years.

您与帕特里克·科里森和约翰·科里森共事多年。

I'm curious what the most useful feedback or advice you have heard from them or learned from them?

我很好奇您从他们那里听到或学到的最有用的反馈或建议是什么？

Jeff Weinstein: On my first month working here, which I guess is six, seven years ago now, they had put me in charge of our payments infrastructure services.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我在这里工作的第一个月，我猜是六七年前了，他们让我负责我们的支付基础设施服务。

That's all the backend systems that communicate with the financial system and all the internal APIs where we build the external APIs and products on top of, so quite a lot of stuff.

这是与金融系统通信的所有后端系统以及我们在其上构建外部 API 和产品的所有内部 API，所以有很多东西。

I knew nothing about finance.

我对金融一无所知。

I knew nothing about the scale that we're talking about.

我对我们正在谈论的规模一无所知。

They entrusted me, somewhat insanely, with that responsibility.

他们把这个责任委托给了我，这有点疯狂。

On the first month we had our quarterly business review where...

在第一个月，我们进行了季度业务回顾，其中......

The normal quarterly process, and I was like, "Okay, cool.

正常的季度流程，我当时想，“好吧，酷。

I'll do the next one.

我来做下一件。

I'll write the next one." I've been here one month.

我会写下一篇。”我来这里已经一个月了。

They're like, "No, you write it.

他们会说：“不，你写的。

It'll be even better that you write it." It's like, oh my God.

如果你写的话就更好了。”就像，天哪。

It's forcing me to have to, in the fourth week, have that catalyst to understand the whole business and with the permission, because I was going to have to write this doc about how we're doing.

这迫使我必须在第四周内拥有催化剂来了解整个业务并获得许可，因为我将不得不写一份关于我们正在做的事情的文档。

The company had been in existence for seven years before I got here.

在我来到这里之前，这家公司已经存在七年了。

It was already at some reasonable scale.

它已经达到了一定的合理规模。

Jeff Weinstein: It was an intense operation, and I remember writing the first draft and sending it to him because it was...

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：这是一个紧张的操作，我记得写了初稿并将其发送给他，因为它是......

I didn't want to send...

本来不想寄的...

He had pushed me to do it a bit, and I figured I'd give him an early draft and he wrote back, "This doesn't sound like you yet." The willingness to entrust a new person to provide their own perspective and bring it into a very formalized document like that was an impressive...

他催促我这么做，我想我应该给他一份初稿，他回信说：“这听起来还不像你。”愿意委托一个新人提供自己的观点并将其纳入这样一个非常正式的文件中，这是令人印象深刻的......

That really spoke to me, and I rewrote it completely, and I made it sound like me, and I've tried to make things sound like me since.

这确实对我有用，我完全重写了它，我让它听起来像我，从那以后我一直试图让事情听起来像我。

Jeff Weinstein: John's is more of a gut punch, I'll say.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我想说，约翰的拳头更像是一记重击。

I reported to John, the co-founder.

我向联合创始人约翰汇报。

Maybe nine months into reporting to him, I would run around with a clipboard.

也许向他汇报九个月后，我就会拿着写字板到处跑。

I was a little bit manic of getting a lot done.

我对完成很多工作感到有点躁狂。

A lot going on at Stripe at the time.

当时 Stripe 发生了很多事情。

We'd have a one-hour one-on-one, I'd be listing all of the things that we had accomplished and the problems we have and where we need escalation help and where we're stuck and all this that and the other.

我们会进行一小时的一对一，我会列出我们已经完成的所有事情、我们遇到的问题、我们需要升级帮助的地方、我们陷入困境的地方等等。

Lots of stuff.

很多东西。

I had checklists and physical paper, flipping it over a little bit frantically.

我有清单和纸质文件，疯狂地翻动着。

And he said, "You are one of the best people I've ever worked with at solving problems three through 100, but I need you stuck on problems one and two."

他说：“你是我合作过的解决问题 3 到 100 的最优秀的人之一，但我需要你专注于问题 1 和 2。”

Jeff Weinstein: Oh man, that hurt.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：天哪，太痛了。

I was like, "Oh, shoot." I am productive on the non-hardest problems and I was trying to mask, not on purpose mask, but who wants to be stuck on something so hard when there's so much else to do?

我当时想，“哦，开枪吧。”我在非最困难的问题上很有成效，而且我试图掩盖，而不是故意掩盖，但是当有这么多其他事情要做时，谁愿意被困在如此困难的事情上呢？

From then on, I would show up to him with problems one and two and not talk about problems three through 100.

从那时起，我会向他提出问题一和问题二，而不再谈论问题三到问题一百。

Even if we were working on them, we would just not talk about them and we would get stuck on problems one and two.

即使我们正在研究它们，我们也不会谈论它们，我们会陷入问题一和问题二。

That was phenomenal advice, which I was like, "Oh, shoot, I'm going to be fired." But it was really a deeply impactful sentence.

这是一个了不起的建议，我当时想，“哦，天哪，我要被解雇了。”但这确实是一句影响深远的一句话。

Lenny Rachitsky: Wow, what a powerful, great, helpful...

Lenny Rachitsky：哇，多么强大、伟大、乐于助人的......

That's great advice right there.

这是很好的建议。

Jeff Weinstein: Like a street fighter style or something.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：就像街头霸王风格之类的。

Lenny Rachitsky: But to your point, very impactful and helpful.

Lenny Rachitsky：但就你而言，非常有影响力和帮助。

Lenny Rachitsky: Jeff, we did it.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：杰夫，我们做到了。

The archeology is complete.

考古工作已经完成。

Jeff Weinstein: I appreciate the time, Lenny.

杰夫·韦恩斯坦：我很感激能抽出时间，莱尼。

It was fun.

很有趣。

I don't do too many of these, so I'm curious to people's feedback and really appreciate the questions.

我没有做太多这样的事情，所以我对人们的反馈感到好奇，并且非常感谢他们提出的问题。

Lenny Rachitsky: Amazing.

莱尼·拉奇茨基：太棒了。

Jeff, thank you so much for being here.

杰夫，非常感谢你来到这里。

Bye everyone.: Thank you so much for listening.

大家再见：非常感谢您的聆听。

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您可以在 LennysPodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。

See you in the next episode.

下一集见。