Failure

Lenny: Today we've got another very special compilation episode.

莱尼：今天我们还有另一集非常特别的合辑。

Something I've been pulling on more and more with the podcast and the newsletter, in case you've noticed, is failure.

如果你注意到的话，我在播客和时事通讯中越来越多地强调的就是失败。

Normally I spend a lot of time researching how the best companies and the best product leaders operate, but you can learn a lot and often a lot more from failure.

通常我会花很多时间研究最好的公司和最好的产品领导者是如何运作的，但你可以从失败中学到很多东西，而且往往会学到更多。

And so what we've done with this episode is we've looked at all of the past episodes we've done and pulled out all the most interesting and insightful stories of failure and turned it into this very focused episode on failure.

因此，我们在这一集中所做的就是回顾我们过去做过的所有剧集，并找出所有最有趣和最有洞察力的失败故事，并将其变成这一集中讨论失败的剧集。

I hope that you find this useful and interesting.

我希望您觉得这有用且有趣。

Let us know what you think in the comments on YouTube or on lennysnewsletter.com, or just let me know on Twitter.

请在 YouTube 或 lennysnewsletter.com 上发表评论，或者在 Twitter 上告诉我您的想法。

If you like this, we'll keep doing this.

如果你喜欢这个，我们会继续这样做。

If not, we'll, probably not.

如果没有，我们可能不会。

Either way, I hope you enjoy.

不管怎样，我希望你喜欢。

Before we dive in, here is a short word from our wonderful sponsors.

在我们深入讨论之前，请先听听我们出色的赞助商的简短致辞。

Lenny: Let me tell you about a product called Sendbird.

Lenny：让我告诉你一个叫做 Sendbird 的产品。

The all-in-one communications API platform designed for both web and mobile apps.

专为网络和移动应用程序设计的一体化通信 API 平台。

In a world saturated with multi-channel communication, product teams are discovering the effectiveness of in-app communication with Sendbird, businesses can elevate their in-app experience with decluttered and branded communication featuring AI-powered chatbots, one-way messages, chat, video calls and livestream capabilities, all tailored for commerce, marketing and top-tier support.

在一个充满多渠道通信的世界中，产品团队正在发现 Sendbird 应用内通信的有效性，企业可以通过具有人工智能驱动的聊天机器人、单向消息、聊天、视频通话和直播功能的整洁和品牌化通信来提升其应用内体验，所有这些都是为商业、营销和顶级支持量身定制的。

Forward-thinking companies such as Hinge, Patreon, Yahoo, Accolade, and more use Sendbird to build in-app communication experiences that drive engagement, conversion, and retention.

Hinge、Patreon、Yahoo、Accolade 等具有前瞻性思维的公司使用 Sendbird 构建应用内通信体验，以提高参与度、转化率和保留率。

In-app communication has the highest conversion, highest engagement, and highest satisfaction of any communication channel.

在所有沟通渠道中，应用内沟通具有最高的转化率、最高的参与度和最高的满意度。

And when it comes to investing in this channel, trust Sendbird to take your in-app communication experience to the next level.

当谈到投资这个渠道时，请相信 Sendbird 会将您的应用内通信体验提升到一个新的水平。

Start today with Sendbird's free plan and as a listener of Lenny's Podcast, you'll get an additional two months of unlimited usage and access to all premium features, including creating your very own generative AI chatbot.

从今天开始，使用 Sendbird 的免费计划，作为 Lenny 播客的听众，您将获得额外两个月的无限制使用和所有高级功能的访问权限，包括创建您自己的生成 AI 聊天机器人。

Visit sendbird.com/Lenny to begin your free journey.

访问 sendbird.com/Lenny 开始您的免费旅程。

That's sendbird.com/Lenny.

那是 sendbird.com/Lenny。

Lenny: This episode is brought to you by Eppo.

Lenny：这一集是 Eppo 为您带来的。

Eppo is a next-generation, A/B testing and feature management platform built by alums of Airbnb and Snowflake for modern growth teams.

Eppo 是由 Airbnb 和 Snowflake 的校友为现代增长团队构建的下一代 A/B 测试和功能管理平台。

Companies like Twitch, Miro, ClickUp and DraftKings rely on Eppo to power their experiments.

Twitch、Miro、ClickUp 和 DraftKings 等公司依靠 Eppo 来支持他们的实验。

Experimentation is increasingly essential for driving growth and for understanding the performance of new features.

实验对于推动增长和了解新功能的性能越来越重要。

And Eppo helps you increase experimentation velocity while unlocking rigorous deep analysis in a way that no other commercial tool does.

Eppo 可以帮助您提高实验速度，同时以其他商业工具无法做到的方式解锁严格的深度分析。

Lenny: When I was at Airbnb, one of the things that I loved most was our experimentation platform where I could set up experiments, easily, troubleshoot issues, and analyze performance all on my own.

Lenny：当我在 Airbnb 时，我最喜欢的事情之一就是我们的实验平台，我可以自己轻松地设置实验、解决问题并分析性能。

Eppo does all that and more with advanced statistical methods that can help you shave weeks off experiment time, an accessible UI for diving deeper into performance, and out-of-the-box reporting that helps you avoid annoying prolonged analytic cycles.

Eppo 通过先进的统计方法（可以帮助您缩短数周的实验时间）、可用于更深入地了解性能的易于访问的 UI 以及开箱即用的报告（可以帮助您避免烦人的长时间分析周期）来完成所有这些工作。

Eppo also makes it easy for you to share experiment insights with your team, sparking new ideas for the A/B testing flywheel.

Eppo 还使您可以轻松地与您的团队分享实验见解，激发 A/B 测试飞轮的新想法。

Eppo powers experimentation across every use case, including product, growth, machine learning, monetization, and email marketing.

Eppo 为每个用例提供实验支持，包括产品、增长、机器学习、货币化和电子邮件营销。

Check out Eppo at geteppo.com/lenny and 10 X your experiment velocity.

请访问 geteppo.com/lenny 查看 Eppo，了解 10 倍的实验速度。

That's geteppo.com/lenny.

那是 geteppo.com/lenny。

Lenny: All right.

莱尼：好吧。

First up, we've got Katie Dill, who is head of design at Stripe and former head of design at Airbnb and Lyft sharing this amazing story of how the entire design team at Airbnb basically rebelled against her soon after she joined and what she learned from that experience.

首先，我们请来了 Stripe 设计主管、Airbnb 和 Lyft 前设计主管 Katie Dill，她分享了这个令人惊奇的故事，讲述了她加入后不久 Airbnb 的整个设计团队如何基本上反抗她，以及她从这次经历中学到的东西。

Katie Dill: I'm happy to talk about it because frankly, it was the biggest learning experience of my leadership career, or at least that happened in one moment, and it happened in my early days at Airbnb.

凯蒂·迪尔（Katie Dill）：我很高兴谈论这件事，因为坦率地说，这是我领导生涯中最重要的学习经历，或者至少是在某个时刻发生的，而且它发生在我在 Airbnb 的早期。

So I was hired to take on the experience design organization, that's basically the product design team, which was 10 people at the time.

所以我被聘请负责体验设计组织，基本上就是产品设计团队，当时有 10 个人。

Katie Dill: And so they had been reporting directly to one of the founders and they were going to start reporting to me.

凯蒂·迪尔：所以他们一直直接向其中一位创始人汇报，他们将开始向我汇报。

And during my interview process, I learned a lot about what was working and what wasn't working and some of the trials and tribulations with the design organization and its collaboration with others.

在面试过程中，我学到了很多关于什么是有效的、什么是无效的，以及与设计组织及其与其他组织的合作的一些考验和磨难。

So it seemed like there was room for improvement in how engineering and product management and design all work together.

因此，工程、产品管理和设计的协同工作方式似乎还有改进的空间。

And there was also really low engagement scores in the design team.

而且设计团队的参与度也很低。

Katie Dill: And so I came in ready to go and excited to try to help make some change based on all the things that I had learned from various leaders and people across the company.

凯蒂·迪尔：所以我进来时就做好了出发的准备，并且很高兴能够根据我从公司各个领导和人员那里学到的所有知识来尝试帮助做出一些改变。

And I came in swinging ready to go, and then about a month into my time there, I got a meeting on my calendar.

我进来时就做好了出发的准备，然后大约一个月后，我的日历上就安排了一个会议。

Thursday 8:30 AM, was an hour and a half with half of the design team, so that was five people, and our HR partner.

周四上午 8:30，设计团队的一半成员参与了一个半小时，总共有五个人，还有我们的人力资源合作伙伴。

Lenny: Oh, no. That's never a good sign.

莱尼：哦，不。这绝不是一个好兆头。

Katie Dill: Usually it's .

凯蒂·迪尔：通常是。

Yeah.

是的。

And I remember this so vividly.

我对这件事记忆犹新。

I remember walking into the office and all the rooms in Airbnb's office are very unique spaces that look like Airbnbs, but of course this was the one room with all white walls and just a gray flat rectangle table.

我记得走进办公室时，Airbnb 办公室的所有房间都是非常独特的空间，看起来像 Airbnb，但当然，这是一个全白色墙壁和只有一张灰色扁平矩形桌子的房间。

And I walked into the room and there were five of them seated around the table and they had a pack of papers in front of them, and they went on taking turns quietly reading from the papers all the things that they saw that I was doing wrong and all the things that they didn't like about me.

我走进房间，有五个人围坐在桌子旁，他们面前放着一包文件，他们继续轮流从文件中安静地阅读他们认为我做错的所有事情以及他们不喜欢我的所有事情。

And it was a really hard moment there.

那是一个非常艰难的时刻。

I went through all the usual stages of grief when one hears feedback, which is just immediate want to respond to be like, "Oh, well there was a good reason for that." And, "That's not how it actually was," and, "This is why I did that."

当人们听到反馈时，我经历了所有常见的悲伤阶段，这只是立即想要回应，“哦，好吧，这是有充分理由的。”并且，“事实并非如此”，以及“这就是我这样做的原因。”

Katie Dill: But luckily I had, thank goodness, I had the sense to just listen and not respond in that way.

凯蒂·迪尔：但幸运的是，谢天谢地，我有意识只倾听而不是那样回应。

Clearly, what they were telling me is that that was one of the things that was missing.

显然，他们告诉我的是，这是缺少的事情之一。

And so I heard them out and took it all in.

所以我听取了他们的意见并接受了一切。

And regardless of each individual thing, what was very clear was that the missing piece, the theme that was across all of that is that I hadn't earned their trust.

不管每件事如何，很明显的是，缺失的部分，贯穿所有这一切的主题是我没有赢得他们的信任。

So whether how right or how wrong what I was doing was is the key piece is that I wasn't bringing the team along with me.

因此，无论我的做法是对是错，关键在于我没有带领团队一起行动。

They had no idea that they could trust in what I was trying to build and what I was trying to shape and that I cared about them and that I had their best interest and shared goals at heart.

他们不知道他们可以信任我正在努力建立的东西和我正在努力塑造的东西，不知道我关心他们，不知道我把他们的最大利益和共同目标放在心上。

And that was absolutely my fault.

这绝对是我的错。

Katie Dill: And in retrospect, as hard as that was, I'm very grateful and very amazed that they could come together and share that with me.

凯蒂·迪尔：回想起来，尽管这很艰难，但我非常感激也非常惊讶他们能够聚在一起与我分享这一点。

It can be hard to bring feedback forward like that.

像这样提出反馈可能很困难。

Katie Dill: And so it was an extremely valuable learning experience and I took from that to then immediately shift how I was operating.

凯蒂·迪尔：所以这是一次非常宝贵的学习经历，我从中吸取了教训，然后立即改变了我的运作方式。

And really a key part in building trust was to listen, to hear out what the individuals on the team were setting out to do, what they cared about, what motivated them.

建立信任的真正关键部分是倾听，了解团队中的个人打算做什么、他们关心什么、是什么激励他们。

And so I started to make pretty fast change and still moving in the direction that was necessary for the org to make the really large impact in how we were operating, but bringing folks along with me.

因此，我开始做出相当快的改变，并仍然朝着组织所必需的方向前进，以便对我们的运营方式产生真正的巨大影响，但让人们和我一起。

You can inflict change on people, but if you want to do it with them, really trust is the key element there.

你可以给人们带来改变，但如果你想和他们一起改变，真正的信任是关键因素。

Katie Dill: And then a couple of months later, we had the best engagement scores in the company.

凯蒂·迪尔：几个月后，我们的敬业度得分是全公司最高的。

So it actually, it did objectively improve the situation and since then taken that on into next steps in other companies that I've joined and just think about instead of coming in swinging, come in listening, so that you can really set out to make change that actually has true positive impact on the folks around you and you bring along with you.

事实上，它确实客观地改善了情况，从那时起，我加入的其他公司就将这一点带入了下一步，只是思考而不是摇摆不定，而是进来倾听，这样你就可以真正着手做出改变，对你周围的人和你带来的人产生真正的积极影响。

Lenny: Next up, Paul Adams, chief product Officer at Intercom, sharing the nightmare experience of freezing on stage in front of thousands of people, having to walk off stage, and then people hearing him curse because the mic was still on, and then how he recovered.

Lenny：接下来，Intercom 首席产品官 Paul Adams 分享了他在舞台上当着数千人的面僵住，不得不走下舞台，然后人们听到他因为麦克风还开着而咒骂的噩梦般的经历，以及他是如何恢复的。

Plus a few stories of building some of Google's most infamous product failures.

再加上一些谷歌最臭名昭著的失败产品的故事。

Paul Adams: Some things have happened in work, are very memorable at the time and they don't really scar you.

Paul Adams：工作中发生的一些事情，当时非常难忘，但并不会让你感到害怕。

This goes in the book that have scarred for life.

这本书里有这句话，给我留下了终生的伤痕。

Yeah, let's go long story short, I was at Facebook just over a decade ago, loved it at the time.

是的，长话短说，十多年前我还在 Facebook，当时很喜欢它。

I think it was a great place to be at the time.

我认为当时这是一个很棒的地方。

And basically San Francisco, I did a lot of talks for Facebook internally and externally.

基本上在旧金山，我为 Facebook 进行了很多内部和外部的演讲。

Facebook had a keynote slot, always have a keynote slot at Cannes, the world's biggest advertising festival.

Facebook 有一个主题演讲时段，在全球最大的广告节戛纳电影节上也总是有一个主题演讲时段。

And the year prior, Zuck had been interviewed.

一年前，扎克接受了采访。

He was the speaker, he'd been interviewed, gotten a hard time on privacy.

他是演讲者，接受过采访，在隐私方面遇到了困难。

It didn't go well, as well as they'd hoped.

事情并不如他们所希望的那样顺利。

Paul Adams: So the next year they asked me to do it, maybe it was the Irish accent that made the offer come my way.

保罗·亚当斯：所以第二年他们邀请我这么做，也许是爱尔兰口音让我接受了这个邀请。

And yeah, I got out into front the stage of the world's biggest advertising stage, and I'd say I was like three or four minutes into the talk, a talk I'd given, a very similar talk that I'd given lots of times.

是的，我走到了世界上最大的广告舞台的前面，我想说我已经进行了大约三四分钟的演讲，这是我做过的演讲，我已经做过很多次的非常相似的演讲。

Paul Adams: And I just froze.

保罗·亚当斯：我愣住了。

I couldn't remember what I was supposed to say.

我不记得我应该说什么。

It was the first ever time in my life I'd rehearsed a talk word for word.

这是我一生中第一次逐字排练演讲。

Usually, I have talking points and I'd ad lib and things get mixed around and it's kind of informal.

通常，我有谈话要点，我会即兴发挥，事情会变得很混乱，而且有点非正式。

This was media trained, do not say the wrong thing kind of talk.

这是媒体训练有素的，不要说错话之类的。

And I just could not remember what to say.

我就是不记得该说什么。

I had some version of a panic attack, walked off stage, I was still mic'd up, cursed.

我有某种程度的惊恐发作，走下舞台，我仍然戴着麦克风，被诅咒。

I was laughing.

我在笑。

I was like, "Geez, are they laughing at me.

我当时想，“天哪，他们在嘲笑我吗？

Oh my God, this is..." But I can manage to turn it around, I walked back out, I'd kind of been disarmed internally in my head, and the rest of it went well.

天哪，这是……”但我能设法扭转局面，我走回去，我脑子里的武装被解除了，剩下的一切都很顺利。

And I was famous that night out in Cannes afterwards on whatever the seafront, it's just like rosé everywhere.

那天晚上我在戛纳出名，无论在什么海滨，到处都像桃红葡萄酒一样。

I was famous and infamous for my performance.

我因我的表演而出名并声名狼藉。

Lenny: I feel like you lived the worst nightmare that everybody has when they're thinking about giving a talk.

莱尼：我觉得你经历了每个人在考虑发表演讲时都会经历的最糟糕的噩梦。

And I think what's interesting is you survived, and I think that's a really interesting lesson is you could freeze in front of thousands of people, walk off stage, and then it works out okay.

我认为有趣的是你活了下来，我认为这是一个非常有趣的教训，你可以在数千人面前冻结，走下舞台，然后一切顺利。

Paul Adams: And it all happened organically, I guess, or very naturally.

保罗·亚当斯：我想，这一切都是有机发生的，或者说非常自然。

But yeah, ever since then, every time I walk out onto a conference talk stage, still today, I ask myself, I have this tiny doubt in the back of my head.

但是，是的，从那时起，每次我走上会议演讲台时，直到今天，我都会问自己，我的脑后仍然有这个小小的疑问。

It's never happened since.

从那以后就再也没有发生过。

But yeah, I think you have to go with it with these things.

但是，是的，我认为你必须接受这些事情。

When life kind of throws you these whatever curve balls you have got to kind of adapt, and it's not that big a deal.

当生活向你抛出这些曲线球时，你必须适应，这没什么大不了的。

None of these things are that big a deal.

这些事情都没什么大不了的。

At the end of the day you kind of move on, live and learn.

一天结束时，你会继续前进、生活和学习。

Yeah, but I still hope it doesn't happen again.

是的，但我还是希望这样的事不要再发生。

Lenny: I also hate public speaking and I always fear this is exactly what's going to happen to me.

莱尼：我也讨厌公开演讲，我总是担心这正是会发生在我身上的事情。

And so I think this is nice to hear that even when the worst possible thing basically happens, things can survive.

因此，我认为很高兴听到即使最糟糕的事情发生，事情也能幸存。

Lenny: A second area I wanted to hear from is your time at Google and there's a couple products you worked on at Google.

Lenny：我想听听的第二个方面是您在 Google 的经历以及您在 Google 开发的一些产品。

Both of them were not what you'd call big successes, and then there's kind of a transition to Facebook, which was also kind messy.

两者都没有取得所谓的巨大成功，然后又向 Facebook 过渡，这也有点混乱。

Can you just share a couple stories from that time?

您能分享几个当时的故事吗？

Paul Adams: Yeah.

保罗·亚当斯：是的。

Similar to the walking off stage thing, you live and learn, and I was at Google for four years.

与走下舞台的事情类似，你要生活和学习，我在谷歌工作了四年。

I was at Facebook for two and a half years or so.

我在 Facebook 工作了两年半左右。

At Google I worked on a lot of failed social projects like you mentioned, Google Buzz, Google, and later Google+.

在 Google，我参与了很多失败的社交项目，比如你提到的 Google Buzz、Google 以及后来的 Google+。

I think a lot of the motivation for those projects came from a place of fear.

我认为这些项目的很多动机都来自于恐惧。

It didn't come from a place of let's make a great product for people,.let's really understand the things people struggle with when communicating with family and friends.

它不是来自让我们为人们制造一个伟大的产品，让我们真正理解人们在与家人和朋友沟通时遇到的困难。

That's really, really try and create something wonderful.

这真的是非常非常尝试去创造一些美妙的东西。

It came from a place of fear.

它来自恐惧的地方。

Paul Adams: And so during those times I learned I think how not to lead in places.

保罗·亚当斯：所以在那段时间里，我学会了如何不去领导某些地方。

And by the way, I should say at the time in Google, there was other things happening that were amazing, like Google building Google Maps.

顺便说一句，我应该说，当时在谷歌，还发生了其他令人惊奇的事情，比如谷歌开发了谷歌地图。

Incredible product, one of my favorite products.

令人难以置信的产品，我最喜欢的产品之一。

I think one of the best products ever made.

我认为这是有史以来最好的产品之一。

They were building Android.

他们正在构建 Android。

I was in the mobile team, in the mobile apps team at the time that Android came out.

Android 推出时，我在移动团队、移动应用程序团队中。

So incredibly good product.

非常好的产品。

So I just happened to be in the social side, which wasn't as good.

所以我只是碰巧从事社交方面的工作，这并不是那么好。

Paul Adams: And yeah, Google Buzz was kind of a privacy disaster, and Google+ similar.

Paul Adams：是的，Google Buzz 是一场隐私灾难，Google+ 也类似。

And so kind of halfway through I kind of published research about groups, and I've done a ton of research.

就在一半的时候，我发表了一些关于群体的研究，并且我做了很多研究。

An interesting kind of side note there is at the time I asked, I was working in the research, in the US team as a researcher, I was being asked to do a lot of tactical research, like usability study type stuff, like can people use these products?

当我问的时候，有一个有趣的旁注，我正在研究工作，在美国团队中作为研究员，我被要求做很多战术研究，比如可用性研究类型的东西，比如人们可以使用这些产品吗？

And I ended up doing a lot of formative research as well in the same session.

我最终在同一次会议中做了很多形成性研究。

So I'd kind of say to the team like, "Hey, I'll do the research, I'll answer your questions, but also I'm going to do this other thing, and I'm going to take 20 minutes doing that."

所以我会对团队说，“嘿，我会做研究，我会回答你们的问题，但我也会做其他事情，我会花 20 分钟来做这件事。”

Paul Adams: And so what we used to do is, what I used to do with people was map out their social network, all the people in it, their family, their friends, how they communicate.

保罗·亚当斯：所以我们过去所做的是，我过去与人们一起做的是绘制他们的社交网络，其中的所有人，他们的家人，他们的朋友，他们的沟通方式。

We'd map on all the channels, we'd talk about what worked well, what didn't.

我们会绘制所有渠道的地图，我们会讨论哪些有效，哪些无效。

And we did this with dozens and dozens of people over the course of maybe 18 months.

我们在大约 18 个月的时间里与几十个人一起完成了这项工作。

And the same pattern emerged every single time, which was people need way better ways to communicate with small groups of family and friends.

每次都会出现同样的模式，即人们需要更好的方式与一小群家人和朋友进行沟通。

And I kind of look back now and go like WhatsApp, or it maybe iMessage if everyone's on Apple, but really obvious in hindsight, but at the time, not obvious.

我现在回想起来，就像 WhatsApp 一样，或者如果每个人都用苹果的话，也可能是 iMessage，但事后看来确实很明显，但在当时，并不明显。

And so we kind of tried to build a product around that called Google+, but again, it was kind of came from the wrong place.

因此，我们尝试围绕 Google+ 构建一款产品，但同样，它来自错误的地方。

And so halfway through the research that I've done, all this research had been made public through a conference talk and Zuck and Facebook noticed, got in touch, one thing led to another and I left and joined Facebook, which was an amazing thing for me, personally.

因此，在我所做的研究进行到一半时，所有这些研究都通过一次会议演讲公开了，扎克和 Facebook 注意到了，并取得了联系，一件事导致了另一件事，然后我离开并加入了 Facebook，这对我个人来说是一件了不起的事情。

Paul Adams: Facebook was amazing, an amazing place at the time and exciting.

Paul Adams：Facebook 太棒了，在当时是一个令人惊叹的地方，令人兴奋。

And they were trying to do things for the other reasons, the kind of good reasons, like, "Hey, let's build an amazing product for people."

他们试图出于其他原因做事，一些好的理由，比如，“嘿，让我们为人们打造一款令人惊叹的产品。”

Lenny: And this was during Google+ being built?

Lenny：那是在 Google+ 构建期间？

You basically shifted.

你基本上已经转变了。

Paul Adams: Yeah, midway, I'm stressed to even telling you about it.

保罗·亚当斯：是的，中途，我什至不得不告诉你这件事。

The project hadn't been launched.

该项目尚未启动。

It was still under wraps.

此事仍处于保密状态。

It was highly confidential.

这是高度机密的。

Google had done a lot of things at the time that were the first for them.

谷歌当时做了很多对他们来说是第一次的事情。

I don't know if they've done them since, but things like everyone worked in Google+ was sent to a different building.

我不知道他们是否已经这样做了，但是像在 Google+ 工作的每个人都被送到了另一栋大楼之类的事情。

That building had a different key card.

那栋大楼有一张不同的钥匙卡。

If you didn't work on Google+, you could not get in.

如果您不在 Google+ 上工作，则无法进入。

All sorts of counter-cultural things at the time.

当时各种反文化的东西。

And as a result, there was a lot of antagonism internally for Google+.

结果，Google+ 内部出现了很多对抗。

And so when I left in the middle of the project, leaving with all of the plans in my head to the enemy, some people saw me as a traitor, understandably.

因此，当我在项目进行到一半时离开，将脑子里的所有计划都交给敌人时，有些人将我视为叛徒，这是可以理解的。

Other people thought I was enlightened.

其他人认为我开悟了。

It depends on who you talked to, but it was the right thing for me to do.

这取决于你和谁交谈，但这对我来说是正确的事情。

But at the time it was a hard thing to do.

但在当时，这是一件很难做到的事情。

Lenny: I know there's also a lot of scrutiny in what you took with you and the process.

莱尼：我知道对你随身携带的物品和过程也有很多审查。

Paul Adams: When I left, Google kind of assumed that I was one of the spies.

保罗·亚当斯：当我离开时，谷歌有点认为我是间谍之一。

I was quarantined when I told them I was leaving.

当我告诉他们我要离开时，我被隔离了。

They forensically analyzed my laptop, all sorts of stuff like that.

他们对我的笔记本电脑进行了法医分析，诸如此类。

So it was pretty intense.

所以这非常激烈。

Looking back, I can understand why that happened, but the root cause for me is that the project has been run from a place of fear, competitive fear, which I don't think leads to good things.

回想起来，我可以理解为什么会发生这种情况，但对我来说，根本原因是该项目是在恐惧、竞争恐惧的情况下运行的，我认为这不会带来好事。

Lenny: So one of the themes through the stories you just shared is, let's say failure is...

莱尼：所以你刚才分享的故事的主题之一是，假设失败是......

I don't want to make it that harsh, but just things not working out.

我不想说得那么严厉，但事情并不顺利。

And I'm curious as a product leader, how important you think that is for people to go through if you think that's something that is almost a good thing.

我很好奇，作为一名产品负责人，如果你认为这几乎是一件好事，那么你认为这对人们来说有多重要。

And I guess just is there anything there that you find helpful as a coach, as a mentor, as someone, to people that are trying to become basically you?

我想，作为一名教练、导师、某人，或者那些想成为你的人，你觉得有什么东西对你有帮助吗？

Paul Adams: It very, very...

保罗·亚当斯：非常非常......

It still is.

现在仍然如此。

It still is.

现在仍然如此。

I've personally failed so many times.

我个人已经失败过很多次了。

There are two stories and the Google one is long deep tentacles.

有两个故事，谷歌的一个是长而深的触手。

There are two stories.

有两个故事。

I've failed a ton of times like at Intercom.

我已经失败过很多次了，就像在 Intercom 那样。

I remember when I was at Facebook, I was very happy and I knew I wanted to the co-founders of Intercom and they're trying to persuade me to join Intercom.

我记得当我在 Facebook 时，我非常高兴，我知道我想要 Intercom 的联合创始人，他们正在试图说服我加入 Intercom。

It was like 10 person company at the time.

当时公司大概有10个人。

But Owen said something to me at that time, which has stuck with me ever since.

但欧文当时对我说了一些话，从那以后我就一直铭记在心。

He said, "At Facebook you can design the product, but at Intercom you can design the company." And that was extremely appealing to me, a great pitch.

他说，“在 Facebook，你可以设计产品，但在 Intercom，你可以设计公司。”这对我来说非常有吸引力，这是一个很棒的宣传。

He's like, "Just design the company with us that you want to work in."

他说，“只要和我们一起设计你想工作的公司就可以了。”

Paul Adams: And so part of that was a company that embraces failure that says it's okay to try things.

保罗·亚当斯（Paul Adams）：这其中的一部分就是一家拥抱失败的公司，并表示尝试新事物是可以的。

I'm a big believer in big bets, higher risk, higher reward.

我坚信大赌注、高风险、高回报。

I don't get as excited about incremental things.

我对渐进的事情不那么兴奋。

Now I haven't said that, there's of course a place for that too, especially as companies get bigger.

现在我还没有这么说，当然也有这样的地方，特别是当公司变得更大时。

But I get excited about big bets and if you make big bets, you're going to get a lot of it wrong.

但我对大赌注感到兴奋，如果你下大赌注，你就会犯很多错误。

So a lot of the principles that we built here at Intercom, on building software, we have a principle called ship to learn, and we've actually changed it since, still on the wall here.

因此，我们在 Intercom 建立的很多原则，关于构建软件，我们有一个称为“船舶”的原则需要学习，从那以后我们实际上已经改变了它，仍然挂在这里的墙上。

Ship fast, ship early, ship often is what it says now.

发货快，发货早，发货频繁，这就是现在所说的。

Used to say ship to learn.

过去常说乘船学习。

Ship fast, ship early, ship often.

发货快、发货早、发货频繁。

It's like in that idea is the idea of failure.

就好像这个想法就是失败的想法。

It's not going to go right, and it's going to go wrong more often than not.

它不会进展顺利，而且常常会出错。

But if you ship early and fast and learn fast, you can change fast, and you can improve fast.

但如果你尽早、快速地交付并快速学习，你就可以快速改变，并且可以快速提高。

And that's the kind of culture that we as much as possible try to embrace and teach people.

这就是我们尽可能尝试拥抱和教导人们的文化。

But it's much easier said than done.

但说起来容易做起来难。

Lenny: Especially when you're in the moment.

莱尼：尤其是当你处于当下的时候。

Like Go damn, it, everything's going to fall apart.

就像该死的，一切都会崩溃。

I really messed this one up.

我真的把这件事搞砸了。

Paul Adams: Yeah.

保罗·亚当斯：是的。

And there's a trade-off with quality that people really struggle with.

人们确实在与质量之间进行权衡。

We've high standards of ourselves.

我们对自己有很高的标准。

A lot of Intercom comes from a design founder background.

很多Intercom的创始人都来自于设计背景。

We value the craft a lot.

我们非常重视这门手艺。

We never want to be embarrassed by what we ship.

我们不想因为我们所运送的东西而感到尴尬。

So there's a real tension there, a real trade-off where people have these high standards, which we encourage and we encourage them to ship fast and learn and make mistakes.

因此，那里存在真正的紧张局势，真正的权衡，人们有这些高标准，我们鼓励他们快速交付，学习并犯错误。

It's a constant kind of tension that we're navigating.

我们正在应对一种持续的紧张局势。

Lenny: Next up, we have Tom Conrad, who is chief product officer at Quibi and engineering leader at Pets.com.

Lenny：接下来是 Tom Conrad，他是 Quibi 的首席产品官和 Pets.com 的工程主管。

Two of the most memorable failures in product history, sharing his lessons from those wild experiences.

产品历史上最令人难忘的两次失败，分享了他从这些疯狂经历中吸取的教训。

Tom is currently CEO of Zero Longevity Science, which is a killer business and an app in case you haven't come across it.

汤姆目前是零长寿科学公司的首席执行官，这是一项杀手级业务，也是一款应用程序（以防您还没有遇到过它）。

I'd definitely check it out.

我一定会检查一下。

Here's Tom.

这是汤姆。

Lenny: You brought up this phrase of notable disasters and I want to talk about that.

莱尼：你提到了“重大灾难”这个词，我想谈谈它。

You've worked at two of the most famous notable disasters of product companies, Pets.com and Quibi.

您曾参与过两家最著名的产品公司灾难：Pets.com 和 Quibi。

I think it's really rare someone sees the inside of so much hype and then such a fall at a company.

我认为很少有人能看到一家公司如此大肆宣传，然后又遭遇如此惨败的内部情况。

And so I just want to spend some time in these two areas, and maybe the way to set it up is just what's a lesson you took away from each of these two experiences that you've taken with you to future work, and maybe advice you share with people?

所以我只想在这两个领域花一些时间，也许设置它的方法就是你从这两种经历中吸取的教训是什么，这些经验将带到你未来的工作中，也许是你与人们分享的建议？

Tom Conrad: Probably the biggest lesson, it's not really about the specifics of the business.

汤姆·康拉德：这可能是最大的教训，这与业务的具体情况无关。

The biggest lesson really is these things make you better.

最大的教训确实是这些事情让你变得更好。

In some instances, actually I think in both instances, they became kind of dominoes that opened doors for me in my own ambition and my own sort of professional life that maybe just wouldn't have opened at all if I hadn't gone to those companies and learned those things and had those experiences.

在某些情况下，实际上我认为在这两种情况下，它们都成为了一种多米诺骨牌，为我自己的野心和我自己的职业生活打开了大门，如果我没有去那些公司，学习那些东西并拥有那些经验，这些大门可能根本不会打开。

And frankly, even in the case of Pets.com, like even the high profile nature of it, I could have worked at one of a thousand e-commerce websites in 1999.

坦率地说，即使就 Pets.com 而言，就像它的高调性质一样，我也可以在 1999 年在一千个电子商务网站之一工作。

And when I went on to some subsequent job interview or something and talked about my experience, I had never heard of the thing that you worked on, but everybody certainly heard about Pets.com.

当我参加后续的工作面试或其他什么并谈论我的经历时，我从未听说过您从事的工作，但每个人肯定都听说过 Pets.com。

Tom Conrad: It's a pretty funny example too of how some struggles are timeless.

汤姆·康拉德：这也是一个非常有趣的例子，说明有些斗争是永恒的。

That was 23, 24 years ago now.

那是23、24年前的事了。

And while as a leadership team, we made, I'm sure, all kinds of mistakes.

我确信，作为一个领导团队，我们犯了各种各样的错误。

One of the things that happened was that there were three kind of over-funded pet e-commerce sites, and we all raised in excess of $50 million, which is a tremendous amount of money now.

发生的一件事是，有3种宠物电商网站资金过剩，我们都筹集了超过5000万美元，这对现在来说是一笔巨款。

It was a tremendous amount of money then, and we all thought it was a zero-sum game and that we as one player started to spend on promotion or to spend irrationally on national broadcast television advertising.

当时这是一笔巨额资金，我们都认为这是一场零和游戏，我们作为一个玩家开始花在促销上或不合理地花在全国广播电视广告上。

We all did, and it became this kind of unwinnable arms race.

我们都这么做了，这变成了一场无法获胜的军备竞赛。

So there is, I think a fundamental lesson about having an excess of investment can be its own albatross or lead you to make decisions that maybe would be unwise.

因此，我认为关于过度投资的一个基本教训可能是其本身的负担，或者导致你做出可能不明智的决定。

Tom Conrad: And then of course, it's just like timing is really important.

汤姆·康拉德：当然，时机非常重要。

Chewy is a online pet store.

Chewy 是一家在线宠物商店。

It's worth $9 billion today.

如今它的价值为 90 亿美元。

They were a private company and bought by PetSmart and then spun back out.

他们是一家私人公司，被 PetSmart 收购，然后又剥离出来。

But when they were bought by PetSmart, they were acquired for 3 billion, biggest e-commerce acquisition of all time.

但当他们被 PetSmart 收购时，他们以 30 亿美元的价格收购，这是有史以来最大的电子商务收购。

And while I think it's probably unfair to compare, Chewy who executed exceptionally well over a decade, grew their business brick by brick, and turned it into something really remarkable.

虽然我认为这样比较可能不公平，但 Chewy 十多年来执行得非常出色，一点一滴地发展他们的业务，并将其变成了真正了不起的东西。

To Pets.com, which was in a very, very different moment in time and tried to go to market in a really different way.

Pets.com 正处于一个非常非常不同的时刻，并试图以一种完全不同的方式进入市场。

Tom Conrad: The critique that is often leveled at Pets.com or at least at the time, was like, this is just a stupid business.

汤姆·康拉德：Pets.com 上经常受到的批评，或者至少在当时，批评是，这只是一个愚蠢的生意。

They're shipping dog food around.

他们正在到处运送狗粮。

You could never make that work, and that's just wrong.

你永远不可能做到这一点，这是错误的。

You absolutely can make it work.

你绝对可以让它发挥作用。

Probably can't make it work when 80% of the country on the internet is still on dial up.

当全国 80% 的互联网仍然采用拨号方式时，可能无法使其发挥作用。

It's really, really early.

真的非常非常早。

Lenny: I saw a stat I think you shared somewhere that you took Pets.com from nothing, to a public company, to completely out of business in 19 months.

Lenny：我看到了一份统计数据，我想您曾在某处分享过，您在 19 个月内将 Pets.com 从无到有，发展成为一家上市公司，最后彻底倒闭。

Tom Conrad: Yeah, yeah, I think that's about right.

汤姆·康拉德：是的，是的，我认为这是正确的。

The other thing that's forgotten in the tale is that we actually didn't go bankrupt.

故事中被遗忘的另一件事是我们实际上并没有破产。

We shut the company down and returned the remaining balance to the investors, which no public company had ever done before.

我们关闭了公司，并将剩余余额返还给投资者，这是以前没有一家上市公司做过的。

And the leadership team just reached the conclusion that given the way market conditions had evolved, there was just no way we were going to be able to get more capital into the company.

领导团队刚刚得出的结论是，鉴于市场状况的发展方式，我们根本无法为公司获得更多资本。

And it was a company that required additional investment to get to profitability.

这是一家需要额外投资才能实现盈利的公司。

And so it was better to wind down early, take the money that we had in the bank and get it back to investors than to just spend every last penny on what was sort of a fruitless attempt to salvage it.

因此，最好早点结束，把我们存在银行的钱拿回给投资者，而不是花光最后一分钱，进行徒劳的挽救。

Lenny: Did not know that.

莱尼： 不知道。

Let's talk about Quibi.

我们来谈谈基比。

What went wrong there?

那里出了什么问题？

Do you think there was a path to Quibi having worked out?

您认为 Quibi 有一条可行的道路吗？

Any big lessons that you took away from that experience that you bring with you?

您从这次经历中学到了什么重要的教训吗？

Tom Conrad: The kind of miraculous thing about Quibi for me was it relit my enthusiasm for the industry for doing this work.

Tom Conrad：Quibi 对我来说很神奇，它重新点燃了我对这个行业从事这项工作的热情。

I had left in, I think it was December of 2018, and I thought that maybe I was just done making software.

我已经离开了，我想那是 2018 年 12 月，我想也许我刚刚完成了软件制作。

I had done it for a really long time, I had done it for twenty-five years or something.

我已经做了很长一段时间了，我已经做了二十五年之类的了。

And I had changed a lot.

而我也改变了很多。

The industry had changed a lot, and I thought maybe I just didn't have the same passion for it that I had a decade before.

这个行业已经发生了很大的变化，我想也许我只是没有像十年前那样对它充满热情。

And it also seemed like maybe it'd be fun to have another chapter of my life that was just completely different.

而且，如果我的人生能翻开完全不同的篇章，也许会很有趣。

And I had a whole list of things that I thought I might want to do.

我有一整套我认为我可能想做的事情的清单。

They were really, they were kind of ridiculous.

他们真的，他们有点可笑。

Maybe I want to be a pastry chef.

也许我想成为一名糕点师。

Maybe I want to be a landscape photographer.

也许我想成为一名风景摄影师。

Maybe I want to learn to make bad music to put up on SoundCloud or something.

也许我想学习制作糟糕的音乐并将其发布到 SoundCloud 或其他东西上。

Really the only thing they had in common were they were all things that I knew nothing about.

事实上，它们唯一的共同点就是它们都是我一无所知的东西。

People would be like, "Oh, you think you might want to be a pastry chef?

人们会说，“哦，你认为你可能想成为一名糕点师吗？

Do you like to bake?" And I'd be like, "No, I don't know anything about baking." "Oh, you might landscape photography.

你喜欢烘焙吗？”我会说，“不，我对烘焙一无所知。” “哦，你可能会拍摄风景。

Do you take photos?" "No, I don't make photos."

你拍照吗？” “不，我不拍照。”

Tom Conrad: But I was kind of committed to the bit, actually to the point where when TechCrunch interviewed me about my departure from Snapchat, I was like, "I'm out.

汤姆·康拉德：但我有点致力于这一点，实际上，当 TechCrunch 采访我关于我离开 Snapchat 的事情时，我的反应是，“我退出了。

I'm going to do something else entirely." So that story is very much out there.

我要做完全不同的事情。”所以这个故事已经很普遍了。

But a few months after my last day at Snap, I got a call from Meg Whitman and Jeffrey Katzenberg who were starting up, it was called New TV at the time.

但在我在 Snap 工作的最后一天几个月后，我接到了梅格·惠特曼 (Meg Whitman) 和杰弗里·卡森伯格 (Jeffrey Katzenberg) 的电话，他们正在启动，当时的名称是 New TV。

Tom Conrad: And the pitch was, "We're going to try to take the best of mobile and Silicon Valley and Consumer Tech and sort of weld it to the best of Hollywood-style content production to build something completely bespoke and purpose-made for consumption on the phone." They were looking for both technology leadership and product leadership and wanted to know if I was interested in one or both.

汤姆·康拉德：我们的宣传是，“我们将尝试汲取移动、硅谷和消费技术的精华，并将其与好莱坞风格的内容制作的精华结合起来，打造出完全定制的、专门为手机消费而设计的东西。”他们正在寻找技术领导力和产品领导力，并想知道我是否对其中之一或两者感兴趣。

And I took the meeting, even though I wasn't really taking these kinds of calls from anybody.

我参加了会议，尽管我并没有真正接听任何人的此类电话。

It just seemed like who's going to pass up the opportunity to have lunch with the two of them?

看来谁会放弃两个人共进午餐的机会呢？

So I listened to the pitch and politely declined and told them that I was going to be a pastry chef or something.

所以我听了他们的推介后礼貌地拒绝了，并告诉他们我要成为一名糕点师什么的。

And we kept doing that every couple of months for seven months.

我们每隔几个月就这样做一次，持续了七个月。

We'd go to lunch, they would give me an update on the progress they were making, and I would decline the invitation to get involved somehow.

我们会去吃午饭，他们会给我他们所取得的最新进展，而我会拒绝以某种方式参与的邀请。

Tom Conrad: And then late in that year, I went to lunch one more time and Meg explained that they brought on someone to lead technology and they brought another person to lead product, and both of them really truly for reasons that are completely disconnected from Quibi itself, both of them had left after about six weeks.

汤姆·康拉德：那年晚些时候，我再次去吃午饭，梅格解释说，他们聘请了一个人来领导技术，又聘请了另一个人来领导产品，他们两人的原因都与 Quibi 本身完全无关，他们都在大约六周后离开了。

And Meg's like, "We've raised all this money, and we've told the world that we're shipping this product in about a year.

梅格说：“我们已经筹集了所有这些资金，并且我们已经告诉全世界我们将在大约一年内推出该产品。

We got an awful lot to do, and I really could use some help, and I would consider it a personal favor if you would come and spend just a couple of days a week helping." She's like, "I'll continue to look for someone who actually wants the job, but it'd be great if you could help me get this off the ground."

我们有很多事情要做，我真的需要一些帮助，如果你每周只花几天时间来帮忙，我会认为这是我个人的恩惠。”她说，“我会继续寻找真正想要这份工作的人，但如果你能帮助我开始这项工作，那就太好了。”

Tom Conrad: And my wife is a freelance writer, marketing strategist and loves her life as a freelance contributor.

汤姆·康拉德：我的妻子是一名自由撰稿人、营销策略师，热爱自由撰稿人的生活。

And she's like, "You should do this.

她说：“你应该这样做。

Why not?

为什么不呢？

It's two days a week, it's just a few months.

一周两天，就几个月了。

What's the worst thing that could happen?

可能发生的最糟糕的事情是什么？

Maybe you'll like it." And I'm like, "No, no. Here's the thing that will happen.

也许你会喜欢它。”我说：“不，不。这就是将会发生的事情。

I won't do it two days a week.

我不会每周做两天。

It will immediately be three days, then four days, then five days, then six days.

马上就会是三天，然后是四天，然后是五天，然后是六天。

I just know myself." And she's like, "No." She's like, "Just on Wednesday night at six o'clock, close your Quibi laptop and be like, all they're paying me for is for Tuesday and Wednesday and then open it back up on Tuesday morning.

我只了解我自己。”她说：“不。”她就像是，“就在周三晚上六点，关上你的 Quibi 笔记本电脑，然后说，他们付给我的只是周二和周三的费用，然后周二早上再打开它。

That's all you've got to do."

这就是你所要做的一切。”

Tom Conrad: Well, she's right about most things and she's wrong about this.

汤姆·康拉德：嗯，她在大多数事情上都是对的，但在这一点上她是错的。

I fell deeply into it right away, and it was just so fun to get to build a team from scratch and to design and build a product from scratch and to take advantage of all of the sort of modern software architecture stuff that had come into being over the course of the 15 years since we had started Pandora.

我立刻就深深地投入其中，从头开始组建一个团队，从头开始设计和构建一个产品，并利用自我们创建 Pandora 以来 15 年来出现的所有现代软件架构的东西，这真是太有趣了。

And I'm embarrassed about some of the what happened with Quibi for sure, but I'm super grateful for the experience, because I just really fell in love with the industry again and was reminded of just how rewarding it can be to build something and to try to put it out there even if you stumble pretty mightily along the way.

当然，我对 Quibi 发生的一些事情感到尴尬，但我非常感谢这次经历，因为我真的再次爱上了这个行业，并提醒我，即使你一路上遇到了很大的挫折，构建一些东西并尝试将其推出是多么值得。

Lenny: Is there something that you took away from that experience that taught you what to try to avoid, to try to pull towards?

莱尼：从那次经历中，你是否学到了一些东西，教会了你应该尽量避免什么、努力争取什么？

Tom Conrad: I think I sort of misunderstood or misjudged companies sometimes by thinking about them really focused on the product execution.

汤姆·康拉德：我认为我有时会误解或误判公司，因为我认为他们真的专注于产品执行。

If you find an interesting problem that people care about and you solve that problem in a really beautiful, elegant, delightful way, that's 10 times better than anything else that they can get in that same space, they'll tell their friends and all the rest will take care of itself.

如果你发现了人们关心的一个有趣的问题，并且以一种非常美丽、优雅、令人愉快的方式解决了这个问题，那么这比他们在同一个空间中所能得到的任何东西都要好 10 倍，他们会告诉他们的朋友，剩下的一切都会迎刃而解。

And so that was always my ambition.

所以这一直是我的抱负。

Find a thing that I cared about building, do a great job building it in a delightful way, go really deep on listening to people and their feedback and iterate your way to success and breaking through that membrane that we all strive to get across, the really great word of mouth.

找到一个我关心构建的东西，以一种令人愉快的方式出色地构建它，真正深入地倾听人们和他们的反馈，迭代你的成功之路，突破我们都努力跨越的那层膜，真正伟大的口碑。

Tom Conrad: But I think the thing I've come to better appreciate is that companies are also, they're kind of a math problem that describes how you take investment and pour them into the equation, and out the other side comes returns on some time horizon.

汤姆·康拉德：但我认为我越来越欣赏的是，公司也是，它们是一种数学问题，描述了你如何进行投资并将其倒入等式中，然后在一段时间内从另一边得到回报。

And yes, there are variables in that equation that are influenced by the product that you build and all of the little details and decisions that you make about making that product great.

是的，这个方程中存在一些变量，这些变量会受到您构建的产品以及您为使该产品变得更好而做出的所有小细节和决策的影响。

But if the equation is fundamentally broken or a big swing in and of itself, no amount of iteration and execution can get you out of the failed outputs of the broken equation.

但是，如果方程从根本上被破坏或者本身发生了很大的波动，那么无论进行多少次迭代和执行都无法使您摆脱破坏方程的失败输出。

Tom Conrad: And I think Quibi made a bet that you could build an entirely bespoke content library that was sufficiently scaled to get people to subscribe and retain for a couple billion dollars.

汤姆·康拉德：我认为 Quibi 打赌，你可以建立一个完全定制的内容库，其规模足以让人们订阅并保留数十亿美元。

It was a huge amount of money, but we made 70 shows in 18 months, which is more content than all of the major broadcast networks combined made in a single year.

这是一笔巨额资金，但我们在 18 个月内制作了 70 个节目，这比所有主要广播网络一年内制作的内容总和还要多。

So it was a pretty major accomplishment.

所以这是一个相当重大的成就。

And we made a bet that we would augment those sort of episodic and serialized or Hollywood style shows with a bunch of daily content that we produce at the level of network television, nightly news, and so forth that would be an alternative to some of the sort of daily content that you might otherwise get on YouTube.

我们打赌，我们会用我们在网络电视、晚间新闻等级别制作的大量日常内容来增强那些情景式、连续剧或好莱坞风格的节目，这将是您可能在 YouTube 上获得的某些日常内容的替代品。

And that was going to be about a third of the content spend.

这大约占内容支出的三分之一。

Tom Conrad: One super interesting thing that no one talks about is that all of that content was designed to be made day of or day before it aired.

汤姆·康拉德：一件非常有趣但没有人谈论的事情是，所有这些内容都被设计为在播出当天或前一天制作。

So there was no back catalog of it, and it was all designed to be shot in these professional studios that we built out, and it was really expensive.

所以它没有后面的目录，而且都是为了在我们建造的这些专业工作室中拍摄而设计的，而且非常昂贵。

Like I said, it was a third of the investment we were going to make in content, almost half the investment we were going to be making content.

就像我说的，这是我们将在内容上进行的投资的三分之一，几乎是我们将在内容上进行的投资的一半。

And we launched two weeks into Covid, and we couldn't make any of that content except literally in the garages of the host's homes.

我们在新冠疫情爆发两周后，除了在主人家的车库里之外，我们无法制作任何内容。

And so we had this thing that was supposed to seem really set apart from YouTube that literally now was being made exactly YouTube content, which is sort of like self-produced at home with very little sort of the support infrastructure of Hollywood.

所以我们有了这个看起来与 YouTube 完全不同的东西，现在实际上完全是 YouTube 内容，这有点像在家里自行制作，几乎没有好莱坞的支持基础设施。

Tom Conrad: Now you can argue, I think the content on YouTube is really, really exceptional in this category, and maybe we were never going to do better than that.

汤姆·康拉德：现在你可以说，我认为 YouTube 上的内容在这一类别中确实非常出色，也许我们永远不会做得比这更好。

But I think what was really fundamentally broken with Quibi was that the actual foundational equation of can you make enough premium content that's totally bespoke and made for the service and takes advantage of the nature of the phone, is that enough content to get people to sign up and retain, and can you do that for a couple billion dollars?

但我认为 Quibi 真正从根本上被打破的是，你能否制作足够的优质内容，这些内容完全是为服务定制的，并利用手机的性质，这些内容是否足以让人们注册并保留，你能花几十亿美元做到这一点吗？

And I think the answer is no. The library has to be much, much bigger and you have to have, like any company, you have to have sufficient time and energy to iterate on the content format itself.

我认为答案是否定的。图书馆必须要大得多，而且你必须像任何公司一样，必须有足够的时间和精力来迭代内容格式本身。

Our roadmap really wanted to innovate on the content format.

我们的路线图确实想在内容格式上进行创新。

And so I think part of what happened is pretty quickly it became clear that the math was just wrong.

所以我认为发生的部分事情很快就变得很明显，数学是错误的。

It wasn't going to take 2 billion, it was going to take six or eight or 10 billion.

这不会需要 20 亿，而是需要 6、8 或 100 亿。

And the risk reward profile of betting 10 billion on the format was just more than anyone can stomach.

而在这种形式上下注 100 亿美元的风险回报超出了任何人的承受能力。

Lenny: Next up, we've got Sri Batchu, former head of growth at Ramp who shares something that I've thought about ever since we had this conversation, which is this idea that when you fail, make sure you fail conclusively to make this failure an actual learning that you can build off of versus just a waste of time.

Lenny：接下来请来的是 Ramp 前增长主管 Sri Batchu，他分享了自从我们进行这次谈话以来我一直在思考的一些事情，那就是当你失败时，确保你最终失败，让这次失败成为你可以借鉴的实际教训，而不是浪费时间。

Here's Sri.

这是斯里。

Sri Batchu: Growth experiments in my history are typically like 30%-ish success rate.

Sri Batchu：我历史上的增长实验通常成功率在 30% 左右。

So the vast majority of things that you try don't work.

所以你尝试的绝大多数事情都不起作用。

And so you want to create a culture where people aren't afraid to take risks and aren't afraid to fail.

因此，你想要创造一种人们不害怕冒险、不害怕失败的文化。

And for me, failure is not that you didn't drive revenue, failure is not learning.

对我来说，失败并不是没有增加收入，而是没有学习。

So it's really important that you learn when you fail.

因此，在失败时学习非常重要。

And so we celebrate failure as long as you're learning, and you can only learn if you've designed the right test and you failed conclusively, because otherwise I think many of us have been in situations where there's intuition that something might work and it doesn't work, and then you end up doing it over and over for years because every time a new executive or somebody else has the same idea, you try it again.

因此，只要你在学习，我们就会庆祝失败，只有当你设计了正确的测试并且最终失败时，你才能学习，因为否则我认为我们中的许多人都曾经历过这样的情况：直觉认为某些东西可能有效，但它不起作用，然后你最终会一遍又一遍地重复多年，因为每次新的高管或其他人有相同的想法时，你都会再次尝试。

And it's because you haven't been able to design the test to fail conclusively.

这是因为您无法将测试设计为最终失败。

Sri Batchu: It's hard to do.

Sri Batchu：这很难做到。

But at the end of the day, there's only two ways to make an experiment successful.

但归根结底，只有两种方法可以使实验取得成功。

Either you have a very large M or you have a very significant treatment, which is what you're doing in the experiment itself.

要么你有一个非常大的 M，要么你有一个非常显着的治疗，这就是你在实验本身中所做的。

And in B2B, you don't usually have the luxury of large M, which you consumer.

在 B2B 中，您通常不会拥有大 M 的奢侈消费。

Sri Batchu: Facebook can get in two hours.

Sri Batchu：Facebook 两小时内即可上线。

A B2B company could take two years to get to the same number of touch points.

B2B 公司可能需要两年时间才能达到相同数量的接触点。

And so to counteract that, I recommend people just trying to maximize the treatment effect, which is like if you have a hypothesis that you're testing, just throw all of the possible tactics and resources that you think would move that needle because you can always cost rationalize later if it works.

因此，为了抵消这一点，我建议人们尝试最大化治疗效果，就像如果你有一个正在测试的假设，只需投入所有你认为可以推动这一目标的可能策略和资源，因为如果它有效的话，你总是可以在以后进行成本合理化。

Sri Batchu: And so just maximize the treatment effect.

Sri Batchu：所以只是最大化治疗效果。

And if with all of that it didn't work, then you can say, "Hey, we're not going to try this again because we literally did try everything that we could to test this hypothesis.

如果所有这些都不起作用，那么你可以说，“嘿，我们不会再尝试这个，因为我们确实尝试了一切可以测试这个假设的方法。

And if it doesn't work in the best version, and it's expensive as it is, this is not worth spending more time on." But if it does work, great.

如果它不能在最好的版本中工作，而且它本身很昂贵，那么就不值得花更多的时间。”但如果它确实有效，那就太好了。

Then you do another version of the test with half the tactics or whichever tactics you think work better or worse and you optimize over time.

然后，您使用一半的策略或您认为效果更好或更差的策略进行另一个版本的测试，并随着时间的推移进行优化。

Lenny: Is there an example you could share when you did that?

Lenny：当你这样做时，有什么例子可以分享吗？

Sri Batchu: Account-based marketing is something that is very common in enterprise software where you've selected certain customers that you think are high priority and you're saying, "I want to touch them in as many nuanced ways possible to see if that drives conversion." And this is something I've seen tried many times where people do it, but they kind of do it halfway where they're like, okay, tried these three things.

Sri Batchu：基于帐户的营销在企业软件中非常常见，您选择了某些您认为具有高优先级的客户，然后说：“我想以尽可能多的细致入微的方式接触他们，看看这是否会促进转化。”我见过人们多次尝试这样做，但他们只是半途而废，就像，好吧，尝试了这三件事。

Conversion of the control group wasn't higher, and so we think it is not going to work.

对照组的转化率并不高，因此我们认为它不会起作用。

And then a new go-to-market executive comes and they have to do it again.

然后新的市场营销主管上任，他们必须再次这样做。

They have to do it again.

他们必须再做一次。

They have to do it again.

他们必须再做一次。

It's like a very common one wherever this happens.

无论在哪里发生这种情况，这都是很常见的事情。

And so when we did it at Ramp, we did exactly what I just described, which is like, let's really be thoughtful about the experiment design, both in terms of maximizing the number of people as well as maximizing the number of ways and types of ways that we're effectively touching these target customers to show the value one way or the other.

因此，当我们在 Ramp 这样做时，我们正是按照我刚才描述的那样进行的，也就是说，让我们认真考虑实验设计，既要最大限度地增加人员数量，又要最大限度地增加我们有效接触这些目标客户的方式和类型的数量，以某种方式展示价值。

Lenny: So what it sounds like is the hypothesis isn't like this email will have a big impact on conversion.

莱尼：听起来好像是假设这封电子邮件不会对转化产生重大影响。

It's like this strategy of coming after customers is what we're testing.

我们正在测试这种追求客户的策略。

Sri Batchu: That's the example there.

Sri Batchu：这就是那个例子。

And I think for example, if you had the...

我想例如，如果你有......

This kind of framework is more important for cross-functional, larger scale, bigger tests rather than an email modification.

这种框架对于跨职能、更大规模、更大的测试比电子邮件修改更重要。

But we can even use it on a micro example like an email modification where you are like, "Okay, I think this particular email is underperforming because it's not talking to this part of the customer's pain point or journey or what have you." And you could just, the simplest test would be, okay, let me make some tweaks to the text and edit that, and that could be the end of that test.

但我们甚至可以将它用在一个微观的例子上，比如电子邮件修改，你会说，“好吧，我认为这封特定的电子邮件表现不佳，因为它没有谈到客户的痛点或旅程或你有什么。”你可以，最简单的测试是，好吧，让我对文本进行一些调整并编辑它，这可能是该测试的结束。

And if that doesn't work, you're like, "Oh, maybe those weren't the right text edits.

如果这不起作用，你会想，“哦，也许这些不是正确的文本编辑。

Let me do a different text edits or whatever."

让我做一些不同的文本编辑或其他什么。”

Sri Batchu: And that's fine, that's low cost.

Sri Batchu：那很好，成本很低。

It's not the end of the world and it's for you to be wrong there.

这不是世界末日，而是你错了。

But an alternative that you could do is like, "Oh, what are all of the things that I could change about this email in the same test?" Is it the trigger of the email?

但是您可以做的另一种选择是，“哦，在同一个测试中我可以对这封电子邮件进行哪些更改？”这是电子邮件的触发因素吗？

Is it the text content of the email?

是邮件的正文内容吗？

Is it additional personalization?

这是额外的个性化吗？

Is it the design of the email?

这是电子邮件的设计吗？

Trying to think of what are all of the various levers that you think could be wrong and put them all together to test your hypothesis of this touch point is wrong, and how do I improve that?

尝试思考您认为可能错误的各种杠杆是什么，并将它们放在一起来检验您对此接触点的假设是错误的，我该如何改进？

Lenny: Well, obviously the downside of that is you, if it doesn't work, you don't know if it's like, oh, maybe it was this thing could have worked in the subject.

莱尼：嗯，显然这样做的缺点是，如果它不起作用，你不知道它是否会像，哦，也许这个东西可以在这个主题中起作用。

Sri Batchu: Yeah, so there's always trade-offs on this, but what you're hoping is you've done a complete refresh where you did all the things that you thought were intuitive that should work.

Sri Batchu：是的，所以在这方面总是需要权衡，但你希望的是你已经完成了一次彻底的刷新，你做了所有你认为直观的、应该起作用的事情。

And if it doesn't work, then you're like, okay, maybe my hypothesis wrong.

如果它不起作用，那么你会想，好吧，也许我的假设是错误的。

But you're right.

但你是对的。

There's always going to be a challenge if maybe the execution is wrong.

如果执行错误，总会遇到挑战。

And I did too many things potentially in that case.

在那种情况下我可能做了太多的事情。

Lenny: Our next story is from JZ, who is a colleague of mine at Airbnb, head of product at Webflow when we recorded this episode, and this is her sharing the story of one of the biggest product misses at Airbnb.

Lenny：我们的下一个故事来自 JZ，她是我在 Airbnb 的同事，当我们录制本集时，她是 Webflow 的产品主管，这是她分享的 Airbnb 最大的产品失误之一的故事。

Lenny: You've seen a lot of new PMs, and you've seen these PMs succeed, you've seen some fail.

Lenny：你见过很多新的 PM，你见过这些 PM 的成功，也见过一些失败的。

What are the most common mistakes that you find new PMs make in this experience of helping new PMs get into the field?

在帮助新产品经理进入该领域的过程中，您发现新产品经理最常犯的错误是什么？

Jiaona Zhang (JZ) (00:39:27): I think something that is really hard to untrain, but I think every human does it, is you jump to solutions.

Jiaona 张 (JZ) (00:39:27)：我认为有些事情确实很难不训练，但我认为每个人都会这样做，就是你跳到解决方案。

And so one of the biggest things I see, not just in my course, but also just as a PM and some of the mistakes that you make as a PM is the idea of you get really attached to a solution, a way of implementing something, something that you can see in your head that you want to build.

因此，我看到的最重要的事情之一，不仅在我的课程中，而且作为一名 PM，你作为 PM 所犯的一些错误就是你真正执着于一个解决方案，一种实现某些东西的方式，一些你可以在头脑中看到你想要构建的东西。

And so that's the first thing I really want to like unteach in our course.

所以这是我真正想在我们的课程中不教授的第一件事。

Lenny: And so a lot of people will literally come in, they'll be like, "I want to build X startup," or, "I want to do this thing," or, "I am in blank school, and I've been doing a lot of research on this particular area." And so untraining that and being like, "Hey, we're going to go out there.

莱尼：所以很多人都会进来，他们会说，“我想建立 X 初创公司”，或者“我想做这件事”，或者“我在空白学校，我一直在这个特定领域做很多研究。”所以不训练它，就像，“嘿，我们要去那里。

We are not going to think at all about the thing that you want to build, but instead we're going to be focused on users and people in the real world and their problems.

我们根本不会考虑您想要构建的东西，而是将重点放在现实世界中的用户和人们以及他们的问题上。

And the first step is to understand their problems and then understand if there's an opportunity here as opposed to, hey, you want to build X thing for Y person." So that's the biggest mistake that you really have to unteach and retrain thinking around.

第一步是了解他们的问题，然后了解这里是否有机会，而不是，嘿，你想为 Y 人构建 X 东西。”所以这是最大的错误，你必须取消教导并重新训练思维。

Lenny: So let's go to the other side of this question.

莱尼：那么让我们看看这个问题的另一面。

We talked about what mistakes new PMs make.

我们讨论了新任产品经理会犯哪些错误。

I'm curious, what's the biggest product mistake that you've made?

我很好奇，你犯过的最大的产品错误是什么？

Jiaona Zhang (JZ) (00:40:34): Wow, that's a good one.

张娇娜 (JZ) (00:40:34)：哇，那是一个很好的。

It's so interesting.

太有趣了。

I feel like as product people we're always making mistakes and we're always learning.

我觉得作为产品人员，我们总是会犯错误，但我们总是在学习。

Maybe I'll give an example from Airbnb since you and I were both there.

也许我会举一个 Airbnb 的例子，因为你和我都在那里。

Lenny: And this one does stand out to me.

莱尼：这个对我来说确实很突出。

So we're working on this concept called Airbnb Plus.

所以我们正在研究这个名为 Airbnb Plus 的概念。

If you took a step back, what we're really trying to do is to be like, "Hey, not everyone trusts Airbnb in terms of it's a platform.

如果你退一步，我们真正想做的是，“嘿，并不是每个人都信任 Airbnb 的平台。

It's not like it's managed inventory, it's not a hotel.

这不像是库存管理，也不是酒店。

How do you go in and really make sure that we're all the Airbnbs are meeting the quality bar?" But I do think we were very solution first, and I think we're also competitor afraid at the time.

您如何介入并真正确保我们所有的 Airbnb 都符合质量标准？”但我确实认为我们首先是解决方案，而且我认为我们当时也害怕竞争对手。

So it was during a time where there were managed marketplaces, there were the Saunders out there, and I think that as a company we're very much like, "Oh, look at this.

所以那是在一个有托管市场的时代，有桑德斯，我认为作为一家公司，我们非常喜欢，“哦，看看这个。

What are we going to do in the world of managed marketplaces?"

在托管市场领域我们要做什么？”

Lenny: And so we went really hard down the solution space.

Lenny：所以我们非常努力地探索解决方案。

We essentially were like, "Let's go inspect our inventory.

我们本质上是这样的，“让我们去检查一下我们的库存。

Let's actually try to manage our inventory more." And really what we should have done is taken a step back and be like, "What's the real problem?" The real problem is people want to know what they're getting themselves into.

让我们实际上尝试更多地管理我们的库存。”事实上，我们应该做的是退后一步，问“真正的问题是什么？”真正的问题是人们想知道自己正在陷入什么境地。

We need to represent the homes a lot better.

我们需要更好地代表家庭。

And I think the other piece here that's really important is what, as a company, is there strategic strength?

我认为这里真正重要的另一件事是，作为一家公司，是否有战略优势？

And what's in your wheelhouse?

你的驾驶室里有什么？

So for example, Airbnb, we weren't that strong in operations.

比如说Airbnb，我们的运营能力并不强。

We again, we're this platform with this marketplace.

我们再说一遍，我们是这个市场的平台。

And so if you don't have that muscle and then you're asking the company, the teams to essentially build it from the ground up, that's really, really difficult.

因此，如果你没有这样的能力，然后你要求公司、团队从头开始构建它，那真的非常困难。

Not to mention the unit economics.

更不用说单位经济效益了。

Are the unit economics actually going to work, even as you scale?

即使规模扩大，单位经济效益真的会发挥作用吗？

Lenny: Yeah, I feel like Airbnb Plus is an untold story that somebody should tell, and that could be its own podcast, I guess.

Lenny：是的，我觉得 Airbnb Plus 是一个不为人知的故事，应该有人讲述，我想这可能是它自己的播客。

Jiaona Zhang (JZ) (00:42:09): You and I can tell it.

张娇娜 (JZ) (00:42:09)：你和我都可以说出来。

Lenny: We could tell it.

莱尼：我们可以这么说。

This could be Airbnb Plus the hidden, the story.

这可能就是 Airbnb Plus 隐藏的故事。

As you said, the problem it was trying to solve was people don't really trust, they don't want to even consider Airbnb.

正如您所说，它试图解决的问题是人们并不真正信任，他们甚至不想考虑 Airbnb。

Like, "No, I don't want to stay in someone's home.

就像，“不，我不想住在别人家里。

I don't know what it'll be.

我不知道会是什么。

It's unpredictable." And so as an outsider, it felt like a really clever approach.

这是不可预测的。”因此，作为一个局外人，这感觉是一个非常聪明的方法。

We're going to get them, we're going to make sure they're awesome.

我们会得到他们，我们会确保他们很棒。

There's a minimum bar.

有一个最低限度。

And I guess this is the question is do you think it was just like this is never possible because we'll never make money as a business doing this, because we don't make that much booking and investing time, resources, sending people pillows, all that stuff is ever going to be economical.

我想问题是你是否认为这永远不可能，因为作为一家企业，我们永远不会赚钱，因为我们不会做那么多的预订和投资时间、资源，给人们送枕头，所有这些东西都是经济的。

Or do you think there was a path, and it was just not executed well?

或者你认为有一条路，只是执行得不好？

Jiaona Zhang (JZ) (00:42:51): I think there wasn't really a clear path.

Jiaona Zhang (JZ) (00:42:51)：我认为并没有一条明确的道路。

I think there was .

我认为有。

Exactly.

确切地。

And it was more just like if you understood, again, this is my point around unit economics, there are things where I think you have magical thinking around unit economics.

这更像是如果你再次理解，这就是我关于单位经济学的观点，我认为你对单位经济学有一些神奇的思考。

You're like, "Well, when we get to the scale of X, it's all going to work out.

你会说，“好吧，当我们达到 X 的规模时，一切都会成功。

We can make these things happen." I think you actually need to really make sure the unit economics work right at the beginning.

我们可以让这些事情发生。”我认为你实际上需要真正确保单位经济学从一开始就发挥作用。

So that is definitely one lesson.

所以这绝对是一课。

Lenny: And I think the other thing is, and going back to the spirit of what are you trying to achieve.

莱尼：我认为另一件事是，回到你想要实现的目标的精神上。

If you're trying to achieve this idea of really knowing the quality of the place, and for a platform like Airbnb, the right way to go about doing is through our reviews, through our guest reviews, which are essentially free as opposed to literally sending out inspectors.

如果您想实现真正了解房源质量的想法，对于像 Airbnb 这样的平台，正确的做法是通过我们的评论，通过我们的宾客评论，这些评论本质上是免费的，而不是直接派出检查员。

Lenny: And I think that the other things are if you can get signal on what are the things around quality that people care about?

莱尼：我认为其他的事情是，如果你能了解人们关心的质量问题是什么？

Is it cleaning?

是清洁吗？

Is it the, "Hey, I'm locked out." And I think that there are other solutions besides inspection that then get at that.

是不是“嘿，我被锁在外面了。”我认为除了检查之外还有其他解决方案可以解决这个问题。

So for example, it is actually cheaper to go send everyone a lockbox than to deploy an inspector and go look at your property, right?

举例来说，给每个人发送一个密码箱实际上比部署一名检查员去检查你的财产更便宜，对吗？

It is actually cheaper to maybe do a partnership with a bunch of cleaners in different local areas, and then get that as part of the feat as opposed to doing inspection.

实际上，与不同地区的一群清洁工建立合作伙伴关系，然后将其作为壮举的一部分，而不是进行检查，实际上更便宜。

Lenny: So again, it's really about what are you really trying to achieve?

莱尼：再说一次，这实际上是关于你真正想要实现的目标是什么？

What is the user problem in each of these areas, and can you target that problem with the particular listing that you're looking at?

每个领域的用户问题是什么？您能否针对您正在查看的特定列表来解决该问题？

And so yeah, I personally don't believe the unit economics ever would've really worked out.

所以，是的，我个人并不相信单位经济学会真正发挥作用。

I think we should have known that, or we should have dug into that more at the very beginning, and then to get very tailored instead of one blunt instrument to solve it all.

我认为我们应该知道这一点，或者我们应该从一开始就深入研究这一点，然后进行量身定制，而不是用一个生硬的工具来解决所有问题。

Hey, we're going to go inspect.

嘿嘿，我们要去检查一下。

It's like, what is the problem for this listing, and what's the best solution to fix that problem?

就像，这个列表有什么问题，解决这个问题的最佳解决方案是什么？

Lenny: Our second to last story is from Gina Gotthilf, who was an early growth leader at Duolingo.

Lenny：我们倒数第二个故事来自 Gina Gotthilf，她是 Duolingo 的早期增长领导者。

She's currently COO of Latitud, and this is her sharing a wide-ranging and important point about how everyone has both an A side and a B side to their career, and people often only share their A side.

她目前是 Latitud 的首席运营官，这是她分享的一个广泛且重要的观点，即每个人的职业生涯都有 A 面和 B 面，而人们往往只分享他们的 A 面。

So this is Gina sharing her B side.

这是吉娜分享她的 B 面。

Gina Gotthilf: We are very encouraged in our lives, especially professionally, to talk about our A side all the time because that's what impresses people.

Gina Gotthilf：我们在生活中，特别是在职业生涯中，经常被鼓励谈论我们的 A 面，因为这会给人们留下深刻的印象。

That's what opens doors, that's what allows us to keep growing, and it's so important.

这就是打开大门的原因，这就是让我们不断成长的原因，这非常重要。

So it means that a lot of what you hear in podcasts and on stage ends up being the Instagramable version of someone or a company or a country's trajectory.

因此，这意味着你在播客和舞台上听到的很多内容最终都会成为某人、一家公司或一个国家轨迹的 Instagram 版本。

It's just the highlights.

这只是亮点。

And when I talk about my A side, it's very impressive.

当我谈论我的 A 面时，令人印象深刻。

I did things like, we'll talk about, I met President Obama, I worked on the Mike Bloomberg presidential campaign.

我做了一些事情，比如我们会谈论的，我会见了奥巴马总统，我为迈克·布隆伯格总统竞选工作。

I helped Duolingo scale from three to 200 million users.

我帮助 Duolingo 将用户数量从 3 亿扩大到 2 亿。

I worked with Tumblr, helping them scale Latin America, Andreesen Horowitz invested in my company, etc.

我与 Tumblr 合作，帮助他们扩大拉丁美洲规模，Andreesen Horowitz 投资了我的公司，等等。

Gina Gotthilf: But between all of those highlights, there were so many B moments that get shoved under the rug because it's just easier for me and it's more impressive for others.

Gina Gotthilf：但是在所有这些亮点之间，有很多 B 时刻被隐藏起来，因为这对我来说更容易，对其他人来说更令人印象深刻。

But I really like to highlight those because I think that most of us have a lot of B moments every day, every week, every month, and every period of our lives.

但我真的很想强调这些，因为我认为我们大多数人每天、每周、每月以及生命中的每个时期都有很多 B 时刻。

And it's easy to think that things aren't just not going to work out for us because we're in one of those B moments if we don't recognize them as moments.

我们很容易认为，如果我们不认识到这些时刻，我们就处于 B 时刻之一，所以事情不会对我们有利。

Lenny: I love this concept.

莱尼：我喜欢这个概念。

We're going to talk as you expected about a lot of your A side stuff.

正如您所期望的那样，我们将讨论您的许多 A 方面的内容。

Is there any example of a B side story of your life that would be interesting to share?

您生活中有哪些有趣的 B 面故事可以分享吗？

Gina Gotthilf: Look, I think those are the most interesting because they're funny or ridiculous.

Gina Gotthilf：看，我认为这些是最有趣的，因为它们很有趣或可笑。

I had a lot of B sides, and I still do.

我有很多 B 面，现在仍然如此。

For example, I had no idea what I wanted to do.

例如，我不知道自己想做什么。

I actually wanted to be.

我其实也想成为。

I thought I wanted to be an actress.

我以为我想成为一名演员。

I either wanted to be that person in Sea World, who goes like this with a dolphin.

我要么想成为海洋世界中的那个人，像这样与海豚同行。

This is before Sea World was canceled.

这是在海洋世界取消之前。

Or I wanted to be an actress.

或者我想成为一名演员。

I applied to schools.

我申请了学校。

I didn't get into any Ivy League.

我没有进入任何常春藤盟校。

I didn't get into any of the top schools I wanted to go to.

我没有进入任何我想去的顶尖学校。

When I got to college, I actually ended up dropping out because I got so depressed, incredibly depressed, couldn't get out of bed depressed.

当我上大学时，我实际上最终退学了，因为我非常沮丧，非常沮丧，沮丧地无法起床。

Ironically, I dropped out of Reed College, which is the same college that Steve Jobs dropped out of.

具有讽刺意味的是，我从里德学院退学，史蒂夫·乔布斯也从这所大学退学。

So I was just destined for greatness.

所以我注定要成就伟大。

I knew it at that moment.

那一刻我就知道了。

Lenny: It all makes sense looking backwards, as he said.

莱尼：正如他所说，回顾过去，一切都是有道理的。

Gina Gotthilf: Totally.

吉娜·戈特希尔夫：完全可以。

I was dropping out, being like, "Yes, this is exactly the path." No, I was miserable.

我当时就退学了，心想：“是的，这正是我要走的路。”不，我很痛苦。

I thought there was no path forward.

我以为没有前进的路了。

And I finally went back and graduated.

我终于回去了并毕业了。

The college counselor looked at my curriculum and said, "What have you even done with your life?

大学辅导员看了我的课程并说：“你一生都做了什么？

There's nothing to show for." And it was shocking because I was always the overachiever who wants to do the maximum curriculum and ace all of my classes and do whatever.

没什么可炫耀的。”这令人震惊，因为我总是成绩优异的人，想要完成最大的课程并在所有课程中取得好成绩并做任何事情。

I did three diplomas in high school, the international, the American, the Brazilian.

我在高中获得了三个文凭：国际文凭、美国文凭、巴西文凭。

Gina Gotthilf: And so that for me, I think my one learning there that has stuck with me, and I think it can work for other people too, is that it's not just about doing things that actually matter and learning.

吉娜·戈蒂尔夫：所以对我来说，我认为我在那里学到的东西一直困扰着我，而且我认为它也对其他人有用，那就是它不仅仅是做真正重要的事情和学习。

It's about being able to tell the story, and it's about understanding what other people perceive as valuable.

这是关于能够讲述故事，并且是关于理解其他人认为有价值的东西。

I applied to a hundred companies.

我申请了一百家公司。

I didn't hear back from most of them.

我没有收到他们中大多数人的回复。

I finally got an internship at kind a tier B/C digital marketing agency in New York City because I wanted to live in New York so badly.

我终于在纽约市的一家 B/C 级数字营销机构获得了实习机会，因为我非常想住在纽约。

And they forgot to apply for my visa on time.

他们忘记按时申请我的签证。

So I lost my visa and had to go back to Brazil, and then I ended up leaving that organization to go work for another one.

所以我失去了签证，不得不返回巴西，然后我最终离​​开了那个组织，去另一个组织工作。

And I won't even go into the details of the shadiness of that company that I worked for, but then they ended up laying me off.

我什至不想详细介绍我工作过的那家公司的阴暗面，但他们最终解雇了我。

So I lost my visa again, had to go back home, found another opportunity, got fired that time.

所以我再次失去了签证，不得不回国，寻找另一个机会，那一次被解雇了。

So there was just a lot of rockiness in my start that I don't think you would imagine when you see someone up on stage leading a conference for 5,000 people.

因此，我一开始就经历了很多坎坷，当你看到有人在台上主持 5,000 人的会议时，我想你是无法想象的。

That I think is important.

我认为这很重要。

Gina Gotthilf: And even when I started working for Tumblr, I was like, "This is it.

Gina Gotthilf：甚至当我开始为 Tumblr 工作时，我就想，“就是这样了。

I made it.

我做到了。

This is a really interesting company.

这是一家非常有趣的公司。

This is going to work out." That was super rocky because it was an early stage startup.

这将会成功。”那是非常艰难的，因为它是一个早期阶段的初创公司。

So for example, they couldn't figure out how to wire money to Brazil.

例如，他们不知道如何将钱汇到巴西。

So I was not paid for six months.

所以我六个月没有拿到工资。

And at one point, me and my colleagues were trying to get money out of the teller to pay contractors because we had no money to pay them, and we borrowed money from people.

有一次，我和我的同事试图从出纳员那里拿钱来支付承包商的费用，因为我们没有钱支付他们，所以我们向人们借了钱。

And finally they also laid me off because they decided to sell to Yahoo.

最后他们也解雇了我，因为他们决定卖给雅虎。

Gina Gotthilf: And then I had to figure out what am I going to do?

Gina Gotthilf：然后我必须弄清楚我要做什么？

No one's going to hire me.

没有人会雇用我。

I've been fired and laid off so many times.

我已经被解雇和下岗很多次了。

So this is all before I started an agency to help US-based tech companies and startups grow in Latin America because I figured I was in this really great place to make that happen.

这一切都是在我成立一家机构来帮助美国科技公司和初创公司在拉丁美洲发展之前完成的，因为我认为我处于这个非常适合实现这一目标的地方。

And it eventually worked for, well-known companies such as Duolingo.

它最终适用于 Duolingo 等知名公司。

At the time they weren't well-known.

当时他们并不出名。

They were a tiny little startup.

他们是一家很小的初创公司。

They didn't have an Android app.

他们没有 Android 应用程序。

And that's how I started working with Duolingo because their head of marketing connected with someone they had worked with at Flickr and said, "I noticed Tumblr grew a lot in Brazil last year.

这就是我开始与 Duolingo 合作的原因，因为他们的营销主管与曾在 Flickr 共事过的人取得了联系，他说：“我注意到 Tumblr 去年在巴西增长了很多。

Can you recommend a company or an agency to help?" And they said, "This girl." And I was twenty-six.

您能推荐一家公司或机构来帮忙吗？”他们说：“这个女孩。”那年我二十六岁。

And so that's how they connected me with Duolingo.

这就是他们将我与 Duolingo 联系起来的方式。

And I started helping them grow in Brazil as a consultant.

我开始以顾问的身份帮助他们在巴西成长。

They were like, "This is great.

他们说：“这太棒了。

Can you help us grow in Chile, Argentina?" And I was like, "Yes." They were like, "How about Mexico?" And I was like, "Yes." Did I know anything about these places, Lenny?

你能帮助我们在智利、阿根廷发展吗？”我说：“是的。”他们说，“墨西哥怎么样？”我说：“是的。”我对这些地方了解吗，莱尼？

Did I know people there?

我认识那里的人吗？

No, but you can figure it out.

不，但你可以弄清楚。

Gina Gotthilf: And then they ended up asking me to come on full time, do that across the world, Japan, China, Korea, Turkey, Spain, France, et cetera.

Gina Gotthilf：然后他们最终要求我全职工作，在世界各地进行这项工作，日本、中国、韩国、土耳其、西班牙、法国等等。

And then to own growth, which ended up meaning communications, social media, government partnerships, anything to grow.

然后是自身的增长，这最终意味着通信、社交媒体、政府合作伙伴关系等任何方面的增长。

And then eventually became an A/B testing growth engine with engineers and PMs and designers of which I knew nothing about.

然后最终成为一个 A/B 测试增长引擎，工程师、PM 和设计师对此一无所知。

Gina Gotthilf: And even after that, I left Duolingo five years later, didn't know what to do with my life.

Gina Gotthilf：即使在那之后，五年后我离开了 Duolingo，也不知道该做什么。

You'd think, "Oh wow, you have it figured out now.

你会想：“哦，哇，你现在已经明白了。

You left Duolingo, you have the world in front of you." And I'm like, "Maybe I can finally go work for nonprofits," which is what I actually wanted to do in the first place.

你离开了 Duolingo，你的面前就有了世界。”我想，“也许我终于可以去非营利组织工作了，”这就是我最初想做的事情。

Tried a hand at that.

尝试了一下。

Had a couple of experiences before going to work for the Mike Bloomberg campaign.

在为迈克·布隆伯格竞选团队工作之前有过一些经历。

Gina Gotthilf: Working for the Mike Bloomberg campaign is impressive.

吉娜·戈蒂尔夫：为迈克·布隆伯格竞选团队工作令人印象深刻。

But you know what?

但你知道吗？

Mike Bloomberg didn't win.

迈克·布隆伯格没有获胜。

He's not the president.

他不是总统。

So that was not a successful campaign if you really look at it.

所以如果你仔细观察的话，这并不是一次成功的活动。

And yeah, Latitud seems like it's a really promising path, but there's A days and B days.

是的，Latitud 似乎是一条非常有前途的道路，但也有 A 天和 B 天。

So it's just a lot of that.

所以这只是很多。

And just staying resilient and believing in yourself and getting back on the horse when you fall on your face.

只要保持韧性，相信自己，当你摔倒时就能重新骑上马。

Lenny: Amazing.

莱尼：太棒了。

That's such an important message.

这是一个非常重要的信息。

I think one of the threads from what you're describing, something that I think about a lot is people kind of underestimate how long their career is.

我认为你所描述的线索之一，我经常思考的事情是人们有点低估了他们的职业生涯有多长。

There's just so much time to do stuff and for things to start to work.

有这么多的时间去做事情，让事情开始发挥作用。

This going to sound really fancy, but I think Marcus Aurelius has this quote about how our life is actually very long.

这听起来确实很奇特，但我认为马库斯·奥勒留有这样一句话来说明我们的生命实际上很长。

We just use it really badly and we just waste a lot of our time.

我们只是非常糟糕地使用它，并且浪费了很多时间。

Gina Gotthilf: I think you're so right, Lenny, and I love that because people are going around being like, "Life is short, life is short." But that's so true.

吉娜·戈蒂尔夫：我认为你是对的，莱尼，我喜欢这一点，因为人们总是说，“生命短暂，生命短暂。”但这是真的。

We waste so much time.

我们浪费了太多时间。

But also I think we don't recognize how much opportunity we have in front of us.

但我也认为我们没有意识到我们面前有多少机会。

And as a 26-year-old, I definitely thought my career was over.

作为一个 26 岁的人，我确实认为我的职业生涯已经结束了。

I was like, "I blew it." And looking back, it's funny.

我当时想，“我搞砸了。”现在回想起来，这很有趣。

Lenny: Yeah, I know exactly what you mean.

莱尼：是的，我完全明白你的意思。

I spent nine years at my first job at a random company in San Diego in a startup.

我的第一份工作是在圣地亚哥的一家初创公司工作了九年。

I was like, "What am I doing here so long?" And it turned out that was really useful for the thing I did next.

我当时想，“我在这里这么久做什么？”事实证明这对我接下来做的事情非常有用。

And then eventually, wow, things started to really take off.

最终，哇，事情开始真正起飞了。

So I think that's a really good lesson for people.

所以我认为这对人们来说是一个非常好的教训。

It's just a long time.

只是时间很长而已。

This is my fourth career.

这是我的第四个职业生涯。

I've switched careers many times.

我已经换过很多次职业了。

I was an engineer then.

那时我是一名工程师。

I was a founder.

我是一名创始人。

Then I was a product manager, and whatever this is.

然后我是一名产品经理，不管这是什么。

Whatever you call this thing.

不管你怎么称呼这个东西。

Gina Gotthilf: I guess me, too.

吉娜·戈特希尔夫：我想我也是。

I was an operator.

我是一名接线员。

I was a consultant.

我是一名顾问。

Well, I was an employee.

嗯，我是一名员工。

I was a consultant.

我是一名顾问。

Then I was an operator, which is a fancy way to say employee at a startup.

然后我是一名操作员，这是对初创公司员工的一种奇特说法。

And then now I'm a founder and a VC and an angel and whatever this is..

现在我是一名创始人、一名风投和一名天使，无论这是什么……

Lenny: Awesome.

莱尼：太棒了。

Awesome.

惊人的。

So I think that's a really important takeaways.

所以我认为这是一个非常重要的收获。

Just there's a lot of time to do stuff and don't stress if things aren't moving as fast as you want.

只是有很多时间去做事情，如果事情进展得没有你想要的那么快，也不要感到压力。

I'm curious, what's a mess-up or a big mistake maybe that you made or your teammate that was like, "Oh wow, that was a big waste of time."

我很好奇，你或你的队友可能犯了什么混乱或大错误，“哦，哇，那真是浪费时间。”

Gina Gotthilf: Yeah, look, a lot of things didn't work out.

Gina Gotthilf：是的，看，很多事情都没有成功。

More than 50% of our A/B tests didn't work out.

我们超过 50% 的 A/B 测试没有成功。

We made bets that didn't make sense.

我们下了没有意义的赌注。

I will say though, that in the spirit of A and B sides, I, and I think in general, we are really good at forgetting the B stuff.

不过我要说的是，本着 A 和 B 方面的精神，我认为总的来说，我们真的很擅长忘记 B 的东西。

I talk so much about all the stuff that worked that it's hard to remember all of those moments that didn't actually work.

我谈论了太多有用的东西，以至于很难记住所有那些实际上不起作用的时刻。

And the thing that I tend to talk about, which is this mistake that we made as the growth team is almost like one of those, when you get asked in an interview, what's your biggest weakness, and you're like, "I'm a perfectionist." It's like one of those things that actually makes you sound good because it's the story about how my team really wanted to implement badges.

我倾向于谈论的事情是，我们作为增长团队所犯的错误几乎就像其中之一，当你在面试中被问到你最大的弱点是什么时，你会说，“我是一个完美主义者。”这就像真正让你听起来不错的事情之一，因为这是关于我的团队如何真正想要实施徽章的故事。

We spent a lot of time playing all the games that were popular at the time, trying to understand how those gamification growth hacks that we could find in those apps would potentially overlay onto Duolingo and how we would do that.

我们花了很多时间玩当时流行的所有游戏，试图了解我们在这些应用程序中找到的游戏化增长技巧如何可能覆盖到 Duolingo 上，以及我们将如何做到这一点。

Gina Gotthilf: And badges was just pervasive in all of the top games.

Gina Gotthilf：徽章在所有顶级游戏中都很普遍。

And so it seemed like a no-brainer, but since we ranked all of our experiments in terms of ROI and return being like how many users we think we're going to get from this DAUs, and time investments, it never made sense to focus on this because we thought that the time sink would be too high.

这似乎是理所当然的事情，但由于我们根据投资回报率和回报对所有实验进行了排名，比如我们认为我们将从这个 DAU 中获得多少用户以及时间投资，因此专注于这一点从来没有意义，因为我们认为时间消耗太高。

So I actually ended up not letting the team run this experiment for six months so that we focused on lower hanging fruit.

因此，实际上我最终没有让团队进行六个月的实验，以便我们专注于容易实现的目标。

So that's a mistake on my end.

所以这是我的错误。

Gina Gotthilf: Then we decided to run this experiment in the most lean way possible.

Gina Gotthilf：然后我们决定以尽可能最精简的方式进行这个实验。

We're like, "You know what?

我们就像，“你知道吗？

There's MVEs.

有 MVE。

There's minimum viable experiments.

有最低限度可行的实验。

We don't have to run a whole badges thing.

我们不必运行整个徽章的事情。

We can just do something more simple and actually see if that leads to growth in an interesting way, and then we'll know."

我们可以做一些更简单的事情，看看这是否会以一种有趣的方式带来增长，然后我们就会知道。”

Gina Gotthilf: And we ran this very simple experiment that was like, you signed up and then you get a badge.

Gina Gotthilf：我们进行了这个非常简单的实验，就像，你注册了，然后你就会得到一个徽章。

And it was like this girl with a balloon.

就像这个拿着气球的女孩。

I don't know, she was happy or whatever.

我不知道，她是高兴还是怎样。

And of course in retrospect, it led to no results, because no one is proud of signing up.

当然，回想起来，这并没有带来任何结果，因为没有人为签约而感到自豪。

It's not an exciting moment, and you don't even have badges to collect.

这不是一个激动人心的时刻，而且你甚至没有徽章可以收集。

You can't show it to other people.

你不能把它展示给其他人。

None of the things that make badges compelling were there, but we were like, "Okay, well, we tested it didn't work." And then we moved on.

没有任何使徽章引人注目的东西在那里，但我们就像，“好吧，好吧，我们测试了它不起作用。”然后我们继续前进。

Gina Gotthilf: So we moved on for another, I don't know, eight months and we didn't look back.

吉娜·戈蒂尔夫：所以我们又过了八个月，我不知道，我们没有回头。

And then when we did look back, first of all at that point we discovered that we hadn't been dogfooding, which also was embarrassing.

然后当我们回顾过去时，首先我们发现我们并没有进行内部测试，这也很尴尬。

Looking back, we hadn't been dogfooding in the growth team.

回想起来，我们并没有在增长团队中进行测试。

We just come up with hypotheses.

我们只是提出假设。

We were super careful about prioritizing them and making sure that we were doing the best possible write ups and all these things.

我们非常小心地确定它们的优先顺序，并确保我们正在做最好的文章和所有这些事情。

But the dogfooding piece, I didn't come from a product background.

但就测试而言，我并没有产品背景。

I was a marketer and I didn't really understand the term dogfooding, but when we thought, we had a conversation, we were like, "You know what?

我是一名营销人员，我并不真正理解“dogfooding”这个词，但当我们思考时，我们进行了一次对话，我们就像，“你知道吗？

If we had just tested that, we would've all known that this was a super lame badge." And I was like, "Why are we not testing our experiments?" And so that became part of our practice.

如果我们刚刚测试过，我们都会知道这是一个超级蹩脚的徽章。”我当时想，“为什么我们不测试我们的实验呢？”所以这成为我们实践的一部分。

Gina Gotthilf: It's still relevant.

Gina Gotthilf：它仍然具有现实意义。

I just had a conversation yesterday with engineers at Latitud.

我昨天刚刚与 Latitud 的工程师进行了交谈。

I haven't explained what we built yet, where we're building it.

我还没有解释我们建造了什么，我们在哪里建造它。

Maybe we'll get there, but I was talking yesterday, at Latitud, and they're awesome.

也许我们会到达那里，但我昨天在 Latitud 说过，他们非常棒。

In terms of product team, we have the number eight employee at NewBank.

从产品团队来看，我们NewBank有第八名员工。

You might've heard of NewBank, but it's this massive banking fintech in Latin America.

您可能听说过 NewBank，但它是拉丁美洲的一家大型银行金融科技公司。

And we have people from other fintechs.

我们还有来自其他金融科技公司的人员。

And then we have this guy who was a lead PM at Twilio, and I was explaining to them why we should be dogfooding.

然后我们有一个人，他是 Twilio 的首席产品经理，我向他们解释为什么我们应该进行内部测试。

And they were all like, "Oh yeah, we should dogfood." It's just easy to forget stuff like that.

他们都说，“哦，是的，我们应该进行测试。”忘记这样的事情很容易。

Gina Gotthilf: So that was a mistake that we could have probably gotten to the growth that we got to with badges much earlier on.

Gina Gotthilf：所以这是一个错误，我们本来可以更早地通过徽章实现增长。

And not only did we get to growth with badges, but it became this amazing treasure trove of opportunity because once you have badges and people want them, you can now ask people to do anything.

我们不仅通过徽章实现了增长，而且它还成为了这个令人惊叹的机会宝库，因为一旦你拥有徽章并且人们想要它们，你现在可以要求人们做任何事情。

Go find friends, go buy things, whatever it is.

去找朋友，去买东西，不管是什么。

And so we impacted almost all metrics across the company positively, including some we hadn't expected, but it's easy to talk about a mistake that ended up being a win.

因此，我们对整个公司的几乎所有指标都产生了积极的影响，包括一些我们没有预料到的指标，但很容易谈论一个最终成为胜利的错误。

So that's why I compared it to the interview thing in the beginning.

所以这就是为什么我一开始就把它与采访的事情进行比较。

But we tried making Duolingo a social app really early on and failed.

但我们很早就尝试将 Duolingo 打造成一款社交应用，但失败了。

It was called Dual Duels.

这被称为双重决斗。

Dual Duels.

双决斗。

You could duel.

你可以决斗。

Gina Gotthilf: Yeah, I know we were clever, but people didn't use it and we didn't figure out why.

Gina Gotthilf：是的，我知道我们很聪明，但人们没有使用它，我们也不明白为什么。

We tried making a Duolingo for schools platform.

我们尝试为学校平台制作 Duolingo。

We couldn't get it to pick up.

我们没能把它接起来。

I went and watched dueling go in China and it got downloaded by a million people in the first day, and then the app got blocked because of the government, and then we couldn't figure out what to do.

我去中国看了《决斗》，第一天就有一百万人下载，然后这个应用程序因为政府的原因被屏蔽了，然后我们不知道该怎么办。

And then everyone rated the app like one star because it didn't work.

然后每个人都给这个应用程序评分为一颗星，因为它不起作用。

And so then we had a lot of trouble actually recovering from that.

因此，我们在真正从中恢复过来时遇到了很多麻烦。

We launched Duolingo in India and didn't realize because we couldn't have unless we went there, which we finally did, that most people set their phone UI in India to English, because typing in Hindi is hard.

我们在印度推出了 Duolingo，但没有意识到，因为除非我们去那里，否则我们无法做到这一点（我们最终做到了），大多数人在印度将手机用户界面设置为英语，因为输入印地语很困难。

And of course there's a lot of languages throughout India, and we were making it so that when you downloaded Duolingo, whatever UI you open your app, your phone was set to, we offered not that language for you to learn.

当然，印度各地有很多语言，我们这样做是为了当您下载 Duolingo 时，无论您打开应用程序的 UI、手机设置为什么，我们都不会提供那种语言供您学习。

That was your base language.

那是你的基本语言。

So we were telling people learn French, Spanish, German from English, and they were all trying to learn English, so they didn't find what they were looking for and they left.

所以我们告诉人们从英语学习法语、西班牙语、德语，他们都在努力学习英语，所以他们没有找到他们想要的东西，然后他们就离开了。

There were so many mistakes and luckily I think we were able to bounce back from most of them in terms of how Duolingo was doing today.

我们犯了很多错误，幸运的是，我认为就 Duolingo 今天的表现而言，我们能够从其中的大多数错误中恢复过来。

Lenny: And our final story is from Maggie Crowley VP of product at Toast, and one of the most beloved episodes of the podcast.

Lenny：我们的最后一个故事来自 Toast 产品副总裁 Maggie Crowley，也是该播客中最受欢迎的剧集之一。

This is Maggie sharing something a little bit different, her favorite interview question about failure and what it tells you about the person you're interviewing.

这是玛吉分享的一些有点不同的东西，她最喜欢的关于失败的面试问题以及它告诉你关于你正在面试的人的信息。

Plus a story of her own product failure.

再加上她自己的产品失败的故事。

Here's Maggie.

这是玛吉。

Maggie Crowley: A question I ask in every product interview is, what's the worst product you've ever shipped?

Maggie Crowley：我在每次产品采访中都会问的一个问题是，您发货过的最糟糕的产品是什么？

And that's because I don't think you're a good PM if you haven't shipped something that's really shitty.

那是因为如果你没有交付一些非常糟糕的东西，我认为你不是一个好的产品经理。

You just haven't had enough reps, you haven't done it enough times.

你只是没有做足够的次数，没有做足够的次数。

And it's not only that you've done it, but that you can admit it and which one it is.

而且这不仅是你已经做到了，而且是你能够承认它以及它是哪一件事。

That's so important.

这非常重要。

Maggie Crowley: I remember...

玛吉·克劳利：我记得……

It was so dumb.

太愚蠢了。

I'm still so mad about this that we did this.

我仍然对此感到非常生气，以至于我们这样做了。

I won't name which team, which company, I'm not going to call that out, but we decided we needed to do a rewrite red flag number one of existing product, and engineer who I'd worked with many times, we had a really good relationship and this person was like, "Yeah, yeah, it's going to take six months.

我不会透露哪个团队、哪家公司的名字，我不会指出这一点，但我们决定需要重写现有产品的第一个危险信号，以及与我合作过很多次的工程师，我们的关系非常好，这个人就像，“是的，是的，这将需要六个月的时间。

No problem." Core part of the product, been around for forever.

没问题。”产品的核心部分，永远存在。

One of those things that the code is still the code written by the founders kind of thing.

其中之一是代码仍然是创始人编写的代码之类的事情。

Maggie Crowley: It didn't take six months.

玛吉·克劳利：不需要六个月。

It took two and a half years.

花了两年半的时间。

It still wasn't done.

事情还没有完成。

It almost never...

几乎从来没有...

It went on for so much longer than it should have.

它持续的时间比应有的时间要长得多。

It took us forever to get to feature parody.

我们花了很长时间才开始模仿。

It was the worst project.

这是最糟糕的项目。

So many people rotated in and out of it.

这么多人轮流进进出出。

Everyone thought it was dumb.

大家都认为这是愚蠢的。

Sunk cost fallacy, just the worst.

沉没成本谬误，只是最糟糕的。

And it's because, A, we got arrogant and we thought we could do it.

这是因为，A，我们变得傲慢，我们认为我们能做到。

B, we skipped discovery.

B，我们跳过了发现。

We didn't really write a one pager.

我们并没有真正编写一个寻呼机。

We just went for it.

我们只是去追求它。

We didn't do enough technical and design research into what the requirements would actually have to be.

我们没有对实际需求进行足够的技术和设计研究。

And there you have it.

现在你就得到了它。

Lenny: And did not work out, or was it a huge success in the end and it changed the trajectory of the business?

莱尼：没有成功，还是最终取得了巨大成功并改变了业务发展轨迹？

Maggie Crowley: Absolutely not.

玛吉·克劳利：绝对不是。

But you know what?

但你知道吗？

I didn't get fired, so it's fine.

我没有被解雇，所以没关系。

Lenny: I feel like I've gone through those experiences and then three, four years later, it's like another...

莱尼：我觉得我已经经历了这些经历，然后三、四年后，这就像另一次……

Maybe this rewrite and redesign may work.

也许这种重写和重新设计可能有效。

We haven't updated this thing in a long time.

我们已经很久没有更新这个东西了。

Maggie Crowley: Just don't do it.

玛吉·克劳利：别这么做。

Don't rewrite.

不要重写。

If anyone ever tells you to do a rewrite, don't do it.

如果有人告诉您要重写，请不要这样做。

A side-by-side rewrite, nope.

并排重写，不。

Lenny: Yeah, I've never had...

莱尼：是的，我从来没有……

What I run into is once you get too far down a redesign slash rewrite, everyone's building in that new world, and then you launch, and experiment's negative, and then it's just like, "Oh, we just got to launch it.

我遇到的情况是，一旦你在重新设计斜线重写方面走得太远，每个人都在那个新世界中建设，然后你启动，实验结果是否定的，然后就像，“哦，我们必须启动它。

We're going to call it back.

我们将把它召回。

We're going to figure out how to get back to neutral someday."

有一天我们会想办法恢复到中立状态。”

Good times.: And that is a wrap.

美好时光：这就是总结。

I hope you enjoy these stories of failure.

我希望你喜欢这些失败的故事。

I want to give a huge special thank you to all of our amazing guests for being vulnerable and sharing these stories of failure in their career.

我要特别感谢我们所有出色的客人，感谢你们的脆弱，并分享了他们职业生涯中失败的故事。

I hope you leave this episode with a new perspective on how setbacks and challenges and failure can often be exactly what you need to get to the next step of your career or your life.

我希望您在结束本集时能够以新的视角认识到挫折、挑战和失败往往正是您迈向职业或生活下一步所需的东西。

If you've got a great story to tell about failure, I'd love to hear it.

如果你有一个关于失败的精彩故事，我很想听。

Leave a comment either on YouTube or on Lennysnewsletter.com or just DM me on Twitter.

请在 YouTube 或 Lennysnewsletter.com 上发表评论，或者在 Twitter 上私信我。

Or you could reach out at LennyRachitzky.com and click the big contact button.

或者您可以访问 LennyRachitzky.com 并单击大联系按钮。

Thank you for listening.

感谢您的聆听。

Bye, everyone.

再见，大家。