Geoffrey Moore on finding your beachhead, crossing the chasm, and dominating a market
Geoffrey Moore: The tendency when you're in the chasm is, "I just need more customers.
杰弗里·摩尔:当你陷入困境时,你的倾向是,“我只需要更多的客户。
I should take any customer I could find," because we need revenue.
我应该接受我能找到的任何客户,”因为我们需要收入。
It's like taking a match and running it back and forth under a log.
这就像拿一根火柴并在一根圆木下来回运行。
It's not going to light the log.
它不会点燃日志。
So how do you start a fire?
那么如何生火呢?
Well, you start it by putting a little kindling, little crumpled up paper, and you hold the match in one place until the fire starts.
好吧,你首先放一点引火物,一点皱巴巴的纸,然后把火柴放在一个地方,直到火开始燃烧。
That's why adjacency is so important.
这就是为什么邻接如此重要。
If you light the fire, the piece of kindling is here, but the log is in the other room.
如果你点燃火,引火物就在这里,但木头在另一个房间。
That doesn't work.
那是行不通的。
Lenny: Today, my guest is Geoffrey Moore.
莱尼:今天,我的客人是杰弗里·摩尔。
Geoffrey is the author of maybe the most influential and important book on go-to-market ever written, Crossing the Chasm.
杰弗里 (Geoffrey) 是《跨越鸿沟》(Crossing the Chasm) 的作者,这本书可能是有史以来最具影响力和最重要的有关市场进入的书籍。
Even though it's sold over a million copies, it still feels like people continue to reinvent many of the lessons that Geoffrey uncovered and shared in a seminal book.
尽管它的销量超过一百万册,但人们仍然感觉人们在继续重新发明杰弗里在一本开创性的书中发现和分享的许多教训。
In our conversation, we discuss why it's so important to get very narrow with your initial audience, how the bowling pin strategy helps you get past early adopters, what the specific go-to-market playbook is for every stage of the adoption lifecycle, why using the wrong playbook during the wrong phase will slow you down.
在我们的对话中,我们讨论了为什么缩小初始受众范围如此重要,保龄球瓶策略如何帮助您超越早期采用者,采用生命周期每个阶段的具体上市策略是什么,为什么在错误的阶段使用错误的策略会减慢您的速度。
Also, the seven deadly sins of trying to cross the chasm incorrectly.
此外,还有试图错误地跨越鸿沟的七宗罪。
Also, how to sell your product at different personas, why you don't need to focus on the problem and the pain when you're selling to early adopters, plus some real good life advice that I didn't expect.
另外,如何以不同的角色销售您的产品,为什么在向早期采用者销售时不需要关注问题和痛苦,以及一些我没想到的真实的美好生活建议。
Lenny: Geoffrey has so much wisdom to share if you're building a B2B company, and I'm really excited to bring you this episode.
莱尼:如果您正在建立一家 B2B 公司,杰弗里有很多智慧可以分享,我很高兴为您带来这一集。
With that, I bring you Geoffrey Moore after a short word from our sponsors.
在我们的赞助商简短致辞后,我为您带来了杰弗里·摩尔 (Geoffrey Moore)。
Lenny: Let me tell you about CommandBar.
莱尼:让我告诉你有关 CommandBar 的事情。
If you're like me and most users I've built product for, you probably find those little in-product pop-ups really annoying.
如果您像我和我为其构建产品的大多数用户一样,您可能会发现那些产品内的小弹出窗口真的很烦人。
Want to take a tour?
想参观一下吗?
Check out this new feature, and these pop-ups are becoming less and less effective since most users don't read what they say.
看看这个新功能,这些弹出窗口的效果越来越差,因为大多数用户不阅读他们所说的内容。
They just want to close them as soon as possible, but every product builder knows that users need help to learn the ins and outs of your product.
他们只是想尽快关闭它们,但每个产品构建者都知道用户需要帮助来了解产品的细节。
We use so many products every day, and we can't possibly know the ins and outs of everyone.
我们每天都会使用很多产品,我们不可能知道每个产品的来龙去脉。
CommandBar is an AI-powered toolkit for product, growth, marketing, and customer teams to help users get the most out of your product without annoying them.
CommandBar 是一款由人工智能驱动的工具包,适用于产品、增长、营销和客户团队,可帮助用户充分利用您的产品而不打扰他们。
Lenny: They use AI to get closer to user intent, so they have search and chat products that let users describe what they're trying to do in their own words, and then see personalized results like customer walkthroughs or actions.
Lenny:他们使用人工智能来更接近用户意图,因此他们拥有搜索和聊天产品,让用户用自己的语言描述他们想要做什么,然后看到个性化结果,例如客户演练或操作。
They do popups too, but their nudges are based on in-product behaviors like confusion or intent classification, which makes them much less annoying and much more impactful.
他们也做弹出窗口,但他们的推动是基于产品内的行为,如混淆或意图分类,这使得它们不那么烦人,而且更有影响力。
This works for web apps, mobile apps, and websites, and they work with industry leading companies like Gusto, Freshworks, HashiCorp, and LaunchDarkly.
这适用于网络应用程序、移动应用程序和网站,他们与 Gusto、Freshworks、HashiCorp 和 LaunchDarkly 等行业领先公司合作。
Over 15 million end users have interacted with CommandBar.
超过 1500 万最终用户与 CommandBar 进行过交互。
To try out CommandBar, you can sign up at commandbar.com/lenny, and you can unlock an extra 1,000 AI responses per month for any plan.
要试用 CommandBar,您可以在 commandbar.com/lenny 上注册,并且对于任何计划,您每月都可以额外解锁 1,000 个 AI 响应。
That's commandbar.com/lenny.
那是commandbar.com/lenny。
Lenny: This episode is brought to you by WorkOS.
Lenny:本集由 WorkOS 为您带来。
If you're building a SaaS app, at some point, your customers will start asking for enterprise features like SAML authentication and SCIM provisioning.
如果您正在构建 SaaS 应用程序,那么在某些时候,您的客户将开始要求提供 SAML 身份验证和 SCIM 配置等企业功能。
That's where WorkOS comes in, making it fast and painless to add enterprise features to your app.
这就是 WorkOS 的用武之地,它可以快速、轻松地将企业功能添加到您的应用程序中。
Their APIs are easy to understand so that you can ship quickly and get back to building other features, and hundreds of other companies are already powered by WorkOS, including ones you probably know, like Vercel, Webflow, and Loom.
他们的 API 很容易理解,因此您可以快速交付并重新构建其他功能,并且数百家其他公司已经由 WorkOS 提供支持,其中包括您可能知道的公司,例如 Vercel、Webflow 和 Loom。
WorkOS also recently launched AuthKit, a complete authentication and user management service.
WorkOS 最近还推出了 AuthKit,这是一项完整的身份验证和用户管理服务。
It's essentially a modern alternative to Auth0, but with better pricing and more flexible APIs.
它本质上是 Auth0 的现代替代品,但具有更好的定价和更灵活的 API。
Lenny: AuthKit's design is stunning out of the box, and you can also fully customize it to fit your app's brand.
Lenny:AuthKit 的设计开箱即用,令人惊叹,您还可以完全自定义它以适合您的应用程序品牌。
It's an effortless experience from your first user all the way to your largest enterprise customer.
从您的第一个用户一直到您最大的企业客户,这都是一种轻松的体验。
Best of all, AuthKit is free for any developer up to 1 million users.
最重要的是,AuthKit 对任何拥有 100 万用户的开发人员都是免费的。
Check it out at workos.com to learn more.
请访问 workos.com 以了解更多信息。
That's workos.com.
那是workos.com。
Lenny: Geoffrey Moore, thank you so much for being here, and welcome to the podcast.
莱尼:杰弗里·摩尔,非常感谢您来到这里,欢迎来到播客。
Geoffrey Moore: Well, it's nice to be here, Lenny, and thank you for having me.
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,很高兴来到这里,莱尼,谢谢你邀请我。
Lenny: It's incredibly cool to have you on.
莱尼:有你在真是太酷了。
You've been at the top of my wishlist of guests to have on this podcast ever since I launched it, so it's surreal to be chatting with you.
自从我推出这个播客以来,你一直是我希望收听的嘉宾名单中的首位,所以与你聊天感觉很超现实。
It almost feels like maybe this podcast has crossed the chasm now that you're on.
现在你开始收听这个播客,感觉好像已经跨越了鸿沟。
Geoffrey Moore: If you'd called me earlier, I probably would've been on it with you.
杰弗里·摩尔:如果你早点给我打电话,我可能会和你一起做这件事。
But anyway, we're together now.
但无论如何,我们现在在一起了。
Lenny: I thought it'd be fun to start with this question of just what frustrates you most about what people still don't get about the things that you teach, particularly Crossing the Chasm.
莱尼:我认为从这个问题开始会很有趣,即人们对你所教授的内容仍然不了解,特别是跨越鸿沟,这让你最沮丧的是什么。
You wrote that, I think, 33 years ago at this point.
我想,你是在 33 年前的这个时候写的。
You have a lot of follow-up books around the topic.
您有很多围绕该主题的后续书籍。
What do you think people still don't really understand or often get wrong?
您认为人们还没有真正理解或经常犯错的是什么?
Geoffrey Moore: All the books I write are about frameworks.
Geoffrey Moore:我写的所有书都是关于框架的。
They're conceptual models about what patterns should you be looking for as something evolves?
它们是关于随着事物的发展您应该寻找哪些模式的概念模型?
Because in disruptive innovation, there's no history.
因为在颠覆性创新中,没有历史。
You're always projecting a possible history, and then seeing if you can make it come true.
你总是在预测一个可能的历史,然后看看是否能让它成为现实。
So that implies there's a lot of freedom to exercise the framework however you choose to.
因此,这意味着您可以自由地选择如何使用该框架。
People sometimes do that in ways that are just...
人们有时这样做的方式只是......
They actually end up being very misleading about what's possible.
他们实际上最终对可能性产生了很大的误导。
I can remember one person early on saying, "Yeah, we're Crossing the Chasm.
我记得很早就有人说过:“是的,我们正在跨越鸿沟。
Our beachhead segments the Fortune 500," and you went, "Well, I don't think maybe you're as clear on this as you could be."
我们的滩头阵地划分了财富 500 强”,你说道,“好吧,我认为你可能对此不太清楚。”
Geoffrey Moore: To be fair, that's what the function of any third party advisor is, is to say, "Look, time out.
杰弗里·摩尔:公平地说,这就是任何第三方顾问的职责,就是说,“听着,暂停一下。
You might be looking at this through an inside-out lens.
您可能会通过由内而外的视角来看待这个问题。
Maybe you should be looking at it from an outside-in lens." That's probably number one.
也许你应该从外向内的角度来看待它。”这可能是第一。
Gosh, after that, I'm just empathetic with the fact that their world's more important than my world, so I try to work with their world.
天哪,在那之后,我只是同情他们的世界比我的世界更重要,所以我尝试与他们的世界合作。
Lenny: That's exactly where I actually wanted to go next is this idea of starting very focused with your initial target audience.
莱尼:这正是我下一步真正想要去的地方,那就是从最初的目标受众开始就非常关注。
I think people conceptually know this.
我认为人们在概念上都知道这一点。
They're like, "Yeah, we should be really focused with our initial target market.
他们会说,“是的,我们应该真正专注于我们最初的目标市场。
We should stay very small, and expand this beachhead idea." But I think they still don't quite actually do this because it's like, "Why not go wider?" So could you just talk about why that is so important, and how to actually think about how to do that correctly?
我们应该保持规模很小,并扩大这个滩头阵地的想法。”但我认为他们实际上仍然没有这样做,因为这就像“为什么不走得更远呢?”那么您能否谈谈为什么这如此重要,以及如何真正思考如何正确地做到这一点?
Geoffrey Moore: If you're essentially in a business where the category is emerging, then the most important thing for you to do is to be able to create enough power around your company that you can navigate your future on your own power.
杰弗里·摩尔:如果你所在的行业本质上是一个新兴类别,那么你要做的最重要的事情就是能够在你的公司周围创造足够的力量,这样你就可以靠自己的力量驾驭你的未来。
Where does power come from in an early adopting technology world?
在早期采用技术的世界中,力量从何而来?
First of all, it'll come from can you get a lighthouse customer?
首先,它来自于你能获得灯塔客户吗?
So one of the things we try to do even before you try to cross the chasm is can you get one or more customers who put you on the map?
因此,在您尝试跨越鸿沟之前,我们尝试做的一件事就是您能否吸引一位或多位让您出名的客户?
And they go, "Whoa, did you know that the CIA used AWS?" Like, "Holy smoke." Okay, that's great.
他们会说,“哇,你知道 CIA 使用 AWS 吗?”就像“神圣的烟雾”。好的,太好了。
It doesn't make a company, but it makes a story, and it lets people know, "Oh, here are the guys that did the CIA project," that kind of thing.
它不会创造一家公司,但它创造了一个故事,它让人们知道,“哦,这些人做了中央情报局的项目,”之类的事情。
Geoffrey Moore: The Crossing the Chasm model is, "Can you create a viable repeatable business?" And in order to do that, you need to have an ecosystem of partners work with you in order to consolidate your position.
杰弗里摩尔:跨越鸿沟的模型是“你能创造一个可行的可重复的业务吗?”为了做到这一点,您需要有一个合作伙伴生态系统与您合作,以巩固您的地位。
Well, why would an ecosystem work with some startup that nobody's ever heard of?
那么,为什么生态系统会与一些没人听说过的初创公司合作呢?
The answer would be if you had consolidated a market segment where you were number one.
答案是,如果你已经巩固了你排名第一的细分市场。
So one of the things we've learned about company power is that basically it's the company power plus the ecosystem together.
因此,我们了解到的关于公司实力的一件事是,基本上它是公司实力加上生态系统的结合。
So ecosystems form around market leaders, and they do not form around the rest of us.
因此,生态系统是围绕市场领导者形成的,而不是围绕我们其他人形成的。
If you're a category leader, if you're like Oracle and Databases, you're 40 years in.
如果您是某个类别的领导者,如果您喜欢 Oracle 和数据库,那么您已经进入了 40 年。
You're still the leader, because the ecosystem organized around you.
您仍然是领导者,因为生态系统是围绕您组织的。
Geoffrey Moore: But when you're little, the only way you can get an ecosystem to organize around you is to go after a segment where you're a big fish in that pond.
杰弗里·摩尔:但是当你还小的时候,让你周围的生态系统组织起来的唯一方法就是追求你是池塘里的一条大鱼的部分。
We talk a lot about fish to pond ratio.
我们经常谈论鱼与池塘的比例。
You want to be...
你想成为...
Your first pond, your target segment should be something that in the next two years, if you hit your really high growth rates, you could be 30, 40, 50% of the market share in that segment.
你的第一个池塘,你的目标细分市场应该是在未来两年内,如果你达到真正高的增长率,你可能会占据该细分市场 30%、40%、50% 的市场份额。
That would cause partners to go, "Whoa, if we're going to serve that segment, we got to work with these guys." So that's the key.
这会导致合作伙伴说,“哇,如果我们要为这个细分市场提供服务,我们就必须与这些人合作。”这就是关键。
The concept there is, "Well, why wouldn't you also do two or three or four segments at the same time?" It's sort of the same reason, "Why wouldn't you run in three or four primaries at the same time if you want the presidential nomination?" Although why you would want that nomination, I have no idea.
这里的概念是,“好吧,为什么你不同时做两个、三个或四个部分呢?”这有点像“如果你想获得总统提名,为什么不同时参加三到四场初选呢?”虽然你为什么想要获得提名,但我不知道。
Geoffrey Moore: But if you did, you realize if you're running in New Hampshire, votes in Vermont do not count.
杰弗里·摩尔:但如果你这样做了,你就会意识到,如果你在新罕布什尔州竞选,佛蒙特州的选票不算数。
It's the same thing with Crossing the Chasm.
《跨越鸿沟》也是如此。
You need to get three or four or five or six reputable companies in a segment to all pick you, for then the rest of the segment to go, "Well, it's pretty obvious who the standard is." I'll just close with one last comment.
你需要让一个细分市场中的三、四、五、六家信誉良好的公司都选择你,然后该细分市场的其余部分就会说:“嗯,标准是谁是很明显的。”我将以最后一条评论作为结束。
And the reason, the mechanism behind all that logic, is that pragmatic people buy what they see their peers are buying.
原因是,所有这些逻辑背后的机制是,务实的人会购买他们看到的同龄人正在购买的东西。
So if peer one is buying product A, and peer two is B and C and D, there's no market leader, and the category goes sideways.
因此,如果同行一购买产品 A,而同行二购买产品 B、C 和 D,则不存在市场领导者,该类别就会横盘整理。
But if A, B and C, if three out of four people are using the iPhone, it's like, "Oh, I guess I'm supposed to get an iPhone," that kind of thing.
但如果 A、B 和 C,如果四分之三的人都在使用 iPhone,就会像“哦,我想我应该买一部 iPhone”之类的事情。
Lenny: Awesome.
莱尼:太棒了。
I'm glad you went there, because that's essentially the root of this Crossing the Chasm idea that people after the chasm, the pragmatists, wait for references and social proof, and they're waiting for someone to tell them, "This is worth using," versus visionaries right before the chasm.
我很高兴你去了那里,因为这本质上是跨越鸿沟想法的根源,即鸿沟之后的实用主义者等待参考和社会证据,他们正在等待有人告诉他们,“这是值得使用的”,而不是鸿沟之前的梦想家。
They're like, "I just want to use the future.
他们就像,“我只是想利用未来。
I need to be there before anyone else."
我需要先于其他人到达那里。”
Geoffrey Moore: You're right.
杰弗里·摩尔:你说得对。
One of the ways we try to capture that in a thought bubble is before the chasm, the customers you work with are people who say, "We believe what you believe." So in other words, they're on the same side.
我们试图在思想泡沫中捕捉这一点的方法之一是在鸿沟之前,与你合作的客户是那些说“我们相信你所相信的”的人。换句话说,他们是站在同一边的。
After the chasm, they say, "I'm not sure about that, but we need what you have." So transitioning from, "We believe what you believe," which is how you sell to visionaries to, "We need what you have," which is how you sell to pragmatists.
鸿沟过后,他们说:“我不确定,但我们需要你拥有的东西。”因此,从“我们相信你所相信的”(这就是你向有远见的人推销的方式)转变为“我们需要你拥有的东西”(这就是你向实用主义者推销的方式)。
That's the shift.
这就是转变。
Lenny: Let's actually spend some more time there on what it is that each of these segments needs, and how you convince them to use it, because this is really useful.
莱尼:实际上让我们花更多的时间来了解每个细分市场需要什么,以及如何说服他们使用它,因为这确实很有用。
So in these pragmatists group, you're saying the pitch there is you have a pain.
所以在这些实用主义者群体中,你说的是你感到痛苦。
I will solve this pain, and it's important pain.
我会解决这个痛苦,这是重要的痛苦。
I think people always assume that's the pitch.
我认为人们总是认为这就是球场。
But interestingly, your point is earlier in the two segments and maybe share what those two are, they use your product for a different reason.
但有趣的是,你的观点是在这两个部分的前面,也许分享这两个部分是什么,他们出于不同的原因使用你的产品。
Geoffrey Moore: In fact, if there's a total in the model of the technology adoption lifecycle that we organize this all around, there's actually four, I call them, inflection points.
杰弗里·摩尔:事实上,如果我们组织的技术采用生命周期模型中有一个总数,那么实际上有四个,我称之为拐点。
The first one we call the early market.
第一个我们称之为早期市场。
That's the one we were talking...
这就是我们正在谈论的那个...
That's the visionaries and the technology enthusiasts.
那就是有远见的人和技术爱好者。
They are as excited about you as you are.
他们和你一样为你感到兴奋。
I mean, they want the demo.
我的意思是,他们想要演示。
They want to see the vision.
他们想要看到异象。
They're exciting.
他们很令人兴奋。
And the key to that market is to have an executive sponsor who has enough clout to essentially fund this thing, because there's no budget for you.
这个市场的关键是要有一个执行发起人,他有足够的影响力来为这件事提供基本资金,因为你没有预算。
So they've got to create the funding, and then drive the organization to go all the way to bright.
因此,他们必须筹集资金,然后推动组织一路走向光明。
Geoffrey Moore: They're not that many visionary customers, but there's always one or two.
杰弗里·摩尔:有远见的客户并不多,但总有一两个。
The reason why it's so important to work with a marquee customer then is you...
与大客户合作如此重要的原因是你......
Look, nobody's ever heard of you, and if they've never heard of your customer, I don't care how amazing the win is.
听着,没有人听说过你,如果他们从未听说过你的客户,我不在乎胜利有多么惊人。
Nobody's going to hear about it.
没有人会听到这件事。
So it's really important you did it with Apple, or you did it with Verizon, or you did it with Mercedes, somebody that people have heard.
因此,与苹果公司合作,或者与威瑞森公司合作,或者与人们都听说过的梅赛德斯公司合作,这非常重要。
So that's number one, and that's a project model.
这是第一,那就是项目模型。
Even if what you sell is a product, those early mark...
即使你销售的是产品,那些早期的标记...
Every one of them is kind of a snowflake.
他们每个人都是一片雪花。
It needs a ton of special services.
它需要大量的特殊服务。
There's no ecosystem of partners to support you, so you throw a bunch of extra labor at it.
没有合作伙伴生态系统来支持您,因此您需要投入大量额外的劳动力。
You do whatever, because you got to make them successful.
你做任何事,因为你必须让他们成功。
So you'll do whatever it takes.
所以你会不惜一切代价。
Geoffrey Moore: Okay, very cool.
杰弗里·摩尔:好的,非常酷。
Got my marquee client, not scalable business, I mean, obviously.
我的意思是,显然,我得到了我的大客户,而不是可扩展的业务。
So then the second one is the Crossing the Chasm playbook.
那么第二本就是《跨越鸿沟》的剧本。
That's the one that organizes around the problem.
这就是围绕问题进行组织的方法。
The good news is those customers are open to hearing from someone new, because they've already talked to everybody they already know, and the problem is still...
好消息是,这些客户愿意听取新朋友的意见,因为他们已经与他们认识的每个人交谈过,但问题仍然是......
It's not that it's unsolved.
并不是说它没有解决。
It's being solved in a crummy way and, by the way, in a deteriorating crummy way.
它正在以一种糟糕的方式解决,顺便说一下,以一种日益恶化的糟糕方式。
So it's getting actually worse.
所以情况实际上变得更糟了。
So there's pressure for them to act.
所以他们有采取行动的压力。
This is where you go from the project model to the solution model, and as a vendor, you over commit to their problem.
这是您从项目模型转向解决方案模型的地方,作为供应商,您过度致力于他们的问题。
Geoffrey Moore: From the very beginning, you talk to them.
杰弗里·摩尔:从一开始,你就和他们交谈。
They don't want to talk to you about you.
他们不想和你谈论你。
They want to talk to you about them, and you need to ask them probing questions about them.
他们想和你谈论他们,你需要向他们询问有关他们的探索性问题。
Just like going to a doctor, you don't want the doctor to come and say, "Hey, can I show you a movie of the operation I just did?
就像去看医生一样,你不希望医生走过来说:“嘿,我可以给你看我刚刚做的手术的电影吗?
I want to give you a demo.
我想给你一个演示。
You mind if I give you a demo?" It's like, "No. What I would like to do is talk to you about this pain I have in my side." And then when the doctor asks you good questions about it, you go, "Ah, this is a good doctor.
你介意我给你演示一下吗?”就像是,“不。我想做的是和你谈谈我身边的痛苦。”然后当医生问你一些很好的问题时,你会说:“啊,这是一个好医生。
I'm going to trust this." So that's the whole point about that.
我会相信这一点。”这就是重点。
Again, that scales a lot more than a project business, but it only scales up to the limit of the target segment.
同样,这比项目业务的规模要大得多,但它只能扩展到目标细分市场的极限。
Geoffrey Moore: So we had this bowling alley model of extending.
杰弗里·摩尔:所以我们有了这个保龄球馆的延伸模型。
You could go to a second segment, a third segment if it was adjacent.
您可以转到第二段,如果第三段相邻,则可以转到第三段。
Adjacent means either it's the same customer with a different use case, or it's the same use case in a different customer base, because the one case, you use your customer references.
相邻意味着要么是具有不同用例的同一客户,要么是不同客户群中的同一用例,因为在第一种情况下,您使用客户参考。
The other case, you use your partners, because the partners who built the one use case will say, "Well, we got another segment that we work with.
另一种情况,你使用你的合作伙伴,因为构建一个用例的合作伙伴会说,“好吧,我们有另一个合作伙伴。
Let's bring you into that segment too." So that can take a company from, I don't know, tens of millions of dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars in the bowling alley.
让我们也带你进入这个领域。”因此,这可能会让一家公司从保龄球馆的数千万美元增至数亿美元。
And in specialized industries like computer-rated design or things like that, you can actually go to a billion dollars or higher.
在计算机设计等专业行业中,您实际上可以花费十亿美元或更高。
Geoffrey Moore: But with most other categories, at some point, you have this third inflection point, which is it's when people go, "Well, wait a minute, wifi isn't just for financial analysts, or isn't just for...
杰弗里·摩尔:但对于大多数其他类别,在某些时候,你会遇到第三个拐点,即人们会说,“好吧,等一下,wifi 不仅仅适用于金融分析师,或者不仅仅适用于......
Wifi is for everybody." So instead of saying, "We believe what you believe," which we're not there anymore.
Wi-Fi 适合所有人。”因此,我们不再说“我们相信你所相信的”。
And these people aren't even really saying, "We need what you have." What they're saying is, "We want what they have.
这些人甚至没有真正说:“我们需要你拥有的东西。”他们的意思是:“我们想要他们拥有的东西。
This is really cool.
这真的很酷。
I want what they have," and that creates what we call the tornado.
我想要他们拥有的东西”,这就产生了我们所说的龙卷风。
That's when people...
这时候人们...
This is when you do want sales coverage, and you do want to go broad, and you do want to have a standard product.
这是当您确实想要销售覆盖范围,并且确实想要扩大范围,并且确实想要拥有标准产品时。
Basically, you want to capture as much market share as you can.
基本上,您希望占领尽可能多的市场份额。
There's a whole playbook around doing that, which was in a book called Inside the Tornado.
有一本关于这样做的完整剧本,在一本名为《龙卷风内部》的书中。
Geoffrey Moore: And then the last one, which is actually becoming much more important in this century is called Main Street, but Main Street where products have become commoditized, services become the new place of innovation.
杰弗里·摩尔:最后一个,在本世纪实际上变得更加重要,被称为主街,但主街的产品已经商品化,服务成为新的创新之地。
We've had taxis for 100 years, but Uber is an incredibly valuable thing.
我们拥有出租车已经有 100 年了,但 Uber 是一个非常有价值的东西。
You convert the product to the service, and how do you revolutionize services?
将产品转化为服务,如何彻底改变服务?
That's a situation where now people are saying, "Look, I don't want to own the product.
在这种情况下,现在人们会说:“听着,我不想拥有这个产品。
I don't want to own it." Well, kids, "I don't want to own a car.
我不想拥有它。”好吧,孩子们,“我不想拥有一辆车。
I just want to call Uber.
我只想给 Uber 打电话。
It's convenient." So anyway, those are the four models, and Crossing the Chasm was about that second one.
很方便。”无论如何,这就是四个模型,《跨越鸿沟》是关于第二个模型的。
Lenny: Amazing.
莱尼:太棒了。
You touched on so many things that I want to talk about.
你谈到了很多我想谈的事情。
I definitely want to dive into the bowling alley metaphor and strategy there.
我绝对想深入探讨保龄球馆的隐喻和策略。
But to close the loop on this target audience to start with initially.
但首先要关闭这个目标受众的循环。
First of all, you have this awesome bonfire analogy that I think might be useful to share.
首先,你有一个很棒的篝火比喻,我认为分享一下可能会有用。
Then along that, is there any example or an example or two you could share of just someone that did that really well of picking a really good initial target?
那么,是否有任何例子或一两个你可以分享的例子,说明有人在选择一个非常好的初始目标方面做得非常好?
Geoffrey Moore: Sure.
杰弗里·摩尔:当然。
Well, the bonfire analogy is just the tendency when you're in the chasm is, "I just need more customers.
嗯,篝火的比喻就是当你陷入困境时的趋势,“我只需要更多的客户。
I should take any customer I could find." Because we need revenue, but the analogy I have is it's like taking a match, and running it back and forth under a log.
我应该接受任何我能找到的顾客。”因为我们需要收入,但我的比喻是,这就像拿一根火柴,然后在一根圆木下来回运行它。
It's not going to light the log.
它不会点燃日志。
So how do you start a fire?
那么如何生火呢?
Well, you start it by putting a little kindling, a little crumpled up paper, and you hold the match one place until the fire starts.
好吧,你先放一点引火物,一点皱巴巴的纸,然后把火柴放在一个地方,直到火开始燃烧。
Then you want to build...
然后你想建立...
The bowling alley metaphor is a little bit about, first of all, how could you win your first segment, but then increasingly, how would you go forward to win it?
保龄球馆的比喻是,首先,你如何才能赢得你的第一部分,但接下来,你将如何继续赢得它?
That's why adjacency is so important.
这就是为什么邻接如此重要。
If you like the fire and the piece of kindling is here, but the log is in the other room, that doesn't work.
如果你喜欢火,并且引火物在这里,但木头在另一个房间,那是行不通的。
So I think those are the key ideas.
所以我认为这些是关键想法。
Geoffrey Moore: There's a lot of people that have made Crossing the Chasm successful.
杰弗里·摩尔:有很多人让《跨越鸿沟》取得了成功。
The one that we wrote about first was this company called Documentum, and it's a good example.
我们首先写的是这家名为 Documentum 的公司,它就是一个很好的例子。
So it was a document management database back in the day that was not...
所以当时它是一个文档管理数据库,但不是......
that nobody had any, "Why would you need this?" It started with the pharmaceutical industry, because pharma said, "Well, new drug approvals are 500,000 page documents, and they really, really, really are hard to manage, and we're screwing it up.
没有人有,“你为什么需要这个?”它始于制药行业,因为 Pharma 说:“嗯,新药批准是 500,000 页的文件,它们真的、真的、真的很难管理,我们把它搞砸了。
And every day we screw it up, we lose a day of patent life of our drug, and the day of patent life's worth about a million or $2 million a day.
每搞砸一次,我们就会失去一天药物的专利寿命,而这一天的专利寿命每天的价值约为一百万或两百万美元。
This is a bad situation.
这是一个糟糕的情况。
We need to do something."
我们需要做点什么。”
Geoffrey Moore: So "Okay, pharma, you got pharma." Great.
杰弗里·摩尔:“好吧,制药公司,你有制药公司。”伟大的。
Well, then what happened was the guys in petrochemicals said, "Well, we're in the chemical industry.
好吧,然后发生的事情是石化行业的人说:“好吧,我们在化学工业。
We're not in the pharmaceutical industry, but we have these standard operating manuals, and we have all these regulatory demands on us too.
我们不是制药行业,但我们有这些标准操作手册,而且我们也有所有这些监管要求。
Not quite like the FDA, but this looks like this could be pretty useful to us too." And then after the petrochemicals guys got...
不太像 FDA,但这看起来对我们也非常有用。”然后在石化公司的人得到之后......
Well, the chemical guys got it, then the petrochemical guys got it.
好吧,化学人员明白了,然后石化人员明白了。
Of course, they're oil and gas, and they say, "Well, in addition, we have all these leases.
当然,它们是石油和天然气,他们说:“嗯,此外,我们还有所有这些租约。
The lease holds them.
租约保留了它们。
It's brilliant.
太棒了。
This property is critical to our future plan, so we need a document database for the leases."
该房产对我们未来的计划至关重要,因此我们需要一个租赁文档数据库。”
Geoffrey Moore: So the guys on Wall Street who are financing these guys are going, "Well, wait a minute.
杰弗里·摩尔:所以华尔街为这些人提供资金的人会说:“好吧,等一下。
Hell, I mean, we're paper from wall to wall here.
天哪,我的意思是,我们这里到处都是纸。
Why don't we..." So what happens is you have this thing of this expansion, but in each case, it was into a new segment, but the use cases were close enough.
我们为什么不......”所以发生的情况是你有这个扩展的东西,但在每种情况下,它都进入一个新的细分市场,但用例足够接近。
Lenny: So if a startup founder is listening and trying to decide is their initial target audience, their ICP too wide, do you have any advice for how to know if this is still too wide, and you should try to get more and more narrow?
Lenny:所以,如果一家初创公司的创始人正在倾听并试图确定他们的初始目标受众,他们的 ICP 太宽,你有什么建议来了解如何知道这是否仍然太宽,并且你应该尝试变得越来越窄?
I know you talk about a single use case.
我知道您谈论的是单个用例。
What else should people be thinking about there?
人们还应该考虑什么?
Geoffrey Moore: Well, so first of all, before you try to cross the chasm, do you have a marquee?
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,首先,在你尝试跨越鸿沟之前,你有一个大帐篷吗?
Have you won a marquee customer that puts you on the map?
您是否赢得了让您名声大噪的大客户?
Because if you're not...
因为如果你不...
You need to make yourself visible before you can make the Crossing the Chasm play.
在玩“跨越鸿沟”游戏之前,您需要先让自己可见。
Let's assume you've done that.
假设您已经这样做了。
So then when we first saw, "Well, why don't I just use that industry?" Turns out that the visionary person you work with...
所以当我们第一次看到“好吧,我为什么不直接使用那个行业呢?”事实证明,与你一起工作的有远见的人......
First of all, they did some very weird things because they're visionaries and second of all, they don't want to help their industry.
首先,他们做了一些非常奇怪的事情,因为他们有远见,其次,他们不想帮助他们的行业。
The whole point of this was they wanted to get ahead of their competitors.
重点是他们想领先于竞争对手。
They didn't want to help.
他们不想帮忙。
So normally you can't use the visionary project as your beachhead.
所以通常你不能使用有远见的项目作为你的滩头阵地。
You'd love to from a point of view of reusing the work.
从重用工作的角度来看,您很乐意这样做。
You just can't.
你就是不能。
So then the question becomes, "Okay, where am I going to go?"
那么问题就变成了:“好吧,我要去哪里?”
Geoffrey Moore: So the key formula, and this is the formula...
杰弗里·摩尔:所以关键公式,这就是公式......
If there's one sort of takeaway from founders listening at this point, you want to have a target segment that is big enough to matter, small enough to lead and a good fit with your crown jewels.
如果创始人在此时倾听时有某种收获,那么您希望拥有一个足够大的目标细分市场,足够重要,足够小以领导并与您的皇冠上的宝石很好地契合。
That's the formula.
这就是公式。
So big enough to matter means do I have enough room to double or...
足够大意味着我有足够的空间加倍还是......
Often venture capitalists talk about a triple double followed by a double triple.
风险投资家经常谈论三双,然后是双三。
So if you said, "Okay, let's just, I'm going to make you a million dollars." Put that visionary, but just to give you a number.
所以如果你说:“好吧,我会让你赚一百万美元。”说得有远见,但只是为了给你一个数字。
Okay, so a double triple would be I went from one to four and from four to 12, and then I did a triple double.
好吧,双三双就是我从 1 到 4,从 4 到 12,然后我做了三双。
So that would be 12 to 24, 24 to 48, 48 to 90.
所以那就是 12 比 24、24 比 48、48 比 90。
Okay, so how would you get from one to a hundred million dollars?
好吧,那么你怎样才能从一美元到一亿美元呢?
Geoffrey Moore: So you want to have a segment that says that I could get to a hundred million dollars in a five year...
杰弗里·摩尔:所以你想要一个片段说我可以在五年内赚到一亿美元......
That was a five-year window.
那是一个五年的窗口。
So you say, "Okay, but what it can't be is a billion dollar segment." Because if it's a billion dollar segment, you might be able to get there, but you would not be a big fish.
所以你会说,“好吧,但不可能是十亿美元的部分。”因为如果这是一个十亿美元的领域,你也许能够到达那里,但你不会是一条大鱼。
So that's a fish to pond ratio thing.
这就是鱼与池塘的比例问题。
So you want to think about, particularly as you're starting out...
所以你要考虑一下,尤其是在你刚开始的时候……
This is a B2B model predominantly.
这主要是 B2B 模式。
If I could take the top 20 customers in this segment, meaning...
如果我能选出该细分市场中排名前 20 的客户,这意味着……
What do I mean by a segment?
我所说的分段是什么意思?
It's in the same geography.
它位于同一地理位置。
People in Japan don't talk to people in America.
日本人不和美国人说话。
People in America don't talk to people in Germany, they even speak different languages.
美国人不与德国人交谈,他们甚至说不同的语言。
I don't know why everybody doesn't speak English, but apparently they don't.
我不知道为什么每个人都不说英语,但显然他们不会。
So they have to be same geography, same industry, because dentists do not talk to software designers, who don't talk to advertising people and in the same profession.
因此,他们必须处于相同的地理位置、相同的行业,因为牙医不与软件设计师交谈,软件设计师不与广告人员交谈并且处于同一行业。
Geoffrey Moore: So salespeople don't talk to finance people and finance people don't talk to the guys in the warehouse.
杰弗里·摩尔:所以销售人员不会与财务人员交谈,财务人员也不会与仓库中的人员交谈。
So same industry, same geography, same profession.
所以同样的行业,同样的地理位置,同样的职业。
And then the compelling use case, which is the thing...
然后是令人信服的用例,这就是......
That's the thing that starts the fire.
这就是引发火灾的原因。
There's segments everywhere and by the way, they all have that...
到处都有片段,顺便说一句,它们都有……
They all do...
他们都做...
Every segment works the same way.
每个部分的工作方式都相同。
If I have to make a high risk buying decision, I'm going to talk to my peers about it.
如果我必须做出高风险的购买决定,我会与我的同事讨论。
And I don't want to be first.
我不想成为第一。
I want to be able to do whatever the herd's doing.
我希望能够做群体所做的任何事情。
But what a compelling reason to buy does is it goes well, but I have to act faster than I want to.
但购买的一个令人信服的理由是它进展顺利,但我必须比我想要的更快地采取行动。
And that's what you need as an entrepreneur.
这就是作为一名企业家所需要的。
You need the customer to be coming toward you even though you're new and you're unproven, and frankly you scare the crap out of them, but they're even more afraid of the problem that they're saddled with.
你需要客户来找你,即使你是新手,未经证实,坦率地说,你把他们吓坏了,但他们更害怕他们所面临的问题。
So that's why you can build a relationship with them.
这就是为什么您可以与他们建立关系。
Lenny: Amazing.
莱尼:太棒了。
And this phase comes...
而这个阶段到来...
You kind of imply it comes after, say you're at a million dollars AR, you don't do this sort of work of trying to cross the chasm at that point, until you reach something like that?
你有点暗示它是在之后发生的,假设你有100万美元的AR,你不会做这种试图跨越鸿沟的工作,直到你达到这样的目标?
Geoffrey Moore: I'm not sure AR is going to be the right reference.
Geoffrey Moore:我不确定 AR 是否会成为正确的参考。
Here's what you need.
这就是您所需要的。
You need a major account who's gone all in with you on the new technology and who is willing in some way to talk about it.
您需要一个与您一起全力支持新技术并且愿意以某种方式谈论它的主要客户。
The good news about visionaries is they tend to have fairly big egos and they tend to like to talk, unlike pragmatists who will not want to talk.
关于有远见的人的好消息是,他们往往有相当大的自负,而且他们往往喜欢说话,这与不愿说话的实用主义者不同。
Pragmatists, they'll have to go to legal and get permission and blah, blah, blah.
实用主义者,他们必须诉诸法律并获得许可,等等等等。
But once you've got that, whatever your revenue is at that point, you should be starting to think about, "Well, what is my beachhead segment?" And the good news about Crossing the Chasm, it's not expensive.
但一旦你明白了这一点,无论你当时的收入是多少,你都应该开始思考,“那么,我的滩头阵地部分是什么?”关于跨越鸿沟的好消息是,它并不昂贵。
Geoffrey Moore: Think about it, once you've said, I'm going to stay in one geography, in one industry, one profession, think about your marketing budget.
杰弗里·摩尔:想一想,一旦你说过,我将留在一个地区、一个行业、一个职业,请考虑一下你的营销预算。
You're not buying Super Bowl ads here.
您不会在这里购买超级碗广告。
There's no sock puppets.
没有袜子木偶。
That's not what we're doing.
那不是我们正在做的事情。
We want to get to maybe 200 people with a message.
我们希望向大约 200 人传达信息。
And then do you have the domain expertise to really understand the problem?
那么您是否拥有真正理解问题的领域专业知识?
And if it's a really compelling problem, they'll take the meeting and getting that meeting is...
如果这是一个真正引人注目的问题,他们就会参加会议,并且召开会议是......
Because if you're an entrepreneurial founder, you're probably fairly charismatic.
因为如果你是一位企业家创始人,你可能相当有魅力。
First of all, you've convinced your spouse that you're willing to work for no money with no benefits, and maybe you pitched a venture capitalist and you fooled them, so why can't you fool these guys?
首先,你已经让你的配偶相信你愿意为没有钱没有福利的工作而工作,也许你向风险投资家推销并且愚弄了他们,那么你为什么不能愚弄这些人呢?
Anyway, that would be the way I would go.
无论如何,这就是我要走的路。
Lenny: Essentially, the advice here is if you're a new early stage startup, one of the biggest milestones you want to aim for is a big marquee customer.
莱尼:本质上,这里的建议是,如果您是一家新的早期初创公司,那么您想要实现的最大里程碑之一就是大客户。
When I think about this and look at a startup deck, if I see something like Figma is using this product or notion or Salesforce.
当我思考这个问题并查看启动平台时,如果我看到 Figma 之类的东西正在使用这个产品或概念或 Salesforce。
Clearly, I'll be like, "Wow, okay, these really sophisticated people decided this was useful to them." And so I will innately trust that.
显然,我会说,“哇,好吧,这些非常老练的人认为这对他们有用。”所以我会天生相信这一点。
There's also often advice of don't work with big companies because they'll push you around, they'll take a long time, they'll force you to build a thing just for them and it won't apply to other people.
人们还经常建议不要与大公司合作,因为他们会摆布你,他们会花费很长时间,他们会强迫你只为他们构建一个东西,而这不适用于其他人。
What's your advice to avoid that downside?
您对避免这种缺点有何建议?
Geoffrey Moore: It has to do with the persona of the executive sponsor.
杰弗里·摩尔:这与执行发起人的角色有关。
Nine out of 10 executive sponsors are going to be the negative because they're going to be a company person working with company processes.
十分之九的执行发起人都会持否定态度,因为他们将是负责公司流程的公司人员。
They're going to send you to purchasing, nobody's going to be happy.
他们会派你去采购,但没人会高兴。
You're looking for the 10th one.
您正在寻找第 10 个。
The 10th one is one who says, "I'm so tired of the status quo.
第十个人说:“我厌倦了现状。
I'm looking for people that are visionary like me.
我正在寻找像我一样有远见的人。
I like talking to you better than I like talking to my peers because you're different and I want to be different.
与同龄人相比,我更喜欢和你说话,因为你与众不同,我也想与众不同。
I want to leapfrog the world, and these people just want to stay on the escalator.
我想跨越世界,而这些人只想留在自动扶梯上。
So they're staying on the escalator.
所以他们留在自动扶梯上。
God bless them, but I want to jump over the top." So it's a persona based choice is the key thing there.
上帝保佑他们,但我想跳过去。”因此,基于角色的选择是关键。
Lenny: That is really interesting.
莱尼:这真的很有趣。
And then say that you are an early stage startup again, how soon do you think it makes sense to invest in finding that big marquee customer versus finding some smaller...
然后说你又是一家早期初创公司,你认为投资寻找大客户与寻找小客户相比多久才有意义......
I imagine you start with some startups to see how people...
我想你从一些初创公司开始,看看人们如何......
You don't go straight there.
你不会直接去那里。
Geoffrey Moore: Yes, and so initially, I think...
杰弗里·摩尔:是的,所以最初,我认为......
And of course you and I are both playing, let's be clear, we're playing a software game.
当然,你和我都在玩,我们要明确的是,我们正在玩软件游戏。
For example, I was trying to apply this framework to Intel, and Intel said to me, "Geoffrey, you do understand that a prototype product in our industry costs about $500 million." Okay, okay, okay, okay.
例如,我试图将这个框架应用到英特尔,英特尔对我说:“杰弗里,你确实明白,我们行业的一个原型产品的成本约为 5 亿美元。”好吧,好吧,好吧,好吧。
Maybe that's not the same model.
也许这不是同一个型号。
I think in our world right now with digital transformation, most entrepreneurs are doing some software led play, which means you can work with a small team.
我认为在当今的数字化转型世界中,大多数企业家都在做一些软件主导的游戏,这意味着你可以与一个小团队合作。
So I think what I would advise is I would do projects.
所以我想我的建议是我会做项目。
Even though I have a product vision, I would start with trying to make as much projects, which would be very customer led.
尽管我有一个产品愿景,但我会首先尝试制作尽可能多的项目,这将是非常以客户为主导的。
And frankly, initially, even if I have a roadmap, the customer's probably going to take me off my roadmap a bit.
坦率地说,最初,即使我有一个路线图,客户也可能会让我稍微偏离路线图。
Geoffrey Moore: I'd have to be willing to say, "I'm going to open the aperture enough." Because I just need to get enough experience with the technology.
杰弗里·摩尔:我必须愿意说,“我要把光圈开得足够大。”因为我只需要获得足够的技术经验。
I need to put in people's hands.
我需要把它交到人们的手中。
If it's a freemium play, you can do it for free.
如果这是免费增值游戏,您可以免费玩。
But that tends to be more of a consumer play.
但这往往更多是消费者的游戏。
There are exceptions.
但也有例外。
There are B2B companies like Atlassian and things that did start as a freemium play, but that's not as normal.
有像 Atlassian 这样的 B2B 公司以及一些确实以免费增值模式开始的公司,但这并不正常。
I would think more of the consultative play to do that.
我会更多地考虑通过协商来做到这一点。
But what I would try to do, so I would try to get to cashflow break even on my own money with no venture capital.
但我会尝试做什么,所以我会尝试在没有风险投资的情况下用自己的钱实现现金流收支平衡。
The only reason you need venture capital is if...
您需要风险投资的唯一原因是...
Well, two things.
嗯,有两件事。
Either A, the technology is too expensive and you cannot self-fund it, GPUs a bunch of that, training large language modules, those kinds of things.
A,这项技术太昂贵了,你无法自筹资金,GPU 之类的,训练大型语言模块,诸如此类的东西。
Or this thing is going to catch fire too soon and I don't have time to dither around for two or three years.
或者说这东西很快就会火起来,我两三年都没有时间犹豫。
So those are two reasons to go to venture capital, but just because you want to do a startup doesn't mean you need venture capital.
这是寻求风险投资的两个原因,但仅仅因为你想创业并不意味着你需要风险投资。
Lenny: We had Jason Fried on recently the CO of Basecamp, and he made that point in many different ways.
Lenny:Jason Fried 最近担任 Basecamp 的 CO,他以多种不同的方式阐述了这一点。
The benefits of not raising and how most VC funded companies do not work out, and even though they do, you often don't make as much as you could if you tried it to bootstrap it.
不融资的好处以及大多数风险投资资助的公司并没有发挥作用,即使它们做到了,如果你尝试引导它,你通常也赚不到尽可能多的钱。
So I think there's a lot of resonance there.
所以我认为那里有很多共鸣。
And you have this quote that essentially kind of what you just said, that with a single round of funding, you should be able to cross the chasm and dominate a single use case in a single market within 18 to 24 months.
您引用的这句话基本上与您刚才所说的类似,即通过一轮融资,您应该能够在 18 到 24 个月内跨越鸿沟并在单一市场中主导单一用例。
Geoffrey Moore: Yeah.
杰弗里·摩尔:是的。
This is like an English major doing math, so be careful because I am an English major.
这就像英语专业做数学一样,所以要小心,因为我是英语专业的。
But in general, because again, I said it's not expensive, and by the way, you're not discounting.
但总的来说,因为我再说一遍,它不贵,顺便说一句,你不打折。
In other words, you're actually using value pricing because the problem you're solving is severe enough, the customer doesn't want a discount, the customer wants you to...
换句话说,你实际上正在使用价值定价,因为你要解决的问题足够严重,客户不想要折扣,客户希望你......
It is like if you have to have heart surgery, you don't want a coupon that says, "Heart surgery 9.99 this Saturday only." You want to go to the Mayo Clinic or you want to go to wherever, so you don't have to discount.
就像如果你必须做心脏手术,你不会想要一张写着“仅限本周六心脏手术 9.99”的优惠券。你想去梅奥诊所或者你想去任何地方,所以你不必打折。
Geoffrey Moore: What you do have to do is you have to make almost like a guaranteed commitment to the problem to solve.
杰弗里·摩尔:你要做的就是对要解决的问题做出几乎有保证的承诺。
We're going to take this problem off the table and we're not leaving until you're satisfied.
我们将解决这个问题,直到您满意为止我们不会离开。
That's the key to the game.
这是游戏的关键。
That's a little bit weird because if you've invented ChatGPT, and now you're saying, "But I am going to solve the third grade math problem," which is a real problem.
这有点奇怪,因为如果你发明了 ChatGPT,现在你说,“但我要解决三年级数学问题”,这是一个真正的问题。
But ChatGPT can do anything.
但 ChatGPT 可以做任何事。
I know, but we're going to solve the third grade math problem.
我知道,但我们要解决三年级数学题。
That's hard for a lot of entrepreneurs to get their head around.
对于很多企业家来说,这是很难理解的。
Lenny: It reminds me of the way Figma started, even though it took them a long time to find product market fit and started scaling, they ended up working very closely with Coda.
Lenny:这让我想起 Figma 开始的方式,尽管他们花了很长时间才找到适合市场的产品并开始扩展,但他们最终与 Coda 密切合作。
I don't know if you know the story where they just wanted to make sure the Coda team, and it was called Krypton back then was very happy with Figma.
我不知道你是否知道这个故事,他们只是想确保 Coda 团队,当时叫做 Krypton,对 Figma 非常满意。
So they went to the office, they set them all up, they started using Figma.
所以他们去了办公室,把它们全部设置好,然后开始使用 Figma。
And then on the drive home they called him like, "It doesn't work anymore.
然后在开车回家的路上,他们这样称呼他:“它不再起作用了。
Something's broken." And they were already home.
有东西坏了。”他们已经到家了。
And Dylan basically, and this team drove all the way back, I think it was an hour or two, and got there and turned out the Wi-Fi was down and there was some internet issue and fixed it and just was obsessed with making sure they were using it.
迪伦基本上,这个团队一路开车回来,我想花了一两个小时,到达那里,结果发现 Wi-Fi 坏了,有一些互联网问题,并修复了它,只是痴迷于确保他们正在使用它。
And they're also just fixing the most ridiculous bugs that were not important because they just wanted to make sure they were really happy with it.
他们还只是修复了最荒谬的错误,这些错误并不重要,因为他们只是想确保他们真的对此感到满意。
Geoffrey Moore: a larger company would say, "Look, we'll put you in our queue and you'll be on our...
杰弗里摩尔:一家更大的公司会说,“听着,我们会把你放在我们的队列中,你会在我们的......
We'll get to you." I think this is...
我们会找到你的。”我认为这是...
And by the way, this is part of the fun, frankly, of being in a startup because you're so close to the action, because there's nothing between you and the action.
顺便说一句,坦率地说,这是在初创公司的乐趣的一部分,因为你离行动如此之近,因为你和行动之间没有任何障碍。
So why wouldn't you do that?
那么你为什么不这样做呢?
Lenny: Yeah, and I think one of the takeaways I've had for my own research into this is that you need to find one company that just loves you.
莱尼:是的,我认为我自己的研究得出的结论之一是,你需要找到一家只爱你的公司。
It's not like ", this is cool." It's like, "I love this product.
这不像“这很酷”。就像,“我喜欢这个产品。
I would never want to give it up."
我永远不想放弃它。”
Geoffrey Moore: That's kind of what I meant by that marquee ref...
杰弗里·摩尔:这就是我所说的那个大牌裁判的意思……
We sometimes we call it a radiating reference.
我们有时称其为辐射参考。
It's just somebody really, we talk about you when you're not even in the room.
这只是一个人,当你不在房间时我们就谈论你。
Yeah, very cool.
是的,非常酷。
Lenny: We've talked about this idea of the chasm and Crossing the Chasm, but it might be helpful just to explain what is the idea, what is this chasm?
莱尼:我们已经讨论了鸿沟和跨越鸿沟的想法,但仅仅解释一下这个想法是什么、这个鸿沟是什么可能会有所帮助?
What is it that people fall into and why is this important?
人们会陷入什么困境?为什么这很重要?
Geoffrey Moore: And this was funny, because I was working at Regis McKenna, which was this marketing agency that was sort of the premier high-tech marketing agency in the eighties.
杰弗里·摩尔:这很有趣,因为我在瑞吉斯·麦肯纳工作,这家营销机构是八十年代首屈一指的高科技营销机构。
And we had all these really successful launches, and then covers of front page articles on Fortune magazine and Wall Street Journal.
我们推出了所有这些非常成功的产品,然后登上了《财富》杂志和《华尔街日报》的头版文章。
And then a couple of years later it's like, "Well, what happened to these guys?" So that's where the chasm was like...
几年后,人们会问:“好吧,这些人怎么了?”所以这就是鸿沟的地方......
That's what caused the investigation.
这就是引起调查的原因。
What we learned was visionaries make their own buying decisions, and they do not consult their peers.
我们了解到,有远见的人会自己做出购买决定,他们不会咨询同行。
In fact, if their peers are doing it, they're probably not going to do it because they want to be different.
事实上,如果他们的同龄人正在这样做,他们可能不会这样做,因为他们想与众不同。
So basically these companies were having success capturing the imagination of the visionary, and they thought, "Well, I'll use the visionaries as a reference to get the pragmatist."
所以基本上这些公司成功地抓住了有远见的人的想象力,他们想,“好吧,我会用有远见的人作为吸引实用主义者的参考。”
Geoffrey Moore: The pragmatist looks at the visionary and goes, "That's not my guy.
杰弗里·摩尔:实用主义者看着有远见的人,然后说:“那不是我的人。
First of all, he thinks I'm dumb.
首先,他认为我很蠢。
He thinks he's smarter than I am.
他认为他比我聪明。
Second of all, he does stuff that I would never do, and he makes decisions in a way that I would never make them.
其次,他做了我永远不会做的事情,他做出的决定也是我永远不会做的。
So that's not...
所以这不是...
No. So but I am interested in talking to my peers, but the problem now is, well, which of the peers are going to go first?" And it was kind of like the junior high dance problem.
不。所以,我有兴趣和我的同龄人交谈,但现在的问题是,哪一个同龄人会先发言?”这有点像初中舞蹈问题。
How do you get the party started?
你如何开始聚会?
So that was the chasm.
这就是鸿沟。
That was what created the chasm.
这就是造成鸿沟的原因。
The pragmatists need references and they will not accept a visionary as a reference, and they don't have any peers that have tried it yet.
实用主义者需要参考,他们不会接受有远见的人作为参考,而且他们还没有任何同行尝试过。
So that was what was happening.
这就是所发生的事情。
Lenny: I think that's such an important point that I think people don't quite always get that that reference, marques customer needs to be a pragmatist.
莱尼:我认为这一点非常重要,以至于人们并不总能理解这一点,品牌客户需要成为实用主义者。
It can't be one of these early adopters that are just trying stuff.
它不可能是那些只是尝试新东西的早期采用者之一。
And these other pragmatists need to feel that this is my person, this is just like me.
而其他实用主义者需要感觉到这是我的人,这就像我一样。
And they love it.
他们喜欢它。
Geoffrey Moore: By the way, one of the reasons that pragmatists have a certain...
杰弗里·摩尔:顺便说一句,实用主义者有一定的原因之一......
It's not contempt for visionaries, but it's definitely wariness, it's because often they have to clean up the messes that these guys leave behind because when you're a visionary, you leave a lot of messes in your wake.
这并不是对有远见的人的蔑视,但这绝对是一种警惕,因为他们常常不得不清理这些人留下的烂摊子,因为当你是一个有远见的人时,你会留下很多烂摊子。
And then the pragmatist has to come in and clean it up.
然后实用主义者必须介入并清理它。
So they're going, "Oh, that's another mark against these people."
所以他们会说,“哦,这是针对这些人的另一个标志。”
Lenny: I saw a deck of yours where you actually represent each of these stages of the lifecycle and the visionary Steve Jobs is the way you represented it, and the pragmatists are just like business people in suits sitting at a conference table.
莱尼:我看到你的一副牌,你实际上代表了生命周期的每个阶段,而富有远见的史蒂夫·乔布斯就是你代表的方式,而实用主义者就像穿着西装坐在会议桌旁的商人。
Geoffrey Moore: Exactly.
杰弗里·摩尔:没错。
And there's six of them.
他们有六个。
And the key idea behind that is none of us...
而这背后的关键想法不是我们……
By the way, I don't think any of these people are a guru and they don't think I'm a guru.
顺便说一句,我不认为这些人是大师,他们也不认为我是大师。
We're using the antelope strategy, it's a herd strategy.
我们正在使用羚羊策略,这是一种羊群策略。
But at some point...
但在某个时刻...
And by the way, we do this all the time, every one of...
顺便说一句,我们一直在这样做,每一个......
Airbnb, I want to get an Airbnb in Portland.
爱彼迎,我想在波特兰租一间爱彼迎。
Have you ever stayed ?
你曾经住过吗?
Is this a good hotel?
这是一家好酒店吗?
Is this a good restaurant?
这是一家好餐厅吗?
Is this a good dentist?
这是一个好牙医吗?
Is this a good lawyer?
这是一个好律师吗?
That's how we do it.
我们就是这样做的。
Lenny: I think Uber and Airbnb is the best example of this in action where I would not ride in a random car, especially I think women were most like, "I will never get into a car, into an Uber." This is insane until all of their friends are doing it.
Lenny:我认为 Uber 和 Airbnb 是最好的例子,我不会随机乘坐汽车,尤其是我认为女性最喜欢的就是“我永远不会坐汽车,不会坐 Uber”。在他们所有的朋友都这样做之前,这太疯狂了。
And then, "Okay, let's give it a shot."
然后,“好吧,让我们试一试。”
Lenny: Yeah.
莱尼:是的。
So essentially most people were pragmatists and I guess that makes sense.
所以本质上大多数人都是实用主义者,我想这是有道理的。
And pragmatists make up the biggest chunk for it.
其中实用主义者占据了最大的份额。
Geoffrey Moore: And by the way, you can be a visionary with some things, a pragmatist with other things, and a conservative with other things.
杰弗里·摩尔:顺便说一句,你可以在某些事情上成为一个有远见的人,在其他事情上成为一个实用主义者,在其他事情上成为一个保守主义者。
So the way to really think about them is, what is my persona in relation to this decision?
因此,真正思考它们的方法是,我的角色与这个决定相关吗?
Lenny: I love this example of the junior high dance problem where nobody wants to go ask the person.
莱尼:我喜欢这个初中舞蹈问题的例子,没有人愿意去问那个人。
It's like, "I'm going to wait for them to come to me.
就像是,“我要等他们来找我。
I want to see how this plays out." It's such a good metaphor.
我想看看事情会如何发展。”这是一个很好的比喻。
In terms of how much of your product needs to be built at each of these stages.
就每个阶段需要构建多少产品而言。
What advice do you share?
您有什么建议?
How much do you need for these visionaries versus the next?
与下一个有远见的人相比,您需要多少钱?
Geoffrey Moore: So with a visionary, you have to have the magic ingredient working.
杰弗里摩尔:所以对于一个有远见的人来说,你必须让神奇的成分发挥作用。
You don't have the whole product.
你没有完整的产品。
And in fact, your product may be buggy, but it does something...
事实上,你的产品可能有缺陷,但它确实做了一些事情......
Andy Grove used to call it the 10 x effect.
安迪·格罗夫 (Andy Grove) 曾将其称为 10 倍效果。
You need to do something that is an order of magnitude better than anything because that's why the visionary is talking to you.
你需要做比任何事情都好一个数量级的事情,因为这就是有远见的人与你交谈的原因。
They're going, "Oh my gosh, you have this fusion." "Fusion, really?" "Yeah, we got fusion energy." So that's number one.
他们会说,“天哪,你有这种融合。” “融合,真的吗?” “是的,我们得到了聚变能。”所以这是第一。
Then what would still cause you to not cross the chasm yet?
那么还有什么原因让你至今还没有跨过鸿沟呢?
If there's not enough product there, pragmatists cannot put up with a product that doesn't work.
如果那里没有足够的产品,实用主义者就无法忍受不起作用的产品。
So you may need to do some additional work to say, "Look, we get some more customers.
因此,您可能需要做一些额外的工作来说:“看,我们获得了更多客户。
I'm still living hand to mouth.
我现在还勉强糊口。
It's mostly project work, but until the product has got enough stability and can be productized, I really can't afford to cross the chasm." So once you have a product that works, then you've got to say, "Okay, now I've got to find a market where it can be the dominant solution." That's the time to cross the chasm.
大部分都是项目工作,但在产品获得足够的稳定性并可以产品化之前,我真的无法跨越这个鸿沟。”因此,一旦你有了一个有效的产品,你就必须说:“好吧,现在我必须找到一个它可以成为主导解决方案的市场。”那是跨越鸿沟的时候了。
Lenny: And a big part of that is obviously they have bosses, they have checklists, they have compliance people, they have IT people, they have people that need to buy into this or this meeting room with six people.
Lenny:其中很大一部分显然是他们有老板,他们有清单,他们有合规人员,他们有 IT 人员,他们有需要购买这个或这个六人会议室的人。
They all have to be like, "All right, this is the best choice."
他们都必须说,“好吧,这是最好的选择。”
Geoffrey Moore: And by the way, normally those people are designed to keep you out, and that decision process will take forever and you'll be in the welfare lines before they make their choice.
杰弗里·摩尔:顺便说一句,通常这些人的目的就是把你拒之门外,而这个决策过程将永远持续下去,在他们做出选择之前,你就会处于福利热线之中。
So that's why it's so important to have what we call the compelling reason to buy.
这就是为什么拥有我们所说的令人信服的购买理由如此重要。
You need to have a group of people in a room where the leader, the guy who's going to actually sponsor make this decision is saying, "Look, I already gave this problem to everybody in the room, and our answer sucks." He wouldn't say it that way, but that's the truth.
你需要让一群人在一个房间里,领导者,真正发起这个决定的人说,“看,我已经把这个问题交给了房间里的每个人,我们的答案很糟糕。”他不会这么说,但事实就是如此。
And therefore, we're kind of at the...
因此,我们有点...
I mean, I'm getting the message.
我的意思是,我收到消息了。
First of all, my boss's boss's boss knows my name.
首先,我老板的老板的老板知道我的名字。
That's a very bad thing.
这是一件非常糟糕的事情。
Secondly, I'm getting the message, you're either going to fix this problem, Geoffrey, or we're going to find somebody who can.
其次,我收到的信息是,杰弗里,你要么解决这个问题,要么我们去找能解决这个问题的人。
So that's what gives them the energy to go against the inertial momentum of the decision-making process in their company.
这就是给他们能量去对抗公司决策过程的惯性动力的原因。
Lenny: Let me tell you about a product called arcade.
莱尼:让我告诉你一个叫做街机的产品。
Arcade is an interactive demo platform that enables teams to create polished on-brand demos in minutes, telling the story of your product is hard, and customers want you to show them your product, not just talk about it or gate it.
Arcade 是一个交互式演示平台,使团队能够在几分钟内创建精美的品牌演示,讲述产品的故事很困难,而客户希望您向他们展示您的产品,而不仅仅是谈论它或门禁它。
That's why product four teams such as Atlassian, Carta, and Retool use Arcade to tell better stories within their homepages, product change logs, emails, and documentation.
这就是为什么 Atlassian、Carta 和 Retool 等产品四团队使用 Arcade 在其主页、产品更改日志、电子邮件和文档中讲述更好的故事。
But don't just take my word for it.
但不要只相信我的话。
Quantum Metric, the leading digital analytics platform created an interactive product tour our library to drive more prospects.
领先的数字分析平台 Quantum Metric 在我们的图书馆中创建了交互式产品游览,以吸引更多潜在客户。
With Arcade, they achieved a two x higher conversion rate for demos and saw five times more engagement than videos.
通过 Arcade,他们的演示转化率提高了两倍,参与度是视频的五倍。
Lenny: On top of that, they built the demo 10 times faster than before.
Lenny:最重要的是,他们构建演示的速度比以前快了 10 倍。
Creating a product demo has never been easier.
创建产品演示从未如此简单。
With browser-based recording Arcade is the no-code solution for building personalized demos at scale.
通过基于浏览器的录制,Arcade 是用于大规模构建个性化演示的无代码解决方案。
Arcade offers product customization options, designer approved editing tools and rich insights about how your viewers engage every step of the way.
Arcade 提供产品定制选项、设计师认可的编辑工具以及有关观众如何参与每一步的丰富见解。
Ready to tell more engaging product stories that drive results?
准备好讲述更具吸引力的产品故事来推动成果了吗?
Head to arcade.software/lenny and get 50% off your first three months.
前往 arcade.software/lenny,前三个月可享受 50% 的折扣。
That's arcade.software/lenny.
那是 arcade.software/lenny。
Lenny: So April Dunford was on this podcast and she has this book that she put out recently called Sales Pitch.
莱尼:四月邓福德参加了这个播客,她最近出版了这本书,名为《销售推介》。
And she make this point that buying software, SaaS software is harder than selling it these days because you can get fired for buying the wrong thing.
她指出,现在购买软件、SaaS 软件比销售软件更难,因为你可能会因为买错东西而被解雇。
It's so stressful.
压力太大了。
There's all these options.
有所有这些选项。
Your boss has to be happy with it.
你的老板一定对此感到满意。
So often people end up just not going with anything.
很多时候,人们最终只是不接受任何事情。
We're just going to keep what we have.
我们只会保留我们所拥有的。
It's fine, simpler, safer.
很好,更简单,更安全。
Salesforce is fine.
Salesforce 很好。
And it sounds like that's kind of what you're describing.
听起来这就是你所描述的。
It's so hard-
太难了——
Geoffrey Moore: So if you're a pragmatist, the first thing is if it ain't broke, don't fix it.
杰弗里·摩尔:所以,如果你是一个实用主义者,第一件事就是如果它没有坏,就不要修理它。
Which makes you totally different than a visionary.
这使你与有远见的人完全不同。
A visionary's like, "Yeah, no, come on, break it.
一个有远见的人会说:“是的,不,来吧,打破它。
Come on, let's move on." It ain't broke, don't fix it.
来吧,我们继续前进。”没坏,不用修。
If it is broke, who has fixed it?
如果坏了,谁修的?
Is there fix in production?
生产中是否有修复?
Does the fix work?
修复有效吗?
I want that.
我想要那个。
In other words, basically to April's point, it is a risk reduction buying strategy.
换句话说,基本上就4月份的观点而言,这是一种降低风险的买入策略。
And by the way, you go as slowly as you can normally, but when you're under duress, you have to go faster.
顺便说一句,你通常可以走得尽可能慢,但当你受到胁迫时,你必须走得更快。
So the compelling reason to buy is putting you under duress.
因此,令人信服的购买理由是让你处于压力之下。
Lenny: Are there any examples of these compelling reasons to buy that come to mind that give people a sense of here's a really good compelling reason to buy?
莱尼:有没有这些令人信服的购买理由的例子让人们觉得这是一个真正令人信服的购买理由?
I don't know if it's a pitch.
我不知道这是否是一个球场。
Geoffrey Moore: Well, there's a ton.
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,有很多。
Well, how about ransomware?
那么,勒索软件怎么样?
I mean, all of a sudden the cybersecurity thing is like holy smoke because it used to be, "Well, they wouldn't attack my company.
我的意思是,突然之间,网络安全问题就像圣烟一样,因为它曾经是,“好吧,他们不会攻击我的公司。
Or if they did, I mean, I have no assets." Yeah, well, actually...
或者如果他们这样做了,我的意思是,我没有资产。”是的,好吧,实际上...
Because it used to be what they did is they would only attack companies that had data that they could resell in the dark web.
因为他们过去所做的就是只攻击那些拥有可以在暗网上转售数据的公司。
Then God bless cryptocurrency, people are saying, "Is it cross the chasm yet?
然后上帝保佑加密货币,人们说,“它跨越鸿沟了吗?
Well, their first use case is criminals." It's not a very good use case, I'm sorry to say.
嗯,他们的第一个用例是犯罪分子。”我很遗憾地说,这不是一个很好的用例。
But the point is, now ransomware with cryptocurrency can be a monetization, so that means everybody is vulnerable.
但关键是,现在使用加密货币的勒索软件可以货币化,所以这意味着每个人都容易受到攻击。
So that's one kind of compelling reason to buy.
所以这是一种令人信服的购买理由。
But if you look around kids who are struggling with school, the parent has a compelling reason.
但如果你环顾一下那些在学业上遇到困难的孩子,家长们有一个令人信服的理由。
Anything with healthcare, compelling reason to buy.
任何与医疗保健相关的东西,都有令人信服的购买理由。
Anything if you're in a legal problem, you have a compelling risk to buy.
任何东西,如果你遇到法律问题,你就必须承担购买的风险。
Geoffrey Moore: So I mean, there's always these situations where you say, "Okay, that's on a personal basis." On a company-wide basis, it may be things like, "Well, what am I supposed to do my office space?
杰弗里·摩尔:所以我的意思是,在某些情况下你总是会说:“好吧,这是基于个人的情况。”在全公司范围内,可能会这样说:“那么,我的办公空间该怎么办?
Can I get my company to come back to the office or do I have to dump the space?
我可以让我的公司回到办公室还是我必须放弃这个空间?
What am I supposed to do?
我该怎么办?
And by the way, I know I'm going to have some kind of space, but do I want to design it the way we used?
顺便说一句,我知道我将拥有某种空间,但我想按照我们使用的方式设计它吗?
I'm getting into some space by the way, I got a great deal if it was a fire sale, right?
顺便说一下,我正在进入一些空间,如果这是一次甩卖,我会得到很大的优惠,对吗?
Cool space, what do I put in it?
很酷的空间,我在里面放什么?
Is it supposed to have offices?
应该有办公室吧?
Do they have doors, do they not have doors do?" So in other words, there's a bunch of stuff where you get people going, "Okay, how can we help?
他们有门吗?他们没有门吗?”换句话说,有很多东西可以让人们去,“好吧,我们能提供什么帮助吗?
How can we help?" "I need help.
我们能提供什么帮助吗?” “我需要帮助。
And I've gone to my standard solutions and no, I don't believe that, so I need help."
我已经采用了标准解决方案,但不,我不相信这一点,所以我需要帮助。”
Lenny: Okay, so it's interesting that I even misunderstood what you're saying and I think this is a really important point.
莱尼:好吧,有趣的是我什至误解了你的意思,我认为这是非常重要的一点。
The compelling reason to buy is not a compelling reason to sell, which people often think about as the pitch you're making.
令人信服的购买理由并不是令人信服的出售理由,人们通常认为这是你所做的宣传。
The buy is basically the pain point.
购买基本上是痛点。
They need a really big pain.
他们需要很大的痛苦。
Geoffrey Moore: Yeah, because that's what's going to...
杰弗里·摩尔:是的,因为那就是……
So therefore the key to the bowling alley that's different from the tornado, and it's also different from the early market.
所以因此保龄球馆的关键就是不同于龙卷风,也不同于早期的市场。
In the early market it's about you.
在早期市场,一切都与你有关。
You tell the story about you and the visionary wants to hear about you.
你讲述你的故事,有远见的人想听听你的故事。
In the tornado it's also about you, because we now have budget to buy this stuff, and you're a candidate.
在龙卷风中,这也与你有关,因为我们现在有预算购买这些东西,而你是候选人。
In the bowling alley, it's never about you.
在保龄球馆里,一切都与你无关。
And that is so hard for a series of entrepreneurs because they want to give a demo, they want to tell the story, they want to share their vision.
这对于一系列企业家来说非常困难,因为他们想要进行演示,他们想要讲述故事,他们想要分享他们的愿景。
The answer is, "We don't care.
答案是:“我们不在乎。
We don't want to hear your story.
我们不想听你的故事。
We hate demos, and I don't know who you are and I don't care.
我们讨厌演示,我不知道你是谁,我不在乎。
I'm in trouble.
我有麻烦了。
We need to talk about me.
我们需要谈谈我。
We don't want to talk about you."
我们不想谈论你。”
Geoffrey Moore: So we have this saying in the Crossing the Chasm playbook.
杰弗里·摩尔:所以我们在《跨越鸿沟》剧本中有这样一句话。
First of all, "Shut the God damn laptop.
首先,“关上该死的笔记本电脑。
Just don't open it and start with..." And the way you start the conversation is always the same.
只是不要打开它并开始......”并且开始对话的方式总是相同的。
"We're here because we've been working with some people in your industry and we understand there's this really serious problem around document management or around Wi-Fi access or whatever it is, and we believe that your company might have it, is that true?" And what's interesting about it is you'll get one of two responses either, "Oh, are you kidding me?
“我们来到这里是因为我们一直在与你们行业的一些人合作,我们了解到文档管理或 Wi-Fi 访问或其他方面存在非常严重的问题,我们相信你们的公司可能存在这个问题,是真的吗?”有趣的是,你会得到两个回应之一,“哦,你在跟我开玩笑吗?
Okay, we have that." Or often they'll say, "Well, not exactly." And you go, "Oh," but then before you can say anything else they'll say, "What our real problem is..." So people will talk about their...
好吧,我们有这个。”或者他们经常会说:“嗯,不完全是。”你会说,“哦,”但在你能说什么之前,他们会说,“我们真正的问题是……”所以人们会谈论他们的……
They want therapy, they'll talk about their problems.
他们想要治疗,他们会谈论他们的问题。
So if you're willing to...
所以如果你愿意...
But as an entrepreneur, you got to realize the gold at this point is problem domain knowledge.
但作为一名企业家,你必须意识到此时的黄金是问题领域知识。
That's the thing you really want to collect.
这才是你真正想要收集的东西。
Lenny: Amazing.
莱尼:太棒了。
So you've sort of answered this question, but I want to make it even more complete.
所以你已经回答了这个问题,但我想让它更加完整。
You have this amazing LinkedIn post of these four go-to-market playbooks based on the stage you're in.
您在 LinkedIn 上发表了一篇精彩的文章,其中介绍了这四本基于您所处阶段的市场营销手册。
And you've touched on this already, but it might be helpful just to go through it one by one.
您已经谈到了这一点,但是逐一浏览可能会有所帮助。
And even more helpful would be like, what does it look like when you're in the early market?
更有帮助的是,当你处于早期市场时,情况会是什么样子?
How do you know if you're in the early market versus in the bowling alley versus in the tornado?
你怎么知道你是处于早期市场、保龄球馆还是龙卷风?
Geoffrey Moore: Okay, so in the early market, you know you're there because first of all, the story is the technology, and it's specifically the disruptive technology.
杰弗里摩尔:好的,所以在早期市场,你知道你在那里,因为首先,故事是技术,特别是颠覆性技术。
By the way, you could start a business with a non-disruptive thing, but then you don't need these playbooks, then you're on Main Street.
顺便说一句,你可以用非破坏性的东西来创业,但你不需要这些剧本,那么你就在大街上了。
So the assumption is you've got something that nobody's ever done before or seen before.
所以假设你已经得到了一些以前没有人做过或见过的东西。
So in that playbook, the first thing is just you hear the responsibilities.
因此,在该剧本中,第一件事就是您听到职责。
And a venture capitalist would say the same thing to you.
风险投资家也会对你说同样的话。
"Do you have a technology expert who's a wizard?
“你们有一位技术专家是巫师吗?
Because we're not going to fund just any two guys and a PowerPoint tech, even though we like your dog."
因为我们不会只资助任何两个人和一名 PowerPoint 技术人员,即使我们喜欢你的狗。”
Geoffrey Moore: So that's number one.
杰弗里·摩尔:所以这是第一。
Number two, "Can you demo the technology?" You have to be able to demo thing.
第二,“你能演示这项技术吗?”你必须能够演示东西。
And then three, "Can you create a vision which says what forces are going to release?" And the concept that we use in venture, I call it trapped value.
然后第三个问题,“你能创造一个愿景来说明将释放什么力量吗?”我们在风险投资中使用的概念,我称之为陷阱价值。
And with the idea is where's the trap value that this innovation would release?
那么这个创新将释放的陷阱价值在哪里?
Because when you release trapped value, the world will give you a portion of the gain, typically 10%.
因为当你释放被困价值时,世界会给你一部分收益,一般是10%。
It's easy an number to do math with.
这是一个很容易做数学计算的数字。
As I said, I'm an English major.
正如我所说,我是英语专业的。
So if you want a billion-dollar company, you better find $10 billion worth of trapped value that your technology could-
因此,如果你想要一家价值 10 亿美元的公司,你最好找到价值 100 亿美元的被困价值,你的技术可以——
Lenny: Airbnb is an amazing example of that, right?
Lenny:Airbnb 就是一个很棒的例子,对吧?
Where they unlocked people's homes, basically 10%-
他们解锁了人们的房屋,基本上是 10%-
Geoffrey Moore: Yeah.
杰弗里·摩尔:是的。
Uber unlocked their backseat of the car.
优步解锁了他们的汽车后座。
By the way, the free labor force, it was like, "Whoa." Okay, so really cool idea early market fund.
顺便说一下,自由劳动力,就像,“哇。”好的,早期市场基金的想法真的很酷。
For the bowling alley one then the playbook is, "No, where's the problem?" And then you got to take it down to in what geography, what industry, what profession, what use case.
对于保龄球馆来说,剧本是:“不,问题出在哪里?”然后你必须将其归结为在什么地理位置、什么行业、什么职业、什么用例。
And that takes...
这需要...
That's not just...
那不仅仅是...
I mean, you want to spend some time in doing that.
我的意思是,你想花一些时间来做这件事。
And then what you want to really do is just maintain intellectual curiosity about the problem as opposed to jumping to the solution.
然后你真正想做的就是保持对问题的好奇心,而不是跳到解决方案。
So why is this a hard problem to do?
那么为什么这是一个很难解决的问题呢?
What is going on?
到底是怎么回事?
Where is the trapped value?
被困值在哪里?
By the way, how expensive?
顺便问一下,多贵?
What is the cost of not solving this problem?
如果不解决这个问题,代价是什么?
Geoffrey Moore: Often it's a risk exposure, or it could be just a gating item on your growth or potentially a churn problem.
杰弗里·摩尔(Geoffrey Moore):通常这是一种风险暴露,也可能只是您成长的一个限制因素,或者可能是一个潜在的客户流失问题。
By the way, if you wanted to pick a compelling reason to buy, how about if you help SaaS companies deal with churn?
顺便说一句,如果您想选择一个令人信服的购买理由,那么帮助 SaaS 公司应对客户流失怎么样?
Do you think they would care about that?
你认为他们会关心这个吗?
I think they might.
我想他们可能会。
So the point being...
所以重点是...
And you're going to say, "Okay, I'm going to learn more about churn and I'm going to really understand...
你会说,“好吧,我将更多地了解客户流失,我将真正理解......
And by the way, I'm going to understand your churn," which is different maybe from somebody else's churn.
顺便说一句,我会理解你的流失,”这可能与其他人的流失不同。
So it's the problem domain thing.
所以这是问题域的事情。
And then you build your go-to market around...
然后你围绕……建立你的目标市场。
The lead gen is, "Hey, do you have any of these seven symptoms of fatal churn?" And the people that respond to that ad are pre-qualified.
潜在客户会问:“嘿,你有这七个致命流失症状中的任何一个吗?”对该广告做出回应的人已经获得资格预审。
And then the BDR, if you're at Salesforce, a BDR would call you and say, "Just confirming you have these problems." "Oh yeah, RBI." "And your role at the company is...
然后是 BDR,如果您在 Salesforce,BDR 会打电话给您并说:“只是确认您有这些问题。” “哦,是的,印度储备银行。” “你在公司的角色是......
And are you responsible for doing this?" "Well, actually no, it's Harry, not Mary." "Maybe we should talk to Harry." "Yeah, you probably should talk to Harry."
而你负责做这件事吗?” “嗯,实际上不,是哈利,不是玛丽。” “也许我们应该和哈利谈谈。” “是的,你也许应该和哈利谈谈。”
Geoffrey Moore: Then you call Harry and you get the appointment with Harry because Harry's got the problem.
杰弗里·摩尔:然后你打电话给哈利,你就得到了与哈利的约会,因为哈利遇到了问题。
And then the next thing is you do a diagnostic with them.
接下来就是对它们进行诊断。
"So we understand we're talking to your colleagues, here's the problem, here's what we think we're doing.
“所以我们知道我们正在与你们的同事交谈,这就是问题所在,这就是我们认为我们正在做的事情。
But before we tell you about how great our solution is, let's make sure that we understand what your challenges are." And your goal in that call is to get them to talk as much as possible and for you to take notes.
但在我们告诉您我们的解决方案有多么出色之前,让我们确保我们了解您面临的挑战是什么。”您在那次电话会议中的目标是让他们尽可能多地交谈并让您做笔记。
And by the way, this is a place where you probably still want to remember to use a pen because you actually want them to see you writing down their words, because that means, "Okay, he's listening.
顺便说一句,这是一个你可能仍然想记住使用笔的地方,因为你实际上希望他们看到你写下他们的话,因为这意味着,“好吧,他在听。
He's listening."
他在听。”
Lenny: Oh, interesting.
莱尼:哦,有趣。
That's a good tip.
这是一个很好的提示。
Like on Zoom, would your advice there be just make sure the camera shows your hands?
就像在 Zoom 上一样,您的建议是确保相机显示您的手吗?
Geoffrey Moore: Or sometimes...
杰弗里·摩尔:或者有时......
I mean, no, you couldn't do this.
我的意思是,不,你不能这样做。
I was going to say we record it, but they don't want to record it because they're going to say some things during the call that they won't be necessarily complimentary to all their colleagues and they don't want you to record it.
我本来想说我们录下来,但他们不想录下来,因为他们会在通话中说一些话,他们不一定会称赞所有同事,而且他们不希望你录下来。
Lenny: Got it.
莱尼:明白了。
So in this bowling alley phase, how do you know you...
所以在这个保龄球馆阶段,你怎么知道你......
I know it's not like this binary switch, but that you're ready to move into that versus the early market playbook.
我知道它不像这个二进制开关,但你已经准备好进入那个与早期市场剧本不同的地方。
Geoffrey Moore: Well, I think you get to a point where you realize, "I can't scale my business doing what I've been doing.
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,我想你会意识到,“我无法通过我一直在做的事情来扩展我的业务。
I mean, I just can't." And if you've taken venture capital, the thing you want to do is, "I don't want to have to raise another..." Well, so understand how venture capital funding works for a second.
我的意思是,我就是做不到。”如果你接受了风险投资,你想做的事情是,“我不想再筹集一次……”好吧,所以先了解一下风险投资是如何运作的。
This is important.
这很重要。
A venture capitalist gives you money, and what they're buying from you with this money is, "I want you to use this money to change the state of your company such that when we raise the next round, the next investor will value your company two to three times higher than we're valuing it today."
风险投资家给你钱,他们用这笔钱从你那里购买的是,“我希望你用这笔钱来改变你公司的状况,这样当我们筹集下一轮资金时,下一个投资者对你公司的估值将比我们今天的估值高出两到三倍。”
Geoffrey Moore: So basically the purpose of this money is to change the value state of your company.
杰弗里·摩尔:基本上这笔钱的目的是改变公司的价值状态。
If you do anything else with that money, you could have done brilliant things, created amazing demos, hired great people, but if at the end of the day you haven't changed the value state of the company and we have to raise more money, we're going to raise it at the old valuation and I as an investor lose, or even worse, we have a down round and I lose even more.
如果你用这笔钱做其他任何事情,你本可以做一些出色的事情,创建令人惊叹的演示,聘请优秀的人才,但如果最终你没有改变公司的价值状态,而我们必须筹集更多的资金,我们将以旧的估值筹集资金,而我作为投资者会损失,或者更糟糕的是,我们进行了一轮下跌,我损失更多。
Geoffrey Moore: So once you start thinking about that, so we're then Crossing the Chasm.
杰弗里·摩尔:一旦你开始思考这个问题,我们就可以跨越鸿沟了。
The Crossing the Chasm play is I need to change the state of my company from a cool possibility to what accountants call a going concern.
跨越鸿沟的玩法是我需要将公司的状态从一个很酷的可能性转变为会计师所说的持续经营。
So what is a going concern?
那么什么是持续经营?
A going concern is a company that two years from now you would expect still to be in existence.
持续经营是指两年后您预计仍然存在的公司。
Why would you do that?
你为什么要这么做?
Because they have a customer base that's loyal and they have a ecosystem of partners that bring them into new deals and they have established their CAC and LTV, and they've kind of figured out their operating model.
因为他们拥有忠诚的客户群,他们有一个合作伙伴生态系统,可以让他们达成新的交易,他们已经建立了自己的 CAC 和 LTV,并且他们已经找到了自己的运营模式。
And it's not the biggest company in the world.
而且它不是世界上最大的公司。
Geoffrey Moore: It's somewhere we're now probably in the 10, $20 million, but it's a real company.
Geoffrey Moore:我们现在的市值可能排在前 10、2000 万美元之内,但它是一家真正的公司。
It's a real company.
这是一家真正的公司。
And that's who you're trying to create when you cross the chasm.
当你跨越鸿沟时,这就是你想要创造的人。
And you know you've crossed the chasm when you say, "I don't have to raise any more venture capital.
当你说:“我不需要再筹集更多的风险投资时,你就知道你已经跨越了鸿沟。
Now, I may want to because I have ambitions to be globally dominant." But you get to raise it on your nickel and on your timeline, not on, "Oh my God, I'm running out of money." So the sooner you can get off with the, "I'm running out..." And particularly last year was fatal to a huge number of companies because that was not how they were thinking about raising funds.
现在,我可能想要这样做,因为我有成为全球主导者的雄心。”但你可以根据你的五分钱和你的时间表来筹集资金,而不是“天哪,我的钱快用完了”。因此,你越早摆脱“我的钱快用完了……”的情况,特别是去年对很多公司来说是致命的,因为这不是他们筹集资金的方式。
They always thought, "Well, there'll be another round, another round, another round." And they were not thinking about changing their valuation state and they're not here.
他们总是想,“好吧,还会有另一轮,另一轮,另一轮。”他们并没有考虑改变他们的估值状态,他们也不在这里。
Lenny: That's a really interesting insight.
莱尼:这是一个非常有趣的见解。
This idea that you know you've crossed the chasm if you can survive without more venture funding, how do you think about that, the profit element of that?
如果你可以在没有更多风险投资的情况下生存,你就知道你已经跨越了鸿沟,你如何看待这个,其中的利润因素?
Because it feels like that's the core to being able to survive without venture funding.
因为感觉这是在没有风险投资的情况下生存的核心。
Is it about making enough money that you can cut and make a profit, or is there some other reason?
是为了赚到足够的钱,可以砍价获利,还是有其他原因?
Geoffrey Moore: All you really care about is cashflow positive.
杰弗里摩尔:你真正关心的是正现金流。
I just want to be able to keep doing what I'm doing.
我只是想能够继续做我正在做的事情。
So you don't care about the actual GAAP accounting at all.
所以你根本不关心实际的 GAAP 会计。
Lenny: I see.
莱尼:我明白了。
So you could cut back and you can get to profitability if you need, but the idea is your cashflow positive?
所以你可以削减开支,如果需要的话你可以实现盈利,但你的现金流是正数吗?
Geoffrey Moore: And you'd like to grow and you might want to raise money.
杰弗里摩尔:你想要成长,你可能想要筹集资金。
But the point is, if you do go out to raise money, you get to raise money at a different valuation.
但关键是,如果你确实出去筹集资金,你就能以不同的估值筹集资金。
So the way in which venture capitalists categorize you is they say, "What risk is my money going to take off the table?" So an angel investor says, "Well, my money is going to take off the table, the risk of whether you can even create anything, I'm going to give you enough money to get into trouble." That's basically it.
因此,风险投资家对你进行分类的方式是,“我的资金将面临哪些风险?”因此,一位天使投资人会说:“好吧,我的钱将会从桌面上消失,无论你是否能够创造任何东西,我都会给你足够的钱来让你陷入麻烦。”基本上就是这样。
And then the Crossing the Chasm money says, "I'm going to take company existence viability off the table.
然后,跨越鸿沟的资金说:“我将把公司的生存能力排除在外。
I don't know if you're going to grow, I don't know if you're going to become a venture return, but I'm going to take you going out of business off the table."
我不知道你是否会成长,我不知道你是否会成为风险投资人,但我不会让你破产。”
Geoffrey Moore: And then the bowling alley stuff is, "Okay, now I'm buying probably a journey from 10 million to a hundred million dollars," something like that.
杰弗里·摩尔:然后保龄球馆的事情是,“好吧,现在我可能会购买一千万到一亿美元的旅程”,类似这样的事情。
"And I'm expecting a growth rate," and this is probably where the rule of 40 starts to kick in.
“我预计会有增长率”,这可能就是 40 规则开始发挥作用的地方。
If you're playing the rule of 40, we want to raise more money later on, you're going to have a different valuation than we had before.
如果你遵循 40 的规则,我们想稍后筹集更多资金,那么你的估值将会与我们之前不同。
And then the tornado thing by that point, now you say, "You're in Gen AI?
然后到了龙卷风的时候,你会说,“你在 Gen AI 中吗?
You have a large language module?
你有一个很大的语言模块吗?
Whoa, okay.
哇,好吧。
You're worth a lot more than we thought," because now the category's in the tornado and that's a different game.
你的价值比我们想象的要高得多”,因为现在这个类别处于龙卷风之中,这是一个不同的游戏。
Lenny: Yeah.
莱尼:是的。
I was going to say AI is clearly an example of being in tornado.
我想说人工智能显然是龙卷风中的一个例子。
So maybe just talk a little bit about what that is, the tornado phase and then there's the Main Street playbook.
所以也许只是简单谈谈龙卷风阶段是什么,然后就是大街剧本。
Geoffrey Moore: So how do you know the difference between the bowling alley and the tornado?
杰弗里·摩尔:那么你怎么知道保龄球馆和龙卷风之间的区别呢?
Prior to the tornado, when your sales team calls on the customer, they do not have a budget for you.
在龙卷风发生之前,当您的销售团队拜访客户时,他们没有为您提供预算。
In the early market, there's no budget for anything.
在早期市场,任何事情都没有预算。
In the bowling alley there's budget, but it's budget for a solution that's not you.
在保龄球馆里有预算,但这是针对不是您的解决方案的预算。
It's for the old way of trying to bandaid the problem.
这是试图解决问题的旧方法。
So we say in the early market, you have to create budget.
所以我们说在早期市场,你必须制定预算。
In the bowling alley, you have to redirect budget, but that takes sales cycles.
在保龄球馆,您必须重新调整预算,但这需要销售周期。
It takes time.
这需要时间。
And if it's a small market...
如果这是一个小市场...
This is why entrepreneurs can win these market segments, because if you're a big established company, this is just a pain in the ass.
这就是企业家能够赢得这些细分市场的原因,因为如果你是一家大公司,这简直就是一件痛苦的事。
It's too small a market, it's too much work, it's too hard.
市场太小,工作量太大,太难了。
Redirecting the...
正在重定向...
I want my salespeople to go where the budget's already established.
我希望我的销售人员去预算已经确定的地方。
Geoffrey Moore: Well, when does budget get established?
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,预算什么时候制定?
When a category goes horizontal and people go, "Well, yeah, we all want Wi-Fi, we all want mobile apps, we all want cloud computing, we all want whatever it is." And now what happens is...
当一个类别横向发展时,人们会说:“嗯,是的,我们都想要 Wi-Fi,我们都想要移动应用程序,我们都想要云计算,我们都想要任何东西。”现在发生的事情是......
And by the way the pragmatist heard is they went from, "You're not doing that, are you?" "No, me neither." "Okay, good." To, "You are, you are, you are.
实用主义者听到的方式是,他们从“你不会那样做,是吗?” “不,我也一样。” “好吧,很好。”到,“你是,你是,你是。
Oh, we're behind.
哦,我们落后了。
We better do it." So these budgets come into the market and kind of all at the same time, which is what creates the tornado.
我们最好这样做。”因此,这些预算同时进入市场,这就是造成龙卷风的原因。
Because if you give a department a budget, they will spend it and when they spend it, they're going to spend it with a vendor and whoever vendor they select they're probably going to stay with.
因为如果你给一个部门一个预算,他们就会花掉它,当他们花掉它时,他们会把它花在供应商身上,而无论他们选择哪个供应商,他们都可能会留下来。
So now the market share battle is now on, and whoever gets the most customers early on, the ecosystem starts to form around them.
因此,现在市场份额之争已经打响,无论谁尽早获得最多客户,生态系统就开始在他们周围形成。
Geoffrey Moore: So in the nineties, we saw a lot of tornado, gorilla play.
杰弗里·摩尔:所以在九十年代,我们看到了很多龙卷风、大猩猩的比赛。
Cisco, Intel, Oracle, obviously Microsoft.
思科、英特尔、甲骨文,当然还有微软。
I mean these companies, , they were all incredibly competitive companies.
我的意思是这些公司,他们都是非常有竞争力的公司。
They were all tornado plays.
都是龙卷风剧。
Between client server and the internet, it just created this massive tornado effect.
在客户端服务器和互联网之间,它刚刚创造了这种巨大的龙卷风效应。
And that game plan is very competitive sales to grab market share.
该游戏计划是非常有竞争力的销售,以抢占市场份额。
And then at some point, if you're not number one, then you have to kind of do a defensive maneuver and retreat into a niche and say, "Okay, if I can't be a gorilla, I at least need to be a chimp." And a chimp is like a local gorilla.
然后在某个时候,如果你不是第一,那么你必须采取防御策略,退回到一个利基市场并说:“好吧,如果我不能成为一只大猩猩,我至少需要成为一只黑猩猩。”黑猩猩就像当地的大猩猩。
"I'm not the gorilla, but..." "I'm not Cisco, I'm Juniper." But for telcos, Juniper was the Cisco of telcos at that time.
“我不是大猩猩,但是……”“我不是思科,我是瞻博网络。”但对于电信公司来说,瞻博网络就是当时电信公司中的思科。
So anyway, I don't know if you saw in the paper today, but at the other end of that lifecycle, HPE has bought Juniper.
不管怎样,我不知道你是否在今天的报纸上看到了,但在生命周期的另一端,HPE 收购了瞻博网络。
Lenny: is happening.
莱尼:正在发生。
I like that.
我喜欢这样。
That's good news.
这是个好消息。
So one of the most interesting lessons you teach is also that these playbooks don't work together well.
因此,您教授的最有趣的课程之一也是这些剧本不能很好地协同工作。
Basically if you use one in the wrong phase, it's the opposite.
基本上,如果你在错误的阶段使用它,结果就会相反。
It has the opposite effect.
它会产生相反的效果。
So before we get there, let me just summarize maybe quickly the playbook in each of these four.
因此,在我们开始之前,让我快速总结一下这四个方面的剧本。
I have some notes here and then maybe just talk about why is it that they fail if you pick the wrong one.
我在这里有一些注释,然后也许只是谈谈为什么如果你选错了它们会失败。
So in the early market, you're looking for a visionary customer that just wants to use something new and cool and stay ahead of the curve.
因此,在早期市场中,您正在寻找有远见的客户,他们只想使用新的、酷的东西并保持领先地位。
In the bowling alley phase, you want to engage with a pragmatic business person who has a huge problem and they need a fix and you're there for them.
在保龄球馆阶段,您希望与一位务实的商务人士打交道,他们遇到了巨大的问题,需要解决办法,而您会为他们提供帮助。
In the tornado, there's just this land grab, something is just going crazy, AI and everyone's just spend, spend, I need AI in my product.
在龙卷风中,只有这种土地争夺,有些东西正在变得疯狂,人工智能和每个人都只是花钱,花钱,我的产品中需要人工智能。
And then Main Street is just, it's kind of the sustaining tech that everyone just needs to make sure continues working and doesn't deteriorate.
Main Street 只是一种维持技术,每个人都需要确保它继续工作并且不会恶化。
Geoffrey Moore: By the way, the way I would the last two is think of tornado as kind of the land and Main Street as the expand.
杰弗里·摩尔:顺便说一句,我对后两者的看法是将龙卷风视为土地,将大街视为扩张。
I mean, that's not a bad way to think about the two as well.
我的意思是,这也不是一个糟糕的思考两者的方式。
Yeah, you got it.
是的,你明白了。
You got it.
你明白了。
Lenny: Okay, great.
莱尼:好的,太好了。
So why is it that these undercut each other if you're trying to use either the one in the wrong phase or use both?
那么,如果您试图在错误的阶段使用其中之一或同时使用两者,为什么它们会相互削弱呢?
Geoffrey Moore: Well, so let's start with classic sales 101 from the nineties.
杰弗里·摩尔:好吧,让我们从 90 年代的经典销售 101 开始。
Qualify the customer on budget before you make a sales call.
在进行销售拜访之前,请先确定客户的预算。
That absolutely is critical on Main Street.
这对于大街来说绝对是至关重要的。
I mean it's critical on the tornado, it's dumb on Main Street because obviously they have budget, they've got budgets that even has your name on it if you can go get it.
我的意思是,这对龙卷风至关重要,对大街来说很愚蠢,因为显然他们有预算,他们的预算甚至上面有你的名字,如果你能去得到的话。
But it's a big mistake in the early market or in the bowling alley because they don't have budget.
但这在早期市场或保龄球馆中是一个很大的错误,因为他们没有预算。
So you're not going to get it.
所以你不会得到它。
And the way you win in the early market is with a project model and the way you win in the bowling alley is with a solution model.
在早期市场中获胜的方式是使用项目模型,在保龄球馆中获胜的方式是使用解决方案模型。
Geoffrey Moore: And the problem is if you bring a project model to the bowling alley, the problem is you won't scale because it won't be repeatable.
杰弗里·摩尔:问题是,如果你将项目模型带到保龄球馆,问题是你无法扩展,因为它不可重复。
The ecosystem won't form around you.
生态系统不会在你周围形成。
And if you bring a solution model to the early market, it's like you're over investing in one thing.
如果你将一个解决方案模型引入早期市场,就好像你对一件事进行了过度投资。
The visionary's saying, "Well, yeah, but I have so many other things I want to do." So they're going to want to take you way off your solution roadmap.
有远见的人会说:“嗯,是的,但我还有很多其他事情想做。”所以他们会想要让你偏离你的解决方案路线图。
So each one of these things, the market dynamics call for a very clear response.
因此,市场动态中的每一件事都需要非常明确的反应。
It's not hard to see the response.
不难看出回应。
What people struggle with is, I have been successful with this playbook, the market has moved to the next phase, but I'm really good at the old playbook, so I want to stay with the playbook I'm good at.
人们纠结的是,我的这个剧本已经取得了成功,市场已经进入了下一个阶段,但我真的很擅长旧的剧本,所以我想继续使用我擅长的剧本。
So that's when they get in trouble.
所以这就是他们遇到麻烦的时候。
Lenny: So I think that's extra reason to pay close attention to which phase you're in and that you're practicing the correct playbook.
莱尼:所以我认为这是密切关注你所处阶段以及你正在练习正确剧本的额外理由。
We've talked about AI a little bit, and I don't want to get too far down this road, but I guess is there any advice you would share for an AI startup in being in this tornado or a company looking to integrate AI?
我们已经讨论了一点人工智能,我不想在这条路上走得太远,但我想你对处于这场龙卷风中的人工智能初创公司或寻求整合人工智能的公司有什么建议吗?
Is there anything that you've seen of just make sure you're doing this right?
您是否见过任何可以确保您做得正确的事情?
Geoffrey Moore: Well, it's interesting about...
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,这很有趣......
And particularly right now, I mean the thing that's caught everybody's imagination is generative AI.
尤其是现在,我的意思是,激发每个人想象力的是生成式人工智能。
So we should be thinking about things like open AI with Microsoft and Co-pilot and those kinds of things.
因此,我们应该考虑与微软和 Co-pilot 合作的开放人工智能之类的事情。
Well, maybe not.
嗯,也许不是。
It depends on what...
这取决于什么...
So from a customer's point of view, there's AI in the early market, there's AI in the bowling alley, there's AI in the chasm, there's AI in the tornado, and there's AI on Main Street.
所以从客户的角度来看,早期市场有人工智能,保龄球馆有人工智能,鸿沟有人工智能,龙卷风有人工智能,大街有人工智能。
So I mean, I would argue if you go to Microsoft Copilot, you're on Main Street, you're not taking any risk, you're experimenting with a new thing.
所以我的意思是,我认为如果你去微软副驾驶,你就在大街上,你不会冒任何风险,你正在尝试新事物。
It's kind of cool, makes you more productive.
这很酷,可以让你更有效率。
God bless.
上帝保佑。
It's kind of like just an add-on to Teams or to your whole Office 365 suite.
它有点像 Teams 或整个 Office 365 套件的附加组件。
Stuff that's in the tornado right now, I don't know.
现在龙卷风中的东西,我不知道。
I'm trying to think about what is the use case for Gen AI?
我正在尝试思考 Gen AI 的用例是什么?
I'm not sure there is one in the tornado, but the closest I would say is Salesforce is probably close enough.
我不确定龙卷风中是否存在龙卷风,但我想说的最接近的是 Salesforce 可能已经足够接近了。
Geoffrey Moore: They have a sales co-pilot.
杰弗里·摩尔:他们有一名销售副驾驶。
They have a services copilot, right?
他们有一名服务副驾驶,对吗?
I'm sure there marketing co-pilot.
我确信有营销副驾驶。
So you're going, but we're going to change our sales motion and we're going to use generative AI in line, in our performance on a very widespread, across our entire base.
所以你可以,但我们将改变我们的销售动作,我们将在我们整个基础上广泛使用生成式人工智能。
So all our salespeople are going to use this new tool.
所以我们所有的销售人员都将使用这个新工具。
That would be okay.
那就没问题了。
And that makes sense because the new tool...
这是有道理的,因为新工具......
First of all, Salesforce has their own large language module.
首先,Salesforce有自己的大型语言模块。
So it's not like you're going out to the open AI world and having all those issues.
所以,当你进入开放的人工智能世界时,你不会遇到所有这些问题。
So you can do it and there's a very high productivity return at a modest risk, I think, and modest disruption.
所以你可以做到这一点,我认为,在适度的风险和适度的破坏下,可以获得非常高的生产力回报。
For the bowling alley you'd say, I don't know if this is bowling alley or early market, I'll say it's bowling alley.
对于保龄球馆,你会说,我不知道这是保龄球馆还是早市,我会说这是保龄球馆。
Geoffrey Moore: So if you're Sal Khan and you have the Khan Academy and you're saying, "Look, we want to provide educational resources for the world for young people." The problem with education right now is that particularly after the pandemic, you're a teacher you used to have...
杰弗里·摩尔:如果你是萨尔·汗,你有可汗学院,你会说,“看,我们希望为世界年轻人提供教育资源。”现在教育的问题是,特别是在大流行之后,你是以前的老师......
When you were a teacher in say K through 12, K through eight, you have a class of 30 kids and probably 10 to 15 of them are middle of the road and some number are actually significantly ahead and some number are behind.
当你担任幼儿园到十二年级、幼儿园到八年级的老师时,你的班级有 30 个孩子,其中可能有 10 到 15 个孩子处于中间状态,有些数字实际上明显领先,有些数字落后。
And your job as a teacher is to kind of work with that.
作为一名教师,你的工作就是解决这个问题。
Well, after the pandemic, you might have five different grade levels in the same classroom, not three or six even.
好吧,在大流行之后,同一间教室里可能有五个不同的年级,甚至不是三个或六个。
That's an impossible problem.
这是一个不可能的问题。
But if you said, "Look, we can use Gen AI tutoring and we can tune it to each one of those sixth grade levels."
但如果你说,“看,我们可以使用 Gen AI 辅导,我们可以将其调整到六年级的每一个水平。”
Geoffrey Moore: Now that's a teacher co-pilot, but that's a really specialized idea.
杰弗里·摩尔:现在这是一名副驾驶教师,但这是一个非常专业的想法。
So you go, "Well, that's amazing." And then if you wanted to go to the other side, "You say all these ad agencies say they do this really cool advertising, but I think I can do it myself with Gen AI and I'm going to sell it to other people." I mean, you can imagine a whole businesses that say we write legal opinions and we always start with Gen AI.
所以你会说:“嗯,这太棒了。”然后,如果你想走到另一边,“你说所有这些广告公司都说他们做的广告非常酷,但我想我可以用 Gen AI 自己做,然后我会把它卖给其他人。”我的意思是,你可以想象整个企业都说我们写法律意见,而且我们总是从 Gen AI 开始。
We don't ship Gen AI, there's a human in the loop.
我们不交付人工智能,而是由人类参与其中。
We're going to do amazing or more images, maybe.
也许我们会制作出令人惊叹的或更多的图像。
We're going to design visual images with all the really cool stuff you could do.
我们将用你能做的所有非常酷的东西来设计视觉图像。
We're going to invent a new agency or a new kind of agency we're going to charge to..." I don't know what it would be, but the point is Gen AI I think can be absorbed by the marketplace at multiple places.
我们将发明一个新的机构或一种新的机构,我们将向其收费……”我不知道它会是什么,但我认为重点是 Gen AI 可以被多个地方的市场吸收。
Lenny: As you were talking about that lawyer example, I was thinking part of the pitch would be...
莱尼:当你谈论那个律师的例子时,我认为演讲的一部分是......
And it's also a lot cheaper, but that reminds me of this other post that you wrote, The Seven Deadly Sins of Crossing the Chasm.
而且它也便宜很多,但这让我想起了你写的另一篇文章,《跨越鸿沟的七大罪》。
And I wanted to chat about some of these, and one of them is discounting before you cross the chasm.
我想谈谈其中的一些,其中之一就是在跨越鸿沟之前打折。
Can you talk about why that's something you want to avoid?
您能谈谈为什么您想避免这种情况吗?
Geoffrey Moore: Back to that issue about, "Heart surgery 9.99, this Saturday only bring a coupon." I mean, the discounting model makes sense when something's commoditized or the let's even do the freemium model.
Geoffrey Moore:回到那个问题,“心脏手术9.99,这周六只带一张优惠券。”我的意思是,当某些东西商品化或者甚至让我们采用免费增值模式时,折扣模式才有意义。
The freemium model makes sense if there is no risk in adopting the offer.
如果采用该服务没有风险,那么免费增值模式就有意义。
But chasms are based on risk bearing decisions.
但鸿沟是基于风险决策的。
Basically that's the problem that creates the chasm.
基本上,这就是造成鸿沟的问题。
I have to make a risk bearing buying decision.
我必须做出一个承担风险的购买决定。
So discounting does not reduce risk.
所以贴现并不能降低风险。
In fact, it might even increase risk because this vendor might say, "Well, yeah, I'll give you a better price, but now I'm not going to give you the extra support or we'll have a change of scope." We'll say, "Yes, but now, that wasn't in the contract.
事实上,这甚至可能会增加风险,因为该供应商可能会说:“好吧,是的,我会给你一个更好的价格,但现在我不会给你额外的支持,否则我们将改变范围。”我们会说:“是的,但是现在,合同中没有这一点。
So you have to add more." And all of that is fair game on Main Street, but it's not for crossing the chasm.
所以你必须添加更多。”所有这些在大街上都是公平的游戏,但这并不是为了跨越鸿沟。
Lenny: I'm going to pick on a couple of these other sims that you mentioned.
莱尼:我将挑选您提到的其他几个模拟游戏。
One is you call the target customer mix up.
一是你把目标客户搞混了。
Can you talk about that?
你能谈谈吗?
Geoffrey Moore: The key to this whole Crossing the Chasm playbook is start with the world.
杰弗里·摩尔:整个《跨越鸿沟》剧本的关键是从世界开始。
Don't start with...
不要从...开始
Well, the question we're trying to answer is where is a small pool of trapped value that we can become our pool?
好吧,我们想要回答的问题是,我们可以成为我们的池子的一小部分被困价值在哪里?
So that's why we have geography, profession, use case.
这就是为什么我们有地理、职业、用例。
We're just trying to get big enough to matter, but small enough to lead is one.
我们只是想变得足够大以发挥作用,但小到足以发挥领导作用就是其中之一。
And then once you find that pool, the question you have to say is, "Who controls access to that?
然后,一旦找到该池,您必须说的问题是:“谁控制对该池的访问?
Who's going to sponsor my deal in order for me to solve that, to release that trapped value for that company?" That's your target customer.
谁来赞助我的交易,以便我解决这个问题,释放该公司被困的价值?”这就是你的目标客户。
And you may not know them.
你可能不认识他们。
Typically, my experience is you probably have worked with at least one company in the industry at some point along the line.
通常,我的经验是,您可能曾在行业的某个时刻与至少一家公司合作过。
It's kind of odd if you just had never heard of the industry and you picked that one.
如果你从未听说过这个行业却选择了这个行业,那就有点奇怪了。
Geoffrey Moore: Usually that's why I said, "Well, maybe I should have added that to how do you know you're ready to cross the chasm?" You should at least have a hunch.
杰弗里·摩尔:通常这就是为什么我说,“好吧,也许我应该在你如何知道你准备好跨越鸿沟时加上这一点?”你至少应该有一种预感。
You should at least, "We've done this work, and I think this is the one." Now, you still have to go validate it and make it happen.
你至少应该说,“我们已经完成了这项工作,我认为这就是唯一的。”现在,您仍然需要去验证它并使其发生。
But basically the way you would validate it is rather than try to go to a research or do something, that won't work.
但基本上,你验证它的方式是,而不是尝试进行研究或做某事,这是行不通的。
You say, "Well, we're going to run a marketing campaign, a modest one.
你说:“好吧,我们要开展一场营销活动,一场规模不大的活动。
I'm going to see if I can't get two more of the same use case.
我将看看是否不能再获得两个相同的用例。
I'm willing to bet the next three months of my company by saying in this three months, all we're going to do is try to get two more deals that have this pattern." And that would be kind of the way you might go after it.
我愿意拿我公司的未来三个月打赌,说在这三个月里,我们要做的就是尝试再达成两笔具有这种模式的交易。”这就是你可能会采取的方式。
Lenny: So I think this is worth spending a little more time on this idea of how you know you're ready to cross the chasm.
莱尼:所以我认为值得花更多时间来思考如何知道自己已经准备好跨越鸿沟。
So one is you find one very excited marquee customer, then you're sharing, maybe find a couple more and see if it's actually starting to roll and tip.
所以一个是你找到一个非常兴奋的大客户,然后你分享,也许找到更多,看看它是否真的开始滚动和倾斜。
Geoffrey Moore: No. Well, I said it wrong.
杰弗里·摩尔:不。好吧,我说错了。
So the marquee customer is probably not in your beachhead market.
因此,大客户可能不在您的滩头市场中。
The marquee customer is a famous company that you have the visionary sponsor.
大客户是您有远见的赞助商的著名公司。
That's the thing, because that's the company that the business press wanted to write about, or the tech press wanted to write about.
就是这样,因为这就是商业媒体想要报道的公司,或者科技媒体想要报道的公司。
People went, "Oh, you were the guys who..." You're like Hans Solo.
人们说,“哦,你们这些人……”你们就像汉斯·索罗。
You did whatever that run was in 15 parsecs.
你在 15 秒差距内完成了所有运行的任务。
I can't even remember what it was.
我什至不记得那是什么。
But that's your claim to fame.
但这就是你成名的理由。
It's your claim to fame.
这是你成名的理由。
But the Crossing the Chasm one is, "Oh..." And by the way the press is not interested in the crossing chasm, but the local, if there was a local press, they'd be all over it.
但跨越鸿沟的一个是,“哦......”顺便说一句,媒体对跨越鸿沟不感兴趣,但当地,如果有当地媒体,他们会全力以赴。
Geoffrey Moore: The Kessel Run.
杰弗里·摩尔:《凯塞尔奔跑》。
Thank you.
谢谢你。
The Kessel Run in 15 parsecs.
凯塞尔跑仅需 15 秒差距。
Thank you.
谢谢你。
Geoffrey Moore: Exactly.
杰弗里·摩尔:没错。
That was his visionary thing.
那是他有远见的事情。
Lenny: So I think the important takeaway there is there's always this advice of talk to customers, make sure they're happy, build what...
莱尼:所以我认为最重要的一点是与客户交谈的建议,确保他们满意,构建......
Not necessarily build what they want, but make sure you're understanding what they need.
不一定要构建他们想要的东西,但要确保您了解他们的需求。
But I think when your most important insights here is make sure you're talking to the right people.
但我认为,当你在这里最重要的见解是确保你正在与正确的人交谈。
Which are essentially people in the next stage, essentially of the adoption life cycle.
他们本质上是处于下一阶段的人,本质上是采用生命周期的人。
The more pragmatists.
越是实用主义者。
Geoffrey Moore: Yes.
杰弗里·摩尔:是的。
And they have to be the...
他们必须是...
I think you need to talk to the economic buyer as opposed to the end user, because the end user will be saying, "Oh, yeah, you're right.
我认为你需要与经济买家而不是最终用户交谈,因为最终用户会说,“哦,是的,你是对的。
Oh, it's just terrible and we're oppressed." But if their boss doesn't want to sponsor it, it doesn't work.
哦,这太可怕了,我们受到压迫。”但如果他们的老板不想赞助,那就行不通。
Lenny: Which is hard, hard often when you're building B2B software, you just don't make it great.
Lenny:这很难,当你构建 B2B 软件时,通常很难,你只是没有把它做得很好。
And then it's like, "Oh, these people don't actually care what they're buying it.
然后就像是,“哦,这些人实际上并不关心他们买的是什么。
They just have all these check boxes." And then another deadly sin, which you've touched on, but I think it might be worth sharing again, is just this idea, you call it the compelling reason, confusion, where instead of thinking about your compelling reason to sell, you think about what is the pain point you're solving, compelling reason to buy.
他们只是拥有所有这些复选框。”然后你提到的另一个致命罪过,但我认为可能值得再次分享,就是这个想法,你称之为令人信服的理由,混乱,你不是考虑你令人信服的出售理由,而是考虑你正在解决的痛点是什么,令人信服的购买理由。
Geoffrey Moore: Obviously as an entrepreneur, you have a compelling reason to sell.
杰弗里·摩尔:显然,作为一名企业家,你有一个令人信服的出售理由。
But what they tend to do is in trying to cross the chasm, if they're not using this approach, they think, "Well, I haven't made my product attractive enough." So then they'd say, "Well, I'm going to make a sexier demo, or I'm going to change my deck.
但他们倾向于尝试跨越鸿沟,如果他们不使用这种方法,他们会想,“好吧,我还没有让我的产品足够有吸引力。”然后他们会说,“好吧,我要制作一个更性感的演示,或者我要改变我的套牌。
I'm going to write a new..." And the sales guy comes back, says, "I had a great presentation.
我要写一篇新的……”销售人员回来说,“我做了一个很棒的演示。
This is the deck that we ought to be using." And that's all about compelling ways to sell, not compelling reasons to buy.
这就是我们应该使用的牌组。”这都是令人信服的销售方式,而不是令人信服的购买理由。
And the pragmatist, by the way...
顺便说一句,实用主义者......
And by the way, the practice will take the meeting.
顺便说一句,练习将在会议上进行。
One of the problems with the chasm is they don't say no. They just never say yes.
鸿沟的问题之一是他们不拒绝。他们只是从不说“是”。
And they actually encourage you...
他们实际上鼓励你......
"You should come back again with this too.
“你也应该带着这个回来。
This is really interesting." Yeah, it is really interesting.
这真的很有趣。”是的,这真的很有趣。
Lenny: Kind of along those lines, positioning, how important is that, and any advice on figuring out your positioning when you're doing this?
Lenny:类似的,定位,它有多重要,以及在你这样做时确定你的定位有什么建议吗?
I know you talk a lot about making sure you focus on their pain point, but at some point you're like, "Here's what we're doing for you."
我知道你经常谈论确保关注他们的痛点,但在某些时候你会想,“这就是我们正在为你做的事情。”
Geoffrey Moore: One of the nice things about Crossing the Chasm is the positioning formula is absolutely the same every time.
Geoffrey Moore:《跨越鸿沟》的好处之一是每次的定位公式都绝对相同。
It's really cool.
真的很酷。
So basically when you're thinking about positioning, you're saying, "Look, I'm going with this use case in this particular segment." So they have an incumbent vendor.
因此,基本上,当您考虑定位时,您会说:“看,我将在这个特定的细分市场中使用这个用例。”所以他们有一个现任供应商。
The advantage of the incumbent vendor is they understand the business, but they don't have the new technology.
现有供应商的优势是他们了解业务,但他们没有新技术。
Conversely, you have technology competitors who have as good technology, maybe a better technology than you have, but they're not committed to this domain expertise of this thing.
相反,你的技术竞争对手拥有同样好的技术,甚至比你更好的技术,但他们并不致力于这个领域的专业知识。
Geoffrey Moore: So your positioning is, "We are the technology leaders who have specialized and committed to solve this problem.
杰弗里摩尔:所以你的定位是,“我们是专门致力于解决这个问题的技术领导者。
And by the way, we have huge respect for your incumbent vendor.
顺便说一句,我们非常尊重您的现任供应商。
We're not asking you to kick them out.
我们并不是要求你把他们赶出去。
They just can't solve this problem.
他们就是无法解决这个问题。
We also have respect for our peers, but frankly, they wouldn't know your problem if they wouldn't recognize it in a lineup.
我们也尊重我们的同行,但坦率地说,如果他们在阵容中不认识到你的问题,他们就不会知道你的问题。
We are here, and by the way, if anybody comes into our quadrant, we're going to kick their ass.
我们在这里,顺便说一句,如果有人进入我们的象限,我们就会踢他们的屁股。
We are going to be beyond compare.
我们将成为无可比拟的。
Nobody is going to handle this problem with this kind of technology the way we will, and that's our claim of fame.
没有人会像我们一样用这种技术来处理这个问题,这就是我们的名声。
That's what we're going to do, and that's our positioning."
这就是我们要做的,这就是我们的定位。”
Lenny: I love that.
莱尼:我喜欢这个。
Say you're building a product led growth company, a bottom up oriented B2B SaaS company.
假设您正在建立一家以产品为主导的成长型公司,一家自下而上的 B2B SaaS 公司。
Is there anything that changes in your advice?
您的建议有什么变化吗?
Geoffrey Moore: Yeah, if you're going to use a volume ups approach like Atlassian or anything grows up from the bottom up, you're playing a different game.
Geoffrey Moore:是的,如果你要使用像 Atlassian 这样的音量增大方法或任何自下而上增长的方法,你就在玩不同的游戏。
First of all, you're playing...
首先,你在玩...
Because you attract the end user before you attract the economic buyer.
因为你先吸引了最终用户,然后才吸引了经济买家。
So you have some version of a freemium strategy, that's what you're going to do.
所以你有某种版本的免费增值策略,这就是你要做的。
And Yammer did this, right?
Yammer 做到了这一点,对吗?
And eventually got bought by Microsoft.
最终被微软收购。
So the way you play that game is, first of all, you probably do need some funding, not necessarily, maybe you can do this all on AWS and a credit card.
所以你玩这个游戏的方式是,首先,你可能确实需要一些资金,不一定,也许你可以在 AWS 和信用卡上完成这一切。
But the game that is going to be, how do I create that moment of criticality?
但是接下来的游戏,我该如何创造关键时刻呢?
What you would do is you'd say...
你会做的就是你会说...
First of all, you need telemetry.
首先,您需要遥测。
So you need to figure out what are the people really doing with our product?
因此,您需要弄清楚人们真正在使用我们的产品做什么?
And then you need to find a way to communicate with them to see if you can ferret out, is there a compelling reason to buy thing in their environment?
然后你需要找到一种方法与他们沟通,看看你是否可以找出在他们的环境中是否有令人信服的理由去购买东西?
So it'd be a different way of doing early market.
因此,这将是一种不同的早期市场营销方式。
Geoffrey Moore: You would not have a marquee client, but to cross the chasm...
杰弗里摩尔:你不会有一个大客户,但要跨越鸿沟......
You cannot cross the chasm of product-led growth, you can't because it is like saying, "Well, yeah, I'm going to cure Covid by just putting vaccines out in public places." It's like, "No, people need to learn more.
你无法跨越产品主导型增长的鸿沟,因为这就像在说:“好吧,是的,我只需在公共场所投放疫苗就可以治愈新冠病毒。”就像是,“不,人们需要了解更多。
No." So you'd have to do that.
不。”所以你必须这么做。
Where product-led growth plays really interestingly, is in the land and expand phases of the market.
产品主导型增长真正有趣的地方在于市场的土地和扩张阶段。
If you can land with a hot product, but more importantly, product-led growth, which is really good at is expand because it prompts the user to get more involved.
如果你能推出热门产品,但更重要的是产品主导的增长,它真正擅长的是扩展,因为它会促使用户更多地参与。
And that's classically a Main Street play.
这是典型的大街戏剧。
But there's got to be no risk.
但一定不能有风险。
That product-led growth works when basically the extended the next purchase has very low risk, and therefore you're not really dealing with chasms.
当基本上延长下一次购买的风险非常低时,以产品为主导的增长就会起作用,因此你并没有真正处理鸿沟。
Lenny: That is incredibly interesting.
莱尼:这非常有趣。
Interestingly, every product led growth company ends up building a sales team, 100% of them, including Atlassian, which had product led growth for a long time.
有趣的是,每家产品主导型增长公司最终都会建立一支销售团队,100% 都是销售团队,包括长期以产品主导型增长的 Atlassian。
And I don't know if anyone's heard this perspective on it, that if you really want to cross the gap...
我不知道是否有人听过这样的观点,如果你真的想跨越鸿沟......
I imagine it happens in some form of-
我想这会以某种形式发生——
Geoffrey Moore: Well, and here's the thing.
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,事情是这样的。
The reason they build a sales team eventually is they need to get enterprise deals.
他们最终建立销售团队的原因是他们需要获得企业交易。
And obviously you need a sales team to get enterprise deals.
显然,您需要一个销售团队来获得企业交易。
And one of the mistakes you could make is hiring an enterprise salesperson when you're trying to cross the chasm.
当你试图跨越鸿沟时,你可能犯的错误之一就是雇用一名企业销售人员。
Enterprise salespeople are not good chasm crossers because they're used to doing horizontal coverage model.
企业销售人员不是优秀的跨越鸿沟的人,因为他们习惯于横向覆盖模型。
This is like no, domain expert narrow model.
这就像不,领域专家的狭隘模型。
You want somebody that looks more like a sales engineer than a salesperson.
您想要一个看起来更像销售工程师而不是销售人员的人。
You want somebody very diagnostic, very committed to the integrity of the problem solution framework.
你需要一个非常善于诊断、非常致力于问题解决框架的完整性的人。
So it's just different.
所以这只是不同的。
Lenny: Okay.
莱尼:好的。
Just a couple more questions.
还有几个问题。
You had this very public exchange with Martin Casado, he's a partner at Andreessen Horowitz.
您与马丁·卡萨多(Martin Casado)进行了非常公开的交流,他是安德森·霍洛维茨基金(Andreessen Horowitz)的合伙人。
And just to summarize briefly, essentially he was arguing that I think some people believe once you've crossed the chasm, life's good.
简而言之,他本质上是在争论,我认为有些人相信一旦跨越了鸿沟,生活就会变得美好。
It's all downhill.
一切都是下坡路。
People are going to start pulling your product out of you.
人们将开始从你身上抽走你的产品。
It's going to be so easy.
一切都会变得如此简单。
And his argument is he doesn't see that, it's endless pain and suffering and hardships.
他的论点是他没有看到这一点,这是无尽的痛苦和磨难。
And I know you went back and forth trying to correct this, but what's a way to think about what happens?
我知道你反复尝试纠正这个问题,但是如何思考会发生什么?
Geoffrey Moore: So actually, Martin and I had a couple of this...
杰弗里·摩尔:实际上,马丁和我有过一些这样的经历……
By the way, his biggest point...
顺便说一下,他最大的一点是……
I'll come back to your point in a second, but his biggest point is, "Jeff..." The venture community at least, and certainly Andreessen Horowitz doesn't deal with the level of granularity of Crossing the Chasm anymore.
我稍后会回到你的观点,但他最重要的观点是,“杰夫……”至少在风险投资界,而且安德森霍洛维茨当然不再处理跨越鸿沟的粒度水平。
There's too much money that wants to be put to work.
有太多的钱想要投入工作。
By the way, there's so much software already out there that the notion that your software is going to be that disruptive is increasingly improbable because you're not standing on the shoulders of giants, you're standing on the shoulders of people standing on the shoulders of people standing on the shoulders of people standing on the shoulders of giants.
顺便说一句,已经有如此多的软件,以至于你的软件将具有颠覆性的想法越来越不可能,因为你不是站在巨人的肩膀上,你是站在人们的肩膀上,站在人们的肩膀上,站在人们的肩膀上,站在巨人的肩膀上。
So he was making a bunch of those points, which I thought were pretty interesting.
所以他提出了很多这样的观点,我认为这非常有趣。
But his other point about, does life ever become easy?
但他的另一个观点是,生活会变得容易吗?
No, life never becomes easy.
不,生活永远不会变得轻松。
The problems change.
问题发生了变化。
Geoffrey Moore: The challenge with software is...
Geoffrey Moore:软件面临的挑战是......
Well, there's a lot of challenges with it, but software that people use, the application software, we all have different minds.
嗯,它有很多挑战,但是人们使用的软件,应用程序软件,我们都有不同的想法。
We all have different contexts.
我们都有不同的背景。
To make a product that would work, that would solve what I want and solve what you want and solve what the listener wants.
为了制造出一个有效的产品,它可以解决我想要的、解决你想要的、解决听众想要的。
I mean, the margin, no. We're going to have different expectations.
我的意思是,边际,不。我们会有不同的期望。
So there's always...
所以总有...
And then of course there's competition, and then there's funding, and then there's technological shifts, and just about the time it really works well, they say, "No, we got to put it...
当然,还有竞争,然后是资金,然后是技术变革,就在它真正发挥作用的时候,他们说,“不,我们必须把它......
No, no, no. You put it in the data center.
不,不,不。你把它放在数据中心。
We got to put it in the cloud." "Oh, no, no, you got in the cloud, you got to put it in Kubernetes." "Oh, no, no, no. You don't understand.
我们必须把它放在云端。”“哦,不,不,你进入了云端,你必须把它放在 Kubernetes 中。”“哦,不,不,不。你不明白。
It's edge AI, it's not cloud." It just goes on and on and on.
这是边缘人工智能,不是云。”它只是不断地持续下去。
So I think if you're going to play this game, you got to be up for...
所以我认为如果你要玩这个游戏,你必须做好准备......
Yeah, there's going to be a new headache every week.
是的,每周都会有新的头痛。
Lenny: That's exactly how I see it.
莱尼:我就是这么看的。
I always tell founders, you shouldn't start a company unless you can't not start a company.
我总是告诉创始人,除非你不能不创办公司,否则你不应该创办公司。
Geoffrey Moore: Yes.
杰弗里·摩尔:是的。
By the way, why did I leave?
顺便问一下,我为什么要离开?
County was a great place to be, but I had to do my own thing.
县城是个好地方,但我必须做自己的事情。
Lenny: And that's a real pull.
莱尼:这是一个真正的吸引力。
Kind of along the lines of something you just shared, maybe a final question.
有点像你刚刚分享的内容,也许是最后一个问题。
Is there something you've changed your mind about or something you've evolved your thinking on recently?
最近有什么事情让你改变了主意或者改变了你的想法吗?
Either from the beginning of the book or just even more recent?
是从书的开头开始还是最近的?
Geoffrey Moore: I think what I realized over time increasingly was this is a model that's really optimized for B2B markets, because it implies federated decision making around high risk buying decisions.
Geoffrey Moore:我想,随着时间的推移,我逐渐意识到这是一个真正针对 B2B 市场进行优化的模型,因为它意味着围绕高风险购买决策进行联合决策。
I would say for the 20th century, that was 95% of tech.
我想说,对于 20 世纪来说,这就是 95% 的科技。
But what was so interesting about the change in the century...
但这个世纪的变化有什么有趣的……
Because remember right at the change of the century, B2B tech went in the tank, the tech bubble just...
因为请记住,在世纪之交,B2B 技术陷入困境,技术泡沫刚刚……
Because everybody was afraid of the Y2K problem.
因为每个人都害怕千年虫问题。
So they did a whole bunch of buying up of software, and then there was a year where they think, "Well, we ate more than we could at Thanksgiving dinner.
所以他们购买了一大堆软件,然后有一年他们想,“好吧,我们在感恩节晚餐上吃得比我们能吃的还要多。
We're not interested in eating another burger here.
我们没有兴趣在这里再吃一个汉堡。
"So the market went in the tank.
“所以市场陷入困境。
By the way at that point, venture started saying, "Well, maybe we should be investing in biotech, or maybe we should doing clean tech." Venture stepped back from the table too.
顺便说一句,风投公司在那时开始说:“好吧,也许我们应该投资生物技术,或者也许我们应该投资清洁技术。” Venture也从桌子旁退了一步。
Geoffrey Moore: But out of this, consumer computing came out of nowhere.
杰弗里·摩尔:但是消费计算就这样横空出世了。
And for my generation, it was unimaginable.
对于我们这一代人来说,这是难以想象的。
The first time I heard about Google and they said, "We're going to save every search argument." I thought, "That's the dumbest thing I've ever heard in my life.
我第一次听说谷歌时,他们说:“我们将保存每一个搜索参数。”我想:“这是我一生中听过的最愚蠢的事情。
They're not going to be able to afford it." But their model was, "We are rethinking this thing from the ground up.
他们负担不起。”但他们的模式是,“我们正在从头开始重新考虑这件事。
Geoffrey, you have no idea what we're doing." And boy were they right.
杰弗里,你不知道我们在做什么。”天哪,他们是对的。
So the point was when that came in, then consumer computing and then the iPhone hits, and then we have mobile apps.
所以关键是当它出现时,然后是消费者计算,然后是 iPhone,然后我们有了移动应用程序。
You have a world now where the B2C play can actually be the core of innovation.
现在,B2C 游戏实际上可以成为创新的核心。
It used to be B2C was an afterthought.
过去,B2C 是事后才想到的。
Now it's like, "No, no, no, no, B2B might be the afterthought." So it's completely different...
现在就像是,“不,不,不,不,B2B 可能是事后才想到的。”所以完全不一样...
And the whole digital transformation of the universe, and we're still living through the digital transformation 20 years in, and I don't think Crossing the Chasm is designed for that problem.
整个宇宙的数字化转型,20 年后我们仍然经历着数字化转型,我不认为《跨越鸿沟》是为解决这个问题而设计的。
So that's a different problem.
所以这是一个不同的问题。
Lenny: So basically, if you're building a consumer app, don't spend time studying Crossing the Chasm.
Lenny:所以基本上,如果您正在构建消费者应用程序,请不要花时间研究“跨越鸿沟”。
Geoffrey Moore: Yeah, if you're doing B2B, this is the most reliable playbook.
Geoffrey Moore:是的,如果您从事 B2B,这是最可靠的策略。
It's still on...
它还在...
People are still into this playbook 30 years in.
30 年来,人们仍然热衷于这本剧本。
So it's obviously...
所以很明显...
The playbook kind of works.
剧本是有效的。
Lenny: I said this earlier, I feel like people are just reinventing many of the things you uncovered 30 years ago.
Lenny:我之前说过,我觉得人们只是在重新发明你 30 年前发现的许多东西。
Everyone's like, "Oh yeah, target audience, really important, or finding a marque customer." So I'm really happy that we spent this time digging into many of your theories.
每个人都会说,“哦,是的,目标受众,真的很重要,或者找到一个品牌客户。”所以我真的很高兴我们花了这段时间来深入研究你的许多理论。
Geoffrey Moore: Well, Lenny, thank you for being...
杰弗里·摩尔:嗯,莱尼,谢谢你……
You've been a really great prompter and questioner, so thank you very, very much.
您是一位非常出色的提示者和提问者,非常非常感谢您。
Lenny: I really, really appreciate that.
莱尼:我真的非常感激。
Is there anything you want to leave listeners with as a final thought or piece of advice or just anything?
您有什么想留给听众的最后想法或建议或其他什么吗?
Geoffrey Moore: Look, I don't know if anybody's reading the paper recently, but the world's not exactly nailing it right now.
杰弗里·摩尔:听着,我不知道最近是否有人读过这篇论文,但世界现在还没有完全明白这一点。
There's a lot of stuff going on that we could do a lot better, and software enabled technology is almost certainly at the core of any solution that scales to any world problem that matters.
有很多事情我们可以做得更好,而软件支持的技术几乎肯定是任何解决方案的核心,可以扩展到任何重要的世界问题。
I think it's more important to be an entrepreneur now than maybe ever.
我认为现在成为一名企业家比以往任何时候都更重要。
I wouldn't make becoming a billionaire my goal.
我不会把成为亿万富翁作为我的目标。
Frankly, I don't even know what a billionaire would even do with their money.
坦白说,我什至不知道亿万富翁会用他们的钱做什么。
I don't even how to even imagine their money.
我什至不知道如何想象他们的钱。
That's a thousand million dollars.
那是一千万美元。
It doesn't make any sense, but what does make sense?
这没有任何意义,但是什么才有意义呢?
But what does make sense is to...
但真正有意义的是……
I'm happy to get two...
我很高兴能得到两个...
Do I know what to do with 10 million?
我知道要拿1000万做什么吗?
Yeah.
是的。
Could I do 20?
我可以做20个吗?
Probably.
大概。
Could I use a hundred?
我可以用一百吗?
Probably not.
可能不会。
But at some point, I want people to make yourself a great living, make yourself...
但在某些时候,我希望人们让自己过上美好的生活,让自己......
But after that, have an impact.
但在那之后,有影响。
If you're gifted enough to be able to start a software company and do something original, you're a scarce resource, so don't waste it.
如果你有足够的天赋能够创办一家软件公司并做一些原创的事情,那么你就是一种稀缺资源,所以不要浪费它。
Lenny: Amazing.
莱尼:太棒了。
I'm going to sneak it one more question along these same lines actually.
实际上,我将沿着同样的思路再问一个问题。
Your last book is very unlike all your other books.
您的最后一本书与您其他所有的书都非常不同。
It's called The Infinite Staircase, which is essentially a guide to living a good life and a meaningful life.
它的名字叫《无限的阶梯》,本质上是一本美好生活、有意义生活的指南。
Is there maybe one piece of advice you could share with folks of just how to live a better life, a more meaningful life, happier life?
关于如何过上更好的生活、更有意义的生活、更幸福的生活,您是否可以与人们分享一条建议?
Geoffrey Moore: The purpose of that book was twofold.
杰弗里·摩尔:这本书的目的是双重的。
One was...
一个是...
So I was looking around...
于是我四处张望...
And this is an American sort of experience between social media and the politicians or whatever.
这是社交媒体和政客或其他什么之间的美国式经历。
Our ability to defend traditional values is becoming increasingly challenging.
我们捍卫传统价值观的能力正变得越来越具有挑战性。
And historically, you say, "Well, religion was sort of the place where the foundation for solidifying traditional values." But in my lifetime, the counter explanation of how we got here, other than being created by a creator, this whole the Big Bang and the Darwinian model, it's becoming increasingly credible and I'm fascinated by it.
从历史上看,你会说,“嗯,宗教是巩固传统价值观的基础。”但在我的一生中,除了由造物主创造之外,我们如何走到这一步的反面解释,整个大爆炸和达尔文模型,它变得越来越可信,我对它着迷。
So the question I had in the back of my mind is how could you take that model and still support traditional ethics?
所以我心里的问题是,你如何才能采用这种模式并仍然支持传统道德?
Geoffrey Moore: So the first part was, well, what's the model?
杰弗里·摩尔:所以第一部分是,模型是什么?
It turns out to explain getting from the Big Bang to Lenny and Geoffrey talking on this podcast, there's a lot of steps you've got to go through.
事实证明,要解释从大爆炸到莱尼和杰弗里在这个播客上的谈话,你必须经历很多步骤。
But there's a whole thing about complexity and how complexity emerges in layers and the staircase is a series of layers, and the first two thirds of the book takes 11 stairs.
但是,复杂性以及复杂性如何分层出现,而楼梯是一系列的层,而这本书的前三分之二需要 11 个楼梯。
That gets you from physics to theory.
这让你从物理学转向理论。
And it's like, really?
真的吗?
Yeah, yeah.
是啊是啊。
From a cloud of atoms to us talking about Crossing the Chasm, 11 steps, we can get you there.
从原子云到我们谈论的跨越鸿沟,只需 11 个步骤,我们就能帮助您实现目标。
It's kind of fun.
这很有趣。
It's assembling the last 25 years of my reading.
它汇集了我过去 25 年的阅读经历。
It's fascinating stuff.
这是令人着迷的东西。
All these different topics, and I was just trying to knit it together.
所有这些不同的主题,我只是想把它们编织在一起。
No original research.
无原创研究。
I was just literally just trying to get the story together.
我只是想把这个故事拼凑起来。
Geoffrey Moore: But then the last third was, okay, that's a very reasonable narrative.
杰弗里·摩尔:但是最后三分之一是,好吧,这是一个非常合理的叙述。
It's maybe even more reasonable than religious narratives, but now how do you validate ethical action and where does it come from?
它可能比宗教叙事更合理,但现在你如何验证道德行为以及它从何而来?
So the last part was about, okay, how do you do that?
所以最后一部分是关于,好吧,你如何做到这一点?
How does it derive from that creation story?
它是如何从那个创世故事中衍生出来的?
The secular creation stories were.
世俗的创世故事是。
So that was what was important.
所以这才是重要的。
At the end of the day, I think the message of that book is just, you really do need to do good, but it's not because you're obeying...
归根结底,我认为那本书的信息只是,你确实需要做好事,但这并不是因为你服从......
In this framework, it's not because you're a bang a divine creator.
在这个框架中,这并不是因为你是一个伟大的创造者。
It's because we're mammals and mammals nurture their young, and we were gifted with unconditional love when we were born because otherwise, you and I could not be here.
这是因为我们是哺乳动物,哺乳动物会抚养它们的幼崽,我们出生时就被赋予了无条件的爱,否则,你和我就不可能在这里。
I mean, a 1-year-old cannot...
我的意思是,1岁的孩子不能...
If somebody doesn't love the hell out of a 1-year-old, they're not going to be two.
如果有人不爱一岁的孩子,他们就不会长到两岁。
So we know where we started.
所以我们知道我们从哪里开始。
So come on, those values were built into us.
所以来吧,这些价值观已经融入我们的内心了。
They don't have to come from above.
他们不必来自上面。
They can come from below, and therefore, how can you integrate them into your life?
他们可能来自底层,那么你如何才能将他们融入你的生活呢?
And that was where the book...
这就是这本书的地方...
Anyway.
无论如何。
Lenny: That is a beautiful message to end on.
莱尼:这是一个美好的结尾。
I promised I'd get you out of here in one minute.
我答应过我会在一分钟内带你离开这里。
Just to let people know, you do speaking, you do consulting, where can people find you online if they want to reach out and-
只是为了让人们知道,你做演讲,做咨询,如果人们想联系你,可以在哪里找到你——
Geoffrey Moore: LinkedIn.
杰弗里·摩尔:LinkedIn。
Yeah, I'm on LinkedIn and I have a blog on LinkedIn.
是的,我在 LinkedIn 上,并且在 LinkedIn 上有一个博客。
And if these topics are interesting to you, you'd probably be interested in the blog.
如果您对这些主题感兴趣,您可能会对博客感兴趣。
Lenny: And then message you on LinkedIn would be the idea?
Lenny:然后在 LinkedIn 上给你发消息是个好主意吗?
Lenny: Easy.
莱尼:简单。
Geoffrey, thank you so much for being here.
杰弗里,非常感谢你来到这里。
Geoffrey Moore: Well, thank you, Lenny.
杰弗里·摩尔:好的,谢谢你,莱尼。
It was a pleasure.
这是一种乐趣。
It was my pleasure.
这是我的荣幸。
Bye, everyone.: Thank you so much for listening.
再见,大家:非常感谢您的聆听。
If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.
如果您发现这很有价值,您可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或您最喜欢的播客应用程序上订阅该节目。
Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast.
另外,请考虑给我们评分或留下评论,因为这确实有助于其他听众找到播客。
You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com.
您可以在 lennyspodcast.com 上找到所有过去的剧集或了解有关该节目的更多信息。
See you in the next episode.
下一集见。